Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 357e365

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Management of life extension for topsides process system of offshore

platforms in Chinese Bohai Bay
Huaizeng Liu a, b, Xuan Shi b, Xu Chen c, Yangyang Liu c, *
a
China University of Geosciences, Wuhan, China
b
CNOOC Energy Technology & Services Limited Safety & Environmental Protection Branch, China
c
School of Chemical Engineering and Technology, Tianjin University, China

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Technological advances in exploration and production mean that production platforms in Chinese Bohai
Received 1 July 2014 Bay have many developments that are now operating beyond their original design life. As equipment
Received in revised form ages, there are increasing challenges to maintain its integrity. Issues related to LE management of
10 November 2014
offshore facilities in government regulations, industrial associations and international oil companies
Accepted 2 December 2014
Available online 3 December 2014
were investigated. The results showed that emphasizing the requirements of labor union and industrial
associations was a great feature in Norway, which was practical in Chinese Bohai Bay. Therefore, with the
combination of the LE management system in Norway with the current situation in Chinese Bohai Bay, LE
Keywords:
Offshore platform
management model which integrates RBI, RCM, FMECA, and SIL risk assessment methods together was
Life extension designed in order to improve understanding and ensure that LE issues were addressed across all aspects
Ageing of asset management during the entire LE period. Finally, an example of three production offshore
Topsides process system platforms on a gas field in the Bohai Bay was used to go through the LE management process and address
Risk assessment the issues in each phase. The suggestions for improving LE management and technologies were given.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Offshore ageing platforms in China are mainly distributed in the
Bohai Bay and South China Sea. The first offshore platform,
ChengBei, which is still in production, reached its original design
life in 2005. In the South China Sea, the WeiZhou10-3 platform
came into LE stage at first in 2008.
The age profile for fixed platforms in the Bohai Bay is shown in
Fig. 1. This indicates that almost 40, approximately 43.8% of the total
population, will be beyond their original design life by 2021. It is
evident that this proportion is steadily increasing with time,
particularly as the rates of decommissioning and new installations
are relatively low.
The successful implementation of an LE management plan for
offshore installations depends on the understanding of the degra-
dation process, the availability of an appropriate level of data on the
actual condition of the equipment, reliable assessment methods
and an implementation strategy to deal with the increasing risk of
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: liuyangyangag@gmail.com (Y. Liu).

failure with time (Kancev and Cepin, 2011; Kancev et al., 2011; Gran
et al., 2012).
This paper is aimed at investigating a kind of LE management for
offshore production platforms to demonstrate that there is suffi-
cient technical, operational and organizational integrity to continue
safe operation beyond the LE period.
This paper first explains the LE background in the Bohai Bay and
the principles of establishing an LE management system. The next
section describes the development of LE management in the North
Sea. The third section designs an LE management model for top-
sides process systems. Section four illustrates and discusses an
application case of LE management model. Conclusions are re-
ported in section five.
2. LE management development in the North Sea
Many offshore installations in the North Sea are now reaching or
have exceeded their original anticipated design life of typically
around 25 years in Fig. 2. LE is a necessary phase in the life cycle of
many offshore installations on both the UKCS and NCS.
Over 127 platforms, 50% of the total population of fixed plat-
forms on the UKCS, exceeded the original design life in 2003 (Stacey

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.12.002
0950-4230/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
358 H. Liu et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 357e365

3. LE management model

This section gives an overview of the LE process outlined in the

project in Fig. 3. The main question was how to perform the process
for deciding on LE, without compromising safety. The main tasks of
the LE process were described, including data & information
collection, system breakdown and screening, identification of
challenges, analyses, risk reducing measures, and KPIs.

3.1. Data & information collection

The continued integrity of process system is largely dependent

on the manner in which the facility was designed, constructed,
commissioned, operated and maintained over its lifetime. A lack of
reliable data could potentially affect LE assessment and decision
making. Thus, it is urgent to introduce a requirement for enhanced
Fig. 1. Number of Life extension offshore platforms and proportion of growth trend
chart.
monitoring to assess and assure asset integrity in the extended life
period. Critical LE data of process system at different stages are
listed in Table 1.
A key component of effective integrity management is the
maintenance of complete and accurate records throughout all
stages of the life cycle in Fig. 4. The availability and quality of data
on historical and current asset condition support effective LE
management.

