Blue Font Criminal Law Cases Syllabus of Atty Atienza

CRIMINAL LAW CASES (ATTY.
ATIENZA SYLLABUS)
PROPERTY OF JOHN PAUL SOTTO MAGUDDATU III
CRIMINAL LAW CASES

(SYLLABUS OF ATTY. ROLAND ATIENZA)
CASE ASSIGNMENT
BATUGAN, ILHAM - Inmates of NBP v. DOJ to Aristotle Valenzuela
v. People
MAGUDDATU, JOHN PAUL - People v. Jesusa Figueroa to People v.
Jesus Vargas
CARLOS, JESIMIEL - People v. Yusop Tadah to Batistis v. People
BALLESTEROS, THEO - Zafra v. People to People v. Roger Tulin
BONSOL, ANTOINETTE - People v. Maximo Dela Pena to Revelina
Limson v. Eugenio Juan Gonzales
PRUDENTE, MAICA - Union Bank v. People to Rios v. Sandiganbayan
NOMBRE, NOREEN - Brgy. Chairman Rodomiel Domingo v.
Ombudsman to People v. Garry Padilla and Francisco Bernas
CABANIT, JOSEPH - People v. Francisco Ejercito to People v.
Edilberto Norada
ORAZA, RON - People v. Felipe Mirandilla to Ariel Lim v. People
MIPANGA, IYAH - Anthony De Silva Cruz v. People to Medelarnaldo

Belen v. People
MAGUDDATU, JOHN PAUL - Noel Villanueva v. People to Jason

Ivler v. Judge San Pedro
NOMBRE, NOREEN - Venancio Sevilla v. People to Disini v. DOJ
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CRIMINAL LAW CASES (ATTY. ATIENZA SYLLABUS)
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ARTICLE 1-20 – GENERAL PRINCIPLES
WHAT IS CRIMINAL LAW; PENAL LAW; CRIME; FELONY; OFFENSE?
INMATES OF NEW BILIBID PRISON VS. DOJ SECRETARY

PONENTE: Peralta
TOPICS: Penal Law and Article 22
FACTS: On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No.
10592, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases is the legality of Section 4, Rule
1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592, which
states:
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new procedures
and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4
of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management, Screening and Evaluation
Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule, the grant of good conduct time
allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time allowance
for loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are likewise subject to the
management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC.
Petitioners and intervenors contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and
beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22
of the RPC.
ISSUE: WON the grant of good conduct time allowance (GCTA), time allowance for study,
teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) should be
given retroactive effect.
RULING: YES. Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however,
a penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he
is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception
on the effectivity of laws.
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which
are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched.
But what exactly is a penal law?
A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:
A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.

Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and
prescribing penalties for their violation.
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Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed
against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon. In
common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the term "penal statutes"
all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish penalties for their violation,
and even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their
commission.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural
rules. Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does not make it penal in
nature.
While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a
penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its
provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the
crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the
ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for
the application of Article 22 of the RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the
disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the
penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more
onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them of time off to which they
are justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending their sentence and increasing their
punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.
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THEORIES IN CRIMINAL LAW

MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA
ARNOLD JAMES YSIDORO VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Abad
TOPIC: Mala Prohibita Under RPC
FACTS: The Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte,
operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to
indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor
needed for construction. On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a,
Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason
that they had to find food for their families. Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge,
sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the
municipality‘s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished
children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its
storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained
could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to
seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed
the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.
Ysidoro was then charged of technical malversation under Article 220 of the RPC. Ysidoro
insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP
beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no
criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.
ISSUE: WON good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
RULING: NO. Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes
the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public
purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act
is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the
commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is
completely irrelevant. Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro‘s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the
amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court,
however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.
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JESTER MABUNOT VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Reyes
TOPIC: Mala in Se Under SPL
FACTS: Shiva and the petitioner were classmates. Shiva and her group were sewing inside the
classroom when the petitioner, who was then under the influence of alcohol, arrived. He boxed
Shiva on her left flank leaving the latter with a fractured rib. Shiva passed out and was
thereafter taken to Potia District Hospital, where she stayed for two days. Back then, Shiva was
14 years old, while the petitioner was 19. The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
ISSUE: WON criminal intent must be established.
RULING: YES. "When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are
deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent
must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed."
The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special
law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the
existence of a criminal intent on the part of the offender. In the petitioner's case, criminal
intent is not wanting. Even if the Court were to consider for argument's sake the petitioner's
claim that he had no design to harm Shiva, when he swang his arms, he was not performing a
lawful act. He clearly intended to injure another person.
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SUPPLETORY APPLICATION OF RPC PROVISIONS (ARTICLE 10) TO SPL
EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Austria-Martinez
TOPIC: Article 10; BP 22
FACTS: Spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga obtained three loans from complainant
Alfredo Oculam. The loans were guaranteed by three United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
checks issued by Adronico. The three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason
"CLOSED ACCOUNT." When the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite
repeated demands, Oculam filed a criminal complaint against them for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The RTC rendered a decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was granted. On the other hand,
petitioner brought the case to the CA, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable
for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg.
22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation
in the issuance thereof. The CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
ISSUE: WON conspiracy is applicable in violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
RULING: YES. Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the
provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the
RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the
RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC
provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Oculam did not specify the nature of petitioner‘s
involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct
inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act
that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued.
However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
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GOVERNING LAW (RPC, PD, EO, SPL, CA [ARTICLE 10])

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN PASSING PENAL LEGISLATION
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND CEFERINO S. PAREDES

PONENTE: Grino-Aquino
TOPIC: Ex Post Facto Law
FACTS: On January 1976, Paredes, who was then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur,
filed an application for a free patent which was granted. On October 1986, complaints for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) were filed against him. An
information was then filed in court. It was alleged that he misrepresented to the land inspector
that the land is disposable by a free patent when the accused well knew that the said land had
already been reserved for a school site. Paredes file motion to quash the information on the
ground of prescription of the crime charged (ten-year prescriptive period). The motion was
granted by the court.
ISSUE: WON the crime charged already prescribed.
RULING: YES. The date of the violation, for the purpose of computing the period of
prescription, would be the date of filing Paredes‘ application on January 21, 1976. The "crime"
prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Hence, the complaint, dated October 28,
1986, was filed late.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A.
No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given
retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for
it should be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the
shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential
element of the "crime" at the time he committed it. To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would
make it an ex post facto law for it would affect his situation to his disadvantage by making
him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing
when it was committed.
2. NULLA CRIMEN NULLA POENAL SINE LEGE
3. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL LAW
a. IN DUBIO PRO REO AND RULE OF LENITY

b. AMBIGUITY IN THE LAW
c. EQUIPOSE EVIDENCE RULE
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DUTY OF THE COURT (ARTICLE 5)
1. WHENEVER ACT IS NOT PENALIZED

2. EXCESSIVE PENALTY IMPOSED
LITO CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Injustice in Penalty
FACTS: Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy turned over to petitioner pieces of jewelry worth
₱98,000.00 to be sold by the latter. They agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the
sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired
without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When
private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay
the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus, an Information was filed
against petitioner for the crime of estafa. The RTC and CA found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
ISSUE: What is the duty of the court in case there is injustice in penalty?
RULING: There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that
the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount
of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court
cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.
What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes
cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power
of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without
any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any
act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition
of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense.
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which
is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the
proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
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the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that
a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked
to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation.
The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The
remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to
submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive,
this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
IRENEO CAHULUGAN VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe
TOPIC: Excessive Penalty
FACTS: Private complainant Tan, a businessman engaged in transporting Coca-Cola products,

instructed his truck driver and helper, Lopez and Lariosa, to deliver 210 cases of Coca-Cola
products worth P52,476.00 to Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that contrary to his
instructions, Lopez and Lariosa delivered the subject items to petitioner's store. Tan then went to
petitioner and informed him that the delivery to his store was a mistake and that he was pulling
out the subject items. However, petitioner refused, claiming that he bought the same from
Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not present any receipt evidencing such transaction. Tan
charged petitioner with the crime of fencing. The RTC and CA found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
ISSUE: What is the duty of the court in case of excessive penalty?
RULING: While PD 1612 penalizes those who acquire properties which are proceeds of
Robbery or Theft, its prescribed penalties are similar to the latter crime in that they are largely
dependent on the value of the said properties. In fact, a reading of Section 3 of PD 1612 and
Article 309 of the RPC (which provides for the prescribed penalties for the crime of Theft)
reveals that both provisions use the same graduations of property value to determine the
prescribed penalty. However, with the recent enactment of Republic Act No. 10951, which
adjusted the values of the property and damage on which various penalties are based,
taking into consideration the present value of money, as opposed to its archaic values when
the RPC was enacted in 1932, the graduation of values in Article 309 was substantially
amended, without any concomitant adjustment for PD 1612. This development would then
result in instances where a Fence, which is theoretically a mere accessory to the crime of
Robbery/Theft, will be punished more severely than the principal of such latter crimes.
This incongruence in penalties therefore, impels an adjustment of penalties.
However, while it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation. As
the Court remains mindful of the fact that the determination of penalties is a policy matter that
belongs to the legislative branch of the government, it finds it prudent to instead, furnish both
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Houses of Congress, as well as the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Department of Justice, pursuant to Article 5 of the RPC, copies of this ruling in order to alert
them on the aforestated incongruence of penalties, all with the hope of arriving at the proper
solution to this predicament.
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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTIONS
1. GENERALITY (ARTICLE 14, NCC)
JEFFREY LIANG VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago
TOPIC: Diplomatic Immunity
FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). For
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
with two counts of grave oral defamation. The DFA issued an "office of protocol" stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the
country.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is covered by immunity under the Agreement.
RULING: NO. Section 45 of the Agreement provides: Officers and staff of the Bank including
for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall
enjoy the following privileges and immunities: a.) immunity from legal process with respect to
acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The
imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of
his authority or jurisdiction.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner
is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an
action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in
the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission
of a crime is not part of official duty.
MINUCHER VS. CA
PONENTE: Vitug
TOPIC: State Agent
FACTS: An Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also
known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher
and one Abbas Torabian. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the
Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity
of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were
accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo. The Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino
rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.
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Minucher then filed civil case for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-
up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE: WON Scalzo was entitled to immunity.
RULING: YES. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers
who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted
beyond the scope of his official function or duties. This Court is constrained to rule that
respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by
the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the
drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
NOLLORA JR. VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Carpio
TOPIC: Preferential Application; Bigamy
FACTS: Atilano Nollora, Jr. was legally married to Jesusa Pinat Nollora. While said marriage
was still subsisting, Nollora contracted a second marriage with Rowena Greraldino. An
information for bigamy was then filed. Accused Nollora admitted having contracted two
marriages. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert even before he contracted the
first marriage with Jesusa. As a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives
as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
ISSUE: WON Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
RULING: YES. The marriage certificate of Nollora and Pinat‘s marriage states that Nollora and
Pinat were married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the
IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate of Nollora and Geraldino‘s
marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were married at Max‘s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, Metro Manila. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.
Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages, Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance
with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim
law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu
of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora‘s religious affiliation is not an issue
here. Neither is the claim that Nollora‘s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law.
Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the
crime of bigamy.
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Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single."
Moreover, both of Nollora‘s marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the
truth or falsehood of the declaration of one‘s religion in the marriage certificate is not an
essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora‘s liability for
bigamy. Nollora‘s false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these
omissions.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

PONENTE: Puno
TOPIC: Presidential Immunity
FACTS: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of
his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for the
resignation of the petitioner filled the air.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: WON petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
RULING: NO. We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a
non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.
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2. TERRITORIALITY (ARTICLE 2, RPC)
DEL SOCORRO VS. VAN WILSEM

PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Territoriality
FACTS: Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
Since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to
the son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. To date, all the parties,
including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter. Petitioner filed a complaint affidavit against respondent
for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter‘s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner.
ISSUE: WON Van Wilsem can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262.
RULING: YES. Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find
strength in petitioner‘s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article
14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and
those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in
refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the
parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent.
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3. PROSPECTIVITY (ARTICLE 22, RPC)
AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND DECRIMINALIZATION OF AN ACT
INMATES OF NEW BILIBID PRISON VS. DOJ SECRETARY

PONENTE: Peralta
TOPICS: Penal Law and Article 22
FACTS: On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No.
10592, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases is the legality of Section 4, Rule
1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592, which
states:
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new procedures
and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4
of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management, Screening and Evaluation
Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule, the grant of good conduct time
allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time allowance
for loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are likewise subject to the
management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC.
Petitioners and intervenors contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and
beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22
of the RPC.
ISSUE: WON the grant of good conduct time allowance (GCTA), time allowance for study,
teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) should be
given retroactive effect.
RULING: YES. Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however,
a penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he
is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception
on the effectivity of laws.
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which
are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched.
But what exactly is a penal law?
A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:
A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.

Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and
prescribing penalties for their violation.
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Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed
against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon. In
common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the term "penal statutes"
all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish penalties for their violation,
and even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their
commission.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural
rules. Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does not make it penal in
nature.
While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a
penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its
provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the
crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the
ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for
the application of Article 22 of the RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the
disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the
penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more
onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them of time off to which they
are justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending their sentence and increasing their
punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.
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CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES
1. INTENTIONAL AND CULPABLE; ELEMENTS
a. INTELLIGENCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION (VOLUNTARINESS)

ACTUM NON FACIT REUM, NISI MENS SIT REA
b. INTENT AND NEGLIGENCE
MIRANDA VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Reyes
TOPIC: Factors to Determine Intent to Kill
FACTS: Victim Pilo and his friend Damaso passed by the house of Miranda and threw stones at
the latter's home. While Pilo was on his way home, Miranda suddenly went outside and started
hacking Pilo. He hit Pilo's right forehead. Again, Miranda tried to hit Pilo, but the latter parried
the attack with his left arm. In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him.
Thereafter, Damaso grabbed possession of the bolo. The RTC and the CA rendered a Decision
finding Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution proved the guilt of Miranda for frustrated homicide beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING: YES. It bears stressing that the main element in frustrated homicide is the accused's
intent to take his victim's life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to
exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is
discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, such as the acts and conduct of the
accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. Likewise, such homicidal intent
may be inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used, and the nature, location,
and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.
In fact, in De Guzman, Jr. v. People, the Court, quoting Rivera v. People, enumerated the factors
that determine the presence of intent to kill, to wit: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2)
the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.
In the case at bar, Miranda's intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of
wounds sustained by Pilo. The records show that Miranda used a bolo measuring 1 ½ feet. The
hacking wound was about five inches long, and 1 inch deep fracturing Pilo's skull in the parietal
area. Relentless in his attack, Miranda continuously made several thrusts against Pilo, while the
latter was already sprawled on the ground. This caused Pilo to sustain two additional wounds.
These deep gashes measured four inches long by one-inch deep, and 1.5 inch long by one-inch
deep in Pilo's forearm. In fact, these continuous attacks were stopped only when Damaso arrived
and grappled with the weapon. Undoubtedly, the manner of attack and the injuries sustained
show forth a clear resolve to end Pilo's life. Indeed, these injuries cannot simply be brushed aside
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as grazing injuries, especially considering that one of which, was an injury to the head of Pilo,
which may have caused the latter's untimely demise, if not for the timely medical assistance.
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c. INTENT AND MOTIVE (VARIANCE IN FELONY)
d. INTELLIGENCE AND DISCERNMENT
2. GRAVITY (ARTICLE 9, 25-26)
3. STAGES OF EXECUTION (SUBJECTIVE PHASE AND OBJECTIVE PHASE)
PEOPLE VS. LAMAHANG

PONENTE: Recto
TOPIC: Overt Act, Vague Intent
FACTS: Policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes
streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar
on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At that time the owner of
the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded
in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up,
who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody. The court rendered a decision finding
Lamahang guilty of attempted robbery.
ISSUE: WON Lamahang should be convicted of attempted robbery.
RULING: NO. It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code
punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its
realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its
nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the
Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter
Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make
on the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman
Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for
the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere
beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical
and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will
develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that
said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order
that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may
be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly
intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to
another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the
accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the decision, that
the accused on the day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of
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Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to
enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he
succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit
any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding. In view of the
foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under consideration does not constitute
attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling.
CRUZ VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Bersamin
TOPIC: Attempted Art. 266-A vs. Art. 336
FACTS: Petitoner Norberto Cruz and his wife were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and
glass wares. They employed AAA to help them in selling their wares. One day, AAA went to
sleep. AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was
mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her
clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she‘ll be killed.
AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears.
She fought back and kicked Norberto twice. Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires.
Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell the incident to her mother otherwise, she will
be killed.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner‘s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they faced each
other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted
attempted rape.
RULING: NO. It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offender‘s intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female
is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is
committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent
to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
The information charged that the petitioner "removed her panty and underwear and laid on top of
said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the
information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was
guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her
vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence
showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her
deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness
and lust for her.
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4. FORMAL, MATERIAL, AND CRIMES WITHOUT FRUSTRATED STAGE
PEOPLE VS. BEJIM

PONENTE: Del Castillo
TOPIC: Consummated Rape
FACTS: Appellant was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, with seven counts of
statutory rape under seven separate Informations. The victims were AAA, BBB and CCC. The
RTC convicted him of the crime charged which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: What were the crimes committed by Bejim?
RULING: Appellant Noel Bejim y Romero is found GUILTY of:
1. Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 in Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR- 6765, 07-CR-6766,
07-CR-6767, 07-CR-6769 and 07-CR-6770
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat or
intimidation or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented. Where the victim is below 12
years old, the only subject of inquiry is whether ''carnal knowledge" took place. Carnal
knowledge is "the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a
woman". There must be proof that his penis touched the labias of the victims or slid into
their female organs and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to produce a
conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.
The revelations of "AAA'' and "BBB" show that the evidence adduced by the prosecution did not
conclusively establish the element of carnal knowledge. In the aforementioned cases, there is no
categorical proof of entrance or introduction of appellant's male organ into the labia of
the pudendum of "AAA." Neither is there evidence to show that appellant made an attempt to
penetrate "AAA's" vagina. The prosecution‘s evidence lacks definite details regarding penile
penetration. On the contrary, "AAA'' and "'BBB" stated that appellant merely "brushed or
rubbed" his penis on their respective private organs. While "BBB" testified that appellant
tried to insert his penis into her vagina, she nevertheless failed to state for the record that
there was the slightest penetration into it. What is clear on record is that appellant merely
brushed it.
The Court held in People v. Butiong that ''the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus,
a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not
sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either the labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness."
Given the foregoing and since there is neither clear showing or direct proof of penile penetration
or that appellant's penis made contact with the labias of the victims, which is an essential
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element of the crime of rape, we cannot sustain appellant's conviction for the crime of rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6765; 07-CR-6766; 07-CR-6767; 07-CR-6769 and 07-CR-6770.
However, appellant can be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610, which was the
offense proved though he was charged with rape through sexual intercourse in relation to RA
7610, applying the variance doctrine under Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC in relation to Section 5 of RA 7610, which was the offense proved is included in rape,
the offense charged.
The essential elements of sexual abuse under Section S(b) of RA 7 610 are as follows: (l) The
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) The said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) The
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
On the other hand, the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are as
follows: (1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) That it is done
under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) Where the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
All the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of RA 7 610 were sufficiently established in the afore-numbered cases. Specifically,
appellant committed lasciviousness when he poured cooking oil on the victims' private organ and
rubbed them with his penis. The victims were under 12 years of age as established by their
respective birth certificate and therefore way below 18 years of age. They were subjected to
"other sexual abuse" as required under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. "A child is deemed subjected to
'other sexual abuse' when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult." There is coercion or influence when there is some form of compulsion
equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. In the
present cases, the victims were sexually abused as they were coerced, influenced, threatened and
intimidated by appellant.
2. Statutory Rape in Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6768 and 07-CR-6771
In Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6768 and 07-CR-6771, there was a slight penetration on "CCC's"
genitalia. "CCC'' positively testified that appellant's penis indeed touched her vagina. That
appellant's penis was not inserted enough only indicates that he was able to penetrate her even
partially. Anyway, complete penetration is not required to consummate the crime of rape. "Full
penile penetration is not a consummating ingredient in the crime of rape."
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PEOPLE VS. ORITA

PONENTE: Medialdea
TOPIC: Attempted Rape
FACTS: Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student. Appellant Orita
was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier. The rape incident happened in Cristina‘s boarding
house. Orita was a frequent visitor of another boarder. With his left arm wrapped around
Cristina‘s neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, Orita dragged complainant up
the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With the
Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room. Upon entering the room,
appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife,
appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she
took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty.
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis
and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her.
At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his
penis entered her as she kept on moving. Orita then lay down on his back and commanded
her to mount him. In this position, only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her
vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Still naked, Cristina
managed to escape and sought help. Orita was convicted of the crime of frustrated rape.
ISSUE: WON the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape.
RULING: NO. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the
essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by
the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the
felony is consummated. In a long line of cases, we have set the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily,
rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of
execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of
rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can
ever be committed. In this case, the victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if
only partially hence Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
VALENZUELA VS. PEOPLE

PONENTE: Tinga
TOPIC: Theft
FACTS: The case stems from an Information charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy
Calderon with the crime of theft. Petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale
Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a
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security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago
saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching
Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand.
Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner
then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of
Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner
for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but
Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and
Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. The RTC
and CA convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Petitioner
argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended,
he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.
ISSUE: WON petitioner‘s conviction should be upheld.
RULING: YES. For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in
the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be
all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is
immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of
execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation
from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is
reflected in Chief Justice Aquino‘s commentaries, as earlier cited, that "[i]n theft or robbery the
crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to
appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated."
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete
from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity
to dispose of the same. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen
property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to
possession upon the completion of the taking. We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal
Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JESUSA FIGUEROA y

CORONADO, Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
SALE OF DRUGS
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FACTS: A team was formed to conduct the buy-bust operation, with PO3 CALLORA
designated as the poseur-buyer. The team proceeded to the agreed meeting place. PO3
CALLORA and the informant waited for accused-appellant FIGUEROA, who after a few
minutes, arrived driving a Toyota Revo with Plate No. XPN 433. Seeing the two, accused-
appellant FIGUEROA waived at them and drove towards them. Stopping near them, accused-
appellant FIGUEROA rolled down the window of her car and asked where the money was. On
the other hand, PO3 CALLORA asked for the shabu. At that juncture, accused-appellant
FIGUEROA opened a Chowking plastic bag and showed a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance. When PO3 CALLORA was about to hand over the buy-bust money to
accused-appellant FIGUEROA, the latter sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so
she sped away towards the direction of Kalayaan Avenue and C-5 road where the accused‘s
vehicle was finally blocked.
The accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado alias "Baby" is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of violation of Sec. 26, Art. II, RA 9165 by the lower court. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF SECTION 26, ARTILCE II,
RA 9165 OR ATTEMPT TO SELL DANGEROUS DRUGS. YES
HELD: The attempt to sell was already clear from accused-appellant‘s actuations which were all
within the personal knowledge of PO3 Callora and testified to by him, to wit: (1) when accused-
appellant arrived at the scene, she waived at the informant and PO3 Callora and approached them
while driving her Toyota Revo;20 (2) upon reaching PO3 Callora and the informant, accused-
appellant asked PO3 Callora where the money was, while the latter asked for the shabu; 21 (3)
accused-appellant showed PO3 Callora a Chowking plastic bag containing a sachet of white
crystalline substance;22 (4) when PO3 Callora was about to give her the money, accused-
appellant sensed that there were police officers around the area, and drove away; (5) PO3 Callora
and the informant boarded the car of PS/Insp. Garcia, and they chased her to C-5 Road corner
Kalayaan Avenue.
Under the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the offender
commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. This definition has essentially been adopted by this Court in interpreting
Section 26 of Republic Act No. 9165. Thus in People v. Laylo, we affirmed the conviction of the
appellant therein and held that the attempt to sell shabu was shown by the overt act of appellant
therein of showing the substance to the poseur-buyer. In said case, the sale was aborted when the
police officers identified themselves and placed appellant under arrest.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN,

defendant-appellant..
TORRES, J.:
FRUSTRATED ARSON
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FACTS: Between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning of April 28th of this year, when M. D. Lewin
was absent from the house in which he was living his family, at No. 328, San Rafael Street, San
Miguel, Mrs. Auckback, who appears to have been a resident of the neighborhood, called Mrs.
Lewin and told her that much smoke was issuing from the lower floor of the latter's house, for
until then Mrs. Lewin had not noticed it, and as soon as her attention was brought to the fact she
ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for the fire, as he did and he found, soaked with
kerosene oil and placed between a post of the house and a partition of the entresol, a piece of a
jute sack and a rag which were burning. At that moment the defendant Valdes was in the
entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED FRUSTRATED ARSON.

YES
HELD: The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed
beside an upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the
burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an
occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it.. This crime of provided for and punished by
article 549, in connection with articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code, and the sole
proven perpetrator of the same by direct participation is the defendant Severino Valdes, for,
notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated exculpations, the record discloses conclusive
proof that it was he who committed the said unlawful act, as it was also he who was guilty of
having set the other fires that occurred in said house.
The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts
conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of his will,
the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be
classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that no
part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag,
soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition might have
started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.
G.R. No. 100699 July 5, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR GUTIERREZ y

CORTEZ, accused-appellant.
VITUG, J.:
CONSUMMATED ARSON
FACTS: A "fight" between appellant and a son of one Mario Alano had transpired in the
evening of 14 December 1989. Later that evening, while Enriquez (a brangay tanod) and
appellant's brother Eric and sister Bolet were conversing at the corner of Rajah Soliman and
Makabalo Streets about the incident, appellant passed by carrying a bag containing what seemed
to be "gasoline‖. Enriquez followed appellant. A few meters away, he saw appellant throw the
bag at the house of Mario Alano and then lit it. Instantly, the wall was aflame. Forthwith,
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Enriquez saw Mario Alano pouring water on the ablaze portion of the house. Neighbors rushed
in to help put the fire under control.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME OF ARSON COMMITTED BY THE

APPELLANT WAS CONSUMMATED. YES
HELD: The information charges appellant with "'violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the
particular provision breached. The information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt
house is inhabited, and not having been established that the house is situated in a populated or
congested area, appellant should be deemed to have only been charged with plain arson under
Section 1 of the decree. Kalookan City might be a densely populated part of the metropolis but
its entire territory cannot be said to be congested. Although the whole 2-storey wood and
galvanized iron house has not been completely gutted by the fire, the crime committed is still
consummated arson. It is enough that a portion thereof is shown to have been destroyed. Under
Section 1 of the decree, the offense of simple arson committed is punishable by prision mayor.
The Court feels that the trial court should not have appreciated the "special" aggravating
circumstance, under Section 4(3) of the decree, of the offender having been "motivated by spite
or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned." The prosecution does not
dispute the mauling of appellant by a son of Mario Alano just a few hours before the incident. It
would appear to us to be more of impulse, heat of anger or risen temper, rather than real spite or
hatred, that has impelled appellant to give vent to his wounded ego.
G.R. No. L-62439 October 23, 1984
GREGORY JAMES POZAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL; NO FRUSTRATED STAGE
FACTS: After filing an application for probation and submitting all the requirements needed in
his probation, the appellant (Pozar) had an occasion to see the Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo
Ocampo, and in that meeting, aside from the fact that he was asking permission from the
Probation Officer to go to Baguio, the Probation Officer required him to furnish the Probation
Office the xerox copy of his visa, and his I.D. picture, inasmuch as it was explained to him these
were needed, he being a foreigner. Days later, the appellant went to the Probation Office looking
for the Probation Officer, and when the Probation Officer was not there, he handed to Mr.
Manalo (a clerk of the Probation Office) an envelope address to the Probation Of officer and
asked and requested Mr. Manalo to give the same to Mr. Ocampo. When Mr. Manalo handed the
envelope given by Mr. Pozar to Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and when Danilo Ocampo opened it in the
presence of Mr. Manalo, he found enclose in the envelope a xerox copy of the applicant's
passport, xerox copy of his visa, and attached also with the same document was a one hundred
peso bill. It would seem that Mr. Ocampo asked Mr. Manalo to keep the one hundred peso bill
and return it to Mr. Pozar, but when Mr. Pozar did not arrive to the office, Mr. Manalo gave it
back to Mr. Ocampo Mr. Danilo Ocampo kept the one hundred peso bill but made it a point that
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this incident regarding the receiving of the one hundred peso being be included in the post-
sentence investigation report which was being prepared.
The evidence for the defense is that the one hundred peso bill the accused-appellant placed in the
envelope delivered to the Probation Officer was allegedly intended to take care of the expenses
in the xerox copying or reproduction of documents that may be needed by the Probation Office.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the offense of Corruption of a Public Official as
charged in the Information and pursuant to Article 212, in relation to Article 211 of the Revised
Penal Code.
ISSUES:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY OF CONSUMMATED CORRUPTION OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL. YES
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION HAS ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ONE HUNDRED PESO BILL WAS GIVEN TO
BRIBE AND CORRUPT THE CITY PROBATION OFFICER. NO
HELD:
(1) The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of Corruption of Public
Official as consummated offense (which is affirmed by the respondent appellant court)
for it is clear from the evidence of the prosecution as recited in both decisions of the trial
and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer did not accept the one
hundred peso bill. Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public official.
(2) We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's application for
probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut
And since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules
and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not confused
so that his act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever documentation was
needed further to complete and thus hasten his probation application, was understandably
innocent and not criminal. In fine, the facts and circumstances on record amply justify
and support the claim of the defense as against the conjectures, speculation and
supposition recited in the decision of the trial court and quoted with approval in the
appealed decision under review. The Government's own evidence as indicated in the
Post-Sentence Investigation Report that the giving of the one hundred pesos ( P100.00)
was done in good faith, is vital for it belies petitioner's criminal intent. There being no
criminal intent to corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to
acquittal of the crime charged.
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WHO INCURS CRIMINAL LIABILITY? (ARTICLE 4, 10)
1. CRIME COMMITTED DIFFERENT FROM INTENTION
G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015
GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
ARTICLE 49 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
FACTS: According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), he heard a commotion.

Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already
sprawled on the ground. While in that position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after
which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood
up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro
was taken to the hospital. Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against
the doctor's orders and eventually, died the next day.
Wacoy and Quibac were found guilty of the crime of homicide.
Wacoy contended that in view of their intent only to inflict slight physical injuries on Aro, they
should only be meted the corresponding penalty therefore in its maximum period, pursuant to
Article 49 of the RPC.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 49 IS APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. NO
HELD: Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is
different from that intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different from that
which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed.
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to
the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter
shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is
different from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in
personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result
from his felonious act (praeter intentionem), as in this case. It is well-settled that if the victim
dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In
such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes
of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the
unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.
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Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period
due to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong under Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and Quibac, as correctly appreciated
by the CA. In determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since
intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the accused's intention must be
judged by his conduct and external overt acts. In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance
is available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from
kicking and punching Aro on the stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the
purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.
G.R. No. 205228 July 15, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. ROLLY ADRIANO y

SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO y DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE
AND PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
TREACHERY IN ABERRATIO ICTUS
FACTS: POI Garabiles and P02 Santos, in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road. While they were at
Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla (Corolla), heading
towards the same direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV.
When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot
the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4)
armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who
was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing
near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet.
Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds. During the investigation, the
police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera).
Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is
one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business, which he leased to Adriano.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT TREACHERY MAY BE APPRECIATED IN ABERRATIO

ICTUS. YES
HELD: Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the
unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no
intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's
death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was killed by a stray
a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan
under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which
imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and
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logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's intention to
shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan's death caused by the bullet fired by
Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against
Cabiedes.
Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora, where the Court ruled that treachery may be
appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of
murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed
by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus,
we follow the Flora doctrine.
G.R. No. 206227
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. STANLEY BUENAMER

STANLEY BUENAMER y MANDANE, Accused-Appellant
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
PRAETER INTENTIONEM
FACTS: A hold-up was announced by Buenamer and Lambada in an FX taxi. The armed duo
demanded for the wallets, cellphones, and other valuables of the FX passengers. The now
deceased Ferrarie Tan (Ferrarie), who was then wearing a nurse's uniform, crying and pleading to
robbers that he had already given to them his cellphone, a Sony PSP, and that he was only a
student. Nevertheless, the armed robbers proceeded to divest, as indeed they divested, the
passengers of their personal effects.
When the FX stopped at an intersection, one of the passengers quickly got off the FX and
shouted for help. Traffic enforcers and bystanders heard her shout and plea for assistance, and at
once chased after Buenamer; and Lambada who had boarded a red jeepney. Ferrarie was holding
on to the estribo (the handle bar) of the jeepney, his hands reaching inside the front seat of the
jeepney, trying to regain possession of his Sony PSP, cellphone and other valuables from
Buenamer who was then sitting in front of the jeepney, near the driver. Buenamer strike or box
Ferrarie, causing Ferrarie to fall off; and that after Ferrarie fell off, the jeepney's rear tire ran over
Ferrarie.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH

HOMICIDE INSTEAD OF ROBBERY ONLY. YES
HELD: We hold that both the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide. Indeed, we are satisfied that in this case
the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish the elements of robbery with homicide, to wit:
(1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
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(2) The property taken belongs to another;
(3) The taking is with animo lucrandi; and
(4) By reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
Anent appellant's claim that the CA erred in not appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, this Court agrees
with the CA that this mitigating circumstance cannot be invoked by the appellant. "This
mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment
when the offender executes or commits the criminal act"9 - an intention that must comport,
amongst others, with the weapon‘s used by the: offender and the mode of attack adopted by the
latter, vis-a-vis the injuries sustained by his victim. Thus, in People v. Gonzalez, Jr.,10 we
explained- ,
[t]his mitigating circumstances is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means
employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of
the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the
mode of attack employed, and the injury sustained by the victim.
Here, the records showed that Buenamer boxed or struck Ferrarie with such force that the latter
lost his grip on the estribo or handle bar of the vehicle, fell off and run over by the vehicle's rear
tire. He subsequently died. The legal postulate enshrined under Article 3 of the RPC decrees that
every person shall be held responsible for all the natural and logical consequences of his
felonious act And, complementing this Article 3 is Article 4 of the same RPC, which provides
that "criminal liability shall be incurred (1) by any person committing a felony, although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." These two articles of the RPC must
thus apply with implacable force against appellant; he must be called to account for all the
natural and logical consequences of his felonious act; and hence must be deemed to have
incurred criminal liability, although the felonious act he committed might have been different
from that which he intended.
G.R. No. 116524 January 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, vs. LYNDON FLORES y

MALARAYAP, accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
PRAETER INTENTIONEM
FACTS: Manuel Lazarte alias Ato was kicked by Lyndon Flores alias Jojo (accused). Ato was
then opposite Rustico Malvar's house lying on the pavement seven arms length from him dead
drunk. The accused hit Ato Lazarte at his stomach twice with the use of the right foot with
Topsider leather shoes.
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It was relayed that on that noon Ato's mother Emperatriz Lazarte had an altercation with the
accused due to a cassette belonging to the former. Emperatriz lost her cassette and was able to
trace it at Salvo's Pawnshop pawned by the accused in his name. When Mrs. Salvo refused to
give it back she redeemed it for P20.00 and instructed Mrs. Salvo to inform anybody who will
complain to see her. Confronting the accused, exchange of words ensued which made Lyndon
mad. Accused Lyndon turned to her son and lacked him three times then pulled him by the shirt
lifting his son then left him fall. She got nervous because she heard the head hit the pavement.
Ato Lazarte was brought to the hospital that Sunday afternoon and died in the evening of the
following day, Monday.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED WAS

MURDER AND NOT MERELY HOMICIDE. YES.
HELD: The evidence clearly establishes the fact that the victim was totally unconscious, dead
drunk, lying on the pavement, when accused-appellant administered strong, vicious, and as borne
out later, killing kicks at the belly of the victim. Totally unconscious at the time of the attack, the
victim could not have put up any defense whatsoever against the sudden assault by the accused-
appellant. Unquestionably, the attack was characterized by treachery. An attack upon an
unconscious victim who could not have put up any defense whatsoever is treacherous. There was
absolutely no risk to accused-appellant from any defense that the victim might have make. There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tends directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party may make
(No. 16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code).
Under Paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended. Thus, anyone who inflicts injuries voluntarily and with intent is liable for all the
consequences of his criminal act, such as death that supervenes as a consequence of the injuries.
Here, accused-appellant is liable for the demise of the victim for such was caused by the violent
kicks which he inflicted on the vital parts of the victim's body. And, as earlier discussed, since
the assault was qualified by treachery the crime committed is murder and not homicide as
suggested by accused-appellant.
However, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed (Paragraph 3, Article 13, Revised Penal Code) should be appreciated in favor of
accused-appellant for he had no intent to kill when he attacked the victim. His intention was
merely to inflict injuries on the victim.
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2. MISTAKE OF FACT
G.R. Nos. 120744-46 June 25, 2012
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
MISTAKE OF FACT
FACTS: Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as
guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations. The company decided to leave shortly after the religious
procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was
on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With
Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney,
Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were
approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup
were both wounded and bleeding profusely. Licup later died.
The burst of gunfie turned out to be a shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which
brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the
guise of maintaining peace and order. Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in
Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement
officers in the area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements,41 and that he
frequently patrolled the barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men
therein.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE OF JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

FULFILLMENT OF DUTY OR LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE UNDER
ARTICLE 11 (5) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND MISTAKE OF FACT ARE
AVAILABLE TO THE PETITIONERS. NO
HELD: The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise
of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the
accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and
(b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The justification is based
on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of
a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law
enforcement operation. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their
suspect vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received;
they may even effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had
just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it may certainly be
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argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence
suggests that the accused were acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects
under any and all circumstances. Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims
having launched such aggression as would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or
having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused, particularly
those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material
evidence was presented at the trial to show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in
the presence of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and
were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain
failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if
true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally,
a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent
component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only
general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all
to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a)
that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crimeor the existence of the mental state which the statute
prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.
G.R. No. 163927 January 27, 2006
ALFONSO D. GAVIOLA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
MISTAKE OF FACT
FACTS: Pursuant to a court decision in Civil Case No. 111 for quieting of title instituted by
Elias Gaviola against Eusebio Mejarito, Eusebio was declared the lawful owner of the 40,500-
square-meter parcel of coconut land located in Barrio Calbani, Maripipi, Leyte, identified as
Cadastral Lot 1301. Eusebio died intestate and was survived by his son, Cleto. Elias Gaviola also
died intestate and was survived by his son, Alfonso. Almost 30 years thereafter, in Civil Case
No. B-0600, Cleto filed a complaint against Alfonso and four others for recovery of possession
of a parcel of land. But the case was dismissed and a final decision was rendered declaring that
the parcels of land occupied by the defendants, inclusive of Lot 1311, were different from the
property adjudicated to Eusebio Mejarito.
Years later, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a barangay councilman, saw
Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees in Lot
1301. Under the supervision of the spouses Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola, they gathered 1,500
coconuts from the coconut trees. A criminal complaint for qualified theft was filed against the
spouses Gaviola and those who gathered the coconuts in the municipal trial court.
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Alfonso admitted that the coconuts were taken upon his instructions, but insisted that the trees
from which they were taken were planted on Lot 1311, the property he had inherited from his
father, Elias Gaviola; the property of private complainant Cleto Mejarito, Lot 1301, was adjacent
to his lot. Alfonso testified that the property was placed in his possession and that he had been
gathering coconuts every three months without being confronted or prosecuted by anybody.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE OF MISTAKE OF FACT IS AVAILABLE TO

THE PETITIONER (GAVIOLA). NO
HELD: In the present case, the trial court found the petitioner‘s claim of having acted in the
honest belief that he owned Lot 1301 when he ordered the harvesting of the coconuts barren of
probative weight. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance or even unfamiliarity with the location,
identity and the metes and bounds of the private complainant‘s property, Lot 1301, vis-à-vis that
of his own, Lot 1311.
Indeed, that the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola (father of defendant Alfonso), and of
defendant Segundo Gaviola (now, but Hermenegildo Gaviola before) are separate and distinct
from each other is shown by the fact that they have been covered by different sets of tax
declarations since as early as 1906. It should be noted that the tax declarations that cover each
land do not merge with, overlap, or cancel, each other.
Moreover, petitioner‘s land is residential, while that of the private complainant is coconut land.
There are no coconut trees in the lot owned by petitioner, nor is there evidence that he planted
coconut trees on private complainant‘s property at any time, believing that it was his own land.
Petitioner could thus not have mistaken the property of the private complainant for that of his
own.
In fine, we find and so hold that the petitioner‘s claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from
the private complainant‘s land is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability.
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3. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
G.R. No. 186412 September 7, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ORLITO VILLACORTA,

Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
TETANUS
FACTS: While Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja‘s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and,
without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz‘s body using a sharpened bamboo
stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz‘s body. Immediately after the stabbing
incident, Villacorta fled. Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center. Dr. Belandres was Head of
the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on
January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-
patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died
the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz,
Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz‘s medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of
tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF CRUZ‘S DEATH IS THE

TETANUS INFECTION, AND NOT THE STAB WOUND, HENCE VILLACORTA SHOULD
ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES AND NOT MURDER. YES
HELD: Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred."
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January 23,
2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On
February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe
tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion.
There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz
was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz
acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a
lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short
incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days
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from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that
Cruz‘s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might
have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz‘s stab wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his
death.
Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for
the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.
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4. IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
UNFUNDED CHECK
FACTS: Baby Aquino handed petitioner BDO Check in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check
was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then
the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of
Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the
former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam. Meanwhile, Rowena
Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land
Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to
inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to
Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash
in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Thereafter, the petitioner, along with the other accused, was arrested by the NBI officials in an
entrapment operation. The petitioner was charged with the crime of qualified theft.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER SHOULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE OF

IMPOSSIBLE CRIME AS THE CHECK WAS UNFUNDED. YES.
HELD: The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons
or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is
a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully
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taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it
not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which
was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check
being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless,
because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace
the value of said dishonored check.
There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant
for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been
impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the
₱5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for
the consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino
to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored
by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of
receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most,
the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
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MULTIPLICITY OF CRIMES AND OFFENDERS
1. COMPOSITE, COMPOUND, SPECIAL COMPLEX AND CONTINUING

CRIMES
G.R. No. 190632 February 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MANOLITO LUCENA y

VELASQUEZ, alias "Machete," Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
COUNTS OF RAPE
FACTS: AAA, who was then 17 years old, was walking and chatting with her friends along one
of the streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the
appellant, approached and informed them that they were being arrested for violating a city
ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAA‘s companions, however, managed to escape,
thus, she alone was apprehended. AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the
tricycle. AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San
Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, the appellant told the other tanod that he will just be the one
to bring AAA back to her house.
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in
San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the
tricycle. The appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy
area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her
clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAA‘s
vagina despite the latter‘s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short
while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA‘s
vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into
AAA‘s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to
dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about
what happened between them.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED SHOULD ONLY BE CONVICTED OF ONE

(1) COUNT OF RAPE DESPITE THE THREE (3) PENETRATIONS BECAUSE HE WAS
MOTIVATED BY A SINGLE CRIMINAL INTENT. NO.
HELD: We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3)
counts of rape.1âwphi1 It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting
his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at
an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his
victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be
clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those separate
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and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but
rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA
were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant‘s
conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
[G.R. Nos. 136300-02. September 24, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EMMANUEL AARON, Accused-

Appellant.
CORONA, J.:
COUNTS OF RAPE
FACTS: The private complainant, Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed ("papag") inside her room on
the second floor of the apartment unit which she shared with her sister and her brother-in-law,
herein appellant Emmanuel Aaron. Jona was wearing only a panty and was covered with a
blanket. Sensing that someone was inside her room, Jona opened her eyes and was surprised to
find Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed totally naked. Emmanuel immediately went on top of
Jona and poked a knife on her neck. Jona‘s attempt to cry for help proved futile as Emmanuel
quickly covered her mouth with his left hand.
Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Jona who could
only manage to cry. Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and ordered Jona to lie down
on the floor. He inserted his penis into her vagina for the second time with the knife still poked
on Jona‘s neck. Thereafter, Emmanuel stood up and commanded Jona to lie down near the
headboard of the "papag" bed where he inserted his penis into her vagina for the third time, still
armed with a knife, and continued making pumping motions ("umiindayog").
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF THREE (3)

COUNTS OF RAPE. NO.
HELD: We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be convicted of only one count of
rape. It may appear from the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into
the private part of Jona Grajo. However, the three penetrations occurred during one continuing
act of rape in which the appellant was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. There is
no indication in the records, as the trial court correctly observed, from which it can be inferred
that the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than
his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed
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G.R. No. 221427
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. ALVIN J. LABAGALA and

ROMEO LABAGALA, Accused-Appellant
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
FACTS: Jun Alberto (Jun) was having dinner with the victim (Mario Legaspi) under the mango
tree at the latter's residence when Salve (co-accused) entered the yard to buy a pack of cigarettes.
As he was attending to Salve, he noticed four men enter the premises. Jun identified two of them
in open court as appellants Alvin and Romeo Labagala. Jun saw Alvin poke a gun at the victim
and whip him with a gun while the other three held him in place. Alvin then took the victim's
jewelry consisting of two rings, a necklace and a wristwatch.
Afterwards, Jun witnessed the victim being dragged inside the house by Alvin. At the time, he
was cornered at the backyard by one of Alvin's companions. There was a commotion inside the
house and he heard someone moaning. Alvin and his companions immediately ran away. When
he went inside the house, he found the victim already dead.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANTS SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. YES
HELD: For the accused to be convicted of robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against the person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
In robbery with homicide, it must be established that the original criminal design of the
malefactor/s is to commit robbery, and the killing is merely incidental thereto. "The intent to
commit robbery must precede the taking of human life[, but] the homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery."
We agree with the court a quo in upholding the detailed, clear and straightforward testimony of
Jun. That said testimony is uncorroborated by another witness is of no moment. After all, "the
testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction x x x."
We likewise uphold the CA's conclusion that appellants, together with their co-accused who are
still at large, acted in conspiracy in committing the crime charged. We explained in People v. De
Jesus that an accused who participated as a principal in the commission of a robbery will also be
held liable as a principal of robbery with homicide even if he did not actually take part in the
killing that was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, unless it is clearly shown
that he tried to prevent the same.
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G.R. No. 227698
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. HERNANDO BONGOS, Accused-

Appellant
PERALTA, J.:
ROBBERY WITH RAPE
FACTS: AAA, helper of BBB and CCC, was left to tend the house when CCC went to her
mother's house. While AAA was washing dishes, two male persons entered the house through
the kitchen. She identified them as Bongos, the one wearing bonnet up to his forehead, and
Dexisne, the one wearing black short pants with red stripes on the side. She knew them because
they are neighbors of her employers. Bongos pointed a gun at her, while Dexisne pointed his
knife. They forced her to enter the room where the money of her employer was and demanded
her to open the drawer. Since it was locked, Dexisne forced it open using a steel, while Bongos
remained at AAA's side poking the gun at her neck. After they took the money, they forcibly
dragged AAA outside the house until they reached a clearing on the lower level of the yard.
There, armed with a knife and gun, both accused threatened and ordered AAA to undress herself.
When she refused to do so, Dexisne got violent and slashed her leg and then hit her chest near
her left breast which caused her to lose consciousness. When AAA woke up, she no longer had
her clothes on and felt pain on her private part.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT TH ACCUSED SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF ROBBERY

WITH RAPE. YES.
HELD: Robbery with rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. To be
convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal
property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken
belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4)
the robbery is accompanied by rape.
The prosecution was able to establish that Bongos and Dexisne entered the house of the victims
armed with a handgun and knife and took spouses BBB and CCC's money amounting to
₱20,000.00 without consent and by means of violence and intimidation.
As to the last requirement, the courts a quo correctly held that although AAA did not exactly
witness the actual rape because she was unconscious at that time, circumstantial evidence shows
that the victim was raped by the appellant and his co-accused. Here, the prosecution presented
circumstantial evidence that when analyzed and taken together, lead to the obvious conclusion
that Bongos and Dexisne also raped AAA on the occasion of the robbery: first, after appellant
took the money, they forcibly dragged AAA outside of the house's fence;18 second, appellant
forced AAA to undress; third, when AAA refused, co-accused Dexisne got mad and hit her at
her chest causing her to lose consciousness; fourth, when AAA regained consciousness, AAA
had no longer clothes on; and fifth, she felt pain in her private part.
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G.R. No. 178321 October 5, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN,

Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
FACTS: AAA and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on
their way to apply for work at a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael,
Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and
forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant
struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When
Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe,
knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter
covered her body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head
several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such
defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up
her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her
vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out.
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she
reached her uncle‘s farm at daybreak. She later learned that Jennifer had died.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF RAPE

WITH HOMICIDE. YES.
HELD: Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for
the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the
killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the
above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA
or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may
not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been
satiated, appellant purposely covered AAA‘s body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifer‘s
body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the
savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But
AAA survived and appellant‘s barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the
woman victim of the rape.
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G.R. No. 126368 September 14, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOHNNY CALABROSO, SONNY

BOY MATOS, RICHARD SATA and LEONARDO DUMRIQUE, accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CARNAPPING OF TRICYCLE AND HOMICIDE
FACTS: The four (4) accused boarded a tricycle driven by Nacnac to attend a dance party in
Gabit. When they reached the place, Dumrique tendered ₱12.00 since he knew that the regular
fare was ₱3.00/head. But Nacnac demanded ₱40.00. Dumrique refused to pay, so Nacnac boxed
him five (5) times on the neck which caused him to fall to the ground. Matos pacified them but
Nacnac simultaneously drew a veinte nueve5 from his waist. Dumrique, who was still lying
prostrate on the ground, saw Nacnac near his feet. Taking advantage of the situation to disable
Nacnac, Dumrique kicked him at his sex organ. Nacnac doubled up in pain. Calabroso then
grabbed the knife from Nacnac. When Calabroso was about to step backwards, Nacnac held his
right elbow, so Calabroso stabbed Nacnac. For his part, Matos tried to stop Calabroso but the
latter kept on swinging the knife. Sata, seated inside the tricycle, was stunned. Dumrique was not
able to do anything because he was still reeling from the punches he received from Nacnac.
Thereafter, Dumrique started the engine of the tricycle while Calabroso pulled Matos and joined
Sata inside the tricycle. All four (4) companions fled to Kiangan, Ifugao, leaving the bloodied
Nacnac behind.
ISSUES:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF CARNAPPING. YES
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE KILLING OF NACNAC IS DEEMED ABSORBED IN THE
"GRAVER OFFENSE OF QUALIFIED CARNAPPING WHICH CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS A "SINGLE OR INDIVISIBLE CRIME" OR "A SPECIAL
COMPLEX CRIME. NO
(3) WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY FOR THE
KILLING OF NACNAC. NO.
HELD:
(1) To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to

have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act
may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators moving them to
execute or implement the conspiracy. When Calabroso, Matos and Dumrique joined Sata
inside the tricycle and fled towards Kiangan after Nacnac was stabbed they performed
well-coordinated acts indicating a common purpose to steal the vehicle. Conspiracy is
also inferred not only from their conduct before and during the commission of the crime
but also thereafter, showing that they acted in unison with each other.29 Calabroso,
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Dumrique and Sata proceeded to Nueva Vizcaya to dispose of the motorcycle. Matos
stayed behind as his companions promised to pick him up later. As promised, they
returned to Kiangan still with the vehicle. Conspiracy having been proven, accused-
appellants are equally liable for carnapping the tricycle of Nacnac.
(2) The theory of the Solicitor General is that the killing of Nacnac is deemed absorbed in the
"graver offense of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated from." The
carnapping and killing can be considered as a "single or indivisible crime" or "a special
complex crime" which is not covered by Art. 48 of the Penal Code. Hence, accused-
appellants Dumrique and Calabroso should be held liable for qualified carnapping and
penalized with reclusion perpetua.
We disagree. The taking away of the tricycle of Nacnac followed the killing apparently as
an afterthought of accused-appellants.1âwphi1 In fact, their original design was not to
commit any crime but to attend a dance party. There is no direct relation, a causal
connection, between the carnapping and the killing, i.e., whether the killing be prior or
subsequent to the carnapping, or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.
(3) Only Calabroso is guilty of Homicide for killing Nacnac.
G.R. No. 210434, December 05, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER ELIZALDE Y

SUMAGDON AND ALLAN PLACENTE Y BUSIO, Accused-Appellants.
PERALTA, J.:
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH HOMICIDE
FACTS: Antonio testified that while he was closing their concrete products store, her wife, Letty
went inside their vehicle that was parked at the right side of the road facing their store. Suddenly,
a red Toyota Lite Ace van arrived. He then saw about seven (7) armed men alight therefrom,
three (3) of which pointed their guns at him and told him not to move, while two (2) of the other
four (4) dragged Letty into their van. Thereafter, they sped away. Antonio immediately called his
children and his brother, Nick. In a series of telephone calls to the store's phone, the kidnappers
told them not to report the matter to the authorities and to be ready with P20M the following day.
Nevertheless, they called the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER) unit of the
PNP. Through Antonio's cellular phone, they would bargain with the kidnappers, telling them
that they did not have the amount, to which the kidnappers replied that they will not see Letty
again without it. At noon of the next day, the PACER team informed Antonio and his family
about a shootout in Tarlac where three (3) persons were killed. They proceeded to the Tarlac
Provincial Hall where they saw Letty's lifeless body with a gunshot below her chin. Thereafter,
the appellants were arrested.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANTS SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH HOMICIDE. YES
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HELD: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Accordingly, direct proof is not essential to
establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing
to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests.41 As aptly held by the
CA, the community of criminal design by the appellants and their cohorts is evident as they each
played a role in the commission of the crime. While appellant Placente and companions pointed
their guns at Antonio, Elizalde and companions simultaneously dragged Letty into their van.
Thereafter, they demanded ransom money as a condition for her release, which, however, never
materialized due to a shootout that sadly led to her death. Consequently, therefore, appellants are
equally liable for the crime charged herein.
In this respect, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
7659, provides:
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Accordingly, in People v. Mercado,43 the Court explained that when the person kidnapped is
killed in the course of the detention, the same shall be punished as a special complex crime, to
wit:
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping
for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this
Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of
kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.
On this score, the Court finds no reason to disturb the rulings of the lower courts for they aptly
convicted appellants with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. As
clearly proved by the prosecution, appellants succeeded in executing their common criminal
design in abducting the victim herein, demanding for the payment of money for her release, and
thereafter, killing her as a result of the encounter with the police officers.
G.R. No. 86728 April 6, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS VARGAS, JR. (AKA)
"LUCKY", defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
ARMALITE, COUNTS AS MANY AS NUMBER OF VICTIMS
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FACTS: Romeo Malones, Sr. was reading the Bible by a kerosene lamp in his house at
Barangay Banugan, Municipality of Dueñas, Iloilo, when his house was sprayed with bullets
causing his death as well as that of his daughter Rosalie, and physical injuries to the remaining
members of his family. Romeo Malones, Jr. heard the first burst of gunfire that came from the
back of the house. He was resting in the extension of the house. His mother, brother and sisters
were also resting in the receiving room. Romeo, Jr. peeped through the wall of bamboo strips
(tadtad) and saw the brothers Jesus Vargas and Fortunato Vargas firing at their house. They were
armed with a long firearm and an armalite, respectively. He recognized them because the moon
was bright. It was a full moon and they stood only about five (5) meters away from him. Besides,
the Vargases were his relatives. Upon seeing them, Romeo, Jr. lay flat on his stomach on the
ground where his bed was situated, then he heard another set of gunfire followed by many others.
After the firing ceased he saw his father fall in the kitchen. He died instantly. 1 His brother and
sisters were also wounded. His sister Rosalie died in the hospital.
In as much as the accused Fortunato Vargas was still at large, so only the accused Jesus Vargas
was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY FOR EACH OF
THE RESULTANT CRIMES. YES
HELD: The shooting and/or spraying with series of gunfires the house of Romeo Malones, Sr.,
by accused Jesus Vargas, Jr., resulted to the death of Romeo Malones, Sr., and his daughter
Rosalie Malones, gunshot wounds to Maribeth and Sheila Malones requiring medical attendance
for more than nine (9) days but less than thirty (30) days and abrasions to Ronald and Nona
Malones requiring medical attendance in less than nine (9) days. The aforenamed victims
sustained gunshot wounds and abrasions because of the several bursts of fire delivered by
Fortunato and Jesus Vargas, Jr.
Evidently, this is a case where several persons were killed and others injured by successive shots.
In the case of People vs. Mones, No. L- 2029, May 6, 1950; 47 O.G. No. 12 Supp. 11; 86 Phil.
331, the Supreme Court found the accused guilty of three distinct and separate murders, each
qualified by treachery, when said accused fires a series of shots killing three persons attending a
school commencement exercise. Similarly, in the case of People vs. Desierto, CA., 45 OG 4542,
it was ruled that several shots from a Thompson sub-machinegun causing several deaths,
although caused by a single act of pressing the trigger, are considered several acts. Although
each burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, in
view of its special mechanism the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger of the sub-
machinegun, with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the
trigger which should be considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets
which actually produced them (L.B Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, pp. 559-560, Book I, 1971
Revised Ed.). This Court is of the considered view and holds that the aforecited jurisprudence
stand four-square with the case at bar. Consequently, the accused should be held responsible for
each of the resultant crimes, instead of the complex crime of double murder under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code.
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TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YUSOP TADAH
PONENTE: BRION, J.:
TOPIC: COUNTS OF KIDNAPPING
FACTS: The RTC of Zamboanga convicted appellant of five counts of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. It noted that conspiracy attended the crime due to the concerted acts of the
accused in the kidnapping. It sentenced the appellant to the death penalty for each count of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, appreciating that the accused committed the kidnapping
to extort ransom, and that the accused used a motorized vehicle and motorized watercrafts to
facilitate the commission of the crimes. The CA, upon appeal, affirmed the RTC ruling but
pursuant to R.A. 9346, reduced the appellant‘s sentence to reclusion perpetua in all five cases.
ISSUE: WON the aggravating circumstance of using a motorized vehicle and motorized
watercrafts can affect the imposable penalty?
HELD: We deny the appeal, but modify the penalty and awarded indemnity. Since the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused conspired to kidnap the victims for
ransom, and kidnapped and illegally detained them until they were released by the accused after
the latter received the ₱2,000,000.00 ransom, the imposable penalty is death as provided for in the
second paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The aggravating circumstance of
using a motorized vehicle and motorized watercrafts, while alleged and proven, cannot affect the
imposable penalty because Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that in all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (like reclusion perpetua and death), it shall be
applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed. The CA correctly reduced the appellant‘s sentence from death penalty to
reclusion perpetua considering the passage of RA No. 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty.
2. HABITUAL OFFENDERS (ARTICLES 14 [9][10], ARTICLE 62[5], ARTICLE 160)
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CONSPIRACY & PROPOSAL TO COMMIT FELONY (ART. 8)
TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY T. GO
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.
TOPIC: (CONSPIRACY; EFFECT OF DEATH)
FACTS: An Information was filed against respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), in relation to contracts awarded by
the government to PIATCO. Respondent, among those charged, was then the Chairman and
President of PIATCO, supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in entering
into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict herein respondent. While there
was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
ISSUE: WON respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died
prior to the filing of the Information.
HELD: YES. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability.
His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy
between him and private respondent. The requirement before a private person may be indicted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to
have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person
must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the
public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If two
or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is,
in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This
means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance
of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes
no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death
of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.
TITLE: SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA
L. TAN
PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
TOPIC: (OFFENDER IN VAWC; APPLICATION OF CONSPIRACY UNDER RPC)
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FACTS: Petitioner Sharica Mari Go-Tan petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of
a TPO against Steven, her husband, and her parents-in-law, respondents Spouses Perfecto Tan and
Juanita Tan before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9262.Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their
persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
ISSUE: WON the respondent-spouses may be included in the petition for issuance of a protective
order in accordance with Anti-VAWC law?
HELD: YES. Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of
the RPC. Because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to
said law, with more reason, therefore, that the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action
in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators,
and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of
violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another
under Section 5, (h). In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include individuals other
than the offending husband under Section 8 (a) and (b).
TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
TOPIC: (CONSPIRACY, SCC)
FACTS: Appellant, among several others, was charged with Robbery with Homicide. It was
alleged by the prosecution witnesses that a vehicle drove up to their gasoline station and while they
were attending the vehicle, 6 men alighted and announced a hold-up. The men took their wallets,
cashier‘s office money and several other valuables and shot the security guard in the stomach. The
security guard later died in the hospital due to the gunshot wound. The RTC convicted appellant
beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges against him. In the CA, he was found guilty of one
count of robbery with homicide.
ISSUES/RULING:
1. WON appellant is a conspirator?
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YES. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual Here, witness
Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at him. Therefore, it can be
inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of the robbery, that a conspiracy existed
and he was part of it. Granting that he was merely present during the robbery, his inaction does
not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed
an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent
the commission thereof.
2. WON the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of robbery
with homicide?
YES. In the crime of robbery with homicide, there are series of acts, borne from one criminal
resolution, which is to rob. A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single
crime, consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a
series of acts, there is only one crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed. In the
case before us, appellant and his companions intended only to rob one place; and that is the
Energex gasoline station. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and
valuables of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these
circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continuing
offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated
by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. This can be said of the case at
hand.
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MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY (ARTS. 11-15)
TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE BUTIONG
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:
TOPIC: (IQ RANGE)
FACTS: AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by Butiong to go over to his house
because he would give her something. AAA obliged. Inside the house, he led her to the sofa, where
he had carnal knowledge of her. She was later brought to the police station and referred to undergo
a series of psychological test. The results of the psychological tests showed that she had a mild
level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child aged from six to seven
years.
ISSUE: WON Butiong is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?
HELD: YES. Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A
of the RPC because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of
force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual
congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim. It
should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article
266-A, supra, because the provision refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason," a phrase that
refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.
Who, then, is a mental retardate within the context of the phrase "deprived of reason" used in the
Revised Penal Code? In People v. Dalandas, the Court renders the following exposition on mental
retardation and its various levels, viz: Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth
or early childhood and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by
standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily demands of the
individual‘s own social environment. Commonly, a mental retardate exhibits a slow rate of
maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity. Although "mental
retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental deficiency," the latter term is usually
reserved for those without recognizable brain pathology.
The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental retardation were (a)
idiot, having an IQ of 0 to 19, and a maximum intellectual factor in adult life equivalent to that of
the average two-year old child; (b) imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual
function in adult life equivalent to that of the average seven-year old child; moron or
feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life
equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists and psychologists apply the
term "borderline" intelligence to those with IQ between 70 to 89. In People vs. Palma, we ruled
that a person is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering
from a "borderline mental deficiency."
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Considering the findings of psychologist de Guzman to the effect that AAA had the mental age of
a six- to seven-year old, an age equated with imbecility under the previous classification, her
mental age was even lower than that of a borderline mental deficiency within the context of that
term. As such, Butiong‘s carnal knowledge of AAA amounted to rape of a person deprived of
reason.
TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J.:
TOPIC: (TREACHERY IN ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE)
TITLE: A bus was travelling along the highway in Bulacan, carrying several passengers including
police officer SPO1 Manio, Jr. Suddenly, Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. announced
a holdup. They took the valuables of the passengers. The felons then went to the place Manio, Jr.
was seated. Juan and Victor took the I.D. of the police officer as well as his service gun and told
him: "Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo." The police
officer pleaded for mercy. However, Victor and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot
him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance
wounds. He fell to the floor of the bus. Victor and Juan alighted from the bus in Pampanga. The
robbery was over in 25 minutes.
Juan and Victor were later arrested. The trial court convicted them of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. The RTC imposed the death penalty on Juan and Victor on its finding that they shot
SPO1 Manio, Jr. treacherously on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery
ISSUES/RULING: Whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery

with homicide?
YES. Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously.
The Supreme Court of Spain so ruled. So does the Court rule in this case, as it had done for
decades.
The Supreme Court of Spain declared that: In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of
homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a
crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the
constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The crime
of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special
complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime.
Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar
because the same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures.
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TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHlLIPPINES vs TIRSO SIBBU
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.:
TOPIC: (DWELLING; DISGUISE; TREACHERY)
FACTS: Laoag RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found appellant Tirso Sibbu guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted murder and of three counts of murder. It was alleged during trial
that between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, he was with his daughter Trisha; his mother
Ofelia and his father, Warlito in the azotea of his parents' house when he saw from a distance of
about five meters a person in camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung across his chest and a
black bonnet over his head. When the armed man inched closer to the house, he tried to fix his
bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear look at the
armed man because there were Christmas lights hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan
recognized the armed man as the appellant. Brian also saw two men in crouching position at a
distance of three meters away from the appellant. Bryan shouted a warning to his family. Appellant
then fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito.
ISSUE: WON the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, disguise and treachery were correctly
appreciated?
HELD: YES. At the time of the shooting incident, Warlito, Ofelia, Trisha, and Bryan were at the
porch of their house totally unaware of the impending attack. In addition, they were all unarmed
thus unable to mount a defense in the event of an attack. On the other hand, appellant and his
cohorts were armed. They also surreptitiously approached the residence of the victims. Appellant,
in particular, wore camouflage uniform to avoid detection. Although Bryan was able to warn his
family about the impending attack, it was too late for the victims to scamper for safety or to defend
themselves. At the time Bryan became aware of appellant's presence, the latter was already in the
vicinity of about five meters. In fine, appellant employed deliberate means to ensure the
accomplishment of his purpose of killing his victims with minimal risk to his safety. There can be
no other conclusion than that the appellant's attack was treacherous.
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should also be taken into account. Although the
triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be
considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the
victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house,
although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from without.
The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
Bryan testified that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident There
could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant's face but to conceal his
identity, especially since Bryan and appellant live in the same barangay and are familiar with each
other.
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TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. WILLIAM SABALBERINO Y

ABULENCIA [June 2019]
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
TOPIC: (PASSION; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO

GRAVE A WRONG)
FACTS: An Information was filed with the RTC charging accused-appellant William with the
crime of Parricide. During trial, two daughters of the accused testified that in the morning of the
incident, they heard their parents arguing. Suddenly, their father punched their mother, the victim,
Delia. Thereafter, William went to the kitchen to get a knife and proceeded to stab Delia hitting her
chest below the armpit while the latter was holding them. Delia collapsed. William then went to
her aid, embraced her and cried. He asked his children to call for help, but Delia died soon
thereafter. William, on the other hand, claimed that the stabbing was accidental. He testified that
he saw his wife half naked with a completely naked man on top of her. He went to get the knife
and the man stood up and tried to get possession of the knife. They grappled and he accidentally
hit his wife.
ISSUE: WON the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed and voluntary surrender may be appreciated in this
case?
HELD: It has been held that there is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to
an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings.
The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused
with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to
deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement which is inherent in all persons who
quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation. In the present case, the prosecution was
able to establish that the crime was precipitated by a quarrel between accused-appellant and the
victim. However, such kind of argument, no matter how heated or serious it was, is not the kind
that would cause the passion or obfuscation contemplated under the law.
As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same can be appreciated if the
accused satisfactorily complies with three requisites, to wit: (1) he has not been actually arrested;
(2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to
the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the
trouble and expense concomitant to his capture. In the instant case, there was no showing of
spontaneity on the part of accused-appellant as it was not he who asked for the police to go to their
house. Neither was there proof that he acknowledged his guilt when apprehended by the police
authorities. While it appears that he did not resist when the police officers brought him to the
police station for questioning, such lack of resistance does not necessarily equate to his voluntary
surrender. The voluntariness of one's surrender should denote a positive act and not a mere
compliant or submissive behavior in the presence of authorities.
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Anent the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, this circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular
moment when such offender executes or commits the criminal act. In the instant case, the
undeniable fact is that when accused-appellant attacked the victim, the former used a deadly
weapon and inflicted a mortal wound on the latter. While intent to kill is purely a mental process, it
may be inferred from the weapon used, the extent of the injuries sustained by the offended party
and the circumstances of the aggression, as well as the fact that the accused performed all the acts
that should have resulted in the death of the victim. Indeed the location and nature of Delia's stab
wound belie accused-appellant's claim of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong against the
victim.
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JUVENILE JUSTICE & WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630)
1. EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY; EXEMPTION TO THE

EXEMPTION (SEC. 6-7)
TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILAN ROXAS y AGUILUZ
PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
TOPIC: (Age Determination)
FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the
Judgment of the RTC finding accused Milan Roxas y Aguiluz guilty of five counts of rape against
AAA, a minor. During trial, Dr. Aglipay testified that based on her examination of the accused, she
concluded that he is suffering from a mild mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to ten
(10) years old. Accused-appellant Roxas points out that under Republic Act No. 9344, minors
fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from criminal responsibility. Accused claims that
since he has a mental age of nine years old, he should also be "exempt from criminal liability
although his chronological age at the time of the commission of the crime was already eighteen
years old."
ISSUE: WON the accused is exempt from criminal responsibility?
HELD: NO. In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6
clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of one‘s birth date, and not the mental
age as argued by accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or
of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent.
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2. DIVERSION AND INTERVENTION PROGRAMS (SEC. 20-41, 51)
3. TREATMENT OF CHILD IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW
TITLE: ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
TOPIC: (CLAIM FOR LOWER PENALTY – PROBATION)
FACTS: Dequito testified that on the day of the incident, he was at the gate of a school watching
the graduation ceremony. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later,
however, appellant approached the victim and stabbed the latter. The witness demonstrated that
with the appellant‘s left arm around the neck of the victim, appellant stabbed the victim using a
bladed weapon. The victim later died.
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner‘s conviction but modified the penalty in which his sentence
was reduced to six months and one day to six years of prision correccionalas minimum, to six
years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as maximum. The case was also directed to be
remanded to the RTC for appropriate action on the application for probation appellant.
ISSUES/HELD:
(1) WON the CA imposed the correct penalty taking into consideration the pertinent
provisions of R.A. 9344, the RPC and Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law)
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide.
Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being
17 years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide, such minority was a
privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional
(i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision
mayor in its medium period – eight years and one day to 10 years – was proper because there were
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and
one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him
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to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968. The petitioner‘s insistence is bereft of
legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant
law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence.
To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to
deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding
principles in the trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is
that found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the
personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum. Consistent with this principle, the
amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for
homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere
allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for
the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
(2) WON he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under
Republic Act No. 9344
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968, which disqualifies from probation an
offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the
petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to
remand the case to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in
conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child
offender turns 21 years of age. If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years
of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. We
note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide.
Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
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PERSONS LIABLE UNDER PENAL LAWS (ARTS. 16-20)
1. PRINCIPAL
2. ACCOMPLICE
TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS
PONENTE: SERENO, CJ:
TOPIC: (ACCOMPLICE; HAZING)
FACTS: Balidoy was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. In order to reach
active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory
"Indoctrination and Orientation Period. ― Balidoy died on its 2nd day. The Prosecutor issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to charge the principals to the crime of hazing. The school
authorities of the PMMA were also criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices
to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the
Information against them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal
accused and, the failure to include in the Information the material averments required by the Anti-
Hazing Law.
ISSUES/RULING:
1. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in
spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
YES. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto
dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the
latter; or even the latter‘s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established. Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of
those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of
that of the alleged principal.
2. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the
prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
NO. We affirm the quashal of the Information against respondents.
The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for
admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would
prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as
principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term – in this
case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly
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committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the
ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.
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3. ACCESSORIES (SEE: PD 1612 AND PD 1829)
TITLE: JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA v. PEOPLE

PONENTE: BRION, J.:
TOPIC: (ACCESSORY BY REMOVING EVIDENCE; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
LUMBER)
FACTS: A DENR Officer approached a truck loaded with lumber, which was parked at a national
highway and requested from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck helper, Mostera, the
lumber's supporting documents but they failed to produce any. Balico reported the matter to the
police. The DENRO group then decided to transfer the lumber and left the truck at the national
highway. The next day, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos
arrived at the place where the truck was being held in custody and they agreed to transfer it to the
police station. However, Mesina increased the truck speed towards Nueva Ecija. They were later
apprehended by the Philippine Army. The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of
illegal possession of lumber, in violation of P.D. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are liable for a crime?
HELD: YES. The facts alleged in the Information and the crime proved in the present case do not
make the petitioners liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for
violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
Article 19, paragraph 2 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the commission of
the crime and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or
instruments, in order to prevent its discovery. Under this provision, the punished acts should have
been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. In the present case, the
crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already been
discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the
truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the truck on November
16, 2002, after its confiscation. In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the
crime charged in the Information as the legal definition of the technical term "accessories" does
not coincide with the factual allegations in the Information that serves as the actual criminal charge
against the petitioners.
However, the factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense committed
by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead the criminal offense of
obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled "Penalizing
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."
P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to
obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
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Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the
following acts:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000
to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx (b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object,
with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence
in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]
First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice
under Section 1(b). The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking
and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its
confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as a tool or instrument of the crime.
Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The
term "suppress" means to subdue or end by force. Specifically, the petitioners intentionally
suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and prevent its use
as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705. This intent
was duly proved during trial.
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ANTI-FENCING LAW (PD 1612)
TITLE: IRENEO CAHULOGAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
TOPIC: (ELEMENTS OF FENCING)
FACTS: Johnson Tan instructed his truck driver and helper, Lopez and Lariosa, to deliver 210
cases of Coca-Cola products to Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that contrary to his
instructions, both delivered the subject items to petitioner's store. Tan then went to petitioner and
informed him that the delivery to his store was a mistake and that he was pulling out the subject
items. However, petitioner refused, claiming that he bought the same from Lariosa for P50K but
could not present any receipt evidencing such transaction. Tan negotiated with petitioner to instead
deliver to him P20K worth of empty bottles with cases. Nonetheless, Tan charged petitioner with
the crime of Fencing. He also claimed to have charged Lariosa with the crime of Theft but he had
no update as to the status thereof.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Fencing?
HELD: YES.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (a) a crime of robbery or theft
has been committed; (b) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (c) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (d) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
Notably, Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of
Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything
of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on
the value of the property.
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime of Fencing, as it was shown that: (a) Lariosa sold to
petitioner the subject items without authority and consent from his employer, Tan, for his own
personal gain, and abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him as a truck helper; (b)
petitioner bought the subject items from Lariosa and was in possession of the same; (c) under the
circumstances, petitioner should have been forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal
source, as his transaction with Lariosa did not have any accompanying delivery and official
receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary
to common practice among dealers of soft drinks; and (d) petitioner's intent to gain was made
evident by the fact that he bought the subject items for just P50,000.00, lower than their value in
the amount of P52,476.00.
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TITLE: ERNESTO FRANCISCO y SPENOCILLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J.:
TOPIC: (ELEMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE)
FACTS: Jovita, a businesswoman, acquired several pieces of jewelry which were placed inside a
locked cabinet. She hired Macario as one of her workers and his sister Pacita as a household
helper. Without her knowledge, Pacita was able to take hold of the key to the jewelry cabinet, and
one by one, took her jewelries to sell it in a pawnshop. She contacted her brother and told him that
a friend of hers asked her to sell pieces of jewelry. Macario went to the shop of Erning Francisco
(petitioner) who agreed to buy the gold rings, bracelets, earrings and necklace. They transacted for
5 to 6 times, and Macario received some tips each time. Pacita was charged with qualified theft
and was found guilty by the RTC. Later, an Information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor
with the RTC charging the petitioner with violation of P.D. No. 1612. He was also found guilty by
the trial court.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of the crime of fencing?
HELD: NO. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the
prosecution‘s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Assuming, for the nonce, that the petitioner purchased the said jewelry from Macario, there is no
evidence on record that the petitioner knew that they were stolen. Significantly, even Macario did
not know that the jewelry was stolen. He testified that his sister Pacita told him before he sold the
jewelry to the petitioner that they belonged to a friend of hers. Macario learned, after the case
against Pacita had already been filed in the trial court, that the jewelry was, after all, owned by
Jovita. However, he failed to inform the petitioner that the said jewelry was stolen.
The prosecution cannot even validly argue that the petitioner should have known which pieces of
jewelry were stolen, considering that Macario was selling the same for P50,000 when the said
pieces stolen from Jovita were alleged to be worth P655,000. This is so because the prosecution
failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove the value of the said stolen articles. The
prosecution relied solely on the bare and uncorroborated testimony of Jovita, that they were worth
P655,000. When required by the petitioner, through counsel, to bring to the court any receipts
reflecting the price of the pieces of jewelry to show that she purchased the same, Jovita answered
that she had no such receipts. In People v. Paraiso, we cited our ruling in People v. Marcos that
an ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry, nor may the courts take judicial notice of
the value of the same.
It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the
jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can
be concluded that the accused should have known that the property sold to him were stolen. This
requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing;
and, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty
68 | P a g e
depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court will fix the value of the property at
P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v. Dator.
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OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (PD 1829)
TITLE: JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. HON. OMAR U. AMIN
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
TOPIC: (PD 1829 ABSORBED IN REBELLION)
FACTS: Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Enrile as having committed
rebellion complexed with murder with the RTC QC, prosecutors filed another information
charging him for violation of P.D. 1829 with the RTC Makati. This was allegedly committed by
harbouring or concealing Honasan in his house.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
HELD: The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99
Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of
Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar. The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the
long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting
them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently
declared: The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion.
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex
crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for
two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in
furtherance of rebellion. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of
harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constitute a component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the
crime of rebellion.
The Hernandez mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common
crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in
the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to
rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but
also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
TITLE: ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO vs.

THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.:
TOPIC: (NO PD 1829 IN ILLEGAL ARREST)
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FACTS: Dennis Venturina was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity.
Chancellor Posadas asked the Director of the NBI for assistance in determining the persons
responsible for the crime. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men
went to U.P. and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses,
attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla
Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty.
Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of
arrest with them. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI
agents on that day. However, criminal charges were filed later against the two student suspects.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners
petitioners with violation of P.D. 1829.
ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No.
1829.
HELD: NO. As to validity of arrest, the SC ruled that the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to
arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of the crime. They had no personal
knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the
crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which
is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of
P.D. No. 1829, §1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had a right to prevent the
arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.
Whether or not petitioner Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following
day is immaterial. In the first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their
undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI agents could not have validly
arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have a warrant at that time.
Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their inability to arrest Taparan and
Narag. If the NBI believed the information given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI
should have applied for a warrant before making the attempted arrest instead of taking the law into
their own hands. That they chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a
warrant is their responsibility alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.
TITLE: JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA v. PEOPLE

PONENTE: BRION, J.:
TOPIC: (ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF LUMBER)
FACTS: A DENR Officer approached a truck loaded with lumber, which was parked at a national
highway and requested from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck helper, Mostera, the
lumber's supporting documents but they failed to produce any. Balico reported the matter to the
police. The DENRO group then decided to transfer the lumber and left the truck at the national
highway. The next day, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos
71 | P a g e
arrived at the place where the truck was being held in custody and they agreed to transfer it to the
police station. However, Mesina increased the truck speed towards Nueva Ecija. They were later
apprehended by the Philippine Army. The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of
illegal possession of lumber, in violation of P.D. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are liable for a crime?
HELD: YES. The facts alleged in the Information and the crime proved in the present case do not
make the petitioners liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for
violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
Article 19, paragraph 2 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the commission of
the crime and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or
instruments, in order to prevent its discovery. Under this provision, the punished acts should have
been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. In the present case, the
crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already been
discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the
truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the truck on November
16, 2002, after its confiscation. In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the
crime charged in the Information as the legal definition of the technical term "accessories" does
not coincide with the factual allegations in the Information that serves as the actual criminal charge
against the petitioners.
However, the factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense committed
by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead the criminal offense of
obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled "Penalizing
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."
P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to
obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the
following acts:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000
to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx (b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object,
with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence
in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]
72 | P a g e
First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice
under Section 1(b). The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking
and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its
confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as a tool or instrument of the crime.
Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The
term "suppress" means to subdue or end by force. Specifically, the petitioners intentionally
suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and prevent its use
as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705. This intent
was duly proved during trial.
TITLE: NOEL NAVAJA VS. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO

PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
TOPIC: ELEMENTS
FACTS: Magsigay was a materal witness for DKT in a case for falsification of private document
against Visayas and Ana Navaja. In the course of the preliminary investigation proceedings,
Magsigay was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing before the OPP-Bohol. Magsigay did not attend
the hearing as petitioner, Ana Navaja‘s husband, told her that her attendance is no longer needed as
per instruction from Ana Navaja‘s lawyer. Petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy presented an affidavit
allegedly executed by Magsigay which resulted to the dismissal of the proceedings. This prompted
the filing of criminal complaints charging petitioner of Obstruction of Justice, specifically, for
violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 for the first incident and charging petitioner and Atty.
Bonghanoy of Obstruction of Justice as well, specifically, for violation of Section 1 (f) of the same
law in connection with the second incident.
ISSUE: WON petitioner may be separately tried for different acts constituting violations of PD
1829, namely, violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of the same law allegedly committed during the
pendency of a single proceeding.
HELD: The elements of the Section 1 of PD 1829 are: (a) that the accused committed any of the
acts listed under Section 1 of PD 1829; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of
obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the successful investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases.
While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in different locations, the
Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD
1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse
- that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238,
which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol. The foregoing conclusion is premised
on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series
of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution. Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-
Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will be unduly exposed to double jeopardy, which
the Court cannot countenance.
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ARTICLE 21-88 – PENALTIES; CLASSIFICATIONS; APPLICATION; COMPLEX

CRIMES
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
2. CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES (ARTICLE 25-26)
a. PRINCIPAL
b. ACCESSORY PENALTY
3. IMPRISONMENT AND FINE (RA 10951)
4. DURATION OF PENALTIES (ARTICLE 27) AND SERVICE (ARTICLE 28)
5. PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT (ARTICLE 29 AS AMENDED BY RA 10592)
6. SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT (ARTICLE 39 AS AMENDED BY RA 10159)
7. APPLICATION OF MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES ( ARTICLES 11-15, 48, 62,
68, 69, 160)
8. GRADUATED PENALTIES (ARTICLES 61 AND 71)
9. DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES (ARTICLES 62, 63, 64, 65, 76, 77)
10. EFFECTS OF PENALTY
11. PENALTY FOR COMPLEX CRIME/COMPOUND CRIME/CONTINUING
CRIME/SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME (READ: CASES UNDER COMPLEX
CRIME)
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INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
TITLE: JUNO BATISTIS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
TOPIC: Nang Kay Doctrine was not applied for lack of jurisdiction; ISLAW in Special Law)
FACTS: Juno Batistis was charged with with violations of Section 155 (infringement of
trademark) and Section 168 (unfair competition) of the IPC for the manufacture, sale and
distribution of counterfeit Fundador brandy products. He was found guilty by the RTC for
Violation of Section 155 of the IPC with the penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and to pay a fine
of ₱50,000.00. He was likewise found guilty of Violation of Section 168. The CA affirmed the
conviction for infringement of trademark, but reversed the conviction for unfair competition.
ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed by the trial court was correct?
HELD: NO. Section 170 of the IPC provides the penalty for infringement of trademark which is:
penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from P50,000 to
P200,000.
The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, whose
Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be an indeterminate sentence.
According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge de Guzman,Jr., the imposition of an indeterminate sentence
with maximum and minimum periods in criminal cases not excepted from the coverage of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law pursuant to its Section 2 is mandatory.
We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay, a prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms punished by a special law (Revised Administrative Code, as amended) with
imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than ten years. There, the Court sustained the
straight penalty of five years and one day imposed by the trial court because the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison
sentence. Yet, we cannot apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a prosecution
under a special law like that in Nang Kay. Firstly, the trial court in Nang Kay could well and
lawfully have given the accused the lowest prison sentence of five years because of the mitigating
circumstance of his voluntary plea of guilty, but, herein, both the trial court and the CA did not
have a similar circumstance to justify the lenity towards the accused. Secondly, the large number
of Fundador articles confiscated from his house clearly demonstrated that Batistis had been
committing a grave economic offense over a period of time, thereby deserving for him the
indeterminate, rather than the straight and lower, penalty. Hence, the Supreme Court modified the
penalty to imprisonment ranging from two years, as minimum, to three years, as maximum, and a
fine of ₱50,000
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MANOLITO ZAFRA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 176317, JULY 23, 2014
PENALTY NOT COMPOSED OF THREE (3) PERIODS; ARTICLES 76 AND 55
Facts: Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) assigned in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union was guilty of 18 counts of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. Appellant was the only
Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San
Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. Among his duties was to receive tax payments for which
BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR
was then given to the taxpayer while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer. Every
month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31of the Monthly Report of Collections (MRC)
indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection, name of taxpayer, the amount
collected and the kind of tax paid. In July 1995 an audit team was tasked to audit the cash and
non-cash accountabilities of the appellant. Revenue Official Receipts (ROR), Monthly Report of
Collections (MRC), and Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) of appellant vary with
respect to the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of
payment. Of particular concern to the audit team were the lesser amounts of taxes reported in
appellant‘s MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the CARs and
PNB‘s RORs7. In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount
reflected in the CARs and PNB‘s 12 copies of RORs isPhP615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00
was reported as tax collections in the RORs‘ triplicate copies submitted by appellant to COA and
in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93. Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a
demand letter requiring him to restitute the total amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant ignored
the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of public funds through
falsification of public document against him."
RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of
public funds through falsification of public documents. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in the penalties rendered in the case.
Held: Yes. To determine the maximum periods of the penalties tobe imposed on the petitioner,
therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering that the penalties
provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Codeare not composed of three periods, the
time included in the penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each
portion forming one period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be
divided into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty properly imposable on
each count, except in any instance where the penalty for falsification would be greater than such
penalties for malversation. The tabulation of the periods of the penalties prescribed under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code follows, to wit:
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Amount Penalty Duration Minimum Periods Maximum

Misappropriated prescribed Medium
Not exceeding Prision 2 years, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years,
₱200.00 correccional 4 months 4 months 6 months 9 months
in its and 1 day and 1 day and and 11 days
medium and to 6 years to 3 years, 21 days to to 6 years.
maximum 6 months 4 years,
periods and 20 days 9 months
and 10
days
More than ₱200 Prision 6 years and 6 years and 7 years, 8 years,
pesos but not mayorin its 1 day to 10 1 day to 4 months 8 months
exceeding minimum years 7 years and and 1 day and 1 day
₱6,000.00 and medium 4 months to 8 years to 10 years
periods and 8
Months
More than Prision 10 years 10 years 11 years, 13 years,
₱6,000.00 but mayor in its and 1 day and 1 day 6 months 1 month
less than maximum to 14 years to 11 years, and 21 and 11 days
₱12,000.00 period to and 6 months days to to 14 years
reclusion 8 months and 20 days 13 years, and
temporal in 1 month 8 months
its minimum and
period 10 days
More than Reclusion 14 years, 14 years, 16 years,
₱12,000.00 temporal in 8 months 8 months 5 months
but less than its medium and 1 day and 1 day and 11 days to
and to 20 years to 16 years, 18 years,
maximum 5 months 2 months
periods. and 10 days and
20 days
18 years,
2 months<
and 21 days
to 20 years/td>
More than Reclusion 17 years, 17 years, 18 years, Reclusion
₱22,000.00 temporal in 4 months 4 months 8 months perpetua
its maximum and 1 day and 1 day and 1 day
period to to to 18 years to 20 years
reclusion reclusion and
perpetua perpetua 8 months
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Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the
offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.28 The maximum term is the
penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after considering any attending
circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense committed.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law was applicable here, save for the counts for which the
imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. Considering that each count was a complex crime
without any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the penalty for each count is the
maximum period as shown in Table 1, supra, except for the count dealt with in Criminal Case
No. 4635 involving the misappropriated amount of ₱4,869.00, for which the corresponding
penalty for malversation as stated in Table 1 was prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. However, because such penalty for malversation was lower than the penalty of prision
mayor imposable on falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, it is the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period that was applicable.
On other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count should come from the
penalty next lower than that prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, except in
Criminal Case No. 4635 where the penalty next lower is prision correccional in its full range, to
wit:
TABLE 2
Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term

prescribed lower in degree
under Art. 217
Prision Arresto mayor in 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and

correccional in its maximum 4 months
its medium and period to prision
maximum periods correccional in
its minimum
period
Prision mayor in Prision 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years

its correccional in
minimum and its medium and
medium maximum
period periods
Prision mayor in Prision mayor in 6 years and 1 day to 10 years
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its its minimum and

maximum period medium periods
to
reclusion
temporal in
its minimum
period
Reclusion Prision mayor in 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and

temporal in its maximum 8 months
its medium and period to
maximum periods. reclusion
temporal in its
minimum period
Reclusion Not applicable in the present case since the proper imposable penalty
temporal in to be imposed upon the accused in already reclusion
its maximum perpetua
period to
reclusion perpetua
Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term

prescribed lower in degree
under Art. 171
Prision mayor Prision 6 months and 1 day to 6 years

correccional
To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the accused totaling
₱75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua, and a fine of ₱75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that prescribed for malversation of
public funds, the more serious offense.
In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the maximum terms
within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.
It committed another error by fixing indeterminate sentences on some counts despite the
maximum of the imposable penalties being reclusion perpetua. There is even one completely
incorrect indeterminate sentence. And, as earlier noted, the penalty for falsification under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving ₱4,869.00
due to its being the higher penalty.
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The Court now tabulates the corrected indeterminate sentences, to wit:
TABLE 3
Amount Indeterminate sentence

misappropriated
Minimum term Maximum term
₱19,775.00 10 years and 1 day of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days

prision mayor of reclusion temporal
₱4,869.00 2 years of prision 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of

correccional prision mayor29
₱13,260.90 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days

mayor of reclusion temporal

₱11,390.00 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of

mayor prision mayor
₱9,736.86 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of

mayor prision mayor
₱39,050.00 - Reclusion perpetua

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FELINA ROSALDES V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 173988, OCTOBER 8, 2014
PENALTY WITH ONE (1) PERIOD; PM MINIMUM
Facts: On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly
entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina
Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael
Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat,
petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits
and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan‘s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost
consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly
slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried.
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying
and told his mother about the incident. His mother and his aunt reported the incident to their
Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a
doctor.
Rosaldes was charged with violation of Anti-Child Abuse Law (Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610)
RTC convicted petitioner of child abuse. Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, sentences her to an indeterminate prison
term ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
CA affimed the conviction BUT modified the penalties to Indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum of it, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in modifying the penalties.
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Held: Yes. The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty
of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one
day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the
petitioner being a public schoolteacher. It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610, which
commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the
offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the
information and established by evidence as well as admitted by her.
The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610
punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose
three periods are six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period;
six years, eight months and one day to seven years and four months, for the medium period; and
seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of
the indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the Court
fixes it at seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from prision correccional in the maximum period, the
penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum period, whose range is from four years,
two months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one
day of prision mayor.
PEOPLE V. ALLEN MANTALABA

G.R. NO. 186227, JULY 20, 2011
MINOR DRUG OFFENDER
Facts: Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received
a report that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation, in the
presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory of the items
recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-
1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two
(2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill The laboratory
examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-
violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets separately
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Two information were filed against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba
pleaded not guilty.
RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 55 of RA9165 and
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua to death and fine of P500,000 for selling shabu and for
illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was sentenced to 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as
maximum of prision mayor and fine of P300,000. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Mantalaban averred that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no
evidence of actual sale between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also
claims that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established.
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Issue: Whether RTC erred in rendering the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death against
Mantalaba.
Held: Yes. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to
death; however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty
for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be
reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be graduated as
it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal
Code.
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in

fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying
the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua,
which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no
other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the
present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion
perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion
temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the
proper imposable penalty.
ALAMADA MACAMANDO V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 188708, JULY 31, 2013
PENALTY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL TO RECLUSION PERPETUA; ARTICLE
77(2)
Facts: On Dec. 21, 2001 Alamada Macamando broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I.
pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla ko"). Afterwards, he uttered that he
would burn his house.
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire.
When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant‘s
house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor
whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to
get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who was
carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3)
shots in the air. The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire
would be killed.
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces. Eric
also returned to his house to save his belongings. Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI
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Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident, and concluded, among others,
that the fire started in the appellant‘s house; and that it had been intentional. Barangay Chairman
Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his barangay, and that he assisted the
City Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in assessing the damage.
RTC ruled that Macamando is guilty of violating Art. 320 (Destructive Arson) of the RPC and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in finding Macamando guilty of Destructive Arson and applying
its imposable penalty.
Held: Yes. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section
3 of this law provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua
shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law
punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree
of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson.
Alamada Macamando is only committed simple arson. The elements of simple arson under
Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to
his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and
appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been
intentional.
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is
reclusion temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion
perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years, and whose maximum should be the medium period of reclusion temporal to
84 | P a g e
reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, taking into
account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended the
commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on the
appellant the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
PEOPLE V. MARISSA BAYKER

G.R. NO. 170192, FEBRUARY 10, 2016
ISLAW IN ESCALATING PENALTY
Facts: The State presented four witnesses, namely: Virgilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab, et. al.
Caniazares testified that he and Dahab had met Marissa Bayker at the house of a friend in Makati
City in January 2001, and she had then represented herself to be recruiting workers for overseas
employment, probably as hotel porters in Canada; that on January 27, 2001, he had gone to her
residence in Pembo, Makati City to pay P4,000.00 for his medical examination, and she had then
accompanied him to the Medical Center in Ermita, Manila for that purpose;that on March 30,
2001, she had gone to his house to inform him that he would be deployed as a seaman instead but
that he had to pay P6,000.00 more; that he had paid the P6,000.00 to her, for which she had
issued a receipt; that two weeks thereafter, she had called him about his deployment on April 21,
2001; that on the promised date, he had gone to her office at Makati but no one was around; that
he had then proceeded to her house, and she had then told him that his seaman's application
would not push through; none of the her promise materialized so he had gone to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), where he had learned that the accused,
Bermudez and Langreo, had not been issued the license to recruit and place people overseas; and
that he had then decided to charge them all with illegal recruitment and estafa in the Philippine
National Police Crime Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City.
Dahab met Marissa Bayker at the Guadalupe Branch of Jollibee to pay P2,500.00 for his medical
examination; that a week later, he had undergone the three-day training in Mandaluyong City, for
which he paid P2,500.00; that she had then demanded from him the placement fee of
P25,000.00; and that after he had not been able to raise the amount, he never saw her again; and
that Caniazares soon called him to urge that he should complain against the accused in the PNP-
CIDG.
Miparanum paid a total of P54,000 to Bayker and the others were also promised the same
deployment to Hong Kong as an ordinary seaman. However, after taking their money the
promised deployment abroad never materialized, which prompted them to file a case. Marissa
Bayker was charged with Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale and estafa under Article
315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
RTC sentenced her with life imprisonment for Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale and
for Estafa she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE
(9) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional to NINE (9)YEARS of prision
mayor.
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CA affirmed with modifications for Estafa, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9)
years of prision mayor as maximum.
Issue: Whether the CA was correct in modifying the penalties.
Held: Yes. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional l0,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
Inasmuch as the prescribed penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, plus one year for each additional Pl0,000.00 over P22,000.00,
provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years, the penalty to be imposed on the
accused-appellant should depend on the amount defrauded. We note that the RTC took into
consideration only the sum of P40,000.00, and the CA concurred with the RTC thereon. Yet, the
records reveal that Miparanum paid to the accused-appellant and her co-accused not only
P40,000.00 but the aggregate sum of P54,700.00 (i.e., the P6,000.00 for the seaman's book, the
additional P6,000.00 for the seaman's book, the P40,000.00 for placement fee, and P2,700 for his
training certificate). The amount of P54, 700.00 is the determinant of the penalty to be imposed.
Pursuant to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for estafa in which the
amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years, two
months and one day to eight years); if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty
thus prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period, and one year shall be added for each
additional Pl0,000.00 provided the total penalty imposed shall not exceed 20 years. Considering
that the penalty does not consist of three periods, the prescribed penalty is divided into three
equal portions, and each portion shall form a period,with the maximum period being then
imposed. However, the floor of the maximum period – six years, eight months and 21 days - is
fixed in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, or of any showing of the greater extent of
the evil produced by the crime, to which is then added the incremental penalty of one year for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, or three years in all. The resulting total penalty is
nine years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, which shall be the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence.
The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision correccional in its minimum
period to prision correccional in its medium period (i.e., six months and one day to four years
and two months), the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. We note that the CA correctly fixed the minimum of the indeterminate sentence at four
years and two months of prision correccional.
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In view of the foregoing, the indeterminate sentence for the accused-appellant is from four years
and two months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to nine years, eight months and 21
days of prision mayor.
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ARTICLES 88-89 – EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1. TOTAL EXTINCTION (ARTICLE 89)

 ACT NO. 3326 – PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES (SPL)
REPUBLIC VS. COJUANGCO JR.

