Consequences of The Vietnam War On Thai Foreign Policy

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Intemationai 300 N Z E E B R O A D . A N N A R B O R . M l 4 8 1 0 6
CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIETNAM WAR
ON THAI FOREIGN POLICY
A THESIS
Presented to the Department o f P o lit ic a l Science
C a lifo rn ia State U n iv e rs ity , Long Beach
In P a rtia l F u lfillm e n t
o f the Requirements f o r the Degree
Master of Arts
By Makata Ma
August 1980
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE,
HAVE APPROVED THIS THESIS
By
Makata Ma
COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Alain-Gerard Marsot, P h . D . ( C h a i r ) P o l i t i c a l Science
■PSSrV.
Sudershar Chawla, Ph a— P o lit ic a l Science
Ronald J. Schmidt, Ph.D. P o l it ic a l Science
RECEIVED FOR THE UNIVERSITY
Ip/- \ j X.UM M SL,

A. Jay Stevens, /Rfn D(l j
Dean o f Graduate Studies!
C a lifo rn ia State U n iv e rs ity , Long Beach
August 1980
ABSTRACT
By
Makata Ma
August 1980
This thesis is an attempt to examine Thailand's foreign
p o lic y a f t e r the Vietnam war, e s p e cia lly a f t e r the f a i lu r e of the
United States containment p o lic y against the spread o f Communism
in to Indochina. Since the end o f World War I I , Thailand had adopted
a p o lic y o f becoming an a l l y with the United States. They conducted
a common p o lic y w ith the United States of containment against the
spread o f Communism. But, a f t e r the Vietnam war, Thailand reviewed
i t s close t ie s with the United States, requesting the United States
to close a ll i t s m i l i t a r y i n s t a lla t io n s on Thai s o il . This p o lic y
was taken in order to reach an accommodation with the Communists.
At the same time, Thailand announced i t s p o lic y of n e u t r a l i t y ,
e s ta b lish in g f r ie n d ly t ie s with a ll nations regardless of t h e i r
differences in social systems. I t has adopted a p o lic y o f s t r i c t
n e u t r a l i t y in the Indochinese c o n f lic t s and a humanitarian p o lic y on
Indochinese refugees. Besides these, Thailand has reaffirm ed i t s
o b lig a tio n under the ASEAN Declaration of November 1971, to bring
about the re a liz a tio n o f Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom
and N e u tra lity .
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1
II. BACKGROUND OF THAILAND'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE

VIETNAM W A R .......................................................................... 5
Thailand's Anti-Communist Policy ................................... 5
Thailand As An A lly o f the United States . . . . . . 10
Thailand As A Member o f the SEATO P a c t ....................... 14
III. REVIEW OF THAILAND'S CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE

UNITED STATES ...................................................................... 18
The Nixon Doctrine and the Nixon V i s it

to P e k i n g .......................................................................... 22
The Congress's L im ita tio n o f American

Involvement Abroad .......................................................... 25
U.S. Mayaguez Ship I n c i d e n t ........................................... 28
IV. RECOGNITION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC

RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ............................... 34
Mainland China ...................................................................... 34
Communist Vietnam .............................................................. 39
Communist Regimes o f Cambodia and L a o s ....................... 45
V. STRENGTHENING OF REGIONAL COOPERATION WITH

ITS NEIGHBORS—ASEAN.......................................................... 52
Economic Cooperation .......................................................... 53
N e u tra liz a tio n o f Southeast Asia ................................... 54
Opposition to the Vietnamese Occupation

o f C a m b o d ia ...................................................................... 58
iii
iv
Chapter Page
VI. THAILAND'S POSITION ON SELECTED ISSUES ................................ 65
Sino-Soviet Dispute ............................................................... 65
Soviet-Vietnamese A llia n ce ................................................... 67
Chinese-Vietnamese C o n flic t ............................................... 70
V II. THAILAND'S POLICY ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES ........................ 75
R epatriation o f Indochinese Refugees ................................ 77
Resettlement o f Indochinese Refugees in

Thailand to Third Countries ........................................... 80
V III. CONCLUSION................................................... 83
APPENDIXES
A. ASEAN BANGKOK ACCORD OF AUGUST 8, 1967

ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A S E A N ........................................................87
B. ASEAN KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION OF

NOVEMBER 27, 1971 ON NEUTRALIZATION
OF SOUTHEAST A S I A ........................................................................90
C. JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 1, 1975 BETWEEN THAILAND

AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATICRELATIONS .............................. 93
D. JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF OCTOBER 31, 1975 BETWEEN

THAILAND AND CAMBODIA ON ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ............................................................... 95
E. JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF AUGUST 6, 1976 BETWEEN

THAILAND AND VIETNAM ON ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ............................................................... 97
F. AGREEMENT OF DECEMBER 22, 1975 BETWEEN THE

GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES................................................ 98
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................. 102
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Communist v ic to r ie s in the Indochinese states have a lte re d
profoundly the balance o f power in Southeast Asia; the United States
l e f t Indochina and the Soviet Union has entered the area. The non-
Communist nations o f Southeast Asia have s h ifte d t h e i r p o lic ie s in
order to reach an accommodation w ith Communist China. Since the
f a l l o f the Indochinese states to the Communists, Southeast Asia
has become an arena o f r i v a l r y between the two Communist major
powers, China and the Soviet Union. Vietnam has risen to the level
o f a regional power in Southeast Asia a f t e r i t successfully toppled
the Pol Pot regime o f Cambodia. No country in the region has been
more profoundly affected by the changes than Thailand. This is
because Thailand found i t s e l f facing i t s new Communist neighbors on
i t s borders in the east and northeast, along the borders o f 1,000
miles w ith Cambodia and Laos. In the past, Cambodia and Laos
served as b u ffe r states between Thailand and Communist China and
Vietnam, but Thailand now shares common borders with the Communists.
In t h is s itu a tio n , Thailand has attempted to l i v e in peace with i t s
new neighbors, seeking peaceful coexistence with the Communists
regardless o f the d ifferences in social systems.
Before the f a l l o f the Indochinese states to Communists,
many believed in the so-ca lle d "domino th e o ry ," th a t the downfall
o f one s ta te to the Communists would bring about the successive f a l l
o f a l l the o th e r s J In other words, in t h is regard, the success
o f the Communists in Indochina would encourage Chinese and Soviet

2
Expansionism in to Southeast Asia to expand t h e i r domination and
influence over the other non-Communist nations in the region. In
the past, the domino theory had played a dominant ro le in the
form u la tio n o f the foreign p o lic ie s o f non-Communist nations o f
Southeast Asia, t h e i r containment p o lic y . The containment p o lic y was
based upon the b e li e f th a t the v ic to r y o f a Communist regime in one
nation would lead to the winning o f power by the Communist party in

3
the neighboring nations. In t h is regard, some Thai leaders did not
believe in t h i s domino theory. For example, the former Thai Prime
M in is te r Tanin K ra iv ixie n t o ld a group o f the United States National
Defense College led by Morris P. Smith who v is it e d Thailand on
May 11, 1977, th a t the "domino theory w i l l d e f i n i t e l y not apply to
Thailand and other Southeast Asian n a tio n s ,"^ Communism w i l l not
1Alain-Gerard Marsot, "The Lesson o f Vietnam," Asian Thought

and S ociety: An In te rn a tio n a l Review 2 (December 1977): 343.
2
Melvin Gurtov, "S ecu rity By Proxy: The Nixon Doctrine
and Southeast A s ia ," in Mark W. Zacher and R. Stephen Milne, eds.,
C o n f lic t and S t a b i l i t y in Southeast A sia. (New York: Anchor
Books, 1974), p. 217.
David F. Roth, " P o l i t i c a l Changes in Asia A fte r Vietnam:

Some Thoughts and A lte rn a tiv e to Domino," Asia Q uarterly 4 (1976):
4.
^ Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 17

(A p ril-J u n e 1977): 52.
3
expand beyond Indochinese peninsula, or former French colony. One
reason is th a t China has abandoned i t s ambition to dominate
Southeast Asia as i t s sphere o f influence a ft e r i t lo s t the
Indochinese states to Soviet influence. Another reason is th a t
Vietnam has no p o te n tia l a b i l i t y to go beyond the Indochinese
peninsula because i t lacks a strong economic foundation. Even
though, she claimed her armed forces is the t h i r d strongest in the

5
world a f t e r the United States and Soviet Union. Without outside
support, i t is almost impossible f o r Vietnam to conduct a m i l i t a r y
invasion o f Southeast Asian nations. The Soviet Union is located
too f a r away from Southeast Asia. I t is not easy fo r her to carry
out her immediate mission because she does not have m i l i t a r y
f a c i l i t i e s or bases in t h is part o f the world.
Furthermore, the Thai leader, Prime M in is te r Kriangsak
Chomanon rejected the domino theory. He said th a t Thailand d iffe r e d
from the Indochinese states in many respects. For example,
Thailand had never been colonized arid i t s people were more u n if ie d .^
Besides these,
the in s i t u t io n o f Monarchy has always been the r a lly in g p o in t

and u n ify in g fa c to r f o r the people, which is an added advantage
to Thailand. Moreover, there is no real poverty. The Thai
people have never been known to starve. Nor are there many
who might be considered as hard core Communist.?
5
"Teng Starts Asia Tour to Counter Soviet In flu e n ce,"
New York Times, November 6, 1978, sec. 1, p. 12.
Ân inte rvie w given by the Thai Prime M in is te r Kriangsak
Chomanon to the Foreign Correspondent in Bangkok on December 9, 1977,
Press Release, No. 185/2520, December 1977. (Bangkok: Information
Department, M in is try o f Foreign A f f a ir s , 1977), p. 9.
71b i d.
In th is sense, the Thai people are united under the leadership of
the king which has served as unifyin g force to contain Communists.
Economic conditions are another important fa c to r in preventing
Communism, because Communism flo u ris h e s in poor so cie tie s. But
Thailand's economic conditions are b e tte r than any other nations in
Indochina.
In a d d itio n , Thailand, in order to face Communist nations,
has established a close association with i t s neighbors—ASEAN. The
ASEAN—Association o f Southeast Asian Nations w il l not to le r a te an
attack upon any o f i t s members by Communists. They are ready to
take a common stand and measures in the defense of t h e i r countries.
The ASEAN nations have pledged to help Thailand i f Thai se c u rity is
threatened or i f the survival o f Thailand as a nation is in danger.
In other words, the survival o f Thailand as a nation is an element
o f t h e i r s e c u rity. Besides these, Thailand, in order to secure i t s
survival as a nation in Southeast Asia, has adopted a p o lic y o f
n e u t r a lit y based on the p rin c ip le s o f peaceful coexistence and
establishment o f tie s with a l l countries o f d if fe r e n t social systems
CHAPTER I I
BACKGROUND OF THAILAND'S INVOLVEMENT
IN THE VIETNAM WAR
Thailand's Anti-Communist Policy
Following the Communists' capture o f mainland China and
the establishment of the People's Republic o f China in 1949, China
declared i t s p o lic y : to spread Communism and support wars of
lib e r a tio n in the Southeast Asia region in p a r t ic u la r , and the world
in general. Thailand considered th is Chinese declaration as a
th re a t to Thai s e c u rity in p a r tic u la r and to the whole region in
general. From th is Chinese a ttit u d e , Thailand began to formulate
i t s anti-Communist p o lic y . China in order to implement th is p o lic y ,
backed the Thai Communist Party."' The Thai Communist Party,
d ire c ts the Communist insurgents a ll over Thai t e r r i t o r y through
i t s p rin c ip a l organizations, "the Thailand Independence Movement

2
and the Thailand P a t r io t ic Front." These a c t i v i t i e s o f the Thai
Communist Party
are made known p r im a r ily through broadcasts by the "voice of

the People o f Thailand," a clandestine radio sta tio n located
in China, and by the "New China News Agency," in which Peking
gives the insurgents strong propaganda support. China also
provides funds and tr a in in g .- 3
"'Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. S e c u rity .

(D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1975), p. 192.
2I b i d . , p. 193. 31bid.
5
The ultim a te goal the Thai Communist Party seeks is to replace the
system o f Thai a dm inistration by the Communist system. In other
words, to overthrow the Thai government in power and replace i t
by a Communist government. China conducted a p o licy o f spread o f
Communism in to the t e r r i t o r i e s o f Indochina, Burma, and Malaysia, by
providing moral and material supports to local insurgents and
in t e r fe r in g the in te rn a l a f f a i r s o f the local governments. These
Chinese a c t i v i t i e s contributed to Thailand's firm stand on an a n t i
communist p o lic y . In order to face these s itu a tio n s , Thailand took
precautions to prevent Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n s by introducing the

4
d r a f t o f an anti-Communist law to the Parliament in 1952. A fte r the
passage in Parliament of t h is law, i t became a strong anti-Communist
law in the kingdom. This anti-Communist Act gives the government
a wide range o f powers to a rre s t anyone who is suspected o f having
connections with a Communist o rg a n iza tio n , or o f being Cornmunist-

5
oriented, or who t r i e s to propagandize f o r the Communist cause.
Under th is p ro v isio n , a person found g u i l t y is subjected to a term
o f imprisonment o f 5 to 10 years. As a d ir e c t consequence o f t h is
law, more than 250 Chinese Communist oriented persons were arrested,
over 150 firm s were raided, and several Chinese associations and
schools were closed.'7 This action by the Thai a u th o ritie s was a
^Donald E. N uechterlin, Thailand and the Struggle fo r

Southeast Asia. (New York: Cornell U n ive rsity Press, 1965),
p. 65.
51bid. , p. 111. 61bid.
^ I b id . , p. 110.
prevention o f Communist a c t i v i t i e s w ith in the Chinese Community in
Thailand. Following an order o f the Chief o f Thailand's Police
General Phao Sriyanond, the local police took in to custody any person
g
suspected o f a id in g the Communists. In th is connection, the
g
government arrested 104 persons, these included p o li t i c i a n s ,
w r it e r s , government o f f i c i a l s , m i l i t a r y personnel and students.
The same year, in 1952, a f t e r the passage by Thailand's
Parliament o f the Anti-Communist Law, China's propaganda attempted
to separate teachers, students, w r it e r s , even Buddhist monks from
the Thai governm ent,^ but i t f a ile d to achieve i t s goal. In early
1953, China announced the establishment o f "an autonomous Thai
s ta te in Southern C h i n a , a n d created some 20,000 Thai-speaking
troops, which were aimed at overthrowing the Thai government by fo rce ,
by Thai people, and i t expected the support from Thai people inside
Thailand. China's announcement indicated th a t " t h is Thai government
would serve as a guide to other Thai-speaking people in Southeast

12
Asia who wanted autonomy" separated from the Thai central
government, p a r t i c u l a r ly Thai-speaking people in Laos, Cambodia,
Burma, and Malaysia, re sid in g near the Thai f r o n t i e r s .
In a d d itio n , in the Spring o f 1953, Viet-Minh forces had
su cce ssfu lly moved in to Laotian t e r r i t o r y and set up a Free Laotian
O
Frank C. D arling , Thailand and the United States.
(D.C.: Public A f f a ir s Press, 1965), p. 116.
91bid. , p. 122.
^ N u e c h te rl in , p. 110. ^ "*Neuchterl i n , p. 65.
12I b i d . , p. 112.
13
government. In December o f the same .year, Viet-Minh forces
captured the Lao Town o f Takhaek near Thailand's northeastern
fro n tie r. By A p ril 1954, the Viet-Minh moved i t s m i l i t a r y forces
in to Cambodian t e r r i r o t y w ith the aim o f overthrowing the Cambodian

14
government. These s itu a tio n s added more support to Thailand's
anti-Communist p o licy and indicated th a t Communists were a real
danger to Thai s e c u rity . This development created fear among the
Thai leaders. They were worried about the Thai northeastern and
eastern provinces, who are e th n ic a lly and c u lt u r a l l y close o f related
to the Laotians and Cambodians re sp e c tive ly.
In re la tio n to Thailand's anti-Communist p o lic y , General
S a r it Thanarat of the Thai Army "banned a ll trade w ith Communist
China and took strong measures to stop the tra ve l o f Thais to

15
Peking," when he took control o f the Thai government in October
1958. This p o lic y was d irected against Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n ,
subversive and sabotage a c t i v i t i e s from both outside and inside
Thai t e r r i t o r y . Moreover, Chinese schools in Thailand were r e s t r i c t
ed in number and teaching system and were compelled to teach the
Thai language beside t h e i r Chinese lan g u a g e .^ This measure was in
lin e with the Thai anti-Communist p o lic y , and served to n e u tra liz e
the Chinese oriented toward mainland China w ith in the Thai-Chinese
community in Thailand.
As described above those were the p rin c ip a l causes and
131bid. , p. 113. 14Ib id .
151bid. , p. 136. ’ 161bid.
measures o f Thailand's anti-Communist p o lic y . As we have seen,
t h is p o licy was in lin e with the objectives o f United States
foreign p o lic y in the Southeast Asia, which "sought to contain

17
Communism," a primary goal o f Thailand's involvement in the
Vietnam war. In other words, the containment p o licy o f the United
States attempted to h a lt the spread o f Communism in the area. This
United States entrance in to the Vietnam war was to h a lt the spread
o f Communism into Southeast Asia. In f a c t , th is p o licy was
id e n tic a l with Thailand's anti-Conmunist p o licy as pointed out
e a r lie r . The containment p o lic y pushed Thailand to involve h e rs e lf
in the Vietnam war along side the United States. However, as fa r as
th is containment p o licy was concerned, both Thailand and the United
States have admitted th a t they f a ile d to achieve t h e i r common goal.
They f i n a l l y dropped t h is p o licy and conducted t h e i r new p o licy of
rapprochment with Communist China based upon the foundation o f
mutual in te re s ts irre s p e c tiv e of t h e ir differences in p o l i t i c a l ,
economic, or social systems. Thailand, in i t s rapprochment p olicy
with the Communist nations, has extended i t s recognition to and
established diplomatic re la tio n s with Communist China, Communist
Vietnam, and the Communist regimes o f Cambodia and Laos.
^Sudershan Chawla, "U.S. Strategy in Southeast Asia

in the Post-Cease-Fire Period," in Sudershan Chawla, Melvin Gurtov
and Alain-Gerard Marsot, eds., Southeast Asia Under the New
Balance o f Power. (New York: Praeger Publishers In c ., 1974),
p. 11.
10
Thailand As An A l ly of the United States
P rio r to Thailand becoming an a l l y o f the United States,
Thailand aligned i t s e l f with Japan in World War I I , by declaring

1R
war on the United States on January 25, 1942. A fte r Thailand
announced i t s declaration o f war on the United States, there emerged
a "Free Thai Movement," or "Seree Thai" organ iza tion , which aimed
at lib e r a tin g the country from foreign occupation. The Free Thai
Movement formed by a group o f Thai nationals mostly residing in the
United States under the leadership o f Thai Ambassador in Washington,
D.C., M. R. Seni Pramoj, refused to recognize the declaration of

19
war. They claimed i t did not represent the w i l l o f the Thai
20
people in general. So M. R. Seni Pramoj, he "decided on his own
not to inform the American government o f f i c i a l l y o f Thailand's

21
declaration o f war against the United S tates." The Free Thai
Movement requested the government o f the United States not to
recognize Thailand's declaration o f war and sought assistance from
the American people to lib e r a te t h e i r country from Japanese

22
occupation. This Free Thai Movement, f o r i t s cause, conducted
resistance and espionage a c t i v i t i e s against Japanese both inside and

23
outside Thai t e r r i t o r y . In a b r ie f period o f time, th is movement
18
D arling, Thailand and the United States, p. 16.
191bid. , p. 35. 20I b i d . , p. 35.
21
David Joel Steinberg, Alexander Woodside, David K. Wyatt,
W illiam R. R off, John R. W. Small and David P. Chandler, eds.,
In Search o f Southeast Asia. (New York: Praeger Publishers, In c .,
1971), p. 349.
22
D arling , Thailand and the United States, p. 35.
obtained great support from the Thai people in Thailand and abroad.
Furthermore, "an extensive underground movement had been organized
inside Thailand under the leadership o f P r id i, who was s t i l l serving

24
as Regent." P rid i in his opposition to Thailand s declaration
o f war and Japanese occupation o f Thai t e r r i t o r y , declared th a t
Thailand's declaration o f war on the United States and i t s a l l i e s
was i l l e g a l since i t had never been c o n s tit u t io n a lly r a t i f i e d by the

25
Assembly, nor signed by the Regent. Besides these, the "Free
Thai Movement had successfully i n f i l t r a t e d the country and
established contacts w ith P r i d i ‘ s underground headquarters in

9f\
Bangkok." F in a lly , the United States government decided not to
27
recognize Thailand's declaration o f war announced by the government
of Prime M in is te r Pibun Songkram in Bangkok as v a lid .
The same year, in 1942, a f t e r the United States refusal o f
Thailand's declaration o f war, the United States offe re d assistance
to the Free Thai Movement by tr a in in g a group o f about 70 Free Thai
volunteers under the d ire c tio n o f Dr. Kenneth Landon o f the Depart
ment o f State and Colonel Preston Goodfellow o f the O ffic e of
S tra te g ic Service. In 1943, t h is group was sent to southern China
to i n f i l t r a t e Thailand fo r lib e r a t in g Thailand from Japanese

28
occupation. These underground a c t i v i t i e s had been carrie d out
?4
Ib id . , p. 35. I b i d . , p. 37.
26I b i d . , p. 36.
^ Thailand Into the 8 0 's . (Bangkok: the O ffic e o f the

Prime M in is te r o f Thailand, 1979), p. 249.
28
D arling, Thailand and the United S tates, p. 35.
12
u n t i l Japan's surrender to the United States in August 1945. A fte r
the war, the United States refused to consider Thailand who aligned
29
i t s e l f w ith Japan as an enemy. This refusal was based on the
United States' recognition o f the Free Thai Movement to lib e ra te
t h e i r homeland from Japanese occupation. When peace came, "the
United States, regarded Thailand as a lib e ra te d fr ie n d and a symbol
o f s e lf-d e te rm in a tio n in a world th a t had begun to r e je c t c o lo n ia l-

30
ism." In t h i s respect, the United States openly recognized the
Free Thai Movement as the true and sole representative o f the Thai
people. A ft e r the war, with the help o f the United States,
Thailand retained i t s independence, sovereignty, and t e r r i t o r i a l
in te g r ity . From t h is basis as described above, Thailand and the
United States have developed t h e i r re la tio n s to the level o f
becoming a l l i e s .
As fo llo w up o f t h e i r re la tio n s , in September o f 1950,
Thailand and the United States signed an Agreement on Economic and
Technical Cooperation. Under th is agreement, the United States
gave economic aid and personnel tr a in in g to Thailand. In the same
year, the United States set up the United States Operation Mission
(USOM) in Bangkok, to administer the American economic aid program to
Thailand. But a f t e r 1965, USOM extended American aid to strengthen