3.2. System breakdown

Typical combinations or packaged equipment located on

offshore installations are process and export gas compression,
crude oil handling and main oil export, water injection, natural gas
liquids, chemical injection, fire water and utilities (HSE, 2003).
The topsides process equipment can be divided into three cat-
egories which are static mechanical equipment, machinery and
Fig. 2. Age of offshore installations in the UK and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea rotating equipment, and EC&I. The assessment methods of the
(Ersdal, 2005). three kinds of equipment are different.
Resources should concentrate on equipment or components
that have an impact on safety. Thus, breakdown and screening of
et al., 2008). It is necessary to consider the issue of LE beyond the
functions/equipment should be carried out to determine which has
design life in the thorough review process and make provision for
to be analyzed in detail in Fig. 5.
assessment of ageing (HSE, 2005).
Through HSE's Key Program 3, targeted asset, and asset integrity
of ageing installations were addressed (HSE, 2009). The Key Pro-
gram 4 focused on the industrial management of ageing and LE. It
was launched in July, 2010, and would run until the end of 2013.
Favorable comments on the industrial response to KP4 and the
efforts made to maintain or improve ageing and LE management
across the asset base were summarized (HSE, 2012).
In Norway, there was a requirement that an operator shall
get permission from PSA and NPD to continue to operate equip-
ment that is beyond the original design life (OLF, 2008). The Nor-
wegian regulations on offshore ageing installations were
underpinned by relevant NORSOK standards and SINTEF reports
(Hokstad et al., 2010).
The main difference of topsides equipment on production
platforms between North Sea and Bohai Bay is ESP. ESPs are
necessary to exploit thickened oil restored in Bohai Bay, while light
oil restored in North Sea is exploited by gas lifting. The Risk
assessment model for topsides equipment in Bohai Bay and North
Sea may be different, but LE management strategies are the same.
In addition, Bohai Bay is icy unlike North Sea. Ice can increase vi-
bration of topsides process equipment, which will speed equip-
ment ageing and increase LE difficulty.

Fig. 3. Framework of LE management of topsides process system.

 H. Liu et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 357e365 359

Table 1 3.3. Analysis of failures and challenges

Life extension critical information of the process system at different stages.

Design & installation Operation Life extension period Failures and challenges analysis involves applying RBI technique
1 Material(s), protection, 14 Information about 21 Information about
to static mechanical equipment, RCM technique to rotating and
insulation maintenance and planned maintenance machinery equipment, and SIL technology to instrumented pro-
2 Process definition and modification and modification tection systems. As for the obsolescence and organizational chal-
design criteria 15 Process/operation 22 Process/operation lenges, gap analysis was used to identify challenges.
3 Equipment parameters parameters
specifications 16 Info. from condi- 23 Changes in classification
4 Design codes and tion monitoring due to change in oper- 3.3.1. Introduction of risk assessment methods
standards 17 Info. from inspec- ation parameter
RBI analysis is primarily intended to be used for the planning of
5 Design drawings tion/testing 24 Length of life extension
6 Design life calculations 18 Info. from similar period in-service inspection for offshore topsides static mechanical pres-
7 Operation and process operation sure systems when failures by loss of containment of the pressure
info. 19 New standards and envelope (DNV, 2010) are considered.
8 Installation load recommended
RCM is closely related to, and takes its form from FMECA. It is an
9 Installation accidents practice
10 As-installed/built 20 New tools/design
approach which places emphasis on analyzing the system func-
documentation methods/experi- tions, function failures, and prevention of these failures. RCM
11 Technical and engi- ence since design techniques can be used to create a cost-effective maintenance
neering queries and blueprint to identify risk criteria, the symptoms of system func-
variations
tions, and address the main causes of systems failure and equip-
12 Close-out and certifi-
cation packs ment failure.
13 Design records Adequate SIL levels could be established for the different
required for final instrumented protection systems, and right lever of layers of pro-
decommissioning
tection would be identified. This was carried out in accordance with
planning
Industry Practice IEC61508/511. Alternative codes could also be

Fig. 4. Total life cycle management of equipment.