G.R. NO. 139930 JUNE 26, 2012
PRESCRIPTION
Facts: On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro D. Regala, et. al. incorporated the United
Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM). On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, et.al.
approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than ₱500 million from the fund in the equity of
UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut farmers.
On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million shares
without par value. The Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock stated that the incorporators held
one million shares without par value and that UCPB subscribed to 4 million shares worth ₱495
million.
On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of respondents Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, et.al. approved another amendment
to UNICOM‘s capitalization giving the incorporators unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1
million shares to 100 million shares without cost to them.. This increased its authorized capital
stock to one billion shares divided into 500 million Class "A" voting common shares, 400
million Class "B" voting common shares, and 100 million Class "C" non-voting common shares,
all with a par value of ₱1 per share. The paid-up subscriptions of 5 million shares without par
value (consisting of one million shares for the incorporators and 4 million shares for UCPB)
were then converted to 500 million Class "A" voting common shares at the ratio of 100 Class
"A" voting common shares for every one without par value share.
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 against respondents, the
1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPB‘s investment in UNICOM was manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only ₱5
million and it had no track record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common
shares, the government‘s ₱495 million investment was reduced by ₱95 million which was
credited to UNICOM‘s incorporators.
Issue: Whether respondents‘ alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.
Held: Yes. R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed in
accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326, which provides:
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Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
That investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld from the curious or from
those who were minded to know like banks or competing businesses. Indeed, the OSG
made no allegation that respondent members of the board of directors of UCPB connived
with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment.
Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board rooms when
UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible government clearing house for increases
in corporate capitalization, to accommodate UCPB‘s investment. Changes in shareholdings are
reflected in the General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated to submit
annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon request
Granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the UCPB investment into
UNICOM during martial law, the second element that the action could not have been instituted
during the 10-year period because of martial law does not apply to this case. The lastday for
filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after martial law ended.
Petitioner had known of the investment it now questions for a sufficiently long time yet it let
those four years of the remaining period of prescription run its course before bringing the proper
action.
JADEWELL PARKING VS. JUDGE LIDUA

G.R. NO. 169588, OCTOBER 7, 2013
ACT 3326; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE
Facts: Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to
operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is
also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by
placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint
that on May 17, 2003, the respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then
illegally parked and unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp
belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00.
The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid by
the respondents herein. Jadewell filed two cases against respondents for Robbery it was filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. A preliminary
investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case
charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation
of Authority/Grave Coercion. On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003.
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Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino
filed on January 20, 2004 a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation[8] on February 2, 2004. In an
Order[10] dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and
dismissed the cases. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004
responding to the February 10, 2004 Order.
Respondents argued that in Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that
the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial
proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the
crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were
filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the cases. The RTC of Baguio City, Branch 7 dismissed the case.
Issue: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,
2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense.
Held: No. The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the
procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period,
Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the
violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other
prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue
that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription: In resolving
the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run;
and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. With regard to the period of
prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under
City Ordinance 003-2000.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the
prescription period. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing
of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an
ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In
Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured
similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11,
1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
90 | P a g e
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted
on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. Jurisprudence
exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then
files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003,
the period had already prescribed.
PRISCILLA Z. ORBE VS. LEONORA O. MIARAL

G.R. NO. 217777, AUGUST 16, 2017
COMPUTATION OF PRESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES
Facts: Leonora Miaral agreed to enter into a partnership agreement with her sister Priscilla Orbe.
They executed an agreement wherein both of them will contribute P250,000 each to Toppy Co
Inc. and Miaral Enterprises. The business will be engage in the buying & selling of stock lots of
garments to be exported to the United States particularly in Los Angeles, California. On one trip
to the United States of America in April of 1996, Miaral told Orbe that she could join
respondent, her daughter Anne Kristine, and her granddaughter Ara in the trip to the United
States. Miaral convinced Orbe to pay for the plane tickets of respondent, Anne Kristine and Ara
amounting to Two Thousand Seventy One Dollars (US$2,071.00) with a promise to pay
petitioner once they arrive in the United States.
Upon arrival, respondent issued three (3) checks drawn in a bank in the United States as
payment. However, one of the checks was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. Orbe likewise discovered that there was no exportation of garments to the United States or
any other transactions in the United States that took place.
Orbe demanded from respondent and Anne Kristine the total payment of Two Hundred Three
Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Pesos (₱203,999.00) and One Thousand Dollars
(US$1,000.00). Despite demands, Miaral and Anne Kristine failed to return the money.
On 7 February 2011, Orbe filed a complaint for estafa against Miaral and Anne Kristine before
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City.
In their counter-affidavit, respondent and Anne Kristine denied petitioner's allegations and
claimed, among others, that the partnership agreement they entered into rules out a successful
prosecution for estafa. They also claimed that the action had already prescribed since the
complaint was filed 15 years after the agreement.
Issue: Whether the action for estafa has already prescribed.
Held: No. ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if
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such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The total amount allegedly swindled by respondent is ₱203,999.00 for the buying of
garments and workers' salaries plus US$ 1,000.00for the plane tickets which exceeds
₱22,000.00. Taking into consideration the whole amount with the additional one year for
each additional ₱10,000.00, the penalty imposable on respondent shall be prision mayor in
its maximum period to reclusion temporal, the total penalty not exceeding twenty (20)
years.
Under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalties of prision mayor and reclusion
temporal are included in the enumeration of afflictive penalties. Furthermore, Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code states that crimes punishable by afflictive penalties, such as the crime of
estafa, prescribe in fifteen (15) years.
The said prescriptive period is computed under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the off ended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
xxxx
In this case, the fifteen-year prescriptive period commenced in April 1996 when the petitioner
discovered that one of the checks that respondent issued as payment was dishonored for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. At around that time, petitioner likewise discovered that
there was no buying, selling and exportation of garments or any other transactions that took place
in the United States.
The fifteen-year period was interrupted on 7 February 2011 when petitioner filed a
complaint for estafa against respondent and Anne Kristine before the OCP of Quezon City.
In People v. Olarte,"the filing of the complaint, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should and does interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on its merits."
As of the filing of the complaint on 7 February 2011, the prescriptive period had run for
fourteen (14) years and ten (10) months. Thus, the fifteen-year period has not yet
prescribed.
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DEL CASTILLO VS. TORRECAMPO

G.R. NO. 139033, DECEMBER 18, 2002
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTY
Facts: May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in Barangay Ombao,
Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, Jovendo Del Castillo strike in a
disorderly manner the electric bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting the room
where voting center no. 24 is located, during the counting of the votes in said voting center
plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of
the Board of Election Tellers.
Del Castillo was charged for violation of Section 178(nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial
court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. During the execution of judgment on October 14, 1987, petitioner was not
present. The presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner
was never apprehended. 10 years later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on
the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had already prescribed. The motion was denied by
the trial court.
Issue: Whether the penalty imposed upon Del Castillo had prescribed.
Held: No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades
the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of
sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the
limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to
have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution
of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the
compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he
failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to
become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner‘s
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed.
He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ V. SIMEON V. MARCELO

G.R. NO. 165510-33, 2006-07-28
PRESCRIPTION; WHEN ABSENT IN THE PHILIPPINES
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Facts: This case involves a motion for reconsideration of the petitioner Romualdez. Romualdez
claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the
filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution
of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on
appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a
quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before
the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription. Petitioner invokes prescription since he
was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to 2000, hence the crime already prescribed.
Issue: Whether the case agains Romualdez already prescribed.
Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the
absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive
period is more apparent than real.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect as early
as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines "special acts" as "acts defining
and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code".
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.

Desierto, this Court was categorical in ruling that –
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for
offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not
provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the
prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the
Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.
Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies
to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special laws only suppletorily
and only when the latter do not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory
construction dictate that special legal provisions must prevail over general ones.
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2. PARTIAL EXTINCTION (ARTICLE 94, AS AMENDED BY RA 10592)

3. RA 10592 (GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCES, MTS, LOYALTY)
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PROBATION LAW (PD 968) AS AMENDED BY RA 10707
PABLO FRANCISCO V. CA
G.R. NO. 108747. APRIL 6, 1995
PROBATION IN MULTIPLE CONVICTION
Facts: Francisco's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans.
Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —
“You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo walang
utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.”
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5)
separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him
with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation by his employees. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati sentenced him of prision correccional in its minimum period
in each crime committed on each date of each case. Francisco then elevated the case to the RTC
in which they sentenced him only of eight straight months for appreciating mitigating
circumstances.
Francisco failed to make an appeal on the RTC‘s decision making it final. The MTC issued a
warrant of arrest, but before Francisco was to be arrested, he filed an application for probation
which the MTC denied. He went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which was also denied.
Issue:
1. Whether Pablo Francisco is still qualified to avail of probation.

2. Whether a convict can avail of probation even he is sentenced to multiple prison terms.
Held: 1. No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. First, Francisco violated Sec.4 of the
Probation Law in which no application for probation shall be entertained after the judgement is
final.
Second, Francisco misunderstood when he thought that his prison sentence held by the MTC was
not qualified for probation. Multiple prison terms should not be added up. Consequently,
Francisco lost his right to probation when he appealed the MTC decision to the RTC. The law
considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
Third, Francisco‘s appeal to the RTC was not for reducing his penalties but for his assertion of
his innocence. The Probation Law prevent opportunism when petitioners apply for probation
when their appeal was dismissed. Lastly, the application for probation was filed way beyond the
period allowed by law.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially
rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability
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and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires
that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation.
2. Yes. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one
decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed
against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification
from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled
to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is
immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable
period.
MICHAEL PADUA V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 168546, JULY 23, 2008
DRUG TRAFFICKER NOT ELIGIBLE
Facts: June 16, 2003, Padua and Edgar Ubalde were charged before the RTC Pasig of violation
of R.A. No. 9165 [Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs act of 2002] for selling dangerous drugs.
When arraigned, Padua assisted by counsel de officio entered a plea of not guilty. During the
pre-trial, Padua‘s counsel de officio manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of
not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail the benefits granted to 1 st time offenders. The
prosecutor interposed no objection, thus the not guilty plea was withdrawn, Padua re-arraigned
and pleaded guilty.
Padua then filed a petition for probation alleging that he is a minor and a 1st time offender, and
that he possess all qualifications and none of the disqualifications of the probation law. RTC
ordered for the post-sentenced investigation and recommendation and comment of the probation
office and the city prosecutor relatively.
Pasana, the chief probation and parole officer recommended Padua to be placed on probation.
However, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an order denying the petition for probation on the ground
that under R.A. No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law.
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. He filed for a petition for
certiorari, but the CA dismissed his petition.
Issue: Whether Michael Padua can avail the benefits of the Probation Law.
Held: No. Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep.
Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165
that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any
person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty
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imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking
or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, can not avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of
a statute there should be no departure.
MANUEL BALA V. JUDGE MARTINEZ

G.R. NO. L-67301, JANUARY 29, 1990
PROBATION; TERMINATION
Facts: Manuel Bala had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa
Criss Diazen which had been attached to her United States of America passport, with that of
Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. On January 3, 1978,
the trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case No. 24443, guilty of the crime
of falsification of a public document. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY
and not exceeding THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS & TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS
of prision correccional.
Bala applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order dated August 11,
1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the
terms and conditions enumerated therein. By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should
have expired on August 10, 1983, one year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the
order of final discharge could not be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet
submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge.
Issue: Whether the expiration of the probation period of Bala automatically discharges him from
probation.
Held: No. The Court finds no merit in the petition. Probation is revocable before the final
discharge of the probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioner's submission.
Section 16 of PD 968 is clear on this score:
See. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and upon consideration of
the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge
of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and
thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
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Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate
probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of the
probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued by
the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the
probation officer. Only from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed
terminated.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to exceed the period set
in the law. This is so because the period of probation, like the period of incarceration, is deemed
the appropriate period for the rehabilitation of the probationer.
ENRIQUE ALMERO V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 188191, MARCH 12, 2014
APPEAL AND PROBATION MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE REMEDIES
Facts: Almero is the accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and multiple physical injuries. Trial ensued and the MTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced
him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Petitioner filed an
Application for Probation, reasoning that he was informed of his conviction only upon being
served the warrant for his arrest. Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed his application on the
ground that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even neglected to
inform the court of his change of address.
MTC denied his application. Almero files a certiorari before the RTC. The RTC granted the
certiorari and sets aside MTC ruling and remands it back to MTC. The CA ruled that the RTC
should have confined itself to determining whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioner‘s application for probation
Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to probation.
Held: No. Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred
by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of the courts , it is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. In Francisco v.
Court of Appeals, the Court explained: Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to
a penitent qualified offender, it essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible
convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to
jettison an appeal.
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he
can avail of probation.
This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused to )ager on the result of his
appeal that when his conviction is final and affirmed on appeal, he now applies for probation as
an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate court‘s affirmance of his conviction. Aside
from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the
treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on
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diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have
accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an
accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the
Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments
of conviction, even if the sentence is probationable, for the purpose of securing an acquittal and
applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.
Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to
appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of
the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing,
he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal
and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 151258 DECEMBER 1, 2014
PROBATION AFTER APPEAL
Facts: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). Hazing was pre-requisite in joining for which Lenny was one of few who had
undergone the process. After the initiation, Lenny‘s condition worsened due to the blows he
received, during the night, after just an hour of sleep, Lenny roused the other neophytes with his
shivering and incoherent mumbling. The Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. Four of the
accused (Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty of homicide by the trial court but was reduced to
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor by the Court of
Appeals. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Supreme Court ruled that they should be liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
instead.
In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified the effect of the decision
of the Supreme Court to their criminal liability. According to Tecson et. al., they immediately
applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the
crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which
carries a probationable sentence. Hence, they have already been discharged from their criminal
liability and the cases against them closed and terminated by virtue of their granted Applications
for Probation for which the terms therein are already been complied with.
Issue: Whether Tecson et. al. can be covered by the Probation Law despite their appeal of
conviction.
Held: Yes. The Court abandoning its previous stance on ineligibility of those who have appealed
their conviction to probation, citing the then recent case of Colinares vs. People that the
Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his.
Had the RTC done what was right and imposed the correct penalty, he would have had the
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right to apply for probation. Moreover, the Court was quick to clarify that it remains that
those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of
his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be
regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes
within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation
Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its
beneficent purpose.
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ARTICLES 100-113 – CIVIL LIABILITY
1. WHO ARE LIABLE? (ARTICLE 100
PEOPLE V. IRENEO JUGUETA

G.R. NO. 202124, APRIL 5, 2016
CIVIL INDEMNITY
Facts: The family of Norberto Divina were all lying down side by side about to sleep on June 6,
2002 at around 9:00 o‘clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped
off by appellant and his companions. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he
refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them successively and indiscriminately, having
hit and killed his two daughters, Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were 13 years old and 3
½ years old respectively.
Two of the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace (13 years old) and Claudine (3 1/2 years
old), died from gunshot wounds. Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children
Elizabeth and Judy Ann Divina, both minors, were not hit.
Appellant Jugueta was charged with the Double Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine
Divina, both minors. The crime was alleged to have been committed with treachery, evident
premeditation, in the dwelling of the offended party, and the accused taking advantage of
nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. He was also charged, together with Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel, with Multiple Attempted Murder, for the shooting attack on the
other family members of Norberto Divina, who fortunately, were not hit.
Trial court found Jugueta guilty and sentenced him with death penalty. However, pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder
without eligibility for parole.
Issue: Whether the accused is liable for civil indemnity. (and how much?)
Held: Yes. The Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal cases
where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal
cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral,
and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in
some instances.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended
party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other
proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in
civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, ―Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.‖ It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically,
not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. In our
jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
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latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
restitution.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender
caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of
the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any
ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the
penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be
imposed, then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
ANITA TAN V. STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO.

G.R. NO. L-4160, JULY 29, 1952
AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL, CIVIL LIABILITY
Facts: On May 3, 1949, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the delivery to the Rural
Transit Company at its garage at Rizal Avenue Extension, City of Manila, of 1,925 gallons of
gasoline using a gasoline tank-truck trailer. The truck was driven by Julito Sto. Domingo, who
was helped by Igmidio Rico. While the gasoline was being discharged to the underground tank,
it caught fire, whereupon Julito Sto. Domingo drove the truck across the Rizal Avenue Extension
and upon reaching the middle of the street he abandoned the truck with continued moving to the
opposite side of the first street causing the buildings on that side to be burned and destroyed.
The house of Anita Tan was among those destroyed and for its repair she spent P12,000.
As an aftermath of the fire, Julito Sto. Domingo and Imigidio Rico were charged with arson
through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Manila where, after trial, both were acquitted, the
court holding that their negligence was not proven and the fire was due to an unfortunate
accident. Defendant Julio Sto. Domingo was acquitted, on the ground that he so acted
causing damage to another in order to avoid a greater evil or injury, under article 11,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Under the foregoing facts, there can be no doubt
that had the accused Julito Sto. Domingo not taken the gasoline tank-truck trailer out in
the street, a bigger conflagration would have occurred in Rizal Avenue Extension.
With respect to damages, Anita Tan did not make any reservation of her right to file a separate
civil action against the accused as required by the Rules of Court Rule 107, section 1-(a). As
Anita Tan failed to make reservation, and the accused were acquitted, the lower court ruled that
she is now barred from filing this action against the defendants. Anita Tan then brought the
action against the Standard Vacuum Oil Company and the Rural Transit Company; including the
two employees, seeking to recover the damages she has suffered for the destruction of her house.
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss alleging in substance that plaintiff's action is barred
by prior judgment.
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Issue: Whether Rural Transit Co. is civilly liable.
Held: Yes. Standard Vacuum Oil and Rural Transit Co. liable and res judicata does not apply to
them. The case of the Rural Transit Co. is predicated on a special provision of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, article 101, Rule 2, of said Code provides:
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following
rules:
xxx xxx xxx
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm
has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they have received.
The cause of action against the Rural Transit Company can hardly be disputed, it
appearing that the damage caused to the plaintiff was brought about mainly because of the
desire of driver Julito Sto. Domingo to avoid greater evil or harm, which would have been
the case had he not brought the tank-truck trailer to the middle of the street, for then the
fire would have caused the explosion of the gasoline deposit of the company which would
have resulted in a conflagration of much greater proportion and consequences to the
houses nearby or surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this company is one of those for
whose benefit a greater harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the purview
of said penal provision. The acquittal of the accused cannot, therefore, be deemed a bar to
a civil action against this company because its civil liability is completely divorced from the
criminal liability of the accused. The rule regarding reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action does not apply to it.
2. SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY

3. EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY
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EXCLUDED:
TITLE III, CHAPTER II (CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION)
TITLE IV, CHAPTER III (FRAUDS)
TITLE V (CRIMES RELATED TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS)
TITLE VI, CHAPTER I (GAMBLING AND BETTING)
TITLE VII, CHAPTER VI (EXCEPT ARTICLES 235 AND 245)
TITLE IX, CHAPTER III (DISCOVERY AND REVELATION OF SECRETS)
105 | P a g e
ARTICLES 114-365 – FELONIES; DEFINITION; NATURE;

PENALTIES
 ELEMENTS OF FELONY NECESSARY FOR PROSECUTION
MAYOR AMADO CORPUZ V. PEOPLE

GR NOS. 212656-57, NOVEMBER 23, 2016
REQUIREMENTS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION; FALSE NARRATION OF FACTS
Facts: Two counts of Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Corpuz, in his official capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, was indicted for two (2) counts of the abovementioned criminal offense.
Arsenio Flores, a retired government employee who testified that being one of the wedding
sponsors of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal, he attended and witnessed the actual
ceremony of their wedding which was solemnized by Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal
Registrar, and not petitioner, at the Municipal Registrar's Office where it was held; that with the
knowledge that said Municipal Registrar was not authorized to solemnize marriage, he did not
sign as a witness their marriage certificate, and thereafter searched for documents, including
pictures and invitation cards, in order to establish such illegal acts; that based on the documents
he gathered, it was made to appear that petitioner was the one who solemnized said marriages
because of his signature appearing on the corresponding marriage certificates; and that he could
not explain why the subject marriage certificate was already signed by petitioner when in fact he
was not around during the ceremony, and was immediately given to them on the same day.His
testimony was corroborated by Honorato M. Tolentino, the brother-in-law of Alex Pascual, who
testified that he rendered his services for free as a photographer during said wedding, and
witnessed the actual ceremony, with the observation that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr. who
solemnized the same.
Issue: Whether Mayor Amado is guilty of the crime of falsification of public documents.
Held: No. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article 171, paragraph 4
of the RPC, which provides:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister. - The
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:
x x x x4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; x x x
It bears emphasis that what is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it. Generally, the
elements of Article 171 are: (1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2)
he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by committing
any of the ways it is done.
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Specifically, paragraph 4 of the said Article requires that: (a) the offender makes in a
public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by
the offender are absolutely false. In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven
that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making
the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have
taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody
of the document which he falsifies.
We rule to reverse the Sandiganbayan's ruling of conviction against petitioner.
First, none of the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by the prosecution was able to
dispute the presumption of regularity of an official function and authenticity and due execution
of the public instruments issued by petitioner as the Municipal Mayor, which may only be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
As can be gleaned from the narration of facts provided by the trial court, there is no showing that
an actual appearance by the concerned parties spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion before
petitioner as their solemnizing officer did not occur or happen.
Looking into the evidence presented, the only patent conclusion that can be derived from the
prosecution's evidence, as admitted by the witnesses for the defense, is that both couples
appeared before. Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., for the sole purpose of receiving marriage counselling
and/or marriage rehearsals, nothing more.
Second, the Sandiganbayan expressed that the testimonies of the defense's witnesses appear
biased considering that they "owe their current employment with the accused as these narrations
rang no truth and sounded to have been well-coached;"
Unfortunately, we find this declaration quite odd considering that there was no iota of evidence
to show that both Alex Y. Pascual and. Manny M. Asuncion owe debts of gratitude to petitioner.
 AMENDMENTS BY RA 7659 AND RA 10951
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CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW OF

NATIONS (ARTICLES 114-123)
ARTICLE 122-123 – PIRACY AND MUTINY
ANTI-PIRACY LAW (PD 532)
PEOPLE V. ROGER TULIN

G.R. NO. 111709 AUGUST 30, 2001
ARTICLE 122 VS. PD 532
Facts: In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation ,loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline, and
diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates including the accused Roger P.
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and completely took over the
vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded
transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the
captive vessel returned to the Philippines. A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the
accused were charged with qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy
in Philippine Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this
appeal. Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing
him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside
of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for
trial, to convict, and sentence.
Issue: Whether the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the
Philippine waters and territory.
Held: We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants. Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any
person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses
committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued
in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters."
Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise
no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighbouring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in
one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under
the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as
separate laws.
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As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to
state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee"
by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and
sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong,
in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code
but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters.
Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is
precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA
761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a
reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
PHILIPPINE WATERS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMO DELA PEÑA
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
PHILIPPINE WATERS
FACTS: Julita, her husband, Jose and their son, Marwin were about to board their pump boat
loaded with 13 sacks of copra. As the Nacoboan's pump boat was about to depart, a smaller boat
suddenly blocked its path. For fear of collision, Jose stopped the engine of their pump boat.
Three armed men then immediately ordered the pump boat. One of the armed men pointed a
firearm at Jose and ordered him to proceed to the aft or the rear side of the boat. Julita identified
him as Maximo Dela Pena. Jose's hands were tied and his head covered.
Another armed person grabbed Julita‘s bag and took the following items: 1) ₱1,000.00 Cash; 2)
Earrings; 3) Cellular phone; and 4) Necklace. Another person operated the pump boat and
docked it on a small island after nearly two hours of travel. When they arrived at the small
island, the appellant unloaded the 13 sacks of copra. The appellant and his armed companions
then brought the pump boat to another island where its engine, propellertube, and tools were
taken and loaded on appellant's boat. Consequently, the Nacoboan‘s boat was left without an
engine and they had to paddle to safety. They discovered that they were already in Equiran,
Daram, Samar.
RTC: rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of piracy under PD 532.
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CA: Affirmed
ISSUE: whether appellant is guilty of piracy. YES
RULING: The Information categorically alleged that the incident happened along the river bank
of Brgy. San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar.
Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters''' is defined as follows:
[A]ll bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and
connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth,
length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or Iegal title,
including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which
the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
From this definition, it is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters.
The Information also clearly alleged that the vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal belongings
of the passengers were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. It stated, in no
uncertain terms, that 13 sacks of copra were taken by the appellant through force and
intimidation. Undoubtedly, these sacks of copra were part of the vessel's cargo. The Information
also stated that the vessel's equipment which consisted of the engine, propeller tube, and tools
were taken and carried away by the appellant. Furthermore, the Information also stated that the
personal belongings of the passengers consisting of two watches, jewelry, cellphone, and cash
money were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. The appellant was able to seize
these items when he, along with armed companions, boarded the victims' pump boat and seized
control of the same. Armed with firearms, appellant and his companions tied Jose's hands,
covered his head, and operated their pump boat. They travelled to an island in Samar where they
unloaded the sacks of copra. Thereafter, appellant and his armed companions travelled to another
island where the engine, propeller tube, and tools of the pump boat were taken out and loaded on
appellant's boat.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the victims'
pump boat was in Philippine waters when appellant and his armed companions boarded the same
and seized its cargo, equipment, and the personal belongings of the passengers.
ANTI-HIJACKING LAW (PD 6235)

HI-JACKING OF PASSENGER PLANE
CARRYING OF PROHIBITED CARGO
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CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE

STATES (ARTICLES 124-133)
BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
ARBITRARY DETENTION; PHYSICAL RESTRAINT
FACTS: Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the DENR, Tacloban City sent a team
to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection
operations. En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats
being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting
them to stop and investigate. Thus, two of the members of the team (Maniscan and Militante)
disembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and proceeded to the site of the boat
construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga.
Mayor Astorga then ordered someone to fetch "reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes
later, a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men
were armed with rifles, and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team
members. Simon then tried to reiterate his request for permission to leave, which just succeeded
in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily said ―You cannot go home now because I will bring you to
Daram. We will have many things to discuss there‖ The team was brought to a house where they
were told that they would be served dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several
others. The meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m. After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1
Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but not to leave the barangay. On the other
hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally
allowed to leave.
Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and his
men. Sandiganbayan found accused BENITO ASTORGA guilty of Arbitrary Detention.
ISSUE: WON Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention. YES
RULING: Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without
legal grounds, detains a person.
The elements of the crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
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3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram,
Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a
public officer or employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred
by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his "instinct
for self-preservation" and the feeling that he was being "singled out."32 The detention was thus
without legal grounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Cortez,we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his
liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her
freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in said case was found
outside talking to the owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did
not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make good their threats to
kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew
where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin
was to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render people
immobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar
threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence.
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the
victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victims person. If the acts and
actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze
the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in
accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes,
detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses
and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was quickly
followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-
issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the
witnesses. Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement that it
was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders.39 It was not just the presence of the armed men,
but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear
was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to
stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and
witnesses against their will is thus clear.
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FELICIANO GALVANTE vs. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
NO WARRANTLESS SEARCH
FACTS: Galvante narrated how private respondents aimed their long firearms at him, arbitrarily
searched his vehicle and put him in detention, thus:
That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house to meet retired police Percival Plaza and inquire
about the retirement procedure for policemen; That upon arrival at the house of retired police
Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a
ride from the highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately went down of the jeep but before
I could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked my way; That the four policemen were
[private respondents] who all pointed their long firearms ready to fire [at] me, having heard the
sound of the release of the safety lock; That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1
Avenido saying, "Give me your firearm," to which I answered, "I have no firearm," showing my
waistline when I raised my T-shirt;
That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and showed their
waistline. Mr. Percival Plaza came down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also
a former police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements; That while we were raising
our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner type jeep and
conducted a search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant; That after a while
they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my jeep and asked me of the MR of the
firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to us, I searched my wallet and
gave the asked document; That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without
saying anything bringing with them the firearm;
Galvante then filed cases of Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against
the private respondents before the Ombudsman. Ombudsman dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: WON the private respondents can be held liable under the RPC for searching Galvante‘s
jeep without warrant. NO
RULING: The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a
warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained. Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses.
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Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint;
rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed
with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of
the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, 35 under
Article 32, in relation to Article 221936 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No.
6975.
To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a complaint for
damages with the regular courts or an administrative case with the PNP/DILG and not a criminal
action with the Ombudsman.
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed
with the Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore proper, although the reasons
public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the mark because they relied
solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and
that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his
complaint.40 Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was
not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the
result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search
which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or
not public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is
completely hypothetical under the circumstance.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE M. BAES

CONCEPCION J.:
OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
FACTS: That on April 14, 1937, at about 9a.m., while holding the funeral of one who in life was
called Antonio Macabigtas, in accordance with the rites of religious sect known as the "Church
of Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed,
through the chruchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, which churchyard belongs to the
said Church and is devoted to the religious worship thereof, against the opposition of the
complainant who, through force and threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled
to allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard. An act committed in grave profanation
of the place, in open disregard of the religious feelings of the Catholics and in violation of article
133 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: WON the accused may be held liable under Article 133 of the RPC. YES
RULING: The offense imputed to the defendants herein is defined in article 133 which is as
follows:
ART. 133. Offending religious feelings. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who,
in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious
ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
Whether the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question
of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of
other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who
profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing
another faith. We, therefore, take the view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the
offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file
an information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should
be conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of,
or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may be
proper, pursuant to section 29 of General Orders, No. 58.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. PROCOPIO REYES

HULL, J.:
OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
FACTS: In the barrio of Macalong, La Paz, Province of Tarlac, there is a chapel where it is
customary to hold what is known in local parlance as a pabasa. While the pabasa was going on
115 | P a g e
the evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants Procopio Reyes, et al
arrived at the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a barbed wire fence in
front of the chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge of
the pabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan, by reminding them of
the fact that it was Holy Week and that it was highly improper to construct a fence at that time of
the evening. A verbal altercation ensued.
The people attending the pabasa left the place hurriedly and in such confusion that dishes and
saucers were broken and benches toppled over. The pabasa was discontinued and it was not
resumed until after an investigation conducted by the chief of police on the following morning,
which investigation led to the filing of the complaint. Many years ago the Clemente family by
informal donation gave the land on which the old chapel was erected. When it was destroyed, the
present chapel was erected, and there is now a dispute as to whether the new chapel is not now
impinging on the land that belongs to the Clemente family. The appellants are partisans of the
Clemente family.
ISSUE: WON Procopio Reyes et al may be held liable under Article 133 of the RPC. NO
RULING: It is to be noted that article 133 of the Revises Penal Code punishes acts "notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the faithful." The construction of a fence, even though irritating and
vexatious under the circumstances to those present, is not such an act as can be designated as
"notoriously offensive to the faithful", as normally such an act would be a matter of complete
indifference to those not present, no matter how religious a turn of mind they might be.
It is urged upon us that the act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private
property rights. The fact that this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the
circumstances under which the fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as
to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further shown by
the fact that many of the appellants saw fit to introduce as their defense a false alibi.
Appellants are acquitted of a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code but found guilty
of a violation of article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER (ARTICLES 134-160)

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO
SERENO, CJ.:
POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE
FACTS: On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army in Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal remains of
individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" launched by members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP to purge their ranks of suspected military informers. Prosecutor Vivero then
recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court
presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando. Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in
the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged."33 He ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.34
Petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner
Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the
petition. Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others was then
pending before the RTC Makati. Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner
Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the
crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance
of rebellion.
ISSUE: Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the political
offense doctrine. NO
RULING: The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in
furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty."121
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Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. 122 Thus,
when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder.
Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must
be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents
with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle
in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to
charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.123
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes
crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political
end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can
be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-
conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged
by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. 125 The proof
showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity
to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter
in the instant petitions.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion,
the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple
rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a
valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized
under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.129
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944.Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
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Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the
DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack
of impartiality and independence.130 When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis
and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-
944.131 We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first
jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
LYDIA C. GELIG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
DIRECT ASSAULT, PERSON IN AUTHORITY
FACTS: Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos were public school teachers.
Lydia‘s son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case. On July 17,
1981, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy"
while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall
and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia‘s violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her
"maxillary area". However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started
bleeding two days after the incident. She was them admitted in the hospital and was diagnosed,
to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion.
RTC: rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion.
CA: It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from
being a person in authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing
the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia. Likewise, Lydia‘s purpose was not
to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her son. The
appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since there
was no evidence that she was aware of Gemma‘s pregnancy at the time of the incident. However,
it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries.
ISSUE: WON Lydia can be held liable for the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion.
RULING: Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.
The provision reads as follows:
Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ
force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes
of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
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on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with
a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands
upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that
may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without
a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion
of such performance.14
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. Its
elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the
actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties.
4. That there is no public uprising.
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her
official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the
needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia
was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a
"sissy". Lydia refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal
abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principal‘s office but Lydia
followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The
violent act resulted in Gemma‘s fall to the floor.
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Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly
mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent portion of the
provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority – Who shall be deemed as
such. –
xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion
of such performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 873)
Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in
setting aside the trial court‘s verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of
direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because
she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains
that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official
functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk
properly,17 but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia
continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly
situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her
against a wall divider while she was going to the principal‘s office. No fault could therefore be
attributed to Gemma.
The prosecution‘s success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not
necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the
crime of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and
pushing of Gemma by Lydia was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical
certificate of Gemma‘s attending physician was presented to the court to prove that she suffered
an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her medical condition was a direct
consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident.18
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete
abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of
time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a
direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident
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were not substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion
may have been the result of other factors.
EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO vs. HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ

CONCEPCION, J.:
ARTICLE 156
FACTS: The accused, being then a member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur and
specially charged with the duty of keeping under custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo
Denaque, did then and there with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence leave the latter
unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity to run away and escape, as in
fact said detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from the custody of the said
accused.
Witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur, the defense brought forth
and confronted the witness with a note, purportedly written by Gov. Armando Cledera, asking
Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house then leased
by the province and used as an official guest house. That the escape of Pablo Denaque was made
possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are
equally guilty of the offense for which the accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the defense
cousel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the information so as to include Gov.
cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants therein.
ISSUE: WON Cledera and Esmeralda can be held liable under Article 156 of the RPC. NO
RULING: Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jail.
The offense may be committed in two ways:
(1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and
(2) by helping such a person to escape.
To remove means to take away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without the
active compensation of the person released.
To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that
person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his
escape. 15
The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail any
person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody
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or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty
under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the
province, 16and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for
the escape of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code. There is likewise no
sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code,
which reads, as follows:
ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. - Any Public officer who shall consent to
the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary disqualification
in its minimum period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been
sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case
the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any
crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.
In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the
public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or
charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an essential
condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the
public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he
has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. 17 For sure no connivance in the escape of
Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced from the note of
Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house, it appearing that
the notes does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that
it was the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose the work party.
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG v. HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES

FELICIANO, J.:
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
FACTS: Wilfredo Torres, petitioner was convicted by the CFI Manila of the crime of estafa
(two counts). On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the
President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the
manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. The evidence before the Board
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showed that petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of estafa. It was also showed that the
petitioner had been convicted by the RTC of Rizal of the crime of sedition. Records of the NBI
also showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last
twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave
threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious
mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772
(interfering with police functions). Some of these charges were identified in the NBI report as
having been dismissed. The respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the
Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the
conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner.
The President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly
arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Petitioner
now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not
violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty
(20) counts of estafa charged nor of the crime of sedition.
ISSUE: WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
RULING:
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following
propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for
the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
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We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well understood rules and doctrine on this
matter.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the
parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What
is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that
he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of
reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we
here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A
convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course
be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him.
Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the
parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or
(ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon."
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President‘s executive prerogative
and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENTINO ABILONG

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
DESTIERRO AND EVASION
FACTS: That the said accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place
within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered
by the municipal court on April 5, 1946 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits made
against him and commit vagrancy.
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence
of destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
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article 157 of the said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are
imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his
contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article which in part
reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.
ISSUE: WON the accused can be held liable under Article 157 of the RPC. YES
RULING: Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish,
the Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear that the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase
"sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation
of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence
of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view has been adopted
in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court
held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence
of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty
when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was ratified by this Court, though,
indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it
was held that one evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited
area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall
have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence
of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of
Manila, he entered said City.
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COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION LAW

(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10591)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO

PUNO, J.:
ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
FACTS: ROBERTO LUSTICA, a construction worker, was on the last rung of the stairs on the
third floor of the Gaisano building when he saw his co-worker ROGELIO ABAWAG being
closely pursued by accused JULIAN CASTIILLO, a lead man in the same construction site.
During the chase, the accused pointed a gun at Abawag and shot him. Abawag, then about a half
meter away from the accused, fell on his knees beside a pile of hollow blocks. FRANKLIN
ACASO, a mason working on the third floor of the Gaisano building, heard the first shot.
Initially, he did not pay attention to it as he thought that the sound came from one of their
construction equipments. Seconds later, he heard a second shot and a person screaming. When he
looked towards the direction of the sound, he saw the accused in front of Abawag, about a meter
away, pointing a .38 caliber revolver at the latter. Abawag was then leaning on a pile of hollow
blocks, pleading for mercy. The accused shot Abawag a third time despite the latter's
imploration. The accused then fled, leaving Abawag lifeless.4
The police then, accompanied by Akoy, proceeded to Port San Pedro where they saw the
accused on board a vessel bound for Cebu. The accused attempted to escape when the police
identified themselves but the police caught up with him. The police found in his possession a .38
caliber handmade revolver, three (3) empty shells and (3) live ammunitions. Further inquiry
revealed that the accused owned the gun but had no license to possess it. The police then took the
accused into custody and charged him for the murder of Abawag and for illegal possession of
firearm.
ISSUE: WON the accused can be held liable for illegal possession of firearm. NO
RULING: Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms:
first, the existence of the subject firearm, and
second, the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding
license or permit to carry it outside his residence.
The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the
prosecution.11
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The first element — the existence of the firearm — was indubitably established by the
prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant shoot the victim thrice with a .38
caliber revolver.12 Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over the gun to the security
guards in the building after the shooting.13 The same gun was recovered from the appellant and
offered in evidence by the prosecution. However, no proof was adduced by the prosecution to
establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that the appellant was not licensed to possess the
firearm. This negative fact constitutes an essential element of the crime as mere possession, by
itself, is not an offense. The lack of a license or permit should have been proved either by the
testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the
accused was not a licensee of the subject firearm14 or that the type of firearm involved can be
lawfully possessed only by certain military personnel.15 Indeed, if the means of proving a
negative fact is equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is on the party
averring said negative fact. As the Information alleged that the appellant possessed an unlicensed
gun, the prosecution is duty-bound to prove this allegation. It is the prosecution who has the
burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged, consistent
with the basic principle that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.16 Thus, if
the non-existence of some fact is a constituent element of the crime, the onus is upon the State to
prove this negative allegation of non-existence.17
Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself admitted that he had no license for the
gun recovered from his possession, his admission will not relieve the prosecution of its duty to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit to possess the gun.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO CRUZ alias Rene Hapon

PADILLA, J.:
OWNERSHIP NOT NECESSARY IN ILLEGAL POSSESSION
FACTS: On May 9, 1986, Lt. Noel Manabat, along with the elements of CRIG, acting On an
intelligence information of a reliable informant that about noon of that day a stolen car, coming
from Quezon City, was to be sold somewhere in MagaIlanes, Makati, nabbed Romeo Fernandez
and Joey Flores at the intersection of EDSA and Timog Street and brought them to headquarters.
After some questioning, these two (2) carnap suspects led the eight man-CRIG team to
Masambong, Quezon City where they alleged the other members of the carnap gang were
waiting for their shares of the proceeds from the sale of a vehicle. At said address, a sister of
appellant, who owned the apartment, opened the door to the CRIG team. Inside the apartment,
the team found appellant, sleeping on the floor, and gangmates Herminio Rivera and Lolito
Timcang. The team recognized appellant because he was pointed to by Romeo Fernandez and
Joey Flores. These two also informed the team that appellant was armed and, sure enough, the
team found a clutch bag containing a caliber .38 paltik revolver, one (1) live ammunition and a
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hand grenade under a bar, located one (1) meter away from the slumbering appellant After
waking him up, sgt. Reynaldo Cachuela confronted him at once with these exhibits. Appellant, in
the presence of all the eight-man CRIG team and gangmates admitted ownership of the bag,
firearm, bullet and grenade. The team arrested appellant and the rest of his group, as well as
confiscated the items of the crime.
Lilian Lauron of the Legal Research Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Unit, made a
thorough check of her records and determined that appellant Reynaldo Cruz y Santos was not a
licensed holder of caliber .38 paltik revolver. As to hand grenades, she declared that only
military personnel were authorized to carry them.
The accused, upon the other hand, denied ownership or possession of the firearm and hand
grenade, as well as the bag which contained the same. According to the accused, the bag and its
contents belonged to Joey Flores and was "planted" by PC operatives.
ISSUE: WON ownership is an essential element of illegal possession of firearms. NO
RULING: The appellant maintains that the revolver and hand grenade in question did not belong
to him; nor was he in actual possession thereof at the time he was arrested. Ownership, however,
is not an essential element of the offense charged. What the law requires is merely possession
which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one's control and management.
In the instant case, PC Lt. Noel Manabat, leader of the PC team that arrested the accused and his
companions for "carnapping," declared that after finding the bag containing the revolver and the
hand grenade under the bar in the apartment of the sister of the accused, he asked the
"carnapping" suspects to whom the bag belonged and they replied that it belonged to the herein
accused Reynaldo Cruz, and when he confronted the accused with the revolver and hand
grenade, the accused readily admitted that they belonged to him.
EUGENE C. FIRAZA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
MISSION ORDER
FACTS: Petitioner, appointed as a confidential agent of the NBI was issued a firearm and a
mission to gather and report to the NBI such information as may be relevant to investigations
undertaken by it.
In his private capacity, petitioner served as manager for RF Communications in connection with
which he dealt with Christopher Rivas for the establishment of a Public Calling Office. In the
course of a meeting between petitioner and Rivas at the latter's restaurant regarding the delivery
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of a defective machine for the Public Calling Office, a heated exchange ensued during which
petitioner is alleged to have pointed a gun at Rivas. Petitioner was thereupon accosted by P/Insp.
Alberto A. Mullanida, and PO2 Nilo Ronquillo, who discovered that his permit to carry firearm
outside residence had expired more than a month earlier.
Hence, a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for "UNATHORIZED CARRYING OF
LICENCE [sic] FIREARM OUTSIDE RESIDENCE," Petitioner, denying that any argument
occurred between him and Rivas, claimed that while he was explaining to Rivas the defect in the
machine subject of their meeting, P/Insp. Mullaneda and PO2 Ronquillo apprehended him and
seized his firearm tucked inside his shirt, even as he identified himself as an NBI agent; and that
he was prevented from presenting a Mission Order issued to him by the NBI, to prove his
authority to carry firearms outside of his residence, due to the coercive manner by which the two
approached him.
ISSUE: WON the accused can justify his carrying of the firearm outside his residence with the
Mission Order issued to him by the NBI. NO
RULING: Petitioner is mistaken. Permit to carry firearm is not the same as permit to carry
licensed firearm outside one's residence. Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D.
No. 1866, a Mission Order is defined as "a written directive or order issued by government
authority as enumerated in Section 5 hereof to persons who are under his supervision and
control for a definite purpose or objective during a specified period and to such place or places
as therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his duly issued or licensed
firearms outside of residence when so specified therein."
The Mission Order issued to petitioner authorized him to carry firearms "in connection with
confidential (illegible) cases assigned to [him]." Admittedly, petitioner was at Rivas' restaurant
in connection with a private business transaction. Additionally, the Mission Order did not
authorize petitioner to carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.
At all events, Sayco v. People,8 citing Section 6(a) of The Implementing Rules and Regulations
of P.D. No. 1866 and Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated October 16, 1986 issued by the
Department (then Ministry) of Justice, should put to rest any nagging doubts on the liability of
petitioner, a confidential civilian agent who was not shown to be in the regular plantilla of the
NBI.
First, special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the regular plantilla of any
government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving regular compensation for services
rendered are not exempt from the requirement under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294, of a regular license to possess firearms and a permit to carry the same outside of residence.
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xxx
Third, said special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to carry
firearms (whether private-owned or government-owned) outside of their residence.
xxxx
As for petitioner's claim that he was searched without a warrant to thus render the firearm seized
inadmissible in evidence, the same fails.
For even assuming arguendo that, as claimed by petitioner, his firearm was tucked inside his
shirt, the plain view doctrine, of which the following requirements which must concur, viz: (1)
the law enforcement officer has a prior justification for the intrusion, (2) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent, and, (3) the illegality of the evidence observed in plain
view is apparent to the apprehending officer,9 justified the intervention by the police officers in
petitioner's and Rivas' heated arguments in the course of which they noticed the suspicious
bulging object on petitioner's waist to draw them to check what it was.
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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST (ARTICLES 161-184)

1. ARTICLES 168-172 – FORGERY, FALSIFICATION, AND USE OF FALSIFIED
DOCUMENT
MARK CLEMENTE Y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL DINO VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FORGERY, ELEMENTS
FACTS: Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. An informant in the person of inmate
Francis dela Cruz narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders
to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however,
recognized the bill as a fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and
Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. The
informant returned to appellant the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and
announced a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet
from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which
were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same. Appellant simply raised the defense
of frame-up.
ISSUE: WON the accused can be held liable under Art. 168 of the RPC. NO
RULING: Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of
credit. -- Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding
articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of
the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed in said articles.
The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are:
(1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer,
or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or
falsified by another person;
(2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and
(3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.
As held in People v. Digoro,[21] possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without
anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the
RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.
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In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the
fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers,
they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at
the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have
personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. [23] Their
account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.
The non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's evidence since he
was the only one who had knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's intent to use a
counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its
witness, if in fact such person existed, but it did not present him. Hence, the trial court did not
have before it evidence of an essential element of the crime. The twenty-three (23) pieces of
counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner is not sufficient to show intent, which is a state of
mind, for there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.
ABUSAMA M. ALID vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