31
Thai defense and s e c u rity forces. Moreover, i t was followed by
the establishment o f the J o in t United States Advisory Group (JUSMAG)
^ L e a E. W illiam s, Southeast Asia: A H is to r y . (New York:

Oxford U n iv e rs ity Press, 1976), p. 198.
30Ib id . 31 Ib id . , pp. 38-39.
13
32
O ffice in Thailand in 1954, to a s s is t in the tr a in in g o f Thai
Armed Forces in the use o f American weapons and equipments and the
expansion o f the Thai Armed Forces from approximately 50,000 to

33
140,000 men. Since the outbreak o f the Communist insurgency in
the northeastern p a rt o f Thailand, the United States Special Forces
had provided g u e r r i l la warfare tr a in in g to the Thai Armed Forces.
Due to the d e te rio ra tio n of the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y s itu a tio n
in Indochina, Thailand permitted the United States to set up i t s
m i l i t a r y bases in the northeastern part o f Thailand and stationed
there about 48,000 U.S. m i l i t a r y personnel, mostly A ir Force
personnel, in order to face any possible m i l i t a r y development in the
area. The United States used these m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s to s tr ik e
m i l i t a r y targets in North Vietnam, bombing North Vietnamese m i li t a r y
f a c i l i t i e s in Laos, as well as attackin g V ie t Congs in South

34
Vietnamese t e r r i t o r i e s . Moreover, by the mid-1960's, Thailand
permitted United States f i g h t e r planes to use a i r bases in Thai

35
t e r r i t o r y to s tr ik e d i r e c t l y at targets inside North Vietnam.
At the same time, the Thai government also sent troops to South
Vietnam. More than 30,000 Thai so ld ie rs volunteered to f i g h t V iet
Cong and North Vietnamese forces along side the United States forces
32
Lucien M. Hans, "American Aid Is Damaging Thai S o ciety," in
Robert Jay L if t o n , ed. , America and the Asian Revolutions. (New
Haven: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970), p. 128.
33
D arling, Thailand and the United S ta te s , p. 39.
34
David A. Wilson, The United States and the Future of
Thailand. (New York: Praeger Publishers, In c ., 1970), p. 40.
35
D arling, Thailand and the United S ta te s, p. 40.
14
in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. By 1968, Thailand sent forces of

37
about 12,000 in fa n try men to South Vietnam, in order to support
the United States in the defense o f South Vietnam from North
Vietnam and Viet Cong attacks. As a matter o f f a c t, due to Thailand's
d ir e c t involvement in the Vietnam war along side the United States,
Thailand became one of the United States a ll i e s in the area. ~or
example, as an a l l y , Thailand permitted the United States to set up
i t s m i l i t a r y in s t a lla tio n s in Thai t e r r i t o r y and stationed there a
large number o f the United States m i l i t a r y personnel serving s o le ly
fo r the purpose of defense o f the Thai t e r r i t o r y and m i li t a r y
operation in Indochina.
Thailand As A Member o f the SEATO Pact
*30
Thailand and China had been h o s tile since the e arly 1950's,
immediately a ft e r the establishment of the Communist government in
mainland China. Thailand had always feared the extension of
Chinese Communist influence in the Southeast Asia region, p a r tic u la r ly
in the Indochinese states, fo llo w in g the Chinese government's
announcement o f the establishment o f an automous Thai state in 1953,
the Viet-Minh fo rces' occupation o f some parts o f the Laotian
t e r r i t o r y in 1954, and la t e r in the same year, the Viet-Minh's move
36
D arling, Thailand and the United States, p. 42.
37I b i d . , p. 41.
38
Frank Langdon, "China's P olicy in Southeast A sia,"
in Mark W. Zacher and R. Stephen Milne, eds., C o n flic t and S t a b i l i t y
in Southeast A s ia , p. 310.
15
39
o f i t s m i l i t a r y forces in to Cambodian t e r r i t o r y . In addition
to these, there was the Geneva Agreement o f 1954, the p a r t it io n o f
Vietnam and the establishment o f a Communist regime in North Vietnam.
Thailand considered these developments as a th re a t to i t s national
se c u rity . With respect to the presence o f Viet-Minh forces in
Laotian and Cambodian t e r r i t o r i e s , Thailand appealed to the United
Nations Security Council f o r in v e s tig a tio n o f the s itu a tio n in the
area, but the Soviet Union vetoed th is request.4^ A fte r the Thai
appeal to the United Nations was turned down by the Soviet veto,
Thailand turned to the United States f o r help. The United States
responded w ithout delay to the Thai request and promised to defend
Thailand in case o f Communist aggression on Thai t e r r i t o r y . To
bring about the re a liz a tio n o f t h is pledge, in 1954, the United
States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed the concept
o f c o lle c tiv e containment o f Communism, with the establishment o f
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The signatories
to th is tre a ty were the United States, Great B r i t a in , France,
A u s tr a lia , New Zealand, Pakistan, the P h ilip p in e s , and Thailand.
The SEATO pact was a m i l i t a r y pact which was signed in Manila on

41
September 8, 1954. This tr e a ty was designed to defend Thailand
and contain Communism from expanding in to Southeast Asia. For th is
o b je c tiv e , in February 1955, SEATO decided to e sta b lish i t s Head-

42
Quarter and the SEATO M i li t a r y Command in Bangkok. As already
OQ 40
N uechterlin, p. 113. Nuechterlin, p. 113.
41 I b i d . , p. 114. 42Ib id , p. 114.
16
known, the main b e n e ficia ry among SEATO members was Thailand, which
gained a special U.S. commitment: The United States made a pledge
to defend Thailand in case o f Communist aggression in the area. For
th is special U.S. commitment, in the communique between the Thai
Foreign M in is te r Thanat Khoman and the United States Secretary o f
State Dean Rusk in 1962, the United States f ir m ly declared th a t,
they would "act in the defense o f Thailand even w ithout the unanimous
43
agreement o f SEATO members." In th is j o i n t communique, the
United States also stated repeatedly th a t " i t regards the preservation
o f the independence and i n t e g r i t y o f Thailand as v i t a l to the

44
national in te r e s t o f the United States and world peace." In the
same j o i n t communique, the United States also affirm ed th a t the
" o b lig a tio n o f the United States does not depend upon the p r io r
agreement o f a ll other p a rtie s to the tr e a t y , since th is o b lig a tio n

45
is in d iv id u a l as well as c o ll e c t i v e . " This firm declaration o f
the United States served as a strong reminder to the Communists who
planned to conduct a g u e r r i l la warfare or invasion o f Thai t e r r i t o r y .
The SEATO tr e a ty had two fe a tu re s, namely, member states of
SEATO i t s e l f and protocol s ta te s , a separate category w ith SEATO
pro te ction extended over the non-member states of Laos, Cambodia,

46
and former South Vietnam. Laos, Cambodia, and former South
Vietnam were not sig n a to rie s to the SEATO t r e a ty , but under the
tr e a tie s terms SEATO's umbrella pro te ction could be extended to these
43 44
Clough, p. 187. Clough, p. 187.
46
Ib id . I b i d . , p. 11.
17
47
states under s p e cifie d conditions. However, in th is respect,
SEATO f a ile d to p ro te c t the Indochinese states from Communist
occupation. For Thailand, what had happened in Laos and Cambodia are
v i t a l to Thailand's s e c u rity and p o sitio n in Southeast Asia. In
the past, Laos and Cambodia provided b u ffe r states to Thailand from
the Communist states.
For Thailand, SEATO seemed to be an e ffe c tiv e d e te rre n t,
w ith c o lle c tiv e defense by SEATO members in case o f Communist d ir e c t
aggression on Thai t e r r i t o r y . The establishment o f the SEATO head
quarter in Bangkok, was a strong in d ic a tio n o f SEATO's in te n tio n s ,
p a r t i c u l a r ly the United States determination to defend Thailand.
When the United States and other members of SEATO decided to use
m i l i t a r y forces to h a lt the Communist advance in Indochina, Thailand
as a member o f SEATO was obliged to become involved i t s e l f in the
Vietnam war along side the other SEATO members, and she joined the
United States in the war in order to h a lt Communist aggression. This
Thai p o lic y was in l i n e with the SEATO tr e a ty , containing Communist
expansion in to Southeast Asia. During the war, Thailand was an a l l y
o f the United States and conducted i t s p o lic y o f anti-Communism since
the Communist capture o f mainland China and the Communist invasion of
the Indochinese sta te s. In other words, Thailand's involvement in
the Vietnam war was a matter o f p r in c ip le ; Thailand's anti-Communist
p o lic y , i t s alignment w ith the United States under the SEATO tre a ty .
CHAPTER I I I
REVIEW OF THAILAND'S CLOSE RELATIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES
The close a llia n c e between Thailand and the United States
had begun from e a rly 1950's when they signed the b ila t e r a l agree
ments and lasted a f t e r the collapse o f the United States containment
p o lic y in Indochina in 1975, a f t e r the f a l l o f Phnom Penh and Saigon
to Communist c o n tro l. Thailand viewed the collapse o f American
p o lic y to prevent a Communist take over of Indochina as a major
setback o f the United States p o lic y in th is area. In other words,
the United States was unable to preserve the independence o f her
a l l i e s , like w ise the American commitment to defend Thailand and the
preservation o f Thai t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y became in doubt. Thai
a ttitu d e towards the United States began to change, anti-American
slogans among students and p o li t i c i a n s had been seen throughout
Thailand, e s p e c ia lly c a lls f o r the withdrawal o f a ll U.S. forces
from Thai soil."* The most immediate cause o f t h is change was the
f a i l u r e o f the United States commitment to her a l l i e s in Indochina,
to p ro te ct Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam from Communist occupation. In
a d d itio n , "Thailand fin d s her la o tia n and Cambodian borders co n tro lle d
by Communist f o r c e s - - a ll of whom c le a r ly remember where the American
^W illiam R. K in te r, "Thailand Faces the Future," Orbis: A

Journal o f World A f f a ir s 19 (Fall 1975): 11288.
18
19
?
planes th a t had bombed them came from" and "the Vietnamese s t i l l
re c a ll th a t the Thai's opposed them in the recent Vietnam war and
allowed t h e i r t e r r i t o r y to be used as a staging post f o r American

3
warplanes operating in t h e i r country." In th is r e la t io n , Thai
leaders realized th a t the next ta rg e t o f Communist invasion was
Thailand, as "Hanoi may wish to include ce rta in northeastern

4
provinces into an expanded Laos" and i t may play a major ro le in
the northeastern Thailand insurgency, by supporting 3,500 h i l l - t r i b e

5
rebels o f northern Thailand against Thai a u th o ritie s .
As we know, the collapse o f American p o lic y in Indochina has
brought about a new s itu a tio n in Southeast Asia. For instance, every
nation in the region must reevaluate i t s p o lic ie s , commitments and
alignments. I t may be said th a t t h is period was a period o f confusion
and f r u s tr a tio n f o r many Southeast Asian people, esp ecia lly f o r those
in Indochina and Thailand i t s e l f who placed t h e i r confidence and tr u s t
fo r t h e i r se cu rity in the United States. This was because
Southeast Asian governments formerly dependent on the United

States m i l i t a r y capacity would have to compensate fo r the change
by g e ttin g a dditional support from countries other than the
United States, or by reaching compromise settlements w ith t h e i r
enemies.®
2Ib id .
3
Joe Fernandez, "Southeast Asia May Face Danger o f Balkanisa-
t i o n , " The Southeast Asia Record 1 (J u ly 27-August 2, 197S): 11.
\ i n t e r , p. 1130.
^Sheldon W. Simon, "The ASEAN States: Obstacles to Security

Cooperation," Orbis: A Journal o f World A ffa ir s 22 (Summer 1978): 425.
6Clough, p. 183.
20
For a tta in in g t h is goal, Thailand pursues an independent foreign
p o lic y based p r in c ip a lly on preservation o f national in te r e s ts - -
independence, sovereignty, t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , and survival o f
the nation. In conducting th is p o lic y , Thailand has developed
f r ie n d ly tie s as well as economic re la tio n s with a l l countries
irre s p e c tiv e o f the differences in p o l i t i c a l , economic, or social
systems.^ Because of the change o f s itu a tio n in Indochina, Thailand
is ready to adjust i t s foreign p o lic y to the new r e a l i t i e s in the
region, by moving to recognize the Communist regimes and e stablishing
diplom atic re la tio n s with the Communist cou ntrie s, mainland China
and the Indochinese states. In th is connection, Thailand would want
to play down i t s past close a llia n c e w ith the United States and
would emphasize i t s s e lf - a llia n c e and i t s a b i l i t y to have good

O
re la tio n s w ith a ll the big powers, the Soviet Union and mainland
China. This "fo re ig n p o lic y is one o f n e u t r a lit y and frie n dsh ip
with a ll nations irre s p e c tiv e o f t h e ir p o l i t i c a l ideologies or

g
economic and social systems." Thailand considers th a t th is foreign
p o lic y may serve to preserve i t s national in te r e s ts , p a r tic u la r ly
Thai national s e c u rity , in facing i t s new Communist neighbors.
This was a review o f Thailand's reassessment close a llia n c e
w ith the United States as a consequence o f the Vietnam war, the
^News B u l l e t i n , No. 14/1977, November-December 1977.

(Banqkok: Information Department, M in is try of Foreign A f f a ir s ,
1977), p. 15.
8Clough, p. 201.
^Thailand Into the 8 0 's , p. 246.
21
f a i lu r e o f the United States to prevent Communism entrance Southeast
Asia and to defend i t s a ll i e s in th is area. This major review o f
Thailand's close a llia n c e w ith the United States, led to the closure
o f a ll U.S. m i l i t a r y bases on Thai s o il . A statement made by the
Spokesman o f the Thai Foreign M in is tr y , Mr. Nissai V e jja jiv a ,
declared th a t a ll American m i l i t a r y bases on Thai s o il s o le ly
belonged to the Thai government and th a t a ll American forces should
be withdrawn from Thai t e r r i t o r y before March 20, 1976. A fte r t h is
statement, the government of K u k rit Pramoj went to Parliament f o r
approval o f i t s a c tio n ."'0 This was followed by the closure o f U.S.
m i l i t a r y bases in the northeast on January 31, 1976.^ This closing
by the United States o f i t s m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s and request th a t the
United States withdraw i t s m i l i t a r y personnel from Thai s o il were
an in d ic a tio n th a t Thailand had reviewed i t s close a llia n c e with the
United States. The closure o f U.S. m i li t a r y bases and the w ith
drawal o f a l l U.S. troops from Thai s o i l , cleared the way fo r
Thailand to make frie n d s w ith mainland China and i t s new Communist
neighbors—Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. In other words, Thailand
faced new r e a l i t i e s , and adjusted ra p id ly to the new r e a l i t i e s o f the
post-Vietnam war s itu a tio n . In a d d itio n , by closing U.S. m i l i t a r y
bases on Thai s o i l , Thailand could avoid becoming a ta rg e t of
Communist a tta c k , or becoming an arena o f f i g h tin g among major
^^Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 15

(October-December 1975): 23.
^ Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 16

(April-June 1976): 38.
22
powers. This review o f Thai fo re ig n p o lic y w ith the United States
was based on a consideration o f the s h if t s o f United States p o lic y ,
fo r example, the Nixon d o c trin e , the Nixon v i s i t to Peking in 1972,
and U.S. Congress's l i m i t a t i o n o f American involvement abroad or
Congressional l i m i t a t i o n o f the P residential power in fo re ign p o lic y .
The Nixon Doctrine and the Nixon

V i s i t to Peking
Under the Nixon d o c trin e , Thailand and other Southeast Asian
nations are not considered o f s tra te g ic importance f o r the s e c u rity
o f the United States. Under t h i s d o c trin e , the survival o f any
p a r t i c u l a r Southeast Asian nation would not be regarded as a
p rin c ip a l in t e r e s t o f the United States o b lig a tin g the United States

12
government to ensure i t s s u r v iv a l. In other words, the government
o f the United States no longer views the s e c u rity o f Southeast Asian
nations as a v i t a l in t e r e s t f o r United States s e c u rity . As a
consequence o f the Nixon d o c trin e , the United States reduced i t s
m i l i t a r y forces in Indochina a f t e r signing the Paris Accord w ith

13
Communist Vietnam in January 1973. However, the United States had
reaffirm e d to i t s a l l i e s in the region th a t i t would honor a l l
e x is t in g commitments. The p rin c ip le s o f the Nixon d o ctrin e , as
described above, serve as a g u id e lin e in definin g the new United
States ro le in world a f f a i r s and in the region o f Southeast Asia in
^ C lo u g h , p. 189.
13
Melvin Gurtov, "A New Asian Balance o f Power," in
Sudershan Chawla, Melvin Gurtov and Alain-Gerard Marsot, eds.,
Southeast Asia Under the New Balance o f Power, p. 1.
23
p a r tic u la r . In a d d itio n , the United States stated in the Nixon
doctrine th a t " i t sought to induce a ll i e s o f the United States to
assume a la rg e r share o f the burden o f providing f o r t h e i r own
s e c u rity and f o r the economic development o f the developing
n a tio n s ."^ I t c le a r ly indicated th a t the United States intended to
reduce i t s global r e s p o n s ib ility in Asia in general, and Southeast
Asia in p a r t ic u la r , leaving the nations in t h is continent to help
themselves f o r t h e i r own defense. Thailand viewed the doctrine as
a s h i f t o f the United States foreign p o lic y and considered th is
change would a f f e c t Thai s e c u rity . As a r e s u lt o f the new United
States p o lic y , Thailand a t the moment has no other choice, i t must
r e ly on i t s own in defense matters. As consequences o f th is d o c trine ,
Thailand reconsidered i t s close alignment w ith the United States and
sought accommodation w ith the Communist n ations, p a r t ic u la r ly i t s
new Communist neighbors, Indochina, and mainland China. This move
is regarded as a major change in Thai foreign p o lic y , as adopted
since the end of World War I I , s h if t i n g to the new r e a l i t i e s of the
s itu a tio n in the area to ensure i t s survival as a fre e nation in
Southeast Asia.
As regards Nixon's v i s i t to Peking, a ft e r long diplom atic
negotiations and bargaining, Nixon made an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to mainland
China in February 1972. Nixon's v i s i t to Peking is regarded by
Thailand and other Southeast Asian nations as a change in United
States p o lic y in th is area as the United States was no longer
^C lo u g h , p.2.
24
pursuing i t s containment p o lic y against Communism, "they brought an

15
end to the doctrine of containment," which the United States had
followed f o r over twenty years. Nixon's t r i p to Peking was a re s u lt
o f domestic pressures, as some opposition groups wanted the United
States forces to get out o f the Indochina war. In th is regard, the
e f f o r t o f the United States was to resolve the Indochina problem by
peaceful means, by making a t r i p to Peking with the hope o f tra n s
forming the Indochina s i t u a t i o n , ”'® based on compromise and d ire c t
dialogue with the Communists on the Indochina issue. In f a c t , in
th is r e la t io n , the United States f a ile d to bring peace in Indochina
by peaceful means; the war went on in Indochina u n til the United
States' la s t troops l e f t the Indochinese peninsula in 1975. As
fo r Thailand, th is v i s i t was a strong in d ic a tio n o f the United States'
in te n tio n to leave i t s a l l i e s in th is area, by reaching a compromise
with Communist China, irre s p e c tiv e o f the s e cu rity needs o f i t s
a l l i e s in th is part o f the world. As described e a r li e r , Thailand had
adopted a p o lic y of anti-Communism in a ll i t s forms both w ith in the
Thai t e r r i t o r y and on the in te rn a tio n a l scene. Thailand regarded
as a r e s u lt o f th is v i s i t , th a t the United States did not care about
Thai inte rna l se c u rity problems re s u ltin g from Communist insurgency,
which was supported mainly by Communist China. Thailand, in order to
survive in the new s itu a tio n a f t e r the Vietnam war, re-examined
i t s alignment with the United States and had to "work fo r more
^Chawla, p. 17.
^ W illia m s , p. 272.
25
balanced associations with a ll the major powers,""*^ both in the
Communist bloc and in the non-Communist world.
The Congress's L im ita tio n o f

American Involvement Abroad
A fte r the signing o f the Paris Agreement o f January 1973, the
United States withdrew some o f i t s m i l i t a r y forces from Indochina.
When the war resumed again in Vietnam, the Vietnamese v io la te d the
Paris Agreement. The United States was not in a p o sitio n to involve
i t s e l f in the war again, due to the fa c t th a t the United States
government was r e s tr ic te d by Congressional ru le in August 1973,
when Congress ordered an end to American involvement in the Indo-

18
china war. I t meant th a t American bombing o f the Vietnamese
t e r r i t o r y came to a h a lt. This r e s t r i c t i o n o f Presidential powers

19
was "imposed by the Congress on a ll fu tu re a c tio n ." Following
th a t, Congress passed a re s o lu tio n , the War Powers Resolution in
November 1973. This re s o lu tio n , overrode the veto o f President
Nixon w ith respect to the United States could not punish and r e t a l
ia te against Vietnam m i l i t a r i l y f o r i t s v io la tio n o f the Paris
Agreement. According to Thanat Khoman, former Thai Foreign M in is te r
s ta tin g th a t th is Congress's r e s t r i c t i o n gave the Vietnamese a
p o s itio n o f advantage, "Hanoi recognized the sig n ific a n c e o f
^ M e lv in Gurtov, "S ecurity by Proxy: The Nixon Doctrine

and Southeast A sia ," in Mark W. Zacher and R. Stephen Milne, eds.,
C o n flic t and S t a b i l i t y in Southeast A s ia , p. 233.
18Chawla, p. 26.
19
Ib id . , p. 27.
26
Congress's decisions which shaped American p o lic y in Cambodia and

20
Vietnam" because Vietnam believed th a t l e g i s l a t iv e r e s tr ic tio n s
confirmed th a t there would not be a m i l i t a r y inte rve n tio n by the
United States. In th is respect, Thanat Khoman questioned the
United States p o s itio n in the whole o f Asia and "raised doubts about
21
how e ffe c tiv e i t w i l l play i t s fu tu re ro le as a great power"
because the President of the United States was lim ite d in his power by
Congressional ru le and was not independent to take action in conduct
ing his foreign o o lic y in regard to other nations. As a r e s u lt o f
t h is ru le how could the United States keep i t s commitments in r e la tio n
to i t s a l l i e s in p a r tic u la r and other fore ign nations. This
Congressional ru le by placing firm legal r e s t r ic t io n s on the
executive, made the f u l f i l l m e n t o f i t s e a r li e r commitments

