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The Sabah State Election of 1994: End of Kadazan Unity

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The Sabah State Election of 1994: End of Kadazan Unity
Author(s): James Chin
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10 (Oct., 1994), pp. 904-915
Published by: University of California Press
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THE SABAHSTATE ELECTION
OF 1994
End ofKadazan Unity

JamesChin

The East Malaysian state of Sabah, situatedon the

northern end of theislandof Borneo,helda stateelectionon March19-20,
1994,thatwas notableforseveralreasons.First,of thethirteen statesin the
Malaysianfederation, Sabah and Kelantan(in PeninsularMalaysia) are the
onlytwothatweregovernedby theopposition.The otherelevenstatesare
controlled by theBarisanNasional(BN or NationalFront)coalitionled by
PrimeMinisterMahathirMohamad'sUnitedMalays NationalOrganisation
(UMNO). Second,thiswas thefirstelectionthatUMNO had contestedin
eitherof theEast Malaysianstates.Previously, UMNO and theotherPenin-
sular-basedBN partiesdid noteven have branchesin theBorneoanstates.
UMNO's performance in thepolls was particularly
important foritsplansto
transform itselfintoa nationwide partyforbumiputera of
(sons thesoil-i.e.,
indigenousMalaysians). Moreover,beforetheparty9s entryintoSabah, it
could acceptonlyethnicMalaysas members;withtheformation of UMNO
Sabah, a sizable minority of its membersare now non-Malays.Third,the
electionwas widelyseen as a precursor to generalelectionsexpectedto be
held in early1995.
Sabah's 1.8 millionpopulationis made up of about 30 different ethnic
groups-the Kadazan and a closely-related group,Dusun,constitute about
30%, thelargestsinglegroup;Malaysabout25%; Chinese20%; Bajaus 11%;
Muruts5%; andothersabout6%. However,theseareestimates as it is diffi-
cult to get precisefigures.In the 1980 census,a broadcategory, pribumi,
was used to countall nativegroupings (includingnon-natives who had con-

JamesChin,who is fromSarawak,recently receivedhis doctoralde-

greefromtheDepartment ofPolitics,VictoriaUniversity, New Zealand. He would
Wellington,
like to thankMargaretClarkand Carol Legge fortheiradviceand comments on a draftof this
article.
?c 1994 by The Regentsof theUniversity
of California

904

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 JAMESCHIN 905
vertedto Islam and Malays). Moreover,thereis a sizablenumberof Sino-
Kadazandue to a highintermarriage rate.It wouldperhapsbe easierto quan-
tifythepopulationas 40% nativeMuslims,40% nativeChristians, and 20%
others.The nativesare officially categorizedas bumiputera, whichentitles
themto preferentialtreatmentbythestate,bothsociallyandpolitically.Prior
tojoiningtheFederation of Malaysiain 1963,Sabah was ruledby a private
entity,the BritishNorthBorneoCompany,and lateras a Britishcolony.
Since then,Sabah politicshas been drivenby patronage,specificallythe
awardingof timberconcessionsand businessopportunities. Therehas also
been a rapidshifting of electoralloyalty,withsupportfortherulingparty
fallingwithina decade. first government of Sabah after 1963
In the 1970s,Sabah politicswas dominatedby Tun MustaphaHarun,a
Muslimfromthesouthern Philippines,and his party,theUnitedSabah Na-
tional Organisation(USNO). Mustapha'srule, from1967 to 1975, was
markedbyhis dictatorial ways,propagation of Islam,hisjet-setlifestyle, and
fierceindependence fromthefederalauthorities in Kuala Lumpur.This led
the federalgovernment to back a new politicalparty,Berjaya,formedby
USNO dissidents and led byTun MohammadFaud Stephens,a former Mus-
taphaally who resignedthe governorship to spearheadBerjaya's electoral
campaignagainstUSNO. Stephenswas to playa crucialrolein swinging the
Kadazanvoteas he was theirparamount chief(huguansiou),andin the1975
stateelectionBerjayaeasilywonand StephensbecameSabah's chiefminis-
ter. Barelya yearlater,however,Stephensand severalseniorministers were
killedin a plane crash,and HarrisSalleh,theformer USNO vice-president
sponsoredby Kuala Lumpurto formBerjaya,succeededhim.
Harris,a MuslimMalay/Indian, becameincreasingly dictatorial like Mus-
tapha,and he againpromoted theIslamization processdespitestrongopposi-
tion fromthe largelynon-MuslimKadazan and Chinese communities.
Althoughhe was widelyseenas a "federalman,"he wenttoo farin his pro-
federalpolicieswhenhe gave away Labuan,a smallislandoffthewestern
coastof Sabah,to Kuala Lumpurwithout compensation.All of theseissues
plusallegationsof widespread corruption amongthoseclose to Harriscaused
a groupof Berjaya dissidents-primarily non-Muslimsled by a Kadazan
Catholic,JosephPairinKitingan-tocriticizeHarrisopenly. Forcedto re-
signfromBerjayaand his constituency of Tanbunan,Pairinstoodas an in-
dependent andeasilywonre-election withan increasedmajority in December
1984.In an actofrevengeon thevoters,Harrisabrogated thedistrict statusof
Tanbunan,thusensuring thatless development funding wouldbe directedto
the constituency.By now, the groundswell of supportforPairinhad in-
creasedsignificantly and he registered a new politicalparty,PartiBersatu
Sabah (UnitedSabah Partyor PBS). However,unlikeBerjaya,PBS did not
gettheblessingof thefederalgovernment.

