Autonomy: Sarawak during the Mahathir Years

James Chin

By the end of his tenure, Mahathir had fundamentally changed

political dynamics across the South China Sea. In Sabah, UMNO’s
entry created a new political relationship with the federal govern-
ment that increased its control over the long-standing troublesome
state. In Sarawak, local leaders had managed to stave off federal
control and remain autonomous. Under the leadership of Abdul Taib
Mahmud, a Muslim Melanau, local parties dominated the political
environment and the federal encroachment of parties, particularly
UMNO, was checked. This autonomy, however, obscures signifi-
cant changes that took place in Sarawak during the Mahathir years;
changes that point to increasing contention among elites once
Mahathir and his loyal ally, Taib, retire.

Politics in Sarawak
Sarawak politics can best be described as a constant maneuvering
between the three local ethnic groups: the Melanau-Malay com-
munity which represents the Muslims, the Chinese who represent
the non-bumiputera, and the Ibans who represent the majority
indigenous Dayak.1 When Sarawak helped form the Malaysian
federation in 1963, power was held by the Iban. In 1971, power
was transferred to the Melanau-Malay community, where it has
stayed ever since. Throughout, the Chinese have remained the
second most powerful group, due mainly to their stranglehold on
the state economy. While the contest among these three groups is
fierce, infighting within groups is fiercer. Sarawak’s comparatively
small size often makes political infighting intensely personal and
contentious. Consequently, new political parties have continuously
emerged, primarily centered around individual leaders.
2 James Chin

The main voice of the Melanau-Malay community has tradi-

tionally been Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), but they are many
attempts to create a separate vehicle for just the Malay commu-
nity. In the 1970s it was Parti Anak Jati Sarawak (PAJAR), in the
1980s it was Persatuan Raykat Malaysia Sarawak (PERMAS), and
most recently Parti Keadilan Sarawak (PKS) claims strong support
among the Sarawak Malay community.
Among the Chinese, the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP)
was able to claim a monopoly on Chinese politics until the late
1970s, when DAP Sarawak was established. Since then, Chinese
politics revolves mainly around the SUPP and the Sarawak DAP,
which has often challenged SUPP in Chinese majority areas.
The situation is more complex in the Dayak community. Their
political support is split among all the parties: PBB has a Dayak
wing called “Pesaka,” SUPP has several Dayak elected repre-
sentatives, while DAP has fielded several candidates in elections,
albeit unsuccessfully. While the Dayak are a minority in the men-
tioned parties, they are the majority in the Sarawak National Party
(SNAP), Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS), and Sarawak Pro-
gressive Democratic Party (SPDP). Part of the reason the Dayak
remain politically weak is that their political support is spread out
among several parties, highlighting the intense political infighting
among the Iban.
Since 1970, the ruling coalition in Sarawak has been the
Sarawak Barisan Nasional (SBN), which like its counterpart on the
peninsula consists of three major parties: PBB, SUPP, and SNAP.
When PBDS was established in the early 1980s, it was admitted
into the state ruling coalition, but its inclusion was not smooth since
it was expelled in 1987 in a leadership challenge against Taib.
Although it kept its membership in the federal BN, its expulsion
weakened its influence at the state level. It was only readmitted
in 1994, seven years later, after it had been weakened further and
no longer posed a threat to Taib’s authority. In 2002, SPDP became
the latest admission into the SBN. In terms of real power, PBB and
SUPP hold the power in SBN and the three majority Dayak-based
parties, SNAP, PBDS and SPDP, are seen as “little brothers.” The
leader of PBB, by convention, becomes the chief minister while
the leader of SUPP is made the first deputy chief minister.
 Sarawak’s Autonomy 3

