Middle East and North Africa

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Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa

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Chapter Seven
Middle East and North Africa
A region reshaped troops in his stronghold, and hometown, of Sirte.
Gadhafi was killed on 20 October, ending 42 years of
The tumult across the the Middle East and North rule. A key challenge for the NTC, and for the interna-
Africa, sparked by the self-immolation of Tunisian tional community, will be in disarming, demobilising
street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010, and, where necessary, integrating the various armed
has rocked many states in the region, and toppled former rebel groups into new security and military
some long-established regimes. The way militaries institutions.
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
have behaved has depended on particular national In Yemen and Syria, however, fighting continued
situations (see p. 9 and Strategic Survey 2011, pp. at least into November. A September 2011 report
43–76). In some cases, such as Tunisia and Egypt, the by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
armed forces distanced themselves from the regime; Human Rights (OHCHR) noted that ‘the Yemeni
in others, such as Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and, for a Government had lost effective control of parts of the
time, Libya (see p. 9), where relatives of the rulers country and within the major cities, where armed
were entrusted with command responsibilities, opponents appeared to have de-facto control’.
security forces remained more cohesive or fought Demonstrations calling for Saleh’s departure started
back. In these cases, dependable, elite and generally in February and, despite initial concessions, the
well-resourced units carried much of the repressive president organised counter demonstrations and
burden. ordered a crackdown. Violence spread outside the
and North Africa

capital, notably to Ta’izz in the south, where heavy
Middle East
Tensions within regional armed forces have at
times led to fractures. In Libya, the regular military force was used against demonstrators. Further,
quickly split, with significant numbers joining rebel fighters from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
forces. In Syria, the military has remained largely (AQAP) ‘took advantage of the distraction of Saleh’s
cohesive, though there have been some defections security forces to temporarily seize the town of
to protesters’ ranks. In Yemen, General Ali Muhsin Zinjibar and advance through the region of Abyan’.
al-Ahmar, commander of the 1st Armoured Division Saleh’s stalling, and refusal to sign the power-
and former confidant of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, transfer deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation
defected in March and ordered his troops to protect Council (GCC), led tribal fighters to declare support
crowds protesting against Saleh’s rule. This led to an for the opposition; clashes with forces loyal to the
armed stand-off with loyalist units; defections from president worsened across the country and, after an
military units continued in late 2011. In other cases, attack on his palace in June, a wounded Saleh left for
however, regimes have improved military pay and Saudi Arabia to seek medical treatment, though he
conditions in a bid to forestall discontent among the returned in late September.
armed forces, and ensure support. The OHCHR report said that the government
In the three cases where there was some frac- ‘resorted to using all the armed units at its disposal,
turing of the military, fighting proved persistent: in from the army to intelligence and law enforcement
the Libyan case this erupted into civil war. This war agencies, in responding to demonstrations or in
involved external military action in the wake of UN dealing with armed efforts to bring about regime
Security Council Resolution 1973 (see p. 12). UN change. The Yemeni air force was involved in clashes
member states were authorised to ‘take all necessary with armed groups around Sana’a and Abyan. In
measures … to protect civilians and civilian popu- addition, the Yemeni navy reportedly supported
lated areas under threat of attack’. After seven months ground troops fighting in Abyan, by shelling from the
of bitter fighting, anti-Gadhafi forces – by then the sea.’ The elite Republican Guard, concentrated near
Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC) main towns, reportedly engaged in crowd control
was internationally recognised as the Libyan admin- along with other army units. The situation in Yemen
istration – defeated the former dictator’s remaining is complicated by the pre-existing tensions between
304 The Military Balance 2012
north and south, as well as tribal dynamics: key oppo- Strategic Comment noted increasing defections to the
nents of Saleh lead the Hashid tribal confederation, ‘Free Syrian Army’ (FSA), based across the border in
while other tribes remain loyal to the government. Turkey, headed by former Syrian army officers and
Notwithstanding Saleh’s decision, in late November, intent on overthrowing the regime. Estimates of FSA
to transfer power after signing the GCC-brokered strength varied between hundreds and, according
deal, instability persisted. Should fighting continue, to the FSA’s General Riadh Asaad, ‘10,000’. As of
and the Yemeni security forces fracture further, November, demonstrations and counter-demonstra-
the risk of this strategically significant country tions, and strikes, were occurring in some cities; and
descending once more into civil war increases; this low-level armed clashes continued.
will trouble regional as well as international states, Though there has been considerable international
notably Saudi Arabia, nearly two years on from its pressure, both diplomatic and in terms of personal
military actions against Houthi forces straddling the sanctions on regime officials, the government has not
Saudi–Yemeni border. relented in its tough response to protests. Unlike in
Meanwhile, Yemen remains a source of interna- the Libyan case, there was little appetite for interna-
tional concern due to the presence of AQAP fighters. tional involvement and in October the UN Security
The preoccupation of Yemeni security forces with Council was unable to agree a resolution condemning
the political dispute – and the sharpened focus on the actions of the regime. Regional responses tough-
these issues of loyal units such as the US-equipped ened in November, with the Arab League announcing
special-forces units – has granted AQAP greater sanctions on Syria and reports that, while it had no
freedom of movement. It has not, thus far, led to plans to intervene in Syria, Turkey was ‘ready for any
a halt in US-led counter-terrorist actions: another scenario’.
Predator strike on a Yemen-based target killed, in Egypt’s Supreme Council for the Armed Forces
late September, the Islamist ideologue and terrorist (SCAF), headed by Defence Minister Field Marshal
suspect Anwar al-Awlaki. Washington faces a Mohammed Tantawi, assumed power in February
dilemma: on the one hand it has criticised Sana’a’s after the departure of former President Hosni
use of force and called both for Saleh to leave and Mubarak (see Strategic Survey 2011, pp. 63–4.) SCAF
for an orderly transition of power in Yemen. On the is overseeing the transition towards elections and,
other hand, further instability after Saleh’s depar- while the armed forces have generally proved to be
ture could increase AQAP’s freedom of action and a steadying hand, their actions have been governed
could make it more problematic for Washington by a desire to preserve military power and privileges.
to obtain accurate information of use for counter- After further demonstrations in April and May, the
terrorism purposes. military did address some of the demonstrators’
In Syria, as detailed in Strategic Survey 2011 (pp. grievances, but it also arrested activists and jour-
88–91), the heavy-handed response to anti-regime nalists ‘deemed to be endangering the transition or
sloganeering in the southern city of Deraa (when attacking the military’. There is little appetite for the
security forces arrested several children and killed armed forces to change strategic orientation. Cairo
three protesters) inflamed the city. Popular resis- still receives $1.3bn in US military aid, and has long
tance to security forces emerged, and assets and been upgrading its inventories with US systems.
symbols of the regime were destroyed. By mid-April, Indeed, a further notification of a foreign military
anti-regime demonstrations started in Baniyas, Deir sale to Egypt, of 125 Abrams tank kits, was made by
el-Zour, Hama, Homs, Lattaqiyah and in the Kurdish the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency in July.
northwest. Military units loyal to the regime have There is little incentive for the military to endanger its
been heavily mobilised, including elite troops from ability to continue this process, or endanger support
the 4th Armoured Division – commanded by Maher and maintenance agreements. But, as noted on p.
al-Assad, the president’s brother – the Republican 11, it is conceivable that Cairo might widen its list of
Guard and the Alawite shabbiha militia (see essay, suppliers in some capability areas.
p. 9). Conventional army units considered less reli- The fall of established rulers and continuing
able were kept away from the centres of dissent, but upheaval in the region has unnerved Israeli secu-
there were a growing number of defections, mostly rity planners. The persistent disturbances and secu-
from junior officers and soldiers, raising questions rity crackdown in Syria, and the impact any change
about the army’s cohesiveness. An October 2011 IISS of direction in Damascus could have on Lebanese
Middle East and North Africa 305
stability, raises concerns in Israel over the future around critical infrastructure. Kuwait, after its parlia-
activities of Hizbullah, now a part of the Beirut ment had vetoed ground troops, sent a naval force
government and which, Israel alleges, continues to to Bahrain’s waters. Bahrain’s military sealed off
build its weapons holdings in villages south of the protest sites, established military checkpoints and
Litani River. In the south, the long-established ‘cold enforced a curfew. Military authorities then took
peace’ with Egypt is also under increased scrutiny measures designed to crush the political opposition.
and, while conflict there remains unlikely, there will Pearl roundabout was bulldozed, the largest hospital
be renewed focus on the southern flank. At the very was placed under military control and a number of
least, Israel might engage in contingency planning human-rights violations took place, including the
to contain possible threats from Sinai and knock-on destruction of Shia mosques. The Peninsula Shield
effects in Gaza. force was still deployed as of November (see Strategic
Indeed, the continued intermittent firing of rockets Survey 2011, pp. 76–9). However, for many Gulf armed
from Gaza remains a concern for Israel and has driven forces and international military forces stationed in
some recent capability additions. The Iron Dome the region the effects of the Arab Awakening merely
short-range anti-missile system was used operation- added a new layer of security preoccupations to those
ally for the first time in April, and by August three already motivating military planners.
batteries had been deployed in Ashdod, Ashkelon
and Beersheba. Defence Minister Ehud Barak has Middle East AND North Africa
announced a plan for a fourth battery by the end of Defence Economics
2011. The Trophy active defence system for armoured
vehicles was also deployed on vehicles near the Gaza The region continued to experience reasonably robust
border. Iran, and its ballistic-missile and nuclear economic growth, largely owing to high global oil
programmes, remains another concern. In the field prices. Despite relatively stable levels for most of 2010
of ballistic-missile defence, Arrow 3 continues under ($75–$85 per barrel), oil prices rose dramatically from
and North Africa

Middle East
development by the US and Israel, designed to the last quarter of 2010 to the middle of 2011 (to above
engage incoming missiles in the upper atmosphere – $110 per barrel), due to strong demand from fast-
a development of Arrow 2 and complementing Israel’s growing emerging economies (particularly China),
Patriot missiles. Israel has furthered its military-to- market perceptions of economic recovery among
military ties with Greece, an interesting shift given industrialised economies, and the fighting in Libya.
the apparent foundering of Israel’s defence relation- Indeed, global demand for oil grew by 3.3% in 2010,
ship with Turkey. Naval exercises in the Aegean Sea the fastest rate in more than 20 years. Higher prices
and air exercises in Larissa using IAF UH-60 and boosted overall economic activity in much of the
AH-64 helicopters were held and, in September, a region, which the IMF expected to grow by around
security-cooperation agreement was signed by the 4% in 2011.
two nations’ defence ministers. Air exercises have This masks a severe discrepancy between
again been held in Romania, with C-130s flying the economic performances of oil-exporting and
for two weeks in August in locations including the -importing countries (see Table 23, note 3, for details
Carpathian mountains; early November saw Israeli of regional groupings). Higher oil prices boosted
F-16Cs and Ds depart for week-long exercises in the public finances of oil exporters, as tax revenues
Sardinia, Italy. grew by nearly 55% between 2009 and 2011. The
Bahrain’s security forces reacted to the 14 GCC states are expected to see an expansion of more
February 2011 ‘Day of Rage’ with tear gas and rubber than 70% in their collective current-account surplus,
bullets. Demonstrators started camping out at the with economic growth of greater than 7% in 2011.
city’s Pearl roundabout. Mixed responses from the Meanwhile, the public coffers of oil-importing coun-
government suggested an internal rift in the ruling tries grew by a much more modest 14%, and their
family. Although moves for a ‘national dialogue’ overall growth in 2011 was expected to be just 1.9%.
were proposed, the king instituted a state of emer- However, high oil prices have been a mixed blessing
gency. Troops from the GCC’s Peninsula Shield force, for oil exporters. The rapid increase stoked strong
comprising Saudi, UAE and Qatari contingents, domestic inflation, which in 2011 rose to approxi-
then deployed in Bahrain in mid-March following mately 8.5% compared with 5.9% for non-exporters.
a Bahraini request. These troops were deployed Overall, in 2011 the region as a whole experienced
Table 23 Middle East and North Africa Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Top 10 and Regional Break-
down1 (US$bn)
2010 % of Regional Total 2011 Estimate % of Regional Total Real % Change2
Saudi Arabia 45.17 38.11% 46.18 36.18% –3.1%
Israel 17.17 14.49% 18.25 14.30% –2.8%
Iran* 10.56 8.91% 11.96 9.37% –3.4%
UAE 8.65 7.29% 9.32 7.30% 5.1%
Algeria 5.59 4.72% 8.61 6.74% 44.0%
Egypt 5.43 4.58% 5.53 4.33% –3.2%
Iraq 4.19 3.53% 4.79 3.75% 8.9%
Oman 4.19 3.53% 4.29 3.36% –1.6%
Kuwait 3.91 3.30% 4.05 3.17% –6.2%
Qatar 3.12 2.63% 3.45 2.71% 8.2%
Sub-Total 107.97 91.09% 116.42 91.21% –1.01%

Regional Expenditure Breakdown3
Oil Exporting States 87.97 74.21% 95.57 74.88% 0.08%
Non-Oil Exporting States 30.57 25.79% 32.07 25.12% –3.16%
Total 118.53 127.64 –0.77%
*Figures for both 2010 and 2011 are estimates.
1
Current prices and exchange rates. Figures include US Foreign Military Assistance funds for relevant countries. Analysis excludes Mauritania,
Libya, Tunisia and the West Bank & Gaza due to insufficient data.
2
Percentage changes calculated in real terms (i.e. constant 2010 prices and exchange rates). These will differ from any percentage-change
calculations made based on the defence-expenditure figures contained in the rest of the table, which are based on current prices and current
exchange rates.
3
Regional groupings: Oil-exporting states (Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen); Non-oil exporting states
(Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria).
one of the highest levels of inflation in the world

(around 10%, up from 6.6% in 2009 and 6.8% in 2010). Maghreb
Estimated changes in defence allocations over 13.8%
2010 and 2011 mirrored these underlying trends. Levant (Jordan,

As shown in Table 23, oil-exporting states made up Lebanon and Saudi Arabia
Syria) 4.0% 37.3%
nearly 75% of total regional defence expenditure, and
in 2011 their collective spending rose to US$95.57bn, a
nominal increase of 8.6%. Adjusting for inflation, this Israel
14.2%
amounted to a negligible real-terms increase in expen-
diture of 0.08%. By contrast, although defence outlays
by oil importers rose by 4.9% in nominal terms to Other Gulf
(Iraq and Yemen)
US$32.07bn, this corresponds to a 3.16% real decline 5.3%
Iran GCC (excluding Saudi
in expenditure once inflation is taken into account.
8.7% Arabia – i.e. Bahrain,
Among exporters, significant increases in real Kuwait, Qatar, Oman
spending are estimated to have occurred in Algeria and UAE) 17.0%
(at 44%, the largest increase in the region), Iraq (8.9%)

and Qatar (8.2%); while among non-exporters Syria Figure 10 Approximate Middle East and North
saw the highest real increase in spending (5.4%). The Africa Defence Expenditure: Sub-Regional
region as a whole saw a nominal spending increase of Breakdown
7.7%, which equated to a fall in real terms of 0.77% as
a result of high inflation. over Iran’s ballistic-missile and nuclear programmes,
Oil-exporting countries, particularly those that coupled with concerns closer to home, may also drive
perceive a deteriorating security environment or Israeli spending. Yet states with uncertain economic
face a specific threat, will probably use their growing futures or considerable constraints on economic
revenues from hydrocarbon exports to continue growth, including Libya, Yemen and Iran, are likely
to increase defence spending, despite competing to continue to struggle to expand their defence
imperatives of social-security spending. Concern spending to any significant degree.
7 6.48
6.21
5.67 5.86
6 5.49 5.29 5.06 5.09 5.01
4.62
5
% of GDP
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 11 Middle East and North Africa Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP
The GCC, cooperative defence and regard to interoperability, integration, unified logis-
Iran tics, joint training and sustainment, or collective
combat effectiveness. There are to date no projects that
The GCC has been successful in promoting greater enable GCC forces to deploy rapidly and coherently
diplomatic, economic and cultural cooperation to meet an external military threat. And despite two
amongst its members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, decades of discussions and external encouragement,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) since it the GCC has yet to establish a regional air-defence
and North Africa