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 906 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1994
Fearingfurther deterioration
of supportforhis government, Harrisopted
fora snap electionin April 1985 but it was too late forBerjaya. A clear
swingtowardthePBS netted26 seats;USNO won 16 and Berjaya6. PBS
had theneartotalsupportof theKadazancommunity and a majority of Chi-
nese.I The PBS victorywas also a blow to Mahathiras he had pledgedto
"sinkor swim"withBerjayaduringtheelectioncampaign.Whentheresults
becameknown,Harris,hopingfora fewdefectors fromPBS, forgedan un-
likelypactwithMustapha,and thetwoparties-USNO and Berjaya-which
togetherheld22 seats,persuadedthestategovernor to swearin Mustaphaas
chiefminister.ButMalaysia'sdeputyprimeminister, Musa Hitam,immedi-
atelyintercededand Pairinwas swornin on April22, 1985.
USNO and Berjayasupporters thenlauncheda campaignof harassment
againstthenewlyelectedgovernment, whichincludeda suitfiledby Mus-
taphaagainstPairin'sappointment and bombexplosionsin thecapitalcity,
Kota Kinabalu. The rationalewas thatwitha breakdown of securityin the
state,thefederalgovernment wouldhaveto declarea stateof emergency and umno +
ruleSabah directly,
thusbringing Pairindown. Theseactionsweresupported usno =
bycertainUMNO factions,2 whichalso triedto pressurePBS to forma coali- pressure
pbs
tiongovernment withtheUSNO. Underthesecircumstances, Pairinopted
fora snap electionin May 1986, whichresultedin thePBS increasingits
majorityfrom26 to 34 seatsanditsshareofthepopularvotefromabout30%
to 53%.3 For politicalexpediency,and afterits secondconvincing electoral
victory,PBS was admitted intothe Barisan Nasional. Sabah was now in a
uniqueposition with one BN
component party(PBS) in power and another
BN component (USNO) as themainopposition.In theJuly1990 stateelec-
tion,theUMNO-ledBN government publiclytooka neutralpositionin the
PBS-USNO contest,althoughUMNO privatelybacked the Muslim-based
USNO. PBS easily won re-election whenit took 36 of the 48 seats with
53.92% of thevote,whileUSNO won theother12 seats.
Hence,fromtheoutsetPBS did nothave a smoothworkingrelationship
withMalaysia's UMNO-led federalgovernment. The uneasyrelationship
itselfwhenPBS withdrew
was to manifest fromtheBN a fewdaysbeforethe
October1990 generalelectionand threwits supportbehindMahathir'sarch
rival,TengkuRazaleigh,whoat thattimewas widelyseenas a realthreat to

1. Far EasternEconomicReview(FEER), 9 May 1985; K. T. Kalimuthu, "The Sabah State

Electionof April1985,"Asian Survey,26:7 (July1986),pp. 815-37; and MarvisPuthucheary,
Federalismat the Crossroads: The 1985 Electionsin Sabah and TheirImplicationsfor the
Federal-StateRelations(Kuala Lumpur:ISIS Malaysia,1985).
2. AudreyKahin,"Crisison thePeriphery:The RiftBetweenKuala Lumpurand Sabah,"
65:1 (Spring1992), p. 41.
PacificAffairs,
3. FEER, 15 May 1986; Bala Chandran, TheThirdMandate(Kuala Lumpur:Bala Chandran,
1986).