Transition Pains in the 1980s

When Mahathir came into power in 1981, a similar political tran-
sition had occurred six months earlier in Kuching. Taib took over
as chief minister from Abdul Rahman Yakub, his uncle. Yakub had
been chief minister for the past decade. Taib had spent the previous
decade as a federal minister and was accordingly close to federal
leaders, including Mahathir, a cabinet colleague for many years.
Yakub got himself elevated to Yang Di-Pertua Negri (Governor), a
largely ceremonial position with no executive power.
The transition did not stop Yakub from interfering in state
affairs. Political tensions between the nephew and uncle quickly
emerged over the allocation of timber concessions, party positions
in PBB, infrastructure projects, and other business opportunities,
as Yakub tried to maintain his grip on power. The conflict was not
just personal; it involved the spoils of office, as cronies fought hard
to stake their claim over lucrative state-linked benefits.
While the Governor and the chief minister were barely on speak-
ing terms, the Dayak community was heading for a monumental
split that would have decisive effects on the evolving leadership
contest. The main Dayak party, SNAP, underwent a party election
in which an ethnic Chinese, James Wong Kim Min, was elected
president. Leo Moggie Anak Irok, his Iban challenger, claimed that
the Dayak majority SNAP should not have a Chinese leader and
went on to set up his own political party, Parti Bansa Dayak
Sarawak (PBDS) or Dayak People’s Party, in 1983. For political
expediency, PBDS was admitted into the SBN and given junior
cabinet portfolios. The creation of PBDS pulled away Dayak
support from SNAP, and heralded the emergence of a new political
contender in the ongoing power struggle.
When Taib replaced Yakub as Governor in 1985 the leadership
struggle intensified. Yakub immediately set about to topple Taib
and come back as chief minister. He established Persatuan Raykat
Malaysia Sarawak (PERMAS) and began a campaign to discredit
Taib, claiming that the chief minister’s “dictatorial ways” were no
longer acceptable. By 1987 he had teamed up with PBDS and
managed to convince a group of state assemblymen to sign a “no
confidence” letter against Taib, demanding his resignation. PBDS
joined Yakub after he allegedly agreed to allow Ibans to be “gen-
4 James Chin

erals” instead of “soldiers” in Sarawak politics if the PERMAS-

PBDS coalition was able to capture government.
Taib fought back. He opted for a snap election, and relied
heavily on his close connection with Mahathir for critical support.
Mahathir backed Taib, maintaining that his position was consistent
with a practice of only supporting “official” SBN parties, in this
case PBB, SUPP, and SNAP. Both the PBDS and PERMAS were
not in Sarawak BN, after the former’s expulsion at the state level
and the latter’s failed attempts to gain membership. Yakub, whose
main contact in the federal BN was then Deputy Prime Minister
Ghafar Baba, did not have as strong a personal relationship with
the federal leadership.
What is not widely known is the role played by SUPP in per-
suading Mahathir to choose Taib over Yakub. Mahathir had strong
personal links to the SUPP: Dr. Wong Soon Kai, SUPP’s president
from 1990 to 1996, and his wife were classmates with Dr. Mahathir
and Dr. Siti Hasmah during their medical college days in Singapore.
Wong had told Mahathir in no uncertain terms that SUPP and the
Sarawak Chinese community supported Taib. SUPP was unhappy
with Yakub because the party believed, correctly, that Yakub wanted
to weaken it. In 1978, when Yakub was chief minister, he allowed
DAP to establish a Sarawak branch. This move ended the SUPP’s
monopoly over the Chinese vote. The SUPP was also unhappy with
Yakub’s moves to destabilize the party internally. It was known that
Yakub supported individuals in SUPP during factional fights. Other
grouses held by SUPP were Yakub’s push for Islamization and his
promotion of several Chinese businessmen who had no connections
with SUPP. Sarawak’s Chinese political leaders played a decisive
role in tilting the balance in Taib’s favor.
Through the struggle Mahathir was unwilling to cut ties with
the Dayak community. The Dayak community, numerically the
largest ethnic grouping in Sarawak, was too important for Mahathir
to ignore. He already had the “indigenous problem” in Sabah. Two
years earlier, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), led by the indigenous
Kadazandusun, had swept to power on the strength of ethnic
nationalism and anti-federal sentiments. Mahathir knew that
Dayak nationalism was equally potent in Sarawak. He thus allowed
Moggie to stay on as federal minister, and PBDS was not expelled
at the federal level. For Mahathir, the outcome was a win-win
 Sarawak’s Autonomy 5

situation: even if the challengers had won, Sarawak would have

remained under the national BN umbrella.
In the deciding 1987 election, Taib won narrowly. The PBDS-
PERMAS alliance collapsed shortly after Yakub announced his
retirement from politics. Without his considerable financial sup-
port, PERMAS instantly became a “mosquito” party. PBDS and the
Sarawak DAP became the main opposition parties at the state
level, with limited resources to challenge Taib’s growing power.