Middle East
was formed in 1981. However, it has largely failed capacity outside US coordination and control.
in its attempts to create a multilateral, cooperative This may change, as the threats facing the GCC
defence network. While the GCC’s military wing, the evolve; the decision in November to set up a GCC
Peninsula Shield force, has of late had some limited marine security coordination centre in Bahrain may
impact on mutual security, this has been in relation be a useful pointer. The primary threat to the GCC
to internal, not external, problems. The military inef- does not flow from Iran’s conventional forces, which
fectiveness of its land component was exposed during consist mostly of ageing military hardware acquired
the Gulf War, and although it is reported to comprise well before the Islamic revolution. Iranian airpower
some 40,000 troops based at King Khalid Military City, is operationally limited and cannot compete with the
its first and only deployment was in the form of the modern air forces of Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Iran’s
Saudi National Guard, UAE and Qatari elements sent ground forces have scant expeditionary capacity and
to Bahrain in March 2011 in an internal-security role. cannot realistically threaten GCC territory. Rather,
The GCC’s failure to establish a collective security the GCC is threatened today by Iran’s navy, which is
framework can be traced to divergent threat percep- focused on developing a capacity to conduct irregular,
tions, parochial interests of the individual states, asymmetric warfare, rather than maritime supremacy
issues of sovereignty, lingering fears of Saudi domi- in the traditional sense. Iran is also investing heavily
nance, and a general distrust of Arab military compe- in the acquisition of ballistic missiles and long-range
tence. Consequently, the individual states of the GCC, artillery rockets. Though the missiles lack the accu-
with ample oil and gas revenues, have used lavish racy needed to be militarily effective, they could be
military-acquisition programmes to cement formal used as terror weapons, to sow fear and degrade GCC
and informal bilateral security arrangements with the political resolve.
United States. This strategy has further complicated These developments have prompted the GCC to
efforts to develop joint military capabilities founded invest in modern air and missile defences, and new
on burden-sharing and rational allocation of security naval platforms capable of protecting vital infra-
responsibilities across the GCC. structure, military facilities and civilian population
Indeed, GCC countries have procured major centres against asymmetric attacks. At the April 2011
weapons systems and military technologies without International Symposium on Air Defence, held in
Jeddah, there were calls for more joint alignment of approached. With this in mind, the US Iraq Training
GCC defence capabilities, such as coordinated early- and Advisory Mission’s goal was to train and mentor
warning and missile-defence structures. While these the Iraqi security forces in the hope that they could
advanced systems, particularly the air and missile reach what the US government termed the ‘minimum
defences, are operated individually by each of the essential capability’ standards needed to replace US
Gulf states, they are electronically linked to a US infor- forces by 2012.
mation and operations ‘hub’. The US-coordinated By April 2011, it was clear that the US government
system, while operationally effective at protecting was keen to renegotiate the SOFA to allow between
against limited strikes on any one sector within the 10,000 and 20,000 American troops to remain past the
Gulf, is far from optimised and remains vulnerable original deadline. Both the then-Secretary of Defense
to concentrated Iranian fire against a single sector or Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
country. The US, and its private defence contractors, Admiral Mike Mullen visited Baghdad in an attempt
will therefore likely push hard to create a region- to persuade the Iraqi government to allow the troops
wide, interconnected air- and missile-defence system to stay, secure legal protection for American soldiers
that pools all space- and ground-based sensor data from Iraqi law, and gain approval from the Iraqi parlia-
collected within the region to all parties to provide an ment. In late May, Gates estimated that the US would
enhanced and unified threat picture and notification need a minimum of 8,000 soldiers in the country to
of attack. Further, with no compromise of sovereignty, meet its ongoing commitments to training Iraqi forces.
operational protocols and weapon-system algorithms By October 2011, however, it was apparent that
could be negotiated in advance to commit intercep- the US would not get an extension to the SOFA on
tors in one country to launch at incoming threats to terms that would allow them to retain several thou-
a neighbour, increasing the number of interceptors sand troops in Iraq. In private, key Iraqi politicians
available at any given moment. Such action would acknowledged that the Iraqi armed forces, particu-
only be taken if the target country had consented in larly the Iraqi air force, were still heavily dependent
advance to the operational protocol automatically on US support for key functions. In public, however,
authorising such action. With cooperative air and Iraqi opinion was against any renegotiation. Muqtada
missile defence as a precedent, greater GCC defence al-Sadr’s party mobilised popular sentiment in oppo-
cohesion and collective action could be fostered over sition to a continuing US presence, staging demon-
the long term strations and promising to use violence if necessary
to drive the remaining American troops from Iraq.
Iraq: the US military departs In his public statements, Maliki attempted to balance
the needs of the Iraqi military with the political reality
US President Barack Obama announced on 21 of Iraqi opinion. In an interview he gave to the Wall
October 2011 that ‘the rest of our troops in Iraq will Street Journal at the end of 2010, he appeared to leave
come home by the end of the year. After nearly little room for treaty revision, stating: ‘I do not care
nine years, America’s war in Iraq will be over.’ This about what’s being said. I care about what’s on paper
announcement came after a failure to agree terms and what has been agreed to. The withdrawal of
to continue a US military presence in Iraq, and ‘the forces agreement expires on December 31, 2011. The
determination of the Iraqi people to forge their own last American soldier will leave Iraq.’ Yet he also left
future’ as discussed between Obama and Iraqi Prime open the possibility of a new agreement if the Iraqi
Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The timetable for US troop parliament agreed to it. Given that the Sadrists are the
withdrawal, set in place by the Status of Forces largest party in parliament and only the Kurdistan
Agreement (SOFA) signed in 2008, had been a key Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
discussion point between the US and Iraq throughout were expressly backing a new agreement, enacting
2011 as well as the major factor shaping the Iraqi secu- legislation before the deadline was always highly
rity forces since August 2010. Under the SOFA, all US unlikely.
forces were to leave the country by 31 December 2011. This means that from 2012, the US State
From August 2010 onwards, the working assump- Department will have to shoulder the responsibility
tion of American ground commanders was that the for protecting its own diplomats and overseeing the
US deployment would be reduced to the ‘tens or low continued training of the Iraqi security forces. To do
hundreds’ as the final deadline of 31 December 2011 this the American Embassy has hired 5,000 private
security contractors. It will also take over a substan- MoD budget grew annually by 28% between 2005
tial proportion of the base adjacent to Baghdad and 2009, compared to an average increase of 45%
International Airport and open consulates in both annually for the MoI. The size, speed and scale of
the north and south of the country. The Embassy will the Iraqi armed forces’ expansion since 2005 raises
also house an Office of Security Cooperation with 157 two key questions. Firstly, against a background of
military personnel to manage the US government’s Iraq’s recent civil war, can a force built so quickly
relations with Iraq’s armed forces and their purchase by an external actor function coherently once that
of new weaponry. actor (the US) ends its military presence at the end
of 2011? If not, the domestic stability of the country
Iraqi security capacity and capabilities could again be in doubt. Secondly, and perhaps of
It will now be up to the Iraqi security forces to guar- greater importance in the long term, given Iraq’s
antee order across the country and protect Iraq’s history of military-led regime change, can such
borders. They have had the lead in these tasks since armed forces be kept out of politics, subservient to
the US withdrew all its combat forces in August 2010. the civilian arm of government and ultimately to the
As of June 2011, the Iraqi security forces employed Iraqi electorate?
806,600 people, spread between the MoD, the The speed with which the Iraqi army was recon-
Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Prime Minister’s stituted after 2003 meant that up to 70% of old,
Counter-Terrorism Force. The fact that these forces pre-regime-change officers were eventually reinte-
are primarily designed to impose order on Iraq’s own grated into the new officer corps. To counter this,
population, not protect the country from external Iraq’s ruling elite inserted so-called dimaj officers
aggression, is indicated by their size: the MoI has into senior military ranks. These political appoint-
double the staff of the MoD. The latter employs a total ments were either militia leaders or had no mili-
of 271,400 personnel, spread between the Iraqi army tary experience at all. They owe their allegiance and
(193,421), the air force (5,053) and subsidiary organisa- appointment to the sectarian political parties who
and North Africa

inserted them into the chain of command and act to
Middle East
tions. The Ministry of Interior employs 531,000. The
Iraqi police has 302,000 on its payroll, the Facilities tie the military to the parties rather than the state.
Protection Service 95,000, Border Enforcement 60,000, The result is a struggle within the security forces
Iraqi Federal Police 44,000 and Oil Police 30,000. In between those who gained their experience under
2010, the total number of people employed by the the old regime and those who were inserted into the
security forces equalled 8% of the Iraqi workforce, or senior ranks of the military by those who dominate
12% of the total population of adult males. the new government.
Rebuilding the security forces has played a domi- Some 75–80% of the army’s rank and file are
nant role in Iraqi government policy since 2003: the Shi’ites. This is comparable to the pre-regime-change
Iraq’s F-16 deal 50/52s along with weapons and support was made in
A decade of stagnation, with two wars at either side, September 2011. The Iraqi government had delayed
destroyed Iraq’s air force. The pull-out of US combat the purchase in early 2011, instead prioritising social
forces at the end of 2011 rendered further rebuilding of expenditure. Iraq had first considered ordering 36 aircraft,
a national air capability that much more desirable. US subsequently reduced to 24, and then further cut to the
mentors and others have been training and supporting initial procurement number of 18. Training and support is
the embryonic Iraqi air force, which at least initially projected to extend over 15 years. US Defense Secretary
constituted a mix of junior pilots and a scattering of older Leon Panetta said in October 2011 that the US would
aircrew, some with thousands of hours of flight time on ‘work with [Iraq] to try to ensure they have the capability
Soviet-era aircraft types. and training … to use [them] to protect their own air
Initially a mix of light utility and rotary-wing aircraft, space’. It would be logical to assume that training and
the air force now also operates medium transport aircraft maintenance aspects of the deal would lead to a USAF
and is acquiring a multi-role fighter in the shape of the presence in some capacity. However, the announcement
Lockheed Martin F-16; there is currently no indigenous that US forces were to leave Iraq at the end of December
capability to police and defend national airspace. 2011 leaves uncertain the precise level of any continuing
The first payment on a package of 18 F-16C Block US military support in-country.
figure. The senior ranks of the army are more reli- The politicisation of the military has extended well
giously and ethnically balanced, with divisional beyond the national police, special forces and intelli-
commanders coming from the three major ethnic gence services. From 2006 onwards, Maliki has used
and religious communities. The ethnic diversity of a number of tactics to tighten his personal grip over
specific army divisions and the influence of political Iraq’s armed forces. First he used the Office of the
parties on them is, to a large extent, dependent upon Commander in Chief to control overall security policy,
whether they were recruited locally or have had their undermining the independent chains of command
rank and file diluted. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 15th and 16th within both the MoI and MoD. Maliki then forced
divisions of the army have high numbers of Kurdish a number of technocratic senior commanders aside,
soldiers and are considered to be heavily influenced appointing individuals close to him into positions
by the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic of influence in both ministries. These appointments
Union of Kurdistan. were labelled ‘temporary’ to avoid parliamentary
The MoI has acquired responsibility not only for oversight. Finally, Maliki set up nine joint-operation
day-to-day law and order but also for paramilitary commands. Each of them consolidates, under one
counter-insurgency. The risks involved in this expan- commanding officer, the management of all the secu-
sion of its role are evident in Iraq’s recent history. rity services operating in one of the nine provinces
Between 2005 and 2006, MoI forces were a major (out of 18) considered unstable. The officers, in turn,
factor in driving Iraq into civil war. The Ministry’s are appointed and managed from a central office in
Special Police Commandos (later renamed the Federal Baghdad under Maliki’s control. Through the use of
Police) were alleged to have acted as a sectarian death the joint-operation commands, Maliki has bypassed
squad, frequently resorting to extra-judicial execu- the security ministers and their senior commanders,
tion and torture. After 2007, the Federal Police was securing control over Iraq’s armed forces at the oper-
purged of its most egregious sectarian elements ational level. While this arrangement has made a mili-
when 60,000 officers were dismissed and the force tary coup in Iraq highly unlikely, it has also brought
was greatly expanded and further restructured. But incoherence to the chain of command, allowed
despite extensive vetting, restructuring and sustained the promotion of political cronies over talented
expansion, the force is still plagued by corruption and commanders and detracted from the military’s esprit
sectarianism. de corps.
The politicisation of Iraq’s security forces is most Beyond political interference, a broad set of prob-
evident in the Iraqi National Counter Terrorism Force. lems continue to plague Iraq’s army and need to be
Over 6,000-strong, it is organised into two brigades addressed for it to fulfil its new responsibilities. The
and is considered to be one of the best trained in the first involves weaknesses in management, logistics
Middle East. It operates its own detention centres and and strategic planning. The unwillingness of senior
intelligence-gathering operations and has surveil- military officials to delegate responsibility down the
lance cells in every governorate. Its politicisation chain of command also stifles innovation and inde-
began in April 2007, when managerial responsibility pendent decision-making at junior level. Overall,
was transferred from US Special Forces, which estab- in spite of ongoing inefficiencies and politicisation,
lished the force, to the Iraqi government. The prime Iraq’s security forces will probably be able to impose
minister set up a ministerial body, the Counter- a rough order on the country from 2012 onwards.
Terrorism Bureau, to control it, effectively removing They will not, however, be able to defend the coun-
the force from the oversight of parliament or the try’s borders or air space.
control of either MoI or the MoD. Since then, the In 2011, Iraq’s defence procurements reached
force has become known as the Fedayeen al-Maliki, new levels. Though acquisitions of tanks and other
a reference to its reputation as the prime minister’s armoured vehicles have taken place in recent years,
tool for covert action against his rivals as well as an the long-mooted deal for F-16 fighters from the US (see
ironic comparison to Saddam Hussein’s militia. Iraq’s box, page 309) has started to proceed. In September,
intelligence services have been similarly politicised. Iraq transferred the first funds for 18 Block 50/52 aircraft
Maliki’s personal control over them has directly and the sale is valued – according to the Pentagon – at
hampered their ability to collect and analyse intelli- around $3bn. Earlier in the year, it was reported that
gence professionally and objectively without close US Iraq had delayed the deal and diverted some $900m of
supervision. funding to its national food-ration programme.
Saudi Arabia The primary responsibilities of the Saudi Arabian

National Guard (SANG) include protecting the
Saudi Arabia’s size, wealth, population and strategic royal family, guarding against internal unrest and
location should make it a pre-eminent regional power. terrorism, protecting strategic facilities and resources,
But on paper at least, Saudi defence capabilities are not and protecting the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina.
overwhelmingly superior to those of its neighbours. As the campaign against indigenous terrorism has
In numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, naval vessels, intensified in recent years, the police and other forces
combat aircraft and personnel under arms, Saudi of the interior ministry have played a more promi-
forces appear to be matched or exceeded by those of a nent role. There is now closer coordination between
number of other regional nations. However, the Saudi the SANG and the interior forces on domestic secu-
inventory is generally more modern and better main- rity issues, although still very little between the
tained. Whether it is configured to meet the country’s Guard and the regular armed forces; this is a reflec-
security requirements is another matter. tion of the historical allegiance of the former to King
Determining these requirements is problematic. Abdullah and his branch of the royal family, and the
Riyadh does not publish defence and security poli- latter to the late Crown Prince Sultan (the king’s half-
cies and doctrines, and even private discussions brother) who was defence and aviation minister from
with Saudi officials rarely go into more detail than 1982 until his death in October 2011.
‘the security of the nation and its borders, and of Coordination and cooperation between the
the Two Holy Places’ (Mecca and Medina). The regular armed forces remains poor, and deci-
main factors threatening that security seem clear sion-making at the highest levels is hampered by
to outside analysts: they include indigenous and inter-service competition as well as the age and
regional terrorist groups; internal unrest; instability infirmity of senior ministers. The king himself has
within neighbours, particularly Iraq and Yemen; become much more closely involved in issues hith-
threats to oil and gas installations and export routes; erto the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence
and North Africa