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 JAMESCHIN 907
UMNO's monopolyof Malay votes.4Mahathir neverforgavePairinforthis
"stabin theback,"andimmediately announcedthatUMNO wouldspreadits
wingsin Sabah. UMNO's mainpartner in thePeninsula,theMalaysianChi-
neseAssociation(MCA), also begansetting up branchesin Sabah. Mustapha
leftUSNO, wona by-election as an UMNO Sabahcandidate, andbecamethe
UMNO's Sabah liaisonchief. In orderto give himmorepatronage powers,
Mustaphawas appointedFederalMinisterforSabah Affairs in 1992,a port-
foliounfilledsincethe 1970s. Meanwhile,his USNO partycame underthe
controlof his son,Amirkahar Tun Mustapha.
Withina fewmonthsof the 1990 parliamentary polls,Pairinwas charged
withthreecountsof corruption, and his powerfulbrother, JeffreyKitingan,
who headstheSabah Foundation, was detainedwithout trialundertheInter-
nal SecurityAct (ISA) forallegedlyplotting Sabah's secessionfromtheMa-
laysianfederation. He was also chargedwithcorruption involving hugesums
of moneyheldin Hong Kong.5 Since then,tiesbetweenKota Kinabaluand
Kuala Lumpurhave deteriorated rapidlyand the federalgovernment has
pointedlyneglectedSabah. Since 1990 Sabah's economicgrowthhas con-
sistentlybeen below thenationalaverage,and locals referto Sabah's eco-
nomicills as "politicalrecession."

The 1994 Election

The PBS-led stategovernment hadsixteenmonths ofitsfive-year
termto run
whenPairinannouncedthedissolution of thestateassemblyin earlyFebru-
ary 1994. Pairinhad good reasonsforcallingan earlyelection.First,his
corruption charge)hadjust concluded;thecourtfoundhim
trial(on thefirst
guiltyof corruption buthe did nothave to stepdownas chiefminister.He
was fined1,800ringgit(US$700), whichsaved himfromprovisionsin the
Sabah and federalconstitutions disqualifyinga personfromholdingpublic
officewho had been finedmorethan2,000 ringgit orjailed formorethana
year. The verdictwas seen as a vindication by thecourtsthatthecharges
againstPairinwerepolitically motivated.Thus,PBS calculatedthatit could
relyon thesympathy voteof ordinarySabahansforwhatwas perceivedas a
personalvendettaby thefederalgovernment againsttheirchiefminister.
Second, Pairin'sbrotherwas releasedin January1994 afterhavingbeen
detainedfortwo years. Manybelievedthathis releasewas due to a "deal"
betweenJeffrey KitinganandPrimeMinister Mahathir on waysto resolvethe

4. KhoongKim Hoong,Malaysia's GeneralElection1990: Continuity, Changeand Ethnic

Politics(Singapore:ISEAS ResearchNotesand DiscussionPaper,no. 74, 1991).
5. JeffreyKitinganhad beenchargedwithacceptinghundreds ofthousands ofdollarsin cash
and companysharesin return forpoliticaland businessfavors,some allegedlydoled out in his
of thestate-owned
capacityas director Sabah Foundation.

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 908 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1994
PBS-BN standoff.Thereweresuggestions thatJeffrey was releasedso he
could be the "bridge"betweenKota Kinabaluand Kuala Lumpur.Third,
Pairinsaid thattheelectionswouldprovidean opportunity forSabahansto
voice theirconcernsoverthefederalgovernment's planto redrawthestate's
electoralboundaries.Accordingto PBS, theplan was to redefineelectoral
boundariesalongethniclinesin orderto consolidateMuslimvotesand help
UMNO Sabah winpowerin thestate.
Finally,PBS in 1992 had stageda political"coup" whenit successfully
enticedUSNO tojoin it as a coalitionpartner,
an alliancethatcontrolled 41
seatsin theSabah LegislativeAssemblywiththeothersevenheldbyUMNO
Sabah. Shortlyafterwards, USNO was deregistered by the federallycon-
trolledRegistrar
of Societies;sixUSNO statelegislatorswentovertoUMNO
Sabah, whiletherestmovedintoPBS and stoodas PBS candidatesin the
1994 polls.

