To be admissible, an admission must

(a) involve matters of fact, and not of law;

(b) be categorical and definite;

(c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and

(d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.

 The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against
them. The reason for this rule is that:
                 “On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only
be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him” (HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO
AWINGAN, et al. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, Third Division, Corona, J.).
                An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
                “Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration” (emphasis  supplied).
                This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the
conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order
that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it
is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b)
the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-
conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against
them and to cross-examine them.
               In Harold Tamargo vs. Romulo Awingan, et. al., aside from the extrajudicial
confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them
(HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, et al. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, Third
Division, Corona, J.).