Taib’s Dominance in the 1990s

It was not until the subsequent election that Taib was able to
definitively quell the challenge of Iban nationalism. In 1991, Taib
won an overwhelming victory, losing only seven seats. PBDS’s
Dayakism was no longer potent. PBDS then applied to rejoin the
SBN, but its application was not accepted until three years later in
1994, after a period to test PBDS’s “sincerity.”
Throughout his tenure Taib maintained a strong following among
Sarawak Chinese through effective cooperation with SUPP. He built
strong personal bonds with the SUPP leaders. During Wong Soon
Kai’s term as SUPP president, key allies of Taib were (and are)
involved in timber ventures with the Foochow Chinese, the most
powerful dialect group within the Chinese community. Soon Kai
is a Foochow. A few years after George Chan Hong Nam took over
as president of SUPP, one of his daughters married Taib’s son. Taib
also provided key access to state resources, stability and adequate
distributive funds for SUPP by giving it powerful ministries such
as Finance and Infrastructure. The ministry has always been held
under SUPP during Taib’s reign.
For Taib, opposition among the Chinese was largely a SUPP
problem. Although challenged by DAP, SUPP managed to use its
access to and distribution of state resources to maintain its domi-
nant position, thus strengthening Taib control over the Sarawak
government. Sarawak Chinese, like their peninsula counterparts,
were unhappy with the pro-bumiputera government policies.
UMNO was seen to be nationally pursuing a “Malay Agenda” at
the expense of the non-Malays. The DAP exploited these concerns
and argued that the Sarawak Chinese could have it “two ways.”
DAP told the voters that it understood their desire to support the
6 James Chin

SUPP at the state level to protect local Chinese interests; however,

the DAP argued that voting in favor of the DAP in national
parliamentary elections would send a signal that Sarawak Chinese
opposed ethnic discriminatory policies. This tactic worked through-
out the Mahathir years; the Sarawak DAP managed to win at
parliamentary elections while consistently losing at state elections.
Their victories were small, however, never extending beyond two
seats. Taib, through his alliance with the SUPP, limited Chinese
opposition.
Taib’s relationship with the Malay community is more compli-
cated. The problem is rooted in history and competition between
Melanaus and Malays. The Melanau constitute less than 5 percent
of the state’s population compared to the Malay 20 percent. Since
PBB’s formation in 1973, it has always been led by a Melanau.
This is resented by Malays who, like their counterparts in UMNO,
believe that only ethnic Malays should be allowed to rule since they
are the “true” bumiputera. At the same time, they feel marginalized
in state politics; no Malay has ever been chief minister. The first
two chief ministers, Stephen Kalong Ningkan and Tawi Sli, were
both Ibans, followed by Yakub and Taib, Melanau Muslims. The
resentment also extends to the economic arena. Malay critics argue
that Melanaus have been the major beneficiaries of Taib’s rule.
They point to one of Sarawak’s biggest companies, Cahaya Mata
Sarawak (CMS), a conglomerate majority-owned by Taib’s family
that profited extensively from state-funded infrastructure projects,
and the prominence of several Melanau millionaire politicians to
suggest that the system has not adequately protected Malay inter-
ests. Consequently, Malays want greater representation, and this
pressure has increased through the Mahathir years.
In the early 1990s, a younger generation of Malays decided that
the only way to dislodge the Melanau hold on Muslim politics was
through UMNO. The psychological barrier to UMNO’s entry into
East Malaysia was broken in 1991 when UMNO moved into
Sabah. Since then, there has been a concerted effort by Malay
political leaders (including some inside the PBB) to bring UMNO
to Sarawak. The leaders come mainly from the Persatuan Kebang-
saan Melayu Sarawak (PKMS), the oldest state Malay nationalist
organization, and former Malay leaders of the now defunct
PERMAS. Many Sarawak Malays are already UMNO members,
 Sarawak’s Autonomy 7