The Campaign
The campaignforcontrolof Sabah actuallybeganlongbeforethedissolution
of thestateassembly.Since PBS pulledoutof theBN in 1990,UMNO and
its BN coalitionparties,such as theMCA, thesmallSabah Chinese-based
LiberalDemocraticParty(LDP), and theKadazan-basedAngkatanKeadilan
Rakyat(Justicepartyor AKAR),6 together withPBS dissenters have pro-
motedtheidea thatSabah was underdeveloped comparedto otherMalaysian
statessimplybecauseit was heldby "oppositionhands." Thus,by thetime
formalcampaigning was allowedin February,
thepositionsof all thecontes-
tantswerewell-defined.
ThePBS. Campaigning on thetheme"Sabah fortheSabahans"and appeal-
ing to regionalsentiments and state's rights,the PBS arguedthatif the
UMNO-led BN won the election,Sabah would be "colonized"by Kuala
Lumpur.The issue of state'srightscenteredon theso-calledTwentyPoints
containedin the 1963 MalaysiaAgreement, whichhad stipulatedtherights
and privilegesof thetwo Borneostatesin theMalaysianfederation.7 The
PBS has consistently alleged thatmanyof the provisionsin the Twenty
Pointshavebeenviolatedbythefederalgovernment. The morechauvinistic
elementsin PBS appealedto Kadazannationalism, whichhad been used ef-
fectivelyin thetwopreviouselections,andarguedthatiftheKadazandidnot
rallyto PBS, thechiefminister's postwouldgo to a non-Kadazanwiththe
resultthattheKadazancommunity wouldsuffer Pairin's cor-
discrimination.

6. AKAR was formedby MarkKoding,a former seniorPBS figurewho servedas deputy

underPairinbeforea fallingoutbetweenthetwo.
chiefminister
7. The TwentyPointsincludeguarantees thatSabah (and Sarawak)wouldretainrightsover
education,and religion.
immigration,
PBS: maintain the Sabahan
and avoid the misleading
federal government

UMNO: give development to

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 JAMESCHIN 909
ruptionchargeswerealso used to demonstrate how thefederalgovernment
was victimizing theKadazan. Amongtheparty9s demandswerean increase
in petroleum royaltiesfrom5% to 15%, establishment of a universityand a
separateTV stationin Sabah, and thereturn to statecontrolof theislandof
Labuan.
The PBS also calledfora crackdown on thelargenumberof illegalimmi-
grantsfromthesouthern Philippines.The Filipinoshadbeena politicalissue
fora numberof years,as theywerewidelyblamedforthehugerisein petty
crimeand fortakingemployment opportunities awayfromthelocals. More-
over,theirsheernumbers, estimated at abouta halfmillion,poseda physical
securitythreatto Sabah. The PBS government couldnotdeal withtheillegal
migrant problemeffectively becausesecurity matterscomeunderthepurview
of thefederalgovernment.
PBS accusedUMNO oftrying to stampitsMuslim-Malay brandofpolitics
on a statewheremostof the tribalpeople are Catholicand whereethnic
Chineseformaboutone-fifth of thepopulation.The religiousfactortookon
addedsignificance as it was believedthatthemajority oftheillegalFilipinos
wereMuslimsand on thisbasis wereissuedMalaysianidentity cards(a sign
of citizenship),makingthemeligibleto vote. TheseFilipinoMuslimsnatu-
rallywereexpectedto voteforthechampionofIslam,UMNO, and although
it is impossibleto ascertaintheexactnumberof suchvoters,theiropenpres-
ence in mainlyKadazan-majority constituencies madeIslamization an impor-
tantelectoralissue.8
The BN. The NationalFront'scampaignwas based on the themethatit
alone had theresourcesto bringback "development."In its manifesto, "A
New Sabah,"BN promisedhugeinfrastructure projectsifit wereelected,as
well as thestate'sfirstuniversity.
It also promisedto eradicatepovertyby
the turnof the centuryand to increasethe incomeof all Sabahans. To
counterthe PBS accusationthatUMNO would "colonize"Sabah, the BN
promisedthatthechiefminister's postwouldgo to a Sabahan,and to secure
the non-Malayand non-Muslim vote,Mahathiradded thatif the BN took
overthereinsof government theSabah chiefministership wouldbe rotated
everytwoyearsbetweenMalay/Muslim, KadazanlDusun,and Chineselead-
ers. This majorconcessioneffectively bluntedthePBS argument thatnon-
Muslims and non-Malayswould be marginalized if theBN won.
The BN campaignedextensively on Pairin'sgraftconvictionand argued
thathe shouldresignfor"moral"reasons.Extensivecoveragewas also given
to sales of state-owned that,accordingto theBN, hadbenefited
enterprises a
fewPBS supporters and non-Sabahans.Radio broadcastsand thetwo state-
ownedtelevisionstationsas well as theUMNO-controlled TV3 wereused