22
impossible.
As described e a r l i e r , there were the consequences o f th is
Congressional r e s t r i c t i o n . Thai leaders had doubts about the United
States commitments toward Thailand, e sp e cia lly on defense matters.
As expressed in the Thanat-Rusk Communique o f 1952, the United
States would come to defend Thailand in case o f Communist aggression
on Thai t e r r i t o r y . Would the United States regard the preservation
o f the independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f Thailand as v i t a l
20
Thanat Khoman, "The New Equation of World Power and It s
Impact on Southeast A sia," Orbis: A Journal o f World A ff a ir s 20
(Fall 1976): 613.
21 I b i d . , p. 614.
22
Robert A. Scalapino, Asia and the Road Ahead: Issue f o r
the Major Powers. (Berkeley: U n iv e rsity o f C a lifo r n ia Press,
1975), p. 262.
27
to the national in t e r e s t o f the United States i t s e l f . Thailand
worried about i t s s e c u rity on the northeastern and eastern f r o n tie r s
bordering with the Communist states o f Indochina.
Furthermore, the "War Powers Resolution" imposed by the
Congress,
places lim it a t io n s upon the prerogatives o f the executive

branch in the intro d u c tio n o f United States Armed Forces in to
h o s t i l i t i e s , o r in to s itu a tio n s where imminent involvement in
h o s t i l i t i e s is c le a r ly indicated by the circumstances, and to
the continued use o f such forces in h o s t i l i t i e s or in such
s itu a tio n .
This r e s t r a in t aimed at pressuring the President o f the United
States in to informing Congress before making any decision to deploy
United States Armed Forces abroad. For example, i t "mandates th a t
the president informs the Congress w ith in 48 hours i f American

,,,24
roops become involved in h o s t i l i t i e s abroad" and i t orders "the
president to terminate engagement of troops a ft e r 60 days unless the

25
Congress has declared war." The wars in the world today, mostly,
are undeclared war, lik e w is e the wars in Southeast Asia. For
Thailand, i t faces wars o f f i g h tin g Communist insurgents supported
openly by external powers. They t r i e d to capture t e r r i t o r y from
w ith in and then the captured area under t h e i r control was declared
as a lib e ra te d area. This type o f war is not open war, but i t is
underground war, w ith the Communist elements supported openly by the
Communist nations. For example, the wars in Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam, were undeclared wars supported openly by the Communist
23Chawla, p. 27.
24Ib id . 251bi d.
nations. In th is kind o f war, the United States Armed Forces cannot
become involved. I t is hard to forsee, when the United States can
a s s is t i t s a l l i e s in fu tu re armed c o n f l ic t s , or come to defend i t s
a l l i e s in such s itu a tio n s when la rg e -sca le Communist elements
a tta c k , supported openly by Communist nations. At th a t time the
United States w i l l lose i t s c r e d i b i l i t y among i t s a l l i e s . I t may be
said th a t the war powers re s o lu tio n is not in the in te r e s t o f Thai
s e c u rity needs. In t h is respect, Thailand f o r i t s se c u rity needs,
had to "begin to maneuver away from Washington and toward Peking"
and Thai fo re ig n p o lic y had to s h i f t toward a more open dialogue

27
w ith the Communists o f Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Thai leaders
hoped th a t Thailand's s e c u rity needs could best be protected by
such a s h i f t in i t s foreign p o lic y . As a re s u lt o f the war powers
re s o lu tio n , Thailand no longer expected any United States commitment
f o r i t s s e c u rity .
U.S. Mayaguez Ship Incident
The Mayaguez ship, a U.S. merchant ship w ith 39 crewmen, was
seized by the Cambodian Naval Forces in the Gulf o f Thailand on
May 12, 1975. The United States took immediate action by f ly in g
1,100 U.S. marines to Thailand to take part in the Mayaguez rescue
Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissin g e r. (New York: Dell

Publishing Co., In c ., 1975), p. 322.
27
W illiam Bradley, David M o rre l, David Szanton, and Stephen
Young, Thailand, Domino, By D e fa u lt—The 1976 Coup' and Im plication
fo r U.S. P o lic y . (Athens: Center f o r In te rn a tio n a l Studies, Ohio
State U n iv e rs ity Press, 1979), p. 18.
29
operation without consulting the Thai government about the use o f

28
Thai bases. The Thai government and i t s people p u b lic ly voiced
t h e i r outrage at the v io la tio n o f Thai sovereignty by the United
States. The government of Prime M in is te r K ukrit Pramoj stated
p u b lic ly th a t the United States v io la te d Thai t e r r i t o r y in rescuing
the Mayaguez ship and i t s crewmen. I t used Thai t e r r i t o r y fo r
m i l i t a r y operation without the permission o f the Thai government.
Thailand accused the United States to have acted w ith l i t t l e thought
o f the consequences to Thailand when i t landed 1,100 marines to free

29
the Mayaguez from the Cambodian Naval Forces. Thailand was
accused by the Communist nations to have cooperated with the United
States when they invaded Cambodia using the Mayaguez as a reason fo r
invasion. For example, one o f the possible consequences o f th is
action is th a t while Cambodia cannot r e t a lia t e against the United
States i t may r e t a lia t e against Thailand. I t was hard f o r Thailand
to remove th is misunderstanding between Thailand and i t s Communist
neighbors as a re s u lt o f the United States rescue operation o f the
Mayaguez. In a d d itio n , Thailand blamed the Ford Adm inistration fo r
having f a ile d to n o t if y the government o f Prime M in iste r K ukrit
Pramoj th a t i t planned to land the marine contingent on Thai so il
and use American planes stationed there f o r such operation.
The government o f Thailand, whose t e r r i t o r y was used by the
United States Armed Forces f o r a m i l i t a r y operation in Cambodia,
OO
E d ito ria ls On F ile 6 (May 16-31 , 1975): 550.
30
lodged a strong protest to the United States government about the use
30
o f Thai t e r r i t o r y and recalled i t s ambassador from Washington. In
the note o f p ro te s t, i t accused the United States o f v io la tio n o f

31
Thai sovereignty and stated the Thai p o s itio n th a t Thailand, in
whatever s itu a tio n , did not wish to become involved in the dispute
between the United States and Cambodia over the Mayaguez in c id e n t.
In order to show Thai outrage as described above, Thailand in s is te d
th a t the United States withdraw a l l U.S. m i l i t a r y forces stationed

32
in various bases on Thai s o il w ith in one year. This d ra s tic action
was the d ir e c t consequence of the fa c t the United States used Thai
s o il f o r a m i l i t a r y operation in Cambodia. In th is respect, i t
considered th a t the United States did not respect Thailand as a
sovereign nation and misused Thailand's a llia n c e w ith the United
States. I t s alignment w ith the United States was fo r mutual in te re s t
and on an equal basis. Furthermore, Thailand accused the United
States to have disregarded the consequences o f i t s action f o r Thai
s e c u r ity , to have created misunderstanding w ith the Communist regime
o f Cambodia in p a r tic u la r and Communist nations in general. A
r e s u lt o f t h is United States a c tio n , was to accelerate Thailand's
review o f i t s p o lic y o f alignment with the United States f o r i t s
s e c u rity needs. I t gave a reason fo r the K u krit government to c a ll
30
Justum M. van der Kroef, "Hanoi and ASEAN: A New Confront
a tion in Southeast A sia ," Asia Quarterly 4 (1976): 258.
31 E d ito ria ls On F ile 6 (May 16-31 , 1975): 548.
32I b i d . , p. 550.
31
fo r a re v isio n o f a l l e x is tin g tr e a tie s and agreements w ith the
United States. For th is purpose, the Thai government sent a note to
the government o f the United States in reaction to the Mayaguez

33
in c id e n t. In th is note i t stated " i t s in te n tio n to review a l l the
34
e x is tin g b ila t e r a l agreements" f o r Thai s e c u rity purposes, in order
to preserve Thai sovereignty as a n a tio n , i t s independence and
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y a f t e r the Vietnam war.
As described e a r l i e r , there were some in d ica tio n s o f the
f a i lu r e o f the United States containment p o lic y . For example, there
were the announcement o f Nixon d o ctrine in 1969, Nixon's o f f i c i a l
v i s i t to mainland China in 1972, the Congress imposed r e s t r ic t io n s on
American involvement abroad, and l a s t l y , the United States v io la tio n
o f Thai sovereignty in the rescuing operation o f the Mayaguez.
These fa c to rs o f development served as fa c to rs fo r Thailand to
review i t s p o lic y o f close a llia n c e w ith the United States which i t
adopted since the end o f World War I I . In th is respect, Thailand,
in order to adjust i t s e l f to the new r e a l i t i e s o f the post Vietnam
war s itu a t io n , has adopted an independent foreign p o lic y . With th is
independent fo re ign p o lic y , Thailand is no longer aligned w ith any
bloc o f n ations, or any bloc o f major power o f the world. The Thai
government in conducting an independent fore ign p o lic y , is attempting
to keep a balance o f re la tio n s among the major powers in the world.
With th is p o lic y , Thailand leaders th in k th a t i t w i l l serve best
33
Sarasin V irap h o l, Directions in Thai Foreign P o lic y .
(Singapore: I n s t i t u t e o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), p. 30.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
Thai national in te re s ts in the present s itu a tio n , e sp ecia lly in the
post Vietnam war s itu a tio n . In the post Vietnam war s itu a tio n , the
Communist states o f Indochina are on the Thai border and there is no
sta te to serve as a b u ffe r between them and Thailand.
The American containment p o lic y to preserve the non-Communist
states from being c o n tro lle d by the Communist collapsed in 1975. It
caused a major s h i f t in Thai fore ign p o lic y . This f a i lu r e caused as
a d ir e c t consequence the United States to abandon the containment

35
p o lic y and renounce i t s world-wide r e s p o n s ib ilit ie s , abandoned
i t s a l l i e s in Southeast Asia. The United States "reduced American
m i l i t a r y presence and urged each nation to r e ly la rg e ly on i t s own

36
resources to preserve i t s national independence and s e c u r ity ."
This abandonment o f United States containment p o lic y was followed
by President Nixon's o f f i c i a l v i s i t to mainland China in 1972 and
the Congress imposed r e s t r i c t i o n on American involvement abroad.
These developments were inte rpre te d as a s h i f t o f United States
p o lic y and an abandonment o f i t s a l l i e s . In a d ditio n to these, the
U.S. Mayaguez in c id e n t in the Gulf o f Thailand in 1975 created more
misunderstanding between Thailand and the United States. These
fa c to rs had a considerable impact on Thai foreign p o lic y , Thai
leaders reviewed Thailand's close a llia n c e with the United States
35
Thanat Khoman, "Thailand in the Midst o f Change," in
M. Rajaratnam and Lim So Jean, eds., Trends in Thailand.
(Singapore: U n iv e rs ity o f Singapore Press, 1973), p. 109.
Frank C. D arling , "Thai Diplomacy Tested As Major Powers

Revive Competition," The Southeast Asia Record 1 (June 15-21, 1979):
11.
33
by closing the United States m i l i t a r y bases on Thai so il and asking
a l l American m i l i t a r y units to leave Thailand. This action opened
the way f o r Thailand to e sta b lish some kind o f balanced re la tio n s
w ith mainland China and the new Communist regimes o f Indochina--
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. In other words, t h is major s h i f t o f
Thai fo re ig n p o lic y was to accommodate to the new s itu a tio n of the
post Vietnam war and was a r e s u lt o f the United States abandonment
o f i t s containment p o lic y .
CHAPTER IV
RECOGNITION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Mainland China
In the past, Thailand had considered mainland China to be a
major supporter o f Thai insurgency. This was due, f i r s t , to China's
paramount geographical loca tio n in Asia and, secondly, to her
tr a d itio n a l influence on the overseas Chinese community. Thailand
has the largest Chinese population o f any country in Southeast Asia,
about 10 percent of the to ta l population."' Overseas Chinese have
played a great ro le in the a f f a i r s of Southeast Asian nations,
p a r t ic u la r ly through t h e i r control of economic l i f e o f d if fe r e n t
regions. T h ird ly , Thailand has recognized China as a major Asian

?
power, "she is a major power situated closest to Thailand,"
especially in the aftermath o f China's a cq u is itio n of nuclear weapons.
China, with i t s nuclear weapons p o te n tia l, could play a constructive
role in the a ffa ir s o f Southeast Asian nations. In recognition o f
these r e a l i t i e s , a ft e r China had been admitted to the United Nations
in 1971, the Thai government "had informed the Chinese through t h ir d
^ N uechterlin, p. 97.
2
A Speech delivered by the Thai Prime M in is te r Kriangsak
Chomanon at the Foreign Correspondents Club o f Hona Kong on
A p ril 6, 1978, Foreign A ffa ir s B u lle tin : (Bangkok) Thailand 18
(April-June 19720! 97
34
35
countries th a t i t was interested in developing contacts with Peking
and had begun trade study in a n tic ip a tio n o f the le g a liz a tio n o f
3
trade with China." China, in response to Thai in te n tio n s , decided
to in v it e the Thai table tennis team to v i s i t China fo r p a r tic ip a tio n
in the f i r s t Afro-Asian Table Tennis Tournament in China in 1973.
This team was led by P ra s it Kanjanawat in his capacity in charge o f
trade a f f a i r s o f Thailand as the representative o f the Thai government.
He was the f i r s t high ranking Thai o f f i c i a l to hold a t a l k with the
Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Peking on p o l i t i c a l and economic

4
matters. S h o r t l y th e re a fte r the Thai badminton team toured China,
in August o f 1973; t h is bandminton team was accompanied by the
D ire cto r General o f the P o l it ic a l Department of the Thai M in is try of

5
Foreign A f f a ir s . In re tu rn , China sent i t s table tennis team to
Thailand in June 1973, accompanied by o f f i c i a l s o f the Chinese
Foreign M in is try . At th is tim e, China and Thailand talked p o li t i c a l
and economic matters o f mutual in te re s t. Further development o f th is
sport diplomacy led to economic contact when in December 1973 the
Thai Deputy Foreign M iniste r Chatichai Choonhavan led a Thai
delegation to China to negotiate the purchase o f diesel fuel f o r the
r e l i e f o f the Thai energy c r i s i s . ^ In return f o r China's goodwill
gesture, Thailand's National Assembly abolished the law o f no trade
with China7 by relaxing cne trade embargo with China, amending the
^Clough, p. 200. ^Viraphol, p. 19.
^Viraphol, p. 20. ® Ib id ., p. 21
7I b i d . , p. 22.
36
e x is tin g trade re g ula tio ns, and e s ta b lish in g a state trading

g
company through which trade w ith mainland China would be conducted.
In other words, trade with China could be conducted through
government to government channels, and p riv a te companies could
channel t h e i r trade w ith China through government agencies.
A fte r trading contacts between the two governments had been
established as channels o f conducting trade between China and
Thailand, and fo llo w in g the d e te rio ra tio n of the s itu a tio n in
Indochina, the government o f Prime M in is te r K u k rit Pramoj on March
19, 1975 made a p o lic y statement to the Parliament s ta tin g th a t:
in order to create balance in the re la tio n s w ith the big power,

th is government w i l l take steps fo r the recognition and
establishment of normal diplom atic re la tio n s h ip with the
People's Republic o f China and fo r the withdrawal o f foreign
troops from Thailand w ith in one year, taking in to consideration g
the s itu a tio n in th is region, and through f r ie n d ly negotia tio n s.
This statement was issued in order to improve re la tio n s
w ith mainland China. A fte r the f a l l of Phnom Penh and Saigon to
the Communists in A p ril 1975, Thailand moved to extend i t s recognition
to mainland China. For example, on July 1, 1975 Prime M in iste r
K u k rit Pramoj made an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to China and he announced his
government's recognition o f the government of mainland China and i t s
establishment o f diplom atic re la tio n s w ith the People's Republic o f
China. In the j o i n t communique o f July 1, 1975 between Thailand and
China, they emphasized "the p r in c ip le o f mutual respect f o r
8Clough, p. 200.
" Foreign A ff a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 15

(January-March 1975): 23^
37
sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , mutual non-aggression,
non-interference in each o th e r's in te rn a l a f f a i r s , e q u a lity and
mutual b e n e fit, and peaceful coexistence."^0 This communique
indicated th a t a ll major issues between the two nations had been
resolved by peaceful means. In th is communique Thailand had
recognized "the government o f the People's Republic o f China as the
sole legal government o f China, acknowledging the p o sitio n o f the
Chinese government th a t there is but one China and th a t Taiwan is an
in te g ra l p a rt o f Chinese t e r r i t o r y , C h i n a , in return f o r Thai
recognition o f the status o f Taiwan as an in te g ra l pa rt of mainland
China, agreed "to respect the independence, sovereignty and

12
te rrito ria l i n t e g r i t y o f Thailand." This special emphasis in the
j o i n t communique o f July 1, 1975 served as the basis f o r fu rth e r
r e la tio n s between Thailand and mainland China. The recognition and
establishment o f diplom atic re la tio n s w ith mainland China was a
r e f le c t io n o f Thai independent foreign p o lic y as announced by the
government o f Prime M in is te r K u k rit Pramoj a f t e r the f a i l u r e o f the
United States' containment p o lic y and the collapse o f the government
o f the Indochinese states to the Communists in 1975. Thailand
sought to accommodate i t s e l f in order to have good re la tio n s with a ll
the big powers. This p o lic y , i t was believed, would serve best the
in te re s ts o f Thailand in the new s itu a tio n o f the post-Vietnam War
p eriod, w ith the Communist states on the Thai border and no other
^ ° J o in t Communique o f July 1, 1975 between Thailand and

China on establishment o f diplom atic r e la tio n s , News B u l l e t i n ,
No. 08/1975, July-August 1975, p. 1.
11 Ib id . 121b i d.
38
states serving as a b u ffe r between them. In other words, Thailand
has extended i t s recognition and has established diplom atic re la tio n s
as a r e a liz a tio n o f the Thai p o lic y which had been expressed in the
government's statements on several occasions, f c y' i t wished to have
f r i e n d l y t ie s w ith a ll countrie s, both Communist and non-Communist,
in s p ite o f t h e i r differences in p o l i t i c a l , economic, or social
systems. Of course, t h is p o lic y is based on the p r in c ip le of mutual
respect f o r independence, sovereignty, t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , and
non-interference in in te rn a l a f f a i r s .
To fu r th e r development o f re la tio n s between Thailand and
China, on March 29, 1978 Thai Prime M in is te r Kriangsak Chomanon

13
paid an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to mainland China. This v i s i t sought to
strengthen e x is tin g re la tio n s between the two countries in matters
o f mutual in t e r e s t and common concern, e sp ecia lly the cause of peace
and s t a b i l i t y in the Southeast Asia region, as well as trade
cooperation between Thailand and China. The s p e c ific re su lts o f the
second Thai Premier's v i s i t to China may be summarized as fo llo w s:
Two agreements, one on trade and the other on s c i e n t i f i c and

technical cooperation, were concluded. These two agreements
provide a broad framework w ith in which to expand mutual
b e n e ficia l cooperation between the two countries.
The Chinese government o f f i c i a l l y stated i t s f u l l support o f

ASEAN in i t s endeavor to forge regional cooperative undertakings
as well as the a s so c ia tio n 's aim to estab lish a Zone of Peace,
Freedom and N e u tr a lity in Southeast Asia.
The Chinese government expressed i t s appreciation o f the Thai

government's domestic and foreign p o lic ie s , p a r t ic u la r ly th a t of
r e la tio n s h ip with a ll countries irre s p e c tiv e o f t h e i r adminis
t r a t i v e , economic and social system.
^ News B u l l e t i n , No. 03/1978, March-April 1978, p. 1.
39
The Chinese government kindly offered to s e ll to Thailand a

ce rta in q u an tity of crude o il at a r e la t iv e l y favorable p rice.
This v i s i t marked the beginning o f a new phase in Thai-
Chinese re la tio n s and b e tte r prospects f o r peace. This might be
regarded as a concrete step by which i t can be hoped th a t Thailand
and China w i l l fu rth e r develop t h e i r re la tio n s fo r the b e n e fit of
the two nations as well as Southeast Asia as a whole. Thailand
needs peace and s t a b i l i t y , and China wishes to keep th is region in
i t s sphere o f influence. A fte r China lo s t Cambodia to Vietnam in
1979 and l o s t i t s influence throughout the Indochinese states to
the Soviet Union, China reviewed i t s previous p o lic ie s in th is
region, including her previous p o lic y o f supporting wars of
lib e r a tio n in the form o f local insurgency. China adopted a p o licy
o f cooperation with the non-Communist states o f Southeast Asia.
China wishes to e sta b lish i t s influence in the non-Communist states
o f Southeast Asia to prevent Soviet influence in the Indochinese
states from spreading to other states in th is region. In th is
respect, Thailand needs China to keep the Vietnamese and Soviets
from expanding t h e i r influences in to Southeast Asia, p a r t ic u la r ly
through the eastern and northeastern Thai borders with the Indochinese
states.
Communist Vietnam
A fte r the f a l l o f the Indochinese states to the Communists,
Vietnam emerged as the most powerful states w ith in the
14
I b i d . , p. 3.
40
15
region, "having emerged from the Indochina war as the strongest
and most aggressive m i l i t a r y power in Southeast Asia.""*® Its
m i l i t a r y strength was enhanced with various kinds o f weapons
captured a f t e r the United States l e f t Vietnam in 1975. With the
success o f Communist Vietnam in capturing South Vietnam in 1975,
the f a l l o f Laos and Cambodia to Communist control served as a
reminder to Thailand th a t i t s neighbors had become Communists,
leaving no other states to serve as a b u ffe r between them. Of
course, these changes a ffe c t Thailand's s e c u rity , p a r t ic u la r ly ori
the eastern and northeastern Thai borders with the Indochinese
states. The northeastern region o f Thailand is composed o f 16
provinces with approximately 32 percent o f Thailand's land area and
30 percent o f the p o p u la t io n . ^ H is t o r i c a ll y t h is region has been
considered as the center o f movements opposing the central government
because i t is located in the northeast, close to Laos and Communist
Vietnam, and i t s poverty and backwardness are f e r t i l e ground fo r
in s u rre c tio n . These geographical conditions place Communist Vietnam
in a good p o sitio n to provide aid to the Thai insurgents. The
u ltim a te o b je ctiv e o f insurgency " is to cause the downfall o f the
Thai government and p o l i t i c a l system and to replace i t w ith a

15
Richard W. Mansbach, "Southeast Asia in the Global P o l i t i
cal System," Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies 9 (March 19781:
126.
^John B. Haseman, "Thailand and the R e a litie s o f Southeast

A sia ," M i li t a r y Review L7 (May 1977): 87.
^Stephen I. Alpern, "Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A

New Cause f o r Alarm," Asian Survey 15 (August 1975): 685.
41
I O
re v o lu tio n a ry system." For th is purpose, Communist Vietnam has
established a sophistica te d support system a t several points of

19
entry along the Thai-Laotian and the Cambodian borders. These
Vietnamese a c t i v i t i e s along the Thai borders w ith Laos and Cambodia
pose a p o te n tia l th re a t and an immediate danger to Thai s e c u rity ,
p a r t i c u l a r ly with Vietnam a s s is tin g and supplying the Thai insurgents

20
in northeastern Thailand in t h e i r armed struggle against Thai
armed forces along the northeastern Thai border.
Thailand recognizes the Vietnamese p o te n tia l th re a t to i t s
s e c u rity as stated above. A fte r the downfall o f Saigon in 1975,
Thailand was ready to a djust to the new r e a l i t i e s o f power in the
region, p a r t i c u l a r ly as Communist Vietnam which has emerged as the
most powerful state in the Indochinese peninsula. I t appears th a t
Communist Vietnam's ambition is to create a greater Indochinese
sta te in the Indochinese peninsula, composed o f Cambodia, Laos and
u n ifie d Vietnam. In th is greater Indochinese sta te s , "Vietnam wants
to play a dominant ro le in Indochina which she thinks necessary fo r
her s e c u rity , and is determined to act independently o f China as

21
well as in the re s t o f the w o rld ." In other words, i t desires to
c o n s titu te i t s e l f as a sin g le source o f leadership in t h is peninsula.
181bid. , p. 687. 191bid. , p. 691.