although they are categorized as members of UMNO branches out-

side Sarawak.
Taib has been extremely sensitive to criticism that he is mar-
ginalizing Malays. This can be seen by the way Taib deals with
perceived Malay political threats from within his own party, PBB.
Abang Johari Tun Abang Haji Openg, the most senior Malay
minister, comes from one of the oldest aristocratic Malay families.
“Abang Jo” was widely seen to be the first Malay chief minister.
Known to be close to Anwar Ibrahim when the latter was deputy
prime minister, Abang Jo was expected to become chief minister
once Anwar became the prime minister. When Anwar was removed,
Abang Jo’s political fortunes immediately worsened. In 1988,
Abang Jo won the deputy presidency of PBB, but instead of getting
a promotion, he was moved to the minor Tourism Ministry from
the more powerful Ministry of Industrial Development.
Another prominent Sarawak Malay who failed to dent Melanau
hegemony was Abang Abu Bakar Mustapha, who comes from one
of the most prominent Malay families. His father was Datu Bandar,
a key Malay leader in the 1960s who was given a federal cabinet
post by Tunku Abdul Rahman. Abu Bakar was seen to be involved
in a plot to bring UMNO to Sarawak in 1998. A year later, Taib
dropped him as a PBB-BN candidate in the parliamentary election,
effectively ending his political career.
Mahathir has not intervened in the Malay-Melanau contest. It
appears that he has entered into an agreement with Taib that assures
Taib’s political autonomy. The most important element of the pact,
published on the front page of the PBB-controlled Sarawak Tribune,
was a promise made by both sides that UMNO would not be estab-
lished in Sarawak as long as Taib and Mahathir are in power.2
Without the possibility of UMNO coming into Sarawak, some
Malays have turned towards Parti Keadilan Nasional as their main
vehicle to mobilize the community. In the 1999 parliamentary elec-
tions, Keadilan candidates in Malay-majority areas near Kuching
did exceedingly well. Although none won, two came extremely
close in what was otherwise “safe” PBB constituencies. However,
a year and half later in the 2001 state election, the same Malay
voters who had backed Keadilan in 1999 supported the PBB this
time around. The Malay threat to Taib has been contained, although
the issues remain unresolved.
8 James Chin

Fortunately for Taib, the long history of political infighting

among the Dayak community persists. In a space of less than two
years since 2001, SNAP and PBDS have imploded from within
due to a power struggle between William Mawan Ikom, SNAP’s
vice president, and the party president, James Wong. Mawan has
emerged victorious, with the creation of the Sarawak Progressive
Democratic Party (SPDP) and its inclusion in the SBN last year,
while Wong’s SNAP has been severely weakened. Personality
politics has hampered the representation of the Dayak community.
The infighting in PBDS also has its roots over a leadership tussle.
With the retirement of Leo Moggie, two contenders have squared
off: James Jemut Masing and Daniel Tajem. By the end of July
2003, the PBDS had two of everything, from two party “presidents”
to two “Supreme Councils.” No matter how this leadership struggle
will be resolved, it is clear that any ambition of the Dayak com-
munity to put one of their own into the office of the chief minister
will not occur for the foreseeable future.

Hands-Off Approach
Mahathir’s attitude towards politics in Sarawak can best be de-
scribed as “hands off” as long as the SBN reigned supreme. Under
Taib, the SBN has consistently given the federal BN more than
90 percent of Sarawak’s parliamentary seats. The importance of
Sarawak’s parliamentary seats cannot be understated. Sarawak
(and Sabah) account for roughly one-quarter of the seats in the
national parliament. Traditionally, 70-80 percent of these seats
are “safe” BN seats, giving the National Front a “safety buffer”
should it suffer a major defeat in the peninsula. In 1990 and
1999, Mahathir and the BN would have lost their all-important
two-thirds majority in the Dewan Rakyat without the East
Malaysia seats.
Of all the chief ministers in Mahathir’s tenure, Taib has had the
most successful record of consistently securing BN support. In the
last election in 1999, the BN won all 28 seats on offer in Sarawak.
It is not a coincidence that Taib has acquired the greatest autonomy.
Taib has been the undisputed leader from 1987 onwards, with
strong Mahathir backing. The Prime Minister’s trust in Taib was
further exemplified when he signed the no-UMNO pact which
 Sarawak’s Autonomy 9