SERENO, CJ.:
FALSIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTS
FACTS: That on or about July 2004, in Cotabato City, Philippines, the accused, ABUSAMA
MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public officer holding the position of Assistant
Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture, taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the Philippine Airline (PAL) plane, a genuine
document which he attached and submitted as supporting document to his liquidation voucher
for the purpose of liquidating his cash advance of (₱10,496.00) Pesos as traveling expenses for
the period July 28-31, 2004 thereby rendering the said plane ticket a public/official document,
which falsification was committed in the following manner to wit: that in the upper right corner
of the said plane ticket indicating the date and place of issue, accused inserted the figure/number
8 after the figure/number 2 and erased the original word Aug (August) and superimposed the
[word] July to make it appear that the plane ticket was purchased/issued on July 28, 2004, when
the original date of purchase/issue was August 2, 2004; that in the portion of the ticket indicating
the flight route, accused also erased the original word "Cotabato" and superimposed therein the
word "Davao" and under the column "Date" of flight, accused erased the original figure 22 and
superimposed the figure "28" and also erased the word "Aug." and superimposed the word "Jul"
to make it appear that the flight took place on July 28 originating from Davao, thus accused
made alterations and intercalations in a genuine document which changed its original meaning
and perverting the truth to make it appear that he made an official trip to Manila, originating
from Davao on July 28, 2004 using a plane ticket issued/purchased on July 28, 2004 to conform
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with the entries in his liquidation voucher when accused knew [full] well that he did not make
such official trip on said date and route as indicated in the aforesaid falsified PAL plane ticket.
ISSUE: WON Alid can be convicted of the crime of falsification of a commercial document
under paragraph 1 of Article 172. NO
RULING: Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code
Notwithstanding the erroneous conviction meted out by the Sandiganbayan, this Court proceeds
to peruse the nature of the crime established in the records of this case. In People v.
Castillo,43 we emphasized a basic rule in criminal jurisprudence: that the defendant in a criminal
case may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegation stated in the
information and fully established by the evidence.
Guillergan v. People 44 declares that the falsification of documents committed by public officers
who take advantage of their official position under Article 171 necessarily includes the
falsification of commercial documents by private persons punished by paragraph 1 of Article
172. To reiterate, the elements of Article 171 are as follows:
1. The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.
2. The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.
3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under
Article 171.
In turn, paragraph 1 of Article 172 contains these requisites:
1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not
take advantage of his or her official position.
2. The falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.
3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under
Article 171.
Analyzing these felonies, we find that neither of them include damage or intent to cause damage
as an element of the crime; and that Article 171 encompasses all the elements required in a
conviction for falsification under paragraph 1 of Article 172.
Here, if the records show sufficient allegations that would convict Al id of paragraph I of Article
172, the Sandiganbayan is bound to sentence him to that lesser offense.1âwphi1 But, as
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mentioned, it overlooked this provision and jumped to convicting him of falsification under
paragraph 2 of Article 172. As discussed, the latter felony is not covered by his indictment under
Article 171.
This Court finds that the prosecution has sufficiently alleged all the elements of paragraph 1 of
Article 172. As regards the first element, Alid was a public officer who did not take advantage of
his official position.
Offenders are considered to have taken advantage of their official position in falsifying a
document if (1) they had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of
the document; or (2) they had official custody of the falsified document.47 Here, the accused
definitely did not have the duty to make, prepare, or intervene in the preparation of the PAL
Ticket. Neither was it in his official custody. Therefore, when he falsified the PAL Ticket, he did
not take advantage of his official position as Assistant Regional Director of the DA.
Anent the second element, the Sandiganbayan concluded that because the PAL Ticket was a
private document, Alid should not have been charged with falsifying a public document.
However, the PAL Ticket fell under the category of commercial documents, which paragraph 1
of Article 172 protects from falsification.
Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or business persons to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions. Examples include receipts, order slips, and
invoices.48 In Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group, 49 we considered a sales invoice
a commercial document and explained:
The Vehicle Sales Invoice [Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for
by checks issued by one Romeo Valera] is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is
a commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Business forms, e.g., order slip,
delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly recognized in ordinary commercial
transactions as valid between the parties and, at the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment
that a business transaction has in fact transpired.
In this case, since the PAL Ticket functioned as a sales invoice that memorialized the
consummation of the commercial transaction between the air carrier and the passenger, the
Sandiganbayan should have considered the fact that Alid had altered a commercial document.
Finally, the accused did not dispute that he had altered a genuine document. The date "22 AUG
2004" was changed to read "28 JULY 2004"; and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato"
appearing on the PAL Ticket was altered to read "Davao-Manila-Cotabato."50 Hence, the third
element of the felony punished by paragraph 1 of Article 172 is apparent in this case.
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Criminal Liability of the Accused
Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as
falsification.51 Such intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a
person.52 Thus, the acts of Alid must have displayed, with moral certainty, his intention to
pervert the truth before we adjudge him criminally liable. In cases of falsification, we have
interpreted that the criminal intent to pervert the truth is lacking in cases showing that (1) the
accused did not benefit from the falsification; and (2) no damage was caused either to the
government or to a third person.
In Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals,55 the heirs of the deceased
falsified the signature of the latter in a Notice of Appeal. The Court rejected the imputation of
falsification because the forgery produced no effect.
This Court is well aware that falsification of documents under paragraph 1 of Article 172, like
Article 171, does not require the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person as an element
of conviction. But, as early as People v. Pacana,57 we have said:
Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by
public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or
the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,
the principal thing punished is the violation of the solemnly proclaimed, it must, nevertheless, be
borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity
of the same or to change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for unless that
happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is
required by article 1 [now Article 3] of the Penal Code.
Here we find that, there is no moral certainty that Alid benefitted from the transaction, with the
government or any third person sustaining damage from his alteration of the document.
The peculiar situation of this case reveals that Alid falsified the PAL Ticket just to be consistent
with the deferred date of the turnover ceremony for the outgoing and the incoming Secretaries of
the DA Central Office in Quezon City. Notably, he had no control as to the rescheduling of the
event he had to attend. Neither did the prosecution show that he had incurred any additional
benefit when he altered the document. Moreover, after he submitted the PAL Ticket that he had
used to support his liquidation for a cash advance of ₱10,496, the public funds kept by the DA
remained intact: no apparent illegal disbursement was made; or any additional expense incurred.
Considering, therefore, the obvious intent of Alid in altering the PAL Ticket - to remedy his
liquidation of cash advance with the correct date of his rescheduled travel - we find no malice on
his part when he falsified the document. For this reason, and seeing the overall circumstances in
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the case at bar, we cannot justly convict Alid of falsification of a commercial document under
paragraph 1 of Article 172.
NORMALLAH A. PACASUM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS
FACTS: That on or about August 22-23, 2000, the accused NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a
high ranking public official being the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official
position, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified her Employee
Clearance3 submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the
DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of claiming her salary for the months of August and September
2000.
ISSUE: WON accused can be held liable for falsifying her Employees Clearance (public
document) under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. YES
RULING: Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a person had
in his position a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and
profiting thereby, he is presumed to be the material author of the falsification. He argues that the
Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner made use
of or uttered the Employees Clearance, because there was no evidence that she submitted it -- if
not, at least caused it to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. To support such
claim, she said there were no "receipt marks" in the Employees Clearance to show that the Office
of the Regional Governor received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and distinct from the
"falsification" of a public document. The act of "using" falsified documents is not necessarily
included in the "falsification" of a public document. Using falsified documents is punished under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the Employees
Clearance was consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the
falsification of a public document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents set forth therein
were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of another was counterfeited.54 It is a
settled rule that in the falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there
be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the
falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.55 Thus, the purpose for which
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the falsification was made and whether the offender profited or hoped to profit from such
falsification are no longer material.
The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees Clearance. The fact that
the same was circulated to the different division heads for their signatures is already considered
use of falsified documents as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of the stamp mark
"Received" in the Employees Clearance does not mean that said document was not received by
the Office of the Regional Governor. We find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C.
Parcasio, Executive Secretary of Office of the Regional Governor - ARMM, as contained in the
Employees Clearance, to be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to the Office of the
Regional Governor. It must be stressed that the Executive Secretary is part of the Office of the
Regional Governor.
Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature
of Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge about the falsification because it was her
assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her Employees Clearance.
Petitioner‘s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the
person whom she instructed to work for her Employees Clearance. Her failure to present this
person in order to shed light on the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find that the defense
never intended to present Marie Cris Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial
order, because the defense never listed her as a witness.
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the signature of Laura
Pangilan in her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We have ruled that it is not strange
to realize that in cases of forgery, the prosecution would not always have the means for obtaining
such direct evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely.
In People v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court held that –
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material
author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents
was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to
have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers.
In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took advantage and
profited in the use of the falsified Employees Clearance in question, the presumption is
inevitable that she is the material author of the falsification. And despite full opportunity, she
138 | P a g e
was not able to rebut such presumption by failing to show that it was another person who forged
or falsified the signature of Laura Pangilan or that at least another person and not she alone, had
the reason or motive to commit the forgery or falsification, or was or could have been benefited
by such falsification/forgery.60
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of petitioner,

convince us to apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in
possession of, and who has used, a forged document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of
falsification.61 The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is
offered, will thereby prevail.62 A prima facie case of falsification having been established,
petitioner should have presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome such burden. This,
she failed to do.
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under Article 171, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of falsification under said paragraph, the
followings elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public officer, an employee, or a
notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a
document by counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.
All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established. There is no dispute that petitioner
was a public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism of the
ARMM, when she caused the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a public document) for
the release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. Such being a
requirement, and she being a public officer, she was duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and
submit said document. Were it not for her position and employment in the ARMM, she could not
have accomplished said Employees Clearance. In a falsification of public document, the offender
is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he had the duty to make or
prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) he had official custody
of the document which he falsified.69 It being her duty to prepare and submit said document, she
clearly took advantage of her position when she falsified or caused the falsification of her
Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan.
ATTY. BERNARDO T. CONSTANTINO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

LEONEN, J.:
FALSIFICATION; PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
FACTS: That on or about September 9, 2001 the above-named accused, ATTY. BERNARDO
CONSTANTINO taking advantage of his being a notary public for Laoag City and Ilocos Norte,
together with TERESITA C. SALIGANAN, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to appear in the LAST
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WILL AND TESTAMENT executed by Severino C. Cabrales in favor of the accused

TERESITA C. SALIGANAN, known as Doc. No. 15909, Series of 2001 of the Notarial Register
of Atty. BERNARDO CONSTANTINO, a notary public for Laoag City and Province of Ilocos
Norte, that SEVERINO C. CABRALES participated in the execution of the LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT, when in fact he did not so participate, and making it appear that the testator
Severino Cabrales and the attesting witnesses, Dr. Eliezer Asuncion, Mary Balintona and Dr.
Justino Balintona acknowledge the Last Will and Testament before Atty. Bernardo Constantino
while in truth they never appeared to acknowledge the same.6
the Regional Trial Court found Atty. Constantino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification
of a public document under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Bernardo T. Constantino is guilty of falsifying a public document under
Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code. NO
RULING: Petitioner claims that it would have been difficult for him to remove Dr. Asuncion's
name at the time of signing. Due to his muscular dystrophy, he had to be accompanied by his
wife and two (2) sons to climb to the second floor of the house. Additionally, there was no
typewriter, clerk, or typist in Severino's house for the corrections to be done. Petitioner also
alleges that he wanted the notarization to be made in Severino's residence to honor the testator's
wish. Then and there, he asserts, he notarized the document to avoid going up the steep stairway
again.34
Petitioner argues that precisely due to his physical condition, he has relied on his secretary to file
the office documents. As such, he was not able to check the Last Will and Testament when
Saliganan returned it to his secretary. While he admits that he had been negligent for failing to
cross out Dr. Asuncion's name in the document, he asserts that it should not be taken against
him, but on Dr. Asuncion, who admitted to signing the document without reading it.35
Petitioner, likewise, explains that his failure to immediately surrender was due to his failing
health and his wife being abroad to take care of their two (2) daughters. He alleges that as
litigation had started in 2008, Saliganan assured him on the phone not to worry as she was trying
to settle the case as a family misunderstanding, which was why he did not pay attention to the
case.36
Before one can be held criminally liable for falsification of public documents, it is essential
that the document allegedly falsified is a public document.
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Public documents are defined in Cacnio v. Baens53 as "those instruments authorized by a notary
public or by a competent public official with all the solemnities required by law[.]"54 By this
definition, any notarized document is considered a public document.
Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, however, provides:
SECTION 19. Classes of documents. — For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied)
Notarization confers a public character upon private documents so that, for the purposes of
admissibility in court, no further evidence is required to prove the document's authenticity.55 The
notary public swears to the truth of the document's contents and its due execution. In Antillon v.
Barcelon:56
The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public
certifies the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal he thereby gives
such a document the force of evidence.
....
Indeed, one of the very purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary
public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of
documents, is to authorize such documents to be given in evidence without further proof of their
execution and delivery.57
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Thus, notaries public are cautioned to take due care in notarizing documents to ensure the
public's confidence in notarized documents. In Ramirez v. Ner:58
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason
notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the elementary formalities in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyancing would be undermined.59
Under the Rules on Evidence, notarized documents are clothed with the presumption of
regularity; that is, that the notary public had the authority to certify the documents as duly
executed. A last will and testament, however, is specifically excluded from the application of
Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. This implies that when the document being presented
as evidence is a last will and testament, further evidence is necessary to prove its due execution,
whether notarized or not.
A last will and testament is a "species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after his
death."60 A notarial will is one that is "acknowledged before a notary public by a testator and the
attesting witnesses[.]"61 Moreover, Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court.
This acknowledgment is embodied in an attestation clause at the end of the instrument. An

attestation clause, in Caneda v. Court of Appeals,62 is:
. . . that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has
been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the
witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required
by law has been observed. It is made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record
of the facts that attended the execution of a particular will, so that in case of failure of the
memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved.63
By this definition, the formalities required by law to prove a notarial will's authenticity do not
pertain to the notarization, but to the attestation and subscription of the testator and the attesting
witnesses. In Caneda, this Court further explained:
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[T]he subscription of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the
purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same
instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses.
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution
of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong
legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. As it
appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed only by them. Where it
is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to
add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator and the witnesses.64
Hence, an authentic attestation clause must not only contain the names of the instrumental
witnesses. Mere mention of their names in the attestation clause will not accurately represent the
fact of their attestation and subscription. Instead, the instrumental witnesses must also sign the
instrument before it is notarized by the notary public.
Here, petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article 171(2) of the
Revised Penal Code. The provision reads:
ARTICLE 171. Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or Ecclesiastic Minister. —

The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:
....
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate [.]
There is falsification of a public document when the public document is simulated "in a
manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading
others to errors as to its authenticity[.]"65 Moreover, "[w]hat is punished in falsification of
public document is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of
truth as solemnly proclaimed therein."66
When a notary public falsifies a public document, his or her act effectively undermines the
public's trust and reliance on notarized documents as evidence. Thus, he or she is held
criminally liable for the offense when the falsity committed leads others to believe the
document was authentic when it is not.
In falsification of public documents under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code, the
prosecution must prove that these elements exist:
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1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.
2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding.
4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding.67
Here, the first element has already been proven since both the prosecution and the defense
stipulate that petitioner is a notary public. The second element is presumed when the alleged
falsity committed by the notary public pertains to the notarization, since only notaries public
have the duty and authority to notarize documents.
Thus, the elements that remain to be proven by the prosecution are: (1) that petitioner falsified a
document "by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding"; and
(2) that "such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding."68
The due execution of a notarized will is proven through the validity of its attestation clause. The
prosecution must prove that either the testator could not have authored the instrument, or the
instrumental witnesses had no capacity to attest to the due execution of the will. This requires
that the notary public must have falsified or simulated the signatures appearing on the attestation
clause.
Here, petitioner was found to have falsely certified in the Joint Acknowledgment that Dr.
Asuncion was an instrumental witness to the execution of Severino's Last Will and Testament
since he did not sign it in petitioner's presence.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, however, disregarded one crucial detail from its finding
of facts: Dr. Asuncion signed the Joint Acknowledgment after it was notarized by petitioner.
Based on the findings of the trial court, at the time petitioner notarized the Last Will and
Testament, only three (3) witnesses had signed it. The trial court, however, did not make any
finding that petitioner had falsified the participation of the three (3) witnesses who attested and
subscribed to its due execution. It likewise found that Dr. Asuncion signed the document at the
urging of Saliganan's son-in-law, Ferrer, and that petitioner seemed unaware that Dr. Asuncion
later signed the document. Dr. Asuncion also admitted that his signature was genuine and that he
was aware of what he was signing.
Since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint Acknowledgment before it was notarized, he cannot be
considered as having attested and subscribed to its due execution at the time of its notarization.
Thus, when petitioner certified that the persons who attested and subscribed to the document
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were present before him, there could have been no falsity. It was not petitioner who made it
appear that Dr. Asuncion participated in the execution of the Joint Acknowledgment, but Ferrer
and Dr. Asuncion himself. Petitioner, therefore, must be acquitted.
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2. ARTICLE 178 – USING FICTITIOUS NAME

ANTI-ALIAS LAW, AS AMENDED (CA NO. 142; RA 6085)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

BRION, J.:
EXEMPTION TO CA 142; INTENT
FACTS: That on or about 04 February 2000, the above-named accused, being then President of
the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or
administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to
office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and
his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‗JOSE VELARDE‘ IN
SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS
neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence. His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No.
26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds11:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms.
Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000),
they saw movant use the name "Jose Velarde";
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as
can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the
prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be
revealed without following proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
ISSUE: WON Estrada may be held liable under the Anti-Alias Law. NO
RULING: The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
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Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted
practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at
birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in
case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons
whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized,
have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil
registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings
like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall
be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias
shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry,
if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other
than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than
his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias – "A NAME OR
NAMES USED BY A PERSON OR INTENDED TO BE USED BY HIM PUBLICLY AND
HABITUALLY usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority." There must be, in the words of Ursua, a "SIGN OR INDICATION THAT THE
USER INTENDS TO BE KNOWN BY THIS NAME (THE ALIAS) in addition to his real name
from that day forth … [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No.
142 as amended."
Following the doctrine of stare decisis, we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime
punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is
unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.
Our close reading of Ursua – particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to
be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above – tells us that the required publicity in the
use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be
considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become
generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias
must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In
other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
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To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and
opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly
known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the
public who had no access to Estrada‘s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in
Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared
matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath
of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus,
Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time.
The same holds true for Estrada‘s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming
the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada‘s representations to these
people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account – a
transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.37 Given the private
nature of Estrada‘s act of signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening of the
trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo
and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations
imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy
situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed
privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or
with the intent to use the alias publicly.
The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it
clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were
permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation.
To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained
without violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.38
We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not an
attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No.
142 must necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua.
The application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estrada‘s use of the alias was
pursuant to a transaction that the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law
guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties to the transactions; it is at this point
that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is
no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires harmonization.
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Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read together when these spheres
interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the
indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his indictment.
REVELINA LIMSON, vs EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ,

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzalez for falsification. The charge for
falsification of Limson is based on Limson‘s assertion that in the records of the PRC, a certain
‗EUGENIO GONZALEZ‘ is registered as an architect and that Gonzalez, who uses, among
others, the name ‗EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ‘, and who pretends to be said architect.
Registered [sic] with the PRC, is an impostor and therefore, guilty [sic] of falsification x x x.‖
Gonzalez filed his Counter–Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that his full name is
EUGENIO (first given name) JUAN (second given name) GONZALEZ (father‘s family name) y
REGALADO (mother‘s family name). He alleges that in his youth, while he was still in grade
school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or
EUGENIO GONZALEZ and that thereafter, he transferred to the University of Santo Tomas and
therein took up architecture and that upon commencement of his professional practice in 1943,
he made use of his second name, JUAN. Consequently, in his professional practice, he has
identified himself as much as possible as Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, because the surname
GONZALEZ was and is still, a very common surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted
to distinguish himself with his second given name, JUAN, after his first given name, EUGENIO.
Gonzalez supposed [sic] his allegations with various supporting documents x x x.
Limson filed a new letter of complaint against Gonzales accusing the latter of violation of the
Anti Alias Law (RA. 6085) for using various combinations of his name, in different signature on
different occasions
ISSUE: WON Gonzales may be held liable under Anti-Alias Law. NO
RULING: On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court observes that respondent‘s
aliases involved the names ―Eugenio Gonzalez‖, ―Eugenio Gonzales‖, ―Eugenio Juan Gonzalez‖,
―Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado‖, ―Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez‖, ―Eugenio J. Gonzalez‖, and –
per Limson – ―Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.‖ But these names contained his true names, albeit
at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one
instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of
the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time.
What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of
the Anti–Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he
was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse
the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.
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An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was
registered at birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a competent
authority; a man‘s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by
his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several
different names and these are known as aliases.9 An alias is thus a name that is different from the
individual‘s true name, and does not refer to a name that is not different from his true name.
In Ursua v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court tendered an enlightening discourse on the history and
objective of our law on aliases that is worth including here, viz:
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to
be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the lawmakers.
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly
violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the
pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No.142,
which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is
entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known
since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent
court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set
forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has
been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was
granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil
register x x x.
The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As
amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
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Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized
for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of
this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name
and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias.
The petition for an alias shall set forth the person‘s baptismal and family name and the
name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant‘s name, if an alien, and his
pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the
Christian name and the alien immigrant‘s name shall be recorded in the proper local civil
registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name
unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
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3. ARTICLE 180-184 – FALSE TESTIMONY
UNION BANK AND DESI TOMAS VS. PEOPLE, G.R. 192565, FEBRUARY 28, 2012
(PERJURY)
Facts: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accused
allegedly make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer oath which the law requires. The accusation stemmed from
petitioner Union Bank‘s two (2) complaints for sum of money. The first complaint was filed
before the RTC Pasay City. The second complaint was filed to the MeTC Pasay City. Both
complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she
did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or
agency.
Issue: What is the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should it be – Makati
City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court?
Ruling: MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue. In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of
perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
elements of perjury under Article 183 are: (a) That the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before
a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) That in the statement or
affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) That the
sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper
venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was
committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
ALFONSO CHOA VS. PEOPLE AND LENI CHOA, G.R. 142011, MARCH 14, 2003
(PERJURY INSTEAD OF FALSE TESTIMONY)
Facts: Petitioner is a Chinese national. He filed with the Regional Trial Court a verified petition
for naturalization. Meanwhile, State Prosecutor acting upon the complaint of petitioner‘s wife,
Leni, filed an Information with the MTCC charging petitioner with perjury under Article 183 of
the Revised Penal Code which allegedly made untruthful statements or falsehoods upon material
matters required by the Revised Naturalization Law.
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Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of perjury

Ruling: Yes. The elements of perjury are: 1) The accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter; 2) The statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath; 3) In that statement or affidavit, the
accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and 4) The sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. All these elements
are present in the instant case.
Petitioner willfully and deliberately alleged false statements concerning his "residence" and
"moral character" in his petition for naturalization. The petition for naturalization was duly
subscribed and sworn to by petitioner before Notary Public, a person competent and authorized
by law to receive and administer oath. The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and
"moral character" are material matters because they are among the very facts in issue or the main
facts which are the subject of inquiry and are the bases for the determination of petitioner's
qualifications and fitness as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
ANTONIO MONFORT III, ET. AL VS. MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, ET. AL,
G.R. 168301, MARCH 5, 2007
(ELEMENTS)
Facts: Petitioners are children of the late Antonio H. Monfort, Jr., one of the original
stockholders/incorporators of the Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation
(MHADC).6 On 28 October 1998, petitioners filed a letter-complaint for perjury under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code before the City Prosecutor of Cadiz against private respondents.
In the said complaint, petitioners claimed that the private respondents made false statements in
their respective counter-affidavits which the latter had executed and submitted to the City
Prosecutor of Cadiz in connection with another complaint for perjury earlier filed by the
petitioners against the private respondents. The alleged false statements referred to the
declarations of the private respondents that the 1996 annual stockholders‘ meeting of the
MHADC was held on 16 October 1996, and that they were elected as board directors of the
MHADC during the same meeting. Petitioners insisted that the 1996 annual stockholders‘
meeting of the MHADC was held, not on 16 October 1996, but on 27 November 1996 as stated
in the 1996 General Information Sheet (GIS) accomplished by the MHADC and submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Further, there is nothing in the 1996 GIS of the
MHADC which states that an election of the board of directors of the MHADC took place on 16
October 1996.
Private respondents thus argue that they cannot be held liable for perjury since one of the
elements of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is that the assertion of
falsehood must be willful and deliberate; that the terms willful and deliberate imply malice and
evil intent in asserting falsehood; and that this element is lacking in the case at bar.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are liable for perjury
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Ruling: No. The elements of perjury are as follows: (a) That the accused made a statement under
oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) That the statement or affidavit was made
before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) That in the statement or
affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) That the
sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
The third element of perjury requires that the accused had willfully and deliberately asserted a
falsehood. A mere assertion of a false objective fact is not sufficient. The assertion must be
deliberate and willful. In the instant case, the petitioners failed to establish the fact that the
private respondents made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in their counter-
affidavits dated 11 June 1998. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of
the accused. Willfully means intentionally, with evil intent and legal malice, with consciousness
that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a
statement of what was true in fact. In this case, the private respondents believed in good faith
that, based on the above-explained events, their statements in their respective counter- affidavits
dated 11 June 1998 are true and correct. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense vis-a-vis
the allegation of deliberate assertion of falsehood in perjury cases.
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CRIMES RELATED TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED

DRUGS (ART. 190-194)
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUG ACT OF 2002 (RA NO. 9165)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JESUSA FIGUEROA Y CORONADO, G.R. NO.

186141, APRIL 11, 2012
(ATTEMPTED SALE OF DRUGS, NON-COORDINATION WITH PDEA)
Facts: Two infromations were filed against accused-appellant Jesusa Figueroa being in her
possession, direct custody and control a total weight of 9.42 grams of shabu which is a dangerous
drug and for without the corresponding license or prescription, feloniously attempt to sell, give
away, distribute and deliver 4.60 grams of shabu which is a dangerous drug, by then and there
agreeing to sell and deliver the said dangerous drug to the proposed buyer PO3 Callora, thereby
commencing the commission of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, but which nevertheless
failed to consummate the said sale by reason of causes other than her own spontaneous
desistance, that is she got frightened by the presence of police officers at the scene of the crime
and that the alleged buy-bust operation was conducted by the special operation unit 1 of the PNP
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force was irregular because of lack of prior
coordination with the PDEA. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
RTC acquitted accused-appellant of the charge for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II RA No. 9165 for
lack of evidence. However, accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
violation of Sec. 26, Art. II, RA 9165
Issue: Whether or not accused must be held liable for attempted sale of drugs
Ruling: Yes. It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not invalidate operations
on account of the law enforcers‘ failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA. Under the
Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the offender commences its
commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. This definition has essentially been adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 26
of Republic Act No. 9165. Thus in People v. Laylo, we affirmed the conviction of the appellant
therein and held that the attempt to sell shabu was shown by the overt act of appellant therein of
showing the substance to the poseur-buyer. In said case, the sale was aborted when the police
officers identified themselves and placed appellant under arrest. Thus, in this case the crime of
attempt to sell a dangerous drug under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 9165 was sufficiently
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS. ALLEN D.T. BAHOYO, G.R. 238589, JUNE 26, 2019
(ELEMENTS OF SELLING; POSSESSION; CHAIN OF CUSTODY)
Facts: A confidential informant arrived at the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations
Task Group of the Makati Police Station and reported about the illegal drug activities of a certain
Bahoyo of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati City. From there, the buy-bust team proceeded to the
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target area wherein PO2 Limbauan met with the informant and proceeded to where Bahoyo was
conducting his activities. The transaction took place. After introducing themselves as police
officers and informing Bahoyo of his constitutional rights, PO2 Limbauan conducted a
procedural search and three (3) more sachets containing white crystalline substance were
recovered from Bahoyo. At the place of arrest, PO2 Limbauan marked the plastic sachet obtained
from the sale. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the Makati Police Station where
physical inventory was conducted and photographs were taken in the presence of Bahoyo and
Cesar Morales, a media representative.
In two separate Informations, Bahoyo was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Issue: Whether or not Bahoyo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged against
him
Ruling: To convict an accused who is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must
establish the following elements by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that the accused was in
possession of dangerous drugs; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.
On the other hand, in order to secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must establish the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is important
is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the object of the transaction is
properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the
accused.
The prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited drug, considering
that the dangerous drug itself forms part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution must
show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary
doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in
the chain of custody from the moment that the illegal drugs are seized up to their presentation in
court as evidence of the crime.
Here, the prosecution failed to justify its non-compliance with the requirements laid down in
Section 21, specifically, the presence of the two required witnesses during the actual inventory of
the seized items. The unjustified absence of an elected public official during the inventory stage
constitutes a substantial gap in the chain of custody. Such absence cannot be cured by the simple
expedient of alleging that there has been substantial compliance with the requirement. This
substantial gap or break in the chain casts serious doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti. As such, Bahoyo must be acquitted.
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PEOPLE VS. FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016
(INFORMANT; WHEN NECESSARY; NON-COORDINATION WITH PDEA)
Facts: On the afternoon of November 4, 2005, a civilian informant, one "Droga", went to Police
Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City and reported to SPO1 Espenido that the appellant was
actively engaged in the illegal drug trade at Sitio Mangga, Punta Princesa, Cebu City. SPO1
Espenido immediately assembled a buy-bust team as back-up. The police team designated the
unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer and provided him with a P100.00 marked money
bill7 to be used for the purpose of buying shabu from appellant. When the police team reached
the target area, the "civilian informant" went to the house of appellant and called the latter.
Hidden from view, some 15 meters away from the house, PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Cañete, saw
the civilian informant talking with the appellant. Not long after, they saw the "civilian informant"
handling over the marked P100.00 bill to the appellant, who in exchange gave to the former a
plastic pack containing 0.03 gram white crystalline substance which these two suspected
as shabu. The appellant was taken to the police station for investigation. The appellant denied
that he was a shabu-seller; he also denied that he was arrested in a buy-bust operation. The
appellant was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
Ruling: No.
The Court held in People v. Abedin that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation; that in fact, even the
absence of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation. Neither is the
presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in prosecuting drug-related
cases. Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their
invaluable service to the police. Unless their testimony is absolutely essential to the conviction of
the accused, their testimony may be dispensed with since their narrations would be merely
corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team.
The Court declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to
establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of the shabu plus the irregular manner which
plagued the handling of the evidence before the same was offered in court, whittles down the
chances of the government to obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case. Here, apart
from the utter failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, yet another
procedural lapse casts further uncertainty about the identity and integrity of the subject shabu.
The Court refer to the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the most rudimentary
procedural safeguards relative to the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section
21(1), Article II of RA 9165. Here, the alleged apprehending team after the alleged initial
custody and control of the drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same, never
ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor did it ever photograph the same in the presence
of the appellant from whom the alleged item was confiscated. There was no physical inventory
and photograph of the item allegedly seized from appellant. Neither was there any explanation
offered for such failure.
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SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. VS. HON. LOBRIGO, G.R. NO. 226679, AUGUST 15, 2017
(PLEA BARGAINING IN DRUG CASES)
Facts: Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586
for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). That
on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license
or prescription have in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which
when examined were found to be positive for Shabu, a dangerous drug.
Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for
violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in
view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in
his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law
expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of
powers among the three equal branches of the government. Respondent Judge Lobrigo of RTC
Legazpi issued an Order denying Estipona‘s motion.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge is correct in denying motion to allow the accused to
enter into a plea bargaining
Ruling: Yes.
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial
court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. "Grave abuse of
discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty
could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's
evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of
the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.69
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The Court in this case held that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional
for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
PEOPLE VS. BABYLYN C. MANANSALA, G.R. 229509, JULY 3, 2019
(ABSENCE OF INSULATING WITNESSES; SEC. 21)
Facts: A confidential informant came to the Manila Police District (MPD) District Anti-Illegal
Drugs - Special Operations Task Unit (DAID-SOTU) to report that he had set a drug deal at 6:00
p.m. at Taft Avenue, corner Kalaw Street, with a certain alias "Bek Bek", later identified as
herein appellant. The team arrived at the target area at 6:00 p.m. Upon meeting appellant, the
confidential informant introduced PO3 Taruc as the buyer of the shabu. PO3 Taruc then gave
appellant the marked P1,000.00 bill. Appellant placed the marked money in the right pocket of
her pants and brought out a small plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance which
she handed over to PO3 Taruc. Thereafter, PO3 Taruc removed his bull cap, which was the pre-
arranged signal, to summon the back-up operatives to come forth as the transaction had been
consummated. Appellant was then immediately arrested.
Appellant was charged and the RTC of Manila rendered Decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165. On appeal, appellant
contended that the prosecution failed to prove the integrity of the seized shabu as the
apprehending officers did not strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule spelled out in
Section 21 of RA 9165. CA denied the appeal affirming the RTC Decision.
Issue: Whether or not Section 21 of RA 9165 has been complied with by the apprehending
officers
Ruling: No. The prosecution made no effort at all to explain or justify why two of the three
required witnesses - a representative from the DOJ and an elected public official - were not
present during the buy-bust operation against appellant, nor did it show that earnest efforts were
in fact exerted to secure or obtain their presence or attendance thereat.This Court, in People v.
Malana, took the view that a buy-bust team can easily gather the three required witnesses,
considering that its operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Here, the apprehending team
had more than enough time to comply with the requirements under RA 9165. The buy-bust team
had ample time to comply with the requirements of the law had they exerted the slightest of
efforts.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that the presence of the required insulating witnesses at the
time of the inventory is mandatory, and that their presence thereat serves both a crucial and a
critical purpose. Indeed, under the law, the presence of the so-called insulating witnesses is a
high prerogative requirement, the non-fulfillment of which casts serious doubts upon the
integrity of the corpus delicti itself - the very prohibited substance itself - and for that reason
imperils and jeopardizes the prosecution's case.
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LAW ON COUNTERFEIT DRUGS (RA NO. 8203)
ROMA DRUG AND ROMEO RODRIGUEZ VS. GLAXO SMITH KLINE, G.R. NO.
149907, APRIL 16, 2009
(LAW ON COUNTERFEIT DRUGS)
Facts: A team composed of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) operatives and inspectors of the
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) conducted a raid on petitioner Roma Drug, a duly registered sole
proprietorship of petitionerRodriguez operating a drug store located at San Matias, Guagua, Pampanga.
The raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant. The raiding team seized several imported
medicines. It appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around the same
time upon the request of SmithKline Beecham Research Limited (SmithKline), a duly registered
corporation which is the local distributor of pharmaceutical products manufactured by its parent London-
based corporation. The local SmithKline has since merged with Glaxo Wellcome Phil. Inc to form Glaxo
SmithKline, private respondent in this case. The seized medicines, which were manufactured by
SmithKline, were imported directly from abroad and not purchased through the local SmithKline, the
authorized Philippine distributor of these products.
The NBI subsequently filed a complaint against Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 (in relation
to Sections 3 and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, also known as the Special Law on Counterfeit
Drugs. Rodriguez challenged the constitutionality of the SLCD.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9502 impliedly abrogates the provisions of RA 8203 (SLCD) with
which the petitioner is criminally charged
Ruling: Yes. Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 9502 unequivocally grants third persons the right to
import drugs or medicines whose patent were registered in the Philippines by the owner of the
product. The unqualified right of private third parties such as petitioner to import or possess
―unregistered imported drugs‖ in the Philippines is further confirmed by the ―Implementing
Rules to Republic Act No. 9502‖ promulgated on November 4, 2008.
It may be that Rep. Act No. 9502 (Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of
2008) did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD. However, it is clear that the SLCD's
classification of "unregistered imported drugs" as "counterfeit drugs," and of corresponding
criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conflict with Rep. Act No. 9502
since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unqualified right to import or
otherwise use such drugs. Where a statute of later date, such as Rep. Act No. 9502, clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that
intention must be given effect. When a subsequent enactment covering a field of operation co-
terminus with a prior statute cannot by any reasonable construction be given effect while the
prior law remains in operative existence because of irreconcilable conflict between the two acts,
the latest legislative expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict.
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CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS (ARTS. 195-201; AS

AMENDED BY RA 10158)
ELISEO SORIANO VS. MA. CONSOLIZA LAGUARDIA, ET. AL, G.R. 165785, APRIL
29, 2009
(OBSCENITY)
Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks: ―Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka
talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan.
Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.‖
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. The MTRCB issued an
order holding petitioner liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three
(3) months suspension from his program, "Ang Dating Daan‖. Petitioner then filed this petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief. Petitioner asserts that his utterance
in question is a protected form of speech.
Issue: Whether petitioner‘s remarks was a protected form of speech

Ruling: No. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression
refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or
"fighting words‖. The Court finds that petitioner‘s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of
Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition of obscenity that would apply to all
cases, but nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v.
California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average
person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to
conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is
"patently offensive." x x x What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper
for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the
judge‘s sound discretion.
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month
suspension was slapped on him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion by
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petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against the duty of the government
to protect and promote the development and welfare of the youth. The Court rules that the
government‘s interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately
buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner‘s prayer to continue as
program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period.
GAUDENCIO FERNANDO, ET. AL VS. C.A., GR NO. 159751, DECEMBER 6, 2006

(ARTICLE 201-PUBLICITY)
Facts: Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group conducted police
surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair).
Judge Perfecto Laguio of the RTC Manila issued Search Warrant for violation of Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren
Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair in Quiapo,
Manila and seized nude and obscene magazines and VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.
Petitioners and Tingchuy pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. RTC convicted Gaudencio E.
Fernando and Rudy Estorninos for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and 969. RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence
to prove his guilt.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
Ruling: Yes. The Court emphasizes that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell,
exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to
prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under
Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require that a person be caught in
the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said
materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find that
petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.
Notably, the subject premises of the search warrant was the Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair,
named after petitioner Fernando. The mayor‘s permit was under his name. Even his bail bond
shows that he lives in the same place. Furthermore, when he preferred not to present contrary
evidence, the things which he possessed were presumptively his. Petitioner Estorninos is
likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and exhibiting the obscene
materials.
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ILLEGAL NUMBERS GAME (P.D. 1602 AS AMENDED BY R 92887 – GAMBLING)
ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2009 (RA NO. 9775)

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR. ET. AL VS. SECRETARY OF DOJ, GR 203335, ET. AL,
FEBRUARY 18, 2014
(ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ONLINE; NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY)
Facts: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or
computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and
enable him, among other things, to: 1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of
information that he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity; 2. Post
billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for
special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them; 3.
Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments; 4. Inquire and do
business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade
houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and 5. Communicate in
writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Issue:
1) Whether or not Section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 is unconstitutional
2) Whether or not charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) RA 10175 and Anti-
Child Pornography Act f 2009 would tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy
Ruling:
1. No. It is constitutional. It merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the
government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA‘s definition of child pornography
already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any
other means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when he crime is committed in
cyberspace. Section 7 provides that prosecution under the Act shall be without prejudice
to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code as amended or
special laws.
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2. Yes. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA‘s scope so as to include identical
activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA‘s definition of child
pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2)
and ACPA would be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy.
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CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS (ARTICLES

203-245)
PEOPLE VS. TEOFILO PANTALEON, JR., ET. AL, GR NO. 158694-96, MARCH 13,
2009
(MALVERSATION)
Facts: The case originated from the joint affidavit-complaints alleged that the appellants
Pantaleon Jr and Jaime Vallejos, Ken Swan Tiu and Engr. Ramos conspired to illegally disburse
and misappropriate the public funds of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales by falsifying
documents relating to three (3) fictitious or ghost construction projects. The affidavit-complaints
further alleged that the disbursement vouchers were not signed by the municipal accountant and
budget officer; that the Sangguniang Bayan did not adopt a resolution authorizing Pantaleon to
enter into a contract with La Paz Construction and/or Ken Swan Tiu; and that no projects were
actually undertaken by the Municipality of Castillejos.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed three (3) separate Informations for Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against the appellants before the
Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan convicted the appellants of the crimes charged.
Issue: Whether or not appellants are guilty of malversation
Ruling: Yes. Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had
the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) That those
funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; (d) That he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.
Going by the elements of Malversation – Appellants are public officers. Pantaleon and Vallejos
were the municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of
Castillejos at the time of the crimes charged. Appellants, in their capacities as mayor and
treasurer, had the custody and control of funds or property by reason of the duties of their office.
Furthermore, the appellants were accountable for public funds. The funds for which malversation
the appellants stand charged were sourced from the development fund of the municipality. They
were funds belonging to the municipality, for use by the municipality, and were under the
collective custody of the municipality‘s officials who had to act together to disburse the funds for
their intended municipal use. The funds were therefore public funds for which the appellants as
mayor and municipal treasurer were accountable. Lastly, The appellants appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take the public funds. The Court note at the outset that no less than the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Zambales already made a finding that the projects subject of Disbursement
Vouchers never implemented in 1998. Thus, all elements were present.
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Respondents are liable for three (3) counts of complex crime of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents.
ARNOLD JAMES YSIDORO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. 192330, NOVEMBER 14, 2012
(ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS)
Facts: The Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte operated a
Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent
calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed
for construction. When construction for calamity victims was 70% done, the beneficiaries
stopped reporting for work.. Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the
Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek the release and approved the withdrawal slip for four sacks of
rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP. Alfredo Doller, former member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present complaint against Ysidoro and testified that the
subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte‘s malnourished children.
Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP
goods to the CSAP beneficiaries. Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of technical malversation.
Issue: Whether or not the approved diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different
from their originally intended purpose constitute technical malversation
Ruling: Yes. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he
applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the
public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which
they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be
used for SFP‘s needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of
its feeding programs. This rule provides assurance that the SFP would cater only to the
malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the government‘s limited resources.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation
Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public
purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral
but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.
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ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (RA NO. 3019, AS AMENDED)
MANUEL BAVIERA VS. ZOLETA, GR. 169098, OCTOBER 12, 2006

(SEC. 3a)
Facts: Manuel V. Baviera filed several complaints against officers or directors of the Standard
Chartered Bank (SCB), Philippine Branch, with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Baviera claimed
that he was a former employee of the bank, and at the same time, an investor who was victimized
by the officers or directors of SCB, all of whom conspired with one another in defrauding him as
well as the investing public by soliciting funds in unregistered and unauthorized foreign stocks
and securities. Baviera, through counsel, requested the Secretary of Justice for the issuance of a
Hold Departure Order (HDO) against some of the officers and directors of SCB, including
Raman, an Indian national who was the Chief Finance Officer of the bank. It turned out that
Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas N. Gutierrez had verbally allowed the departure of
Raman.
Baviera filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman charging Undersecretary
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(a), (e), and (j) of Republic Act (RA) No.
3019, as amended. Respondent Gutierrez requested the Office of the Ombudsman to dismiss the
complaint against her. Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Rolando Zoleta signed a
Resolution recommending that the criminal complaint against respondent Gutierrez for violation
of RA No. 3019 be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Baviera filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the CA, assailing the resolutions
of the Ombudsman. CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the ground that the proper
remedy was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue: Whether or not the office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that respondent Gutierrez cannot be
held liable under Section 3(a) of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act
Ruling: No. On the merits of the petition, the Court finds that petitioner failed to establish that
the respondent officials committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman‘s exercise of power must have been done in
an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
The Court has reviewed the assailed resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, and finds that
petitioner likewise failed to establish probable cause for violation of Sections 3(a), (e) and (j) of
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RA No. 3019. Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court will not
interfere with the exercise of the Ombudsman‘s discretion, who, based on his own findings and
deliberate consideration of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it.
MAYOR RUBERTO P. FUENTES VS. PEOPLE, G.R. 186421, APRIL 17, 2017
(ELEMENTS OF SEC 3e)
Facts: That on January 8, 2002 at the Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, accused Mayor
Roberto Fuentes, a high-ranking public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, cause undue injury to private complainant Fe N. Valenzuela by refusing for
unreasonable length of time to renew the latter's Business Permit to engage in Ship Chandling
Services in the Port of Isabel without any legal basis or reason despite the fact that Fe N.
Valenzuela has complied with all the requirements and has been operating the Ship Chandling
Services in the Port of Isabel since 1993, which act caused damage to the perishable ship
provisions of Fe N. Valenzuela for MN Ace Dragon and a denial of her right to engage in a
legitimate business thereby causing damage and prejudice to Valenzuela. Fuentes was charged of
violation of Article 3 (e) of RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan found Fuentes
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Issue: Whether or not Mayor Fuentes is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019
Ruling: Yes. The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a
private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Going by the elements: first, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the
Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of; second, it is
worthy to stress that the law provides three modes of commission of the crime, namely, through
"manifest partiality", "evident bad faith", and/or "gross negligence." Fuentes's acts were not only
committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith; and third, suffice it to say that
Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his
issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from engaging in
its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on
the part of Valenzuela. In view of the foregoing, Fuentes committed a violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019, and hence, must be held criminally liable therefor.
SELVERINA E. CONSIGNA VS. PEOPLE AND SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. 175750-51,
APRIL 2, 2014
(SEC. 3e, RA 3019 – MEJORADA DOCTRINE)
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Facts: Petitioner Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte,
together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from private respondent Hermelina Moleta
(Moleta), the sum of ₱320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality
and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipality‘s Internal Revenue Allotment had
not yet arrived. As payment, petitioner issued three (3) Land Bank of the Philippines checks
signed by Jaime Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna.
Moleta demanded payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail. Moleta filed with the
Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of Information against petitioner, in the latter‘s capacity as
Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of General Luna, Surigao
del Norte. The charges were violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Art. 315 of the RPC, otherwise known as Estafa. Sandiganbayan,
found petitioner guilty but exonerated Rusillon.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3e of
RA 3019
Ruling: Yes. In this case, petitioner was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under
the alternative mode of "causing undue injury" to Moleta committed with evident bad faith, for
which she was correctly found guilty. This has long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan, where we categorically declared that a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is "charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." Quoted hereunder is an excerpt from
Mejorada:
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is
without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We
agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of
paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and
employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary
concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained
construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers
charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
The above pronouncement was reiterated in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court
affirmed the Mejorada ruling that finally puts to rest any erroneous interpretation of the last
sentence of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law. All the elements of the crimes as charged are
present in the case at bar. All told, this Court finds no justification to depart from the findings of
the lower court. Petitioner failed to present any cogent reason that would warrant a reversal of
the Decision assailed in this petition.
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JOEY P. MARQUEZ VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 182020-24, SEPTEMBER

2, 2009
(SEC. 3g, RA 3019)
Facts: Five (5) Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan against accused Public
Officers Joey Marquez, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Parañaque City
and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee based
on the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Team that there was
overpricing in certain purchase transactions of Parañaque City. In March 1999, a Special Audit
Team audited selected transactions of Parañaque City for the calendar years 1996 to 1998,
including the walis tingting purchases. Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioners
and the other local government officials of Parañaque City for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
No. 3019. andiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioners Caunan and Marquez, along with
Silvestre de Leon and Marilou Tanael, guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
Ruling: No. For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present:
(1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf
of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. Hence, the threshold question
we should resolve is whether the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly
injurious or disadvantageous to the government. Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject
contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government if characterized by
an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government
was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not
also adequately proven. In order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been
identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the
walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a
determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to
make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
RIOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 129913, SEPTEMBER 26, 1997
(PERIOD OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION UNDER LGU)
Facts: Accused Rios, a public officer allegedly criminally caused the disposition of confiscated,
assorted and sawn tanguile lumber consisting of 1,319 pieces without proper authority therefo
causing undue injury to the Government. On March 6, 1996, an information was filed against
petitioner for alleged unauthorized disposition of confiscated lumber, in violation of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner entered a
plea of not guilty. Sandiganbayan ordered Rios suspended from his position as Mayor of the
Municipality of San Fernando, Romblon and from any other public position he may be holding
for a period of ninety (90) days. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
subsequently denied in a resolution.
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Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in placing petitioner under preventive suspension for
90 days
Ruling: No. The suspension pendente lite meted out by the Sandiganbayan is, without doubt, a proper
and commensurate sanction against petitioner. Having ruled that the information filed against petitioner is
valid, there can be no impediment to the application of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 which states, inter
alia:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act of under Title 7, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offenses involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office.
It is settled jurisprudence that the aforequoted provision makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer who has been validly charged with a violation of
R.A. No. 3019, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to
determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office
to intimidate witnesses or frustrate in prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office.
On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90 day suspension upon
petitioner for the single case filed against him. Under Section 63 (b) of the Local Government
Code, "any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty
(60) days." Thus, suspension be reduced to 60 days.
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CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS (R.A. NO. 6713)