360 H. Liu et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 357e365
Fig. 5. System breakdown structure (Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
agreed. Then the SIL validation was followed up (Grossel, 2005;
Langeron et al., 2008).
3.3.2. Obsolescence and organizational challenges
With respect to obsolescence, it is necessary to identify chal-
lenges related to requirements and regulations, new and advanced
technology (IAEA, 2009), outdated technology (Hollins, 2009; HSE,
2012), spare parts, new operational conditions and anticipated
needs during the LE period, overall layout and space challenges on
the facility (Hokstad et al., 2010).
Another main question is whether sufficient human resources
are available to operate during the LE period. Possible organiza-
tional challenges during the LE period are related to human re-
sources (No 2008; HSE, 2012). A disciplined approach to matters is
needed so that the loss of an individual from organization does not
disproportionately impair operational capability (UK, 2012).
Considering management structure of the duty holder in Fig. 7
composed of platform senior leader, technical director, supervisor
(Conchie et al., 2013), and site personnel (O'Dea and Flin, 2001)
including maintenance personnel and operation personnel, main-
taining a trained and competent work force with an awareness of
equipment is an important issue for LE (Mearns and Flin, 1995;
Qingfeng et al., 2011). A gap analysis was conducted by providing
a check list for identifying obsolescence and organizational risk
factors (Mearns and Flin, 1995; Vinnem et al., 2012), including de-
viation from new requirements, new needs, new technology, lack of
spare parts, lack of space and lack of competence.
Fig. 6. Life extension management pyramid structure of offshore platforms.
3.4. LE management planning and implementing
The purpose of a maintenance program in Fig. 6 is to control all
risks associated with degradation of equipment. The program shall
include activities and maintenance intervals per equipment.
Input to the process was the system breakdown structure and
functional classification of the process system in question. Then, an
RCM/RBI/SIL analysis was carried out. Identification of relevant
failure modes and estimation of failure probability should primarily
be based on operational experience of the actual equipment, and
alternatively on generic failure data from similar operations. Again,
the task involved authority/company requirements.
For equipment classified with low consequence of failure, a
planned corrective maintenance strategy may be selected (run to
failure). However, a minimum set of activities to prolong lifetime
may also be considered.
Finally, all the maintenance tasks should be packed and sched-
uled, considering production plans of the plant, resources re-
quirements, and schedule should be turned around to derive to the
final maintenance plan.
3.5. Measuring effectiveness of LE management model
Applying indicators to evaluate safety integrity is important for
follow-up and decision making during operation of ageing facilities.
An indicator of ageing is a sign or evidence that some damage has
already occurred or is about to occur, and can be thought of as
symptoms of ageing damage. Duty holder had KPIs in place to aid
 H. Liu et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 357e365 361

Fig. 7. Establish maintenance program for topsides process system.

the LE risk assessment or operational performance against defined
leading and lagging indicators (Vinnem et al., 2006; Vinnem, 2010).
These arrangements included KPIs designed to monitor and mea-
sure the effectiveness of LE management.
Some of the Various Types of Indicators are inspection/moni-
toring results. The occurrence of specific failures/failure modes,
number of various undesired events, and reduced performance of
process of quality of product are observed, status with respect to
obsolescence, status with respect to organization and human re-
sources (Hokstad et al., 2010).
4. Application case
In this study, the LE management model was developed on three
offshore production platforms on a gas field in the Bohai Bay, which
was aimed at developing improved practices to ensure the safe
operation of topsides process system of the ageing production
platform, and identify shortcomings in duty holder's approaches.
The platforms were commissioned in 1992, and the age of the
facilities reached 21. On the basis of a typical design life of 20 years,
it can be assumed that the facilities are now operating beyond their
original design life.
4.1. Study objective
This LE pilot study has been commissioned by duty holder with
the following objectives for static mechanical equipment, ma-
chinery rotating equipment and instrumented protection systems:
 Determine the condition and current life expectancy of the
systems
 Propose actions to extend the service life beyond the design life
assumed to be 20 years
 For the static mechanical equipment, assess failure risks
(probability of failure, consequences of failure)
 Recommend an RBI strategy to keep failure risks below
acceptable levels
 For the machinery rotating equipment, assess reliability and
failure modes
 Recommend an RCM strategy to maintain current levels of
reliability
 For instrumented protection systems, assess the probability of
accident scenarios, and specify SIL related to each SIF loop.
 Select some typical SIF loops to do the SIL verification. Recom-
mend an SIS strategy to maintain the specified SIL.
 Recommend work processes of the management system to
ensure asset integrity is managed and demonstrated for the
extended life of the systems
4.2. (Step 0) system breakdown
System breakdown can be used both on system level and on
component level, see Table 2.
4.3. (Step 1) collect background information
Most critical information can be collected from operation
manual, maintenance manual and enterprise software system
(Table 3).
The collection and systematization of information at different
stages is indicated in Table 1. For each system or component, the