?n
Justum M. van der Kroef, "ASEAN, Vietnam, Southeast Asia's
Search fo r S e c u rity ," Asian Thought and Society: An In te rn a tio n a l
Review 3’ (A p ril 1978): 25.
21
Nguyen Manh Hung, "Beyond the Sino-Vietnamese C o n f lic t: A
New Power Alignment," The Southeast Asia Record 1 (Ju ly 6-12, 1979):
11.
42
The p rin c ip a l foundation o f Thailand's foreign p o lic y since
the end o f World War I I had depended upon a close p o l i t i c a l , m i li t a r y
and economic a llia n c e w ith the United States in containing Communism.
But a f t e r the conclusion o f the Vietnam war, Thailand moved "to

22
reach an amicable understanding with i t s neighbors," p a r t ic u la r ly
Communist Vietnam. This move came as a sign o f Thailand's s h if t in g
fo re ign p o lic y in order to adjust to the new s itu a tio n o f the post
Vietnam war. The f i r s t sign o f th is tendency was when Thailand
accepted the Vietnamese o f f i c i a l delegation led by Ambassador-at-
large Nguyen Minh Phuong who v is ite d Bangkok on May 16, 1975, to
23
disucss matters o f mutual concern, e sp ecia lly with respect to the
United States m i l i t a r y forces stationed on Thai s o i l , the return of
South Vietnamese planes which had entered Thai t e r r i t o r y w ith t h e i r
p il o t s fle e in g the Saigon government, and the r e p a tr ia tio n o f the

24
Vietnamese refugees who had been in Thailand since the 1950's .
This was a p o s itiv e development in the o f f i c i a l contact between
Thailand and Communist Vietnam. In the same month, May o f 1975,
came the v i s i t to Bangkok o f the Vietnamese delegation, led by Deputy
Foreign M in is te r Phan Hien, to discuss the normalization o f re la tio n s

25
between the two c o u ntrie s. In re tu rn , in order to maintain the
e x is tin g contact w ith Hanoi. Thai Foreign M in is te r Bhichai Rattakul
made an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Hanoi in August o f 1976 where he reached an
22
Norman Peagant, "Thailand's New V i s i t o r , " Far Eastern
Economic Review 88 (June 6, 1975): 16.
23Ib id . 24Ib id . 25Ib id .
43
agreement to e sta b lish diplom atic re la tio n s w ith Vietnam and he
issued the j o i n t communique o f August 6, 1976 on normalization of

26
diplom atic re la tio n s between Thailand and Communist Vietnam.
Thailand's recognition o f the Communist regime in Vietnam served as
the p rin c ip a l basis f o r Thailand to develop i t s fu r th e r re la tio n s
with other Communist regimes in the Indochinese peninsula and to
resolve the e x is tin g issues w ith them. One example is Vietnamese
n ationals in Thailand, about 50,000 to 60,000, who fle d to Thailand
as a r e s u lt o f the defeat o f France in the war a t Dien Bien Phu in
1954. Thailand demanded th a t the Vietnamese refugees be re p atria te d
to Communist Vietnam under the Rangoon Agreement o f 1959 between

27
Thailand and Communist Vietnam which Vietnam f a ile d to honor.
Further developments in the establishment o f diplomatic
r e la tio n s , came when Nguyen Duy T rin h , Vice Premier and Foreign
M in is te r o f Communist Vietnam, paid an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Thailand on
January 9, 1978. In the j o i n t communique of January 12, 1978
between Thailand and Communist Vietnam, both sides reaffirmed t h e ir
p rin c ip le s th a t:
The p o l i t i c a l system o f e ith e r country was s o le ly the internal

a f f a i r o f th a t country, and th a t differences in the p o li t i c a l
systems o f the kingdom o f Thailand and the S o c ia lis t Republic
o f Vietnam should not be any obstacle to the fu r th e r development
o f amicable re la tio n s and f r u i t f u l cooperation between the two
nations.
26
Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 16
(July-September 1976): 44!
^ Bangkok Post, September 8, 1978, part I , p. 1.

pO
Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 18
(J anuary - March 19787! TT.
44
The above a ffirm a tio n o f Thailand and Communist Vietnam
indicated both parties expressed t h e i r in te n tio n to have good
re la tio n s fo r the mutual b e n e fit of the two nations and the s t a b i l i t y
o f the region. This communique re fle c te d Thailand's basic foreign
p o lic y : Thailand wishes to develop f r ie n d ly tie s as well as
economic re la tio n s with a ll countries regardless o f t h e i r differences
in p o l i t i c a l , economic or social systems. This p o licy was developed
f o r the new s itu a tio n in the Indochinese peninsula in the post
Vietnam war period, in order to l i v e in peace with i t s new Communist
neighbors.
In a d d itio n , Thailand's recognition and normalization of
diplom atic re la tio n s with Communist Vietnam changed the a ttitu d e o f
Communist Vietnam towards Thailand. For example, Vietnamese Premier
Pham Van Dong made an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Thailand on September 6, 1978
when he declared th a t "Vietnam w i l l not support Communist insurgency

29
or other a c t i v i t i e s which w i l l adversely a ffe c t Thailand." While
he was in Thailand, he also made the statement th a t he w i l l respect
the independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Thailand and w i l l
avoid anything th a t would cause misunderstanding between the two

30
nations. He joined Thai leaders in saying th a t both nations " w ill
r e fr a in from in te r fe r in g in each o th e r's inte rna l a f f a i r s , from
carrying out subversive, d ir e c t or i n d ir e c t , against each other and

31
from using force or threatening to use force against each o th e r."
?Q
Bangkok Post, September 11, 1978, part I , p. 1.
45
These declarations were the f i r s t ever made by a top Vietnamese
leader, marking th a t Communist Vietnam had changed in i t s a ttitu d e
towards Thailand, p a r t ic u la r ly since Vietnam would not support
Communist insurgency and would respect the independence and
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f Thailand. The a lte r a tio n o f the Vietnamese
a ttitu d e towards Thailand is the d ir e c t r e s u lt o f Thailand's s h i f t
in i t s p o lic y : conducting a p o lic y o f rapproachment and peaceful
coexistence with Communist nations, in general, and i t s Communist
neighbors in Indochina, in p a r tic u la r .
Communist Regimes o f Cambodia and Laos
Thailand and Cambodia share common borders. In the past,
Cambodia served as a b u ffe r state between Thailand and Communist
Vietnam. A fte r the downfall of Cambodia to the Communist in 1975,
Thailand attempted to e sta b lish o f f i c i a l contact w ith the new regime
in Phnom Penh. In order to create a favorable atmosphere f o r o f f i c i a l
contacts, the government o f Prime M in iste r K u k rit Pramoj authorized
the Thai ambassador at the United Nations, Anan Panyarachun to make a
statemnt o f Thai p o lic y w ith respect to Indochina in his speech at
the T h ir t ie t h Session o f the United Nations General Assembly on
October 1, 1975. He declared th a t Thailand wished to estab lish
f r ie n d ly tie s and to l i v e in peace with i t s Indochinese neighbors
"on the basis o f mutual respect o f sovereignty, t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y

32
and non-interference in the in te rn a l a f f a i r s of each o th e r."
32
Foreign A ff a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 15
(October-December 1975): ET
This statement made by the government o f Prime M in iste r K u k rit
Pramoj conveyed i t s firm w illin g n e ss to l i v e together in peace and
a f r ie n d ly atmosphere with i t s Communist neighbors.
In October o f 1975, the Thai government in v ite d Ieng Sary,
Cambodian Deputy Prime M in is te r in charge o f Foreign A f f a ir s , to
v i s i t Thailand. A fte r long n e g o tia tio n s, both sides agreed on the

33
establishment o f diplom atic r e la tio n s between t h e i r two nations.
In the j o i n t communique between Thailand and Cambodia they affirmed
t h e i r common p rin c ip le s , th a t "the p o l i t i c a l , economic and social
systems o f the country was s o le ly the in te rn a l a f f a i r s o f the people
o f th a t country, and th a t external in te rfe re n ce shall not be

34
to le r a te d ." Both Thailand and Cambodia have agreed to conduct
t h e i r re la tio n s on the basis o f "mutual respect f o r the sovereignty
and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f each country, non-aggression and non
inte rfe ren ce in each o th e r's in te rn a l a f f a i r s , e q u a lity and mutual

35
b e n e f it ." The communique indicated th a t both Thailand and i t s
neighbor Cambodia wish to l iv e in peace, th a t t h e i r d iffe re nce in
p o l i t i c a l , economic and social systems do not create obstacles fo r
peaceful coexistence. Both sides gave t h e i r pledge, "to r e fr a in
from using i t s own t e r r i t o r y or from allow ing the use o f i t s
t e r r i t o r y by any t h i r d country in any form, d ir e c t ly or i n d i r e c t l y ,

36
in v io la tio n o f the above mentioned p r in c ip le s ."
The above j o i n t communique serves as declaration of
Thailand's recognition o f the Communist regime o f Cambodia, the
3 3 ,,.. 34,, . , 3 5 ,,. , 36,, . ,

Ib id . Ib id . Ib io . Ib id .
47
government o f Prime M in is te r Pol Pot. But, a f t e r the Vietnamese
armed in te rv e n tio n in Cambodia a t the end o f 1978, Vietnam in s ta lle d
another government led by Heng Samrin. Cambodia is presently
divided between two governments, one in Phnom Penh led by Heng Samrin
and another regime in the ju n g le led by Pol Pot's group. In th is
s itu a t io n , Thailand is not going to recognize the Heng Samrin
regime because Thailand s t i l l recognizes the Pol Pot government as

37
the le g itim a te government o f Cambodia. I t is necessary to
c l a r i f y Thailand's p o s itio n on tnese two issues: Thailand does not
give material support to the Pol Pot regime in i t s armed struggle
against the Vietnamese backed regime in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese
forces in Cambodia, but has recognized i t as the le g itim a te government
o f Cambodia. Thailand regards the Heng Samrin regime, in s t a lle d by
Vietnam in place o f the Pol Pot government through armed in te rve n tio n
in Cambodian t e r r i t o r y and Cambodian in te rn a l a f f a i r s , as an
i l l e g i t i m a t e government. Thailand w i l l not accept a Vietnamese

38
domination o f Cambodian t e r r i t o r y because th is change poses a
great th re a t to Thai s e c u rity and the fu tu re o f the Southeast Asian
region as a whole.
As regards Laos, as we already know, Laos is ruled by an
37
An Exclusive Interview o f Dr. Upadit Pachariyangkun,
M in is te r o f Foreign A f f a ir s o f Thailand, given to Miss Ing Galtung,
Correspondent o f Radio Norway at the M in is try o f Foreign A f f a ir s ,
Bangkok, on August 24, 1979. Press Release, No. M. 42/2522,
August 1979, p. 1.
38
Joe Fernandez, "Southeast Asia May Face Danger of
B a lk a n is a tio n ," The Southeast Asia Record 1 (J u ly 27-August 2, 1979):
11.
48
a llia n c e government, composed o f n e u t r a l i s t , r i g h t i s t and l e f t i s t
groups. Thailand recognized the composition o f the Laotian govern
ment and has maintained diplom atic re la tio n s w ith the government in
power in Laos. U ntil the f a l l o f Saigon and Phnom Penh in 1S75 to
the Communists, the tra n s fe r o f power in Laos to the l e f t i s t s had
begun gradually by peaceful means. During th is change o f power in
Laos, Thailand did not withdraw i t s recognition o f the new Laotian
regime. But on the co n tra ry, Thailand has maintained fr ie n d ly tie s
with the government in power in Laos and has maintained diplomatic
representatives in several c i t i e s in Laos. Thailand and Laos share
a common border o f 900 miles and, in the past, Laos and Cambodia had
served as a b u ffe r state between Thailand and Communist Vietnam.
A fte r the end o f the Vietnam war, Thailand declared a p o lic y o f
peaceful coexistence with i t s neighbors, pledging to l i v e in peace
w ith i t s new neighbors on the Indochinese peninsula. In th is
respect, Thailand always stated th a t i t wishes to develop fr ie n d ly
tie s as well as economic re la tio n s with a ll countries whatever t h e i r
differences in p o l i t i c a l , economic and social systems. In order to
re a liz e th is p o lic y and to show Thailand's recognition o f the
Communist regime o f Laos, Thai Prime M in iste r Kriangsak Chomanon

39
made an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Laos on January 6, 1979. The j o i n t
communique between.Thai land and Laos affirmed th a t t h e i r common
p rin c ip le s are:
Respect f o r each o th e r's independence, sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l

i n t e g r i t y , respect fo r each o th e r's r i g h t to e x is t without
^News B u lle t in , No. 05/1979, April-May 1979, p. 2.
49
outside in te rv e n tio n and th r e a t, non-interference in each o th e r's

inte rna l a f f a i r s and re fra in in g from carrying out subversive
ac+s against -each other d ir e c t ly or i n d i r e c t l y , settlement o f
disputes by peaceful means if, accordance with the Charter o f the
United Nations and on the basis o f e q u a lity , r e fra in in g from
th re a t or use o f force against each other and from allowing
other p arties to use one's t e r r i t o r y as a base f o r in te rv e n tio n ,
or aggressive acts against other countries in whatever
This j o i n t communique between Thailand and Laos may serve
as a basis f o r fu r th e r re la tio n s between the two nations. In
response to the Thai leaders v i s i t to Laos, Laotian Premier Kaysone
Phomviharn made an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Thailand from A p ril 1-4, 1979
during which he assured the Thai leaders th a t "the present government
in Laos, which has become in to existence in 1975, would not pose a

41
th re a t to any country including Thailand." He made a pledge to
prevent anti-Thai government insurgents from using areas along

42
t h e i r common border as sanctuaries. This was the f i r s t statement
ever made by the Laotian top leader, pledging to work with Thailand
to suppress insurgent a c t i v i t i e s along the Thai-Laotian border.
With the assurance o f the Laotian leader, Thailand can be assured
th a t i t s independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y can be maintained
so long as Kaysone Phomviharn remains in power as Laotian Prime
M iniste r. He fu r th e r declared th a t "Thailand and Laos would maintain
t h e i r good re la tio n s h ip and b ro th e rly cooperation despite the

43
difference in ideologies and government systems." This development
40
Ib id .
47 \
The Southeast Asia Record 1 (Ma>-ch 29-April 5, 1979): 12.
43.
News B u l l e t i n , No. 05/1979, April-May 1979, p. 2.
o f re la tio n s proved th a t the Thai objectives o f peaceful coexistence
with i t s neighbors are welcome among the Indochinese states. As
proof, Thailand has successfully established diplom atic re la tio n s
with i t s Indochinese neighbors. In th is connection, Premier Kaysone
Phomviharn made a statement to praise Thailand's fore ign p o lic y
s ta tin g : "Thailand had become a good example fo r re la tio n s between

44
countries o f d if f e r e n t social systems." Moreover, Premier Keysone
Phomviharn announced his agreement with Thailand "on transformation

45
o f the Mekong River in to a border o f peace and fr ie n d s h ip ." For
th is purpose, "Thailand and Laos fu r th e r agreed to turn the e n tire
Thai-Laotian border—both the Mekong River and the land border—in to

46
a border o f peace and fr ie n d s h ip ," to make t h e i r common border
in to a zone o f peace and frie n d s h ip fo r the b e n e fit o f t h e i r people
on both sides o f the Mekong River.
In review o f the Thai foreign p o lic y with Communist cou ntrie s,
i t may be summarized th a t Thailand has achieved great success in
diplomacy w ith i t s former enemies toward peaceful coexistence. Thai
leaders believe th a t, w ith the present foreign p o lic y , Thailand may
survive as a nation in any s itu a tio n and may re ta in i t s independence,
sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . Thailand no longer aligns
i t s e l f with any bloc o f world powers and i t no longer regards
Communist countries as enemies o f the Thai nation. Thailand's
^ Southeast Asia Record 1 (March 29-April 5, 1379): 12.
45
News B u l l e t i n , No. 05/1979, April-May 1979, p. 2.
declared p o lic y is to e sta b lish f r ie n d ly re la tio n s w ith countries
o f d if f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l , economic and social systems. In th is
respect, Thailand is independent to conduct i t s fo re ign p o lic y f o r
the best o f Thai national in te re s ts . For example, the Thai Premier
K u k rit Pramoj v is it e d mainland China in 1975, and from then Thai
foreign p o lic y "was s h if t in g toward more open dialogue w ith Vietnam,

47
Cambodia and Laos," I t is hoped th a t w ith t h is s h i f t o f foreign
p o lic y Thailand's s e c u rity can best be protected from external
th re a t and Thailand can l iv e in peace p a r t ic u la r ly w ith Communist
China and i t s Communist neighbors o f Indochina. There were the main
o b jectives o f Thailand's recognition and establishment o f diplom atic
r e la tio n s w ith Communist cou ntrie s. One o f the p o s itiv e developments
is th a t
Chinese o f f i c i a l s have p u b lic ly stated th a t during the v i s i t s

by Thai, F i l i p i n o , and Malaysian missions to Peking th a t the
Chinese government urges Southeast Asian Chinese to th in k o f
themselves as members o f the nations in wbich they reside and
thus to become c itiz e n s o f these s ta te s .48
This statement indicated th a t China has altered i t s a ttitu d e toward
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. In th is respect, Thailand can
be sure th a t China would not provoke Chinese in Thailand to create
any in te rn a l disturbance and disorder which might pose a th re a t to
Thai national s e c u rity .
47
Bradley, M orrel, Szanton and Young, p. 18.
48
Guy J. Pauker, Frank H. Golay and Cynthia H. Enloe, eds.,
D iv e rs ity and Development in Southeast Asia. (New York: McGraw
H i l l Book Company, 1977), p. 175.
CHAPTER V
STRENGTHENING OF REGIONAL COOPERATION
WITH ITS NEIGHBORS—ASEAN
On a number o f occasions, Thailand has repeatedly stated
i t s p o lic y w ith emphasis on regional cooperation with i t s neighbors—
ASEAN. The Association o f Southeast Asian Nations composed o f
Indonesia, Malaysia, the P h ilip p in e s , Singapore and Thailand. The
Thai ASEAN p o lic y has become an in te g ra l part o f the present Thai
fo re ign p o lic y , good neighborliness p o lic y with ASEAN nations. For
example, in a recent Thai p o lic y statement, Thai Prime M in iste r
Kriangsak Chomanon said to the Parliament on June 7, 1979 th a t
Thailand would:
promote close re la tio n s w ith , and shall give f u l l support and

cooperation to , a l l member countries o f the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations in the economic, p o l i t i c a l and social
f i e l d s , and on the settlement of problems and crises which
a ffe c t the s t a b i l i t y and s e c u rity o f th is region o f the world,
having in view the progress and p ro s p e rity o f the member countries
o f the region. I t shall support a l l measures which w i l l be
aimed at e s ta b lish in g the Southeast Asian region as a Zone o f
Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a lit y . '
From th is p o lic y statement of the Thai government, i t can be
deduced th a t both Thailand and ASEAN have a sense o f r e s p o n s ib ility
to achieve the same goal: to bring about the s t a b i l i t y and s e c u rity
o f the region o f Southeast Asia, stressing the establishment of
Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u tr a lity . In other
~*News B u l l e t i n , No. 06/1979, May-June 1979, p. 2.