Middle East
and the threats – military, religious and even existen- and Aviation (MoDA) and the decisions in 2010 to
tial – posed by Iran. In the absence of any detailed replace the long-standing chiefs of the Naval and Air
published doctrine, the response to these threats Forces, both princes, by non-royal military profes-
has to be assessed by Saudi actions. Saudi Arabia sionals were reportedly taken by the king rather
has preferred, where possible, to pursue diplomacy than by Crown Prince Sultan. Analysts believe that
rather than to use force, with this perhaps stemming this may reflect a desire to exert greater control over
from Riyadh’s desire to preserve the status quo when the MoDA following concern over departmental
possible, and its propensity to take the path of least efficiency. All major equipment-procurement deci-
resistance. sions are taken by the king in person, advised by
the Council of Ministers, and not by the services or
Armed forces MoDA. How this may change in the wake of Sultan’s
With few exceptions, noted below, Saudi Arabian death, and the annoucement of his replacement by
forces have not been deployed in action outside the Prince Salman, former Governor of Riyadh and a
nation, and are generally not configured for expedi- half-brother of the king, remains uncertain. Deputy
tionary warfare. The emphasis given over the years Minister Abdulrahman has been replaced by Sultan’s
to equipping the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) eldest son, Prince Khalid. Responsibility for civil avia-
with modern combat aircraft and weapons follows tion has been removed from the ministry and placed
this judgement, since it is also clear that the RSAF’s with a new General Authority for Civil Aviation
priorities are air defence and deterrence, not expedi- under the current minister, Prince Fahd. Salman has
tionary air operations. The same is true of the much little direct experience of defence, although for some
less powerful and less well equipped naval forces. years he was Sultan’s constant companion during his
The Land Forces (RSLF) are configured militarily and frequent overseas visits for medical treatment and
geographically to meet threats such as instability at convalescence. It is likely that the king will continue
key borders, especially those with Iraq and Yemen. to play a leading part in key defence decisions, at
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has historically looked to least until Salman has been longer in post. Khalid’s
its allies to provide support and security assistance, appointment as deputy minister may be a significant
up to and including military intervention. pointer for the future.
Riyadh’s preference for diplomacy over force is The preference has historically been to procure
illustrated by its approach to other regional players. equipment through government-to-government
Even in the case of Iran, dialogue has, at least in public, arrangements. Most procurement from the US has
been the preferred course. For many years Saudi been carried out using Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Arabia pursued quiet diplomacy in relations with procedures; and both the SBDCP and the Salam
Syria, notwithstanding the latter’s close alliance with project consist of formal arrangements between
Iran; and the king’s public criticism in mid-2011 of the the Saudi Arabian and UK governments, with BAE
attempts by Damascus to suppress its own internal Systems being the nominated prime contractor
opposition indicates Riyadh’s alarm and frustration. for the delivery of all systems included within the
programmes. For many years, government policy has
Deployments required a commitment by suppliers to maximise the
Contingents of the Land Forces were deployed use of Saudi Arabian companies to support and main-
during the Arab–Israeli wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, tain, and increasingly to manufacture or assemble,
but played no combat role at least in the last two. the equipment procured. For instance, the Salam deal
Elements of all forces, including the National Guard, specified that the final 48 Typhoon aircraft out of the 72
took part in Coalition operations during the 1991 ordered should be assembled in Saudi Arabia. (This
Gulf War to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait (and commitment may now not be met, mainly as a conse-
from Khafji in the Eastern Province). More recently, quence of Riyadh’s failure to agree on a location for
the RSLF and RSAF took part in operations against final assembly.) It has also been long-standing policy
Houthi militias straddling the Yemeni–Saudi border to require as many posts as possible within compa-
in 2009–10 and, in March 2011, units of the National nies operating in the kingdom to be filled by Saudis:
Guard were deployed to Bahrain after the Bahraini about half of BAE Systems’ 4,000 or so employees
government requested support from the GCC in based in Saudi Arabia are now Saudi nationals.
suppressing Bahrain’s protest movement. This obligation has in the past made it necessary for
companies to invest in their own technical training
Partnerships and procurements programmes, both within Saudi Arabia and else-
The long-standing partnerships with key allies – where, to make up for the shortfall of personnel with
notably the US, but also the UK – allow Saudi Arabia relevant skills emerging from the Saudi educational
to maintain the capabilities of its armed forces system. It remains to be seen whether recent substan-
and equipment. Most of the Land Force’s inven- tial investments by Riyadh in domestic education and
tory is American, and most air-force equipment has training programmes will improve the supply of suit-
been procured from the US and UK. Much atten- ably qualified individuals.
tion has been paid to the procurement from the US
of an additional 84 F-15SA aircraft, together with Capability
supporting equipment, munitions and upgrades to The Saudi armed forces continue to rely to a consider-
existing aircraft, in a package with a lifetime value able extent on overseas partners for training and other
of some $60bn. However, the Saudi–British Defence support. The US maintains a substantial Military
Cooperation Programme (SBDCP), which supplanted Training Mission. This was created under the 1951
the former Al Yamamah project in 2006 to main- Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and is funded
tain and upgrade the equipment procured under through the FMS Security Assistance Program to
that project, and the Salam project for the procure- ‘train, advise and assist the Saudi Arabian Armed
ment and support of Typhoon aircraft, will together Forces’. Its six divisions interact with all the main
be worth about as much over the lifetimes of those Saudi armed services except the National Guard, for
programmes. Other significant suppliers include which there is a separate US Program Management
France, which has provided a number of naval Office. The UK also maintains a liaison mission to the
vessels and aircraft, as well as air-defence equipment. SANG and a small Royal Navy liaison team at the
Nevertheless the US remains the primary supplier, King Faisal Naval Academy; in addition, one of the
evidenced by other substantial deals in recent years, tasks of the UK MoD Saudi Arabian Projects Team
including the October 2010 $25.6bn deal for a range is to provide advice and assistance to the RSNF and
of helicopters (including AH-64D and AH-6i), muni- RSAF. The Saudi armed forces also place importance
tions and support assets for the SANG. on access to overseas training courses, ranging from
officer training to higher command and staff courses ministry, although it is still not clear whether lessons
to specific qualifications such as fast-jet flying. If have been learned. Given the scale and compara-
financial considerations and capacity limitations lead tive lack of sophistication of the Houthis, the ability
Western military training establishments to reduce the of the Saudi Arabian armed forces to withstand on
number of places available to international students, their own a determined attack by a well-armed and
it is possible that the Saudi armed forces will seek to -trained enemy must remain in some doubt. And the
place their students elsewhere. It is unlikely that their will and resources needed to resolve that doubt are
own military schools will be capable of fully meeting unlikely to be forthcoming as long as the Saudi leader-
the requirement. ship continues to be compromised by slow decision-
The three main regular forces increasingly partic- making, family rivalry, poor health and uncertainty
ipate in exercises with other nations, either bilater- about the succession.
ally or multilaterally, which allows some insight into
their professional military capabilities. All three have Defence economics
held recent exercises with their counterparts in both Saudi Arabia recovered swiftly from the global finan-
India and Pakistan. The army has exercised with cial crisis, with growth of 0.1% in 2009 accelerating
Egyptian and US forces, often with units of the US to 4% in 2010, buoyed by domestic fiscal expan-
National Guard. The navy frequently takes part in sion as well as by higher oil prices stemming from
passage exercises with US, French and UK forces, as improving global demand. The upwards trajectory
well as more complex exercises with deployed task in oil prices continued into 2011, as the shutdown in
groups. In June 2011, the Royal Navy’s Cougar task Libyan production and heightened uncertainty over
group conducted a series of exercises (Red Alligator) the political turmoil across the region caused prices
with the RSNF, ranging from maritime security and to spike nearly to the record levels seen in 2008; they
counter-piracy operations to a full-scale amphib- remained above $100 per barrel for much of the year.
ious assault. Saudi naval forces have joined CTF In response to concern that persistently high oil
and North Africa

Middle East
151, tasked with anti-piracy operations in the Gulf prices would choke off a fragile global recovery, in
of Aden, and are receiving relevant training from June 2011 Saudi Arabia broke with OPEC consensus
the US Fifth Fleet. The RSAF regularly takes part in to unilaterally provide ‘whatever the market needed’,
exercises such as Red Flag in the US and Anatolian drawing on its vast (over two-thirds of the world’s
Express in Turkey, and in exchanges with friendly air total) spare capacity to augment the global supply
forces. Over the years, the picture is one of increasing of crude. This stabilised global oil markets and offset
professionalism and sophistication on the part of shortfalls elsewhere. As the Saudi government relies
Saudi Arabian forces, although they continue to on oil for more than 80% of its revenues, the combina-
require considerable planning and logistic support tion of high prices and increased production meant
from their exercise partners. that 2011 governmental oil revenues were projected
The most recent operational test of combat capa- to reach SR931 billion (US$266bn), more than double
bility came during the Houthi conflict of 2009–10. their levels in 2009 and only marginally below the
Militarily, both the land and air-force components record revenues accrued during the previous cyclical
performed adequately. Though Saudis did, according peak in 2008 (see Table 24).
to one cable released by WikiLeaks, raise doubts This windfall meant that the kingdom was finan-
about the air force’s ability to ‘operate with adequate cially well placed to placate any popular discon-
precision’ and expressed a desire for Predator UAVs, tent arising from the Arab Awakening in the rest
in general the air force made disciplined use of of the region. King Abdullah issued royal decrees
their advanced reconnaissance and target acqui- in February and March 2011 announcing massive
sition equipment (such as the Damocles pod) to spending measures aimed at tackling a wide array
produce tactical imagery. But coordination between of social issues. Totalling SR400bn (US$114bn) –
land and air forces was inconsistent, reflecting of which SR117bn was to be disbursed in 2011 (an
the long-standing stovepipe mentality of the indi- amount equivalent to 5.5% of projected 2011 GDP) –
vidual services, as was communication and liaison the measures included a two-month salary bonus for
between Saudi and Yemeni forces. These shortcom- public-sector workers, a 70% increase in the govern-
ings are understood to have been noted with disquiet ment minimum wage, the provision of unemploy-
by senior Saudi officials in MoDA and the interior ment benefits, increased social-security and transport
Table 24 Saudi Arabia Macroeconomic and Budgetary Trends 2001–10 (SR bn)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Saudi Arabia GDP 686 707 805 939 1,183 1,336 1,443 1,786 1,409 1,679
Inflation –1.1 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.6 2.3 4.1 9.9 5.1 5.4
Gross Government Debt (as a %
of GDP) 93.7% 96.9% 82.0% 65.0% 38.9% 27.3% 18.5% 13.2% 15.9% 9.9%
Average Oil Price ($) 23.1 24.4 28.1 36.1 50.6 61.1 69.1 94.5 61.1 77.5
Total Revenue 228 213 293 392 564 674 643 1,101 510 742
Oil Revenue 184 166 231 330 505 604 562 983 434 670
Oil Revenue (% of Total Revenue) 80.6% 78.0% 78.8% 84.1% 89.4% 89.7% 87.5% 89.3% 85.2% 90.4%
Total Expenditure 255 234 257 285 346 393 466 520 596 654
Defence Budget 78.9 69.4 70.3 78.4 95.1 110.8 132.9 143.3 154.8 169.7
Annual % Change in Defence
Budgets 5.3% –12.0% 1.3% 11.5% 21.3% 16.4% 20.0% 7.8% 8.0% 9.6%
Defence Budget (% of Planned
Outlays) 36.7% 34.3% 33.6% 34.1% 34.0% 33.1% 35.0% 35.0% 32.6% 31.4%
Defence Budget (% of GDP) 11.49% 9.81% 8.74% 8.35% 8.05% 8.29% 9.21% 8.02% 10.98% 10.10%
Annual % Change in Real
Defence Budget* 9.0% –14.5% –4.1% 0.6% 1.7% 6.3% 13.3% –9.2% 36.75 –3.9%
*Real defence and national-security budgets calculated based on IMF GDP deflator figures at 1999 constant prices. The large fall in the 2008
figures are in part due to an inflation rate that was more than double the rate during the previous year. These figures may underestimate true
defence spending due to large outlays on foreign equipment procurement and maintenance programmes.
Sources: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Economy and Planning, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry
of Finance, Saudi Arabian Central Department of Statistics and Information, OPEC Annual Basket Price Statistics, International Monetary Fund
2011 Article IV Consultation Country Report No. 11/292 (September 2011), International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database
(September 2011).
allowances, hospital expansions, mosque restorations of total planned outlays in 2000 (not shown) to just
and the building of 500,000 affordable homes. over 30% of planned outlays in 2010 (see Table 24).
These extraordinary measures came on top of However, despite this relative decline, the defence
the planned 2011 budget, announced in December budget has more than doubled over the period (in
2010, which at SR580bn (US$165bn) was scheduled nominal terms), whilst real defence spending in 2010
to be the largest-ever national budget plan – SR40bn was 20.5% higher than 2001 levels. Furthermore, the
(US$11bn) or 7.4% higher than the planned allocation defence budget has consistently hovered at around
for the 2010 budget. It focused heavily on job creation, 10% of Saudi GDP, one of the highest levels of defence
economic diversification away from the oil sector and spending, as a proportion of GDP, in the world.
on investments in education, health and infrastruc- Indeed, various decisions and negotiations over
ture projects. More generally, Saudi Arabia has used the course of 2010 and 2011 indicate that Saudi
the steady rise in oil prices since 2001 to pay down defence spending is set to rise significantly. Personnel
government debts, which has resulted in a dramatic expenditure increments are likely to be driven by the
decline in its gross government debt-to-GDP ratio increase in military wages introduced from late 2010
from almost 97% of GDP in 2002 to a projected 7% of onwards, as well as by the creation of 60,000 addi-
GDP in 2011 (see Table 24). tional security jobs at the interior ministry announced
by King Abdullah in March 2011, as part of Riyadh’s
Defence and Security Spending Trends reaction to the Arab Awakening.
The recent budgetary emphasis on education, health Increases in procurement expenditure are also
and civil infrastructure projects follows a decade- anticipated, with the Obama administration’s October
long effort to reform and diversify the economy, in 2010 proposal, noted above, to sell up to $60bn worth
response to the financial crisis the country experi- of fast jets and helicopters to the kingdom over a
enced in the late 1990s. This shift in emphasis towards 15–20 year period receiving Congressional assent the
debt reduction and economic development has following month. As the largest proposed US Foreign
meant that defence has occupied a shrinking share Military Sale (FMS) ever, the deal provided for the
of total government outlays, falling from over 40% acquisition of 84 F-15SA multi-role fighters, 190 mili-
tary helicopters, and up to 12,000 missiles and 15,000 Table 25 Notifications of October 2010
bombs; as well as the upgrade of the existing RSAF Proposed US Foreign Military Sales to Saudi
fleet of 70 F-15S aircraft to the F-15SA configuration. Arabia ($bn)
However, despite claims on 5 January 2011 by Royal Saudi Land Forces 5.5
Assistant Defence Minister Prince Khaled bin Sultan 34 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow helicopters
that final details of the package were being negoti- 24 Hellfire training missiles
ated, overall progress on the final composition of the 2,176 AGM-114R Hellfire II missiles
transfer slowed in 2011, with the Letter of Agreement 6,000 2.75in 70mm laser-guided rockets
only signed at the end of 2011. Analysts have argued Royal Saudi Air Force 29.4
the delay may have stemmed from political factors 84 F-15SA aircraft and associated equipment, parts and
logistical support
either in Riyadh or Washington: in the former case
600 AGM-88B HARM missiles
perhaps due to concern over Washington’s posi-
400 AGM-84 Block II Harpoon missiles
tion on the Arab Awakening and related regional
300 AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles

unrest; and in the latter case possible heightened
500 AIM-120C/7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles
sensitivity surrounding the sales in light of the Arab (AMRAAM)
Awakening in general, as well as Saudi Arabia’s role 50 air training missiles
in the suppression of protests in Bahrain in March 2,000 Dual Mode Laser/GPS-Guided Munitions (500lb &
2011. Similar concerns have also affected the planned 2,000lb)
1,100 GBU-24 Paveway III Laser Guided Bombs (2,000lb)
purchase of 200 Leopard-2 tanks from Germany and
1,000 GBU-31B V3 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)
Spain, as German opposition parties baulked at the (2,000lb)
prospect that the Federal Security Council might 3,000 MK-82 General-Purpose Bombs (500lb & 2,000lb)
overturn the country’s export regulations, despite 8,000 MK-82 Inert Training Bombs (500lb & 2,000lb)
both the United States and Israel reportedly signing Upgrade of existing RSAF fleet of 70 F-15S multi-role fighters
off on the purchase beforehand. to F-15SA configuration
and North Africa