Table 2
Equipment or components chosen for further analysis.

Static mechanical equipment Machinery rotating equipment EC&I

Name Number Name Number Name Number

Vessel (-Components) 50 (73) Pump 45 SIF loop 139

Compressor 4
Piping/-Components 102 Turbine 2
Crane 1
Total 175 Total 52 Total 139
362 H. Liu et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 357e365

Table 3 Table 4
Source of input information. Degradation status of static mechanical equipment.

Source Commissioning Operation Failure modes Degradation Vessel Piping/- Total

mechanism(s) (-components) components
Operation manual Debugging Journal/Sampling
Maintenance Start Monitoring/spare parts Wall thinning Corrosion Under 68 102 170
manual Insulation
Enterprise software e Preventive maintenance/Corrective CO2 corrosion 25 35 60
system maintenance follow-up Bacterial corrosion 30 58 88
Evaluation for each individual equipment, improve the life extension Unknown 18 0 18
maintenance Cracking and Fatigue 0 31 31
fracture
Physical Physical damage 5 0 5
deformation
availability and quality of information are a little different, which
need to be identified.
4.4.2. Risk assessment of machinery rotating equipment
The primary screening of machinery rotating equipment was
4.4. (Step 2) analysis of failures and challenges based on a criticality classification of systems or components ac-
cording to their consequences, measured by:
With respect to topsides process system, it was necessary to
perform a detailed risk assessment. As for obsolescence and orga- 1. Potential for personnel injuries; including personnel injuries
nizational issues, it was necessary to identify challenges and gaps associated with fire& explosion, severity of personnel injuries,
related to current requirements. and personnel health risk
In order to make LE management for topsides process facilities
in keeping with AIM principle, LE period is defined as 3 years. Ac-
cording to the national regulation that inspection cycle of pressure
vessels is 3 years, it will be more convenient to collect most critical
information to conduct RBI technology and recommend mainte-
nance strategies to keep failure risks of static mechanical equip-
ment below acceptable levels every three years.
As for machinery rotating equipment, its maintenance strategy
is preventive maintenance to maintain current level of reliability
during LE period, no matter how long LE period is. As for EC&Is,
they can't be replaced whenever damaged. Therefore, EC&Is whose
design life is twice as service life were chosen at the beginning
based on regulations of the company. When platforms step into LE
stage, EC&Is usually don't excess their design life. We just employ
SIL method to evaluate their current safety status as a part of LE
strategy.

4.4.1. Risk assessment of static mechanical equipment

Based on information from design, installation, operation and LE
period, one should assess status of systems or components from
start-up and until the end of LE period. Fig. 8. Vessel/-component risk distribution diagram.
For each component, actual degradation mechanism(s) of the
process under the actual conditions and operation conditions shall
be defined, and each of the degradation mechanism is linked to a
failure mode (Table 4).
Systems or components status was assessed, based on RBI
analysis, according to (American Petroleum Institute, 2000). Based
on the risk assessment, it should be decided whether LE is feasible
for the equipment (Hokstad et al., 2010).
Risk is given as a combination of PoF and CoF. PoF of the major
hazards was estimated. The probabilities were split into the various
causes. For static equipment subject to material degradation, the
level of degradation was assessed, and then the PoF category
relative to this degree of degradation was given. CoF can be related
to on the following aspects: fire and explosion, personnel (life and
health), potential energy, and pollution.
The number in the matrix shows the quantity of vessels or
pipelines (components) with the corresponding risk level. The re-
sults of RBI analysis for static mechanical equipment are shown in
Figs. 8 and 9. Four risk classes have been suggested: Low (green
color), medium (blue color), mediumehigh (yellow color), and high
(red color) Fig. 9. Pipeline/-component risk distribution diagram.
 H. Liu et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 357e365 363