52
53
words, "Thailand is inte rested in strengthening the concept of

9
regionalism as a s t a b i li z i n g fa c to r in Southeast A s ia ." ”
Economic Cooperation
The Association o f Southeast Asian Nations was established
in Bangkok on August 8 , 1967, by the foreign m inisters o f Indonesia,
Malaysia, the P h ilip p in e s , Singapore and Thailand." From the ASEAN
accord o f August 8 , 1967, i t s main o b je ctive is purely economic,
social and c u lt u r a l. But ASEAN places special emphasis on economic
matters, encourages the development o f a common market fo r the

4
products o f ASEAN member s ta te s , coordinating t h e i r common products
in local and world markets, in order to avoid competition o f t h e i r
common goods. Also ASEAN has adopted a p o lic y o f p rice f ix in g fo r
t h e i r common products in world markets, taking a united stand in
facing world t a r i f f s on t h e i r products, and in maintaining a standard
o f t h e i r commodities.
I t is c le a r th a t ASEAN is "a regional organization committed

5
to economic growth, social progress and c u ltu ra l development."
ASEAN is committed to achieving s e lf - r e lia n c e in economic matters
fo r i t s members. They believe th a t ASEAN's s e lf- r e lia n c e in the
2
Haseman, p. 92.
3
ASEAN Documents, June 1978. (Bangkok: Information
Department, M in is try o f Foreign A f f a i r s , 1978), p. 1.
4
Seyom Brown, New Forces in World P o l i t i c s .
(D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1974), p. 194.
5
News B u lle t in , No. 10/1978, November-December 1978, p. 3.
54
economic f i e l d w i l l bring s t a b i l i t y and balance and may co n tribu te
to the maintenance o f peace in the region as a whole.
N eutralizatio n o f Southeast Asia
As already described, ASEAN is an organization f o r regional
cooperation of Southeast Asian nations. Its main o b je ctive is to
achieve economic, social and c u ltu ra l cooperation among i t s members.
But, however, by November o f 1971, ASEAN brought p o l i t i c s in to i t s
scope as an additional ob je ctive . This was announced by ASEAN in
i t s Kuala Lumpur declaration o f November 27, 1971, the Declaration
o f Southeast Asia as a Zone o f Peace, Freedom and N e u tra lity .^
This was done in order to make clear th a t: Indonesia, Malaysia,
the P h illip p in e s , Singapore and Thailand are "determined to exert
i n i t i a l l y necessary e ffo r t s to secure the recognition o f, and
respect f o r , Southeast Asia as a Zone o f Peace, Freedom and Neutral
i t y , free from any form or manner of interference by outside
powers. " 7 The concept o f the n e u tra liz a tio n o f Southeast Asia, is
meant to cover the e n tire region including Burma and the Indochinese
states. In other words, i t includes a ll nations in the region,
both Communist and non-Communist. ASEAN's declaration was made open
f o r p a r tic ip a tio n to a ll states in Southeast Asia. The la te Prime
M inister Tun Abdulrazak o f Malaysia addressed the ASEAN foreign
m inisters meeting in Kuala Lumpur in May 1975, c a llin g f o r an
6ASEAN Documents, June 1978, p. 15.
7Ib id .
55
extension of ASEAN to the re s t o f Southeast Asian nations--Burma,

Q
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. U ntil now, there has been no response
in support o f th is concept from Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
Burma, as a non-aligned n a tio n , so fa r is not interested in th is
idea, whereas the Indochinese states suspect the good inte ntio n s o f
the ASEAN decla ra tio n. Vietnam, fo r example, viewed ASEAN w ith

g
suspicion. Vietnam stated p u b lic ly th a t "ASEAN is nothing more than
an American s ta lk in g horse serving to r a l l y a ll pro-American
reactionary forces against the revolu tio n ary movement in Southeast
A sia . " 10
The ASEAN Declaration o f N e u tra lity o f Southeast Asia has
been seeking ways and means to bring about the r e a liz a tio n o f i t s
goal. For t h is purpose, "the great powers need to agree to respect
the neutral zone," 1 in which ASEAN1s nations have sought recognition
by the United States, the Soviet Union and mainland China. China
endorsed the concept in 1974 w ith the view th a t no single power
should dominate the region, opposed e specially to super-power

12
hegemony. In other words, China, supporting the aspira tio n s of
the t h ir d world nations, has endorsed ASEAN' s c a ll f o r the e s ta b lis h -

13
ment o f a Zone o f Peace, Freedom and N e u tra lity . In th is
connection, China o f f i c i a l l y informed the government o f Prime
M in iste r Kriangsak Chomanon o f China's endorsement of the ASEAN
°Simon, p. 418. °Simon, p. 432. 10Simon, p. 432.
^Langdon, p. 309. ^Simon, p. 430.
10News B u lle t in , No. 14/1977, November-December 1977, p. 23.
56
Declaration o f the N e u tr a lity o f the Southeast Asian region when he

14
v is it e d China in March o f 1978. The Soviet Union was unresponsive
15
to ASEAN's c a ll and generally skeptical o f the idea. I t c e r ta in ly
appears th a t the Soviet Union is not interested in the ASEAN
Declaration o f N e u tr a lity o f Southeast Asian region. As f o r the
United States, in the past i t has never endorsed the idea. This
changed with the recent v i s i t o f the United States Vice President
Walter F. Mondale to Thailand on May 4 and 5, 1978 when he informed
the Thai government th a t "the United States s t i l l have continued
in te re s ts in Southeast Asia, and th a t i t would co n trib u te as much
as i t could towards the peace and s t a b i l i t y in t h is pa rt o f the

16
w o rld ." A fte r t h i s , fo llo w in g the v i s i t o f the United States
A ssistant Secretary o f State f o r East Asia and P a c ific A f f a i r s ,
Pochard Holbrooke, on October 23, 1978, the United States s h ifte d
i t s stand on th is region. While he was in Bangkok, Holbrooke to ld
a press conference on October 25, 1978, th a t "the United States
supports the ASEAN concept o f a Zone o f Peace, Freedom, and
N e u tr a lity as a long-term goal and welcomed the emergence o f ASEAN as
a s t a b i li z i n g force in the r e g i o n . " ^ This statement, made by the
United States A ssistant Secretary o f State, re fle c te d his n a tio n 's
^ News B u l l e t i n , No. 09/1978, October-November 1978, p. 3.

15
Robert C. Horn, "The Soviet Perspective," In Sudershan
Chawla, Melvin Gurtov and Alain-Gerard Marsot, eds., Southeast
Asia Under the New Balance o f Power, p. 47.
~*6News B u l l e t i n , No. 04/1978, April-May 1978, p. 7.
^News B u lle tin , No. 09/1978, October-November 1978, p. 4.
57
p o s itio n on th is issue, and guaranteed support o f the idea in
p r in c ip le . Even though China f u l l y endorsed the establishment o f a
Zone o f Peace, Freedom and N e u tr a lity , and the United States
supported the p r in c ip le o f th is concept, i t is s t i l l a long way
from the r e a liz a tio n . One reason is th a t the Soviets o b je ct to the
idea. For example, the Soviet Union stated th a t "the Soviet Union,
18
c o n s is te n tly opposes closed p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y and economic blocs."
Such as the Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, but i t supports
ASEAN, " p a r t i c u l a r l y with respect to regional economic, social and
c u ltu r a l cooperation and to the fa c t th a t the Association is not o f

19
a m i l i t a r y ch a ra c te r." The Soviet Union considers th a t cooperation
in these f i e ld s would c o n trib u te to stronger peace and s e c u rity in
Asia and to the prevention o f war or use o f force in Southeast
Asia. Another problem e x is ts because both China and the United
States have not f u l l y implemented t h e i r statements o f support o f the
establishment o f Southeast Asia as a Zone o f Peace, Freedom and
N e u tr a lity . In th is respect, they f a ile d to force Soviet-backed
Vietnamese f o r c e s to withdraw from t h e i r occupation o f the Cambodian
te rrito ry . In other words, both China and the United States were
unable to guarantee peace and s t a b i l i t y in the region. These
nations do not do so because the Soviet Union does not cooperate
w ith them in support of ASEAN's Declaration o f the establishment o f
Southeast Asia as a Zone o f Peace, Freedom and N e u tr a lity as
^ News B u l l e t i n , No. 04/1979, March-April 1978, p. 9.
58
announced in the J o in t Declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia, the
P h ilip p in e s , Singapore, and Thailand in November 1971. ASEAN's
leaders also believed th a t peace might be achieved in the region,
or i f not the e n tir e region, then a t least peace among the ASEAN
members. In other words, the establishment o f Southeast Asia as a
Zone o f Peace, Freedom and N e u tr a lity is a long-term goal, depending
upon the balance o f power among major nations. The Thai government
is committed to bringing in to re a liz a tio n the ASEAN Declaration.
For th is purpose, i t supports a ll steps taken towards reaching th is
o b je c tiv e . Thai leaders believe th a t the ASEAN Declaration "o ffe rs

20
the hope f o r genuine and la s tin g peace in the re g io n ." This
represents Thailand's strong commitment to ASEAN, and th is p o licy
is in lin e with i t s p o lic y o f good neighbor!iness with border nations.
Opposition to the Vietnamese

Occupation o f Cambodia
The background of the Vietnamese occupation o f Cambodia is
t e r r i t o r i a l dispute in the Tay Ninh region northwest of Saigon and

21
in the old P a rro t's Beak o f Cambodia, ju s t west o f Saigon. Each
country claimed sovereignty over these portions of t e r r i t o r y . The
border dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam was made known to the
world by the Cambodian announcement o f i t s breaking diplomatic
r e la tio n s w ith Vietnam on December 31, 1977 charging Vietnam with
2D
News B u lle t in , No. 14/1977, November-December 1977,
p. 21.
21
"Cambodia's Admission o f Vietnam Border War A n tic lim a tic ,'
Los Angeles Times, January 1, 1978, part I , p. 8.
59
r\ p
t e r r i t o r i a l ambition. 11 Shortly a fte r th a t, Vietnamese forces
invaded Cambodian t e r r i t o r y , but were stopped by the Cambodian armed
forces a t the border. In December o f 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia
again. This time, the Pol Pot government was forced to move i t s
forces from Phnom Penh to the countryside outside Phnom Penh. Once
the Pol Pot government l e f t Phnom Penh, Vietnam in s ta lle d the leader
o f the United Front f o r National Salvation o f Cambodia, Heng Samrin,
to lead the government o f Cambodia. In other words, as a r e s u lt o f
the Vietnamese armed in te rve n tio n into the Cambodian t e r r i t o r y , the
Pol Pot government was toppled and replaced by the Heng Samrin
regime. This change led to a strong reaction from the ASEAN members.
Thailand and other ASEAN members issued a j o i n t statement in Bangkok
on January 13, 1979, declaring th a t ASEAN foreign m inisters strongly
deplored the armed inte rven tio n against the independence, sovereignty
23
and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f Cambodia, and called f o r "the
24
immediate withdrawal of the foreign forces from Cambodian t e r r i t o r y . "
This statement o f ASEAN was t o t a l l y ignored by Vietnam; the
Vietnamese government did not withdraw i t s forces from Cambodian
t e r r i t o r y as demanded. ASEAN brought the case to the United Nations
Security Council on March 16, 1979, proposed a re so lu tio n c a llin g fo r
an end to Vietnam's occupation o f Cambodia, but the measure was
23
"Thailand," Asia 1980 Year B ook-Far Eastern Economic
Review, (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review L td ., 1980), p. 292.
?4
Facts On F ile 39 (January 1-5, 1979): 28.
60
25
vetoed by the Soviet Union. In fu r th e r e f f o r t s . Thailand and other
ASEAN members held a meeting in Kluala Lumpur on August 16, 1979
to review i t s c a ll fo r Vietnam to withdraw i t s forces from Cambodia.
At th is meeting they agreed to bring the issue o f the Vietnamese
invasion o f Cambodia to a conference o f non-aligned states in Havana
in September 1979. At the conference they recommended th a t the Pol
Pot government should be recognized as the sole and legal government
o f Cambodia. ASEAN's j o i n t recognition o f the Pol Pot regime was
aimed at persuading other nations not to recognize the Vietnam
in s ta lle d regime o f Heng Samrin.
Furthermore, in order to force Vietnam to withdraw i t s forces
from Cambodia, Thailand and other ASEAN members sponsored the d r a ft
o f another re so lu tio n to the United Nations General Assembly on
November 14, 1979, c a llin g f o r the withdrawal o f Vietnamese forces
from th is area. The m a jo rity o f the United Nations General Assembly
members voted in favor o f ASEAN, c a llin g fo r the withdrawal o f a ll

27
foreign troops from Cambodian t e r r i t o r y , and c a llin g on Vietnam to
28
withdraw i t s 200,000 s o ld ie rs who supported Heng Samrin's regime.
Thus, ASEAN won a m a jo rity vote o f members o f the w orld 's body,
against the Vietnamese occupation o f Cambodia. On the same day,
s h o rtly a f t e r the United Nations General Assembly voted to c a ll f o r
25Facts On F ile 23 (March 23, 1979): 200.

26The Southeast Asia Record l (August 17-23, 1979): 1.
27
The Southeast Asia Record 1 (November 9-15, 1979): 1.
pO
The Southeast Asia Record 1 (December 7-13, 1979): 1.
Vietnam to withdraw i t s troops from Cambodia, Thai Foreign M in is te r
Upadit Pachariyangkun gave an inte rvie w to a group o f Scandinavian
Correspondents, he said th a t the ASEAN nations recognized the Pol

29
Pot regime as the sole and legal government o f Cambodia. This
inte rvie w was given by the Thai Foreign M in iste r on behalf o f ASEAN,
was confirmed l a t e r in the meeting o f the ASEAN foreign m iniste rs
in Kuala Lumpur on December 14, 1979 who reaffirm ed t h e i r recognition

30
o f the Pol Pot government. The purpose o f recognition was to
demonstrate th a t the Pol Pot regime was s t i l l in existence and to

r •? :?4* 4- l*>i/-i \ / 4 /■
■>+
• m
t i- j i w u iiw w ^ i wjjwi 9 «icuiiuiiii
In respect to the Cambodia and Vietnam c o n f l i c t , "Thailand
has always f i r m l y adhered to the p o lic y o f n e u t r a l i t y and non
involvement in the c o n f lic t s in Southeast Asia since the out-break of

31
h o s t i l i t i e s in 1978," namely the c o n f l i c t between the Pol Pot
regime and the government o f Vietnam. Thailand, in order to maintain
i t s n e u t r a l i t y , has not allowed supplies o f arms to pass through i t s
t e r r i t o r y to the b e llig e re n ts in Cambodia and has not allowed i t s
t e r r i t o r y to be used in any way to aid the Pol Pot group or any other
29
An Interview given by Dr. Upadit Pachariyangkun, Thai
Foreign M in iste r to a group o f Scandinavian Correspondentsat the
Thai Foreign M in is try on November 14, 1979, Press Release, No. M.
57/2522, November 1979, p. 2.
in
ASEAN J o in t Statement, December 14, 1979, Press Release,
No. 144/2522, December 1979, p. 2.
31
A statement made by Dr. Pracha Guna-Kasem, Permanent
Representative o f Thailand to the United Nations on s itu a tio n in
Cambodia on November 14, 1979, Press Release, No. 143/2522,
November 1979, p. 4.
62
39
groups in Cambodia. ^ Besides these acts, Thailand has disarmed any
Pol Pot s o ld ie r who escaped the Vietnamese forces and fle d in to Thai
te rrito ry . The same statement is given to other groups in the
c o n flic ts :
I f they are so ld ie rs they w i l l be disarmed, i f they do not allow
themselves to be disarmed, we have to counter them. We w i l l not
l e t our t e r r i t o r y be a base f o r doing h o s tile things because our
p o lic y is one o f s t r i c t n e u t r a lit y and non-involvement in the
c o n f l i c t in Cambodia.33
These fir m actions, o f course, re fle c te d the Thai p o sitio n in the
Cambodia and Vietnam c o n f l i c t , p a r t i c u l a r ly in maintaining i t s
n e u t r a l i t y and non-involvement in the Indochinese c o n f l ic t . In
other words, "Thailand would not side w ith any c o n flic t in g p a rties in
I n d o c h i n a . T h i s p o s itio n indicated th a t Thailand s t i l l recognized
the existence o f the Pol Pot regime as the sole le g itim a te government
o f the Cambodian people. This Thai p o s itio n is supported by the
United Nations, f o r the United Nations General Assembly voted on
September 19, 1979 th a t i t "upheld ousted Premier Pol Pot's claim to
Cambodia's seat in the Assembly, against the r iv a l claim o f the

35
Vietnam-backed regime." In t h is sense, the Pol Pot regime s t i l l
e x is ts , the f i g h tin g s t i l l goes on in Cambodia, and the Vietnam-
backed regime of Heng Samrin is not f u l l control o f the Cambodian
•Ân Interview given by Dr. Upadit Upachariyangkun, Thai

Foreign M in is te r to a group o f Scandinavian Correspondents at the Thai
Foreign M in is try on November 14, 1979, News B u l l e t i n , No. 10/1979,
November-December 1979, p. 11.
33Ib id .
34
A Press Conference given by Dr. S uvit Yodmanee, Deputy
Government Spokesman, "Pact w ith Hanoi Not Need," Bangkok Post,
June 3, 1979, part I , p. 1.
35
"Chinese at UN Gain Edge on Cambodia," Los Anneles limes,
September 20, 1979, part I , p. 4.
63
te rrito ry . I t was reported th a t the Pol Pot's s o ld ie rs , about
25,000 Khmer Rouges, have a c tiv e ly conducted resistance against the
Vietnam-backed regime o f Heng Samrin. As a d ir e c t r e s u lt o f the
existence o f the two reg' ..es in Cambodia, the Cambodian people were
divided in to two groups, one group supporting the Vietnam-backed
regime o f Heng Samrin and another group supporting the Pol Pot
regime. Thailand views th is s itu a tio n o f c o n f l i c t as "a th re a t to
peace, s e c u rity and s t a b i l i t y in Asia, in p a r tic u la r , in Southeast

37
A s ia ." On t h is issue Thailand shares the view o f i t s ASEAN
partners. They share the same views which have been expressed on
various occasions. For example, they issued a j o i n t statement in
Bangkok on January 13, 1979, and brought th is issue to the United
States S ecurity Council and United Nations General Assembly on
March 16 and November 14, 1979 re sp ective ly. They demanded the
withdrawal o f Vietnamese forces from the Cambodian t e r r i t o r y . These
demands by Thailand and i t s ASEAN partners aimed at restoring peace,
s e c u rity and s t a b i l i t y in the region as a whole. In th is connection,
Thailand is tr y in g to remain as t r u l y neutral as possible.
C le a rly , Thailand's close cooperation and common stand
with i t s ASEAN partners were aimed s o le ly at a tta in in g t h e ir
common in te re s ts and p a r t i c u l a r ly at achieving a s e lf - r e lia n c e in
Far Eastern Economic Review 107 (February 29, 1980): 8.
37
A Statement made by Dr. Pracha Guna-Kasem, Permanent
Representative o f Thailand to the United Nations on the escalation
o f the Vietnam-Cambodiaconflicts at the United Nations General
Assembly on January 15, 1979, Press Release, NO. 11/1922,
January 1979, p. 1.
economic matters and maintaining peace, s e c u rity , s t a b i l i t y , and
n e u t r a lit y in the region as t h e i r ultim a te goal.
CHAPTER VI
THAILAND'S POSITION ON SELECTED ISSUES
Sino-Soviet Dispute
The p o l i t i c a l differences between China and the Soviet Union
were made known to the world outside o f the denunciation o f S ta lin .
S h o rtly a f t e r the denunciation, China immediately c r i t i c i z e d the
Soviet leaders, because China admired S ta lin 's leadership as a
Communist re v o lu tio n a ry. This d iffe re nce resulted from a clear
c o n f l i c t in the in te rp re ta tio n o f Communist ideology. The ideological
dispute was accompanied by a t e r r i t o r i a l dispute. The border
disputes between China and the Soviet Union range over "the justness
o f the tr e a tie s by which T s a ris t Russia annexed parts o f Siberia.""*
Russia had annexed about 580,000 square miles o f Chinese land during
O
the reign o f the Qing Dynasty. In th is connection, China "in s is te d
th a t the Soviet Union acknowledge the unequal nature o f the tre a tie s
3
by which Russia obtained i t , which the U.S.S.R. refuses to do."
Besides these, t h e i r r i v a l r y extends "over leadership o f the

4
world Communist movement." China and the Soviet Union each
claim leadership of the world Communist movement. In other words,
they have attempted to control and influence Communist movements
^Clough, p. 130.
"H isto ry o f F r ic tio n , Enmity Underlies Sino-Soviet R i f t , "
Los Angeles Times, September 16, 1979, p a rt I , p. 8.
^Clough, p. 130. ^Clough, p. 130.
65
66
throughout the world—-in A fr ic a , Asia and Latin America. In the
polony clash over the issue o f Indochina, both China and the Soviet
Union wished to exert t h e i r influence over Indochinese a f f a i r s as a
matter o f national i n t e r e s t . In recent developments in the Indo
chinese states, China has l o t i t s main foundation and influence in
the Indochinese peninsula as a re s u lt o f the Vietnamese occupation o f
Cambodia. In the a f f a i r s o f Indochina, China is in the p o s itio n of
losing face to Vietnam and the Soviet Union. China, in order to
prevent i t from losing face, has supported the ousted regime o f Pol
Pot in the struggle against the Vietnamese occupation o f the Cambodian
t e r r i t o r y and invaded Vietnamese t e r r i t o r y in February o f 1979
in order to punish the Vietnamese f o r t h e i r invasion and occupation
o f Cambodia.
In th is dispute, the Thai p o sitio n was stated by the then
Thai Foreign M in is te r and Deputy Prime M iniste r Dr. Thanat Khoman in
the present Cabinet o f the Thai government. He stated i t th is way,
"despite changes in U.S. and Chinese foreign p o lic y , Thailand does
not want to l i v e w ith the cro co dile (the Soviet Union) j u s t to
avoid a t i g e r (China)." This statement made by the Thai leader was
a r e fle c tio n o f the Thai fe a r o f Communism from both China and the
Soviet Union. In other words, Thailand would not take sides with
e ith e r one and, on the co ntrary sought to stay out o f the dispute,
in order to show China and the Soviet Union i t s s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y in
the Sino-Soviet dispute. In t h is Sino-Soviet dispute, however,
5
Bradley, M o rre l, Szanton and Young, p. 42.
67
Thailand has no major in te r e s t and i t regards i t as a c o n f l ic t
w ith in the Communist camp. This was because Thailand is a non-
Communist nation and is not a party to e ith e r side and does not
wish to become involved i t s e l f in the dispute. Moreover, the Sino-
Soviet dispute does not a ffe c t Thai national in te re s ts and i t s
se c u rity in t e r e s t at a l l . For the reasons described above, "Thailand
is attempting to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet c o n f l i c t . " ^
This p o lic y o f n e u t r a lit y in the dispute between the two Communist
major powers is the best a lte rn a tiv e f o r Thailand and serves i t s
best in te re s ts in the present world s itu a tio n . Moreover, Thailand
has reaffirm ed i t s p o s itio n : "the Thai government and people w il l
maintain t h e i r p o sitio n o f s t r i c t n e u t r a lit y and w i l l not allow
themselves to be pushed toward one or the other side in the present
c o n flic t." ^ I t is clea r th a t Thailand's po sitio n in th is c o n f l ic t
is n e u tr a l.
Soviet-Vietnamese A llia n ce
The Soviet-Vietnamese a llia n c e emerged from the Treaty o f
Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam,
signed in Moscow on November 3, 1978, by Leonid Brezhnev and A.
Kosygin o f the Soviet Union and Le Duan and Pham Van Dong o f Vietnam.
^The Thai Prime M in iste r Kriangsak Chomanon to ld the

Press, Bangkok Post, September 6 , 1978, p a rt I , p. 1.
Speech made by the Thai Prime M in is te r Kriangsak