Middle East
The F-15 deal reinforced the long-standing mili- Saudi Arabian National Guard 25.6
tary alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia. 36 AH-64D Block III Apache helicopters
However, such deals have a history of running 72 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters
into Congressional opposition and this could have 36 AH-6i light attack helicopters
prompted subsequent attempts by Riyadh to diver- 12 MD-530F light turbine helicopters
sify arms suppliers, including by entering into arms 2,592 AGM-114R Hellfire II Missiles
Total Estimated Value: 60.5
discussions with Russia (in late 2011, discussions
were reported to have centred on assets includng
air-defence systems). Indeed, even the current a variety of other vessels. Although no decisions are
US$60bn package only received Congressional imminent (the Saudis have reportedly been consid-
blessing after strong assurances from both the then- ering Aegis-class Littoral Combat Ship designs from
defence secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State both Austal USA and Lockheed Martin since at least
Hillary Clinton that the deal would not adversely 2008), if the existing arms package was expanded
affect Israel’s qualitative military edge, assurances to incorporate these additional items, the value of
that were given in response to a bipartisan letter in the final deal could eventually rise to US$90bn.
November 2010 from 198 members of the House of Elsewhere, the kingdom received 24 tranche-2
Representatives. Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from BAE Systems,
Furthermore, the magnitude of the currently part of Project Salam (see above). Negotiations over
envisaged purchases does not necessarily diminish elements of this project continued during 2011, as
the prospect that further acquisitions may be in the parts of the overall programme were recast. This
pipeline. For example, signs emerged in May 2011 included the possibility that the final 24 aircraft be
of possible sales to the Royal Saudi Navy after a delivered to the tranche-3 standard. Saudi ambitions
reported briefing by US Navy officials on the capabil- to licence assembly of 48 of the 72 aircraft have been
ities of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, also providing reconsidered, with the likelihood that aircraft will
the kingdom with information and price estimates on now be assembled in the UK.
MANOEUVRE
Algeria ALG Armoured
2 armd div (3 tk regt; 1 mech regt, 1 arty gp)
Algerian Dinar D 2010 2011 2012
1 indep armd bde
GDP D 11.7tr 14.1tr Mechanised
US$ 156bn 193bn 2 mech div (1 tk regt; 3 mech regt, 1 arty gp)
per capita US$ 4,497 5,502 4 indep mech/mot bde
Growth % 3.26 2.86 Air Manoeuvre
1 rapid reaction div (4 para regt; 1 SF regt)
Inflation % 3.9 3.9
COMBAT SUPPORT
Def bdgt D 422bn 631bn
2 arty bn
US$ 5.59bn 8.61bn 7 AD bn
US$1=D 75.45 73.32 4 engr bn
Population 34,994,937 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 1,080: 185 T-90S; 325 T-72; 300 T-62; 270 T-54/T-55
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus RECCE 134: 44 AML-60; 26 BRDM-2; 64 BRDM-2M with
Male 12.3% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 20.0% 2.4% 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
Female 11.8% 5.0% 5.1% 5.2% 19.8% 2.8% AIFV 1,089: 100 BMP-3; 304 BMP-2M with 9M133 Kornet
(AT-14 Spriggan); 685 BMP-1
Capabilities APC 707
APC (W) 705: 250 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80; 150 OT-64; 55 M3
Algeria’s military has experience in counter-insurgency, Panhard; 100 Fahd
although recent procurement has been focused on PPV 2 Marauder
conventional weaponry for state-on-state contingencies, ARTY 1,019
with which the armed forces have little familiarity. SP 170: 122mm 140 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 30 2S3
There is limited experience of tri-service joint operations, TOWED 375: 122mm 160 D-30; 25 D-74; 100 M-1931/37;
and few training exercises have focused on this issue. 60 M-30 M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 152mm 20 ML-20
Nonetheless, Algeria has been a leading proponent M-1937
of combined training with regional powers, partially MRL 144: 122mm 48 BM-21; 140mm 48 BM-14/16;
to build capacity in neighbouring states to combat al- 240mm 30 BM-24; 300mm 18 9A52 Smerch
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Algeria, Mali, Niger and MOR 330: 82mm 150 M-37; 120mm 120 M-1943; 160mm
Mauritania formed a joint operation staff committee in 60 M-1943
2010 to co-ordinate intelligence and operations. Algiers has AT
conducted joint operations with Mali. Limited combined MSL • MANPATS Milan; 9K133 Kornet-E (AT-14
training has occurred with the US, with SF exercises and Spriggan); 9K115-2 Metis-M1 (AT-13 Saxhorn-2); 9K11
through the International Military Education and Training (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 (AT-5 Spandrel)
programme, as well as with France, the UK and Belgium. RCL 180: 107mm 60 B-11; 82mm 120 B-10
The army maintains a division-sized rapid-reaction force, GUNS 250: 57mm 160 ZIS-2 M-1943; 85mm 80 D-44:
although the fact that two-thirds of the army is conscript- 100mm 10 T-12; (50 SU-100 SP in store)
based reduces expertise and the ability to deploy quickly. AD • SAM 288+
Mobility is enhanced by a large fleet of light armoured SP 132+: ε48 9K-33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); ε20 9K31 Strela-1
vehicles and helicopters. A modest power-projection (SA-9 Gaskin); 4+ S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle); ε20
capability is also apparent in the transport and tanker air S-125 Pechora-M (SA-3 Goa); ε40 2K12 Kub (SA-6
fleet, although given the size of the country these may be Gainful)
more useful for internal rather than overseas deployment. MANPAD 200+: ε200 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7A/B Grail)
GUNS ε830
ACTIVE 130,000 (Army 110,000 Navy 6,000 Air SP ε225 ZSU-23-4
14,000) Paramilitary 187,200 TOWED ε605: 14.5mm 100: 60 ZPU-2; 40 ZPU-4 23mm
Terms of service Conscription in army only, 18 months (6 100 ZU-23 37mm ε150 M-1939 57mm 75 S-60 85mm 20
months basic, 12 months wth regular army often involving M-1939 KS-12 100mm 150 KS-19 130mm 10 KS-30
civil projects)
RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) to age 50 Navy ε6,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4
Organisations by Service 2 Kilo (FSU Paltus) with 6 single 533mm TT with Test-
71ME HWT
Army 35,000; 75,000 conscript (total 110,000) 2 Improved Kilo (RUS Varshavyanka) with 6 single 533mm
FORCES BY ROLE TT
6 Mil Regions; re-org into div structure on hold PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 3
FRIGATES • FFM 3 TRANSPORT

3 Mourad Rais (FSU Koni) with 1 twin lnchr with 9M33 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules;
Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 53mm TT, 2 RBU Gulfstream IV-SP; Gulfstream V; Il-76MD Candid B; Il-
6000 Smerch 2, 2 twin 76mm gun 76TD Candid; L-100-30
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 2 (VIP) sqn with F-27 Friendship; Falcon 900
CORVETTES 6 TRAINING
FSGM 3: 2 sqn with Z-142
3 Rais Hamidou (FSU Nanuchka II) with 4 quad 1 sqn with Yak-130
2 sqn with L-39C/ZA Albatros
lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM,
1 (hel) sqn with PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
1 twin lnchr with 9M33 Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM
ATTACK HELICOPTER
FSG 3 Djebel Chenona with 2 twin lnchr with C-802
3 sqn with Mi-24 Hind
(CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 76mm gun
TRANSPORT
PBFG 9 Osa II (3†) with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit 7 sqn with AS355 Ecureuil; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-
(SS-N-2B Styx) AShM 171, Ka-27PS Helix D; Ka-32T Helix
PB 9 Kebir AIR DEFENCE

AMPHIBIOUS • LS 3 3 ADA bde
LSM 1 Polnochny B (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) 3 SAM regt with S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)/S-125 Neva
LST 2 Kalaat beni Hammad (capacity 7 tanks; 240 troops) (SA-3 Goa)/2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)/9K33 Osa (SA-8
with 1 med hel landing platform Gecko)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AGS 1 El Idrissi AIRCRAFT 125 combat capable
AX 1 Daxin FTR 55: 12 MiG-25 Foxbat; 25 MiG-29C Fulcrum/MiG-
YGS 2 Ras Tara 29UB Fulcrum; 18 MiG-23MF/MS/U Flogger (possibly
YPT 1 Poluchat I (used for SAR) withdrawn)
YTB 6: 1 El Chadid; 1 Kader; 4 Mazafran FGA 62: 28 Su-30MKA; 34 Su-24M/Su-24MK Fencer D
ISR 8: 4 MiG-25RBSh Foxbat D*; 4 Su-24MR Fencer E*
Naval Aviation TKR 6 Il-78 Midas
and North Africa

TPT 51 Heavy 9: 3 Il-76MD Candid B; 6 Il-76TD Candid;
Middle East
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS Medium 19: 9 C-130H Hercules; 8 C-130H-30 Hercules;
SAR 10: 6 AW101 SAR; 4 Super Lynx Mk130 2 L-100-30 Light 15: 6 Beech 200T (additional units on
order); 6 Beech 1900D (electronic surv); 3 F-27 Friendship
Coast Guard ε500 PAX 8: 3 Falcon 900; 4 Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream V
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55 TRG 99: 36 L-39ZA Albatros; 7 L-39C Albatros; 16 Yak-130
PBF 6 Baglietto 20 being delivered; 40 Z-142
PB 49: 6 Baglietto Mangusta; 12 Jebel Antar; 21 Deneb; 4 HELICOPTERS
El Mounkid; 6 Kebir ATK 33 Mi-24 Hind
SAR 3 Ka-27PS Helix D
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
MRH/TPT 75 Mi-8 Hip (med tpt)/Mi-17 Hip H
ARL 1 El Mourafek
TPT 40 Medium 4 Ka-32T Helix Light 36: 8 AS355
AXL 7 El Mouderrib (PRC Chui-E) (2 in reserve†)
Ecureuil; 28 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
AD
Air Force 14,000 SAM ε140 SA-2 Guideline Towed/SA-3 Goa/SA-6 Gainful
Flying hours 150 hrs/year SP/SA-8 Gecko SP (140–840 eff.)
FORCES BY ROLE GUNS 725 100mm/130mm/85mm
FIGHTER MSL
1 sqn with MiG-23MF/MS/U Flogger (possibly with- ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-23
(AS-7 Kerry); Kh-31P/A (AS-17A/B Krypton); Kh-59ME
drawn)
(AS-18 Kazoo)
1 sqn with MiG-25PDS/RU Foxbat
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)
4 sqn with MiG-29C/UB Fulcrum
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (A-
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
11 Archer) IR/SARH R-40/46 (AA-6 Acrid); R-23/24 (AA-7
2 sqn with Su-24M/MK Fencer
Apex); R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
2 sqn with Su-30MKA Flanker
MARITIME PATROL Paramilitary ε187,200
2 sqn with Beech 200T
ISR Gendarmerie 20,000
1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E*; MiG-25RBSh Foxbat D* Ministry of Defence control; 6 regions
TANKER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with Il-78 Midas RECCE AML-60/110 M-3 Panhard APC (W)
APC (W) 100 Fahd The GCC’s defence obligations were invoked in 2011,
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light Some PZL Mi-2 Hoplite reflecting the Bahraini military’s inability to quench
protests. Following a series of crackdowns on protesters
National Security Forces 16,000 a state of emergency was declared and Saudi, Qatari and
Directorate of National Security. Small arms
Emirati personnel were deployed to Bahrain as part of
Republican Guard 1,200 the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force. The deployment was a
tacit admission by Manama that its security forces needed
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECCE AML-60 assistance in the internal security role and suggested
APC (T) M-3 greater training and improved rules of engagement might
be required for any similar future operations.
Legitimate Defence Groups ε150,000
Self-defence militia, communal guards (60,000)
ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,000 Navy 700 Air 1,500)
Paramilitary 11,260
Deployment
Organisations by Service
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
UN • MONUSCO 5 obs Army 6,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Bahrain BHR SPECIAL FORCES
1 bn
Bahraini Dinar D 2010 2011 2012
MANOEUVRE
GDP D 8.52bn 9.94bn Armoured
US$ 22.5bn 26.3bn 1 armd bde(–) (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn)
per capita US$ 19,044 21,610 Mechanised
Growth % 4.09 1.48
1 inf bde (2 mech bn, 1 mot bn)
Light
Inflation % 2.0 1.0
1 (Amiri) gd bn
Def exp a D 279m COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 736m 1 arty bde (1 hvy arty bty, 2 med arty bty, 1 lt arty bty,
Def bdgt a D 283m 330m 358m 1 MRL bty)
US$ 747m 873m 1 AD bn (1 ADA bty, 2 SAM bty)
1 engr coy
FMA (US) US$ 19.0m 19.5m
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
US$1=D 0.38 0.38 1 log coy
a
Includes expenditure on National Guard and the Supreme 1 tpt coy
Council for Defence Secretariat General. Excl arms purchases 1 med coy
Ethnic groups: Nationals 64%; Asian 13%; other Arab 10%; Iranian MBT 180 M60A3
8%; European 1%) RECCE 30: 22 AML-90; 8 S52 Shorland; (8 Ferret & 8 Saladin
in store)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AIFV 25 YPR-765 (with 25mm)
Male 12.6% 4.4% 4.2% 3.8% 27.8% 2.4% APC 375
Female 12.4% 4.3% 4.0% 3.5% 18.6% 2.0% APC (T) 200 M113A2
APC (W) 120: 10 AT105 Saxon; 110 M3 Panhard
Capabilities PPV 55: 49 Cobra; 6 Nimer-1
Bahrain retains moderately well trained and equipped ARTY 151
forces, but their small size limits their effectiveness. SP 82: 155mm 20 M109A5; 203mm 62 M110A2
While in general focused on the possibility of state-to- TOWED 36: 105mm 8 L118 Light Gun; 155mm 28 M198
state conflict, their role in internal security became more MRL 227mm 9 M270 MLRS (with 30 ATACMS)
apparent in 2011. With regards to its primary role, defence MOR 24: SP 120mm 12 M113A2; 81mm 12 L16
of the island from an amphibious invasion and/or aerial AT • MSL • MANPATS 75: 60 Javelin; 15 BGM-71A TOW
assault from Iran, Bahrain could mount a sturdy defence RCL 31: 106mm 25 M40A1; 120mm 6 MOBAT
though it would eventually be overwhelmed by concerted AD • SAM 91
operations. The kingdom therefore relies on the security SP 7 Crotale
umbrella offered by the Gulf Cooperation Council and TOWED 6 I-HAWK MIM-23B
the deterrent effect provided by the presence of the US MANPAD 78: 18 FIM-92A Stinger; 60 RBS-70
through Fifth Fleet/NAVCENT. Bahrain is a member of the GUNS 24: 35mm 12 Oerlikon; 40mm 12 L/70
GCC, and has participated in GCC military exercises. ARV 53 Fahd 240
Navy 700 AAM • IR AAM AIM-9P Sidewinder SARH AAM