2. Potential for environment pollution; including toxicity, amount Table 6

of pollutant, polluted area, pollution control test, and radiation System to be used to define the PoF values.

detection PoF Failure mode Comment

3. Potential for production loss; including downtime, probability category status
and severity of damage to product quality. 1 No Classification according to the failures can be expected
4. Cost of maintenance; including cost of repair, spare parts supply, 2 Minor during an inspection cycle
maintenance technologies 3 Some
4 Severe
5. Difficulty of maintenance.
5 Excessive
6. Redundancy
7. Cost of upgrade
Table 7
Numbers 1e4 are related to a specific risk matrix separately and System to define the CoF values.
will be considered in the primary screening.
CoF Description of consequences
Numbers 4 and 7 are related to acceptance and cost-benefit. In
category
practice, a specific risk reducing measure may not be feasible due to A. Safety B. Pollution C. Loss of D.
high cost. production Maintenance
cost
Number 5 is related to surveillance and testing activities to
assess degradation of components and system, a preventive 1 Classification Classification Classification Classification
2 according to according to according to according to
maintenance program, periodic evaluation of operating experience,
3 potential for amount of downtime cost of repair
repair and replacement (Pesic et al., 2000). 4 personnel injures pollutant, polluted
Number 6 is considered because ageing may increase the 5 and loss in million area, harm to the
probability of common cause failures. Therefore, in the primary Chinese renminbi society
screening for ageing components, it is questionable if redundancy due to equipment
damage
should be taken into account (IAEA, 2009).
The primary screening results are shown in Table 5. Based on
current status and information about the remaining operation
Table 8
phase (LE period) of three years, PoF was defined. The start con-
Number of failure modes related to each equipment or component.
dition was the actual current status if no repair or upgrade had been
performed. The evaluation was valid for the end of the LE period. Risk A. B. C. Loss of D. Maintenance Overall
level Safety Pollution production cost
FMECA could be used to analysis PoF and CoF of every component,
and the availability and maintainability index are provided in H 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6. M 0 0 66 88 98
L 286 286 220 198 188
A categorization of Consequence of Failure with these di-
mensions is indicated in Table 7. The most valuable part of the CoF
evaluation is to use the Risk matrix to define the Risk level at the
end of LE period. The CoF values of the four areas shall be included. occurrence probability of initiate incident and PoF of independent
The highest CoF value could be used and combined with the PoF protection layer were identified.
value to find the overall Risk level. Here three values of risk level Comparison the product of initiate incident occurrence proba-
were defined (L e low, M e medium, H e high). Both H and M risk bility and independent protection layer PoF with the risk accep-
level were defined as unacceptable. The risk distribution of all the tance limit, SIL of each SIF loop is shown in Table 9.
machinery rotating equipment and components are shown in Then, typical SIF loops with at least one feature as follows were
Table 8. selected to conduct SIL verification:

1. Through HAZOP study, SIF failure would have safety or envi-

4.4.3. Risk assessment of EC&Is
Current status of instrumented protection systems was assessed
based, on information including up-to-date PFDs, P&IDs, detailed
equipment specifications, materials of construction, and mass and
energy balances. The process of SIL analysis is illustrated in Fig. 10.
Firstly, HAZOP study was applied in 29 P&ID of the platform to
identify SIF accident scenarios, including causes, consequences,
independent layer of protection, and consequence categories
(safety, environment, property), which provided basis for LOPA.
Secondly, with the combination of the risk acceptance limit from
other similar international corporations with company HSE risk
management standard, the risk acceptance limits for different
consequence categories were specified.
Thirdly, with reference to the industrial guidance and recom-
mendation of other similar international corporations, the
Table 5
Criticality classification.
Criticality classification High Medium
Equipment number 0 19
ronment consequences.
2. SIL was 1 or above 1 level.
3. If SIF loops shared similar accident scenarios, logic relationship
and the same SIL, only one of them would be chosen to conduct
SIL verification.
Finally, 16 SIF loops passed the SIL verification according to
related standards. The calculation result of software showed that
except one SIF loop, other 15 SIF loops failed to satisfy the SIL
requirement.
4.5. (Step 3) mitigation
A mitigation plan for the topsides process system was estab-
lished to secure an acceptable risk level throughout the planned
period of LE. The framework of maintenance strategies was
developed according to the evaluation methodologies above.
The mitigation plan described the complete plan for upgrade,
Low
condition monitoring, inspection and testing for the LE period. The
higher risk level was, the more detailed condition monitoring and
33
inspection plan to be implemented were.
364 H. Liu et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 357e365