 SECTION 4 NORMS OF CONDUCT
[G.R. NO. 176127 : JANUARY 30, 2009]
RODOMIEL J. DOMINGO, PETITIONER, V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
KATHRYN JOY B. PAGUIO, ALLAN JAY M. ESGUERRA, AND NEIL PATRICK H.
CELIS, RESPONDENTS.
(NO PENALTY UNDER SECTION 4, R.A 6713)
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman found the accused guilty for violation of Section 4(B)
of RA 6913 or ―professionalism‖ and imposing upon him a suspension for a period of 6 months.
The complaint was filed by the SK officials against petitioner (the barangay Chairman) and
Barangay Treasurer Lao. They alleged that the two misappropriated the cash advances taken by
respondents from the SK funds. They added that petitioner gave a false statement in his
justification supporting the 2002 Budget and expenditures by declaring that his barangay has no
SK incumbent officials when the respondents are the incumbent SK officials; hence,
unprofessional.
The OMB rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No.
6713. Petitioner was held administratively liable for the irregular submission of a falsified
instrument to the Manila Barangay Bureau (MBB) in connection with his barangay's 2003
budget. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the OMB denied. denial of his motion
for reconsideration, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the OMB's decision in toto. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed the instant petition seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is liable.
HELD: No. Respondents merely echo the stance of the OMB with the argument that by
submitting the falsified Justification in connection with the 2003 barangay budget, petitioner
failed the mark of professionalism required of a Barangay Chairman.
On the merits, the Court is also unconvinced that there is substantial evidence establishing
petitioner's culpability. Petitioner had a hand in the preparation and submission of the documents
in support of the budget, such as the 2003 barangay budget, budget proposal, barangay
development plan for 2003, and statement of income and expenditures for 2003. In all these
documents, the existence of the SK was recognized and corresponding allocations were made for
it. With these attestations on petitioner's part, there is absolutely no rhyme or reason for him to
issue the questioned Justification and attest to the non-existence of these SK officials, more so in
light of respondents' assertion that he did so in connection with the process for the approval of
this barangay's 2003 budget.
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The sole evidence relied upon by the OMB in holding petitioner liable is the undated
Justification. The handwritten entry "Copy Budget 2004" as certified by the Chief of the MBB
appears to be a clerical error because the Justification was ostensibly made in connection with
the 2003 budget. If the Justification was intended for 2004, respondents should have presented
the 2004 budget since the burden is on them to prove the charges against petitioner. But
respondents failed to do so.
The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The
provision commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said
provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by
public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political
neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy
and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No.
6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and rewards to
officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their
observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the mandated
incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply with the high standard set
by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same favorable treatment.
However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to be sanctioned for
failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the Implementing Rules affirms as
grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts "declared unlawful or prohibited by the
Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty-three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for
administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of
R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them.
 SECTION 7, PROHIBITED ACTS
G.R. No. 169196 July 6, 2011

PETRA C. MARTINEZ, in her capacity as General Manager, Claveria Agri-Based Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc., Petitioner,
vs.
FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA, Respondent.
(SECTION 7d)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS: Petitioner is the Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority
(CDA) for Region II. She obtained loans on three occasions. (50k for first loan then 1m for the
second loan but it was immediately returned and lastly, her husband borrowed 780k) from a
cooperative (CABMPCI). A complaint before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
charging respondent with violation of Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 7(d) in
relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 was filed against her. A provision of the RA 6713
prohibits public officials from, as stated in the law, soliciting/ accepting (directly or indirectly)
any loan from any person in the course of their official functions or in connection with his office.
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The Office of the Ombudsman found that respondent abused her position when she solicited a
loan from CABMPCI despite the fact that she is disqualified by its by-laws and when she used
her influence to transfer her loan obligation to her husband with no money being actually paid.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered Decision on the administrative aspect of petitioner‘s
complaint finding respondent liable for grave misconduct and recommending the penalty of
dismissal. Respondent sought reconsideration of the decision but it was denied. Respondent filed
a petition for review before the CA and it was granted as she argued the she is a qualified
member of a cooperative and is entitled avail of the attendant privileges and benefits of
membership. Hence, this petition by the Office of the Ombubdsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of RA 6713
HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman adds that it is incumbent upon respondent, as CDA Assistant
Director, to be knowledgeable of the by-laws and articles of incorporation of CABMPCI,
particularly regarding the qualifications of the members, since the affairs of CABMPCI are
within the area of jurisdiction of respondent‘s office. Despite this, however, respondent still
applied for membership, enabling her to obtain a loan, by clearly using her influence as an
officer of the CDA in violation of R.A. No. 6938, the very law she is supposed to implement.
The Ombudsman argues that respondent put herself in a conflict-of-interest situation proscribed
by Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 and clearly violated said law when she took the prohibited
loans.
The relevant provision under which respondent was charged is Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713
which reads:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept,
directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value
from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.
xxxx
Said prohibition in Section 7(d) is malum prohibitum. It is the commission of that act as defined
by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision
has been violated. Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since
the law prohibits the mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section
7(d) of R.A. No. 6713. Neither is undue influence on respondent‘s part required to be proven as
held by the CA. Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA official is of no
consequence in the determination of her administrative liability. And considering that respondent
admitted having taken two loans from CABMPCI, which is a cooperative whose operations are
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directly regulated by respondent‘s office, respondent was correctly meted the penalty of
suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Section 7(d). The CA
committed reversible error when it granted respondent‘s petition for review which should have
been dismissed for lack of merit.
 SECTION 8-9 SALN
G.R. NOS. 190580-81 FEBRUARY 21, 2011
LIBERATO M. CARABEO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

(FOURTH DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
(SECTION 10 CORRECTION OF SALN)
ABAD, J.:
Facts: Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 259, investigators of the Department of Finance
(DOF) Revenue Integrity Protection Service (RIPS) made lifestyles check of DOF officials and
employees. As a result of these investigations, the DOF charged petitioner Liberato Carabeo,
Parañaque City Treasurer, before the Office of the Ombudsman for violations of Section 7 in
relation to Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 and Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The informations filed with the Sandiganbayan. It has been alleaged that the accused Carabeo
failed to disclose several items in his sworn SALN filed over the years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable.
HELD: Yes. Carabeo claims that his head office, the DOF, should have alerted him on the
deficiency in his SALN and given him the chance to correct the same before any charge is filed
against him in connection with the same.
But, the Sandiganbayan, citing Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), held that the review of the SALN by the head of office is
irrelevant and cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an independent
investigation for criminal violations committed by the public official or employee. But what
Carabeo fails to grasp is that it was eventually the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOF-RIPS,
that filed the criminal cases against him before the Sandiganbayan. That office is vested with the
sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or on complaint of any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office, or agency when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman could file the
informations subject of these cases without any help from the DOF-RIPS.
True, Section 10 of R.A. 6713 provides that when the head of office finds the SALN of a
subordinate incomplete or not in the proper form such head of office must call the subordinate‘s
attention to such omission and give him the chance to rectify the same. But this procedure is an
internal office matter. Whether or not the head of office has taken such step with respect to a
particular subordinate cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from investigating the latter. Its
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power to investigate and prosecute erring government officials cannot be made dependent on the
prior action of another office. To hold otherwise would be to diminish its constitutionally
guarded independence.
Further, Carabeo‘s reliance on his supposed right to notice regarding errors in his SALNs and to
be told to correct the same is misplaced. The notice and correction referred to in Section 10 are
intended merely to ensure that SALNs are "submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper
form." Obviously, these refer to formal defects in the SALNs. The charges against Carabeo,
however, are for falsification of the assets side of his SALNs and for declaring a false net worth.
These are substantive, not formal defects. Indeed, while the Court said in Pleyto that heads of
offices have the duty to review their subordinates‘ SALNs, it would be absurd to require such
heads to run a check on the truth of what the SALNs state and require their subordinates to
correct whatever lies these contain. The responsibility for truth in those SALNs belongs to the
subordinates who prepared them, not to the heads of their offices.
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ANTI PLUNDER LAW (R.A NO. 7080)
G.R. NO. 148560 NOVEMBER 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, PETITIONER,VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
(PLUNDER, MALA IN SE)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, makes a stringent call for the Court to subject the
Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental
rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by
RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No.
26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
Sandiganbayan, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for
the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused."
Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner moved to quash the
Information but the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the
issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and,
ISSUES: (A) Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
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(B) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is
within the power of Congress to so classify it.
(A) As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or

series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving,
directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other
form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining,
receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form
of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended
to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least ₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained.
It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with
its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes
is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of
the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4..
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The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers -
to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining.

To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and
temporal succession.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1).
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan9 that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2
of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal
which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common
goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of
action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall
scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal
acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined
than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in
the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the
law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every
other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner
179 | P a g e
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who
voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated
upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered
his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers
from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to
prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an
Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The
prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least
two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least
₱50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the
very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern
arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This
conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not
required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with
the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition
in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them.
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case
for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a
means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral
(B) No. As regards the third issue plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It
is true that Section 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the
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commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe,

however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice
Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."35
(B) The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it
is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since
in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the
inherent wrongness of the acts.
Plunder Law is especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral
and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of
the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and
other venalities in public office. This Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is constitutional.
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LAW ON SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS (RA NO. 1405, AS AMENDED AND RA

6426)
G.R. NO. L-18343 SEPTEMBER 30, 1965
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK AND EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS,
VS.
EMILIO A. GANCAYCO AND FLORENTINO FLOR, SPECIAL PROSECUTORS OF
THE DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
(EXEMPTION TO BANK SECRECY – SECTION 8, RA 3019)
REGALA, J.:
FACTS: Emilio A. Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of
Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearingthe records of the
bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In
declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank invoked Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405.
On the other hand, the defendants cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act
No. 3019) in support of their claim of authority and demanded anew that plaintiff Eduardo Z.
Romualdez, as bank president, produce the records or he would be prosecuted for contempt. The
law is Section 8 of Republic Act 3019.
SEC. 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. — xxx Properties in the name of the
spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration,
when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank
deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.xx
ISSUE: Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclose bank records of depositor who is
under investigation for unexplained wealth.
HELD: Yes. With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making
bank deposits confidential, it is enough to point out that while section 2 of Republic Act 1405
declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in
the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of
impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation.
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason
is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy
express the motion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to
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public scrutiny. Yes. RA 3019 indicates that bank deposits should be taken into consideration
notwithstanding any provision contrary to law. The decision appealed from is affirmed by this
court.
G.R. NOS. 157294-95 NOVEMBER 30, 2006
JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, PETITIONER, VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
(PLUNDER EXEMPTION TO RA 1405)
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS: Petitoner Joseph Victor G. Ejercito is the owner of several bank accounts and records.
His father former President Joseph Estrada was charged with plunder. The prosecution in that
case requests that his bank account be inquired into. He then wrote a letter before the
Sandiganbayan stating that his accounts are protected under the Bank Secrecy Law. From his
petition, it is gathered that the "accounts" referred to by petitioner in his above-quoted letter
are Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9. In his Motion to Quash,
petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated therein. However, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
ISSUES: (A). Whether petitioner‘s Trust Account No. 858 is covered by the term "deposit" as
used in R.A. 1405;
(B). Whether petitioner‘s Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
are excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405; and
(A) Yes.The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in
R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the
trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term "deposits" used
therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-
debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to

the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so
that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic
development of the country. (Underscoring supplied)
If the money deposited under an account may be used by banks for authorized loans to third
persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship
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between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely
seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.
(B) Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between
petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers "deposit, placement or
investment of funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under
Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be
invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would
encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in other ventures,
contrary to the policy behind the law. The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive
interpretation of "deposits." Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that,
generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which
are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to "deposits" in the
strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase "or
invested." Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.
The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being recognized exceptions
thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1)
the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation.
Petitioner contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his accounts are
not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco7 holds
otherwise:
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason
is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy
expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to
public scrutiny.
An examination of the "overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)" of R.A. No. 7080
would make the similarity between plunder and bribery even more pronounced since bribery is
essentially included among these criminal acts.
The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public
officers, and in either case the noble idea that "a public office is a public trust and any person
who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to
his duty, is open to public scrutiny" applies with equal force.
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of
bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.
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In light then of this Court‘s pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject matter of the litigation
cannot be limited to bank accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but must include
those accounts to which the money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was
alleged to have been transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
in the name of petitioner fall under this description and must thus be part of the subject matter of
the litigation.
G.R. NO. 94723 AUGUST 21, 1997
KAREN E. SALVACION, MINOR, THRU FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., FATHER

AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, AND SPOUSES FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., AND
EVELINA E. SALVACION, PETITIONERS,
VS.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION AND
GREG BARTELLI Y NORTHCOTT, RESPONDENTS.
(EXEMPTION AGAINST GARNISHMENT)
TORRES, JR., J.:
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American Tourist, raped a 12 year old Salvacion and was arrested
thereafter. The policeman received several banking instruments including China Banking
Corporation Bank book. He was charged with illegal detention and four counts of rape. Petitioner
filed with the RTC a civil case for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg. The judge
granted the attachment. The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China
Banking Corporation. The CBC invoked RA 1405 and Section 13 of the Central Bank Circular
No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits are exempt from court processes such as
garnishment (money), attachment (property) or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. They also invoked
Section 8 of RA 6426.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A.
6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: No. The exemption in not allowing the attachment is not applicable to Greg because of
the factual circumstances of the case.
It is evident from our laws that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit
System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors It is these deposits
that are induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them. Obviously, the
foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by
PD Nos. 1034 (EXPANDING THE AUTHORITY OF CERTAIN DEPOSITORY BANKS
UNDER R.A. NO. 6426 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) and 1035 (AUTHORIZING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFSHORE BANKING SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES) and
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given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in
the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with
respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the
Philippines.
For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that
the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
"Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to
the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
G.R. NO. 174629 FEBRUARY 14, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-MONEY

LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), PETITIONER,
VS.
HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, MANILA,
BRANCH 34, PANTALEON ALVAREZ AND LILIA CHENG, RESPONDENTS.
(EXEMPTION UNDER AMLA)
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: This case is aftermath of the ruling of this Court in Agan v. PIATCO nullifying the
concession agreement awarded to the Philippine International Airport Terminal Corporation
(PIATCO) over the Ninoy Aquino International Airport – International Passenger Terminal 3
(NAIA 3) Project.
A series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were
undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of petitioner
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC). Petitioner Republic of the Philippines was presently
defending itself in two international arbitration cases filed in relation to the NAIA 3 Project.4The
CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals
involved in the award, including respondent Pantaleon Alvarez (Alvarez) who had been the
Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee, NAIA-IPT3 Project. Meanwhile, the Special
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Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a letter dated 2
November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and
several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to
believe that the bank accounts "were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were
committed" in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the Sandiganbayan, the court
affirmed the point of view of the special prosecutor thereby granting his request by issuing an
AMLC resolution.
Following the December 2005 AMLC Resolution (allowing the examination of the banks
accounts of the parties including the account of Alvarez and Yong ) the Republic, through the
AMLC, filed an application before the Manila RTC to inquire into and/or examine thirteen (13)
accounts and two (2) related web of accounts alleged as having been used to facilitate corruption
in the NAIA 3 Project. Among said accounts were the DBS Bank account of Alvarez and the
Metrobank accounts of Cheng Yong, the court presided by Judge Eugenio granted the request
of the AMLC to inquire into the bank accounts listed therein in accordance to Section 11 of
AMLC. Another request was made to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of
Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act before the RTC of Makati and it was also granted. Both courts order
the ex-parte inquiry order requiring ex parte application on the aforementioned bank accounts,
hence this petition.
ISSUES: (a) Is an application for an order authorizing inquiry into or examination of the
aforementioned bank accounts or investments violative under Section 11 of the AMLA?
HELD: No. The Court‘s construction of Section 11 of the AMLA is undoubtedly influenced by
right to privacy considerations. However, sufficient for our purposes, we can assert there is a
right to privacy governing bank accounts in the Philippines, and that such right finds application
to the case at bar. The source of such right is statutory, expressed as it is in R.A. No. 1405
otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. The right to privacy is enshrined in Section 2
of that law, to wit:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in

the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered
as of an absolutely confidential nature xxx.
Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state
policy in the Philippines. Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added exceptions to
the Bank Secrecy Act, yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule. It falls within
the zones of privacy recognized by our laws.
Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section 2 of
the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by "any person, government official, bureau or office"; namely when: (1) upon written
permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts
is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
187 | P a g e
and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A.
Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as
constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality,92 and there have been
other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC
may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the
AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments
are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering
offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the
deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking and other violations under R.A. No.
6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order
before it could inquire into such accounts.
It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section
11 of the AMLA is a "litigation" encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act
which is when "the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation." The
orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As
earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-blown trial.
Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act
it does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the
older law that "[a]ll deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature."
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ARTICLE 235 – MALTREATMENT OF OFFICERS
ANTI-TORTURE ACT OF 2009 (RA 9745)
 PHYSICAL TORTURE
 MENTAL TORTURE
 OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, EGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT
 SAFEGUARDS/REMEDY OF VICTIMS
 DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
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ARTICLE 245 – ABUSE AGAINST CHASTITY
ANTI SEXUAL HARRASSMENT ACT OF 1005 (RA NO. 7877), AS AMENDED BY

SAFE SPACES ACT RA 11313
A.M. NO. CTA-01-1 APRIL 2, 2002
ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO, COMPLAINANT,

VS.
HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, RESPONDENT.
(CASUAL BUSS ON THE CHEEK, NOT SEXUAL HARASSMENT)
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS: Atty. Susan M. Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), charged Judge Ernesto Acosta, Presiding Judge of the same court, with sexual
harassment under R.A. 7877 and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Code of
Professional Responsibility.In her affidavit-complaint, Aquino narrated at least 6 attempts both
successful and unsuccessful, by Judge Acosta, to embrace and kiss her and the last incident when
she forcefully pushed Acosta away from her only showed that she was repulsed by his behaviour.
In his comment, respondent judge denied complainant's allegation that he sexually harassed her
six times.
On the first incident, he explained that it was quite unlikely that complainant would ask him to
go to her office on such date in order to give him a "pasalubong." With respect to the second
incident on December 28, he claimed it could not have happened as he was then on official
leave.Anent the third incident, respondent explained that he went to the various offices of the
CTA to extend New Year's greetings to the personnel. He also greeted complainant with a casual
buss on her cheek and gave her a calendar. In turn, she also greeted him. As to the fourth
episode, he averred that he and complainant had been attending the deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee at the Senate on the bill expanding the jurisdiction of the
CTA. Hence, when the bill was finally approved that particular day, respondent, in jubilation and
in the presence of other people, gave complainant a spontaneous peck on her cheek. He could not
recall any resentment on her part when he kissed her. She even congratulated him in return,
saying "Justice ka na Judge." Then he treated her to a lunch to celebrate the event. As to the fifth
incident, respondent alleged that he did not call complainant to harass her, but to discuss with her
and Elizabeth Lozano, HRMO III, and Elsie T. Forteza, Administrative Officer, the health plan
for the CTA officers and employees. The fact that such meeting took place was confirmed by a
Certification issued by Lozano.4
Regarding the sixth incident,, he remarked that he forgot to greet her on Valentine's Day, the day
before. He approached complainant to give her a casual buss on the cheek. But she suddenly
stood and raised her arms to cover her face, causing her to lose her balance. So he held her arms
to prevent her from falling. Her rejection came as a surprise to him and made him feel quite
190 | P a g e
embarrassed. Shortly, complainant excused herself and left the room. Stunned at the thought that
she might misinterpret his gesture, he sent her a short note of apology. Respondent further
explained that the structure of his office, being seen through a transparent glass divider, makes it
impossible for anyone to commit any improper conduct inside.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Acosta is violative of the Anti- sexual harassment law.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that "A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual
conduct or favor and does not fall within the purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877.
Moreover, it was clear fro the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on a
festice and special occasion‖ and ― they took place in the presence of other people and the same
was by reason of the exaltation or happiness if the moment‘‖.
"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment are as
follows:
1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,

instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence
or moral ascendancy over another;
2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;
3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,

instructor, professor, coach, or any other person having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy makes a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.
In her Complaint-affidavit, Reply and Sur-rejoinder, complainant did not even allege that
Judge Acosta demanded, requested or required her to give him a buss on the cheek
which, she resented. Neither did Atty. Aquino establish by convincing evidence that the
busses on her cheek, which she considers as sexual favors, discriminated against her
continued employment, or resulted in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.
In fact, complainant continued to perform her work in the office with the usual normalcy.
Obviously, the alleged sexual favor, if there ever was, did not interfere with her working
condition. Moreover, Atty. Aquino also continued to avail of benefits and leaves
appurtenant to her office and was able to maintain a consistent outstanding performance.
On top of this, her working area which, is at the third floor of the CTA, is far removed
from the office of Judge Acosta located at the fourth floor of the same building.
Resultantly, no hostile or intimidating working environment is apparent.
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CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS (ARTS. 246-266-A)

G.R. NO. 188751, NOVEMBER 16, 2016
BONIFACIO NIEVA Y MONTERO, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
(PROOF OF INTENT TO KILL)
JARDELEZA, J.:
FACTS: In an Information dated November 2, 2005, Nieva was charged with the crime of
Frustrated Murder in the Regional Trial Court. Nieva, acting with discernment, while armed with
a gun attacked and shoot with the said gun one Judy Ignacio (President of the Catmon
Homeowners Association) hitting the latter on the left leg by reason of the alleged negligence of
Judy as to the electrification project of the Homeowners Association. He was able to fire the gun
but it jammed, hence, he fled from the crime.
In his defense, He inquired on the electrification of the Homeowners Association and Judy
informed him that it was already done. Thereafter, a heated argument ensued between him and
Judy. The latter accused him of having a hand on an electric post that fell down. He claimed that
the gun fired accidentally when the colleague of Judy tried to restrain him. The RTC convicted
Nieva of Frustrated Homicide Nieva appealed to the CA. CA affirmed Nieva's conviction.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Nieva.
HELD: No. Nieva submits that he has no intent to kill Judy considering that the gun was pointed
to the ground when it was fired and Judy's wound was not fatal.
In Rivera v. People, we explained that intent to kill may be proved by: (a) the means used by the
malefactors; (b) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (c) the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; (d)
the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and (e) the motives of the accused.
We concur with the findings of the CA that intent to kill was present. It is undisputed that Nieva
used a gun, a deadly weapon, in assaulting Judy. At that time, Judy was unarmed and could not
have defended herself. Nieva fired the gun several times towards Judy. If the bullets had not
jammed, Nieva could have killed Judy through multiple gunshot wounds. As it was, the gun's
bullets jammed and the gun fired only once; albeit, leaving Judy with a wound on her upper right
leg, which according to Dr. Serrano could have caused her death if not for the timely medical
intervention at the MCU Hospital. Prior to the incident, Nieva also admitted that there had been
several quarrels between him and Judy. These circumstances showing the weapon used, the
nature of the wound sustained by Judy, and the conduct of Nieva before and during the incident,
manifest Nieva's intent to kill Judy.
In fine, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of frustrated homicide,
which are: first, the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
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weapon in his assault; second, the victim sustained a fatal or mortal wound but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and third, none of the qualifying circumstances for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.
G.R. NO. 198954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VS.

RODRIGO MACASPAC Y ISIP, ACCUSED-APPELLANT
(MURDER VS. HOMICIDE)
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: The accused stabbed with a knife Jebulan on the vital part of his body, thereby
inflicting physical injuries to him. Accordingly, while they were drinking, Macaspac had an
argument with jebulan. It becaome so heated that Macaspac uttered to the group ―hintayin nyo
ako dyan, wawalisin ko kayo‖. He left for a while but upon his return he brought with him a
kitchen knife. He suddenly stabbed Jebulan on the chest and fled away. The wound inflicted
upon him resulted to his death.
The defendant invoked self-defensse since he and Jebulan scuffed for possession of the kitchen
knife. However, he changed his testimony and stated that Jebulan fell on the knife, and that he
did not have an argument with Jebulan. Both the RTC and CA ruled that the defendant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the killing. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct.
HELD: No. The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of
time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.22
Macaspac 's having suddenly left the group and his utterance of Hintayin n’yo ako d'yan,
wawalisin ko kayo marked the time of his resolve to commit the crime. His returning to the group
with the knife manifested his clinging to his resolve to inflict lethal harm on the others. The first
and second elements of evident premeditation were thereby established. But it is the essence of
this circumstance that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolve to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. Was the lapse of time between the determination and execution - a
matter of three minutes, based on the records - sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act? By quickly returning to the group with the knife, he let no appreciable
time pass to allow him to reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the
execution immediately followed the resolve to commit the crime. As such, the third requisite was
absent.
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There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which ·give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or
forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. Treachery,
whenever alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing
and raises it to the category of murder.
When the victim was alerted to the impending lethal attack due to the preceding heated argument
between him and the accused, with the latter even uttering threats against the former, treachery
cannot be appreciated as an attendant circumstance. When the resolve to commit the crime was
immediately followed its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the
crime is homicide, not murder.
G.R. NO. 74433 SEPTEMBER 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

FRANCISCO ABARCA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
(DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE)
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte,
sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder
with double frustrated murder. Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca,
Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in
Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in
TaclobanOn the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to to fetch his daughter but
the bus had engine trouble and could not leave Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife,
Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the
accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away.
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier.,
C2C Arturo He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh.
The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle
Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room
where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Kingsley Koh
died instantaneously. Arnold Amparado his wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the
hospital. The trial court found the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of murder with
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ISSUE: Whether or not the court is correct in charging the accused with complex crime of
murder instead if applying Art. 247 of the RPC
HELD: Yes. Article 247 applies in this case. There is no question that the accused surprised his
wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which,
he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the
following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court,
in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-
appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter
was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the
victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall
kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of
intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires
that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually
motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The
killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v.
Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-
quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment
— to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter
in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the
enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who would
otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or
serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only with destierro.
This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the
protection of the accused than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.)
And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is
exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional
circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even
where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly
lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it
defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances
which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of
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the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally,
admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not
absurd, since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an
integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the
offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance
which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an
essential element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be
proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106,
Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not
define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the
accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries
under the circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended
for his protection.
G.R. NOS. 130634-35 MARCH 12, 2001

MANOLITO OYANIB Y MENDOZA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
(ELEMENTS UNDER ART. 247)
PARDO: J
FACTS: This is a joint trial of 2 cases filed against Manelito for the killing of his wife, Tita
Oyanib, and her paramour, Esquierido. Manalito charged upon them in a very intimatesituation
by a nagging bridge in Iligan. Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and
exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very
reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other
men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her
paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan
City. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that
she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him. By that time they
were separated due to marital differences. He stated that they aare still sposuses for him.
Manolito then went to the rented house of Tita to inform her of their child‘s failing grade and to
ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf. When he opened the door using a hunting
knife, he saw them having a sexual intercourse. Both of them died from multiple stab wounds
inflicted by Manolito.The trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused guilty beyond
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reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed an
appeal from the joint decision of the trial court to the Supreme Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exception circumstance under Article 247 would apply in this case.
HELD: Yes. . Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements
for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife
(or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. Accused
must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be
untenable. "The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the
husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery.
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that
accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the
act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. After an assiduous analysis of the evidence
presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the
circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-
appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the
place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by
jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented
his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he
stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the
police when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the
opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v.
Wagas:35
"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife
creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can only be
justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted
to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during
the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter."
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R.A NO. 8353 (ANTI- RAPE LAW OF 1997)
G.R. No. 225642-43
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs.

JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO, Accused-Appellant
(HONOR DOCTRINE)
MARTIRES, J.:
FACTS: AAA, single, housekeeper at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, she was watching a
beauty contest with her aunt.The contest was being held at a basketball court where a make-shift
stage was put up. The only lights available were those coming from the vehicles around. She had
the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong
Cooperative near the basketball court. Between the cooperative building and the basketball court
were several trees. She was not able to reach the comfort room because [ Amarela was already
waiting for her along the way. Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was
shocked and was no match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day
care center. He punched her in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed
her. She tried to resist him but he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He
placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull
movement. She shouted for help and then three (3) men came to her rescue so Amarela fled but
those men also have bad intention with her so she fled went to the house of Godo Dumandan
who brought her first to the Racho residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was not at
home. Dumandan stayed behind So Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her
aunt's house instead.
Then Racho brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to lie down.
When she refused, he boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking him but he
succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of her He
then inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. After consummating the act, Racho left her. So she
went home alone. The RTC found Juvy D. Amarela (Amarela) and Junard G.
Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) different charges of rape. CA affirmed.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court is correct.
HELD: No. The court reversed the RTC and the CA rulings due to the presence of lingering
doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum
of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case (The "women's honor" doctrine is deemed to
have been abandoned in this case). It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos,
would not admit that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due
to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We cannot believe that the offended party would
have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place. And while the
factual setting back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be
198 | P a g e
reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria
Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We, should stay away from such
mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has over
the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to
fight for her rights. Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond
reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.
The court found some issues in AAA‘s credibility as she changes her testimonies every now and
then.
After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony, reasonable doubt
lingers as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The following
circumstances, particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of her testimony: (1) the
version of AAA's story appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her
testimony in court; (2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene
was dark and she only saw him for the first time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on how
she was brought under the stage against her will; and (4) the medical findings do not corroborate
physical injuries and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.
As to Racho's case, if the denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could have easily raised
these defenses and denied that AAA ever came to the house. His mother could have likewise
covered up this story, but she did not and confirmed that Racho was with AAA that night. If
indeed Racho raped AAA that night, the best defense available for him was alibi which he
thought he did not have to raise, given that he was telling the truth when he left AAA by herself
to go home. To our mind, these are badges of truth which persuade us that Racho might be
telling the truth.
In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be
supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty. The
prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether
AAA's ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must
do its part to convince the court that the accused is guilty.
G.R. NOS. 148939-40 FEBRUARY 13, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE VS.

JOSEPH ORILLA, APPELLANT.
(COUNT AND CONSUMMATED, LACK OF SEMEN)
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: A fifteen-year old Remilyn Orilla, sister of accused Joseph Orilla was sound asleep
inside one of the rooms of their house when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy weight
pressing on her body and found appellant Joseph Orilla on top of her and successfully had a
carnal knowledge as the she stated that she felt pain. She was not able to fight back as she was
199 | P a g e
threatened to be killed with a knife. This prompted her to silently cry for help. The RTC
convicted the accused if 1 count of rape because while he ejaculated twice in Remilyn‘s vagina,
they occurred during the ―single body connections. Hence, accused was convicted of qualified
rape.
HELD: Yes. Appellant is guilty of rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 3219-A but the proper
penalty is reclusion perpetua, not death. Since appellant committed only one count of rape.
The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will. Remilyn‘s
straightforward narration on how appellant forcibly ravished her proves beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant is guilty of the crime of rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. However,
appellant committed only one count of rape. Remilyn‘s own account of the rape proves this
Remilyn testified that appellant‘s penis penetrated her genitalia. At that point, appellant had
already consummated the rape. The mere introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the
victim‘s genitalia engenders the crime of rape. Hence, it is the "touching" or "entry" of the penis
into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victim‘s genitalia that
consummates rape.
Appellant ejaculated twice during the time that he consummated the rape. Appellant did not
withdraw his penis to insert it again into the vagina or to "touch" the labia majora or the labia
minora when he ejaculated the second time. It is not the number of times that appellant
ejaculated but the penetration or "touching" that determines the consummation of the sexual act.
Thus, appellant committed only one count of rape.
G.R. NO. 190632 FEBRUARY 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

VS.
MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ, ALIAS "MACHETE," ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
(COUNTS OF RAPE)
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: AAA, who was then 17 years old was walking and chatting with her friends along one
of the streets then two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and
informed them that they were being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew
against minors. AAA‘s companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was
apprehended. She was brought in the barangay hall. After a while, the barangay tanod, the one
who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be
the one to bring AAA back to her house, however on their way to her house they stopped in a
grassy area then the appellant subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie
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down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and
inserted his penis into AAA‘s vagina despite the latter‘s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the
appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once
again, inserted his penis into AAA‘s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the
appellant inserted again his penis into AAA‘s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant
stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would
kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between them. The following day, AAA
took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay authorities and filed the case. the Court
finds the appellant Manolito Lucena Y Velasquez alias MACHETE, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of Rape. CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct.
HELD: Yes. As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron
Case),35 insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3)
penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this
contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim‘s vagina; he then withdrew it
and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his
penis into the victim‘s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie
near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into
the victim‘s vagina and continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court
convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful penetrations
because there is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the accused
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire
to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed
that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was
obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here, we
quote with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial
court, to wit:
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts of
rape.1âwphi1 It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis
into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an
interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his
victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be
clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those separate
and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but
rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA
were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant‘s
conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
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G.R. NO. 212193
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VS.

JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC Y MARQUEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT
(RAPE; LACK OF RESISTANCE)
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS: "AAA" testified that at around 9:30 p.m. 2008, she was having a drinking session with
appellant (Tionloc) and Meneses in the house of appellant. After some time, she felt dizzy
thenshe was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis
into her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife and now lying
on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left after raping her.
While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant approached her and asked if he could
also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and raped her. Appellant
stopped only when she tried to reposition her body. On his defense, Appellant denied raping
"AAA." He claimed that he only saw Meneses and ―AAA‖ having sexual intercourse. The RTC
finds the accused Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape punishable under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code ( rape through
sexual intercourse). CA affirmed the decision despite the argument of the appellant that
discrepancies in ―AAA‖sworn statement diminished her credibility. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in its decision.
HELD: Yes. Be that as it may, the prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence
of appellant by presenting evidence that would establish the elements of rape by sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a man; (2)
the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; (3) such act was accomplished by using force,
threat or intimidation. "In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or
intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on
the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to
consummate the purposes which the accused had in mind. On the other hand, intimidation must
produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something
would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if
she reports the incident. "Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening
the girl with a knife or pistol."
It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-year old man who had sexual
intercourse with "AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there
was no evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat or intimidation during his sexual
congress with "AAA." No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or
appellant employed force, threat or intimidation against her. No claim was ever made that
appellant physically overpowered, or used or threatened to use a weapon against, or uttered
threatening words to "AAA." While "AAA" feared for her life since a knife lying on the table
202 | P a g e
nearby could be utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere product of her own
imagination.
"AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to utter a word or
make any sign of rejection of appellant's sexual advances. It was only in the middle of their
sexual congress when "AAA" tried to move which can hardly be considered as an unequivocal
manifestation of her refusal or rejection of appellant's sexual advances.
In People v. Amogis, this Court held that resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere
attempt to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman defending her virtue,
honor and chastity. And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the
moment appellant's evil design became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a
man of rape committed against a woman who, after giving him the impression thru her
unexplainable silence of her tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her,
changed her mind in the middle and charged him with rape.
It must be also noted that the fact that she was tipsy would not be held against the appellant as
she voluntarily went to the appellant‘s house while drinking liquor.
G.R. NO. 187495 APRIL 21, 2014

EDGAR JUMAWAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
(MARITAL RAPE)
REYES, J.:
FACTS: Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married. They Iived together since then
and raised their four (4) children as they put up several businesses over the years. Then the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him. He successfully had
carnal knowledge with the private complainant twice both instances against the latter's will . The
accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because
he took over the control and management of their businesses. He alleged that KKK wanted to
cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd
behaviour and evidenced by the love letters addressed to Bebs (KKK). RTC finds accused Edgar
Jumawan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape. CA affirmed
the decision. Hence, this petition.
HELD: YES. The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital
rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the
exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to
marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny The Court also declared
the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional. Said exemption
203 | P a g e
states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his
wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his
wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.
Moreover, RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist‘s legal
relationship with his victim as the law uses the term ―man‖.
"Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
"b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
"c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
"d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the
accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband
and wife unless the contrary is proved. According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape,
as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her
consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State
Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353.
G.R. NO. 234947, JUNE 19, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GARRY PADILLA Y
BASE AND FRANCISCO BERMAS Y ASIS, ACCUSED, FRANCISCO BERMAS Y
ASIS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
(GUIDING PRINCIPLES)
CAGUIOA, J.:
FACTS: AAA, mentally retarded since birth, told her mother (BBB) that she was to attend a
birthday party near their house. AAA testified that as she was watching those having videoke,
she was told by accused (Bermas) to go to Barangay Captain CCC's house. Upon her arrival,
204 | P a g e
accused and one Garry Padilla were already at the house of the barangay captain. While at the
stairs of the said house, accused [Bermas] allegedly told her "AAA, wag kang magsumbong
marami ako ritong pera, sige na hubarin mo na ang parity mo." Both men then removed private
complainants' shorts and underwear. Bernas and Padilla had carnal knowledge with AAA.
On the other hand, the evidence of the defense is based on the lone testimony of Bermas, who
testified that he went to a drinking session and did not heed the invitation of Gary to attend a
birthday party near BBB‘s house. He was merely pinpointed as the male companion of private
complainant. He was thereafter brought to the police station where he was incarcerated with
Gary for allegedly raping private complainant. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Art. 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Republic Act 7610. CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court is correct
HELD: No. It bears emphasis that in rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of
the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear,
convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature.16 This is a matter best assigned to the
trial court which had the firsthand opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and
observe their demeanor, conduct, and attitude during cross-examination. Hence, the trial court's
findings carry very great weight and substance. However, it is equally true that in reviewing rape
cases, the Court observes the following guiding principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.18
This must be so as the guilt of an accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Before he is
convicted, there should be moral certainty — a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason
and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
The Court, in Cartuano and as subsequently clarified in Dalandas, does not require a
comprehensive medical examination in each and every case where mental retardation needed to
be proved. However, it is well to emphasize that the conviction of an accused of rape based on
the mental retardation of the private complainant must be anchored on proof beyond reasonable
doubt of her mental retardation.
The victim apparently "consented" (AAA answered before the court that she liked what the
accussed did to her) to the act, the Court necessarily had to determine whether this consent was
vitiated, such that the act would amount to Rape under Article 266-A(l)(b) for having carnal
205 | P a g e
knowledge with a woman "deprived of reason." However, as discussed, the prosecution failed to
establish her mental retardation beyond reasonable doubt.
NOTA BENE
In holding that AAA was a mental retardate, the CA rationalized:
People v. Dalandas has already qualified the application [of] the Cartuano, Jr. ruling.
In Dalandas, the Supreme Court held that clinical evidence is necessary in borderline cases
when it is difficult to ascertain whether the victim is of a normal mind or is suffering from a
mild mental retardation. Medical evidence is not a condition sine qua non in all cases of rape
or sexual crimes for that matter to prove that the victim is a mental retardate or is suffering
from mental deficiency or some form of mental disorder. A person's mental retardation can
also be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of
witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.
In Dalandas, the private complainant was a 20-year old mental retardate who only finished
the second grade of elementary school. As proof of her mental retardation, the private
complainant's father, much like AAA's mother in this case, testified that his daughter has had
a mental defect since childhood. The Court eventually acquitted the accused therein and, in
the process, held that the "claim that his daughter was suffering from a mental defect since
childhood was a mere conclusion." In acquitting the accused in Dalandas, the Court
explained at length:
The basic postulate in criminal prosecution anchored on the constitution is that the
prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused the crime charged beyond cavil of
doubt. In this case, the prosecution was burdened to prove conclusively and indubitably not
only that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant but also that private
complainant was a mental retardate.
It goes without saying that there must be some evidence in the record which, if true, will afford
substantive support for such findings and its absence cannot be cured by assuming that the
trial court saw something in the conduct or demeanor of the victim which must have led to the
decision appealed from.
Our pronouncement in People vs. Cartuano, Jr. that a finding of the victim being a mental
retardate must be based on laboratory and psychometric support does not preclude the
presentation by the prosecution of evidence other than clinical evidence to prove the mental
retardation of the victim. We held in said case that clinical evidence is necessary in borderline
cases when it is difficult to ascertain whether the victim is of a normal mind or is suffering
from a mild mental retardation. Medical evidence is not a condition sine qua non in all cases
of rape or sexual crimes for that matter to prove that the victim is a mental retardate or is
suffering from mental deficiency or some form of mental disorder. However, the conviction of
an accused of rape based on the mental retardation of private complainant must be anchored
on proof beyond reasonable doubt of her mental retardation.
206 | P a g e
GR.229861, JULY 2, 2018

PEOPLE v FRANCISCO EJERCITO
(266-A vs. RA7610)
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No.
(RA) 8353, otherwise known as "The Anti--Rape Law of 1997‖ against the victim when she was
still 15 years of age but she eventually became his paramour. The RTC was pronounced as guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. However, there has been clarification on whether the charge against
him was for violation of RA 8353 or violation of RA 7610 (Child Abuse law, Sec 10b)
Issue: W/N the charged against him must be for violation of RA 8353 or violation of RA 7610
(Child Abuse Law)
Ruling: In this case, it has been established that Ejercito committed the act of sexual intercourse
against and without the consent of AAA, who was only fifteen (15) years old at that time. As
such, she is considered under the law as a child who is "exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse;" hence, Ejercito's act may as well be classified as a violation of Section 5 (b)
of R.A. 7610.
Between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, and Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the
Court deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be convicted under the former. Verily, penal
laws are crafted by legislature to punish certain acts, and when two (2) penal laws may both
theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is more special in nature, regardless of
the time of enactment, should prevail. In Teves v. Sandiganbayan:
It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms,
and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be
harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether
it was passed prior to the general statute. Or where two statutes are of contrary tenor or of
different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefor specially should prevail over the other.27 (Emphases supplied)
After much deliberation, the Court herein observes that RA 8353 amending the RPC should now
be uniformly applied in cases involving sexual intercourse committed against minors, and not
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Indeed, w}file RA 7610 has been considered as a special law that
covers the sexual abuse of minors, RA 8353 has expanded the reach of our already existing rape
laws. These existing rape laws should not only pertain to the old Article 33528 of the RPC but
also to the provision on sexual intercourse under Section 5 (b)29 of RA 7610 which, applying
Quimvel's characterization of a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other abuse,"
virtually punishes the rape of a minor.
207 | P a g e
It bears to emphasize that not only did RA 8353 re-classify the crime of Rape from being a crime
against chastity to a crime against persons,30 it also provided for more particularized instances
of rape and conjunctively, a new set of penalties therefor. Under RA 8353, Rape is considered
committed not only through the traditional means of having carnal knowledge of a woman (or
penile penetration) but also through certain lascivious acts now classified as rape by sexual
assault
Significant to this case, the above-highlighted provisions of RA 8353 already accounted for the
circumstance of minority under certain peculiar instances. The consequence therefore is a clear
overlap' with minority as an element of the crime of sexual intercourse against a minor under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. However, as it was earlier intimated, RA 8353 is not only the more
recent statutory enactment but more importantly, the more comprehensive law on rape; therefore,
the Court herein clarifies that in cases where a minor is raped through sexual intercourse, the
provisions of RA 8353 amending the RPC ought to prevail over Section 5 (b) of RA 7610
although the latter also penalizes the act of sexual intercourse against a minor.
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ANTI-CHILD ABUSE LAW (RA 7610, AS AMENDED)

GR 195224, JUNE 15, 2016
VIRGINIA JABALDE v PEOPLE
SEC 10a, REQUIRED INTENT TO DEBASE
PONENTE: REYES, J.
Facts: The victim Lin was playing ―Langit, Lupa‖ when he accidentally injured Nova, the
accused‘s daughter with puncture on her head. He then helped Nova to stand while one of his
classmates called Jabalde. Afraid of what happened, he ran towards a dilapidated building, which
was near the place of the incident. Soon thereafter, Jabalde arrived and slapped him on his neck
and choked him. Lin was able to get out of her hold when he removed her hands from his neck.
He immediately ran towards their house some 500 meters away from the school. He told his
mother Aileen about the incident. Thereafter, he was brought to Sta. Catalina Hospital for
treatment and a medical certificate was then issued to him. According to the medical report, the
abrasions could have been caused by a hard object but mildly inflicted and that these linear
abrasions were signs of fingernail marks.
The RTC convicted the accused guilty for violation of RA 7610 Sec. 10a.
Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they were, is
punishable under the RPC particularly Article 266(1) which defines slight physical injuries;
hence, she should be punished under the RPC and not under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610.
Issue:W/N Jabalde is guilty for violation of RA 7610 Sec. 10a
Held: Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin, hitting the latter on his nape, and
immediately thereafter, choking the said offended party causing the latter to sustain injuries.
However, the records of the case do not show that Jabalde intended to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human being. The laying of the hands on Lin
was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional outrage after being informed that her daughter's head was
punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got blurred and she
fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the board for about
five to ten minutes. Moreover, the testimony of the examining physician, Dr. Muñoz, belied the
accusation that Jabalde, with cruelty and with intent, abused, maltreated and injured Lin. It
would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution's witness herself
testified that the abrasions suffered by Lin were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde indeed
intended to abuse, maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy with
heavy blows.As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the flesh of
her flesh, is the most excruciating idea that a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the acts
of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own
child from harm and danger as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered
by Lin, thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the strength of her
209 | P a g e
mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential
element of intent was not established with the prescribed degree of proof required for a
successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. As a mother, the death
of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the flesh of her flesh, is the most excruciating
idea that a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin is just a
product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger as
manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any
intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that
specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent was
not established with the prescribed degree of proof required for a successful prosecution under
Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.
However Jabalde is liable for slight Physical injuries under Article 266(2) of the RPC since In
the case at bar, the positive testimonies of the minor victim Lin that Jabalde slapped him on his
neck and choked him,[49] and that of Ray Ann that she saw Jabalde struck Lin on his neck,
squeezed it and then shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself because if not I should
have killed you,"[50] deserve more credit than Jabalde's own statement that she merely held Lin
still because the latter kept on jumping.[51] The laying of the hands and the utterance of words
threatening the life of Lin established the fact that Jabalde, indeed, intended to cause or inflict
physical injuries on, much less kill, Lin.
GR 218970, JUNE 8, 2017
RICHARD ESCALANTE v. PEOPLE
(SEC. 5b vs. ART. 336)
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.
Facts: At around midnight of December 24, 2006, AAA accompanied his classmate Mark in
going home. On his way back from Mark's house, AAA was called by Escalante and was pulled
into a comfort room at the Divine School in Parada, Valenzuela City. Once inside, Escalante
pulled down AAA's shorts and sucked the latter's penis for about ten (10) minutes. Shortly
thereafter, he forcibly inserted AAA's penis into his anus.
Four (4) days after the incident, AAA complained to his mother that he was experiencing pain in
his penis and had difficulty in urinating. He divulged the incident to his mother, who then
brought him to the Fatima Medical Center for examination. In the course of the examination, it
was determined that he was afflicted with gonorrhoea, a sexually-transmitted disease and urinary
tract infection.
Escalante was charged with the crime of child abuse committed against AAA, who was then a
twelve (12) year old minor. He was convicted for violating Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610
210 | P a g e
Issue: W/N the charged was correct

Held: Escalante was convicted by the RTC of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
The correct provision, however, should be Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which imposes a
higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 reads:
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: xxx
On the other hand, Section 10(a) thereof states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development-
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
As can be gleaned from the above-mentioned provisions, Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610
specifically applies in case of sexual abuse committed against children; whereas, Section l0(a)
thereof punishes other forms of child abuse not covered by other provisions of R.A. No. 7610.
Parenthetically, the offense will not fall under Section l0(a) of R.A. No. 7 610 if the same is
specifically penalized by a particular provision of the law such as Section 5(b) for sexual abuse.
the Court stated that the elements of sexual abuse under Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are as
follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said
act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3)
the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. It further ruled that the law covers
not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. Hence, the foregoing provision
penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual
abuse of children. All of the foregoing elements are present in the case at bench
GR 235071, JANUARY 7, 2019
EVANGELINE G. PATULOT v. PEOPLE
211 | P a g e
SEC. 10a, NO INTENT REQUIRED