ensured that Taib would not have to face a Sarawak Malay revolt
via UMNO.
Despite the lack of direct involvement, Mahathir appears unwill-
ing to accept non-Muslim indigenous political ascendancy. When
the largest indigenous group, the non-Muslim Dayaks, asserted their
political power in 1987, he sided openly with Taib (although he
kept his line open to PBDS at the federal level). This could also
explain why he does not take seriously the complaints of Sarawak
Malays against Melanau political hegemony. Taib is a Muslim and
therefore acceptable to Mahathir.
Although federal support has been crucial in power struggles,
Mahathir has been reluctant to directly intervene in Sarawak be-
cause of his experiences with Sabah. He is mindful of the strong
regional sentiments and the testy relationship he had with the
Kadazandusuns. Fortunately for the BN, “state rights” did not
emerge as a major political issue in Sarawak. Mahathir also had
strong ties with the other two major power brokers in Sarawak
politics: the Chinese through SUPP and the Dayak community
through PBDS, SNAP, and SPDP. As long as they all supported
the federal BN and delivered the seats, he left them alone. Thus,
on a political level, there was little need for him to intervene
given that the ruling SBN, or more precisely the parliamentary
seats, was never threatened during his tenure. Economically, Sara-
wak’s extensive oil and gas output buttressed Mahathir’s ability to
channel state resources for development nationwide. Sarawak was
a consistent major contributor to federal coffers because of its ex-
tensive oil and gas reserves.
In sum, one could easily argued that Taib (and Sarawak) prob-
ably had the highest degree of political autonomy among BN-
controlled states during Mahathir’s reign. The wealth accumulated
by his family’s businesses in the past two decades has further
cemented his political supremacy, so much so that some people
describe Taib as the “New Rajah.”

Conclusion
When Mahathir leaves office, the dynamics in Sarawak politics
are likely to change, albeit slowly. Mahathir’s departure will
mark the end of the UMNO pact and presumably open up the
10 James Chin

path for UMNO to enter Sarawak. The tensions between the

Malays and Melanau, which have increased during the latter years
of Mahathir’s tenure, will continue to fester. Given the tight control
exercised by Taib over politics in Sarawak, these tensions are un-
likely to move beyond elite political infighting in the near future.
The same could be said for the Chinese and Dayak. The SUPP
remains dominant over the Sarawak DAP, while infighting among
the Iban politicians weakens their representation. The broader issues
of Chinese and Dayak rights will likely remain clouded behind the
haze of elite power struggles.
Ethnic issues, however, will continue to shape the political dy-
namic, as the structure of Sarawak politics remains deeply rooted
in ethnic representation.
Similarly, Sarawakians will continue to rely on state distribution
of benefits. Taib mastered the careful distribution of state spoils
to assure loyalty and support. Sarawakians, unlike their counter-
parts in Sabah, have been quite content under his leadership.
Taib’s close relationship with Mahathir assured a wide berth. It is
unlikely that Mahathir’s successors will interfere with existing
patterns in the short term, but the issue of the sustainability of state
resources and political patronage using state resources will become
more salient.
Significant political change is more likely to come after Taib’s
departure. The similar length of Taib’s tenure with Mahathir will
make this an issue once Mahathir retires. There will be more elites
contending for power, and greater infighting. What is clear is that
whoever takes over from Taib will no longer enjoy the same level
of political autonomy from the federal level. At the state level, the
new chief minister will not have the same concentration of power;
he must consult within a much larger circle of elites than the
present. In the meantime, Taib and Sarawak can expect to continue
on with the high degree of autonomy from Mahathir’s successor.

Notes
1 The term “Dayak” is commonly used to refer to all non-Muslim in-
digenous ethnic groups such as the Iban, Bidayuh, Kayan, Kenyah, and
more than 20 others.
2 Sarawak Tribune, February 15, 1997.
 Sarawak’s Autonomy 11

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