Fig. 10. SIL analysis process.

Table 9 traditional equipment management and risk assessment together.

SIL collection. However, maintenance data, process and operation parameters in
SIL 4 SIL 3 SIL 2 SIL1 A No requirements Total no. the LE period are insufficient or even unavailable, and the data
exchange standards for data collection and data exchange are not
No. of SIF / / 62 41 24 12 139
unified. Enterprise management usually lacks comprehensive data
Note: A indicates SIL is below 1 level, needed not to be modified; No requirement & information in terms of LE management, and this hinders the
means no requirement of SIL, needed not to be modified.
successful application of LE management model.

In addition, the outcome of gap analysis on obsolescence and

organizational issues would be a set of suggested compensating
measures, together with information on which gap they possible
could close and how they should be implemented and followed up.
4.6. (Step 4) check model effectiveness of LE management
The results of SIL analysis showed that nearly all selected SIF
loops failed to satisfy the SIL requirement. Follow-up actions were
needed to check whether SIL analysis was fit for the assessment of
instrumented protection systems on these platforms. Besides, SIL
analysis only completed the assessment of current status of
instrumented protection systems, lacking the assessment of their
future condition.
Other methodologies supporting evaluation or decision-making
could also be used in the LE management model, such as spare
analysis/optimization, RAM, equipment health index evaluation, etc.
Acknowledgments
This project was funded by CNOOC Energy Technology &
Services Limited safety & Environmental Protection Branch
(CCL2012TJPXXS0053). The views reported are those of the authors
and should not be taken to represent the position or policy of the
companies involved. We would like to thank Dr. Mentzer of
MKOPSC for his help in modifying the abstract and recommending
the paper to the 2013 MKOPSC Symposium. We would also like to
thank Melinda of Texas A&M University for providing language
help and the offshore personnel of CNOOC Energy Technology &
Services Limited Tianjin Branch and Bureau Veritas who assists
with the project.
Abbreviations

5. Conclusions CoF Consequence of Failure

EC&I Electrical Control System & Instrumentation
The study emphasized the importance of the LE management FMECA Failure Model Effect and Criticality
model for topsides process systems of offshore platforms in the ESP Electrical Submersible Pump
Bohai Bay, and investigated the process of applying LE management HAZOP Hazard and Operability Analysis
model to three ageing production platforms, which could ensure KP4 Key Program 4
that safety was maintained throughout the entire LE period. KPI Key Performance Indicator
The application results suggested that the established RBI/RCM/ LE Life Extension
FMECA/SIL analysis model could be considered in risk reducing LOPA Layer Of Protection Analysis
measures to increase reliability, availability, maintainability and NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf
safety of equipment. In order to ensure that LE issues were NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
addressed across all aspects of topsides process system manage- PDCA Plan-Do -Check e Adjustment
ment, gap analysis model for identifying obsolescence and orga- PFD Process Flow Diagram
nizational risk factors has been set up. P&ID Process and Instrumentation Diagram
Based on principles of equipment integrity management in PoF Probability of Failure
process industry, LE management has realized PDCA Cycle: the PSA Petroleum Safety Authority
formulation of risk reducing measures (Plan), implementation of RAM Reliability, Availability and Maintenance
risk reducing measures (Do), LE management model effectiveness RBI Risk Based Inspection
check/re-evaluation recommendations & strategies (Check) and RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance
information feedback (Adjustment). SIL Safety Integrity Levels
The pilot application of this model in the production platform SIF Safety Instrumented Function
showed that LE management could be built on the basis of UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf
 H. Liu et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35 (2015) 357e365 365

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