Facts: As she was about to enter the house, CCC, after gathering clothes from the clothesline
outside her house, was surprised to see Patulot who was holding a casserole. Without warning,
Patulot poured the contents of the casserole – hot cooking oil – on her. AAA and BBB, both
minors, who were nearby, suddenly cried because they were likewise hit by the hot cooking oil.
CCC hurriedly brought AAA and BBB to her three neighbors who volunteered to bring the
children to the hospital, for treatment. She then went to the barangay hall also at South Signal,
Taguig City, to report the incident.
The doctor, who examined and treated CCC and her children, testified that the injuries suffered
by AAA and BBB would heal for an average period of thirty (30) days. Next, DDD testified that
he incurred P7,440.00 in medical expenses for his wife and children.
The Regional Trial Court found Patulot guilty of child abuse under R.A. 7610.
She contends however that not every instance of laying hands on a child constitutes the crime of
child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown to be
intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human
being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the RPC. Thus, in the
absence of such intention on the part of Patulot, her true intention being to pour hot oil only on
CCC with AAA and BBB being merely accidentally hit, she cannot be convicted of child abuse.
Issue: W/N she was rightfully charged for violation of child abuse under RA 7610
Held: Patulot contends that on the basis of our pronouncement in Bongalon, she cannot be
convicted of child abuse because it was not proven that she intended to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. Her reliance on said
ruling, however, is misplaced. In Bongalon, the Information specifically charged George
Bongalon, petitioner therein, of committing acts which ―are prejudicial to the child‘s
development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human
being.‖Thus, we ruled that he can only be held liable for slight physical injuries instead of child
abuse in the absence of proof that he intended to humiliate or ―debase the ‗intrinsic worth and
dignity'‖of the victim.
A cursory review of the Informations in the instant case, however, reveals no similar allegation
that Patulot‘s acts debased, degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and
BBB as human beings. Instead, they charged Patulot for willfully committing acts of child abuse
on AAA and BBB ―by throwing on them boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor
physical injuries, which acts are inimical and prejudicial to the child‘s normal growth and
development.‖
There are distinct acts punishable under R.A. No. 7610, to wit: (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty,
(c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child‘s
development.
212 | P a g e
R.A. No. 7610 and its Rules and Regulations distinctly and separately defined child abuse,
cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from
the act prejudicial to the child‘s development. Contrary to Patulot‘s assertion, an accused can be
prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he
commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse,
child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act
prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Neither can Patulot argue that in the absence of intention on her part to harm AAA and BBB, she
cannot be convicted of child abuse because she merely intended on committing physical injuries
against CCC.
―When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they
are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.‖
The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special
law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of
a criminal intent on the part of the offender.
Patulot‘s criminal intent is not wanting for as she expressly admitted, she intended on pouring
hot cooking oil on CCC. As such, even granting that it was not her intention to harm AAA and
BBB, she was performing an unlawful act when she threw the hot oil from her casserole on
CCC. She cannot, therefore, escape liability from the same in view of the settled doctrine that a
person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
GR 227363, MARCH 12, 2019
PEOPLE v. SALVADOR TULAGAN
(RA 8353, ART. 336, v. 5b)
Facts: Accused with a separate crimes of rape against the victim AAA when he brought her to
his house and old her to lie down on the floor, and removed her short pants and panties. He also
undressed himself, kissed AAA's cheeks, and inserted his penis into her vagina. And another
when while she was peeling corn with her cousin who lived adjacent to her grandmother's house,
Tulagan approached her, spread her legs, and inserted his finger into her private part. She said
that it was painful, but Tulagan just pretended as if he was just looking for something and went
home.
He was convicted by the RTC of Statutory Rape and Rape by Sexual Assault
respectively.
Issue: W/N the crimes charge was proper
213 | P a g e
Held: The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the nomenclature of the
crime, the penalty imposed, and the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for
sexual assault, and a reduction of the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for
statutory rape, are in order.
The following are the applicable laws and penalty for the crimes of acts of lasciviousness or
lascivious conduct and rape by carnal knowledge or sexual assault, depending on the age of the
victim, in view of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A and Article 336 of the
RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610:
Designation of the Crime & Imposable Penalty
12 years old or below

Under 12 years old or 18 years old and
Age of Victim: 18, or 18 under special
demented above
circumstances74
Crime Committed:
Acts of Acts of Lasciviousness Lascivious Not applicable

Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the conduct75 under
committed against RPC in relation to Section Section 5(b) of R.A.
children exploited in 5(b) of R.A. No. No. 7610: reclusion
prostitution or other 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium
sexual abuse temporal in its medium period to reclusion
period perpetua
Sexual Assault Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct Not applicable

committed against Article 266-A(2) of the under Section 5(b) of
children exploited in RPC in relation to Section R.A. No.
prostitution or other 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610: reclusion
sexual abuse 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium
temporal in its medium period to reclusion
period perpetua
Sexual Intercourse Rape under Article 266- Sexual Abuse77 under Not applicable
committed against A(1) of the RPC: reclusion Section 5(b) of R.A.
children exploited in perpetua, except when the No. 7610: reclusion
prostitution or other victim is below 7 years old temporal in its medium
sexual abuse in which case death period to reclusion
penalty shall be imposed76 perpetua
Rape by carnal Rape under Article 266- Rape under Article Rape under
knowledge A(1) in relation to Art. 266-A(1) in relation to Article 266-A(1)
266-B of the Art. 266-B of the of the
RPC: reclusion perpetua, RPC: reclusion RPC: reclusion
except when the victim is perpetua perpetua
214 | P a g e
below 7 years old in which

case death penalty shall be
imposed
Rape by Sexual Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct Sexual Assault

Assault Article 266-A(2) of the under Section 5(b) of under Article 266-
RPC in relation to Section R.A. No. A(2) of the
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610: reclusion RPC: prision
7610: reclusion temporal in its medium mayor
temporal in its medium period to reclusion
period perpetua
For the crime of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct, the nomenclature of the crime and
the imposable penalty are based on the guidelines laid down in Caoili. For the crimes of rape by
carnal knowledge and sexual assault under the RPC, as well as sexual intercourse committed
against children under R.A. No. 7610, the designation of the crime and the imposable penalty are
based on the discussions in Dimakuta,Quimvel and Caoili, in line with the policy of R.A. No.
7610 to provide stronger deterrence and special protection to children from all forms of abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is not amiss to stress that the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law
violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting
the crime charged, for what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the
offense, but the actual facts recited in the information. Nevertheless, the designation in the
information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly
GR 234841, JUNE 3, 2019

MANUEL BARALLAS RAMILO v. PEOPLE,
(SEXUAL ASSAULT v. SEC 5b)
Facts: AAA. was Manuel's daughter. According to her while her mother, CCC was already busy
downstairs, AAA was about to go downstairs with her sister when Manuel held her wrist. She
knew that he was going to molest her again like what he had been doing in the past. According to
AAA, she uttered to Manuel, "isusumbong ko kayo kay mama," but the latter replied
"isusumbong mo ako, papatayin kita." Thereafter, Manuel pulled AAA and forced her to lie on
the floor. He embraced her tightly and put his hand inside her shorts and panty. Then, he inserted
his finger inside her vagina, moving it in and out for about five (5) minutes. When AAA's vagina
became painful, she struggled and pushed Manuel's hand away. She stood up, went downstairs,
and had breakfast. She did not tell anybody of the incident because she was scared of Manuel's
threat to kill her.
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However, her sister BBB, who became aware of the sudden change of behaviour of AAA
confronted her together with the school principal and that they later knew of the sexual assault
that happened. Manuel was immediately apprehended while AAA was medically examined the
result found no hymenal lacerations and no remarkable findings regarding her anus.
RTC convicted him of Sexual Assault under Article 266-A[,] paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: W/N the charged was correct
Held: No. before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the Court held in Quimvel v. People that the requisites of acts
of lasciviousness as penalized under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the
requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, namely:
That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present; x x x
[That said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
That the offended party is a child, whether male or female, below 18 years of age.]
A review of the evidence presented by the prosecution reveals that the elements enumerated
above were sufficiently established. First, through the credible testimony of AAA, the
prosecution was able to show that Manuel committed lascivious conduct against AAA when he
forced her to lie on the floor, embraced her tightly, put his hand inside her shorts and panty, and
inserted his finger inside her vagina, moving it in and out for about five (5) minutes.
It is clear from the foregoing account that Manuel molested his daughter, AAA, and even
threatened to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. These acts constitute sexual
abuse and lascivious conduct as defined in the rules and regulations of R.A. No. 7610, known as
the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, which
pertinently provide:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in these Rules, unless the context requires otherwise
—
xxxx
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(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into
the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person[.]
Second, in Quimvel, we ruled that "'force and intimidation' is said to be subsumed under
'coercion and influence' and such terms are even used synonymously. This can be gleaned from
Black's Law Dictionary definitions of 'coercion' as 'compulsion; force; duress,' of 'influence' as
'persuasion carried over to the point of overpowering the will,' and of 'force' as 'constraining
power, compulsion; strength directed to an end'; as well as from jurisprudence which defines
'intimidation' as 'unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear."' It is clear from the
testimony of AAA that Manuel employed force, intimidation, coercion, and influence upon her
when he hugged her tightly and even threatened to kill her should she tell anyone of his
lascivious acts.
Third, "a child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse when the
child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or any influence of any adult, syndicate or group."32 In
Tulagan, we explained that on the one hand, the phrase "children exploited in prostitution"
contemplates four (4) scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female who, for money, profit or
any other consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child who, for money, profit
or any other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female,
who, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious
conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulges in sexual intercourse.
The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of
"child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and of "sexual abuse" under Section
2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. In
the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child which includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse"
includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
It cannot be denied from the facts of the case that AAA was subjected to sexual abuse under the
foregoing definitions. She is clearly a child who, due to the coercion or influence of Manuel,
indulged in lascivious conduct. In fact, it must be stressed that Manuel is the father of AAA. As
such, he has moral ascendancy over his minor daughter. Settled is the rule that in cases where
rape is committed by a relative, such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral
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influence or ascendancy takes the place of "force and intimidation" as an essential element of
rape.
Fourth, as previously mentioned, it is undisputed that AAA was only twelve (12) years old at the
time of the commission of the offense. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610, the term "children"
refers to persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over, but unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
In view of the presence of all the elements of the crime, Manuel should be convicted of
Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. As duly found by the
trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, AAA positively and categorically stated that
Manuel, her own biological father, inserted his finger into her vagina, and it was painful. She
gave a direct and straightforward narration of her ordeal in his hands. In a long line of cases, this
Court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims, considering that their
youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Indeed, leeway should be given
to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse.
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ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF 2003 (RA 9208, AS AMENDED RA 10634)

TITLE: PEOPLE v. XXX AND YYY, GR 235652, JULY 09, 2018
(QUALIFIED- PARENTS)
Facts: AAA, BBB, and CCC are the minor children of spouses XXX and YYY. AAA claimed
that sometime in April 2010, when she was just 13 years old, her mother XXX brought her to a
hotel in Makati to meet with a certain John Hubbard who proceeded to have sexual intercourse
with her. AAA further alleged that from 2008 to 2011, XXX ordered her to engage in cybersex
for three (3) to four (4) times a week in pornographic websites where AAA was shown in her
underwear and made to do sexual activities in front of the computer. For their part, BBB and
CCC corroborated AAA's statements, both averring that from 2010-2011, XXX ordered them to
dance naked in front of the computer with internet connectivity while facilitating the webcam
sessions and chatting with a certain "Sam," their usual client. BBB and CCC alleged that during
those sessions, their father YYY would be outside the room or fixing the computer. The children
all claimed that they were made to do sexual activities to earn money for their household
expenses which were collected by YYY in remittance centers
AAA sought the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as
she wanted her and her siblings to be rescued. AAA was then taken by the DSWD Social
Worker, who then coordinated with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). After making an
investigation and a technical verification of the pornographic websites which revealed photos
and transactions of AAA, the NBI applied for and was granted a search warrant. Subsequently,
the law enforcement authorities implemented the search warrant, resulting in the rescue of AAA,
BBB, and CCC, the confiscation of the computer units and paraphernalia connected with the
alleged crimes, and the arrest of both XXX and YYY.
RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons as defined and penalized under RA 9208. All other charges against them
were dismissed for being superfluous as they are deemed subsumed under the crimes for which
they were convicted. CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction
Issue: What qualifies the crime of Trafficking in Persons
Held: The crime of "Trafficking in Persons" becomes qualified under, among others, the
following circumstances:
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – The following are considered as qualified
trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxxx
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(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises
authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or
employee;
xxxx
In this case, accused-appellants were charged of three (3) counts each of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208. XXX was further
charged with another count of the same crime under Section 4 (a) also in relation to Section 6 (a)
and (d) of the same law. Section 4 (a) and (e) of RA 9208 reads:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. – It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including
those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship,
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
xxxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
xxxx
As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6
(a) and (d) of RA 9208 as the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) they
admittedly are the biological parents of AAA, BBB, and CCC, who were all minors when the
crimes against them were committed; (b) they made their children perform acts of cybersex for
different foreigner customers, and thus, engaged them in prostitution and pornography; (c) they
received various amounts of money in exchange for the sexual exploitation of their children; and
(d) they achieved their criminal design by taking advantage of their children's vulnerability as
minors and deceiving them that the money they make from their lewd shows are needed for the
family's daily sustenance.
TITLE: PEOPLE v. GLORIA NANGCAS, GR 218806, JUNE 13, 2018
(QUALIFIED TRAFFICKING FORCED LABOR-MINOR)
PONENTE: MARTIRES, J.
Facts: An Information was filed charging appellant for Violation of the "Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003", which alleges that the accused, unlawfully recruit, transport four (4)
women, three of them are minors, by taking advantage of the vulnerability of said victims for the
purpose of offering and selling said victims for forced labor, that is, by promising them local
employment (as househelpers in Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro City) with a monthly salary of
PhP1,500.00 each and that they could go home every Sunday, but instead, said accused brought
them to Marawi City and sold them for PhP1,600.00 each to their great damage and prejudice.
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Nangcas denied the allegations claiming that she had no idea that the employer would no longer
be needing house helpers; hence, with no money to pay for the fare, she had no other choice but
to stay with Baby Abas in Marawi City.
Issue:W/N the charged is qualified
Held: Accused-appellant's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Nangcas was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(a), in
relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b), and (d) of R.A. No. 9208, which read:
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified
trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
xxxx
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or,
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of
the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18)
but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
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xxxx
(d) Forced Labor and Slavery - refer to the extraction of work or services from any person by
means of enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including
deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception.
Under Republic Act No. 10364,47 the elements of trafficking m persons have been expanded to
include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability
of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person."
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs." (emphasis supplied)
The information filed against Nangcas sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of
Judith and three (3) other minor victims for forced labor or services, with Nangcas taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through her assurance and promises of good
salary, accessibility of place of work to their respective residences, and weekly dayoff. Pursuant
to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Nangcas was qualified trafficking, as it
was committed in a large scale and three (3) of her victims were under 18 years of age.
The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who testified
during the trial. The testimonies of Judith and three (3) other minor victims established that
Nangcas employed deception and fraud in gaining both the victims and their parents' trust and
confidence.
In the instant case, we concur with the trial court's decision, to wit:
"Deception was apparent in the manner with which accused dealt with Enerio, Judith and the
three other private complainants. Enerio was made to believe that Judith and company will be
working as house helpers at Camella Homes in Cagayan De Oro City. Through the haze with
which the private complainants were transported from Cagayan de Oro City to Marawi City,
what is clear is that Nangcas has Enerio's number but she never called him to inform him they
were proceeding to Marawi City. Much worse, she deceived Enerio anew when she told him
sometime in the last week of March 2009 that Judith and her friends were in Camella when she
fully knew they were made to work in Marawi City."48
The testimonies of the victims and Enerio gave a clear picture as to how the victims were
deceived by Nangcas into going with her, and how she orchestrated the entire trip pretending to
take them first to Cagayan De Oro City, then to Iligan, and finally to Marawi City, so as to be
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sure that the victims have no other choice but to go to Marawi City and serve as house helpers.
The prosecution has aptly shown that the victims would not have agreed or would not have been
allowed by their parents if Nangcas would directly offer them work at Marawi City; that she
deliberately fabricated a story to delude her victims and their parents.
All told, the prosecution has adequately proved Nangcas' guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense as defined in Section 4 of R.A No. 9208.
PEOPLE v, SUSAN R. SAYO AND ALFREDO S. ROXAS, GR 227704, APRIL 10 2019
(SEC. 5)
PONENTE: CAGUIOA, J.
Facts: The victims were rescued by the police when the International Justice Mission request for
their assistance. The victims known as Plaza Girls. The information provides that the accused
Susan Sayo, willfully and unlawfully recruiting and transporting minors [AAA],15 years old,
[BBB] 16 years old, together with [CCC], by taking advantage of their vulnerability, for the
purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation; while accused Alfredo Roxas, in conspiracy with
accused Sayo, did then and there, willfully, and unlawfully, own, manage and operate a room in
his apartment in Pasig City used as a prostitution den, receive and harbor said trafficked persons,
also by taking advantage of their vulnerability and for the purpose of prostitution and sexual
exploitation.
RTC found accuse Susan Sayo guilty of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (a,e)
and Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208 while Alfredo Roxas was found guilty of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5 (a) and Section 6 (a) of R.A. 9208 insofar as minors AAA and BBB. As
for CCC who‘s not a minor at the time of the commission, Susan Sayo is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of trafficking in persons under Section 4 (a, e) of R.A. 9208
while Alfredo Roxas y Sagon is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of trafficking in persons under Section S(a) of R.A. 9208
Sayo died pending appeal
Issue: W/N Roxas was correctly charged
Held: The denomination of his conviction is corrected to Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5(a) of RA 9208
There are four punishable acts under RA 9208: (1) Acts of Trafficking in Persons under Section
4; (2) Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5; (3) Violation of the
Confidentiality Rule under Section 7 in relation to Section 10(d); and (4) Use of Trafficked
Persons under Section 11.
The offense of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 and Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5 of RA 9208 are separate and distinct offenses with their own
corresponding penalties. Section 6 provides for qualifying circumstances of Trafficking in
Persons under Section 4, which when alleged and proved, will merit the imposition of the
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maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not
more than Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) under Section 10(c).
The relevant portions of the provisions are quoted below:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including
xxxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. — The following acts which promote or
facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building or establishment
for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
xxxx
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are considered as qualified
trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Section 10 of RA 9208 provides for the penalties of the above:
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. — The following penalties and sanctions are hereby
established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:
(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00);
(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more
than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00)[.]
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Thus, Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking in persons,
such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying, offering, selling, or trading
persons to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those acts that promote or
facilitate any of the aforementioned predicate acts of Trafficking in Persons.
The RTC found that Roxas violated Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for knowingly leasing a room for
the purpose of prostitution. Unfortunately, in spite of this, it still convicted Roxas of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons as regards minors AAA and BBB and Trafficking in Persons as regards
CCC. The CA, for its part, affirmed the RTC's ruling.
The RTC and the CA thus committed serious error as the proper denomination of the offense is
Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a). In this regard, it should be noted
that the offenses punished under Section 5 cannot be qualified by Section 6 as what the latter
seeks to qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of trafficking. To be sure, this was
clarified in the amendatory law, RA 1036433 or the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2012 where Section 6 was amended accordingly:
SEC. 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall be
considered as qualified trafficking:
"x x x
"(d) When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who
exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public
officer or employee
"x x x
"(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
"(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies,
becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or
the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS);
"(h) When the offender commits one or more violations of Section 4 over a period of sixty (60)
or more days, whether those days are continuous or not; and
"(i) When the offender directs or through another manages the trafficking victim in carrying out
the exploitative purpose of trafficking." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As can be gleaned from the above amendment, only violations of Section 4 on Trafficking in
Persons can be qualified. Section 5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons, being separate
and distinct offenses, cannot be qualified as the law does not expressly provide therefor.
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ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT (RA 9262)

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN v. SPS. PERFECTO C. TAN AMD JUANITA L. TAN, GR
168852, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008
(OFFENDER IN VAWC, APPLICATION OF CONSPIRACY UNDER RPC)
PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts: Sharica and Steven were married. Out of this union, two female children were born.
Barely six years into the marriage, Petitioner filed for an issuance of TPO against Steven and her
Parents-in-law before the RTC. She alleged that steven in conspiracy with respondents were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuse upon her in violation of Sec. 5 Pars
e(2)(3)(4), h (5), and I (7) of RA 9262.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their
persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by RA 9262. RTC
dismissed the petition of the petitioner.
Issue:W/N Parents-in-Laws are covered by RA 9262
Held: The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application
of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the
RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
(Emphasis supplied)
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Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law
is silent on a particular matter.
TITLE: KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN DIEGO v. RTC BRANCH 59, ANGELES
CITY, ETC., ET AL, GR 193960, JANUARY 7, 2013
(VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN THROUGH HARASSMENT)
Facts: Prior to the incident, the relationship between petitioner and respondent had already
ended. The physical violence committed by the accused towards the victim was made when the
latter asked the accused to pay for his debt which however the accused did not pay and instead
use personal violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant‘s back,
shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant‘s intrinsic worth and
dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.
Issue: W/N the accused is liable for the crime
Held: Yes, Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to
be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is
committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender‘s wife, former wife, or
with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and
2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
The Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment,
to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be
a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence,
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applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should
the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is
immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim
when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the
parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be
due to the sexual or dating relationship.
TITLE: NORMA DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, GR
193707, DECEMBER 10 2014
(ECONOMIC ABUSE; PRESCRIPTION)
Facts: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and
resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a
complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter‘s unjust refusal to support
his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien
Issue:W/N Ernst could be held liable for violation of economic abuse under RA 9262
W/N the case already prescribed.
Held: a. SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
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(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner‘s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his
child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest.
b. we do not agree with respondent‘s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a
legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has
been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262,
which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
TITLE: AAA v. BBB, GR 212448, JANUARY 11, 2018
(MARITAL INFEDELITY, PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE)
PONENTE: TIJAM, J.
Facts: Petitoner and Respondent were married amd their union produced 2 children. BBB started
working in Singapore as a Chef and acquired permanent resident status. This petition nonetheless
indicates his address to be in Quezon city where his parents and AAA also resides. AAA claimed
that BBB sent little to no support, that they were virtually abandoned and mistreatment of her
and his son CCC when they went to Singapore, aside from sezual and physical abuse. Also, BBB
had started having an affair with a Singaporean with whom he allegedly has been living with
abroad.
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Issue: W/N the Philippine Courts are deprived of jurisdiction over a charge of psychological
abuse under RA 9262 when committed through Marital Infidelity and alleged illicit relationship
took place outside the Philippines.
Held: The Philippine court have jurisdiction. Sec. 7 of RA 9262 provides that the case may be
filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the victim. The law
contemplates that acts of violence against women as transitory or continuing crime. As such, a
person charged with a continuing act or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality
or territory where the offense was in part committed.
TITLE: CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR S, PEOPLE, GR 223477, FEBRUARY 14,2018
Facts: It was alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which resulted
in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as
evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing
Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter had an
affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving
support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This
notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was
constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar. To substantiate her claims, AAA
averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of P8,000.00 per month because he has a
lavish lifestyle with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled in. On
the other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at and she spends the amount of P20,000.00 a month
for his needs, of which she asked Melgar for P8,000.00 as support.
Held: RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband,
former husband, or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse. The
said law defines economic abuse as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x.
xxxx
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
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3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
xxxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation of
support of a common child of the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such common
child is legitimate or not.This specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent
portions of which read:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
Xxxx
(e)Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other hann, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
xxxx
(2)Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3)Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
xxxx
Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an
act of violence against women and children. Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying
support to a child is a continuing offense.
In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship,
resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had
failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not
supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which was
supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no
reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no
indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and detennine
the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties and, hence, due deference should be
accorded to the same.
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In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, inter alia, that he was
charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as the Information alleged that the acts
complained of "caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and
her son[, BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (e)
of RA 9262.
Melgar's contention is untenable.
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes the act of "causing mental
or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological
violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish
caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while
mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show
proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And to
establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as
such experiences are personal to this party." Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that
the accused's denial thereof - which is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse - further
caused mental or emotional anguish to the woman-victim and/or to their common child.
In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of
support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB
any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section
5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration the variance doctrine
which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but
necessarily included in the crime charged - the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of
violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even
without the additional element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized
therein."
TITLE: ESTEBAN DONATO REYES VS PEOPLE, GR 232678, JULY 3, 2019
(ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE; ECONOMIC ABUSE)
Facts: AAA and Reyes were married on May 15, 1969. Four children were born out of this
union, of whom only three are living, and who are all now of legal ages. Reyes was seldom at
home since he used to render military service as a Philippine Air Force pilot, and later he worked
as a commercial pilot for the Philippine Airlines. At the time the complaint for violation of the
VAWC was filed against him, Reyes was employed as a pilot based in Angola, Africa tasked to
deliver relief goods by air.
AAA claimed that Reyes used to give her and their children monthly financial support, ranging
from Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but he
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suddenly ceased giving the same in July 2005. On top of this unpleasant situation, AAA got sick
of various illness such as hypertension, cardio-vascular disease, diabetes and osteoarthritis. Due
to her advancing age, AAA's health condition further deteriorated requiring her to take
maintenance medicines and to undergo regular consultation, monitoring and treatment to prevent
organ damage, stroke, renal failure and heart attack. According to AAA, what impelled her to
file the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 9262 against Reyes was due to the latter's failure to
provide her with monthly financial support.
Issue:W/N he was correctly charged
Held: Psychological violence is certainly an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of the mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional suffering is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the
offended party.21 To establish psychological violence, it is necessary to adduce proof of the
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar of such acts. We concur with
the similar findings of the courts a quo that the prosecution had duly proved, through the clear
and convincing testimonies of AAA and her daughter, that Reyes committed psychological
violence against AAA when he deprived her of financial support beginning July 2005 and
onwards which caused her to experience mental and emotional suffering to the point that even
her health condition was adversely affected.
The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that if properly indicted, Reyes can also be
convicted of violation of Section 5(e), par. 2 for having committed economic abuse against
AAA. Section 5(e), par. 2 identifies the act or acts that constitute the violence of economic
abuse, the pertinent portions of which states:
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physically or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, x x x;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
xxxx
Indeed, criminal liability for violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9262 attaches when the
accused deprives the woman of financial support which she is legally entitled to. Deprivation or
denial of support, by itself, is already specifically penalized therein.
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Here, we note that Reyes, although gainfully employed after June 2005, deliberately refused to
provide financial support to AAA. According to Reyes, he stopped giving monetary support to
AAA because she filed a Bigamy case against him. The Court finds his excuse unacceptable and
will not at all exculpate him from criminal liability under the VAWC. It is noteworthy that AAA
charged Reyes with Bigamy not merely to torment or harass him but to enforce her right and
protect her interest as petitioner's legal wife considering that he contracted a second marriage
with one Marilou Osias Ramboanga during the subsistence of his marriage with AAA. Evidently,
the denial of financial support is designed to subjugate AAA's will and control her conduct,
either to pressure her to withdraw said criminal case for Bigamy or dissuade her from pursuing
it, or at least, to discourage her from filing additional cases against him.
There is nothing in the definition nor in the enumeration of the acts constituting psychological
violence and economic abuse that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse Reyes as what
conducts are penalized under the VAWC. They are worded with sufficient definiteness and
clarity that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what act is prohibited, and need not
guess as to its meaning nor differ in its application. The express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of
the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - to promote the protection
and safety of victims of violence against women and children.
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HAZING REGULATION ACT (RA 8049), AS AMENDED BY RA 11053

TITLE: DANDY DUNGO VS PEOPLE, GR 209464, JULY 1 2015
(HAZING)
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.
Facts: On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna, the
Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers
conducted initiation rite. MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte was subjected to
physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he was ignored
by Castillo. He then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort, they
hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the
security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: W/N accused were guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.
Held: Yes, they are guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing
can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization;
and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating
situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or
otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
Classes of direct participants are: the first class of principals would be the actual participants in
the hazing. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical
injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or
organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals. The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the
organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing. The third class of
principals would be the officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or sorority who
235 | P a g e
knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat due
to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend the hazing. The
next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser. The last class of principals
would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or organization.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy
can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless they
prevented the commission of the acts therein.
TITLE: DOMINADOR BAYOBOS VS PEOPLE, GR 171222, FEBRUARY 18, 2015
(ACCOMPLICE, HAZING)
Facts: Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were
required to successfully complete the mandatory ―Indoctrination and Orientation Period,‖ which
was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. PMMA were criminally
charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before
they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against them on the basis of the
dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the
Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition
was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan‘s quashal of the Information.
Issue/s: May the dismissal of the criminal case of the principal accused be invoked as a ground
to dismiss the criminal case of the accomplices, some school authorities herein?
Is PMMA an organization under the anti-hazing law?
How should be material allegations be averred to prosecute institutions as accessories to the
crime of Hazing?
Ruling: No. That the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the
absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even
the latter‘s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.
Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those
charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of
the alleged principal.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual
knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be
punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis
supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1)
a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or
psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the
person‘s admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient
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distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal
Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on another in
furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization. (wala kc sa information
na requisite ung hazing sa admission sa organization)
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation
in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as
established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or
faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against
hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof. (di na to dinesisyunan ng SC kung liable ba cla kc
nga tama namn ung quashal on grounds as stated below)
The Court rejects the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is
not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational
institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and
the AFP.
Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a

government-owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing
efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term
organization within the meaning of the law.
Nevertheless, the Court finds – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be
granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for
the crime of hazing.
That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001, inside the campus
of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San Narciso,
Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused
RADM Virginio R. Aris, President of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. Dominador D.
BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.) Manny G. Ferrer, 1st Batallion Officer; LTJG.
Ronald G. Magsino, Security Officer; LTJG. Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, 2nd Battalion Officer;
LTJG. Gerry P. Doctor, Batl. Mast.; ENS. Dominador B. Operio, Jr., 1st Battalion Company
Officer; and ENS. Dennis S. Velasco, Mess Officer, all public officers, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, committing the offense in relation to office and while in the
performance of their duties as such public officers being the school authorities and/or faculty
members did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual
knowledge of the hazing perpetrated by the principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen,
against probationary midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. during the school’s
Indoctrination and Orientation; and, fail to take any action to prevent the occurrence of the
hazing and the infliction of psychological and physical injuries against said FERNANDO
BALIDOy, JR. thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR.
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As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts
were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver
this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility
of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to
a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia, both
―the designation of the offense given by the statute‖ and ―the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense.‖ The Special Prosecutor‘s belated argument in his Petition before this
Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a
prerequisite for continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman
status – does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as
the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.
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HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007 (RA 9372)

TITLE: SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK INC., ET AL. VS
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, GR 178552, OCTOBER 5, 2010
(HUMAN SECURITY ACT)
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.
Facts: Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of
the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like
―widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace‖ and ―coerce the government
to give in to an unlawful demand‖ are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Issue: W/N the petitioner may assail the same abovementioned as vague
Held: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society
in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an
actual or imminent charge against them
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CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY

(ARTS. 267-292 EXCLUDING 290-292)
TITLE: PEOPLE v. USTADZ IBRAHIM ALI, ET AL., GR 222965, DECEMBER 6, 2017

(KIDNAPPING; ELEMENTS; DAYS IMMATERIAL)
PONENTE: MARTIRES, J.:
Facts: In an Information, Ali, together with other accused were charged with the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention alleging that accused being then armed with high
powered firearm, conspiring with one another, by means of force and intimidation feloniously,
KIDNAP the person of CHRISTIA OLIZ y EUCOGCO, a young woman, 19 years old,
particularly on the occasion when she was together with her employer named Antonio Yu Lim
Bo and the latter's wife and daughter, on board a Blue Nissan Vehicle then driven by one Rene
Igno, and thereafter through intimidation, commandeered and drove said vehicle towards the area
of Pitogo beach with the clear intention on the part of the accused to extort ransom money from
said victim or other person.
Appellant claimed that before the alleged incident, Hassan pushed Ali inside the motor vehicle
while he was holding a gun and told him to follow or he would be in trouble. When all occupants
arrived at the beach and alighted therefrom, Ali decided to walk away and proceed to the main
road to catch a ride. Ali argues that he could not be guilty of the crime of Serious Illegal
Detention because the alleged deprivation of liberty did not last for more than three (3) days as
the incident only lasted for about an hour or two
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention defined
and penalized under Article 267, paragraphs 2 and of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659
Held: Ali argues that he could not be guilty of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention because the
alleged deprivation of liberty did not last for more than three (3) days as the incident only lasted
for about an hour or two. In order for the accused to be guilty of serious illegal detention, the
following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he or she kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or
kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is
committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill the victim are made; or (4) the person kidnapped
or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.19
In other words, deprivation of liberty is qualified to serious illegal detention if at least one of the
following circumstances exists: (a) detention lasts for more than three (3) days; (b) accused
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simulated public authority; (c) victim suffers serious physical injuries or is threatened to be
killed; or (d) the victim is a minor, female or public officer.
In the case at bar, the elements of serious illegal detention were duly proven by the prosecution.
First, Ali and his cohorts were clearly private individuals. Second, they deprived Oliz of her
liberty. This was manifested by the fact that they forcibly boarded the vehicle and placed Igno
and Antonio in handcuffs evincing their intent to detain the occupants of the motor vehicle.
Third, Oliz was a female victim. The CA was correct in ruling that the period of detention
became immaterial in view of the victim's circumstances. If, during the deprivation of liberty,
any of the circumstances under Article 267(4) of the RPC occurs, i.e, the victim was a female,
the crime of serious illegal detention is consummated.
TITLE: PEOPLE v. EDILBERTO NORADA, GR 218958, DECEMBER 13, 2017
(NO DETENTION; HOMICIDE)
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.
Facts: Norada, Villanueva and Seva for sometime have been hatching to organize a kidnap for
ransom group in Bacolod City. Villanueva is a close friend of the victim Pacil who have a
Canadian friend named Ray Truck which they planned to kidnap. However On the appointed
day, Accused Villanueva fetched Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck in the house of Pacil in Valladolid
but only Reggie Pacil came. Ray Truck remained in the house of Reggie Pacil in Valladolid. The
non-appearance of Ray Truck made them change their plan. They decided to just kidnap Reggie
Pacil as they were convinced that Rey Truck will pay ransom for his release bringing him to the
Taculing Court Apartelle where they had a drinking spree. When they decided to carry out the
kidnapping Pacil resisted thereby prompting them to hit the victim on the head thus killing him
in the Process.
The RTC finds all the three (3) accused, namely, Eugene Villanueva Y Canales, Edilherto
Norada Y Harder and Agustin Seva Y Lacbanes, GUIL Y beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Attempted Kidnapping with Murder, all as conspirators and all as Principals
by Direct participation,
Norada did not appeal his conviction. Seva filed a Notice of Appeal but the same was denied for
having been filed out of time. Hence only the appeal of appellant Villanueva will be resolved in
this proceedings.
Issue: W/N the accused was rightfully charged
Held: The crime of kidnapping was not satisfactorily established. Kidnapping is defined and
punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 7659. The crime has the following elements:
(1) the accused is a private individual.;
(2) the accused kidnaps or detains another or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
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(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority:
(c) any serious physical injuries arc inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made or;
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.
"The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim‘s liberty coupled
with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but
also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time."
The totality of the prosecution's evidence failed to sufficiently establish the offense of
kidnapping in this case. There was no concrete evidence whatsoever to establish, or from which
it can be inferred that appel1ant and his cohorts intended to actually deprive the victim of his
liberty for some time and for some purpose. There was also no evidence that they have
thoroughly planned the kidnapping of the victim. There was lack of motive to resort in
kidnapping the victim for they were bent to kidnap his friend Truck. The fact alone of waiting for
the victim to fall asleep and then and there tying his hands and feet, based on Norada‘s account,
was not determinant of intent to actually detain the victim or deprive his liberty. As such, the
trial court was indulging in speculation when it held that the victim "will either be taken away or
simply be kept in the hotel and thereafter ransom will be demanded from the Canadian Ray
Truck for his release." Courts should not indulge in speculation no matter how strong the guilt of
the accused. Hence since the offense of kidnapping was not sufficiently established, the trial
court erred in holding appellant liable for attempted kidnapping.
Appellant can only be held liable for homicide.
PEOPLE v. FELIPE MIRANDILLA, GR 186417, July 27, 2011
(Kidnapping with rape)
J. Perez
FACTS: During a town fiesta, AAA, went out from the plaza to buy candies. While making her
way through the crowd, the accused grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a
knife‘s point thrust at her right side. They boarded a tricycle. AAA was brought to different
places where the victim would have carnal knowledge of her.
AAA was raped 27 times in 39 days on the occasion of kidnapping. Mirandilla contended that
they were live-in partners. RTC ruled simple kidnapping but CA found Mirandilla guilty of
kidnapping with rape.
ISSUE: W/N CA is correct.
HELD: YES. It is considered as one felony only which is the special complex crime of
―kidnapping with rape‖. No matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex
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crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. However,
for such crime to prosper, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs,
otherwise, it would be complex crime of ―forcible abduction with rape‖.
In this case, since it was established that Mirandilla‘s act was kidnapping and serious illegal
detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, he
should be meted with the special complex crime of ―kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with rape‖ under article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE v. AIDA MARQUEZ, GR 181440, April 13, 2011

(Failure to return a minor)
J. Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS: Carolina Merano entrusted the custody of a 3-month old baby girl with the accused
whom she met in a beauty parlor and was found by Merano to be nice. Accordingly, the accused
borrowed the child to buy her some clothes, milk and food.
When accused failed to return the minor in the afternoon, complainant looked for her. She then
got a call from the accused the she will only return the child the next day because her own child
was sick. Accused also demanded 50,000 for all expenses she incurred while the child was with
her. Unfortunately, the minor was not returned. Hence, a case was filed by Merano. But the
accused defended herself by saying that it was actually Merano who suggested that the minor be
adopted.
ISSUE: W/N the accused is guilty under article 267 (―Kidnapping and serious illegal detention‖)
HELD: NO. She is guilty under article 270 (―Kidnapping and failure to return a minor‖) with the
following elements:
1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and
2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians
A reading of the charge in the information shows that the act imputed to Marquez was not the
illegal detention of a person, but involves her deliberate failure to restore a minor baby girl to her
parent after being entrusted with said baby‘s custody.
The two requisites of article 270 was instead satisfied.
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine.
Whether this is due to Merano‘s version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to
Marquez‘s version that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,
Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not
matter, for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied
that Marquez was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element
of the crime is satisfied.
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As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of
Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a
couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual
custody of Justine. Marquez‘s deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when
demanded to do so by the latter‘s mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly
present in this case.
Finally, even if it were true that Merano subsequently agreed to have Castillo adopt Justine, as
evidenced by the "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapa-ampon sa Isang Anak," this
would still not affect Marquez‘s liability as the crime of kidnapping and failure to return the
minor had been fully consummated upon her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano.
JOSEPH ANTHONY ALEJANDRO, et . al. v. ATTY. JOSE BERNAS, GR 179243,

September 7, 2011
(Grave Coercion)
J. Peralta
FACTS: Alejandro is the lessee of a condominium unit. He sub-leased the properties to his co-
petitioners. They were all lawyers.
Later, there was a problem with the air-conditioning unit. Petitioners then suspended payment
until problem is fixed by the management. Instead of addressing the issue, lessor instituted the
action for ejectment. During pendency, it ordered that the unit be padlocked through respondent
Atty. Bernas.
ISSUE: W/N there was grave coercion on the part of the respondents.
HELD: NO. Its elements are:

1. That a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. That the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and
3. That the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the electricity, water and telephone
facilities. Petitioners were thus prevented from occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose
for which it was intended, that is, to be used as a law office. At the time of the padlocking and
cutting off of facilities, there was already a case for the determination of the rights and
obligations of both Alejandro, as lessee and OPI as lessor, pending before the MeTC. There was
in fact an order for the respondents to remove the padlock. Thus, in performing the acts
complained of, Amor and Aguilar had no right to do so.
The problem, however, lies on the second element. A perusal of petitioners‘ Joint Affidavit-
Complaint shows that petitioners merely alleged the fact of padlocking and cutting off of
facilities to prevent the petitioners from entering the Unit. For petitioners, the commission of
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these acts is sufficient to indict respondents of grave coercion. It was never alleged that the acts
were effected by violence, threat or intimidation. Petitioners belatedly alleged that they were
intimidated by the presence of security guards during the questioned incident.
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the
petitioners. There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. To determine the degree
of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here, the
petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who presumably know
their rights.
PEDRO CONSULTA v. PEOPLE, GR 179462, February 12, 2009

(Robbery vs. Grave Coercion)
J. Carpio Morales
FACTS: Pedro and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia‘s huse. Nelia is his
godmother.
In one instance, Pedro blocked the tricycle with which Nelia was aboard. Nelia alleged that her
necklace was taken forcibly and that bad words were hurled against her by Pedro. RTC,
thereafter, convicted appellant of robbery which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N appellant guilty of grave coercion.
HELD: In robbery, there must be animus lucrandi or ―intent to gain‖ which is absent in this
case. That intent to gain on appellant‘s part is difficult to appreciate gains light given his
undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings, manifested by, among
other things, the filing of complaints against him by Nelia and her family which were
subsequently dismissed or ended in his acquittal.
Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant, robbery does not lie against him. He is not
necessarily scot-free, however, because he is guilty of grave coercion under article 286.
Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. If the coercion be committed
in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage or for the purpose of compelling another to
perform any religious act or to prevent him from exercising such right or from doing such act,
the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.
The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and the other to
coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to
take the property of another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was
the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to
compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then, conviction for
coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion.
And there was no common robber in the present case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title
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to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he
thought was due him. Animus furandi was lacking.
The Court finds that by appellant‘s employment of threats, intimidation and violence consisting
of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the
tricycle, Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination. Appellant is thus guilty of
grave coercion.
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ANTI-WIRETAPPING ACT (RA 4200)

GAANAN v. IAC, GR L-69809, October 16, 1986
(Wiretapping-phone extension)
J. Gutierrez, Jr.
FACTS: Complainant, lawyer for the accused, offered to withdraw a complaint for direct assault
against Laconico for certain conditions. This was heard by petitioner, Atty. Gaanan, through a
telephone conversation.
Complainant then was arrested when he was about to give the money to Laconico. Atty. Gaanan
stated in his affidavit for extortion/ransom that he heard the complainant demand 8K for the
withdrawal of the case. Complainant thereafter charged Atty. Gaanan with violation of RA 4200
or the ―Anti-Wiretapping Act.
ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of RA 4200
HELD: NO. If there is an extension line phone conversation is not private.
First, the law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.
Second, an extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that
the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he
runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which
shares its line with another.
Lastly, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included
in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an
extension telephone.
FELIPE NAVARRO v. CA, GR 121087, August 26, 1999

(conversation must be private)
J. Mendoza
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FACTS: Jalbuena together with Lingan, who were both news reporters, went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. When a dancer began to
perform a strip act, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. He was noticed by the
floor manager, Liquin and was stopped by the security guard, Sioco. A confrontation ensued and
the reporters were threatened to be killed.
Jalbuena and companions went to the police station to report the matter. Liquin and Sioco still
followed them. Instead of listening, Navarro, a police on duty, killed Lingan and argued with
Jalbuena. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the heated
exchange between them.
ISSUE: W/N tape recording is admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private
(because many heard it), its tape recording is not prohibited.
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CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

ARTICLE 293-310 – ROBBERY AND THEFT
LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL v. HON. ZEUS ABROGAR. GR 155076, February 27, 2006
(subject of taking)
J. Callejo, Sr.
FACTS: Laurel was charged for unlawfully taking, stealing and using International Long
Distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) which is a
method of routing and completing international long distance.
PLDT filed theft against them.
ISSUE: W/N Laurel was liable for theft.
HELD: YES. An information or complaint for simple theft must allege the following elements:
(a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the taking be
done with intent to gain; and (d) the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation of person/s or force upon things
The Civil Code provides that anything that does not fall as real properties are considered as
personal properties.
Business interest does not fall under the enumeration of real property. If it was its intention to
include "business" as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the
Philippine Legislature should have spoken in language that is clear and definite: that business is
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA v. PEOPLE, GR 160188, June 21, 2007

(nature of theft)
J. Tinga
FACTS: A security guard sighted Valenzuela and Calderon hauling a push cart with cases of
Tide detergent in SM North Edsa. They unloaded it into the parking area and haled a taxi where
they put all the detergents. The security guard fired warning that alerted other guards.
Valenzuela and Calderon was thereafter charged with theft. RTC ruled it is consummated while
CA ruled that it is frustrated since the accused were apprehended and the items were not freely
disposed.
ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated theft.
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HELD: NO. In theft or robber, the crime is consummated after the accused had material
possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the
thing was frustrated.
This is because the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on
the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim;
otherwise, the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property would introduce a
convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect any legislated intent.
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THEFT BY EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS (PD 133)
ANT-ELECTRICITY AND ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION MATERIALS PILFERAGE

ACT (RA 7832)
US v. IGNACIO CARLOS, GR 6295, September 1, 1911

(Electricity may be stolen; corporeal)
Per Curiam
FACTS: Ignacio is a customer of MERALCO for a building with 30 electric lighs. MERALCO
had doubts regarding the actual consumption of electricity by Carlos; hence, they installed a
meter.
Thereafter, MERALCO asked court to issue a search warrant because a ―jumper‖ was found.
Hence, Ignacio was found with ―larcenery‖
ISSUE: W/N electricity can be a subject of theft.
HELD: YES. It is true that electricity is no longer, as formerly, regarded by electricians as a

fluid, but its manifestation and effects, like those of gas, may be seen and felt. The true test of
what is a proper subject of larceny seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal, but whether
it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner.
Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other
personal property and is capable of appropriation by another.
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ANTI-CARNAPPING LAW (RA 6539 AS AMENDED BY RA 10883)
PEOPLE v. BUSTINERA, GR 148233, June 8, 2004

(Felonious taking of taxi, animus lucrandi)
J. Carpio Morales
FACTS: Cipriano hired Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed that the latter would drive the
taxi from 6am to 11pm, after which, he would return the car and remit boundary.
However, Bustinera failed to return. It was later found abandoned somewhere in Quezon City. A
case was filed against him for qualified theft. Bustinera explained that he did no return the car
because he was short of his boundary, but he was able to return the car later and made a partial
payment for the balance.
ISSUE: W/N intent to gain is present for failure to return the car.
HELD: YES. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent
to gain. The term gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit
which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the
mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.
As to the contention of Bustinera that he returned the car, he did not produce the documentary
evidence, to substantiate his claim.
PEOPLE v. JEFFREY MACARANAS, GR 226846, June 21, 2017

(Carnapping with Homicide)
J. Peralta
FACTS: Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend, Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes, were in
Bulacan, aboard a motorcycle. When they were about to leave, 2 men suddenly approached
them. One of them killed Frank. Kathlyn pretended that she is unconscious.
Thereafter, the perpetrators left with the motorcycle.
ISSUE: W/N there is carnapping with homicide.
HELD: YES. R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines
carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using
force upon things. By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act now reads:
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SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof.
Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to
prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and
more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping
and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder
(if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and bonnets, together with
the appellant who approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed force and
intimidation upon them and thereafter forcibly took the victim's motorcycle and then shot the
victim on the neck causing his death.
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ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW (PD 532)
PEOPLE v. GLENFORD SAMOY, et al., GR 193672, January 18, 2012

(Robbery with homicide vs. Highway Robbery)
J. Abad
FACTS: The victims were riding an Isuzu Elf Truck for an errand when 3 armed men, including
Samoy and Israel, flagged down their vehicle. They were armed with guns.
The accused ordered them to alight and hand over their money. When they resisted, one of the
accused fired his gun. This prompted the captives to run for their lives. When they did not heed
the shot, accused fired at them causing death of one Melencio while the others were slightly hurt.
The robbers then fled to the mountain. RTC ruled that it was homicide which was affirmed by
the CA.
ISSUE: W/N the lower courts are correct.
HELD: YES. They were correct in finding accused guilty only of robbery with homicide, not of
robbery on the highway as defined in P.D. 532. Conviction for the latter crime requires proof that
several accused organized themselves for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately,
preying upon innocent and defenseless people on the highway. Here, the prosecution proved only
one act of robbery.
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ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW (PD 533)
CANTA v. PEOPLE, GR 140937, February 28, 2001

(Elements of cattle rustling)
J. Mendoza
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of PD 533 or the ―Anti-Cattle Rustling Law‖
when he stole a cow owned by a certain Narciso Gabriel which was last entrusted to Gardenio
Agapay.
Petitioner said that it was an honest mistake. He thought that his cow was the lost cattle. He even
saw it suckle the mother cow. However, the lower courts found him guilty of violating PD 533.
ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of PD 533
HELD: YES. The crime is committed if the following elements concur:

(1) a large cattle is taken;
(2) it belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner;
(4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme;
(5) the taking is with or without intent to gain; and
(6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person or force
upon things
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow belongs to
Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner's only defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good faith and
in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent
of the owner, took the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact
that he knew all along that the latter was holding the animal for the owner, Narciso. Third,
petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it
prior to the taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner
adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus
manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things attended the commission of the crime.
Second, the fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and later to the police
authorities does not prove his good faith. He had already committed the crime, and the barangay
captain to whom he delivered the cow after taking it from its owner is his own father.
Lastly, petitioner says that he brought a mother cow to see if the cow in question would suckle to
the mother cow. But cows frequently attempt to suckle to alien cows. Hence, the fact that the
cow suckled to the mother cow brought by petitioner is not conclusive proof that it was the
offspring of the mother cow.
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ARTICLE 315 – SWINDLING OR ESTAFA AS AMENDED BY PD 1689
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO v. PEOPLE, GR 183345, September 17, 2014
(syndicated)
J. Brion
FACTS: Manuel Dy is a client of Victor Ngo in Asia Trust Bank. Because of their good
business relationship, Ngo advice Dy to deposit his money to an investment house that will give
a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced Dy to the petitioners.
However, after investing a lot, Dy was not able to get his earnings. All checks were dishonored.
Dy found out that Ngo already resigned and could no longer be located. Hence, he thereafter
found that his money was invested somewhere else.
ISSUE: W/N crime is syndicated estafa.
HELD: NO. Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, there is syndicated estafa if the following
elements are present:
1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was
committed;
2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and
3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members
of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds solicited
by corporations/associations from the general public.
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of
syndicated estafa are present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the
RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy‘s supplemental complaint-affidavit, he alleged that
the fraud perpetrated against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also
by the other officers and directors of State Resources. The number of the accused who allegedly
participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of
a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited by
the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was
presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought
investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also deceived
to entrust their money to State Resources. The general public element was not complied with.
Thus, no syndicated estafaallegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MATEO, GR 198012, April 22, 2015

(Estafa and Illegal Recruitment)
J. Del Castillo
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FACTS: 5 complainants met accused to fly for overseas employment. Mateo promised them
employment to Japan as mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. Mateo represented himself to
have a tie-up with some Japanese firms.
After paying the required fee, appellant failed to secure overseas employment for them and failed
to return the money.
ISSUE: W/N appellants were guilty of:

a. Estafa and
b. Illegal recruitment.
HELD: YES.
a. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements:
(1) the person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA
8042;
(2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of
workers; and,
(3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group.
These elements are obtaining in this case. First, the RTC found appellants to have undertaken a
recruitment activity when they promised private complainants employment in Japan for a fee.
This factual finding was affirmed by the CA. "The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of
assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge." And when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are
generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Second, the Certification issued by
the POEA unmistakably reveals that appellants neither have a license nor authority to recruit
workers for overseas employment. Notably, appellants never assailed this Certification. Third, it
was established that there were five complainants.
Clearly, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the
prosecution.
Appellants' argument that there was no proof that they received money from the private
complainants deserves no credence. Suffice it to say that money is not material to a prosecution
for illegal recruitment considering that the definition of "illegal recruitment" under the law
includes the phrase "whether for profit or not."
b. YES. Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the [law]
may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the
[Revised Penal Code]. The elements of estafa are:
(1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and
(2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation."
All these elements are likewise present in this case.
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ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT (RA 8042)
PEOPLE v. MARISSA BAYKER, GR 170192, February 10, 2016

(estafa and recruitment)
J. Bersamin
FACTS: Accused, together with 2 others, illegally recruited complainants for an overseas job.
Complainants paid money for released of papers; however, they were not deployed.
It was only after they went to POEA that they learned that accused does not have any license to
recruit.
ISSUE: W/N court is correct to impose illegal recruitment and estafa.
HELD: YES. An illegal recruiter can be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed in
large scale and estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, provided that the accused has
been so charged under separate informations.
Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who:

(a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code; and
(b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers.
It is committed in large scale when it is committed against three or more persons individually or
as a group.
The CA properly affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant by the RTC for illegal
recruitment committed in large scale because she had committed acts of recruitment against at
least three persons (namely: Canizares, Dahab, and Miparanum) despite her not having been duly
licensed or authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for that
purpose.
The accused-appellant's insistence on her very limited participation in the recruitment of the
complainants did not advance or help her cause any because the State established her having
personally promised foreign employment either as hotel porters or seafarers to the complainants
despite her having no license or authority to recruit from the POEA. The records made it clear
enough that her participation was anything but limited, for she herself had accompanied them to
their respective medical examinations at their own expense.
Likewise, she was liable for estafa.
The conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale did not
preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code on
the ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy.
258 | P a g e
The active representation by the accused-appellant of having the capacity to deploy Miparanum
abroad despite not having the authority or license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit as
the first element of estafa. Her representation induced the victim to part with his money,
resulting in damage that is the second element of the estafa. Considering that the damage resulted
from the deceit, the CA's affirmance of her guilt for estafa as charged was in order.
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BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (BP 22)
CECILIO S. DE VILLA v. CA, GR 87416, April 8, 1991

(Foreign checks covered-BP 22)
J. Paras
FACTS: Petitioner was charged for violation of BP 22 against private respondent in the total
amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.0
In his defense, petitioner argued that the check was drawn against his dollar account with a
foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law
ISSUE: W/N foreign checks are covered by BP 22.
HELD: YES. Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), ―foreign checks, provided they
are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the
coverage of said law.‖
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts
should not distinguish.1âwphi1 Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.
Moreover, the records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.
PAULINO CHANG v. IAC, GR L-68589-90, December 29, 1986

(Prima facie evidence of bounced check)
J. Melencio-Herrera
FACTS: Appellant invited Reaport to invest in an importation business with an assurance of
30% profit. Reaport agreed and gave 68K to the appellant. In turn, appellant gave him a check
for the sum of 88, 350 representing the amount given by Reaport plus the 30% profit.
Later on, the check was deposited by Reaport but it was returned to him unpaid and stamped
―payment stopped‖. Reaport then demanded money but appellant refused because he has no
money and that the same was issued for money lost at gambling. As a result, appellant was
charged with violation of BP 22 aside from estafa.
ISSUE: W/N Chang violated BP 22.
HELD: YES. There is no question that the check issued by CHANG bounced for insufficiency
of funds, so that he should be held guilty of violation of BP Blg. 22.
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Also, the defense that "the check was issued as a gambling check for money lost at gambling,"
hence, illegal and void from the very beginning lacks credence and "characterized with
circumstances doubly hard to believe."
AMADA RESTERIO v. PEOPLE, GR 177438, September 24, 2012

(Written notice of dishonor)
J. Bersamin
FACTS: Petitioner was charged of BP 22 after issuing unfunded checks in the amount of 50K.
Despite lack of written notice to the petitioner, both RTC and CA convicted her.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner violated BP 22
HELD: NO. A presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds arises when:

(a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check;
(b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee; and
(c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon,
or make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a
conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee
bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not
suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.
The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the second
element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up but also affords the offender
due process. The law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of
the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by
the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not
been paid. The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory right by not
giving the proper notice of dishonor.
In this case, the service of written notice was made through registered mail. However, only the
registry return receipts were only presented as a proof of service. No authenticating affidavit of
the person mailing the notice of dishonor was sent which is also required.
ARIEL LIM v. PEOPLE, GR 190834, November 26, 2014

(Payment beyond 5 days)
J. Peralta
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FACTS: Lim issued 2 checks to Castor for the latter‘s candidacy. Such checks should be used to
buy printing materials. Due to delay of delivery, Castor instructed Lim to issue a ―stop payment‖
for the 2 checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored. Nonetheless, a replacement check was
issued by petitioner upon demand by private complainant.
However, it was found out that the checks were drawn against insufficient funds and would
likewise be dishonored had not the accused ordered the bank to stop payment. In effect, Lim was
not able to pay within 5 days from notice of such dishonor. The lower courts found petitioner
guilty of BP 22.
ISSUE: W/N Lim violated BP 22 even if the same was made beyond 5 days.
HELD: NO. As long as there is no case filed yet, the same can be paid beyond 5 days despite the
fact that all elements of BP 22 are present.
The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after
having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing
of the Information in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the protection of the
credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who
have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before
charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the
informations has already attained the purpose of the law.
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ACCESS DEVICE REGULATION ACT (RA 8484) AS AMENDED BY 11449
DE SILVA CRUZ v PEOPLE

(POSSESSION AND USE)
FACTS: This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated July 4,
2013 and Resolution dated November 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
conviction of petitioner Anthony De Silva Cruz (Cruz) by the Regional Trial Court for violation
of Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998. Cruz
was charged with violation of Section 9 (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, which provide the
Section 9.
Prohibited Acts. - The following acts shall constitute access device fraud and are hereby declared
to be unlawful: (a) producing, using, trafficking in one or more counterfeit access devices; and
(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently applied for.
He was charged with Criminal Case No. 06-0479, Criminal Case No. 06-0480 and Criminal Case
No. 06-0481. Cruz was arraigned on October 17, 2006, where he pleaded not guilty for each
charge.
According to the prosecution, on April 18, 2006, at around 7:30 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to
purchase two (2) bottles of Calvin Klein perfume worth US$96.00 from Duty Free Philippines
Fiesta Mall. Danilo Wong (Wong), the cashier at the Perfume Section, testified that Cruz paid for
the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card. The transaction was approved, although Wong
doubted the validity of the credit card since the number at the back was not aligned. At around
8:00 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to purchase a pair of Ferragamo shoes worth US$363.00. Ana
Margarita Lim (Lim), the cashier on duty, facilitated the sales transaction. Cruz paid for the
purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card bearing the name "Gerry Santos," with credit card
number 4539 7207 8677 7008. When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free shopping card, Cruz
presented a shopping card with the name of "Rodolfo Garcia." Lim asked for another
identification card, and Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing the name "Gerry Santos."
Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe the credit card for approval. The card
was approved, but she noticed that the last four (4) digits of the card were not properly embossed
and its validity date started in November 2006. She called Citibank to verify the credit card.
Upon verification, Citibank informed Lim that the credit card was counterfeit and that the real
Gerry Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk Management Division. Lim was advised to
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transfer the matter to the Security Department. Redentor Quejada, Security Supervisor of Duty
Free Philippines, testified that he and two (2) other guards held Cruz and his companion,
Rodolfo De Silva Cruz, at the security office until the representative from Citibank arrived.
At around 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., Gerardo T. Santos, Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk
Management Division, arrived with members of the Philippine National Police - Criminal
Investigation Detective Group, together with a certain Atty. Abad Santos, who was allegedly
Cruz's lawyer. Before Redentor Quejada could turn Cruz over to the police, Cruz tried to escape
with the help of Atty. Abad Santos. The security officers, however, were able to close the mall's
main gate, which prevented their escape. Cruz and Rodolfo De Silva Cruz were turned over to
the Criminal Investigation Detective Group and brought to Camp Crame for questioning.
Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008 was also turned over to the Criminal
Investigation Detective Group. Gerardo T. Santos testified that he first heard of Cruz's name in
May 2004. Cruz and his wife Aileen were then managing Antonely's Fabric Warehouse and were
involved in incidents related to credit card fraud.
Santos did not file a case against them for lack of basis. He came across Cruz's name again in
2005, with regard to a fraudulent transaction with a Thai restaurant in Shoemart Megamall. He
also testified that the credit card number was validly issued to a certain Jessamine Bongat, and
that the counterfeit credit card had been previously used on several fraudulent occasions.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was
guilty of violating Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484. Corollary to this is whether the
counterfeit access device can still be presented in trial despite not having been presented and
marked during pre-trial.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207
8677 7008, which bore the name "Gerry Santos."
He used the same credit card to purchase Ferragamo shoes worth US$363.00 at Duty Free Fiesta
Mall. Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008 was later proven to be a
counterfeit access device. Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices
Regulation Act of 1998, defines an access device as: any card, plate, code, account number,
electronic serial number, personal identification number, or other telecommunications service,
equipment, or instrumental identifier, or other means of account access that can be used to obtain
money, good, services, or any other thing of value or to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a
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transfer originated solely by paper instrurnent). Since a credit card is "any card, plate, coupon
book, or other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, labor
or services or anything of value on credit," it is considered an access device.
Section 9(a) and (e) make the possession and use of a counterfeit access device as "access device
fraud" that is punishable by law: SECTION 9. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts shall
constitute access device fraud and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) producing, using,
trafficking in one or more counterfeit access devices; (e) possessing one or more counterfeit
access devices or access devices fraudulently applied for. A counterfeit access device is "any
access device that is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged, or an identifiable component of an
access device or counterfeit access device."57 Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
8484, the possession and use of an access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the
possession and use of a counterfeit access device.
Therefore, the corpus delicti of the crime is not merely the access device, but also any evidence
that proves that it is counterfeit. Possession of a counterfeit access device is punishable by
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and not more than 10 years and a fine of ₱l0,000.00
or twice the value obtained by the offense, whichever is higher. On the other hand, use of a
counterfeit access device is punishable by imprisonment of not less 10 years but not more than
12 years and a fine of ₱l0,000.00 or twice the value obtained by the offense, whichever is
higher.
SECTION 10. Penalties. - Any person committing any of the acts constituting access device
fraud enumerated in the immediately preceding section shall be punished with: (a) a fine of Ten
thousand pesos (₱l0,000.00) or twice the value obtained by the offense, whichever is greater and
imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and not more than ten (10) years, in the case of an
offense under Section 9 (b )-(e), and (g)-(p) which does not occur after a conviction for another
offense under Section 9; (b) a fine of Ten thousand pesos (₱l0,000.00) or twice the value
obtained by the offense, and imprisonment for not less than ten (10) years and for not more than
twelve (12) years, in the case of an offense under Section 9 (a), and (f) of the foregoing section,
which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under Section 9.
Petitioner, having been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of 10 years as minimum to 12 years as maximum and a fine of
US$726.00 for violation of Section 9(a) of Republic Act No. 8484. He was also sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years as minimum to 10 years as maximum and a
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fine of Pl0,000.00 for violation of Section 9(e) of Republic Act No. 8484.
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ARTICLE 320 - ARSON

PD 1613 (LAW ON ARSON)
PEOPLE VS MACABANDO
(DESTRUCTIVE v SIMPLE ARSON)
FACTS: The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the
appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get
even ("manabla ko"). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire.
When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant's house.
He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire.[5] Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose
house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire
extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a
traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the
air.[6] The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be
killed.[7]
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces.[8]
Eric also returned to his house to save his belongings.[9]
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the
incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant's house; and that it
had been intentional. Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses
in his barangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department
personnel in assessing the damage.
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the two-storey house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal. He admitted that he
felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale
had been stolen. The appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio
cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to
burn his house, and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by
his neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New
Year celebration.
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant's cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the
appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001. Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant's
brother-in-law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the same house, and that the latter was
asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire broke out.
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of
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the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.[17] The appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charge on arraignment.[18] In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC's factual
findings since these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence.
The CA held that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that
the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty?
RULING: We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty
imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to
circumstantial evidence since there was no direct evidence to prove the appellant's culpability to
the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
sustain a conviction provided that: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused."
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an
unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first,
the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his house at
around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant
stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third, Judith
Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant's room approximately two hours after the appellant
returned to his house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people
from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then
threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the appellant
carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire
marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant's house,
and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the
appellant set fire to his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to
prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did,
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if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire
is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural
order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning
property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination
to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a
traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on
his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his
house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the
appellant's indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried
to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of
innocence. Notably, the appellant failed to impute any improper motive against the prosecution
witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with
them prior to the incident.
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended,
which reads:
Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people
usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings
and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the
offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on
fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or

conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted
to the service of public utilities.
Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of
another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or
to collect from insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall
burn:
Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse,
archives or general museum of the Government.
In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
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In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons."
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,[21] on the other hand, currently governs simple arson.
Section 3 of this law provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
Any inhabited house or dwelling;
Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law
punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree
of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson.
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these
elements have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire
to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and
appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been
intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant
likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellant's act
affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant's act
does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when
compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only
showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the
neighboring houses.
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People[24] is particularly instructive, thus:
270 | P a g e
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal
Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson.
The Proper Penalty
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is
reclusion temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion
perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower
in degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and
whose maximum should be the medium period of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or
sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, taking into account the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. Taking these
rules into account, we therefore impose on the appellant the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts' findings that the records do not
adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To
seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson
under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and
(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
PEOPLE v BENJAMIN BRAVO

(ARSON WITH HOMICIDE)
FACTS: On 10 August 1989, at around 9:30PM, Mauro, the private complainant, was lying in
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his bed on the second floor of his house when he heard gunshots. He then heard accused calling
for him to come down. When he did not come down, the accused went up the stairs and pointed
the gun at him, accusing him of witchcraft and putting a curse on the accused‘s father. He
remained silent so the accused turned around and uttered ―I will burn you all. All of you will
die‖. About 15 seconds thereafter, Mauro saw a big fire on the second floor coming from the
room of the victims. He and his children were able to jump out the window but the victims were
not. During trial, the accused raised the defense of alibi, with corroborations from numerous
witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty?
HELD: Yes, the prosecution was able to prove an unbroken chain of circumstances that point to
no other than the accused himself as the arsonist. The testimony of a barangay councilman, who
saw the accused running away from the burning house while carrying a long firearm in addition
to the threat uttered by the accused, was among the circumstances which the court used to justify
the conviction.
Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable in the face of positive and credible testimonies of
prosecution witnesses. It becomes less plausible, especially when it is corroborated by relatives
and friends who may not be impartial witnesses.
Physical impossibility is essential in the defense of alibi. Physical impossibility refers to distance
and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the location of the accused when the
crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been
physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed.
The Court of Appeals clearly stated in its Decision that appellant failed to prove the physical
impossibility of his presence at the crime scene which negated his alibi, thus:
Quite noticeable, too, is that the evidence on the alibi did not demonstrate the physical
impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime when the crime was committed at
9:30 pm of August 10, 1989. For, even assuming that the accused had gone to San Fabian earlier
that day of the crime, his being in San Fabian did not preclude his going back to Naguilian, La
Union after the treatment of the father had been completed by 5:00 pm in order for him to be in
the place where the crime was committed at the time of the commission of the crime. In this
regard, the RTC took judicial notice that it would take only about 2 hours more or less to
negotiate the distance from Naguilian, La Union to San Fabian, Pangasinan. For alibi to prosper,
it is not enough that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it must
likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present
at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. That showing
was not made by the accused.
Under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is
imposed when death results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
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We likewise affirm the award of damages.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding appellant BENJAMIN BRAVO y ESTABILLO

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
PEOPLE v BALUNTONG
(ARSON WITH HOMICIDE v MURDER)
FACTS: Ferdinand T. Baluntong (appellant) appeals from the August 13, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals to which the Court had earlier referred the present case for intermediate review
following People v. Mateo.
In its challenged Decision, the appellate court affirmed appellant's conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder,
following his indictment for such offense in an Information reading:
That on or about the 31st day of July 1998, at about 10:30 in the evening at Barangay Danggay,
Municipality of Roxas, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, with malice aforethought
and with deliberate intent to kill, set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the
complete destruction of the said house and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez,
and inflicting serious physical injuries on Josua Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequance but which, nevertheless
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Gathered from the records of the case is the following version of the prosecution:
At around 10:30 p.m. of July 31, 1998, while then 12-year old Jovelyn Santos (Jovelyn) was
sleeping in the house of her grandmother Celerina Solangon (Celerina) at Barangay Dangay,
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, she was awakened by heat emanating from the walls of the house. She
thus roused her cousin Dorecyll and together they went out of the house.
Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around the house near the terrace where the fire
started, but appellant ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll.
Appellant's neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona (Felicitas), also saw appellant near Celerina's house after
it caught fire, following which, appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the
house, as other neighbors repaired to the scene to help contain the flames. Felicitas also saw
Celerina, who was at a neighbor's house before the fire started, enter the burning house and
resurface with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.
Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to their death. Joshua sustained
second degree burns.
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Upon the other hand, appellant, denying the charge, invoked alibi, claiming that he, on his
mother Rosalinda's request, went to Caloocan City on July 15, 1998 (16 days before the incident)
and stayed there until February 1999. Rosalinda corroborated appellant's alibi.
By Decision of February 28, 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty as charged, disposing as
follows
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) The court finds accused Ferdinand Baluntong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH to be executed in
accordance with the existing law;
xxxx
(c) Accused Ferdinand Baluntong is also ordered to pay the heirs of Celerina Suba Solangon the
sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and the heirs of Elvin [sic] Savariz the following:
(I) the sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages (II) the sum of P16,500.00 as actual
damages; and (III) the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not BAluntong is guilty of the crime of complex crime of Double Murder
with Frustrated Murder
RULING: In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v. Malngan teaches:
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain
the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or
edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the
resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular
person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish
such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a
particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means
to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed -
homicide/murder and arson.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, "Amending the Law on Arson," reads:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. â"€ The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua
shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The Court finds that there is no showing that appellant's main objective was to kill Celerina and
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her housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.
In her Affidavit executed on August 11, 1998, Felicitas stated that what she knew is that Celerina
wanted appellant, who was renting a house near Celerina's, to move out.
How Felicitas acquired such "knowledge" was not probed into, however, despite the fact that she
was cross-examined thereon.
Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants,
appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true
with respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill
her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring house,
Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning
house to save her grandsons.
While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with "Double Murder with Frustrated
Murder," appellant may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for
Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act.
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the
house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence,
absorbed by arson.
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved,
conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when death
results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,[14] the penalty should be reclusion
perpetua.
A word on the damages awarded.
The appellate court affirmed the award of compensatory damages to the heirs of Celerina. But
entitlement thereto was not proven.
The appellate court likewise affirmed the award of compensatory damages, actual damages, and
moral damages to the heirs of Alvin. Compensatory damages and actual damages are the same,
however.[15] Since the trial court awarded the duly proven actual damages of P16,500.00
representing burial expenses, the award of compensatory damages of P50,000.00 does not lie. It
is gathered from the evidence, however, that Alvin was hospitalized for five days,hence, an
award of P8,500.00 as temperate damages for the purpose would be reasonable.
As for the award to Alvin of moral damages, the records do not yield any basis therefor.
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More. The appellate court awarded exemplary damages "to the heirs of the victims," clearly
referring to the deceased Celerina and Alvin. Absent proof of the presence of any aggravating
circumstances, however, the award does not lie.
When death occurs due to a crime, the grant of civil indemnity requires no proof other than the
death of the victim. The heirs of Celerina are thus entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto. And so are Alvin's.
The appellate court's award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 to Joshua is in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision of August 13, 2007 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered as follows:
Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson
under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with no eligibility for parole.
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ARTICLE 327 - MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
ROBERT TAGUINOD v. PEOPLE

(ELEMENTS)
FACTS: This case started with a single incident on May 26, 2002 at the parking area of the
Rockwell Powerplant Mall. Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda CRV
(CRV) from the 3rd basement parking, while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his
Suzuki Vitara (Vitara) from the 2nd basement parking. When they were about to queue at the
corner to pay the parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each other. The CRV was
ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake, which resulted the touching of their side
view mirrors. The side view mirror of the Vitara was pushed backward and naturally, the side
view mirror of the CRV was pushed forward. This prompted the private complainant's wife and
daughter, namely, Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the
petitioner. Petitioner appeared to be hostile, hence, the private complainant instructed his wife
and daughter to go back to the CRV. While they were returning to the car, petitioner accelerated
the Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them. The CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara,
took another lane. Private complainant was able to pay the parking fee at the booth ahead of
petitioner. When the CRV was at the upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the
CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit
portion of the ramp.
As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper spare tires and the
front bumper, the repair of which amounted to P57,464.66. The insurance company shouldered
the said amount, but the private complainant paid P18,191.66 as his participation. On the other
hand, the Vitara sustained damage on the right side of its bumper.
Thereafter, an Information[6] was filed in the MeTC of Makati City against petitioner for the
crime of Malicious Mischief as defined in and penalized under Article 327[7] of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty?
RULING: Defense witness Mary Susan Lim Taguinod is wanting in credibility. Her
recollection of the past events is hazy as shown by her testimony on cross-examination. While
she stated in her affidavit that the Honda CRV's "left side view mirror hit our right side view
mirror, causing our side view mirror to fold" (par. 4, Exhibit "3"), she testified on cross-
examination that the right side view mirror of the Vitara did not fold and there was only a slight
dent or scratch. She initially testified that she does not recall having submitted her written
version of the incident but ultimately admitted having executed an affidavit. Also, while the
Affidavit stated that Mary Susan Lim Taguinod personally appeared before the Notary Public, on
cross-examination, she admitted that she did not, and what she only did was to sign the Affidavit
in Quezon City and give it to her husband. Thus, her inaccurate recollection of the past incident,
as shown by her testimony on cross-examination, is in direct contrast with her Affidavit which
appears to be precise in its narration of the incident and its details. Such Affidavit, therefore,
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deserves scant consideration as it was apparently prepared and narrated by another.
Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven its case against the accused by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction;
(3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging
it.[20]
In finding that all the above elements are present, the MeTC rightly ruled that:
The following were not disputed: that there was a collision between the side view mirrors of the
two (2) vehicles; that immediately thereafter, the wife and the daughter of the complainant
alighted from the CRV and confronted the accused; and, the complainant, in view of the hostile
attitude of the accused, summoned his wife and daughter to enter the CRV and while they were
in the process of doing so, the accused moved and accelerated his Vitara backward as if to hit
them.
The incident involving the collision of the two side view mirrors is proof enough to establish the
existence of the element of "hate, revenge and other evil motive." Here, the accused entertained
hate, revenge and other evil motive because to his mind, he was wronged by the complainant
when the CRV overtook his Vitara while proceeding toward the booth to pay their parking fee,
as a consequence of which, their side view mirrors collided. On the same occasion, the hood of
his Vitara was also pounded, and he was badmouthed by the complainant's wife and daughter
when they alighted from the CRV to confront him for the collision of the side view mirrors.
These circumstances motivated the accused to push upward the ramp complainant's CRV until it
reached the steel railing of the exit ramp. The pushing of the CRV by the Vitara is corroborated
by the Incident Report dated May 26, 2002 prepared by SO Robert Cambre, Shift-In-Charge of
the Power Plant Mall, as well as the Police Report.
The CA also accurately observed that the elements of the crime of malicious mischief are not
wanting in this case, thus:
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had proven beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of
the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The
version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the
CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioner's version that it
was private complainant's CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara
considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and
dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would
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be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational
pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just
giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private
complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had proven the
guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malicious mischief. This
adjudication is but an affirmation of the finding of guilt of the petitioner by both the lower
courts, the MeTC and the RTC.
Petitioner likewise raises the issue that the CA was wrong in awarding moral damages and
attorney's fees to the private complainant claiming that during the trial, the latter's entitlement to
the said monetary reliefs was not substantiated. This Court finds petitioner's claim, with regard
to the award of moral damages, unmeritorious.
In Manuel v. People,[23] this Court tackled in substance the concept of the award of moral
damages, thus:
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. An award for moral damages requires the
confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause
of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of
the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
It is true that the private complainant is entitled to the award of moral damages under Article
2220[25] of the New Civil Code because the injury contemplated by the law which merits the
said award was clearly established. Private complainant testified that he felt bad[26] and lost
sleep. The said testimony is substantial to prove the moral injury suffered by the private
complainant for it is only him who can personally approximate the emotional suffering he
experienced. For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury,
competent and substantial proof of the suffering experienced must be laid before it.[28] The
same also applies with private complainant's claim that his wife felt dizzy after the incident and
had to be taken to the hospital.
However, anent the award of attorney's fees, the same was not established. In German Marine
Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that there must always be a factual basis for the award
of attorney's fees. This present case does not contain any valid and factual reason for such
award.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review dated February 5, 2009 of petitioner Robert Taguinod is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 8, 2008 and its Resolution
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dated December 19, 2008 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the attorney's
fees are OMITTED.
MARIO VALEROSO v. PEOPLE

(ACT OF HATE)
FACTS: The Philippine National Bank (PNB) hired Mario as caretaker of its lot in Bataan.
Consequently, Mario put up on the said lot a sign which reads ―No Trespassing‖, to ward off
squatters.
Despite the sign, Julita, believing that the said lot was owned by her grandparents, constructed a
nipa hut thereon.
Mario, tore down and demolished Julita‘s hut. She thus filed with the MTC a criminal complaint
for malicious mischief against Mario.
Mario contends that he acted in the lawful exercise of a right in effecting the demolition invoking
paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether being designated as caretaker of the property necessarily clothed Mario with
authority to demolish the structure of Julita.
RULING: No. Being designated as caretaker of the property does not necessarily clothed him
with authority to summarily demolish the structure of an alleged squatter.
Mario cannot rightfully invoke paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code which states:
―Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
...
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.‖
The requisites of the foregoing justifying circumstance are (1) that the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (2) that the injury caused or the
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.
In this case, Mario deliberately demolished the property of Julita without any lawful authority.
While the first requisite is present, the second is unavailing. Mario was not acting in the
fulfillment of his duty when he took the law into his own hands and summarily demolished
Julita‘s hut.
a) The requisites of the justifying circumstance of ―lawful exercise of a right or office‖ under
Art. 11(5) are: (1) that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right; and (2) that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
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b) Being designated as caretaker of the property does not necessarily clothed him with authority
to summarily demolish the structure of an alleged squatter.
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CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY (ARTICLES 333 - 346)
BELTRAN v PEOPLE AND JUDGE TUAZON

(NULLITY OF MARRIAGE; CONCUBINAGE)
FACTS: Meynardo and Charmaine were married in 1973. After 24 years of marriage, Meynardo
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Charmaine on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Charmaine, however, alleged that it was Meynardo who left the
conjugal home, and is now living with Milagros, his paramour.
Charmaine filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City.
Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court, saying that the
pendency of the petition for nullity of his marriage with Charmaine poses a prejudicial question
to the criminal case.
The lower court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by Meynardo,
hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court to stop the lower court from trying his case. The RTC
denied his petition and the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a
prejudicial question to a prosecution for concubinage filed by the wife?
RULING: No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question to a prosecution for concubinage.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner‘s marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
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courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question
in a criminal case for concubinage.
PEOPLE v SANTIBANEZ AND JAVELLANA

(ADULTERY; PRIVATE COMPLAINT NECESSARY)
FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo, Branch V, presided by the respondent Judge Ricardo M. Ilarde,
granting the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 13086, entitled, "People of
the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Cecile Santibañez and Avelino T. Javellana, accused."
The information in Criminal Case No. 13086 was filed on March 4, 1981 by City Fiscal Ricardo
P. Galvez. It reads:
"The undersigned City Fiscal upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended party Efraim
Santibañez, copies of which are thereto attached as Annexes 'A' and 'B' hereby accused CECILE
SANTIBAÑEZ and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA of the crime of adultery, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1980, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused Cecile Santibañez being lawfully married to Efraim
Santibañez, which marriage at that time has not been legally dissolved, with deliberate intent, did
then and there wilfully, maliciously and criminally have sexual intercourse with her co-accused
Avelino T. Javellana, a man not her husband and who in turn knowing fully well that his co-
accused was then lawfully married to Efraim Santibañez, did then and there wilfully, maliciously
and criminally have sexual intercourse with her.
Annex "A" referred to in the information is the sworn complaint for adultery filed by Efraim
Santibañez against herein private respondents, Cecile Santibañez and Avelino T. Javellana, with
the Integrated National Police, Iloilo Metro Police District, Iloilo City, on November 4, 1980,
which complaint was immediately forwarded to the Office of the City Fiscal for preliminary
investigation. Said complaint reads:
"The undersigned accuses ATTY. AVELINO JAVELLANA, a resident of CPU Compound,

Jaro, Iloilo City, and Cecile Santibañez, a resident of Candido Subdivision, Iloilo City, for the
crime of adultery x x x
xxx xxx xxx
(Sgd.) EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ

(Signature of complainant)
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"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of November, 1980 in the City of
Iloilo.
(Sgd.) RICARDO P. GALVEZ

City Fiscal"
Annex "B" of the information is the affidavit-complaint dated November 6, 1980 executed by
Efraim Santibañez, sworn to and filed before City Fiscal Galvez on November 7, 1980, wherein
Santibañez recounted in detail the antecedents which brought about the apprehension in flagrante
of private respondents. The same is quoted as follows:
"I, EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ, of age, married, and a resident of Fundidor, Molo, Iloilo City, after
having been duly sworn to according to law depose and say:
"That I am legally married to Cecile Sorianosos in a Civil Marriage solemnized by Judge Vicente
Santos, City Court of Pasay City on March 22, 1974 but subsequently remarried in a religious
ceremony before Rev. Panfilo T. Brasil at the Parish Church of La Paz, Iloilo City on July 18,
1974, xerox copies of the aforesaid marriage contracts are hereto attached as Annexes 'A' and 'B',
forming integral parts of this affidavit;
"After our marriage, I built a house for our permanent residence and as our conju-gal home in
Fundidor, Molo, Iloilo City and furnished it with all the comforts well within my means;
"At the start of our marriage, I was led to believe by my wife of her total concern, love and
devotion to me and in turn I lavished her with all the material comfort at my command and even
tried to build up her social status by sending her as a delegate to the Zonta World Conference at
Washington, D.C. last July, 1980 without my company. As a token of my love and unfailing trust
we went sight-seeing and on our second honeymoon to Hongkong only last month.
"Sometime during the last week of October, 1980, while I went on my normal work routine to
Passi Sugar Millsite in Passi, Iloilo, my son Edmund took me aside in confidence and told me
that he has some very delicate matters to take up with me which may be misinterpreted by me or
may be taken by me in a wrong light; however, he said that the honor and dignity of the family is
at stake and I have to know it whatever be the consequence. After I gave him the go signal, he
narrated to me that my wife Cecile Sorianosos has been unfaithful to me and has been having
illicit relationship with another man. Of course, I was taken aback and stunned so I asked him for
the source of his information. He informed me that our maid Elsa Barios and our driver Loreto
Reales had been aware of the illicit relationship and the man usually went to my house and even
slept there whenever I was in Manila. I got angry and blamed our maid and the driver for not
telling me but Edmund told me that they were afraid to tell because they were threatened. After I
have calmed down, I commented that if I confront my wife about her illicit relationship, she will
surely deny it. So I thought that the best way was to catch her red-handed in the act of infidelity
so that she could not deny it anymore. I suggested to Edmund to think of a plan so we can catch
my wife red-handed.
"After several days of planning we agreed to put our plan of action in operation on November 3,
1980 since I will be leaving for Manila in the morning of that day. Our problem was how to
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catch my wife in the very act of having sexual intercourse with her lover considering the fact that
our master's room was air-conditioned with all windows framed by glass jalousies closed and
covered by curtains. At first we thought of breaking down the main door with a sledge hammer
so we could take them by surprise, later we abandoned the idea because of legal complications.
"Finally, I thought of removing a glass of the jalousy so the inside of the bedroom can be seen
from the outside once the curtain can be brushed aside by means of a thin wire and the persons
on bed could be seen clearly since the bed is on the same level as the opening of the window.
After several experiments whenever my wife was out, I found out that my wife cannot notice the
removal of the glass jalousy since our windows are screened from the inside of our room.
"As pre-arranged, I removed one jalousy glass of the window of our master room so that the
people inside our room could be seen actually from the outside and the moment my wife and her
lover is seen in the act of sexual intercourse.
"Having completed all the plans to effect our plan of operation, I told my wife that I was leaving
in the morning of November 3, 1980 for Manila and actually I took the plane for Manila on that
day. I instructed my son Edmund to inform me immediately of the result of the plan of action as
soon as possible.
"Almost midnight of November 3, 1980, I was informed by my daughter-in-law Rebecca that the
operation was successful and resulted in the arrest of my wife and Atty. Bob Javellana inside our
bedroom.
"I know Atty. Bob Javellana for quite a time and we have been close friends. As a friend he has
come to our house at Molo, Iloilo City oftentimes to discuss matters about the court case
between the Iloilo City Government and St. Therese Memorial Chapel which is a business which
I have given to my wife Cecile. Atty. Javellana knew that Cecile Sorianosos is my legally
married wife.
"When I returned to Iloilo City from Manila on November 4, 1980, I was shown the photographs
taken inside our master bedroom and I am attaching hereto the photographs which are marked as
Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I" and "J".
"That I am formally charging my wife, Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of the crime
of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint against
them" (pp. 4-5, Original Records).
Sometime in January 1981, i.e., before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation then being
conducted by the Fiscal's Office, Efraim Santibañez learned that he was sick of cancer and
decided to leave for the United States for medical treatment. Before his departure, he executed a
holographic will, dated January 10, 1981, a portion of which provided:
"I do hereby disinherit my second wife, Cecilia Sorianosos of any and all inheritance she is
entitled under the law as my wife on the ground that she had given cause for legal separation by
committing acts of adultery with Atty. Bob Javellana in the evening of November 3, 1980 in my
con-jugal abode at Candido Subdivision and as a result of which I charged her and Atty. Bob
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Javellana for adultery with the Fiscal's Office and I filed a case of legal separation against her in
Civil Case No. SP-11-309 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Iloilo City for which
act of infidelity, I can never forgive her."
On January 15, 1981, after several requests for postponement, private respondents submitted
their memo-randum to the Fiscal's Office; and on February 19, 1981, Fiscal Galvez issued a
resolution finding the existence of a prima facie case for adultery against private res-pondents.
On February 26, 1981, Fiscal Galvez was informed by relatives of Efraim Santibañez that the
latter had died in the United States on February 16, 1981. This notwithstanding, he prepared the
information in question on March 3, 1981, and on the following day, filed the same with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Private respondents filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged, as the offended party had not filed the required
complaint pursuant to the provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse."
Finding merit in the position taken by private respondents, respondent judge granted the motion
and dismissed the case. The city fiscal moved for a recon-sideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been compliance with the requirement of Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code, reiterated in Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, that "the crimes of
adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party."
RULING: We rule in the affirmative.
We are aware that in a long line of decisions, this Court has maintained strict adherence to the
requirement imposed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
It must be borne in mind, however, that this legal requirement was imposed "out of consideration
for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through
the scandal of a public trial."[4] Thus, the law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to
seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring spouse. And this, to Our mind,
should be the overriding consi-deration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition
precedent prescribed by said Article 344 has been complied with. For needless to state, this
Court should be guided by the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law.
In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party, Efraim Santibañez, to bring his wife and her
alleged paramour to justice is only too evident. Such determination of purpose on his part is
amply demons-trated in the dispatch by which he filed his complaint with the police [Annex 'A',
supra]; the strong and unequivocal statement contained in the affidavit filed with the Fiscal's
Office that "I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of the
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crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint
against them" [Annex 'B', supra]; his filing of a complaint for legal separation against Cecile
Santibañez with the local Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court; and finally, in disinheriting his
wife in his Last Will and Testament dated January 10, 1981.
In quashing the information, respondent judge relied upon Our decision in People vs. Santos to
the effect that a "salaysay"' or sworn statement of the offended party, which prompted the fiscal
to conduct a preliminary investigation and then to file an information in court, was not the
complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
The ruling in Santos is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, the "salaysay" executed by
complainant Bansuelo was not considered the com-plaint contemplated by Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code because it was a mere narration of how the crime of rape was committed
against her. However, in the affidavit-complaint submitted by Efraim Santibañez, the latter not
only narrated the facts and circumstances constituting the crime of adultery, but he also
expli-citly and categorically charged private respondents with the said offense. Thus -
"That I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of the crime of
adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a for-mal complaint against them."
Moreover, in Santos, this Court noted that the information filed by Rizal Provincial Fiscal
Nicanor P. Nicolas "commenced with the statement 'the under-signed fiscal accuses Engracio
Santos with the crime of rape,' the offended party not having been mentioned at all as one of the
accusers." In the instant case, however, the information filed by the city fiscal of Iloilo reads as
follows:
"The undersigned city fiscal upon sworn statement originally filed by the offended party Efraim
Santibañez, xerox copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes 'A' and 'B' x x x."
Undoubtedly, the complaint-affidavit filed by Santibañez contains all the elements of a valid
complaint, as "it states the names of the defendants, the designation of the offense by the statute,
the acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party,
the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed."
What is more, said complaint-affidavit was attached to the information as an integral part
thereof, and duly filed with the court. As held in Fernandez vs. Lantin, the filing in court of such
affidavit or sworn statement of the offended party, if it contains all the allegations required of a
criminal complaint under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, constitutes sufficient
compliance of the law. Thus:
"x x x in a case where the Fiscal filed an Information charging the accused with 'telling some
people in the neighborhood that said Fausta Bravo (a married woman) was a paramour of one
Sangalang, a man not her husband', and Fausta Bravo did not subscribe to the complaint, this
Court held that the trial court had no jurisdic-tion over the case. It ruled that since the accused
imputed to Fausta Bravo the commission of adultery, a crime which can-not be prosecuted de
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oficio, the Inform-ation filed by the Fiscal cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court of origin.
"It must be noted, however, that this error could be corrected without sustaining the motion to
quash and dis-missing the case. Pursuant to section 1 of paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No.
77, under which the Assistant City Fiscal conducted the preliminary investigation, the statement
of the complainant was sworn to before the aforesaid Investigating Fiscal. Assuming that the
recitals in said sworn statement contain all those required of a complaint under the rules, a copy
of said verified statement of the complainant should be filed with respondent Court in order to
comply with the requirements of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code; otherwise, the
respondent Fiscal should file with said court a verified complaint of the offended party."
Upon these premises, We cannot but conclude that the adultery charge against private
respondents is being prosecuted "upon complaint filed by the offended party."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The orders of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch V, in Criminal Case No. 13086, dated May 21 and September 14, 1981, are hereby set
aside, and respondent judge is directed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. No
costs.
PEOPLE v CAOILI
(266 SEXUAL ASSAULT VS SEC. 5b RA 7610; GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTOR)
(ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS IF VICTIM UNDER 12)
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Caoili guilty of the crime of Rape by Sexual
Assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353. The victim was a minor, fifteen (15) years of age and the
daughter of the herein accused.
Caoili pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
The victim, AAA, testified that on October 23, 2005, at 7:00p.m., her father, Caoili, sexually
molested her at their house located in Barangay JJJ, Municipality of KKK, in the Province of
LLL. Caoili kissed her lips, touched and mashed her breast, inserted the fourth finger of his left
hand into her vagina, and made a push and pull movement into her vagina with such finger for
30 minutes. AAA felt excruciating pain during and after the ordeal. Against her father's harsh
warning not to go out of the house, AAA proceeded to the house of her uncle, BBB, located 20
meters away from their house. When he learned of this, Caoili fetched AAA and dragged her
home. He beat and hit her with a piece of wood, and boxed her on the stomach.[12]
The RTC rendered its Decision[20] declaring Caoili guilty of rape by sexual assault. On
September 29, 2008, pursuant to a Commitment Order[22] issued by the RTC on August 27,
2008, provincial jail guards escorted Caoili for his confinement at the Davao Prisons and Penal
Farm, Panabo, Davao del Norte (Davao Penal Colony).[23]
Thereafter, Caoili filed his appeal before the CA.
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The CA held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by sexual assault, what the trial court
should have done was to direct the State Prosecutor to file a new Information charging the proper
offense, and after compliance therewith, to dismiss the original Information. The appellate court
found it "imperative and morally upright" to set the judgment aside and to remand the case for
further proceedings pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110,[26] in relation to Section 19, Rule 119[27]
of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, Caoili and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective petitions
for review before this Court: G.R. No. 196342 was instituted by the OSG and G.R. No. 196848
was filed by Caoili. These petitions were ordered consolidated by the Court in its Resolution[28]
dated on August 1, 2011.
In G.R. No. 196342, the OSG assails the CA's Decision for not being in accord with the law and
established jurisprudence.
RULING: The petitions lack merit. The prosecution has established rape by sexual assault.
Accused Noel Go Caoili alias Boy Tagalog is guilty of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility of parole.
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed -R.A. No. 8353 or the
"Anti-Rape Law of 1997" amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the RPC, reclassifying
rape as a crime against persons and introducing rape by "sexual assault," as differentiated from
rape through "carnal knowledge" or rape through "sexual intercourse." Thus, rape under the
RPC, as amended, can be committed in two ways.
Through AAA's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that Caoili molested his own
daughter when he inserted his finger into her vagina and thereafter made a push and pull
movement with such finger for 30 minutes,[34] thus, clearly establishing rape by sexual
assault[35] under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. Caoili, however, questions AAA's
credibility, arguing that her testimony lacked veracity since she harbored hatred towards him due
to the latter's strict upbringing.
It is settled that ill motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible
declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the liability of the accused. AAA was
a little over 15 years old when she testified,[38] and she categorically identified Caoili as the one
who defiled her. She positively and consistently declared that Caoili inserted his finger into her
vagina and that she suffered tremendous pain during the insertion. Her account of the incident, as
found by the RTC[39] and the CA, was clear, convincing and straightforward, devoid of any
material or significant inconsistencies.
[T]he "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge
because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness
stand; a vantage point denied the appellate courts, and when his findings have been affirmed by
the CA, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court."
289 | P a g e
When a rape victim's testimony on the manner she was molested is straightforward and candid,
and is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as in this case, the same
is sufficient to support a conviction for rape. In a long line of cases, this Court has given full
weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims, considering that their youth and immaturity
are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Indeed, leeway should be given to witnesses who are
minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse.
It is likewise settled that in cases where the rape is committed by a close kin, such as the victim's
father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual
force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.
Verily, the prosecution has sufficiently proved the crime of rape by sexual assault as defined in
paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC. Caoili, however, cannot be convicted of said crime.
Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape through sexual intercourse.
Caoili can be convicted of rape by sexual assault because this offense is necessarily included in
the crime of rape through sexual intercourse.
The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is
different from but necessarily included in the crime charged, is embodied in Section 4, in relation
to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
By jurisprudence, however, an accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual

intercourse cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was
proven during trial. This is due to the substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape.
The elements of rape through sexual intercourse are: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force
or intimidation. Rape by sexual intercourse is a crime committed by a man against a woman, and
the central element is carnal knowledge.[52]
On the other hand, the elements of rape by sexual assault are: (1) that the offender commits an
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act of sexual assault; (2) that the act of sexual assault is committed by inserting his penis into
another person's mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or
anal orifice of another person; and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished by using force or
intimidation, among others.[53]
In the first mode (rape by sexual intercourse): (1) the offender is always a man; (2) the offended
party is always a woman; (3) rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina; and (4)
the penalty is reclusion perpertua.
In the second mode (rape by sexual assault): (1) the offender may be a man or a woman; (2) the
offended party may be a man or a woman; (3) rape is committed by inserting the penis into
another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice
of another person; and (4) the penalty is prision mayor.
The Court en banc's categorical pronouncement in People v. Abulon,[56] thus, finds application
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not
necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in
Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty
of rape by sexual assault although it was proven, without violating his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The language of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353,
provides the elements that substantially differentiate the two forms of rape,i.e., rape by sexual
intercourse and rape by sexual assault. It is through legislative process that the dichotomy
between these two modes of rape was created. To broaden the scope of rape by sexual assault, by
eliminating its legal distinction from rape through sexual intercourse, calls for judicial legislation
which We cannot traverse without violating the principle of separation of powers. The Court
remains steadfast in confining its powers within the constitutional sphere of applying the law as
enacted by the Legislature.
In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape introduced in R.A. No.
8353, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if
the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be
considered subsumed in the latter.
Caoili can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
R.A. No. 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are
children or those "persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition."
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was fourteen (14)
years, one (1) month and ten (10) days old. This calls for the application of Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610.
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The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
The prosecution's evidence has sufficiently established the elements of lascivious conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
The evidence confirms that Caoili committed lascivious acts against AAA when he kissed her
lips, touched and mashed her breast, and inserted his finger into her vagina and made a push and
pull movement with such finger for 30 minutes. AAA likewise confirmed on cross
examination[69] that Caoili molested her. She even recounted that her father threatened her not
to tell anybody about the incident. Caoili's acts are clearly covered by the definitions of "sexual
abuse" and "lascivious conduct."
It has been settled that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require a prior or
contemporaneous abuse that is different from what is complained of, or that a third person should
act in concert with the accused.
AAA was a child below 18 years old at the time the lascivious conduct was committed against
her. Her minority was both sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved.
"Influence" is the improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will
and substitutes another's objective. On the other hand, "coercion" is the improper use of power to
compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it.
It cannot be denied that AAA, who is only a little over 14 years old at the time the offense was
committed, was vulnerable and would have been easily intimidated by an attacker who is not
only a grown man but is also someone exercising parental authority over her. Even absent such
coercion or intimidation, Caoili can still be convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 as he evidently used his moral influence and ascendancy as a father in
perpetrating his lascivious acts against AAA. It is doctrinal that moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence and intimidation.
It bears emphasis, too, that consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5 of
R.A. No. 7610.[76] The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct
with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense
because it is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
Clearly, therefore, all the essential elements of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 have been proved, making Caoili liable for said offense.
Variance doctrine applied
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Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Article 266-A of the
RPC and R.A. No. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., lascivious conduct under Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610, which was the offense proved, because it is included in rape, the offense
charged.[78] With the aforesaid provisions, the appellant can be held guilty of a lesser crime of
acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610, which was the offense proved because it is included in rape, the offense
charged.
PEOPLE v SANDY L. DOMINGO

(FORCIBLE ABDUCTION ABSORBED IN RAPE)
FACTS: An Information was filed charging appellant with the crime of Forcible Abduction with
Rape in this wise: That accused, motivated by lust and with lewd designs, and by means of force,
feloniously, abduct and take away one AAA, against her will, and thereafter, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, with the use of a bladed weapon and actuated by lust and lewd
designs, have carnal knowledge of said victim.
Appellant claimed that he and AAA eloped and went to the house of his brother-in-law. They
spent the night there and agreed that they will go to her Aunt's house and get her things and will
proceed to Bicol. When they reached her aunt's house, AAA went inside while he waited. After a
few minutes, a man came out and chased him with a bolo which prompted him to run. At around
7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at his sister's house when the policemen arrived and
informed him that there was a complaint filed against him.
The RTC and CA convicted appellant for forcible abduction with rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
RULING: The appellant should be convicted only of rape. Under Article 342 of the RPC, the
elements of forcible abduction are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will; and (2) with lewd
designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when the
abductor has carnal knowledge of the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1)
by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, his forcible abduction of AAA was
absorbed by the rape considering that his real objective in abducting her was to commit the rape.
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CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS (ARTICLES 347 - 352 AS

AMENDED BY RA 10655)
ZAMORANOS v PEOPLE AND PACASUM SR.