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIM-7 Sparrow
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1 AT • MSL some TOW
FRIGATES • FFGHM 1 Sabha (US Oliver Hazard Perry)
with 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM/RGM-84C Paramilitary ε11,260
Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun,
(capacity 1 Bo-105 hel) Police 9,000
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 Ministry of Interior
CORVETTES • FSG 2 Al Manama (GER Lurssen 62m) HELICOPTERS
with 2 twin lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm MRH 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey
gun, 1 hel landing platform ISR 2 Hughes 500
PCFG 4 Ahmed el Fateh (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin TPT • Light 1 Bo-105
lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
PB 4: 2 Al Jarim (US Swift FPB-20); 2 Al Riffa (GER Lurssen National Guard ε2,000
38m) FORCES BY ROLE

PBF 2 Mk V SOC MANOEUVRE
AMPHIBIOUS • CRAFT 9 Other
LCU 9: 1 Loadmaster; 4 Mashtan; 2 Sea Keeper; 2 ADSB 42m
3 paramilitary bn
YFU 1 Ajeera Coast Guard ε260
YFL 3: 1 Tighatlib; 2 Halmatic Ministry of Interior
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 50
Naval Aviation
PBF 23: 6 Jaris; 6 Saham; 6 Fajr; 5 Jarach
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PB 27: 6 Haris; 1 Al Muharraq; 10 Deraa; 10 Saif
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 Bo-105
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 Load-
master II
Air Force 1,500
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • YAG 1 Safra
FORCES BY ROLE
and North Africa

Middle East
FIGHTER
2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon Foreign Forces
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Saudi Arabia GCC (SANG): Peninsula Shield ε1,000
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
United Kingdom Air Force 1 BAe-125 CC-3; 1 BAe-146
TRANSPORT
MKII
1 (Royal) flt with B-727; B-747; BAe-146; Gulfstream II;
Gulfstream IV; Gulfstream 450; Gulfstream 550; S-92A United States US Central Commmand: 1,894; 1 HQ (5th
TRAINING Fleet)
1 sqn with Hawk Mk-129*
1 sqn with T-67M Firefly
ATTACK HELICOPTER
2 sqn with AH-1E/F Cobra; TAH-1P Cobra
Egypt EGY
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Egyptian Pound E£ 2010 2011 2012
1 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212); UH-60M Black Hawk GDP Ε£ 1.21tr 1.35tr
1 (VIP) sqn with Bo-105; S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60L
US$ 212bn 226bn
Black Hawk
per capita US$ 2,639 2,579
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 39 combat capable Growth % 5.15 1.22
FTR 12: 8 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II Inflation % 11.7 11.1
FGA 21: 17 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Fighting Falcon Def exp Ε£ 23.5bn
TPT • PAX 10: 1 B-727; 2 B-747; 1 Gulfstream II; 1 US$ 4.13bn
Gulfstream IV; 1 Gulfstream 450; 1 Gulfstream 550; 3
Def bdgt Ε£ 25.4bn 25.2bn 25.3bn
BAe-146
TRG 9: 6 Hawk Mk-129*; 3 T-67M Firefly US$ 4.47bn 4.23bn
HELICOPTERS FMA (US) US$ 1.30bn 1.30bn
ATK 28: 16 AH-1E Cobra; 12 AH-1F Cobra US$1=E£ 5.68 5.96
TPT 27 Medium 13: 3 S-70A Black Hawk; 1 S-92A (VIP);
Population 82,079,636
1 UH-60L Black Hawk; 8 UH-60M Black Hawk Light 14: 11
Bell 212 (AB-212); 3 Bo-105 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRG 6 TAH-1P Cobra
Male 16.7% 4.8% 4.8% 4.9% 17.5% 2.0%
MSL
ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick Female 16.0% 4.6% 4.5% 4.6% 17.3% 2.5%
1 SSM bde with Scud-B

Capabilities 6 engr bde (3 engr bn)
Egypt’s Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF), 2 spec ops engr bn
headed by Defence Minister Field Marshal Mohammed 6 salvage engr bn
Tantawi, assumed power in February 2011 after the 24 MP bn
departure of former President Hosni Mubarak. SCAF is in 18 sigs bn
charge of overseeing the transition towards elections. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
With the armed forces in 2011 preoccupied with 36 log bn
their political role, there is likely little appetite to change 27 med bn
strategic orientation. Cairo still receives $1.3bn in US
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
military aid, and has long been upgrading its inventories
MBT 2,412: 1,002 M1A1 Abrams; 300 M60A1; 850 M60A3;
with US systems. Indeed, a further notification of a sale of
Abrams tank kits was made by the US in July. There is little 260 Ramses II (mod T-54/55); (840 T-54/T-55 in store); (500
incentive to endanger its ability to continue this process, T-62 in store)
or undermine support and maintenance agreements. That RECCE 412: 300 BRDM-2; 112 Commando Scout
Cairo might widen its list of suppliers is not inconceivable AIFV 390 YPR-765 (with 25mm); (220 BMP-1 in store)
in some capability areas, but since the two countries’ APC 3,560
Peace Vector deal in 1980, US equipment has increasingly APC (T) 2,000 M113A2/YPR-765 (incl variants); (500
replaced Egypt’s ageing Soviet-era equipment. Though the BTR-50/OT-62 in store)
armed forces have not been tested in large-scale combat APC (W) 1,560: 250 BMP-600P; 250 BTR-60S; 410 Fahd-30/
since Operation Desert Storm, they maintain a regular TH 390 Fahd; 650 Walid
exercise schedule including with foreign militaries (such as
ARTY 4,468
the Bright Star series). However, while training will be at a
SP 492: 122mm 124 SP 122; 155mm 368: 164 M109A2; 204
high standard for many within the military, it is harder to
judge effectiveness across the entire force, given the level M109A5
of conscription. TOWED 962: 122mm 526: 190 D-30M; 36 M-1931/37; 300
M-30 M-1938; 130mm 420 M-46; 155mm 16 GH-52
ACTIVE 438,500 (Army 310,000 Navy 18,500 Air MRL 450: 122mm 356: 96 BM-11; 60 BM-21; 50 Sakr-10; 50
30,000 Air Defence Command 80,000) Paramilitary Sakr-18; 100 Sakr-36; 130mm 36 Kooryong; 140mm 32 BM-
397,000 14; 227mm 26 M270 MLRS; 240mm (48 BM-24 in store)
Terms of service 12 months–3 years (followed by refresher
MOR 2,564
training over a period of up to 9 years)
SP 136: 107mm 100: 65 M106A1; 35 M106A2 120mm
RESERVE 479,000 (Army 375,000 Navy 14,000 Air 36 M1064A3
20,000 Air Defence 70,000) 81mm 50 M125A2; 82mm 500 120mm 1,848: 1,800
M-1943; 48 Brandt 160mm 30 M160
Organisations by Service AT • MSL
SP 262: 52 M-901, 210 YPR 765 PRAT
Army 90,000–120,000; 190,000–220,000 MANPATS 2,100: 1,200 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
conscript (total 310,000) (incl BRDM-2); 200 Milan; 700 TOW-2
FORCES BY ROLE UAV • ISR • Heavy R4E-50 Skyeye
SPECIAL FORCES AD • SAM
5 cdo gp SP 96: 50 FIM-92A Avenger; 26 M48 Chaparral; 20 9K31
1 counter-terrorist unit Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin)
MANOEUVRE MANPAD 2,764: 2,000 Ayn al-Saqr/9K32 Strela-2 (SA-
Armoured 7 Grail)‡; 164 FIM-92A Stinger; 600 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
4 armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde) GUNS
4 indep armd bde
SP 355: 23mm 165: 45 Sinai-23; 120 ZSU-23-4; 37mm
1 Republican Guard bde
Mechanised 150; 57mm 40 ZSU-57-2
7 mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde) TOWED 700: 14.5mm 300 ZPU-4; 23mm 200 ZU-23-2;
4 indep mech bde 57mm 200 S-60
Light RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder; AN/TPQ-37
1 inf div Firefinder (arty/mor)
2 indep inf bde MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 42+: 9 FROG-7; 24 Sakr-80; some
Air Manoeuvre
(trials); 9 Scud-B
2 air mob bde
ARV 355+: Fahd 240; GMR 3560.55; 220 M88A1; 90 M88A2;
1 para bde
COMBAT SUPPORT M113 ARV; 45 M578; T-54/55 ARV
15 arty bde VLB KMM; MTU; MTU-20
1 SSM bde with FROG-7 MW Aardvark JFSU Mk4
Navy ε8,500 (incl 2,000 Coast Guard); 10,000 AX 5: 1 El Fateh† (UK ‘Z’ class); 1 El Horriya (also used
conscript (total 18,500) as the presidential yacht); 1 Al Kousser; 1 Intishat; 1 other
YPT 2 Poluchat 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4 Romeo† (PRC Type YDT 2
033) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon
Coastal Defence
AShM
Army tps, Navy control
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8
MSL • AShM 4K87 (SSC-2B Samlet)
FRIGATES 8:
LNCHR 3: 3 twin lnchr with Otomat MkII AShM
FFGHM 4 Mubarak (US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1
GUN 100mm; 130mm SM-4-1; 152mm
Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SM-1MP
SAM, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite Naval Aviation
ASW hel) All aircraft operated by Air Force
FFGH 2 Damyat (US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk16 GMLS AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 Beech 1900C (Maritime
with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/ASROC, 2 twin 324mm Surveillance)
TT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity 1 SH-2G Super Seasprite HELICOPTERS

ASW hel) ASW 14: 10 SH-2G Super Seasprite with Mk 46 LWT; 4
FFG 2 Najim Al Zaffer (PRC Jianghu I) with 2 twin lnchr Sea King Mk47
with HY-2 (CSS-N-2 Silkworm) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 MRH 5 SA-342 Gazelle
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 51 UAV • ISR • Light 2 Camcopter 5.1
CORVETTES • FSGM 2
2 Abu Qir (ESP Descubierta) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr Coast Guard 2,000
with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 74
Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm with Sting Ray LWT, 1 PBF 15: 6 Crestitalia; 6 Swift Protector; 3 Peterson
twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 76mm gun PB 59: 5 Nisr; 12 Sea Spectre MkIII; 9 Swiftships; 21
PCFG 11 Timsah; 3 Type 83; 9 Peterson
6 Ramadan with 4 single lnchr with Otomat MkII AShM
5 Tiger with 2 single lnchr with Otomat MkII AShM Air Force 30,000 (incl 10,000 conscript)
PCC 5
and North Africa

FORCES BY ROLE
5 Hainan (PRC – 3 more in reserve†) with 2 triple
Middle East
FIGHTER
324mm TT, 4 single RL 1 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
PBFG 21 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
4 Hegu (PRC – Komar type) with 2 single lnchr with 6 sqn with J-7/MiG-21 Fishbed/MiG-21U Mongol A*
SY-1 AShM 2 sqn with Mirage 5D/E
5 October (FSU Komar – 1†) with 2 single lnchr with 1 sqn with Mirage 2000B/C
Otomat MkII AShM FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
12 Osa I (FSU – 3†) with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit 2 sqn with F-4E Phantom II
(SS-N-2A Styx) AShM 1 sqn with Mirage 5E2
PBFM 4 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
4 Shershen (FSU) with 1 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) 1 sqn with SH-2G Super Seasprite
SAM (manual aiming), 1 12 tube BM-24 MRL 1 sqn with Sea King Mk47
PB 8 MARITIME PATROL
4 Shanghai II (PRC) 1 sqn with Beech 1900C
2 Shershen (FSU – 1†) with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 8-tube ELECTRONIC WARFARE
BM-21 MRL 1 sqn with Beech 1900 (ELINT); Commando Mk2E (ECM)
2 Swiftships 28 ELECTRONIC WARFARE/TRANSPORT
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 14 1 sqn with C-130H/VC-130H Hercules
MHC 5: 2 Osprey; 3 Dat Assawari (US Swiftships) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING
MSI 2 Safaga (US Swiftships) 1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye
MSO 7: 3 Assiout (FSU T-43 class); 4 Aswan (FSU Yurka) TRANSPORT
AMPHIBIOUS 12 1 sqn with An-74TK-200A;
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny A (FSU) (capacity 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules
6 MBT; 180 troops) 1 sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo
LANDING CRAFT • LCU 9 Vydra (capacity either 3 1 sqn with B-707-366C; B-737-100; Beech 200 Super King
AMX-30 MBT or 100 troops) Air; Falcon 20; Gulfstream III; Gulfstream IV; Gulfstream
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 26: IV-SP
AOT 7 Toplivo (1 additional in reserve) TRAINING
AE 1 Halaib (Westerwald-class) 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
AKR 3 Al Hurreya 1 sqn with DHC-5 Buffalo
ARL 1 Shaledin (Luneberg-class) 3 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano
ATA 5† Okhtensky 1 sqn with Grob 115EG;
ε6 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* ADA bn), 12 SAM bty with I-HAWK MIM-23B, 14
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; L-59E Albatros* SAM bty with Crotale, 18 SAM bn with Skyguard, 110
ATTACK HELICOPTER SAM bn with S-125 Pechora-M (SA-3A Goa); 2K12 Kub
2 sqn with AH-64D Apache (SA-6 Gainful); S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline))
2 sqn with SA-342K Gazelle (with HOT) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with SA-342L Gazelle AD
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER SYSTEMS 72+: Some Amoun with RIM-7F Sea Sparrow
1 sqn with CH-47C/D Chinook SAM, 36+ quad SAM, Skyguard towed SAM, 36+ twin
2 sqn with Mi-8 Hip 35mm guns
1 sqn with S-70 Black Hawk; UH-60A/L Black Hawk SAM 702+
UAV
SP 130+: 24+ Crotale; 50+ M48 Chaparral; 56+ SA-6
Some sqn with R4E-50 Skyeye; Teledyne-Ryan 324 Scarab
Gainful
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TOWED 572+: 78+ I-HAWK MIM-23B; S-75M Volkhov
AIRCRAFT 589 combat capable (SA-2 Guideline) 282+ Skyguard; 212+ S-125 Pechora-M
FTR 82: 26 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16B Fighting
(SA-3A Goa)
Falcon; ε50 J-7 GUNS 1,566+
FGA 310: 29 F-4E Phantom II; 127 F-16C Fighting Falcon; SP • 23mm 266+: 36+ Sinai-23 (SPAAG) each with Ayn
38 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 3 Mirage 2000B; 15 Mirage al-Saqr MANPAD, Dassault 6SD-20S land; 230 ZSU-23-4
2000C; 36 Mirage 5D/E; 12 Mirage 5E2; ε50 MiG-21 TOWED 57mm 600 S-60; 85mm 400 M-1939 KS-12;
Fishbed/MiG-21U Mongol A* 100mm 300 KS-19
ELINT 2 VC-130H Hercules
ISR 6 Mirage 5R (5SDR)*
Paramilitary ε397,000 active
AEW&C 7 E-2C Hawkeye
TPT 56 Medium 24: 21 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 Central Security Forces 325,000
Hercules Light 21: 3 An-74TK-200A (3 more on order); Ministry of Interior; Includes conscripts
1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 Beech 1900 (ELINT); 4 Beech APC (W) 100+: 100 Hussar; Walid
1900C; 9 DHC-5D Buffalo PAX 11: 1 B-707-366C; 3 Falcon
20; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV; 4 Gulfstream IV-SP National Guard 60,000
TRG 331: 36 Alpha Jet*; 54 EMB-312 Tucano; 74 Grob Lt wpns only
115EG; 120 K-8 Karakorum*; 10 L-39 Albatros; 35 L-59E FORCES BY ROLE
Albatros* MANOEUVRE
HELICOPTERS Other
ATK 35 AH-64D Apache 8 paramilitary bde (cadre) (3 paramilitary bn)
ASW 15: 10 SH-2G Super Seasprite (opcon Navy); 5 Sea EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
King Mk47 (opcon Navy)
APC (W) 250 Walid
ELINT 4 Commando Mk2E (ECM)
MRH 70: 65 SA-342K Gazelle (some with HOT); 5 SA- Border Guard Forces 12,000
342L Gazelle (opcon Navy) Ministry of Interior; lt wpns only
TPT 93: Heavy 19: 3 CH-47C Chinook; 16 CH-47D
FORCES BY ROLE
Chinook; Medium 74: 2 AS-61; 24 Commando (of which
MANOEUVRE
3 VIP); 40 Mi-8 Hip; 4 S-70 Black Hawk (VIP); 4 UH-60L Other
Black Hawk (VIP) 18 Border Guard regt
TRG 17 UH-12E
UAV • ISR • Heavy 49: 20 R4E-50 Skyeye; 29 Teledyne-
Ryan 324 Scarab Deployment
MSL
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
ASM 245+: 80 AGM-65A Maverick; 123 AGM-65D
UN • UNOCI 176; 1 engr coy
Maverick; 12 AGM-65F Maverick; 30 AGM-65G Maverick;
AGM-119 Hellfire; AGM-84 Harpoon; AM-39 Exocet; AS- Democratic Republic of the Congo
30L HOT UN • MONUSCO 1,000; 24 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 SF coy
ARM Armat; Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)
AAM • IR R-3(AA-2 Atoll)‡; AIM-9FL/P Sidewinder; Liberia
R-550 Magic; SARH AIM-7E/F/M Sparrow; R530 UN • UNMIL 7 obs
South Sudan
Air Defence Command 80,000 conscript; UN • UNMISS 8; 7 obs
70,000 reservists (total 150,000)
FORCES BY ROLE Sudan
AIR DEFENCE UN • UNAMID 2,398; 21 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs
5 AD div (geographically based) (total: 12 SAM bty with coy; 1 tpt coy
M48 Chaparral, 12 radar bn, 12 ADA bde (total: 100 UN • UNISFA 11; 4 obs
Western Sahara prime antagonists, the US and Israel, and also the ability to
UN • MINURSO 21 obs act with greater impunity regionally.
The Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s and various counter-
insurgency campaigns mean the military is battle hardened
Foreign Forces and experienced. Yet its lack of modern and useable
Australia MFO (Operation Mazurka) 25 equipment means the military must rely on personnel
Canada MFO 28 and platform numbers rather than technology to wage
Colombia MFO 354; 1 inf bn war. Large numbers of small, fast-attack craft with anti-
Czech Republic MFO 3 ship missiles, for instance, would be able to use swarm
Fiji MFO 338; 1 inf bn or hit-and-run tactics to attempt to disable much larger
France MFO 2 opponents. Similarly, army equipment may rely on
Hungary MFO 38; 1 MP unit numerical superiority, not sophistication, to prevent an
opponent’s advance. The air force’s ageing fleets of US
Italy MFO 75; 4 coastal ptl unit
and European fighters is of limited value and many may
New Zealand MFO 28 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit
already have been cannibalised to keep others flying. The
Norway MFO 3 imposition of a UN embargo on most major conventional