30 April1994.
8. "The ShadowLife of Filipinosin Sabah,"Asiavveek,

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 910 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1994
effectively to promotetheBN, whoseneartotalmonopolyof thebroadcast
mediacan be a decisivefactorin shapingthevotingpreferences ofthosewho
are illiterate
or live in remoteregions.after dissolution = before the election = within election
campaign (not directly related)
Shortlyafterthedissolution ofthestateassembly,theBN campaigngota
majorboostwhenYong Teck Lee, thehighestrankingPBS ethnicChinese
memberand deputychiefminister, announcedthathe was leavingPBS and
forminga new party,the Sabah Progressive Party(SAPP). Yong accused
Pairinof thwarting plansto reconcilewithKuala Lumpur,and said theChi-
nese businesscommunity, whichhas a 70% share of Sabah's economy,
would suffermoreif PBS werere-elected.Chinesebusinessesalreadyhad
been suffering fromthe"politicalrecession"and appearedto back Yong's
decision to leave PBS. SAPP was immediately accepted into the BN.
Yong's switchwas highlysignificant as itdividedthehitherto unitedChinese
votethathad goneto PBS in twopreviouselections.The importance of the
eightChinese-majority constituencies
to theBN was underscored whenMa-
laysianDeputyPrimeMinisterAnwarIbrahim,who was also head of the
Barisan'sSabah campaign,announcedan immediate M$30 milliongrantto
Chinese-medium schoolsin Sabah.9 The BN campaignwas also aided by
PBS Kadazan dissidents, themostprominent of whomwas theparty'svice-
president, ClarenceBongkosMalakum,who defiedPairinand stoodas an
independent in Moyongconstituency againsttheofficial PBS candidate, Dep-
uty Chief MinisterBernardDompok. However,Malakum lost, despite
favorablepresscoverage.
Defectionswerenotlimitedto thePBS. MustaphaHarun,thelong-time
championof the Sabah Malay/Muslims, resignedfromhis federalcabinet
postandpubliclysupported PBS. Although he didnotstandforelection,two
of his sons (Amirkahar, of thenow-defunct
president USNO, and Badarud-
din) stoodas PBS candidates.Mustaphafellout withUMNO whenone of
his mainmentors UMNO, GhafarBaba, was forcedoutof the
in peninsular
party.10Givenhisreputation forholdingtheSabahMuslimvote,Mustapha's
defection was expectedto givePBS a majorsegmentof thevotethatwould
have otherwisegone to UMNO Sabah. TogetherwithPairin,the revered
huguansiou of theKadazan,PBS was expectedto win at least halfof the
Muslimvote.

9. BusinessTimes(Singapore),16 February1994.
leadingto Ghafar'soustingfromUMNO's deputypresidency
10. The circumstances and the
deputyprimeministership is beyondthescope of thisarticle.But Mustaphawas one of the
UMNO divisionalchiefswho supportedGhafarin his strugglewithAnwarIbrahim.When
Anwarwon,Mustaphasaw his gripon UMNO Sabah loosenedas Anwar'ssupporters startedto
sidelinehim. See JamesOngkili,"Spectreof Issues Will HaunttheState,"BusinessTimes,2
March 1994.

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 JAMESCHIN 911
Whilepartiesandcandidatesin Sabahhavealwaysuseddirect"cashgifts"
to votersto enticetheirsupport,the 1994 polls were characterized
by an
unusuallyhighlevelof financialinducementfrombothsides. Pairinhimself
was quotedas sayingthat"moneywas virtually beingthrown fromhelicop-
tersand distributed Because the BN had almost
freelyin coffeeshops."11
unlimitedfinancial
resources,PBS couldnotcounterthistried-and-tested
tac-
tic.