Chomanon at Kremlin dinner Party on March 22, 1979, "Kriangsak
Voices ASEAN A n x ie ty ," Bangkok Post, March 23, 1979, p art I , p. 1.
A r t i c l e 6 o f th is tr e a ty stated th a t:
In case one o f the Parties becomes the object of attack or o f

a th re a t o f a tta c k , the High Contracting Parties w i l l
immediately begin mutual consultations f o r the purpose of
removing th a t th re a t and taking appropriate e ffe c tiv e measures
to ensure the peace and s e c u rity o f t h e ir c o u n trie s . 8
The tr e a ty is perceived as a m i l i t a r y a llia n c e between the
Soviet Union and Vietnam because the tre a ty contains "a claus fo r
g
possible m i l i t a r y cooperation." In th is regard, President
Brezhnev o f the Soviet Union to ld the press conference a f t e r the
signing o f the tr e a ty th a t t h is tre a ty was signed "because of
d i f f i c u l t i e s created by China""'0 in Southeast Asia. In other words,
th is tre a ty was aimed at countering Chinese influence in Indochina.
With the signing o f t h is tr e a ty , the Soviet Union is committed to
guaranteeing the independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f Vietnam
from outside in te rv e n tio n . So the tre a ty serves the Vietnamese
national in t e r e s t in s e c u rity matters. Vietnam signed t h is tre a ty
w ith the Soviet Union because i t planned to invade Cambodia. Since
Cambodia was under Chinese influ e n ce , Vietnam needed to sign th is
tr e a ty with the Soviet Union before i t went ahead w ith i t s plan to
invade Cambodia.
Thailand viewed the Soviet-Vietnamese a llia n c e as a
O
Treaty o f Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR
and the S o c ia lis t Republic o f Vietnam, November 3, 1978, New Times:
A Soviet Weekly o f World A ff a ir s 46 (November 1978): 5.
g
New York Times, December 10, 1978, sec. 1, p. 2.
^ A Statement made by President Leonid Brezhnev o f the USSR

a t a Press Conference, "The Soviet Union and Vietnam Signed A Long
Awaited Treaty o f Friendship and Cooperation," New York Times,
November 4, 1978, sec. 1, p. 16.
69
consequence of the e x is tin g c o n f l ic t s , the c o n f l i c t between China and
Vietnam on the one hand, and the c o n f l i c t between China and the
Soviet Union on the other. The facts show th a t the Soviet-Vietnamese
a llia n c e resulted in the Vietnamese invasion o f the Cambodian
t e r r i t o r y which toppled the Pol Pot regime and in s t a lle d the
Vietnam-backed regime of Heng Samrin. In other words, the Vietnamese
occupation o f the Cambodian t e r r i t o r y was a product o f th is
a llia n c e . On th is issue Thailand took a neutral s ta n d .^ This Thai
p o sitio n o f n e u t r a lit y also re fle c te d Thailand's n e u t r a lit y in the
Sino-Soviet dispute and the Chinese-Vietnamese c o n f l i c t as one in the
context o f c o n flic t s w ith in the Communist camp. In t h is regard,
Thailand made no statements o f support or opposition to the Soviet-
Vietnamese a llia n c e , because such statement would not serve the
Thai in te re s t and might be in te rp re te d in many ways which might
create a misunderstanding o f the Thai neutral p o sitio n in the
c o n f lic t s . This Thai p o sitio n was expressed in government statements
o f p o licy on many occasions. In February o f 1979, the Thai government
stated th a t:
F i r s t l y , Thailand shall maintain i t s p o sitio n o f s t r i c t

n e u t r a lity . Secondly, Thailand shall adhere s t r i c t l y to the
p rin c ip le s that a ll disputes between states should be s e ttle d by
peaceful means in accordance with the Charter o f the United
Nations. T h ir d ly , Thailand shall continue i t s e f f o r t s , based
on the p rin c ip le s o f peaceful c o e x is te n c e .^
Statement made by the Thai Prime M in iste r Kriangsak

Chomanon at a Press Conference on June 6 , 1979, Keesing's Contemporary
Archives 25 (1979): 29615.
17
A Statement made by the Thai Prime M in iste r Kriangsak
Chomanon at the Asian Society in New Y o rk'in February 1979, News
B u lle tin , No. 03/1979, February-March 1979, p. 4.
The above statement o f p o lic y , shows the Thai p o s itio n in
the c o n f l ic t s , th a t o f maintaining a s t r i c t n e u t r a lit y in a ll
disputes among the states. Such p olicy was taken in order to l iv e
in peace, or peaceful coexistence with Communist nations. I t was
c lea r and re fle c te d the Thai p o sitio n in the Soviet-Vietnamese
a llia n c e . This p o s itio n , may be interpreted as the Thai in te n tio n
to stay out o f the Indochinese internal a f f a i r s and c o n flic t s w ith in
the Communist bloc i f the development of the s itu a tio n in the Indo
chinese states does not a ffe c t Thai s e c u rity.
Chinese-Vietnamese C o n flic t
The t e r r i t o r i a l dispute between China and Vietnam was caused
by the two conventions between the French government and the Chinese
13
Empire signed in Peking in 1887 and 1895. Vietnam claimed that
"as France had wished to sign a trade agreement w ith China i t had
conceded some Vietnamese t e r r i t o r y to China under the 1887 conven-

14
tio n ." Besides th is border dispute, China and Vietnam engage in
dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. China declared to the
world th a t the Spartly and Paracel Islands "had always been pa rt o f

15
China's t e r r i t o r y . " I t said th a t any claim to sovereignty over
the islands by any other country was i ll e g a l and n u ll and v o id ."*6
But Vietnam claimed th a t "Vietnamese sovereignty over both groups of
^ Keesing's Contemporary Archives 25 (1979): 29869.
141bid. 151bid. , p. 29473.
islands was in v io la b le ." " '^ Along with the t e r r i t o r i a l dispute
over the islands, was the dispute over the mistreatment o f the
Chinese community in Vietnam. The Chinese accused Vietnam o f
mistreatment o f i t s Chinese population in Vietnam and o f the

18
expulsion o f about 160,000 Chinese from Vietnam as part o f i t s
anti-Chinese p o lic y . The Chinese said the expulsion o f Chinese
residents in Vietnam was designed to please the Soviet Union fo r

19
i t s support o f the Vietnamese plan to dominate Indochina. There
were, a t the time, about 1,500,000 Chinese inhabitants in Vietnam,

20
known to the Vietnamese as "H0A." Vietnam began to expel the
21
Chinese population in 1977 a f t e r the d e te rio ra tio n o f re la tio n s
between China and Vietnam.
The c o n f l i c t between China and Vietnam is due to a r i v a l r y
fo r influence over Cambodia and Laos. H i s t o r i c a ll y , Indochina was
considered as a sphere o f Chinese influence. Of course, w ith the
current Soviet ro le in the Indochinese a f f a i r s , China lo s t face. In
a d d itio n , "Vietnam wants to play a dominant ro le in Indochina which
she thinks necessary f o r her s e c u rity and is determined to act

22
independently o f China in Asia as well as in the w o rld ." As fo r
' 8New York Times, November 4, 1978, Sec. 1, p. 6 .

19
Nayan Chanda, "Southeast Asia Comes in Focus," Far Eastern
Economic Review 101 (Ju ly 7, 1978): 8.
Of)
Keesing's Contemporary Archives 25 (1979): 29468.
21 I b i d . , p. 29469.
^Nguyen Manh Hung, "Beyond the Sino-Vietnamese C o n f lic t: A
New Power Alignment," The Southeast Asia Record 1 (Ju ly 6-12, 1979):
72
China, the Vietnamese role is seen as a th re a t to Chinese s e cu rity

23
in s te re s ts , p a r t ic u la r ly i f Vietnam is under the Soviet influence.
In essence, China viewed the Soviet-Vietnamese a llia n c e "as antagon-

24
i s t i c to i t s in t e r e s t s ." A new power alignment between the Soviet
Union and Vietnam is perceived as a th re a t to China's in t e r e s t in
Indochina. As "already, the whole o f Indochina is mobilized against

25
China," Cambodia and Laos are under the influence o f Vietnam and
the Soviet Union. During the escalation o f the Sino-Vietnamese
c o n f l i c t , Vietnam aligned i t s e l f w ith the Soviet Union under the
Treaty o f Friendship and Cooperation signed in November o f 1978.
This a llia n c e between Vietnam and the Soviet Union lead to the
Vietnamese invasion o f Cambodia in December of 1978. As a r e s u lt of
the tr e a ty , Cambodia has been occupied by Vietnam. China's response
to the two events, the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese A llia n ce
t r e a ty and the Vietnamese invasion o f Cambodia, was the invasion o f
Vietnam in February 1979, in order to punish and compel Vietnam to
withdraw i t s m i l i t a r y forces from t h e i r occupation o f the Cambodian
te rrito ry . But China f a ile d to achieve i t s goal: the withdrawal
o f the Vietnamese forces from the Cambodian t e r r i t o r y .
The Thai government stated i t s p o s itio n in the Chinese-
Vietnamese c o n f l i c t , as s t r i c t n e u t r a lit y . This p o s itio n was
24
Huynh Kim Khanh, "Vietnam: Neither Peace Nor War," South
east Asian A ff a ir s 1979 (1979): 342.
25I b i d . , p. 343.
73
expressed by one o f the government Deputy Spokesman, Dr. Suvit
Yodmanee. He said th a t "Thailand would not side with any o f the con-
Of
f l i c t i n g pa rties in Indochina." I t is clear th a t the Thai position
on th is issue, is to stay out o f the c o n f l ic t . This p o lic y o f
n e u t r a l i t y in the Chinese-Vietnamese c o n f l i c t re fle c te d the Thai
in te n tio n to maintain good tie s w ith both China and Vietnam. It
regarded t h is c o n f l i c t as an in te rn a l a f f a i r s o f the Communist nations.
This Thai p o sitio n is in accordance with the j o i n t communiques between
Thailand and China and Thailand and Vietnam o f July 1975 and August
1975 re sp e ctive ly. In the said j o i n t communiques, Thailand, China and
Vietnam pledged not to in te r fe r e in each o th e r's in te rn a l a f f a i r s . In
other words, Thailand is committed to these j o i n t communiques as the
basis f o r i t s re la tio n s w ith China and Vietnam. Thailand did not
believe th a t the Chinese-Vietnamese c o n f l i c t "would be a th re a t to the

27
Southeast Asian re g io n ," because the re s t o f the Southeast Asian
nations have maintained a s t r i c t n e u t r a lity in the c o n f l ic t . For th is
reason, i t was assumed th a t the c o n f l i c t between China and Vietnam
would not go beyond the boundary of Indochina. Moreover, the c o n f l ic t
between China and Vietnam was regarded as the in te rna l a f f a i r o f the
two Asian Communist nations, so the c o n f l i c t might be confined w ith in
the boundaries o f the two nations, China and Vietnam.
Thailand's p o s itio n on selected issues, Thailand takes a
^ A Press Conference given by Dr. Suvit Yodmanee, Deputy

Government Spokesman, "Pact w ith Hanoi Not Need," Bangkok Post,
June 3, 1979, p a rt I , p. 1.
71
The Thai Prime M in is te r Kriangsak Chomanon to ld a Press
Conference, "Teng's V i s i t Boots Friendly Relations, Bangkok Post,
November 10, 1979, part I , p. 1.
74
neutral stand on a ll issues dealing w ith the Communist nations, the
Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviet-Vietnamese a llia n c e and the Chinese-
Vietnamese c o n f l ic t . This position o f the Thai government re fle c te d
the Thai p o lic y o f n e u t r a lit y in world a f f a i r s in general and
Communist a f f a i r s in r e t i c u l a r . In other words, Thailand t r i e d to
be neutral in the c o n flic t s between Communist and non-Communist
nations on the one hand and stay out o f disputes among Communist
nations on the other. I t thought th is stand would serve Thai
in te re s ts in the present world s itu a tio n and p a r t ic u la r ly the
s itu a tio n in the region of Southeast Asia. Of course, c le a r ly , th is
Thai p o s itio n , r e fle c ts the fa c t th a t Thailand has no desire to
become involved in Communist issues. S im ila r ly , Thailand wishes
to avoid interference in i t s inte rna l a f f a i r s by Communist nations.
CHAPTER VII
THAILAND'S POLICY ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES
The term "refugee" refers to displaced person. Indochinese
refugees are the displaced people o f Indochina who fle d t h e i r
countries seeking sanctuary in neighboring countries. Indochinese
refugees are the consequence o f the war in Indochina, f o r , at the
war's end in 1975, people from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam fle d t h e i r
countries by land and sea, mostly to Thailand. They did so mainly
because Thailand shares land and sea borders w ith Indochina and
because Thailand has become known as a humanitarian n ation, having
provided sanctuary to Indochinese people. For example, Thailand
provided sanctuary to the Vietnamese nationals who had fle d t h e ir
country to Thailand in 1954 as a r e s u lt o f the war o f lib e r a tio n
from France.
As a r e s u lt o f the immense Indochinese in f lu x in to Thailand,
i t is beyond Thailand's a b i l i t y to take care of the refugees alone.
Hence Thailand sought in te rn a tio n a l r e l i e f from the United Nations
High Commissioner f o r Refugees. Thailand concluded an agreement with
th is o f f i c e r on December 22, 1975. Under the agreement, Thailand is
committed to providing humanitarian aid to displaced persons from
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam."' This a id , "food, s h e lte r, clo th in g and
"Ân Agreement Between the Government o f Thailand and the

United Nations High Commissioner f o r Refugees o f December 22, 1975,
Foreign A ff a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 16 (January-March 1976)
76
2
medical care," served as temporary r e l i e f f o r Indochinese refugees in
Thailand. Under the agreement, the United Nations High Commissioner
f o r Refugees decided to seek to obtain aid from other nations,
organizations and in te rn a tio n a l agencies in the form o f c o n tribu tio n s
in cash, commodities, m a te ria ls , equipment and services f o r the Thai

3
government to serve t h i s purpose. By th is agreement Thailand is
committed to give exemption from import duty and other taxes to a ll

4
items to be used in t h i s r e l i e f e f f o r t . For th is year, 1980, the
United Nations High Commissioner f o r Refugees, Paul H a rlin g , has
promised Thailand a minimum o f U.S. $100 m illio n s f o r use in

5
refugee assistance programs. Of th is sum, Japan would contribute
about 50 percent, the United States 45 percent,® and the re s t would
come from other nations and non-governmental organizations.
According to the l a t e s t fig u re of the Operation Centre fo r
Displaced Persons o f the Thai M in is try of I n t e r i o r , on August 31,
1979 the number o f Indochinese refugees in Thailand was estimated at
283,325. This to ta l consists o f 203,631 Laotians, 44,796 Cambodians
and 33,898 Vietnamese.^ However, th is fig u re c e r ta in ly continues to
r is e . In the recent s itu a tio n a ft e r the f a l l o f the Pol Pot regime,
2Ib id . 31bid. 4Ib id .

5
A Statement made by the Thai Deputy Under Secretary o f
State o f the M in is try o f I n t e r i o r Srisuk Thammarak on February 19,
1980, "United Nations Pledges $100 M illio n Refugee Aid This Year,"
Bangkok Post, February 20, 1980, pa rt I , p. 5.
6Facts On F ile 39 (Ju ly 6 , 1979): 495.
^The U nfair Burden: Displaced Persons From Indochina in

Thailand. (Bangkok: Operation Centre f o r Displaced Persons, M in is try
o f I n t e r i o r , 1979), P- 33.
77
Tianv Cambodians fle d t h e i r country to Thailand in search of food,
sanctuary and medical care. I t was reported th a t about h a lf a m illio n
or more Cambodians are w aitin g along the Thai-Cambodian border to

Q
cross over. A i r Chief Masha! Siddhi S a vetsila, Secretary General o f
the Thai National Security Council, said on September 19, 1979

g
th a t "the refugees, many o f them diseased and s ta rv in g ," would cross
the border in to Thailand in search o f food, c lo th in g , sanctuary and
medical care. The number o f Cambodian refugees swelled to about
200,000 in Thailand as a r e s u lt o f the la t e s t disturbance in
Cambodia,^ the f a l l o f the Pol Pot regime to the Vietnam-backed
regime o f Heng Samrin. The Thai p o lic y o f granting temporary asylum
to Indochinese refugees was based p r in c ip a lly on humanitarian
grounds. This Thai humanitarian concern, however, f o r Indochinese
refugees should n e ith e r jeopardize the s e c u rity , t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y
and social order o f Thailand, nor add to the already heavy economic
burden faced by the Thai government and i t s people.
R epatriation o f Indochinese Refugees
As described e a r l i e r , Thailand has granted temporary s h e lte r
to the Indochinese refugees as a humanitarian act. Such sh e lte r to
the refugees should be considered as temporary; when the s itu a tio n
in t h e i r home countries returns to normal, they ought to go back to

Q
"S ta rvatio n May Drive 500,000 to Flood Over," Bangkok Post,
^ Facts On F ile 39 (September 14, 1979): 684.
~^The Southeast Asia Record 1 (November 9-15, 1979): 10.
78
t h e i r home countries at the f i r s t opportunity. This p r in c ip le is
in lin e w ith Thai governmental p o lic y which i t has declared on
various occasions, "Thailand w i l l not allow any refugees to l iv e
in Thailand because i t might cause misunderstanding between the two
governments.""''' I t is feared th a t refugees in Thailand may create a
misunderstanding between the Thai government and the Communist regimes
in Indochina, because some refugees on Thai s o il committed h o s tile
acts against the Communist regimes o f Indochina. I t may be in t e r p r e t
ed th a t such a c t i v i t i e s are f u l l y known about by the Thai government.
Thailand's granting o f asylum in i t s t e r r i t o r y to Indochinese people
does not bring any advantage to the Thai nation i t s e l f . In order to
avoid fu r th e r misunderstanding between i t s e l f and i t s Communist
neighbors, the Thai government adopted a p o lic y o f re p a tria tio n of
Indochinese refugees to t h e i r homeland. This p o licy is expected
to promote understanding w ith i t s Communist neighbors.
A fte r the f a l l o f Dien Bien Phu to Communist Vietnam, about
150,000 Vietnamese nationals fle d t h e i r country in to Thailand seeking

12
sanctuary. Linder the Rangoon Agreement of 1959, Thailand had
re p a tria te d most Vietnamese refugees, about 90,000 to t h e i r home-

13 14
land. About 60,000 s t i l l remain in Thai t e r r i t o r y , even though
"'"*Foreign A ff a ir s B u l l e t i n : (Bangkok) Thailand 16

(January-March 1976): 9CL
12
An Exclusive Interview w ith the Thai Foreign M iniste r
Upadit Pachariyangkun, given to Miss Ing Galtung, Correspondent of
Radio Norway a t the Thai Foreign M in is try on August 24, 1979,
News B u l l e t i n , No. 08/1979, August-September 1979, p. 10.
13Ib id . 141bi d.
79
the Thai government has asked the Vietnamese government to take back
t h e ir nationals. The re p a tr ia tio n e f f o r t would also include
Laotians, f o r the Thai p o lic y indicated "Thailand would soon ask

15
Laos to take back a ll Laotians refugees." At present, there are
about 140,000 Laotian refugees in Thailand."*6 These refugees,
Thailand demands, should be re p a tria te d to t h e ir homeland because
the s itu a tio n in Laos has already returned to normal.
The problem o f re p a tr ia tio n is made more d i f f i c u l t because
many Indochinese refugees have no desire to return to t h e i r homeland.
They believe i f they were returned th a t they would face serious
punishment from t h e i r governments, possibly execution. They also
fear being charged with p o l i t i c a l crimes against the Communist
regime or system. Another major problem o f r e p a tr ia tio n is th a t
t h e i r homelands1 regimes do not want to accept them back. In
recognition o f these fa c ts , the Thai government w i l l not force
r e p a tr ia tio n , but, on the contrary, in s is ts th a t r e p a tr ia tio n should
be v o l u n t a r y . T h i s measure c le a r ly shows th a t in i t s dealing with
the Indochinese refugees, Thailand always established i t s p o lic y
upon humanitarian grounds. Thailand's p o licy o f r e p a tria tio n o f
Indochinese refugees to t h e i r home countries is not against any
humane p rin c ip le s . One p o s itiv e aspect o f re p a tr ia tio n is th a t i t
15
A Statement made by the Deputy Thai M in is te r o f I n t e r i o r
Narong Wongsawan to the Press on February 26, 1980, The Southeast
Asia Record 1 (February 22-28, 1980): 10.
16ibid.
"*^News B u lle t in , No. 10/1979, November-December 1979, p. 5.
80
clears the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere between Thailand and i t s Indochina
neighbors, the homeland o f the refugees. This re p a tr ia tio n p o licy
w i l l also serve Thai s e c u rity needs and reduce i t s economic burden
because o f Indochinese refugees on Thai s o il .
Resettlement o f Indochinese Refugees

in Thailand to Third Countries
As stated e a r li e r , Thailand faces some d i f f i c u l t i e s with i t s
r e p a tr ia tio n p o l'e y . As an a lte r n a tiv e , Thailand has also adopted a
p o lic y o f resettlement o f Indochinese refugees in Thailand to t h ir d
countries. In t h is connection, Thailand has informed a l l nations o f
the world o f the status o f Indochinese refugees in Thailand, th a t
o f temporary asylum. When r e p a tria tio n has become impossible f o r
some o f the refugees and they wish to leave Thailand f o r th ir d
cou ntrie s, the Thai government has offered to help them by requesting
foreign governments to allow some o f the Indochinese refugees to
s e ttle in t h e i r countries. The Thai request has received less
response from t h i r d countries. So fa r the United States has
accepted about 175,000 Indochinese refugees from Thailand and other
places in Southeast Asia f o r permanent settlemtn in the United

*1 O
States. Besides t h i s , the United States admits 14,000 Indochinese
19
refugees on a monthly basis. France has accepted about 12,000
Indochinese refugees, and i t accepts the same number on yearly
18
Peter Weintraub, "The Exodus and the Agony," Far Eastern
Economic Review 102 (December 22, 1978): 9.
^ The Southeast. Asia Record 1 (June 22-28, 1979): 1.
b a s is .213 A u s tra lia accepted 10,000 Indochinese refugees,2"* and i t plans
to accept more Indochinese refugees in the fu tu re to s e t t le in
A u s tra lia as t h e i r permanent home.
According to the source from the Operation Centre fo r
Displaced Persons o f the Thai M in is try o f I n t e r i o r , the o f f i c i a l
fig u r e o f to ta l Indochinese refugees in Thailand since 1975 to
August 31, 1979 was 283,325. Of t h i s number, 203,631, 44,796 and

22
33,898 were Laotians, Cambodians and Vietnamese re s p e ctive ly . But
only 108,430 o f the 283,325 Indochinese-refugees had departed

23
Thailand f o r resettlem ent in t h i r d countries. Of t h i s number
54,313, 29,610 and 24,507 were Laotians, Cambodians and Vietnamese

24
re sp e ctive ly. L e ft behind them are more than h a lf o f the to ta l
number o f Indochinese refugees in Thailand. This fig u r e excludes
Cambodian refugees who re ce ntly a rriv e d in Thailand a f t e r the f a l l
o f the Pol Pot regime to Vietnam. Most o f the departed Indochinese
refugees from Thailand found t h e i r permanent home in t h i r d countries:
A u s tr a lia , A u s tria , Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, I t a l y ,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Great B r ita in and the
United States. But the m a jo rity o f Indochinese refugees r e s e ttle