(MUSLIM DIVORCE; BIGAMY)
FACTS: Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed
again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of
their marriage was confirmedy theShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a Decree of Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first
nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the
Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter,
in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage
vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike
in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed
with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and
the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated
into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum
arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former,
with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos
including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and
disbarment from the civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor
Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for
Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a
decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such
at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?
HELD: First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of
judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of
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nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a
bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
declared that it was the Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have
taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that
Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and
recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos' divorce
from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the
court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are
governed by P.D. No. 1083.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed
by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim status
should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage
while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the
validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation of
the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions,
beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over
the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the
equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,
entitling one to remarry.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an

Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid,
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and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. GRANTED.
NOLLORA JR v PEOPLE
(PREFERENTIAL APPLICATION; BIGAMY)
FACTS: While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her
husband of two years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed,
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on
December 8, 2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the
moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings.
Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000.
Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim
convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion,
proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is
allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.
Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does
not know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is the
one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he told
her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned
that he is a Muslim convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he also
got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
RULING: Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio
under Article 35 of the Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married
to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the
second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of
Atilano due to his prior marriage.
Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages,
he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with Articles
14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between a
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Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family
Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages
were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, he cannot
claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in
exceptional cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be
permitted to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife
or wives, and should any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If
the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall
subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal
Laws)
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Both of
his marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for marriage, his
omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil
status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal liability,
he recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer
cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.
CENON TEVES v PEOPLE

(DISSOLUTION OF FIRST MARRIAGE; BIGAMY)
FACTS: On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and
Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and would only
come home to the Philippines for vacations. In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had
contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. Thelma then went to the National Statistics
Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage indicating that her husband (Cenon) and
Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 in Bulacan. In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed
a complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of bigamy. Petitioner was charged with bigamy under
Article 349 of the RPC on June 2006. However, during the pendency of the criminal case for
bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City, rendered a decision dated May 2006 (one month before the
case for bigamy was decided) declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on
the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family Code. Said decision became final by a Certification of
Finality issued on 27 June 2006. Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA contending that the
court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal liability had already been extinguished. Petitioner
claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, ―there is in effect no
marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.‖
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Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his
case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration
of nullity of marriage was filed. Petitioner says that in his case, the first marriage had already
been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC)
despite the judicial declaration that his previous marriage with Thema is null and void.
RULING: YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity
was filed before the case for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a
subsequent marriage while his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a
Declaration of Nullity of the First marriage at the time he contracted the second marriage.
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy under Art. 346 of the RPC. Thus, the
CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner. Petitioner was legally married to
Thelma on 26 November 1992. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10
December 2001. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was
legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first
marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second
marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the
essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent
marriage.
His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his
first marriage is bereft of merit. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
If petitioner‘s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage
and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him. We note that in petitioner‘s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage
was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner‘s argument, even assuming that a
complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided
that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court.
Such cannot be allowed.
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TENEBRO v CA
(EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION UNDER ART. 36, FC)
FACTS: Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.
When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was
indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite
clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared
null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect
RULING: As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner‘s valid

marriage to Villareyes, petitioner‘s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner‘s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner‘s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the
City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of the
Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is
AFFIRMED.
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CRIMES AGAINST HONOR (ARTICLES 353 - 364)
ERWIN TULFO v PEOPLE

(LIBEL, MALICE IN FACT)
FACTS: On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4)
separate informations were filed on September 8, 1999 with RTC Pasay City. These were
assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged
petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as
national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo
Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with
the publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12,
1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.
In his (Erwin Tulfo) series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs
as being involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position for personal gain. He
went even further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw
na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw sa miyembro nito." He accused Atty. So of stealing from
the government with his alleged corrupt activities. And when Atty. So filed a libel suit against
him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty.
So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]."
In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that
he neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his
criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but
against a person by the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was
the practice of certain people to use other people's names to advance their corrupt practices. He
also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as
per his source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he
did not do any research on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to
rely on his source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the
South Harbor.
In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel.
In a Decision dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tulfo‘s articles are qualified privileged communications
RULING: No.The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy; but
even as we strive to protect and respect the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced
with responsibility. There is a fine line between freedom of expression and libel, and it falls on
the courts to determine whether or not that line has been crossed.
The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to
300 | P a g e
commentaries made on public figures and matters of public interest. Even in cases wherein the
freedom of the press was given greater weight over the rights of individuals, the Court, however,
has stressed that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The exercise of this right or any
right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible exercise
of that right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod
over the rights of others.
Tulfo claimed knowledge of people using the names of others for personal gain, and even stated
that he had been the victim of such a practice. He argued then that it may have been someone
else using the name of Atty. So for corrupt practices at the South Harbor, and this person was the
target of his articles. This argument weakens his case further, for even with the knowledge that
he may be in error, even knowing of the possibility that someone else may have used Atty. So's
name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the information given by his source or even
to ascertain the identity of the person he was accusing.
OGIE DIAZ v PEOPLE

(IDENTIFIABLE VICTIM)
FACTS: On October 16, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Manila an Information for libel against Manny Pichel and Ogie
Diaz (Ogie Frias in real life), petitioner. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-
1113377, reads:
That on or about December 28, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being
then the Managing Editor and writer, respectively of Bandera, a newspaper of general
circulation, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with the
malicious purpose of impeaching the integrity, honor and reputation of one FLORINDA
BAGAY, and with the evident intent of exposing her to public interest, hatred, contempt, and
ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously write and publish, or cause to
be written and published in the movie section of said newspaper an article which reads in part as
follows:
Ilang beses na nakaladkad ang pangalan ng isang Miss S sa buhay ni Philip Henson ang lalaking
mahilig makipagsex sa asawa. Nasulat na sa ibang tabloid na limang beses diumanong ginalaw
ni Philip ang babaing kine-claim na "nabuntis ako ni Philip."
Dahil sa pahayag na yon ay nagpaliwanang at nagbigay pa ng detalye si Philip. Nagpa-interbyu

siya sa ilang piling reporters.
At muli, babanggitin lang namin ang kanyang mga pahayag tungkol sa pagkakasangkot niya sa
buhay ni Miss S.
Inamin ni Philip na limang beses niyang ginalaw si Miss S. Pero hindi ko pinasok ang akin sa
ano niya dahil siya rin ang may ayaw.
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Ang sabi niya kasi sa akin, isa siyang malinis na babae at hindi siya basta-basta nagpapaganuon.
So ang ginawa namin, ipit method.
Yung ipitin niya iyong akin sa dalawa niyang hita kunwari sa ano niya nakapasok habang nagpa-
pump ako.
Siya pa nga ang nagturo sa akin ng iba't ibang posisyon, e yung helicopter at saka ang galing
niyang bumlow job. Sanay na sanay siya.
Kahit itanong nyo pa kay Ray Ravelo. Nagalaw din siya ni Rey, pahayag ni Philip at kami
mismo ang nakarining ng mga linyang iyon sa isa naming pag-uusap sa Jaloux Disco.
In which words and phrases, which were used by many people, the said accused meant and
intended to convey as in fact, they meant and conveyed false and malicious imputations that the
said Florinda Bagay is a sexual pervert and possesses lascivious and immoral habits, the accused
well knowing that said imputations are devoid of truth and without foundation in fact
whatsoever, highly libelous and offensive to the good name, character, and reputation of the said
Florinda Bagay.
Upon being arraigned on June 8, 1993, petitioner Ogie Diaz and his co-accused Pichel, assisted
by counsel, pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial, the case was heard on the merits.
Florinda Bagay, complaining witness, testified that she is a graduate of medical secretarial
course. She tried her luck in the movies under the guidance of her godmother, Mila Parawan, a
writer covering the entertainment industry. Florinda adopted and used "Patricia Santillan" as her
screen name.
During her brief stint in the movies, she met Philip Henson, an aspiring bit player. A whirlwind
romance between them followed and on June 16, 1988, they started living together. On March 9,
1991, she gave birth to a girl she named Maria Briana Bagay. By that time, her relationship
with Philip Henson ended.
Florinda claimed she was the "Miss S" alluded to in petitioner's column "Pakurot" considering
that her screen name is "Patricia Santillan."
One Nonette Lim called her attention to the article and she felt embarrassed. Mila Parawan
showed her the item. Her family and neighbors also read it. As a result, she was forced to stop
her studies as a medical technology student at the United Doctors' Medical Center.
Florinda further testified that at the time the article came out, she and Philip were no longer
living together.
Mila Parawan also took the witness stand and corroborated Florinda's testimony. She further
testified that after Philip and Florinda parted ways, her former press relations officer, who used
the nom de plume "Isko Peta," wrote an item entitled "Ibinulgar namin ang babaeng inanakan ni
Philip Henson" which appeared in the December 2, 1991 issue of Artista Magazine. Philip
302 | P a g e
believed that Florinda released their story to the press. He then caused the publication of the
libelous article against her.
Mila Parawan added that Florinda came from a well respected family in their community. Thus,
she could not have done the acts being imputed to her.
On cross-examination, Mila Parawan stated she was certain the "Miss S" referred to in the article
is Florinda because petitioner and Pichel, her good friends, told her that "Miss S" is her "alaga"
(ward).
Pichel testified that he had been a journalist covering show business for the past 21 years. He
denied having met or known the complaining witness. He also denied being the editor of
Bandera. He was only its lay-out artist, a part time job.
Petitioner Ogie Diaz admitted that while he wrote the column "Pakurot" where the alleged
libelous statements appeared, however, he did not know the complaining witness or "Miss S."
The source of his article was Philip Henson.
The defense also presented as witness two movie journalists - Ernie Pecho and Mario Bautista.
Both had more than 50 years covering the entertainment industry.
Pecho testified that he has never heard the screen name "Patricia Santillan"; that reading the
article in question would not give the reader any idea that "Miss S" is "Patricia Santillan"; and
that in the movie world, the letter "S" refers to "shabu," not to a person.
Bautista, for his part, stated that he has never heard of any actress or starlet named "Patricia
Santillan." After reading the article, it never came to his mind that "Miss S" is one "Patricia
Santillan."
Douglas Quijano, a long-time line producer and talent manager, testified that in his many years
of managing movie and TV stars, he could not recall an actress named "Miss S." He has never
heard of "Patricia Santillan."
On May 12, 1998, the trial court rendered its judgment convicting petitioner and Pichel of the
crime charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above discussion and findings, the Court finds both accused
Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel, defined in
Article 353 and penalized under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
DAY as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correcional in its
Minimum and Medium Periods, as maximum and to pay a fine of P3,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, sustained the conviction of petitioner but
acquitted Pichel.
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Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court in its
Resolution dated August 29, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the subject article is libelous.
RULING: No. Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a
vice, or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
This provision should be read in relation with Article 355 of the same Code which states:
ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. - A libel committed by means of
writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to
the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable.[2] Absent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper.
We find the first element present. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words
used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in another sense.[3] In the instant case, the article in
question details the sexual activities of a certain "Miss S" and one "Philip Henson" who had a
romantic liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the character,
integrity, and reputation of "Miss S." The words convey that "Miss S" is a sexual libertine with
unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society such as ours, where modesty is still
highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to"Miss S" by the article in question
had besmirched both her character and reputation.
As to the element of malice, we find that since on its face the article is defamatory, there is a
presumption that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same Code, every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the imputation is
prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the
reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed.[4] We agree with the Court of
Appeals that there was neither good reason nor motive why the subject article was written except
to embarrass "Miss S" and injure her reputation.
304 | P a g e
On the element of publication, there can be no question that the article appeared in the December
28, 1991 issue of Bandera, a local tabloid.
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the
libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable,
although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the
allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and
circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the
latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and
did understand that he was the person referred to.[5] Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and
Lyons[6] laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or
could identify the party vilified in the article.
The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient description or other
indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails to show that "Miss S" and
Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.
Although the article is libelous, we find that Florinda Bagay could not have been the person
defamed therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen,[7] we held that where the requirement for an
identified or identifiable victim has not been complied with, the case for libel must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 22545 is REVERSED. Petitioner Ogie Diaz is ACQUITTED of the crime of
libel. The bail on appeal posted for his temporary liberty is ordered CANCELLED.
FERMIN v PEOPLE
(PENALTY, LIABLE PUBLISHER)
FACTS: Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief of Gossip Tabloid.
The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is improbable for Annabelle
Rama to go to the US should it be true that she is evading her conviction in an estafa case herein
the Philippines for she and husband Eddie have more problems/cases to confront there. This was
said to be due to them, especially Annabelle‘s, using fellow Filipinos‘ money and failure to remit
proceeds to the manufacturing company of the cookware they were selling.
On complaint of spouses, two (2) criminal information for libel were filed against the accused
before the RTC.
The RTC found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel.
Aggrieved, petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA which affirmed the conviction of petitioner,
but acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article.
ISSUE: Whether or not both the publisher and the Editor-in-chief are guilty of libel based on the
libelous article written by Fermin.
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RULING: Yes. In U.S. v. Taylor, which provides that: ―Every author, editor or proprietor of any
book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained
in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of
the same.‖ In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb ―publicar.‖ Thus, it was held that Article
360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published,
but also the person who prints or publishes it.
Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the
offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as ―author, editor,
or proprietor‖ or ―printer/publisher‖ of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case. It
is worthy to note that petitioner was not only the ―publisher,‖ as shown by the editorial box of
Gossip Tabloid but also its ―president‖ and ―chairperson‖ as she herself admitted on the witness
stand. Obviously, petitioner had full control over the publication of articles in the said tabloid.
Her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the libelous article
fails to persuade. Following SC‘s ruling in Ocampo, petitioner‘s criminal guilt should be
affirmed, whether or not she had actual knowledge and participation, having furnished the means
of carrying on the publication of the article purportedly prepared by the members of the Gossip
Reportorial Team, who were employees under her control and supervision.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of Fermin for libel should be upheld. CA
erred in acquitting Tugas, he being the editor-in-chief. But the SC cannot reinstate the ruling of
the trial court convicting Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, SC would run afoul of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
DIONISIO LOPEZ v PEOPLE

(DEFAMATORY LANGUAGE IN LIBEL)
FACTS: On April 3, 2003, petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information dated March 31,
2003, the accusatory portion of which reads in full as follows:
That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to impeach the integrity, reputation and putting to public
ridicule and dishonor the offended party MAYOR SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., City
Mayor of Cadiz City and with malice and intent to injure and expose the said offended party to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule put up billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel,
Villena Street, Cadiz City and at Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards
read as follows:
"CADIZ FOREVER"
"______________ NEVER"
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thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention from the
residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the word "NEVER".
Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname of the herein private complainant
"BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the word "NEVER" thus making the
billboard appear as follows
"CADIZ FOREVER"
"BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to induce the
readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was going on, therefore
maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of Mayor Salvador G. Escalante, Jr.,
and hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to the good name, character and
reputation of the offended party and his office and that the said billboards/signboards were read
by thousands if not hundred[s] of thousands of persons, which caused damage and prejudice to
the offended party by way of moral damages in the amount [of]:
P5,000,000.00 - as moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of Libel
RULING: Indeed, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC that all the elements of the
crime of libel are present in this case. Thus, following the general rule, we are precluded from
making further evaluation of the factual antecedents of the case. However, we cannot lose sight
of the fact that both lower courts have greatly misapprehended the facts in arriving at their
unanimous conclusion. Hence, we are constrained to apply one of the exceptions specifically
paragraph 4 above, instead of the general rule.
Petitioner takes exception to the CA's ruling that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER,
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondent's character,
integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. He avers that there is nothing in said printed
matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on the character, integrity and reputation of
private respondent.
The OSG, in its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, asserts that "there is nothing in
the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" and "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" which ascribe to
private respondent any crime, vice or defect, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which will either dishonor, discredit, or put him into contempt."[11]
The prosecution maintains that the appellate court correctly sustained the trial court's finding of
guilt on petitioner. Citing well-established jurisprudence[12] holding that "[w]ords calculated to
induce suspicion are sometimes more effective
to destroy reputation than false charges directly made" and that "[i]ronical and metaphorical
language is a favored vehicle for slander," it argued that the words printed on the billboards
307 | P a g e
somehow bordered on the incomprehensible and the ludicrous yet they were so deliberately
crafted solely to induce suspicion and cast aspersion against private respondent's honor and
reputation.
A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead."[13] "For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be
defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be
identifiable."[14] Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed phrase must
be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words imputed not
defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is necessarily rendered
immaterial.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the

possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine "whether a statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense."[15] Moreover, "[a] charge is
sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the
person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are
sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to
public ridicule."[16]
Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate court's finding that
the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on
private respondent's character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no
derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its
entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect
on private respondent's integrity. Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by petitioner
was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private
respondent's integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense.
Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service,
it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on
private respondent's performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and
besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.
Indeed, the prosecution witnesses were able to read the message printed in the billboards and
gave a negative impression on what it says. They imply that the message conveys something as
if the private respondent was being rejected as city mayor of Cadiz. But the trustworthiness of
these witnesses is doubtful considering the moral ascendancy exercised over them by the private
308 | P a g e
respondent such that it is quite easy for them to draw such negative impression. As observed by
the OSG, at the time the billboards were erected and during the incumbency of private
respondent as mayor of Cadiz City, these witnesses were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall
or active in the project of the city government. Bernardita was a member of the Clean and Green
Program of Cadiz City; Jude was employed as a licensing officer under the Permit and License
Division of the Cadiz City Hall and Nenita held the position of Utility Worker II of the General
Services Office of Cadiz City. These witnesses, according to the OSG, would naturally testify in
his favor. They could have verbicide the meaning of the word "NEVER." Prudently, at the least,
the prosecution could have presented witnesses within the community with more independent
disposition than these witnesses who are beholden to private respondent.
According to the private respondent, the message in the billboards would like to convey to the
people of Cadiz that he is a tuta of Sagay City.
We disagree. Strangely, the OSG adopted a position contrary to the interest of the People. In its
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, instead of contesting the arguments of the
petitioner, the OSG surprisingly joined stance with him, vehemently praying for his acquittal.
We quote with approval the OSG's analysis of the issue which was the basis for its observation,
thus:
During the proceedings in the trial court, private respondent testified that the subject billboards
maligned his character and portrayed him as a puppet of Sagay City, Thus:
Q: You do not know of course the intention of putting those billboards "BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER"?
A: Definitely, I know the intention because to answer your question, it will not only require those
"BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" billboard[s], it was after which additional billboards were
put up. That strengthen, that I am being a "Tuta of Sagay. I am being maligned because of those
billboards that states and I repeat: "Ang Tubig san Cadiz, ginkuha sang Sagay", "Welcome to
Brgy. Cadiz" and there is a small word under it, Zone 2, very small, very very small, you cannot
see it in [sic] a glance.
xxxx
A: That is the meaning of the signboard[s]. The message that the signboards would like to
convey to the people of Cadiz, that the Mayor of Cadiz City is a "Tuta" or Puppet of Sagay City.
x x x x[17]
Contrary to private respondent's assertion, there is nothing in the subject billboards which state,
either directly or indirectly, that he is, in his words, a "tuta" or "puppet" of Sagay City. Except
for private respondent, not a single prosecution witness testified that the billboards portray
Mayor Bading Escalante, Jr. as a "tuta or "puppet" of Sagay City. The billboards erected by
petitioner simply say "CADIZ FOREVER", "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"[18]
309 | P a g e
Apparently, private respondent refers to the circumstances mentioned in another billboard that is
not the subject matter in the present charge. The aforesaid facts dismally failed to support the
allegations in the instant information. Be that as it may, private respondent nevertheless did not
specify any actionable wrong or particular act or omission on petitioner's part that could have
defamed him or caused his alleged injury. While it may be that the Court is not bound by the
analysis and observation of the OSG, still, the Court finds that it deserves meritorious
consideration. The prosecution never indulged to give any reason persuasive enough for the court
not to adopt it.
Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was not pleased with the controversial printed
matter. But that is grossly insufficient to make it actionable by itself. "[P]ersonal hurt or
embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation,"[19]
"words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words
of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do
not constitute bases for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special
damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by
itself," as the Court ruled in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da' Wah Council of the Phils.,
Inc.[20]
In arriving at an analogous finding of guilt on petitioner, both lower courts heavily relied on the
testimony of the petitioner pertaining to the reasons behind the printing of the phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER."[21] Our in-depth scrutiny of his testimony,
however, reveals that the reasons elicited by the prosecution mainly relate to the discharge of
private respondent's official duties as City Mayor of Cadiz City. For that matter, granting that
the controversial phrase is considered defamatory, still, no liability attaches on petitioner.
Pursuant to Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a
public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of
the allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not
prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. As the Court
held in United States v. Bustos,[22] the policy of a public official may be attacked, rightly or
wrongly with every argument which ability can find or ingenuity invent. The public officer
"may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged by the balm of
a clear conscience. A public [official] must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments
upon his official acts."
"In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the
offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of
guilt."[23] In this case, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate
court, the prosecution failed to prove that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER,
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" imputes derogatory remarks on private respondent's
character, reputation and integrity. In this light, any discussion on the issue of malice is rendered
moot.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28175 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
310 | P a g e
JEFFREY TOREDA v PEOPLE

(GRAVE SLANDER VS LIBEL)
FACTS: Jeffrey O. Torreda was employed by Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. as a
finance assistant[4] (on a probationary basis) on July 1, 1997. He was mainly responsible for
payroll processing and management, and for the bookkeeping of T&P
Properties, Inc.[5] Effective January 1, 1998, he was employed on a regular basis as finance
accountant[6] under the Finance and Accounting Department headed by Kazuo Kobayashi, Vice-
President, and Teresita Sepulveda,... Finance Manager.
On May 22, 1998, Torreda and his four co-employees in the Finance and Accounting
Department reported to Senior Vice-President Hisao Tanaka that, before and after the
reorganization, Finance Manager Teresita Sepulveda had ordered them to prepare petty cash
vouchers in their names... and that the sums covered by the vouchers were received by Sepulveda
for her own personal use.[
Sepulveda opened Torreda's personal computer and read his Lotus Notes mail and other
personal files, specifically the report he had sent to Tanaka about her. She reprimanded Torreda
and told him that he should not send mails to Tanaka without her... approval
In order to retrieve the claimants' payrolls and Social Security Services (SSS) files, which
Torreda kept in his drawer, Sepulveda, with prior approval from Kobayashi, had the drawer
forcibly opened by Ruben delos Santos, a staff member of the General
Administration Section. The drawer was opened in the presence of Oscar Eusebio, Noralyn
Florencio and Flor Berdin of the Finance Department. The claims of the employees were later
processed and released.
In a separate development, the HRD issued a "written warning" on September 10, 1998 to
Torreda, in reference to his tardiness from April to July 1998 (the matter Sepulveda had earlier
complained of).[25]
The next day, September 11, 1998, Sepulveda and Kobayashi directed Torreda to explain, in
writing, within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
Insubordination
Sepulveda approved Torreda's paternity leave from September 12 to September 21, 1998.[30]
Torreda received the directive of Sepulveda and Kobayashi on September 13, 1998, but failed to
submit his written explanation on the charges against... him.
Torreda filed a complaint[39] for illegal dismissal against Cristobal and Toshiba.
the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,[40] declaring that Torreda's dismissal from employment
was unjustified.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in ruling that petitioner committed grave
slander against Sepulveda and in applying the Employee's Handbook as basis... for his dismissal
RULING: The rule in labor cases is that the burden is on the employer to prove that the
dismissal of an employee is for a just or valid cause. Evidence must be clear, convincing and
free from any inference that the prerogative to dismiss an employee was abused and unjustly
used by... the employer to further any vindictive end.[74] In this case, respondent Toshiba
adequately proved that petitioner was dismissed for just cause.
The NLRC did not err much less commit grave abuse of its discretion when it based its ruling on
Article 282(a) of the Labor Code on its finding that petitioner committed serious misconduct for
falsely accusing his immediate superior of robbery.
As the Court held in
Villanueva v. People:
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral
defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business... or
means of livelihood.
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral
defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations
of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the case.
Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the
other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,...
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to
prove the intention of the offender at the time.
The false attribution by the petitioner of robbery (theft) against Sepulveda was made in writing;
patently then, petitioner committed libel, not grave slander against Sepulveda.
The malicious and public imputation in writing by one of a crime on another is... libel under
Article 353, in relation to Article 355, of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a... natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
There is abundant evidence on record showing that petitioner committed libel against his
immediate superior, Sepulveda, an act constituting serious misconduct which warrants the
312 | P a g e
dismissal from employment.
BELEN v PEOPLE
(PUBLICATION, PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION)
FACTS: On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former Judge, filed
a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City, which was assigned to then Assistant City Prosecutor
Ma. Victoria Sufiega-Lagman for preliminary investigation. With the submission of the parties
and their respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was submitted for resolution. In order to afford
himself the opportunity to fully present his cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing.
Without acting on the request, Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a Resolution dated
July 28, 2004. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion
(for Reconsideration & Disqualify), the contents of which later became the subject of this libel
case.
Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the Office of the Secretary of
Justice, Manila. The copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a sealed envelope and addressed
to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City was received by its Receiving Section on
August 27, 2004. As a matter of procedure, motions filed with the said office are first received
and recorded at the receiving section, then forwarded to the records section before referral to the
City Prosecutor for assignment to the handling Investigating Prosecutor.
ACP Suñega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the Omnibus Motion from Michael Belen,
the son of Nezer who is the respondent in the estafa complaint. She was also informed about the
motion by Joey Flores, one of the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City. She then asked the
receiving section for a copy of the said motion, and requested a photocopy of it for her own
reference.
On September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal complaint for
libel on the basis of the allegations in the Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify).
The complaint was docketed as LS. No. 04-931 before the OCP of San Pablo City. Since ACP
Suñega-Lagman was then a member of its office, the OCP of San Pablo City voluntarily
inhibited itself from conducting the preliminary investigation of the libel complaint and
forwarded all its records to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
On September 23, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor issued an Order designating State
Prosecutor II Jorge D. Baculi as Acting City Prosecutor of San Pablo City in the investigation of
the libel complaint.
On December 6, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution finding probable cause to
file a libel case against petitioner. On December 8, 2004, he filed an Information charging
petitioner with the crime of libel.
Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to make a plea; hence, the trial court entered a plea of
313 | P a g e
"NOT GUILTY." Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses,
namely: (1) complainant ACP Suñega-Lagman, (2) Michael Belen, the son and representative of
respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint; and (3) Joey R. Flores and Gayne Garno Enseo, who
are part of the administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City. For its part, the defense
presented the accused petitioner as its sole witness.
After trial, the trial court found petitioner guilty of libel. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
court's decision. On the claimed lack of publication, the CA pointed out that the defamatory
matter was made known to third persons because prosecution witnesses Flores and Enseo, who
are the staff in the OCP of San Pablo City, were able to read the Omnibus Motion filed by
petitioner, as well as Michael, son and representative of Nezer in the estafa case then being
investigated by ACP Suñega-Lagman, was furnished copy of the motion. Anent the applicability
of the rule on absolutely privileged communication, the CA ruled in the negative because the
subject statements were unnecessary or irrelevant in determining whether the dismissal of the
estafa case filed by petitioner against Nezer was proper, and they were defamatory remarks on
the personality, reputation and mental fitness of ACP Suñega-Lagman.
In a Resolution dated January 10, 2014, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the element of publication is absent and that petitioner cannot be found
is guilty of libel.
RULING: No. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been
written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication
of the defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it may
wound his self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the
estimation in which other hold him. In the same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed
envelope addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its
possession in such a way that it can be read by person other than the offended party. If a sender
of a libelous communication knows or has good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted
before reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The publication of a libel,
however, should not be presumed from the fact that the immediate control thereof is parted with
unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that it is hereby exposed to be read or seen
by third persons.
In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to third persons, but only
complied with the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done, petitioner
conceded that the defamatory statements in it were made known to someone other than the
person to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that the motion was contained in sealed
envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect that persons other than the one defamed would be able
to read the defamatory statements in it, precisely because they were filed with the OCP of San
Pablo City and copy furnished to Nezer, the respondent in the estafa complaint, and the Office of
the Secretary of Justice in Manila. Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion
is not a mere private communication, but forms part of public record when filed with the
government office. Inasmuch as one is disputably presumed to intend the natural and probable
314 | P a g e
consequence of his act, petitioner cannot brush aside the logical outcome of the filing and service
of his Omnibus Motion.
It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of publication of defamatory matters is not
satisfied by a communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed person. In this case,
however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of the Omnibus Motion was
furnished to and read by Michael, the son and representative of respondent Nezer in the estafa
complaint, who is clearly not an agent of the defamed person, ACP Suñega-Lagman. Petitioner
then argues that there is no publication as to Flores and Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San Pablo
City, who had read the contents of the Omnibus Motion. In support thereof, he cites the settled
rule that "when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a
communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with
respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to
publication."15 Petitioner's argument is untenable. As mere members of the administrative staff
of the OCP of San Pablo City, Flores and Enseo cannot be said to have a duty to perform with
respect to the subject matter of his motion, which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of
his Estafa complaint and to disqualify ACP Suñega-Lagman from the preliminary investigation
of the case. Their legal duty pertains only to the clerical procedure of transmitting the motions
filed with the OCP of San Pablo City to the proper recipients.
G.R. No. 160351 April 10, 2006
NOEL VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and YOLANDA

CASTRO, Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
ORAL AND SLANDER BY DEED
FACTS: Petitioner Noel Villanueva was then a member of the Municipal Council while private
complainant Yolanda C. Castro was then Municipal Vice Mayor.
Noel L. Villanueva, while in the process of hurling verbal insults at the complainant, then and
there unlawfully, feloniously and contemptuously gave the complainant what is commonly
known as "dirty finger" by poking his hand at complainant's face... two utility men came to
complainant's office, bringing with them the application for monetized leave of Sangguniang
Bayan member Noel Villanueva, petitioner in this case.
The application for monetized leave was not immediately attended to by complainant as she was
then busy dictating some important matters to her secretary.
The accused at that time was standing in front of the Vice Mayor's Office and he allegedly said:
"E ano kung wala sa mood, e ano kung galit sya."
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These utterances of accused were disregarded by complainant but accused then entered the
complainant's office bringing with him his Application for Monetized Leave.
The alleged request of accused to the Secretary was made in a very sarcastic manner.
Complainant got the monetized leave and filed it in her "in and out" files and while doing this,
the paper accidentally fell on the floor.
When she was about to pick it up, the accused allegedly got a yellow pad and swung it at
complainant's face, but she was able to evade it.
Then the accused went out of the office and before leaving, he pointed a "dirty finger" at
complainant, prompting the latter to stand and get an empty bottle of coke to shield her face.
Prosecution evidence further showed that accused allegedly mouthed the following disparaging
remarks: ―You are pretending to be clean and honest... yet you are not clean and honest, you are
corrupt. You are like red apple, you are worm infested inside and extremely dirty‖.
ISSUES:
1. WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION

OF PETITIONER FOR GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 139-94.
2. WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER FOR SERIOUS SLANDER BY DEED IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 140-94.
HELD: Anent the first issue, Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 358. Slander. – Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise,
the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral
defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or
means of livelihood.
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral
defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations
of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the case. Indeed, it
is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other,
depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning
judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the
intention of the offender at the time.
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In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and position of the offended party are
also taken into account and thus, it was held that the slander was grave, because the offended
party had held previously the Office of Congressman, Governor, and Senator and was then a
candidate for Vice-President, for which no amount of sophistry would take the statement out of
the compass of grave oral defamation. However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party
constitutes only a light felony.
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of Councilor at
that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against the use of intemperate language
particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor. However, we cannot keep a blind eye
to the fact that such scathing words were uttered by him in the heat of anger triggered by the fact,
as found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve
the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner. In a manner of speaking, she sowed the
wind that reaped the storm.
In the words of the Court of Appeals: The already existing animosity between them does not vest
in the complainant the prerogative to deny petitioner a right to which he was legally entitled.
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. They are designed to permit the
court to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by
public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender. It cannot be invoked as a matter of
right.
The above findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. Considering this
finding, the Court of Appeals not only should have struck out the award of exemplary damages
but should have modified as well the offense committed to be of simple nature punishable by
arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding P200.00 under the above-quoted Art. 358 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In Pader v. People, complainant was conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his
house at Morong, Bataan, when petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted ―putang ina mo Atty.
Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!‖ The latter was dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that time,
Atty. Escolango was a candidate for Vice Mayor of Morong, Bataan in the elections of 8 May
1995. We held that the offense committed was only slight slander. We explained why in this
wise:
The issue is whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation. In resolving the
issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under
one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted
ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to
prove the intention of the offender at the time.
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Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual backdrop
of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The trial court, in arriving at its decision,
considered that the defamation was deliberately done to destroy Atty. Escolango‘s reputation
since the parties were political opponents.
We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were also
neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact
that petitioner‘s anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioner‘s father died.
In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.
In Reyes v. People [137 Phil. 112, 120 (1969)], we ruled that the expression ―putang ina mo‖ is a
common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one‘s
expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident
involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words
expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not
necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional gestures and
words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.
In similar fashion, the trial court erred in awarding moral damages without proof of suffering.
Accordingly, petitioner may be convicted only of slight oral defamation defined and penalized
under Article 358, Revised Penal Code, prescribing the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.
Similarly, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals, petitioner and complainant, a Municipal Judge, were next
door neighbors. Animosity grew between their two families because of some disputes. Petitioner
resented the practice of complainant of throwing garbage and animal excrement into her
premises. There was also a boundary dispute between petitioner's mother and complainant,
which was the subject of a civil suit for "Recovery of Possession, Ownership, Enforcement of
Legal Easement and Abatement of Nuisance" filed by the mother before the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo against complainant. Additionally, petitioner's mother had previously instituted
an administrative complaint against the complainant before the Supreme Court, but the same was
dismissed. There was a pent-up feeling of being aggrieved, resentment, anger, and vexation on
petitioner's part, culminating in her outburst against complainants. For having called the
complainant judge "land grabber," "shameless" and "hypocrite," petitioner was charged and
subsequently convicted by the Court of First Instance of three separate offenses of Grave Oral
Defamation committed on 5, 6 and 8 August 1976. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
verdicts of conviction. On review, however, we held that although the abusive remarks may
ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the environmental circumstances of the
case, there having been provocation on complainant's part, and the utterances complained of
having been made in the heat of unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for
the crime of Slight Oral Defamation. Petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 in each of
the criminal cases, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Guided by the foregoing precedents, we find petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation
because of the attendant circumstances in the case at bar.
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Lest we be misconstrued, the Court does not condone the vilification or use of scurrilous
language on the part of petitioner, but following the rule that all possible circumstances favorable
to the accused must be taken in his favor, it is our considered view that the slander committed by
petitioner can be characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory
words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party, constitutes
only a light felony.
In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of leave without valid justification, but as an

offshoot of a political dissension may have been vexing for petitioner and may have been
perceived by him as provocation that triggered him to blow his top and utter those disparaging
words. In hindsight, to be denied monetization of leave credits must have stirred upon the
petitioner a feeling akin to begging for money that he was legally entitled to. This oppressive
conduct on the part of complainant must have scarred petitioner‘s self-esteem, too, to appear as
begging for money. But again, this is not an excuse to resort to intemperate language no matter
how such embarrassment must have wreaked havoc on his ego.
G.R. No. 212623
ENRIQUE G. DE LEON, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPO3

PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
GRAVE VS. SLIGHT SLANDER
FACTS: De Leon and his son, John Christopher De Leon (John), filed a complaint for Grave
Misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo before the People‘s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). At the
first hearing, while waiting outside the PLEB office on the 5th floor of the Manila City Hall,
SPO3 Leonardo noticed De Leon and several of his companions approaching. Before entering
the PLEB office, De Leon uttered these words to SPO3 Leonardo, "Walanghiya kang
mangongotong na pulis ka, ang yabang yabang mo noon. Patay ka sa akin ngayon." The words
uttered by De Leon caused SPO3 Leonardo embarrassment because there were several persons
present at the PLEB premises. He could have arrested De Leon but he did not want to make a
scene. Afterwards, De Leon‘s wife, Concepcion, emerged from the said office and apologized to
Leonardo for her husband‘s actuations.
The trial court found De Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Oral Defamation. This
decision was affirmed by the RTC and the CA.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT IS CORRECT IN FINDING THE DE

LEON GUILTY OF GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION INSTEAD OF SLIGHT ORAL
DEFAMATION. NO
HELD: The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a
vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally;
(3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;
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(6) which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral
defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting
nature.
Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the
sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the
case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended party.38 "The gravity depends
upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party;
and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the
time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some
provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony."
Considering the factual backdrop of this case, the Court is convinced that the crime committed
by De Leon was only slight oral defamation for the following reasons:
First, as to the relationship of the parties, they were obviously acquainted with each other as they
were former jogging buddies. Prior to the purported gun-pointing incident, there was no reason
for De Leon to harbor ill feelings towards SPO3 Leonardo.
Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during the first hearing on the
administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing incident. The gap between the gun-
pointing incident and the first hearing was relatively short, a span of time within which the
wounded feelings could not have been healed. The utterance made by De Leon was but a mere
product of emotional outburst, kept inside his system and unleashed during their encounter.
Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent to strike deep into the
character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between the parties should have been considered.
It was because of the purported gun-pointing incident that De Leon hurled those words. There
was no intention to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo because De Leon‘s utterance could
simply be construed as his expression of dismay towards his actions as his friend and member of
the community.
Finally, the Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police officer by profession, his
complaint against De Leon for oral defamation must still prosper. It has been held that a public
officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticism. The doctrine,
nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory statement was uttered in connection with the
public officer‘s duty.
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QUASI-OFFENSES (ARTICLE 365)

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (SIMPLE AND RECKLESS)
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the MeTC, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce‘s husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce‘s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
ISSUES:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL OF RECKLESS

IMPRUDENCE BARS SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME QUASI-
OFFENSE. YES
(2) WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 48 APPLIES TO ACTS PENALIZED UNDER
ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. NO
HELD:
(1) In the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking
thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For
the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
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careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.
(2) Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is

conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two
or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another.
By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and
severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and
diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the
judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence
alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and
only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
FACTS: On the first day of his term as councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla made a false
narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). That in answer to the question of whether there is a
pending criminal case against him, Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer
despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority. On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to
the "no" answer vis-à-vis the question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, he
averred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza
(Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house. He was
informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit the same. He then
instructed Mendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the
personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims
that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to
notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza
checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
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The Sandiganbayan found Sevilla guilty of Falsification of Public Documents Through Reckless
Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE DESIGNATION OF THE FELONY BY THE

SANDIGANBAYAN IS ACCURATE. NO
(2) WHETHER OR NOT SEVILLA CAN BE CONVICTED OF THE FELONY OF
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT THROUGH RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM
IN THE INFORMATION WAS FOR THE INTENTIONAL FELONY OF
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT UNDER ARTICLE 171(4) OF THE
RPC. YES
HELD:
(1) It bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan‘s designation of the felony supposedly
committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless
imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification
of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as
"falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The foregoing
designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality
of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate
crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
Thus, the proper designation ofthe felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documents through
reckless imprudence.
(2) While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct crime in itself, designated
as a quasi offense, in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the
former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a wilful
offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
Thus, Sevilla‘s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information
only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To
stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense
that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the
latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only
charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.
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G.R. No. 187246 July 20, 2011
EDWIN TABAO y PEREZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
(RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE)
FACTS: Petitioner was driving his Toyota Corolla along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon
Street towards Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle
Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown into the
middle of the road on her back. Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez‘ speeding blue Toyota Corona car
ran over Rochelle‘s body. Bystanders — armed with stones and wooden clubs — followed
Mendez‘ car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. Francisco Cielo, a newspaper delivery
boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went inside Mendez‘ car, sat beside
him, got his driver‘s license, and ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his
order, but his car hit the center island twice while backing up. Cielo went out of the car and
approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought Rochelle‘s body inside
Mendez‘ car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST
Hospital,where she died 1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries. The RTC, in its
decision dated September 15, 2003, found that it was "very clear that both accused are
responsible for the death of Rochelle Lanete," and convicted the two (2) accused of the crime
charged
It found that the petitioner‘s car first hit the victim, causing her to be thrown into the road on her
back, and that Mendez‘ car ran over her as she was lying down. It held that the two failed to
observe the necessary precaution and due care in operating their respective vehicles, to wit: the
petitioner was not attentive to his driving such that he failed to see the island divider and bumped
Rochelle; Mendez was driving his car too fast at nighttime such that he was unable to avoid
running over her as her body lay prone on the street. CA affirmed the decision with modification
as to the penalty. Hence, this petition.
HELD: Yes. As a general rule, findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court; we will not normally disturb these factual
findings unless they are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment
itself is based on a misapprehension of fact. After a careful review of the records, we see no
reason to overturn the lower courts‘ factual findings that found the petitioner guilty of the crime
charged.
Reckless imprudence, generally defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Imprudence connotes a
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deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the necessary precaution
once the danger or peril becomes foreseen. Thus, in order for conviction to be decreed for
reckless imprudence, the material damage suffered by the victim, the failure in precaution on the
part of the accused, and the direct link between material damage and failure in precaution must
be established beyond reasonable doubt. We are morally convinced that all three were
established in this case in accordance with the required level of evidence in criminal cases.
The positive identification in this case, coupled with the failure of the defense to impute any ill-
motive on the eyewitness, to our mind, works to dispel reasonable doubt on the fact that the
petitioner‘s car had in fact hit Rochelle. The eyewitness account provides the necessary link
between the petitioner‘s failure to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle and Rochelle
Lanete‘s death.
To our mind, the fact that the petitioner‘s entire vehicle ended up ramped on the island divider
strongly indicates what actually happened in the unfortunate incident. The vehicle could not have
ended up in that condition had the petitioner been driving at a reasonable speed. We are not
persuaded by the petitioner‘s rather simplistic account that mere darkness, coupled with the
traffic island‘s alleged newness, caused his car to veer off the traffic trajectory of Governor
Forbes Street and to end up jumping on top of the traffic island intended to channel vehicular
traffic going to the Nagtahan Flyover.
A motorist is expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with all the conditions encountered. to enable him to keep the vehicle under
control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using
the highway. It has not escaped our notice that the intersection of Governor Forbes Street and G.
Tuazon Street is adjacent to the vicinity of the incident. A driver approaching an intersection is
generally under duty, among others, to keep and maintain his vehicle under control so he can, if
needed, stop at the shortest possible notice. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a
motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when
driving elsewhere in a street or highway.
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OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012 (RA 10175)
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA,

JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
ABAD, J.:
(CYBERCRIME, DOUBLE JEOPARDY)

FACTS: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The cybercrime law
aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and
ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet.. But all is not well with the system since
it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace
technology for mischiefs and crimes. And because linking with the internet opens up a user to
communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by
hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him
through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in
sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this
reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and
punish wrongdoings.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that
regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that
would enable the government to track down and penalize violators. One of the provisions is:
1. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
particularly on the issue of double jeopardy.
ISSUES: Whether or not the provision is constitutional.
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HELD: No. Unconstitutional as to online libel and online child pornography. When two
different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other
although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which
is not an essential element of the other. With the exception of the crimes of online libel and
online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination of the correct
application of Section 7 to actual cases.
There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again
posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels.
The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a
violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact
one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is
not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under
both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the
ACPA‘s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed,
ACPA‘s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of ―electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.‖ Thus, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.
327 | P a g e

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Blue Font Criminal Law Cases Syllabus of Atty Atienza

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CRIMINAL LAW CASES (ATTY.

CRIMINAL LAW CASES

ORAZA, RON - People v. Felipe Mirandilla to Ariel Lim v. People

MIPANGA, IYAH - Anthony De Silva Cruz v. People to Medelarnaldo

MAGUDDATU, JOHN PAUL - Noel Villanueva v. People to Jason

NOMBRE, NOREEN - Venancio Sevilla v. People to Disini v. DOJ

ARTICLE 1-20 – GENERAL PRINCIPLES

WHAT IS CRIMINAL LAW; PENAL LAW; CRIME; FELONY; OFFENSE?

INMATES OF NEW BILIBID PRISON VS. DOJ SECRETARY

A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:

A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.

THEORIES IN CRIMINAL LAW

ARNOLD JAMES YSIDORO VS. PEOPLE

ISSUE: WON good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.

JESTER MABUNOT VS. PEOPLE

SUPPLETORY APPLICATION OF RPC PROVISIONS (ARTICLE 10) TO SPL

EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE

ISSUE: WON conspiracy is applicable in violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

GOVERNING LAW (RPC, PD, EO, SPL, CA [ARTICLE 10])

PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND CEFERINO S. PAREDES

ISSUE: WON the crime charged already prescribed.

2. NULLA CRIMEN NULLA POENAL SINE LEGE

3. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL LAW

a. IN DUBIO PRO REO AND RULE OF LENITY

DUTY OF THE COURT (ARTICLE 5)

1. WHENEVER ACT IS NOT PENALIZED

LITO CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE

IRENEO CAHULUGAN VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: Private complainant Tan, a businessman engaged in transporting Coca-Cola products,

ISSUE: What is the duty of the court in case of excessive penalty?

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTIONS

1. GENERALITY (ARTICLE 14, NCC)

JEFFREY LIANG VS. PEOPLE

ISSUE: WON petitioner is covered by immunity under the Agreement.

ISSUE: WON Scalzo was entitled to immunity.

NOLLORA JR. VS. PEOPLE

ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

ISSUE: WON petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

2. TERRITORIALITY (ARTICLE 2, RPC)

DEL SOCORRO VS. VAN WILSEM

3. PROSPECTIVITY (ARTICLE 22, RPC)

AMENDMENT, REPEAL AND DECRIMINALIZATION OF AN ACT

INMATES OF NEW BILIBID PRISON VS. DOJ SECRETARY

A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:

A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.

1. INTENTIONAL AND CULPABLE; ELEMENTS

a. INTELLIGENCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION (VOLUNTARINESS)

b. INTENT AND NEGLIGENCE

MIRANDA VS. PEOPLE

c. INTENT AND MOTIVE (VARIANCE IN FELONY)

d. INTELLIGENCE AND DISCERNMENT

2. GRAVITY (ARTICLE 9, 25-26)

3. STAGES OF EXECUTION (SUBJECTIVE PHASE AND OBJECTIVE PHASE)

PEOPLE VS. LAMAHANG

ISSUE: WON Lamahang should be convicted of attempted robbery.

CRUZ VS. PEOPLE

4. FORMAL, MATERIAL, AND CRIMES WITHOUT FRUSTRATED STAGE

PEOPLE VS. BEJIM

ISSUE: What were the crimes committed by Bejim?

RULING: Appellant Noel Bejim y Romero is found GUILTY of:

2. Statutory Rape in Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6768 and 07-CR-6771

PEOPLE VS. ORITA

ISSUE: WON the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape.

VALENZUELA VS. PEOPLE