TheResults
A totalof 153 candidatescontested
in the1994election.PBS andBN fielded
48 each, Setia Party 13, Bersekutu7, PartyIslam Malaysia (PAS) 3,
DemocracticActionParty(DAP) 2, and Independents 32. Despitethelarge
numberof candidates, thefightwas alwaysbetweentheBarisanand PBS.12
As noted,PBS enteredthe electionwiththe upperhand,as manyregard
Kadazan nationalism and regional/anti-federal
sentiments reasonenoughto
denythepeninsula-based UMNO anyreal headwayin Sabah statepolitics.
However,theelectionresultsweresurprisingly close. PBS won25 seatswith
theremaining 23 goingto theBN (UMNO 18, SAPP 3, LDP 1, AKAR 1).
Of 436,448votescast,PBS won49.48% andtheBN 46.14%.13 The results
followeda clearracialline: PBS wonall 15 Kadazan-majority constituencies
and UMNO took the 18 seats in Malay/Muslim-majority constituencies.
WiththeChinesevotepartiallysplitby SAPP, thesevenChinese-majority
constituenciesweredividedbetweenPBS (4) and BN-SAPP (3).
The resultswere a personalblow to Pairinas he had now lost his two-
thirdsmajority in thestateassembly,themarginneededto amendthestate
constitutionand viewedas a politicalnecessity.Moreover,PBS's partner,
USNO, whichwas expectedto holdon to itstraditional Malay/Muslim vote,
was decimated, andonlyitspresident, Amirkahar,was returned to theassem-
bly. The declineof USNO in theMuslimareaswas bestillustrated by Mus-
tapha's own seat in Usukanwherehis son, Badaruddin,stood as a PBS
candidate.Althoughthe75-yearold Mustaphacampaignedextensively for
his son,Usukanwas wonby a first-time UMNO candidate, MohamedSalleh
Tun Said, theson of GovernorTun MohamedSaid Keruak.
The newlyestablishedSAPP took threeof the seven Chinese-majority
seats,butthefactthatPBS was returned in foursuggeststhatthemajority of

11. FEER, 3 March1994.

12. Fifty-twoofthecandidateslosttheir3,000ringgitelectiondepositwhentheywereunable
to garnerone-eighth 27 Independents,
of thetotalvotescastin theirconstituencies: all 13 from
Setia,all 6 fromBersekutu,all 3 fromPAS, and one fromDAP. Jinuin Jimin,an Independent
runningin theTenon constituency, createdan electoralrecordwhenhe securedonly4 votes.
Daily Express(Kota Kinabalu),21 February1994.
13. New StraitsTimes(Malaysia),21 February1994.

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 912 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1994

ChinesevotersstillpreferredPBS. Thiswas illustrated in theLikas constitu-

ency whereex-PBS incumbent and SAPP founderYong Teck Lee stood
againstthePBS candidate, Yee Moh Chai. The constituency had 19,756vot-
ers comprising10,411Chinese,7,329 Muslimbumiputera, and 2,016 non-
Muslimbumiputera.Yong polled 8,035 votesto Yee's 5,855 in a straight
fight,a significant fromthe5,128-votemajority
reduction Yong receivedas a
PBS candidatein thesameconstituency in 1990. Assumingthatmostof the
Muslimvotersbackedthe BN candidate,thiswouldmean thatYong won
only abouta thousandChinesevoteswiththerestgoingto the PBS. The
close resultalso supported
theallegationsthata largenumberof illegalMus-
lim Filipinoshad voted. Theirvotesprobablymadea significant difference
in marginalseatsandhelpedtheBN wintheMalay-Muslim majority constit-
uencies. However,withoutreliablefigures, theextentof the illegal immi-
grantvotecannotbe ascertained accurately. tipu helah untuk memenangkan UMNO
instead of PBS
ShortlyaftertheresultsrevealedthatPBS had secureda simplemajority,
Pairinrushedto seekan audiencewithGovernor TunMohamedSaid Keruak
to be swornin. The governor refusedto see Pairin,citingillness. Manyfelt
thiswas a ployto allowtheBN to poachseveralPBS legislators.The gover-
norwas hardlyimpartial as his sonhadjustbeenelectedas an UMNO Sabah
candidateand he himselfwas appointedby thefederalgovernment. Pairin,
fearinghe mightlose hispoliticalgripon thestate,started a vigiloutsidethe
gatesof thegovernor'shilltopmansion.In a statewhereshifting alliances
are common,a defectionby two electedassemblymen would have been
enoughto denypowerto thePBS, and as a precaution, all thenewlyelected
PBS legislatorswerehousedat Pairin'sofficialresidence.PrimeMinister
MahathirthenaccusedPairinof physically preventing PBS legislatorsfrom
defecting to theBN. Policeweresentto ensurethatno electedassemblymen
werebeingheldagainsttheirwishes,butall saidtheywerethereoftheirown
freewill. Aftera 36-hourwaitoutsidethegovernor'smansion,Pairinwas
formally swornin as Sabah's chiefminister.supporting Pairin as chief
minister

The Fall
Pairinimmediately rightto nominatesix assem-
exercisedhis constitutional
blymen, thusbringingthePBS majority toeight.ButtheBarisanhad already
startedto enticePBS legislators,and withintwo weeks threeof theman-
nouncedthattheyweredefecting to theBN. A PBS memberof Parliament
also announcedhe was quitting.Accordingto Pairin,thedefectors had been
givenup to threemillionringgit(US$1.1 million).To forestall
further defec-
tions,Pairinsoughtto dissolvetheassembly-whichhas yetto sit-and call
forfreshelections.But thegovernor arguingthatit was too soonto
refused,
call a new electionand since BN had the numbers,it shouldbe given a
chanceto forma government.