United States MFO 700; 1 ARNG inf bn; 1 spt bn (1 EOD weapons imports into Iran in June 2010 will only exacerbate
coy, 1 medical coy, 1 hel coy) the debilitated state of Iran’s equipment. Although Tehran
Uruguay MFO 58 1 engr/tpt unit has attempted, with partial success, to invigorate its
domestic defence industry, it relies on foreign states for
high-technology equipment, including anti-ship missiles
Iran IRN and advanced air-defence platforms.
Iranian Rial r 2010 2011 2012 ACTIVE 523,000 (Army 350,000 Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps 125,000 Navy 18,000 Air
GDP r 4,212tr 5,314tr
30,000) Paramilitary 40,000
US$ 413bn 499bn
Armed Forces General Staff coordinates two parallel
organisations: Regular Armed Forces and Revolutionary
and North Africa

Growth % 3.24 2.52 Guard Corps
Middle East
Inflation % 12.4 22.5
Def bdgt r ε108tn ε128tn
RESERVE 350,000 (Army 350,000, ex-service
volunteers)
US$ ε10.6bn ε12bn
US$1=r 10,206.31 10,658.37
Ethnic groups: Persian 51%; Azeri 24%; Gilaki/Mazandarani 8%; Army 130,000; 220,000 conscript (total
Kurdish 7%; Arab 3%; Lur 2%; Baloch 2%; Turkman 2%
350,000)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus FORCES BY ROLE
Male 12.3% 5.1% 6.2% 5.6% 19.1% 2.4% 5 corps-level regional HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Female 11.7% 4.8% 5.8% 5.4% 18.8% 2.6%
2 cdo div (3 cdo bde)
Capabilities 3 cdo bde
1 SF bde
Iran’s military, and in particular the Iranian Revolutionary MANOEUVRE
Guard Corps (IRGC), is a capable organisation well versed Armoured
in a variety of different operations. Although the armed 4 armd div (1 recce bn, 2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 SP
forces suffer from a generally outdated arsenal, innovative arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn, 1 tpt bn)
and cost-effective tactics and techniques (particularly 1 indep armd bde
the use of asymmetric warfare) mean that Iran is able to Mechanised
pose a challenge to most potential adversaries, especially 2 mech inf div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 2–3 mech bde, 1
its weaker neighbours. At the same time, the inability to SP arty bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn, 1 tpt bn)
offer effective deterrence to an advanced military such Light
as that of the United States, or even potentially Turkey, 4 inf div (3–4 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 log bn, 1 tpt bn)
may be a motivation for Iran’s pursuit of dual-use nuclear 1 indep inf bde
programmes. Tehran claims its uranium enrichment is for Air Manoeuvre
a civil energy purpose but, in conjunction with evidence 1 AB bde
of weapons-design work, it provides a potential break-out Aviation
capability. A nuclear deterrent, based on its burgeoning Some avn gp
ballistic-missile programme, would, in Tehran’s view, COMBAT SUPPORT
afford Iran greater security in its relations with two of its 6 arty gp
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 125,000+

Totals incl those held by IRGC Ground Forces. Some
equipment serviceability in doubt Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground
MBT 1,663+: ε150 Zulfiqar; 480 T-72Z; 150 M60A1; 75+ T-62; Forces 100,000+
100 Chieftain Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/Safir-74; 168 Controls Basij paramilitary forces. Lightly manned in
M47/M48 peacetime. Primary role: internal security; secondary
LT TK 80+: 80 Scorpion; Towsan role: external defence, in conjunction with regular armed
RECCE 35 EE-9 Cascavel forces.
AIFV 610: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 FORCES BY ROLE
Spigot) COMMAND
APC 640+ 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran)
APC (T) 340+: 140 Boragh with 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); MANOEUVRE
200 M113; BMT-2 Cobra Light
APC (W) 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; Rakhsh Up to 15 div (some divs are designated as armd or
ARTY 8,798+ mech but all are predominantly infantry)

SP 292+: 122mm 60+: 60 2S1 Carnation; Raad-1 (Thunder Some indep bde (each bde allocated 10 Basij militia bn
1) 155mm 150+: 150 M109; Raad-2 (Thunder 2) 170mm 30 for ops)
M-1978; 175mm 22 M107; 203mm 30 M110 Air Manoeuvre
TOWED 2,030+; 105mm 150: 130 M101A1; 20 M-56; 1 indep AB bde
122mm 640: 540 D-30; 100 Type-54 (M-30) M-1938;
130mm 985 M-46; 152mm 30 D-20; 155mm 205: 120 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval
GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 Type 88 WAC-21; 203mm 20 M115 Forces 20,000+ (incl 5,000 Marines)
MRL 1,476+: 107mm 1,300: 700 Type-63; 600 HASEB FORCES BY ROLE
Fadjr 1; 122mm 157: 7 BM-11; 100 BM-21; 50 Arash/Hadid/ COMBAT SUPPORT
Noor; 240mm 19: ε10 Fadjr 3; 9 M-1985; 330mm Fadjr 5 Some arty bty
MOR 5,000: 60mm; 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M-30; 120mm Some AShM bty with HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker)
M-65 AShM
AT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 I-Raad (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 In addition to the vessels listed the IRGC operates a
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Towsan-1 (AT-5 Spandrel); substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load dis-
Saeqhe 1; Saeqhe 2; Toophan; Toophan 2 placement below 10 tonnes, including ε40 Boghammar-
RCL 200+: 75mm M-20; 82mm B-10; 106mm ε200 M-40; class vessels and small Bavar-class wing-in-ground effect
107mm B-11 air vehicles
AIRCRAFT • TPT 17 Light 16: 10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 95
Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 690 PAX 1 Falcon 20 PBFG 40:
HELICOPTERS 5 China Cat with 2 twin lnchr with C-701/Kosar
ATK 50 AH-1J Cobra AShM
TPT 173: Heavy 20 CH-47C Chinook; Medium 25 Mi-171; 10 Thondor (PRC Houdong) with 2 twin lnchr with
Light 128: 68 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10 Bell 206 Jet Ranger C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM
(AB-206); 50 Bell 214 25 Peykaap II (IPS-16 mod) with 2 single lnchr with
UAV • ISR • Medium Mohajer IV; Light Mohajer II/ C-701/Kosar AShM
Mohajer III PBF 35: 15 Peykaap I (IPS -16); 10 Tir (IPS 18); ε10 Pashe
AD • SAM (MIG-G-1900)
SP HQ-7 (reported); 10 Pantsyr S-1E (SA-22 Greyhound); PB ε 20 Ghaem
250 Shabab Thaqeb (FM-80); 29 Tor-M1 (SA-15) AMPHIBIOUS
MANPAD 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 Strela-2 LANDING SHIPS 4
(SA-7 Grail)‡; Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard); Misaq 2 (QW- 2 Hejaz (mine-laying capacity)
11); Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); HN-54 2 MIG-S-5000
GUNS 1,122 MSL • TACTICAL • AShM HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker)
SP 180: 23mm 100 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 80 ZSU-57-2
TOWED 942 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm 300 ZU-23- Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Marines
2; 35mm 92 Skyguard; 37mm M-1939; 40mm 50 L/70; 5,000+
57mm 200 S-60; 85mm 300 M1939 FORCES BY ROLE
MSL • TACTICAL • SSM ε30 CSS-8 (175 msl); Shahin-1/ MANOEUVRE
Shahin-2; Nazeat; Oghab Amphibious
ARV 20+: BREM-1 reported; 20 Chieftain ARV; M578; 1 marine bde
T-54/55 ARV reported
VLB 15: 15 Chieftain AVLB Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force
MW Taftan 1 Controls Iran’s strategic missile force.
FORCES BY ROLE LANDING CRAFT 10

MISSILE LCT 2
ε1 bde with Shahab-1/2 LCU 1 Liyan 110
ε1 bn with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in devt) UCAC 7: 6 Wellington; 1 Iran
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 43
MISSILE • TACTICAL AORH 3: 2 Bandar Abbas; 1 Kharg
MRBM 12+: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1; some Sajjil-2 (in AWT 5: 4 Kangan; 1 Delvar
devt) AE 2 Delvar
AK 3 Delvar
SRBM 18+: some Fateh 110; 12-18 Shahab-1/2 (ε200–300
AG 1 Hamzah
msl)
AB 12 Hendijan (also used for coastal patrol)
SSM Some Zelzal
YTB 17
MSL • AshM C-802/A Noor/Ghader; C-701/Kosar; Nasr;
Navy 18,000 Ra’ad (reported; coastal defence)
HQ at Bandar-e Abbas
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Marines 2,600

In addition to the vessels listed the Iranian Navy operates FORCES BY ROLE
a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load dis- MANOEUVRE
placement below 10 tonnes. Amphibious
SUBMARINES 23 2 marine bde
TACTICAL 15
SSK 3 Kilo (RUS Type 877EKM) with 6 single 533mm Naval Aviation 2,600
TT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SSW 12: 11 Qadir (additional vessels in build); 1 Nahang AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable
SDV 8: 5 Al Sabehat (SF insertion and mine-laying ASW 3 P-3F Orion
capacity); 3 other TPT 16 Light 13: 5 Do-228; 4 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 68 (+ ε50 Commander 680 PAX 3 Falcon 20 (ELINT)
small craft under 10 tonnes) HELICOPTERS
and North Africa

CORVETTES 6 ASW ε10 SH-3D Sea King
Middle East
FSGM 1 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 – 1 more under MCM 3 RH-53D Sea Stallion
construction at Bandar-e Abbas, expected ISD 2013) TPT • Light 17: 5 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 2 Bell 206
with 2 twin lnchr with CSS-N-4 Sardine AShM, 2 lnchr JetRanger (AB-206); 10 Bell 212 (AB-212)
with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1
hel landing platform Air Force 30,000 (incl 12,000 Air Defence)
FSG 4 FORCES BY ROLE
3 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with Serviceability probably about 60% for US ac types and
CSS-N-4 Sardine AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 about 80% for PRC/Russian ac. Includes IRGC Air Force
114mm gun equipment.
1 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 FIGHTER
AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 76mm gun 1 sqn with F-7M Airguard; JJ-7 Mongol A*
FS 1 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 76mm gun 2 sqn with F-14 Tomcat
PCFG 13 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 1–2 twin lcnhr 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
with CSS-N-4 Sardine AShM FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
PBFG 8 1 sqn with Mirage F-1E; F-5E/F Tiger II
ε4 Mk13 with 2 single lnchr with C-701 (Kosar) AShM 1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D
4 China Cat with 2 single lnchr with C-701 (Kosar) 5 sqn with F-4D/E Phantom II
AShM 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
PBF 16: 15 Kashdom II; 1 M155 MARITIME PATROL
PB 22: 3 Kayvan; 6 MkII; 10 MkIII; 3 Parvin 1 sqn with P-3MP Orion*
PTF 3 Kajami (semi-submersible) ISR
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 1 (det) sqn with RF-4E Phantom II*
MSC 3: 2 Type-292; 1 Shahrokh (in Caspian Sea as trg SEARCH & RESCUE
ship) Some flt with Bell-214C (AB-214C)
MSI 2 Riazi (US Cape) TANKER/TRANSPORT
AMPHIBIOUS 1 sqn with B-707; B-747; B-747F
LANDING SHIPS 13 TRANSPORT
LSM 3 Farsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops) 1 sqn with B-707; Falcon 50; L-1329 Jetstar; Bell 412
LST 4 Hengam each with up to 1 hel (capacity 9 tanks; 2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules
225 troops) 1 sqn with F-27 Friendship; Falcon 20
LSL 6 Fouque 1 sqn with Il-76 Candid; An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz)
TRAINING Paramilitary 40,000-60,000