25
in France and the United States. The departure o f t h i s large
number o f Indochinese refugees to t h i r d countries solved the Thai

on
^"Soviet-Vietnam ese Treaty May A l t e r Sea S tra te g y," New York
Times, November 8, 1978, sec. 1, p. 2. -------------
21 Ib i d.
22
The U nfair Burden: Displaced Persons from Indochina in
T hailand, p. 33.
23Ib id . 241bid. 25I b i d . , p. 34.
82
problem o f r e p a tr ia tio n .
The changes o f p o l i t i c a l , economic or social systems in
Indochina since 1975 have resulted in an in f lu x o f many hundreds o f
thousands o f Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese in to Thailand. This
in f lu x o f Indochinese refugees has created an extremely heavy burden
on Thailand, a ffe c tin g Thai economic, p o l i t i c a l , and se c u rity
sectors. So the r e p a tr ia tio n and resettlem ent o f Indochinese
refugees to t h i r d countries have served as an e ffe c tiv e p o lic y fo r
the r e l i e f o f Thai burdens in th is area. In th is connection,
Thailand can be assured th a t i t s Indochinese problems, which have
brought a heavy burden upon i t s e l f , can be resolved by peaceful
means w ithout embarrassing other p a rtie s concerned. I t showed
th a t Thailand's humanitarian p o lic y f o r Indochinese refugees could
save many thousands o f human liv e s from the th re a t o f death, as
a r e s u lt o f l i t t l e food, no s h e lte r, and no medical care.
CHAPTER V I I I
CONCLUSION
Thailand has a long h is to r y o f adaptation to change,
facing the new r e a l i t i e s o f the s itu a tio n s in the region and the
world. I t s h if t s i t s fore ign p o licy in order to accommodate
Communist nations, p a r t i c u l a r ly i t s new Communist Indochina neighbors
and the major Commun.ist powers in the world, while re ta in in g tie s
w ith the United States and other free world nations. Thailand is no
longer aligned with any major world bloc and is independent in
conducting i t s foreign p o lic y toward world super-powers in i t s best
national in t e r e s t . In other words, the paramount objective o f Thai
foreign p o lic y is to secure i t s survival as a nation in the world.
In the past, Thailand survived Western c o lo n ia liz a tio n , c le a r ly as a
r e s u lt o f a p o lic y o f adaptation to new s itu a tio n s . For example,
Thai leaders yielded in re lin q u is h in g some portions o f Thai
t e r r i t o r y and sovereignty to the B r it is h and French in exchange fo r
Thai independence as a nation. S im ila r ly , in World War I I , Thailand
aligned i t s e l f w ith Japan. When Japan surrendered to the A l l i e s ,
Thailand was treated as a frie n d and not as a defeated enemy. This
revealed the f l e x i b i l i t y o f Thai leaders in d i f f i c u l t s itu a tio n s .
This p o lic y proved th a t the Thai nation can survive in every
s itu a tio n . In the post Vietnam war period, Thailand has adopted a
s im ila r fo re ign p o lic y , characterized by adaptation to change to new
83
84
s itu a tio n s in the region and the world in general. For example,
Thailand has reached an accommodation with China and i t s new
Communist neighbors o f Indochina w hile, at the same time, maintaining
e x is tin g tie s with the West.
In view o f the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, which has
become an unresolved issue between Thailand and Vietnam, the Thai
recognized th a t the regime o f Pol Pot and the Vietnam-backed regime
o f Heng Samrin have become to o ls o f p o l i t i c a l play between Thailand
and Vietnam. Thailand views the Vietnamese occupation o f Cambodia
as a ffe c tin g Thai national se c u rity but Vietnam said th a t the
occupation of Cambodian t e r r i t o r y is necessary f o r i t s s e c u rity fo r
remaining a strong and secure nation in Indochina. This c o n flic t in g
se cu rity in te re s t has already affected t h e i r e x is tin g re la tio n s and
may escalate into a confrontation between Thailand and Vietnam. For
Thailand recognizes the Pol Pot regime but i t does not recognize
the Vietnam-backed regime o f Heng Samrin. This p o lic y ris k s m i li t a r y
confrontation with Vietnam. I t is also ris k y fo r Vietnam to launch
any m i li t a r y attack on Thailand because such a move would open the
way fo r China to come back and restore i t s ro le and influence in
Indochina.
With respect to Indochinese refugees, Thailand's p o lic y is
based p r in c ip a lly on humanitarian grounds. This p r in c ip le o f Thai
p o lic y on refugees ris k s p o l i t i c a l , economic, social and s e cu rity
consequences i f fu tu re re p a tria tio n and resettlement to t h i r d
countries o f Indochinese refugees f a i l to m a te ria liz e as planned. If
the said p o lic ie s t o t a l l y f a i l , the Indochinese refugees w i l l have
85
no places to go, with the number o f Indochinese refugees in Thailand
reaching one m illio n or more. At th is stage, Thailand has no other
choice but to face the tremendous p o l i t i c a l , economic, social and
s e c u rity problems. I f Thailand f a i l s to solve these problems,
there could be refugees in great disarray in Thailand and the
re s u lts o f t h is could be many p o s s ib i li t i e s . For example, i t is
possible th a t Indochinese refugee organizations would emerge to
serve as p o l i t i c a l organizations to represent refugee in te re s ts in
bargaining w ith the Thai government. Or i t is possible th a t such
organizations might claim some portions o f Thai t e r r i t o r y as t h e i r
permanent home.
APPENDIXES
86
APPENDIX A
ASEAN BANGKOK ACCORD OF AUGUST 8, 1967
ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ASEAN
The Presidium M in is te r f o r P o lit ic a l A ff a ir s / M in is t e r fo r

Foreign A ff a ir s o f Indonesia, the Deputy Prime M in is te r o f Malaysia,
the Secretary o f Foreign A f f a ir s of the P h ilip p in e s , the M in iste r fo r
Foreign A ff a ir s of Singapore and the M in iste r of Foreign A ff a ir s o f
Thailand:
MINDFUL o f the existence o f mutual in te re s ts and common

problems among countries o f Southeast Asia and convinced o f the need
to strengthen fu r th e r the e x is tin g bonds o f regional s o l i d a r i t y and
cooperation;
DESIRING to e sta b lish a firm foundation f o r common action to

promote regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in the s p i r i t of
e q u a lity and partnership and thereby co n tribu te towards peace,
progress and p ro sp e rity in the region;
CONSCIOUS th a t in an in cre a sin g ly interdependent w orld, the

cherished ideals o f peace, freedom, social ju s t ic e and economic
w ell-be in g are best attained by fo s te rin g good understanding, good
neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries o f the
region already bound together by tie s o f h is to ry and c u ltu r e ;
CONSIDERING th a t the countries o f Southeast Asia share a

primary r e s p o n s ib ility f o r strengthening the economic and social
s t a b i l i t y o f the region and ensuring t h e i r peaceful and progressive
national development, and th a t they are determined to ensure t h e ir
s t a b i l i t y and s e c u rity from external inte rfe ren ce in any form or
m anifestation in order to preserve t h e i r national id e n t it ie s in
accordance w ith the ideals and a s p ira tio n s o f t h e i r peoples;
AFFI kMING th a t a l l fo re ign bases are temporary and remain

only w ith the expressed concurrence o f the countries concerned and
are not intended to be used d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y to subvert the
national independence and freedom o f States in the area or prejudice
the o rd e rly processes o f t h e i r national development;
DO HEREBY DECLARE:
FIRST, the establishment o f an Association fo r Regional

Cooperation among the countries o f Southeast Asia to be known as the
87
88
Association o f Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
SECOND, th a t the aims and purposes o f the Association shall

be:
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and

c u ltu ra l development in the region through j o i n t endeavors in the
s p i r i t o f e q u a lity and partnership in order to strengthen the
foundation f o r a prosperous and peaceful community o f Southeast
Asian Nations;
2. To promote regional peace and s t a b i l i t y through abiding

respect f o r ju s t ic e and the ru le o f law in the re la tio n s h ip among
countries o f the region and adherence to the p rin c ip le s o f the
United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active colla b ora tio n and mutual assistance on

matters o f common in t e r e s t in the economic, s o c ia l, c u lt u r a l,
te c h n ic a l, s c i e n t i f i c and adm inistra tive f i e l d s ;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of

tr a in in g and research f a c i l i t i e s in the educational, professional,
technical and a d m in is tra tiv e spheres;
5. To co lla b ora te more e ff e c t iv e ly f o r the greater u t i l i

zation o f t h e i r a g ric u ltu re and in d u s trie s , the expansion o f t h e ir
trade, including the study o f the problems o f in te rn a tio n a l commodity
trade, the improvement o f t h e i r tran sp orta tion and communication
f a c i l i t i e s and the ra is in g o f the l iv i n g standards o f t h e i r peoples;
6. To promote Southeast Asian studies;
7. To maintain close and bene ficia l cooperation with

e x is tin g in te rn a tio n a l and regional organizations with s im ila r aims
and purposes, and explore a ll avenues fo r even closer cooperation
among themselves.
THIRD, th a t, to carry out these aims and purposes, the

fo llo w in g machinery shall be established:
(a). Annual Meeting o f Foreign M iniste rs, which shall be by

ro ta tio n and re fe rre d to as ASEAN M in is te ria l Meeting. Special
Meetings o f Foreign M inisters may be convened as required;
(b). A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship o f the

Foreign M in is te r o f the host country or his representative and having
as i t s members the accredited Ambassadors o f the other member
countrie s, to carry out on the work o f the Association in between
Meetings o f Foreign M in is te rs ;
(c ). Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees o f
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s p e c ia lis ts and o f f i c i a l s on s p e c ific subjects;
(d). A National S e cre ta ria t in each member country to carry

out the work of the Association on behalf of th a t country and to
service the Annual or Special Meetings o f Foreign M in is te rs , the
Standing Committee and such other Committee as may hereafter be
established.
FOURTH, th a t the Association is open fo r p a r tic ip a tio n to

a ll States in the Southeast Asian Region subscribing to the afo re
mentioned aims, p rin c ip le s and purposes.
FIFTH, th a t the Association represents the c o lle c tiv e w i l l

o f the nations o f Southeast Asia to bind themselves together in
frie n d s h ip and cooperation and, through j o i n t e ffo r t s and s a c r ific e s ,
secure fo r t h e i r people and f o r p o s te rity the blessings o f peace,
freedom and prospe rity.
Done in Bangkok on the Eighth Day o f August in the Year One

Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Seven.
FOR INDONESIA
ADAM MALIK
Presidium M in is te r o f
P o lit ic a l A f f a ir s /M in is te r
f o r Foreign A ff a ir s
FOR MALAYSIA
TUN ABDUL RAZAK

Deputy Prime M iniste r
M in iste r o f Defense and
M in iste r of National
Development
FOR THE PHILIPPINES
NARCISCO RAMOS
Secretary o f Foreign A ffa ir s
FOR SINGAPORE
S. RAJARATNAM
M iniste r o f Foreign A ff a ir s
FOR THAILAND
THANAT KHOMAN
M in iste r o f Foreign A ffa ir s
APPENDIX B
ASEAN KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 27, 1971
ON NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
We the Foreign M inisters o f Indonesia, Malaysia, the

P h ilip p in e s , Singapore and the Special Envoy o f the National
Executive Council o f Thailand,
FIRMLY believing in the merits o f regional cooperation which

has drawn our countries to cooperate together in the economic, social
and c u ltu ra l f ie ld s in the Association o f Southeast Asian Nations;
DESIROUS o f bringing about a re la xa tio n o f in te rn a tio n a l

tension and of achieving a la s tin g peace in Southeast Asia;
INSPIRED by the worthy aims and objectives o f the United

Nations, in p a r tic u la r by the p rin c ip le s o f respect f o r the sover
e ig n ty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f a ll sta te s, abstention from the
th re a t or use o f fo rce , peaceful settlement o f in te rn a tio n a l
disputes, equal rig h ts and se lf-d eterm in a tion and non-interference
in the in te rn a l a f f a i r s o f States;
BELIEVING in the continuing v a l i d i t y o f the "Declaration on

the Promotion o f World Peace and Cooperation" o f the Bandung
Conference o f 1955 which, among others, enunciates the p rin c ip le s by
which states may coexist p eacefully;
RECOGNIZING the r ig h t o f every s ta te , large or sm all, to

lead i t s national existence free from outside interference in i t s
in te rn a l a f f a i r s as th is interference w i l l adversely a ffe c t i t s
freedom, independence and i n t e g r i t y ;
DEDICATED to the maintenance of peace, freedom and indepen

dence unimpaired;
BELIEVING in the need to meet present challenges and new

developments by cooperating with a ll peace and freedom loving nations,
both w ith in and outside the region, in the furtherance of world
peace, s t a b i l i t y and harmony;
COGNIZANT o f the s ig n if ic a n t trend towards e stablishing

nuclear free zones, as in the "Treaty f o r the P ro h ib itio n o f Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming
A fric a a n u clear-free zone, fo r the purpose o f promoting world peace
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and s e c u rity by reducing the areas o f in te rn a tio n a l c o n f lic t s and

te n sio n s ;
REITERATING our commitment to the p r in c ip le in the Bangkok

Declaration which established ASEAN in 1967, " th a t the countries o f
Southeast Asia share a primary r e s p o n s ib ility f o r strengthening the
economic and social s t a b i l i t y o f the region and ensuring t h e i r
peaceful and progressive national development, and th a t they are
(determined to ensure s t a b i l i t y and se c u rity from external interference
in any form or manifestation in order to preserve t h e i r national
id e n t it ie s in accordance w ith the ideals and a sp ira tio n s o f t h e ir
peoples
AGREEING th a t the n e u tra liz a tio n o f Southeast Asia is a

desirable o b je c tiv e and th a t we would explore ways and means of
bringing about i t s r e a liz a t io n , and
CONVINCED th a t the time is p ro pitio u s f o r j o i n t action to

give e ffe c t iv e expression to the deeply f e l t desire o f the peoples o f
Southeast Asia to ensure the conditions o f peace and s t a b i l i t y
indispensable to t h e i r independence and t h e i r economic and social
w e ll-b e in g ;
DO HEREBY STATE
1. That Indonesia, Malaysia, the P h ilip p in e s , Singapore and

Thailand are determined to exert i n i t i a l l y necessary e f f o r t s to
secure the re cognition o f , and respect f o r , South East Asia as a
Zone o f Peace, Freedom and N a tu r a lity , free from any form or manner
o f in te rfe ren ce by outside Powers;
2. That Southeast Asian countries should make concerted

e ffo r t s to broaden the areas o f cooperation which would contribute
to t h e i r s tre n g th , s o l i d a r i t y and closer re la tio n s h ip .
Done at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th o f November, 1971.
On behalf o f the Republic o f Indonesia
(Sgd.) ADAM MALIK

M in is te r o f Foreign A ffa ir s
On behalf o f Malaysia
(Sgd.) TUN ABDUL RAZAK BIN HUSSEIN

Prime M in is te r and M in is te r o f Foreign A f f a i r
On behalf o f the Republic o f the P hilip pin e s
(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO

Secretary o f Foreign A ffa ir s
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On behalf o f the Republic o f Singapore
(Sgd.) S. RAJARATNAM
M in is te r f o r Foreign A ffa ir s
On behalf o f the Kingdom of Thailand
(Sgd.) THANAT KHOMAN

Special Envoy o f the National Executive Council
APPENDIX C
JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 1, 1975 BETWEEN THAILAND
AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
1. The Government o f the Kingdom o f Thailand and the

Government o f the People's Republic o f China, d esiring to revive and
strengthen fu r th e r the t r a d i t i o n a l l y close and f r ie n d ly re la tio n s
between the peoples o f the two countries and in conformity with the
in te re s ts and common desires o f the two peoples, have decided upon
mutual recognition and the establishment of diplom atic re la tio n s as
from July 1, 1975.
2. The two Governments re a ffirm th a t only the people o f each

country have the r i g h t to choose t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l , economic and
social systems, w ithout outside interference. They also share the
conviction th a t, in s p ite o f the differences in the p o l i t i c a l ,
economic and social systems o f the Kingdom o f Thailand and the
People's Republic o f China, there should be no obstacle to the
development o f peaceful and f r ie n d ly re la tio n s between the two
countries and peoples in accordance w ith the p rin c ip le s o f mutual
respect f o r sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , mutual non
aggression, non-interference in each o th e r's in te rn a l a f f a i r s ,
e q u a lity and mutual b e n e fit, and peaceful coexistence.
3. The two Governments agree to s e ttle a ll disputes by

peaceful means in accordance w ith the above-mentioned p rin c ip le s
w itho u t re so rtin g to the use or th re a t o f force.
4. The two Governments agree th a t a ll foreign aggression

and subversion and a l l attempts by any country to control any other
country or to in t e r fe r e in i t s inte rna l a f f a ir s are impermissible
and are to becondemned.
5. The two Governments are also opposed to any attempt by

any country or group o f countries to estab lish harmony or create
spheres o f influence in any part of the world.
6.The Government o f the Kingdom o f Thailand recognizes the

Government o f the People's Republic o f China as the sole legal
government o f China, acknowledges the p o sitio n o f the Chinese
Government th a t there is but one China and th a t Taiwan is an inte gra l
p a rt of Chinese t e r r i t o r y , and decides to remove a ll i t s o f f i c i a l
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representations from Taiwan w ith in one month from the date o f signa
ture o f th is communique.
7. The Government o f the People's Republic o f China

recognizes the Government o f th? Kingdom o f Thailand and agrees to
respect the independence, sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f
Thailand.
8. The Government o f the People's Republic o f China takes

note o f the fa c t th a t f o r centuries Chinese residents in Thailand
have liv e d in harmony and amity with the Thai people in conformity
with the law o f the land and w ith the customs and habits o f the Thai
people. The Government o f the People's Republic o f China declares
th a t i t does not recognize duel n a tio n a lit y . Both Governments
consider anyone o f Chinese n a t io n a lit y or o r ig in who acquires Thai
n a tio n a lit y as a utom atically f o r f e i t i n g Chinese n a tio n a lit y . As fo r
those Chinese residents in Thailand who e le c t to re ta in Chinese
n a tio n a lit y of t h e i r own w i l l , the Chinese Government, acting in
accordance with i t s consistent p o lic y , w i l l enjoin them to abide by
the law o f the Kingdom o f Thailand, respect the customs and habits of
the Thai people and l iv e in amity with them. Their proper rig h ts and
in te re s ts w i l l be protected by the Government o f China and respected
by the Government o f the Kingdom o f Thailand.
9. The two Governments agree to pursue p o lic ie s fo r the

development o f trade, economic and c u ltu ra l re la tio n s between them.
10. The Government o f the Kingdom o f Thailand and the

Government o f the People's Republic o f China agree to exchange
mutually accredited Ambassadors as soon as practicab le and to provide
each other with a l l the necessary assistance f o r the establishment
and performance o f the functions o f diplom atic missions in t h e i r
respective c a p ita ls in accordance with in te rn a tio n a l pra ctice and on
a reciprocal basis.
MOM RAJWONGSE KUKRIT PRAMOJ CHOU EN-LAI

Prime M inister o f the Kingdom Premier o f the State Council
o f Thailand o f the People's Republic o f China
APPENDIX D
JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF OCTOBER 31, 1975 BETWEEN
THAILAND AND CAMBODIA ON ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
H.E. Mr. Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime M in is te r in charge o f

Foreign A ff a ir s o f Kampuchea, accompanied by a high ranking delegation
paid an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Thailand at the i n v it a t io n o f the Thai
Government from October 28 to November 1, 1975.
During t h e i r stay in Bangkok, H.E. Mr. Ieng Sary and the

delegation o f Kampuchea called on H.E. Mr. K u krit Pramoj, Prime
M in is te r, H.E. Mr. Pramarn Adireksarn, Deputy Prime M in is te r and
M in is te r o f Defense, and H.E. Mr. Chatichai Choonhavan, M in is te r o f
Foreign A f f a ir s .
The Kampuchea delegation held a series o f ta lk s w ith a Thai

delegation, led by H.E. the Foreign M in is te r on a wide range o f
subjects o f mutual in te re s t.
The two delegations were mindful o f the t r a d itio n a l lin k s and

s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h e i r two peoples and t h e i r two co untries,
p a r t i c u l a r ly in language, customs and t r a d i t i o n s , and through the
Buddhist r e lig io n .
The two delegations were also keenly aware o f the deep sense
o f neighbourliness stemming from the geographical proxim ity o f t h e i r
two countries. They f e l t th a t such consideration made i t necessary
f o r both countries to maintain amicable and good neighbourly re la tio n s
both f o r the present and fo r the fu tu re .
I t has been customary, from time immemorial, th a t the people

o f Thailand and the people o f Kampuchea have desired to l i v e together
in peace and frie n d s h ip .
Founded upon such common a s p ira tio n s , the Government of

Thailand and the Government o f Kampuchea, thus have agreed to e sta b lish
diplom atic re la tio n s between t h e i r two co u n trie s, at the ambassadorial
leve l as from the date of the signing o f th is J o in t Communique.
The two Governments fu r th e r agreed to the exchange o f

Ambassadors to be posted in Bangkok and Phnom Penh at a date con
venient to both countries depending on the conditions p re v a ilin g . The
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two sides also agree to help and a s s is t each o th e r, on the basis o f

r e c ip r o c ity , in the s e ttin g up and fu n ctio n in g o f t h e i r respective
Embassies in Bangkok and Phnom Penh.
The two Governments recognize and mutually respect the

independence, sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of the other
country on the basis o f t h e i r present fr o n t ie r s .
The two Governments expressly affirm ed th a t the p o l i t i c a l ,

economic and social system o f the country was s o le ly the in te rn a l
a f f a i r of the people o f th a t country, and th a t external inte rfe ren ce
shall not be to le ra te d .
The diffe re nce s in the p o l i t i c a l , economic and social systems

o f Thailand and Kampuchea do not c o n s titu te an obstacle f o r peaceful
coexistence and amity between the two nations and t h e i r peoples. On
the co n tra ry , the nation and the people o f Thailand and Kampuchea
can coexist in peace and amity based on the p rin c ip le s o f Pancha
S ila , i . e . , mutual respect f o r the sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l
i n t e g r i t y o f each country, non-agression and non-interference in
each o th e r's in te rn a l a f f a i r s , e q u a lity and mutual b e ne fits.
The two Governments each solemnly gave t h e i r r e a ffirm a tio n to

r e fr a in from using i t s ov/n t e r r i t o r y or from allow ing the use o f i t s
t e r r i t o r y by any t h i r d country in any form, d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y ,
in v io la tio n o f the above-mentioned p r in c ip le s .
The two Governments pledged not to re s o rt to e ith e r the

th re a t or the use o f force in solving t h e i r differences but to adopt
peaceful means based upon the above-mentioned p rin c ip le s o f Pancha
Si 1a.
The two delegations also discussed ways and means to develop

close cooperation in the areas o f economics and commerce. They were
in agreement th a t such re la tio n s be conducted on the basis o f e q u a lity
and mutual b e n e fit. D etails regarding the nature, the terms and the
modality o f trade between the two countries would be discussed at a
l a t e r date.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF

THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND NATIONAL UNION OF KAMPUCHEA
Chatichai Choonhavan Ieng Sary

M in is te r o f Foreign A ff a ir s Deputy Prime M in iste r
o f Thailand in charge o f Foreign A ff a ir s
o f Kampuchea
APPENDIX E
JOJ NT COMMUNIQUE OF AUGUST 6, 1975 BETWEEN
THAILAND AND VIETNAM ON ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
Desirous o f promoting harmonious, f r ie n d ly and good

neighbourly re la tio n s between the Kingdom o f Thailand and the
S o c ia lis t Republic of Vietnam which would b e n e fit t h e i r respective
peoples, the Government o f the Kingdom o f Thailand and the Government
of the S o c ia lis t Republic o f Vietnam have decided to e sta b lish
diplom atic re la tio n s and exchange representatives at ambassadorial
level on the basis o f the fo llo w in g agreed four p r in c ip le s :
1. Respect fo r each o th e r's independence, sovereignty,

t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , non-aggression, non-interference in each
o th e r's inte rna l a f f a i r s , e q u a lity , mutual b e n e fit and peaceful
coexistence.
2. Not to allow any fore ign country to use one's t e r r i t o r y

as a base fo r d ir e c t or i n d ir e c t aggression and inte rve n tio n against
the other and against other countries in the region.
3. Establishment o f f r ie n d ly and good neighbourly re la tio n s ,

economic cooperation and c u ltu ra l exchanges on the basis o f e q u a lity
and mutual b e n e fit. Settlement o f disputes among the countries in the
region through negotiation in a s p i r i t o f e q u a lity , mutual under
standing and respect.
4. Development o f cooperation among the countries in the

region f o r the b u ild in g o f prosperous countries in keeping w ith each
country's s p e c ific co n ditio n s, fo r the b e n e fit o f genuine independence,
peace and n e u t r a lit y in Southeast Asia, thereby c o n trib u tin g to peace
in the world.
Done at Hanoi, the Sixth o f August, 1976
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

KINGDOM OF THAILAND SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
BHICHAI RATTAKUL NGUYEN DUY TRINH

M in is te r o f Foreign A f f a ir s M in iste r o f Foreign A ffa ir s
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APPENDIX F
AGREEMENT OF DECEMBER 22, 1975 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
OF THAILAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES
An Agreement between the Government o f the Kingdom o f Thailand

( h e re in a fte r re fe rre d to as "the Government") o f the one part and the
United Nations High Commissioner f o r Refugees (h e re in a fte r referred
to as "the High Commissioner") of the other p a rt,
Whereas the Government and the High Commissioner have agreed

to collaborate in a programme fo r the purpose o f providing humani
ta ria n aid to Displaced Persons from Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam
who recently a rrive d in the Kingdom o f Thailand (h e re in a fte r referred
to as the "Displaced Persons"),
Whereas the two parties have also agreed to collaborate in

seeking durable s o lu tio n s , including in p a r tic u la r voluntary
r e p a tr ia tio n and resettlement in other countries o f the Displaced
Persons,
Whereas an i n i t i a l agreement between the pa rties fo r th is

purpose was signed on 30 July 1975,
Whereas th is Agreement is to cover the humanitarian aid

programme o f the High Commissioner in Thailand, inclu d in g the
provisions o f the aforementioned i n i t i a l agreement,
Whereas the High Commissioner launched an appeal on 29 August

1975 (h e re in a fte r referred to as "the Appeal") to the in te rn a tio n a l
community, f o r U.S. d o lla rs 124 m illio n to help meet the estimated
needs of the Displaced Persons from 1 August 1975 u n t il 31 December
1976, as agreed and set out in the note and budget attached to the
Appeal, a budget which incorporates the budget annexed to the
agreement signed on 30 July 1975, and,
Whereas th is c o lla b o ra tio n between the parties is the subject

of the High Commissioner's l e t t e r o f understanding dated 12 September
1975 to the M in is te r o f Foreign A f f a ir s o f Thailand and the M in is te r's
reply dated 15 September 1975,
I t is hereby agreed between the p a rties hereto as fo llo w s:
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1. The Government s h a ll, in consultation with the High

Commissioner, assume the r e s p o n s ib ility fo r id e n tify in g the s p e c ific
needs o f the Displaced Persons in the Kingdom of Thailand and fo r
providing them with a ll necessary temporary assistance including
food, s h e lte r, cloth in g and medical care.
2. To a s s is t the Government in i t s e f f o r t to provide care

and maintenance to the Displaced Persons in Thailand, the High
Commissioner shall seek to obtain from other Governments, specialized
agencies o f the United Nations, voluntary organizations and agencies
and from the in te rn a tio n a l community in general, c o n tribu tio n s in
cash, commondities, m aterials, equipment or services with a view to
ensuring the financing o f the programme in accordance w ith the budget
annexed to the Appeal and attached hereto as Annex 1.
3. The Government shall take such steps as i t may deem

necessary to support the e ffo r t s o f the High Commissioner and to
e n li s t contributions to the programme in cash, commodities, m a te ria ls,
equipment or services, from both b ila te r a l and m u lt ila te r a l sources,
and shall keep the High Commissioner c u rre n tly informed o f c o n t r i
butions received outside the programme but related to the achievement
of the purposes o f the programme.
4. The High Commissioner shall consult with the Government

on the use o f d is t r ib u tio n o f such funds, commodities, m a te ria ls,
equipment or services as may be made available to him. The tra n s fe r
to the Government o f such funds shall be the subject o f separate
sub-agreements which w i l l r e f le c t the r e la tiv e needs as assessed
w ithin the framework o f the budget annexed hereto. Where commodities,
m aterials, equipment or services are provided by the High Commissioner,
the Government shall provide an o f f i c i a l re ce ip t and comply w ith any
reporting requirements agreed to by the pa rties and shall in any
event provide the High Commissioner w ith f u l l d e ta ils o f d is t r ib u t i o n .
5. The Government shall ensure th a t a ll r e l i e f commodities,

m aterials, equipment or services provided through the High Commission
er w ith in the framework o f th is Agreement are used e x c lu s iv e ly fo r
the be ne fit o f the Displaced Persons.
6. During the implementation o f the programme and in order to

be able to meet unforeseen circumstances, the Government and the High
Commissioner may, by a mutually acceptable exchange o f l e t t e r s , make
such adjustments as may be necessary between the various chapters
of the attached budget.
7. Where funds provided through the High Commissioner are

made available fo r local disbursement th is shall be in accordancewith
estimates made by the appropriate Thai a u th o ritie s and the High
Commissioner's representatives a ft e r an overall assessment o f needs
and p r i o r i t i e s . Reasonable f l e x i b i l i t y shall be allowed to the
p ro vin cial a u th o ritie s in the tr a n s fe r o f these funds between local
TOO
budget headings to meet immediate and unforeseen needs.
8 . The Government shall keep separate accounts in respect o f

the funds received from the High Commissioner and t h e i r u t i l i z a t i o n ,
and make re a d ily available to the High Commissioner a l l such accounts,
vouchers and supporting documents. The Government shall submit
in te rim and f in a l n a rra tive reports and fin a n c ia l statements fo r
each sub-agreement in accordance with the terms provided th e re in . The
fin a l fin a n c ia l statement s h a ll, i f possible, be accompanied by a
c e r t i f i c a t e o f the Government's A u d ito r; otherwise, the audit
c e r t i f i c a t e shall be submitted as soon as possible th e re a fte r.
9. The Government shall exempt from import duty and other

taxes, commodities, materials and equipment made available through the
High Commissioner by way o f co n tribu tio n s from b ila t e r a l and m u lt i
la te ra l sources or p rivate donors (in c lu d in g in t e r a lia food, c lo th in g ,
medical supplies and sh e lte r m aterials) provided th a t they are
required fo r the implementation of the programme and imported in to
Thailand f o r th a t purpose. The Government shall take a ll the steps
necessary to ensure the reception, unloading, storage, tra n s p o rta tio n
and d is t r ib u t io n w ith in Thailand o f r e l i e f commodities, m aterials and
equipment included in the programme whether purchased by i t or made
a va ila ble through the High Commissioner.
10. The Government's standard procedure fo r awarding contracts

shall also apply fo r purchases or rental o f services, m ate ria ls,
equipment or other requirements under t h is Agreement, on the under
standing th a t th is procedure safeguards the p rin c ip le of awards being
made on an assessment o f competitive quotations or bids.
11. I f durable construction work is carried out with funds

made availa ble by the High Commissioner under th is Agreement, the
Government shall ensure th a t such work is carried out in conformity
with the provisions as set fo rth in the relevant sub-agreement.
12. The Government s h a ll, upon signature, made a va ila b le to

the High Commissioner a copy of any agreement concluded with sub
contractors and re la tin g to funds made available by the High Commiss
ioner. In r e la tio n to any such sub-contractor and fo r the purposes
o f t h i s Agreement the High Commissioner shall be an independent p arty.
13. The Government shall maintain fo r each sub-agreement an

inventory of any permanent equipment purchased and shall submit to
the High Commissioner an inventory o f these items r e fle c tin g the
p o sitio n at the time of term ination o f tne p ro je c t f o r which the
relevant sub-agreement was signed. The fu tu re use o f any items o f
permanent equipment th a t may be provided through the High Commissioner
but are no longer required by the programme shall be decided by
w ritte n agreement between the p a rtie s .
14. The Government agrees to and shall f a c i l i t a t e inspection
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and a u d it o f the p rojects governed by the various sub-agreements on

behalf o f the United Nations; should they at any time wish to do so,
the United Nations Board o f Auditors may carry out an audit o f the
p ro je c ts .
15. The High Commissioner s h a ll not be l ia b l e to indemnify

any t h i r d party in respect o f any claim , debt, damage or demand
a ris in g out o f the implementation o f the Agreement which may be
made against the Government.
15. The High Commissioner sh a ll not accept l i a b i l i t y f o r

compensation f o r the death, d i s a b i l i t y or other hazards which may be
suffered by employees o f the Government or by any o th e r person as a
r e s u lt o f t h e i r employment on work which is the su b ject-m atter o f
t h i s Agreement.
The programme under th is Agreement s h a ll be deemed to have

commenced on 1 August 1975 and sh a ll terminate on 31 December 1975.
In Witness Whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized

hereto, have, on behalf of the p a rtie s hereto, signed t h is Agreement
at the place and on the day and year below w r it te n .
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH

KINGDOM OF THAILAND COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES
Chatichai Choonhavan Dr. Cesars P. Berta

M in is te r o f Foreign A ffa ir s Regional Representative f o r
Southeast Asia o f the United
BANGKOK Nations High Commissioner fo r
22 December 1975 Refugees
BANGKOK
22 December 1975
BIBLIOGRAPHY
102
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. PERIODICALS
Alpern, Stephen I. "Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A New Cause

f o r Alarm." Asian Survey 15 (August 1975): 685.
Chanda, Nayan. "Southeast Asia Comes in Focus." Far Eastern

Economic Review 101 (July 7, 1978): 8.
D arling , Frank C. "Thai Diplomacy Tested as Major Powers Revive

Competition." The Southeast Asia Record 1 (June 15-21, 1979): 11.
E d ito r ia ls On F ile 6 (May 16-31, 1975): 548-550.
Facts On F ile 39 (January 1-5, 1979): 28.
Facts On F ile 23(March 23, 1979): 200.
Facts On F ile 39 (July 6, 1979): 495.
Facts On F ile 39 (September 14, 1979): 684.
Far Eastern Economic Review 107 (February 29, 1980): 8.
Fernandez, Joe. "Southeast Asia May Face Danger o f B a lka n is a tio n ."
The Southeast Asia Record 1 (July 27-August 2, 1979): 11.
Haseman, John B. "Thailand and the R e a litie s o f Southeast Asia."

M i l i t a r y Review L7 (May 1977): 87.
Hung, Nguyen Manh. "Beyond Si no-Vietnamese C o n flic t: A New Power

Alignment." The Southeast Asia Record 1 (July 6-12, 1970): 11.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives 25 (1979): 29473-29869.
K in te r, William R. "Thailand Faces the Future." Orbis: A Journal

o f World A ff a ir s 19 (Fall 1975): 11288.
Khanh. i'-ynh Kim. "Vietnam: Neither Peace Nor War." Southeast

Asian A f f a ir s 1979 (1979): 342.
Khoman, Thanat. "The New Equation of World Power and It s Impact on

Southeast A sia ." Orbis: A Journal o f World A ffa ir s 20 (Fall 1976)
613-614.
103
Kroef, Justum M. van der. "Hanoi and ASEAN: A New Confrontation
in Southeast A sia." Asia Quarterly 4 (1976): 258.
'ASEAN, Vietnam, Southeast Asia's Search fo r S e cu rity ."

Asian Thought and Society: An In ternational Review 3 (A p ril 1978)
25.
Mansbach, Richard W. "Southeast Asia in the Global P o lit ic a l

System." Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies 9 (March 1978):
126.
Marsot, Alain-Gerard. "The Lesson o f Vietnam." Asian Thought

and Society: An In te rn a tio n a l Review 2 (December 1977): 343.
Peagant, Norman. "Thailand's New V i s i t o r . " Far Eastern Economic

Review 88 (June 6, 1975): 16.
Roth, David F. " P o l i t i c a l Changes in Asia A fte r Vietnam:

Some Thoughts and A lte rn a tiv e to Domino." Asia Quarterly 4
(1976): 4.
Simon, Sheldon W. "The ASEAN States: Obstacles to Security

Cooperation." Orbis: A Journal o f World A ffa ir s 22
(Summer 1978): 425.
The Southeast Asia Record 1 (March 29-April 5, 1979): 12.
The Southeast Asia Record 1(June 22-28, 1979): 1.
The Southeast Asia Record 1(August 17-23, 1979): 1.
The Southeast Asia Record 1(November 9-15, 1979): 1-10.
The Southeast Asia Record 1(December 7-13, 1979): 1.
The Southeast Asia Record 1(February 22-28, 1980): 10.
Treaty o f Friendship and Cooperation Between the U.S.S.R.

and the S o c ia lis t Republic o f Vietnam, November 3, 1978. New
Times: A Soviet Weekly o f World A ff a ir s 46 (November 1978): 5.
Thailand. Asia 1980 Year Book--Far Eastern Economic Review.

Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, L td ., 1980.
Weintraub, Peter. The Exodus and the Agony." Far Eastern

Economic Review 102 (December 22, 1978): 9.
105
B. BOOKS
Bradley, W illiam ; M orrel, David; Szanton, David; and Young,

Stephen; eds. Thailand, Domino, By Default--The 1976 Coup'
and Im plication f o r U.S. P o lic y . Athens: Center fo r In te rn a tio n a l
Studies, Ohio State U n iv e rs ity , 1979.
Brown, Seyom. New Forces in World P o l i t i c s . D.C.: The Brookings

I n s t i t u t i o n , 1974.
Chaw!a, Sudershan. "U.S. Strategy in Southeast Asia in the

Post-Cease-Fire Period," in Sudershan Chawla, Melvin Gurtov
and Alain-Gerard Marsot, eds., Southeast Asia Under the
New Balance o f Power. New York: Praeger Publishers, In c .,
T974:
Clough, Ralph N. East Asia and U.S. S e c u rity . D.C.: The

Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 1975.
D a rlin g , Frank C. Thailand and the United States. D.C.:

Public A f f a ir s Press, 1965.
Gurtov, Melvin. "S ecurity By Proxy: The Nixon Doctrine and

Southeast A sia ," in Mark W. Zacher and R. Stephen Milne,
eds., C o n flic t and S t a b i l i t y in Southeast Asia. New York:
Anchor Books, 1974.
. "A New Asian Balance o f Power," in Sudershan Chawla,

Melvin Gurtov and Alain-Gerard Marsot, eds., Southeast Asia
Under the New Balance o f Power. New York: Praeger P ublishers,
I n c . , 1974.
Hans, Lucien M. "American Aid Is Damaging Thai S ociety," in

Robert Jay L ifto n , ed. America and the Asian Revolutions.
New Haven: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970.
Horn, Robert C. "The Soviet Perspective," in Sudershan

Chawla, Melvin Gurtov and Alain-Gerard Marsot, eds.,
Southeast Asia Under the New Balance o f Power. New York:
Praeger Publishers, In c ., 1974.
Kalb, Marvin and Kalb, Bernard. K issin g e r. New York: Dell

Publishing Company, In c ., 1975.
Khoman, Thanat. "Thailand in Midst of Change," in M. Rajaratnam

and Lim So Jean, eds., Trends in Thailand. Singapore:
U n ive rsity o f Singapore Press, 1973.
106
Langdon, Frank. "China's Policy in Southeast A s ia ," in

Mark W. Zacher and R. Stephen Milne eds., C o n flic t and
S t a b i l i t y in Southeast A sia . New York: Anchor Books, 1974.
N uechterlin, Donald E. Thailand and the Struggle f o r

Southeast Asia. New York: Cornell U n ive rs ity Press, 1965.
Pauker, Guy J . ; Golay, Frank H ., ; and Enloe, Cynthia H .; eds.,

D iv e rs ity and Development in Southeast Asia. New York:
McGraw H i l l Book Company, 1977.
Scalapino, Robert A. Asia and the Road Ahead: Issue f o r

Major Powers. Berkeley: U n ive rs ity o f C a lifo r n ia Press,
1975.
Steinberg, David Jo e l; Woodside, Alexander; Wyatt, David K .;

Roff, W illiam R .; Small, John R. W.; and Chandler David P.
eds., In Search o f Southeast A sia . New York: Praeger
Publishers, I n c . , 1971.
V iraphol, Sarasin. D irections in Thai Foreign P o lic y .

Singapore: I n s t i t u t e o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1976.
W illiam s, Lea E. Southeast Asia: H is to r y . New York: Oxford

U n iv e rs ity Press, 1976.
Wilson, David A. The United States and the Future o f Thailand.

New York: Praeger Publishers, In c . , 1970.
C. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
ASEAN Documents, June 1973. Bangkok: Information Department,

M in is try o f Foreign A f f a i r s , 1978.
ASEAN J o in t Statement, Press Release, No. 144/2522, December

1979. Bangkok: Information Department, M in is try o f Foreign
A f f a i r s , 1979.
Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Banqkok) Thailand 15 ( January-March 1975),

1975.
Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Banqkok) Thailand 15 (October-December

1975), 1975.
Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 16 (January-March

1976), 1976.
107
Foreign A ff a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 16 (A pril-June 1976),

1976.
Foreign A ff a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 16 (July-September

1976), 1976.
Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 17 (A pril-June 1977),

1977.
Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 18 (January-March

1~97S), 1978'.
Foreign A f f a ir s B u lle t in : (Bangkok) Thailand 18 (A pril-Ju n e 1978),

1978.
News B u l l e t i n , No. 08/1975, July-August 1975. Bangkok:

Information Department, M in is try o f Foreign A f f a ir s , 1975.
News B u l l e t i n , No. 14/1977, November-December 1977. Bangkok:

News B u l l e t i n , No. 03/1978, March-April 1978. Bangkok:

Information Department, M in is try of Foreign A f f a ir s , 1978.
News B u lle t in , No. 04/1978, April-May 1978. Bangkok:

News B u l l e t i n , No. 09/1978, October-November 1978. Bangkok:

News B u lle t in , No. 10/1978, November-December 1978. Bangkok:

News B u lle tin No. 03/1979, February-Marcr. 1979. Bangkok:

Irrrormation Department, M in is try of Foreign A f f a ir s , 1979.
News B u l l e t i n , No. 05/1979, April-May 1979. Bangkok:

News B u l l e t i n , No. 06/1979, May-June 1979. Bangkok:

News B u l l e t i n , No. 08/1979, August-September 1979. Bangkok:

108
News B u l le t i n , No. 10/1979, November-December 1979. Bangkok:

Press Release, No. 185/2520, December 1977. Bangkok: Information

Department, M in is try o f Foreign A f f a ir s , 1977.
Press Release, No. 11/2522, January 1979. Bangkok: Information

Press Release, No. 143/2522, January 1979. Bangkok: Information

Press Release, No. M. 42/2522, August 1979. Eangkok: Information

Department, M in is try o f Foreign A f f a i r s , 1979.
Press Release, No. M. 57/2522, November 1979. Bangkok:

Thailand Into the 8 0 's . Bangkok: The O ffice o f the Prime

M in is te r of Thailand, 1979.
The U nfair Burden: Displaced Persons from Indochina in Thailand.

Bangkok: Operation Centre f o r Displaced Persons, M in is try of
I n t e r i o r , 1979.
D. NEWSPAPERS
Bangkok Post, September 6, 1978, pa rt I , p. 1.
Bangkok Post, September 8, 1978, p a rt I , p. 1.
Bangkok Post, September 11, 1978, part I , p. 1.
Cambodia'a Admission o f Vietnam Border War A n tic lim a tic ,

Los Angeles Times, January 1, 1978, part I , p. 8.
Chinese at U.N. Gain Edge on Cambodia, Los Angeles Times,

September 20, 1979, part I , p. 4.
H istory o f F r ic tio n , Enmity Underlies Si no-Soviet R i f t ,

Los Angeles Times, September 16, 1979, part I , p. 8.
Kriangsak Voices ASEAN Anxiety, Bangkok Post, March 23, 1979,
part I , p. 1.
New York Times, November 4, 1978, sec. 1, p. 6.
New York Times, December 10, 1978, sec. 1, p. 2.
Pact With Hanoi Not Need, Bangkok Post, June 3, 1979, part I , p. 1.
The Soviet Union and Vietnam Signed A Long Awaited Treaty o f

Friendship and Cooperation, New York Times, November 4, 1978,
sec. 1, p. 16.
Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty May A lte r Sea Strategy, New York Times,

November 8, sec. 1, p. 2.
Starvation May Drive 500,000 to Flood Over, Bangkok Post,

Teng Starts Asia Tour to Counter Soviet Influence, New York Times,
November 6, 1978, sec. 1, p. 12.
Teng's V i s i t Boots Friendly Relations, Bangkok Post, November 10,

1979, pa rt I , p. 1.
United Nations Pledges $100 M illio n RefugeeAid This Year,

Bangkok Post, February 20, 1980, pa rt I , p. 5.

Consequences of The Vietnam War On Thai Foreign Policy

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