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 3 orang yang tukar
parti election 1994:
1. Jeffrey Kitingan
2. Joseph Kurup
JAMESCHIN 913 3. Bernard Dompok

The finalblow to Pairincame whenhis youngerbrother, JeffreyKitingan,

announcedthathe was leavingthePBS to forma PartiDemokratik Sabah
Bersatuthatwouldultimately seektojoin theBN. Two otherkeyPBS politi-
cians,partySecretary-General JosephKurupandformer DeputyChiefMinis-
terBernardDompok,also leftand formednewparties,bothapplyingtojoin
theBN. Faced withthecertainty of a no-confidence voteat theassembly's
firstsitting,Pairinhad littlechoice but to formally resign.'4 The UMNO
Sabah chief,SakaranDandai, was swornin as the new chiefministeron
March17, 1994,andthegovernor's son,MohamedSalleh,andSAPP's Yong
Teck Lee weremadedeputychiefministers fortheMuslimbumiputera and
non-bumiputera communities, respectively.15 The non-Muslimbumiputera
deputychiefwas notappointedimmediately as competing claimswereput
forth by thevariousKadazan-basedparties.AKAR demandedthepost,say-
ingit had beena legitimate BN component partysince 1991,and twoof the
new Kadazan-basedparties,thePDS and thePBRS, also claimedit,stating
thattheyhad appliedto join the BN and were morerepresentative of the
Kadazan community.
Afterabout fivemonthsof negotiations and fearingthatthetwo parties
would be moredangerousin opposition,Mahathiras chairmanof the BN
overruledAKAR's oppositionand decidedon a formulaforboththe PDS
and PBRS to entertheBarisan. Underit,Sabah's non-Muslim bumiputera
deputychiefminister's postwas givento thehead of PBRS, JosephKurup,
whilePDS President BernardDompokwas madea federalcabinetminister.
Jeffrey Kitingan, whowas unableto formhisnewpartyandwas nowAKAR
vice-president,was swornin atthesameceremony as a deputyminister.This
formulaworksin UMNO Sabah's favorat the statelevel as the PBRS is
politicallyweak,withonlyone electedrepresentative (Kurup)comparedto
18 forthe PDS. By givingthe deputychiefminister'sofficeto Kurup,
UMNO Sabah hopedhe woulduse his newlyacquiredpowersof patronage
to balancethePDS and AKAR. But Kurupfacedanothersetbackin early
Octoberwhenseveralof PBRS's proteanleaders,including itspresidentand
vice-president, resignedfromthepartyand rejoinedthePBS.
DespitePairin'sfall,thereis littledoubtthathe has retainedthesupportof
thevastmajority of theKadazan,who stillrecognizehimas theirparamount
chief. In fact,manyKadazan have openlycriticizedthePBS leaderswho
defected, especiallyJeffreyKitinganwhosedefection is seenas a betrayalof
hispreviously strongviewson state'srightsas wellas betrayal ofhisbrother.
The suddendroppingof corruption chargesagainsthimby federalprosecu-

PBS was leftwithjust fiveseats,includingPairin's.

14. Afterthedefections,
are
15. Undera formulasupposedlydesignedto "sharepower,"threedeputychiefministers
Muslimsand non-Muslimsand one for the non-
appointed:one each for the bunziputera
bumiputera communities.