1 sqn with Beech F33A/C Bonanza
1 sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter Law-Enforcement Forces 40,000–60,000
1 sqn with PC-6 (border and security troops); 450,000 on
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer mobilisation (incl conscripts)
Some units with EMB-312 Tucano; MFI-17 Mushshak; TB- Part of armed forces in wartime
21 Trinidad; TB-200 Tobago PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB ε 90
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER AIRCRAFT • TPT: 2 Iran-140; some Cessna 185/Cessna
1 sqn with CH-47 Chinook 310
Some units with Bell 206A JetRanger (AB-206A); Shabaviz HELICOPTERS • UTL ε24 AB-205 (Bell 205)/AB-206
2-75; Shabaviz 2061 (Bell 206) Jet Ranger
AIR DEFENCE
16 bn with MIM-23B I-HAWK/Shahin Basij Resistance Force up to ε1,000,000 on
5 sqn with FM-80 (Crotale); Rapier; Tigercat; S-75M mobilisation
Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); Paramilitary militia, with claimed membership of 12.6
FIM-92A Stinger; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K331 million; perhaps 1 million combat capable; in the process
Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) (reported) of closer integration with IRGC Ground Forces.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
AIRCRAFT 336 combat capable MANOEUVRE
FTR 189+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 60+ F-5E Tiger II/F- Other
2,500 militia bn (claimed, limited permanent member-
5F Tiger II; 24 F-7M Airguard; 44 F-14 Tomcat; 35 MiG-
ship)
29A/U/UB Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh reported
FGA 108: 65 F-4D/E Phantom II; 10 Mirage F-1E; 30 Su-
24MK Fencer D; up to 3 Saegheh reported
Cyber
Iran is believed to have a developed capacity for cyber
ATK 13: 7 Su-25K Frogfoot; 3 Su-25T Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UBK
operations. The precise relationship of groups such as the
Frogfoot
‘Iranian Cyber Army’ to regime and military organisations
ASW 5 P-3MP Orion
is unclear, but the former has launched hacking attacks
ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II*
against a number of foreign organisations. In 2011, it was
TKR/TPT 3: ε1 B-707; ε2 B-747
reported by state-sponsored media that Iran was stepping
TPT 117: Heavy 12 Il-76 Candid; Medium 19 C-130E/H
up its cyber defences and conducting exercises in this area,
Hercules; Light 75: 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140
and that Iran was establishing its own cyber command.
Faraz) (45 projected); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L-1329 Jetstar;
10 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago;
3 Turbo Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 11: 2 B-707; 1 Deployment
B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20; 3 Falcon 50 GUlf of Aden and SOMALI Basin
TRG 151: 25 Beech F33A/C Bonanza; 15 EMB-312 Tucano; Navy: 1 FSG; 1 AORH
15 JJ-7*; 25 MFI-17 Mushshak; 12 Parastu; 15 PC-6; 35 PC-7
Turbo Trainer; 9 T-33
HELICOPTERS Iraq IRQ
MRH 32: 30 Bell 214C (AB-214C); 2 Bell 412 Iraqi Dinar D 2010 2011 2012
TPT 4+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Light 2+: 2 Bell 206A
Jet Ranger (AB-206A); some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous GDP D 94.9tr 127tr
versions in production); some Shabaviz 2061 US$ 80.2bn 107bn
AD • SAM 279+: FM-80 (Crotale); 30 Rapier; 15 Tigercat; per capita US$ 2,704 3,534
150+ MIM-23B I-HAWK/Shahin; 45 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Growth % 0.84 9.65
Guideline); 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 29 9K331 Inflation % 2.4 5.0
Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) (reported)
Def exp D 5.73tn
MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 37mm Oerlikon US$ 4.85bn
MSL Def bdgt D 4.95tn 5.66tn
ASM AGM-65A Maverick; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 US$ 4.19bn 4.79bn
(AS-14 Kedge); C-801K (CSS-N-4 Sardine) AShM US$1=D 1,182.71 1,182.80
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
AAM • IR PL-2A‡; PL-7; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA- Population 30,399,572
11 Archer): AIM-9 Sidewinder; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Ethnic and religious groups: Arab 75–80% (of which Shia Muslim
Alamo) SARH AIM-54 Phoenix; AIM-7 Sparrow 55%, Sunni Muslim 45%) Kurdish 20–25%
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

Air Defence Command
Male 19.4% 5.2% 4.9% 4.6% 15.2% 1.4%
Established to co-ordinate Army, Air Force and IRGC air-
defence assets. Precise composition unclear. Female 18.7% 5.1% 4.8% 4.4% 14.8% 1.6%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities MBT 336+: 140 M1A1 Abrams; 120+ T-72; 76 T-55;
In conjunction with the police and other security services, RECCE 73: 18 BRDM 2; 35 EE-9 Cascavel; 20 Fuchs NBC
the Iraqi Army’s prime role is to provide internal security. AIFV 120: 100 BMP-1; 20 BTR-4
The speed with which the Iraqi Army was reconstituted APC 2,799+
after 2003 meant that up to 70% of old, pre-regime-change APC (T) 605+: 100 FV 103 Spartan; 400+ M113A2; 61
officers were eventually reintegrated into the new officer MT-LB; 44 Talha
corps. To counter this, Iraq’s ruling elite have inserted so- APC (W) 850: 570 Akrep/Scorpion; 60 AT-105 Saxon; 100
called dimaj officers into the senior ranks of the military. BTR-80; 50 M3 Panhard; 60 Mohafiz; 10 VCR-TT
These political appointments were either militia leaders PPV 1,344: 600 DZIK-3; 12 Barracuda; 607 ILAV Cougar;
or had no military experience at all. Beyond political 10 Cobra; 115 Mamba
interference, a broad set of problems continue to plague ARTY 1,386+
the Iraqi Army and need to be addressed for it to fulfil SP 48+: 152mm 18+ Type 83; 155mm 30: 6 M109A1; 24
its new responsibilities. The first involves weaknesses M109A5
in management, logistics and strategic planning. The TOWED 138+: 130mm 18+ M-46; 155mm 120 M198
unwillingness of senior military officials to delegate MLRS 122mm some BM-21

responsibility down the chain of command also stifles MOR 1,200: 81mm 650 M252; 120mm 550 M120
innovation and independent decision-making at a junior ARV 215+: 180 BREM; 35+ M88A1/2; Type 54/55 ARV;
level. In spite of ongoing inefficiencies and politicisation, Type 653; VT-55A
Iraq’s security forces will probably be able to impose a HELICOPTERS
rough order on the country from 2012 onwards. They will MRH 30+: 26 Mi-17 Hip H; 4+ SA342 Gazelle
not however be able to defend the country’s borders or air ISR 10 OH-58C Kiowa
space. TPT 37: Medium 8 Mi-171Sh; Light 29: 16 Bell 205
(UH-1H Huey II); 10 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger; 3 Bell T407
ACTIVE 271,400 (Army 193,400 Navy 3,600 Air
5,050 Support 69,350) Ministry of Interior 531,000 Navy 3,600
Iraqi Coastal Defence Force (ICDF)
and North Africa

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Middle East
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28+:
Military Forces PCO 5
Figures for Iraqi security forces reflect ongoing changes in 1 RiverHawk (one further in build; expected ISD
organisation and manpower. 2012)
4 Fateh (ITA Diciotti)
Army 193,400 PB 17: 9 Swiftships 35; 5 Predator (PRC-27m); 3 Al
FORCES BY ROLE Faw
SPECIAL FORCES PBR 6: 2 Type-200; 4 Type-2010
2 SF bde
MANOEUVRE Iraqi Air Force 5,050
Armoured FORCES BY ROLE
1 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 lt mech bde, 1 engr bn, 1 ISR
sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 sqn with CH-2000 Sama; SB7L-360 Seeker
Light 1 sqn with Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Cessna AC-
8 mot div (4 mot inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log 208B Combat Caravan*
bde) 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air
2 mot div (3 mot inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log TRANSPORT
bde) 1 sqn with C-130E Hercules
1 inf div (1 mech bde, 2 inf bde, 1 air mob bde, 1 engr TRAINING
bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 sqn with Cessna 172
1 inf div (4 lt inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log 1 sqn with Lasta-95
bde) 1 sqn with T-6A
1 inf div (3 lt inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
bde) AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable
2 (presidential) mot bde ISR 5: 3 Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan*; 2 SB7L-360
1 (Baghdad) indep mot bde Seeker
Aviation TPT 25: Medium 3 C-130E Hercules; Light 22: 6 Beech
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) 350 King Air; 8 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 8 Cessna
1 sqn with Bell 206; OH-58C Kiowa 172
1 sqn with Bell T407 TRG 33+: 8 CH-2000 Sama; 10+ Lasta-95; 15 T-6A
3 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171 MSL
1 sqn with SA342M Gazelle ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
Ministry of Interior Forces 531,000 Capabilities

Iraqi Police Service 302,000 (incl Highway The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) remain the most capable
Patrol) in the region, with the motivation, equipment and training
to considerably overmatch the conventional capability of
Iraqi Federal Police 44,000 other regional armed forces. Though the changing strategic
Facilities Protection Service 95,000 environment arising from the Arab Awakening will concern
Israeli planners, they are currently able to contain the
Border Enforcement 60,000 military threats posed by Hamas and Hizbullah. Many of
the lessons of the unsuccessful 2006 war against Hizbullah
Oil Police 30,000 in Lebanon appear to have been addressed. Operation Cast
Lead against Hamas in Gaza in 2008–09 demonstrated a
Foreign Forces high degree of combined-arms and air–land cooperation as
well as advances in ISR and command capabilities, albeit
Australia 35; 1 sy det with ASLAV • UNAMI 2 obs

against an enemy significantly less capable than Hizbullah.
Bulgaria NTM-I 2
In a war against the re-armed Hizbullah, the IDF could
Denmark 23 (sy forces) • NTM-I 1 • UNAMI 2 obs
probably only partially neutralise the rocket and missile
Estonia NTM-I 2 threat to Israel, but the capability of its forces to damage
Fiji UNAMI 278; 3 sy unit Hizbullah’s organisation and infrastructure may have a
Hungary NTM-I 3 deterrent effect.
Italy NTM-I 67 Continued intermittent firing of rockets from Gaza
Jordan UNAMI 2 obs remains a key concern and has driven recent capability
Lithuania NTM-I 2 additions such as the Iron Dome system. Israel remains
Nepal UNAMI 1 obs concerned by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile activities.
Netherlands NTM-I 7 Developments continue in the field of ballistic-missile
defence, with Arrow 3 under development by the US
New Zealand UNAMI 1 obs
and Israel, designed to engage incoming missiles in
Poland NTM-I 17
the upper atmosphere – a development of Arrow 2 and
Romania NTM-I 2 complementing Israel’s Patriot missiles. During the year,
Turkey NTM-I 2 Israel’s highly capable air force has held flying training
Ukraine NTM-I 9 exercises in Greece, Italy and Romania.
United Kingdom NTM-I 15 • UNAMI 1 obs
United States Operation New Dawn 34,000 (withdrawn by
end 2011) • NTM-I 12 • UNAMI 4 obs 34,000) Paramilitary 8,000
RESERVE 565,000 (Army 500,000 Navy 10,000 Air
55,000)
Israel ISR Terms of service officers 48 months, other ranks 36 months,
women 24 months (Jews and Druze only; Christians,
New Israeli Shekel NS 2010 2011 2012 Circassians and Muslims may volunteer). Annual trg as
GDP NS 813bn 903bn cbt reservists to age 40 (some specialists to age 54) for male
US$ 218bn 255bn other ranks, 38 (or marriage/pregnancy) for women
per capita US$ 29,580 34,070
Growth % 4.85 4.80 Organisations by Service
Inflation % 2.7 3.4
Def exp NS 52.5bn Strategic Forces
US$ 14.0bn Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear capability –
Def bdgt NS 53.8bn 54.1bn 55.6bn
delivery means include ac, Jericho 1 SRBM and Jericho 2
IRBM
US$ 14.4bn 15.3bn
FORCES BY ROLE
FMA (US) US$ 2.78bn 3.0bn
MISSILE
US$1=NS 3.74 3.55
3 sqn with Jericho 1/2
MSL • STRATEGIC
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
IRBM: Jericho 2
Male 14.1% 4.1% 4.0% 3.8% 19.7% 4.4%
SRBM: Jericho 1
Female 13.5% 3.9% 3.8% 3.7% 19.3% 5.7% WARHEADS up to 200 nuclear warheads
Strategic Defences Air Manoeuvre

2 para bde
FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE Mountain
1 mtn inf bn
3 bty with 24 Arrow/Arrow 2 ATBM with Green Pine ra-
COMBAT SUPPORT
dar and Citrus Tree command post.
7 arty bde
1 bty with Iron Dome
17 bty with MIM-23B I-HAWK
6 log unit
6 bty with MIM-104 Patriot
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Space MBT 480: ε160 Merkava MkII; ε160 Merkava MkIII; ε160
SATELLITES • IMAGERY 4: 3 Ofeq (5, 7 & 9); 1 TecSAR-1 Merkava MkIV (ε440 Merkava Mk1; ε290 Merkava MkII; ε270
(Polaris) Merkava MkIII; ε140 Merkava MkIV; 111 Magach-7; 711 M60/
M60A1/M60A3 all in store)
Army 26,000; 107,000 conscript; (total 133,000) RECCE 308: ε300 RBY-1 RAMTA; ε8 Tpz-1 Fuchs (NBC)
Organisation and structure of formations may vary APC 1,265

according to op situations. Equipment includes that APC (T) 1,165: ε65 Namer; ε200 Achzarit (modified
required for reserve forces on mobilisation. T-55 chassis); 500 M113A2; ε400 Nagmachon (Centurion
FORCES BY ROLE chassis); Nakpadon (5,000 M-113A1/A2 in store)
COMMAND APC (W) 100 Ze’ev
3 (regional comd) corps HQ ARTY 530
2 armd div HQ SP 250: 155mm 250 M109A5 (155mm 148 L-33; 30
4 (territorial) inf div HQ M109A1; 50 M-50; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 36 M110 all
SPECIAL FORCES in store)
3 SF bn TOWED (122mm 5 D-30; 130mm 100 M-46; 155mm 171:
MANOEUVRE 40 M-46; 50 M-68/M-71; 81 M-839P/M-845P all in store)
Reconnaissance MRL 30: 227mm 30 M270 MLRS (122mm 58 BM-21;
1 indep recce bn 160mm 50 LAR-160; 227mm 30 M270 MLRS; 240mm 36
Armoured BM-24; 290mm 20 LAR-290 all in store)
and North Africa

Middle East
3 armd bde (1 armd recce coy, 3 armd bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt MOR 250 81mm 250 (81mm 1,100; 120mm 650 160mm 18
engr bn) M-66 Soltam all in store)
Mechanised AT • MSL
3 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn,1 sigs coy) SP M113 with Spike
1 mech inf bde (6 mech inf bn) MANPATS IMI MAPATS; Spike MR/LR/ER/NLOS
1 indep mech inf bn AD • SAM
Light SP 20 Machbet
1 indep inf bn MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger
Air Manoeuvre RADAR • LAND AN/PPS-15 (arty); AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder
1 para bde (3 para bn,1 cbt spt bn. 1 sigs coy) (arty); EL/M-2140 (veh)
Other MSL 100
1 armd trg bde (3 armd bn) STRATEGIC ε100 Jericho 1 SRBM/Jericho 2 IRBM
COMBAT SUPPORT TACTICAL • SSM (7 Lance in store)
3 arty bde AEV D9R; Puma
3 engr bn ARV Centurion Mk2; Eyal; Merkava; M88A1; M113 ARV
1 EOD coy VLB Alligator MAB; M48/60; MTU
1 CBRN bn
3 int bn Navy 7,000; 2,500 conscript (total 9,500)
2 MP bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Reserves 500,000+ on mobilisation SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 3 Dolphin (GER
Type-212 variant) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C
FORCES BY ROLE
Harpoon AShM/HWT, 4 single 650mm TT (3 more to be
COMMAND
delivered from 2012)
8 armd div HQ
1 AB div HQ
MANOEUVRE CORVETTES • FSGHM 3 Eilat (Sa’ar 5) 2 quad Mk140
Armoured lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 32 cell VLS with
17 armd bde Barak SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm
Mechanised gun, (capacity either 1 AS-565SA Panther ASW hel or 1
11 mech inf bde AS-366G Dauphin II SAR hel)
Light PCGM 8 Hetz (Sa’ar 4.5) with 6 single lnchr with Gabriel
13 (territorial/regional) inf bde II AShM, 2 twin Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon
AShM, 1 16-32 Cell Mk56 VLS with Barak SAM, 1 76mm 1 medevac unit with CH-53D Sea Stallion
gun UAV
PCG 2 Reshef (Sa’ar 4) with 4–6 single lnchr with Gabriel 1 ISR sqn with Hermes 450
II AShM, 1 twin Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon 1 ISR sqn with Searcher MkII
AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval); Heron TP (Eitan)
PBFT 13: 9 Super Dvora MkI with 2 single 324mm TT with AIR DEFENCE
Mk 46 LWT (AShM may also be fitted); 4 Super Dvora 3 bty with Arrow/Arrow 2
MkII with 2 single 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT (AShM 1 bty with Iron Dome
may also be fitted) 17 bty with MIM-23 I-HAWK
PBT 15 Dabur with 2 single 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT 6 bty with MIM-104 Patriot
PBF 18: 5 Shaldag; 3 Stingray; 10 Super Dvora MK III EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(AShM & TT may be fitted) AIRCRAFT 440 combat capable
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCT 1 Ashdod FTR 143: 16 F-15A Eagle; 6 F-15B Eagle; 17 F-15C Eagle; 11
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 F-15D Eagle; 77 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 16 F-16B Fighting
AG 2 (ex German Type T45) Falcon
AX 1 FGA 251: 25 F-15I Ra’am; 78 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 48