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 914 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1994

torsand his acceptanceof a federalcabinetpostreinforcedtheimagethathe

had "soldout"to theBN. It is unlikely willbe able to recoverhis
thatJeffrey
politicallyamongtheKadazan electorate.'6
credibility

Conclusion
The resultof the Sabah electionillustrates severalthingsabout the state.
First,althoughregionalsentiment and tribalnationalism are strongin Sabah,
as in Sarawak,thesefactorsalone are notenoughto withstand theonslaught
of theBN's nationalpoliticalmachinewithits almostunlimited fundsand
resources. Even as the rulingpartyin Sabah, the PBS was easily out-
performed bytheBN in financial terms.The use ofcash inducements means
thatSabah politicsin thecomingyearswill be increasingly monetized.
Second, the post-election fall of the Pairin-ledPBS state government
showsclearlythatin theMalaysianfederation, power(and patronage)lies in
Kuala Lumpurand not in the respectivestatecapitals. The weaknessof
statesin resistingthe federalgovernment is especiallytrueover the long
term. the authority state to the federal not the state due to the recourses
Third,thedefections fromthePBS haveproducedthreeseparatepolitical
partiesall claimingto represent theinterests of thelargestethnicgroupin
Sabah,theKadazan. ThismeansthatKadazanpoliticalunityanddominance,
held togetherfornine yearsunderPairin,has effectively been destroyed.
UMNO Sabah willremainthelargestpartyin theSabah legislature, and it is
unlikely thatthethreeKadazanparties(AKAR,PBRS, PDS) willbe effective
in promoting Kadazanpoliticalinterests withintheSabah BN. The abilityof
UMNO Sabah to manipulate cabinetpostsand controlaccess to patronage
meansthatno one Kadazan-basedBN component partycan hopeto become
powerfulby unitingtheKadazan community as PBS did whilein power.
Fourth,thesuperiorperformance of UMNO Sabah meansthatUMNO's
deputypresident, AnwarIbrahim,who led the Sabah BN campaign,has
strengthened his positionas heirapparent to Mahathir.UMNO Sabah's suc-
cess in imposingitsbrandof politics,usinga mixof religion, race,and cash
inducements, maymeanthatreligiousconsciousnessand racialpolarization
has worsenedconsiderably in thestate,butitis probablytooearlyto suggest
thatpoliticsin Sabah will now followthewell-established racialpoliticsof
Peninsular Malaysia. Forone thing, theracialcomposition in Sabah is differ-
ent;theMuslimsdo notconstitute a majority andIslamas practicedin Sabah
is muchmoretolerantthanin PeninsularMalaysia. However,giventhat

16. Daily Express(Sabah), 15 June1994. Jeffrey Kitinganwas refusedpermission by the

to formhis new party,and he quicklyacceptedtheofferof thevice-presi-
federalauthorities
dencyof AKAR, whichhad beenoffered to himbeforebutJeffrey thoughtthathe could go it
alone. He was removedshortly aftertheelectionas head of theSabah Foundation.

tools to gain political supports:

1. Religion
2. Race
This content downloaded on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 11:51:45 AM 3. Cash
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 JAMES CHIN 915
UMNO is synonymous withthepromotion of Islam,it is likelythata less
tolerantSabah stategovernment will emergewithinthenextfewyears.
Fifth,thefluidityof Sabah politicshas persisted.The abilityof UMNO
Sabah to stepso quicklyintoUSNO's shoesand SAPP's abilityto winover
someChinesevotersclearlyindicatesthatthereis no suchthingas coresup-
portin Sabah politics.SAPP was formedon January 20, 1994,admitted into
theBN on February 4, andcontestedon February18 and 19. Thisscenariois
verysimilarto thesituationin 1985 whenPairinlaunchedPBS just weeks
beforethestateelectionthatswepthimto power.Thiscontinued fluidity
has
ensuredthatthe "ten-year jinx" theoryis stillvalid. Mustapharuledfrom
1968 to 1975 (7 years),Berjayafrom1976 to 1985 (9 years),and now PBS
from1985 to 1994 (9 years).
Due to Sabah's ethnicand religiousdiversity, UMNO Sabah can expecta
timein theimmediate
difficult future.Governing a statenotwonthrough the
ballotbox will meana certainlack of politicallegitimacy.The appointment
of SakaranDandai, regardedas beingtoo pro-federal, has alreadyaroused
dissensionwithinUMNO Sabah itself.17UMNO's biggestproblem,how-
ever,will be the Kadazan community, whichmayrallyaroundPairinand
PBS in theparliamentary pollsexpectedin early1995. If thenew Kadazan-
based partiesled byformer PBS leadersfailto attractKadazanelectoralsup-
port,UMNO and its BN partners will runtheriskof alienatingmorethan
one-third of thepopulation,whichwouldresultin morepoliticalinstability.

wereplotting
17. A rumorcirculatedwidelythatsomeUMNO Sabah electedrepresentatives
to bringdownthechiefminister.BusinessTimes,29 April1994.

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