F-16D Fighting Falcon; 100 F-16I Sufa
Naval Aviation ATK 46: 20 A-4N Skyhawk; 10 TA-4H Skyhawk; 16 TA-4J
AC • TPT • Medium 2 C-130 Hercules
Skyhawk
HELICOPTERS
FTR/FGA/ATK (200+ A-4N Skyhawk/F-4 Phantom II/F-
ASW 7 AS565SA Panther
15A Eagle/F-16A/B Fighting Falcon/Kfir C-7 in store)
SAR 2 SA366G Dauphin II
MP 3 IAI-1124 Seascan
TPT • Light 17 Bell 212
ISR 6 RC-12D Guardrail
Naval Commandos ε300 ELINT 4: 1 EC-707; 3 Gulfstream G550 Shavit
AEW 4: 2 B-707 Phalcon; 2 Gulfstream G550 Eitam (1 more
Air Force 34,000 on order)
Responsible for Air and Space Coordination TKR/TPT 11: 4 KC-130H Hercules; 7 KC-707
TPT 58: Medium 11: 5 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130H
FORCES BY ROLE
Hercules; Light 47: 3 AT-802 Air Tractor; 9 Beech 200 King
FIGHTER & FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Air; 8 Beech 200T King Air; 5 Beech 200CT King Air; 22
1 sqn with F-15A/B/D Eagle
Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit)
1 sqn with F-15B/C/D Eagle
TRG 37: 17 Grob G-120; 20 T-6A
1 sqn with F-15I Ra’am
HELICOPTERS
7 sqn with F-16A/B/C/D Fighting Falcon
ATK 77: 33 AH-1E/F Cobra; 27 AH-64A Apache; 17 AH-
4 sqn with F-16I Sufa
64D Apache (Sarat)
(3 sqn with A-4N Skyhawk/F-4 Phantom II/Kfir C-7 in
ASW 7 AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but
reserve)
with non-rated aircrew)
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
ISR 12 OH-58B Kiowa
1 sqn with AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but
TPT 200: Heavy 38 CH-53D Sea Stallion; Medium 49: 39
with non-rated aircrew)
MARITIME PATROL/TANKER/TRANSPORT S-70A Black Hawk; 10 UH-60A Black Hawk; Light 6 Bell
1 sqn with IAI-1124 Seascan; KC-707 206 JetRanger
ELECTRONIC WARFARE UAV • ISR 26+: Heavy 4+: Hermes 450; Heron (Shoval); 4
2 sqn with RC-12D Guardrail; Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit); Heron TP (Eitan); RQ-5A Hunter; Medium 22 Searcher MkII
Beech 200 King Air; Beech 200T King Air; Beech 200CT (22+ in store); Light Harpy
King Air; AD
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL SAM 24+: 24 Arrow/Arrow 2; some Iron Dome; some MIM-
1 sqn with Gulfstream G550 Eitam; Gulfstream G550 104 Patriot; some MIM-23 I-HAWK
Shavit GUNS 920
TANKER/TRANSPORT SP 165: 20mm 105 M163 Machbet Vulcan; 23mm 60
2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules ZSU-23-4
TRAINING TOWED 755: 23mm 150 ZU-23; 20mm/37mm 455
1 OPFOR sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon M167 Vulcan towed 20mm/M-1939 towed 37mm/TCM-
1 sqn with A-4N/TA-4H/TA-4J Skyhawk 20 towed 20mm; 40mm 150 L/70
ATTACK HELICOPTER MSL
1 sqn with AH-1E/F Cobra ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-62B Walleye; AGM-65
1 sqn with AH-64A Apache Maverick; Popeye I/Popeye II; Delilah AL
1 sqn with AH-64D Apache AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; Python 4; IIR Python 5;
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER ARH Derby; AIM-120A/C AMRAAM
2 sqn with CH-53D Sea Stallion BOMB • PGM • JDAM GBU-31; Spice, Lizard, Opher,
2 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60A Black Hawk Griffon
Airfield Defence 3,000 active (15,000

reservists) Jordan JOR
Jordanian Dinar D 2010 2011 2012
Paramilitary ε8,000
GDP D 18.8bn 20.2bn
Border Police ε8,000 US$ 26.3bn 28.3bn
Cyber
Israel is widely reported to have developed capacity for Growth % 2.31 2.46
cyber operations. Some reporting has highlighted a ‘Unit Inflation % 5.0 5.4
8200’ believed to be responsible for ELINT, and reportedly Def exp D 1.02bn
cyber, operations. The IDF’s C4I Corps would also likely US$ 1.42bn
have involvement in cyber-related activity, with telecoms
Def bdgt a D 971m 971m
and EW within its purview. Meanwhile, in August 2011, a
National Cyber Directorate was created, to coordinate rel- US$ 1.36bn 1.36bn
evant agencies and expand the cyber-security of national FMA (US) US$ 300m 300m
infrastructure. US$1=D 0.71 0.71
a
Excludes expenditure on public order and safety
Foreign Forces Population 6,508,271
UNTSO unless specified. Figures represent total numbers Ethnic groups: Palestinian ε50–60%
for mission in Israel, Syria & Lebanon
Argentina 3 obs Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Australia 12 obs Male 18.1% 5.5% 4.9% 4.3% 15.6% 2.4%
Austria 7 obs Female 17.1% 5.2% 4.6% 4.2% 15.5% 2.5%
Belgium 2 obs
Canada 7 obs • 9 (Operation Proteus) USSC Capabilities
Chile 2 obs
Long-standing political accommodation with Israel
and North Africa

China 4 obs
Middle East
Denmark 11 obs means that the country does not face a major external
Estonia 2 obs threat. Jordan’s armed forces are capable of combat and
Finland 14 obs contributing to international expeditionary operations,
France 3 obs as demonstrated by the deployment of Jordanian fighter
aircraft to escort Jordanian C-130s flying humanitarian
Ireland 12 obs
aid to Libya. Jordanian special forces (SF) have served
Italy 8 obs
alongside US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan and
Malawi 1 obs
participate in various UN missions. Jordanian forces are
Nepal 3 obs
well trained, particularly their SF and aircrew, and regular
Netherlands 12 obs
exercises take place with foreign air forces.
New Zealand 7 obs
Norway 12 obs ACTIVE 100,500 (Army 88,000 Navy 500 Air 12,000)
Russia 4 obs Paramilitary 10,000
Slovakia 3 obs
Slovenia 3 obs RESERVE 65,000 (Army 60,000 Joint 5,000)
Sweden 6 obs
Switzerland 11 obs Organisations by Service
United States 1 obs • US European Command; 1 AN/
TPY-2 X-band radar at Nevatim Army 88,000
Jordan has reorganised from a divisional structure to
4 commands (Northern, Central, Eastern and Southern), a
strategic reserve and a special operations command. The
strategic reserve still has a divisional structure and special
operations command is responsible for counter terrorism
and unconventional operations. The Royal Guard also
comes under this command.
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 spec ops bde (2 SF bn, 2 AB bn, 1 AB arty bn, 1 psyops
unit)
MANOEUVRE PB 7: 3 Al Hussein (UK Vosper 30m); 4 Abdullah (US

Armoured Dauntless)
1 (strategic reserve) armd div (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde, 1
AD bde) Air Force 12,000
1 armd bde Flying hours 180 hrs/year
Mechanised
FORCES BY ROLE
5 mech bde
FIGHTER
Light
1 sqn with F-16A/B ADF Fighting Falcon
3 lt inf bde
1 sqn with Mirage F-1C/E (F-1CJ/EJ – possibly stored)
COMBAT SUPPORT
3 arty bde
2 sqn with F-5E Tiger II/F-5F Tiger II (one ISR sqn)
3 AD bde
1 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with Mirage F-1E (F-1EJ – possibly stored)
MBT 752: 390 CR1 Challenger 1 (Al Hussein); 274 FV4030/2 ISR
Khalid; 88 M60 Phoenix; (292 Tariq Centurion; 115 M60A1A3; 1 unit with Seeker SB7L
23 M47/M48A5 in store) ISR/TRANSPORT
LT TK (19 Scorpion; in store) 1 (spec ops) sqn wth SA 2-37B; EC 635; AS-350,
RECCE 153: 103 Scimitar; 50 Ferret TRANSPORT
AIFV 472: 31 BMP-2; 321 Ratel-20; ε120 YPR-765 1 sqn with Il-76MF; C-130H Hercules; CN-235; Cessna
APC 450+ 208B
APC (T) 400+: 100 M113A1; 300 M113A2 Mk1J; some 1 (Royal) flt with S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60 Black Hawk
Temsah TRAINING
PPV 50: 25 Marauder; 25 Matador 4 sqn with F-5E (OCU); T-67M Firefly; C-101 Aviojet;
ARTY 1,339 AS-350B3; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Hughes 500
SP 468: 105mm 30 M-52; 155mm 290: 270 M109A1/A2; 20 ATTACK HELICOPTER
M-44; 203mm 148 M110A2 2 sqn with AH-1F Cobra (with TOW)
TOWED 100: 105mm 72: 54 M102; 18 MOBAT; 155mm TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
28: 10 M-1/M-59; 18 M114; 203mm (4 M115 in store) 2 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; Bell 205 (UH-1H
MRL 227mm 12 HIMARS (with 432 guided msl) Iroquois)
MOR 759: AIR DEFENCE
SP 81mm 50 1 comd (5–6 bty with PAC-2 Patriot; 5 bty with I-HAWK
TOWED 709: 81mm 359; 107mm 50 M-30; 120mm 300 MIM-2BB Phase III; 6 bty with Skyguard/Aspide)
Brandt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AT • MSL 975 AIRCRAFT 115 combat capable
SP 115: 70 M901; 45 YPR-765 with Milan FTR 46: 30 F-5E/F Tiger II; 16 F-16A/B ADF Fighting Falcon
MANPATS 860: 30 Javelin (116 msl); 310 M47 Dragon; 320 FGA 69: 39 F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon; 15 Mirage F-1C
TOW/TOW-2A; 200 9K123 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan with (F-1CJ – possibly stored); 15 Mirage F-1E (F-1EJ – possibly
2,000 msl) stored)
RL 112mm 2,300 APILAS ISR 1 SA 2-37B
AD TPT 15: Heavy 2 Il-76MF Candid; Medium 4 C-130H
SAM 1,112 Hercules; Light 9: 2 C-295; 2 CN-235; 5 Cessna 208B  TRG
SP 140: 92 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 48 9K33 26: 16 T-67M Firefly; 10 C-101 Aviojet
Osa-M (SA-8 Gecko) HELICOPTERS
MANPAD 972: 250 FIM-43 Redeye; 9K32M Strela-2M ATK 25 AH-1F Cobra (TOW)
(SA-7B2 Grail); 300 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); MRH 13 EC-635 (Tpt/SAR)
240 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla/Igla-1 (SA-18 TPT 75: Medium 25: 12 AS332M Super Puma; 13 S-70A
Grouse); 182 209-OPU Dzhigit (for use with SA-18) Black Hawk; Light 50: 36 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 8
GUNS • SP 356: 20mm 100 M163 Vulcan; 23mm 40 ZSU- Hughes 500D; 6 AS350B3
23-4; 40mm 216 M-42 (not all op) AD • SAM 80+: 24 I-HAWK MIM-23B Phase III; 40 PAC-
RADAR • LAND 7 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder/AN/TPQ-37 2 Patriot
Firefinder (arty, mor) MSL
ARV 137+: Al Monjed; 55 Chieftain ARV; Centurion Mk2; 20 ASM AGM-65D Maverick; BGM-71 TOW
M47; 32 M88A1; 30 M578; YPR-806 AAM • IR AIM-9J/N/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH
MW 12 Aardrvark Mk2 AIM-7 Sparrow; R530; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
Navy ε500 Paramilitary 10,000 active

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 (+ 10 patrol Public Security Directorate ε10,000 active
boats under 10 tonnes) Ministry of Interior
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Kuwait KWT
Other
Kuwaiti Dinar D 2010 2011 2012
1 security bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GDP D 38bn 48.1bn
LT TK: Scorpion US$ 132bn 174bn
APC (W) 55+: 25+ EE-11 Urutu; 30 FV603 Saracen per capita US$ 51,841 66,974
Growth % 3.41 5.73
Reserve Organisations 60,000 reservists
Inflation % 4.1 6.2
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Def exp D 1.34bn
Armoured US$ 4.65bn
1 Royal Guard armd div with (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde, Def bdgt D 1.13bn 1.12bn
1 AD bde) US$ 3.91bn 4.05bn
Civil Militia ‘People’s Army’ ε35,000 reservists US$1=D 0.29 0.28

Men 16–65, women 16–45 Population 2,595,628
Ethnic groups: Nationals 35%; other Arab 35%; South Asian 9%;
Deployment Iranian 4%; other 17%
Afghanistan Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

Operation Enduring Freedom- Afghanistan 720; 1 ranger bn Male 13.2% 3.6% 6.6% 10.4% 25.0% 1.9%
CÔTE D’IVOIRE Female 12.7% 3.8% 5.2% 5.7% 10.7% 1.2%

UN • UNOCI 1,068; 8 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 SF coy
Capabilities
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Kuwait’s military has been transformed since its failure
UN • MONUSCO 220; 25 obs; 1 SF coy; 1 fd hospital
to prevent or deter an Iraqi invasion in 1991. A more
and North Africa

Haiti professional officer corps now exists, with better training,
Middle East
UN • MINUSTAH 612; 1 inf bn greater joint force capabilities and a higher state of
readiness. However, the force remains too small to deter
IRAQ
a resolute threat from its larger neighbours, and hence
UN • UNAMI 2 obs
the country relies on its membership of the GCC and
Liberia relationship with the US to guarantee its security.
UN • UNMIL 120; 4 obs; 1 fd hospital A close defence relationship with the US has afforded
Kuwait access to high-technology weapons systems and
South Sudan
combined training exercises. This has allowed Kuwait to
UN • UNMISS 2
develop a professional, relatively well-equipped, land-
Sudan focused force. The US maintains large bases in the country,
UN • UNAMID 7; 4 obs latterly preoccupied with managing the drawdown of
UN • UNISFA 3 obs personnel and equipment from Iraq. Kuwait’s navy is
small, with patrol boats capable of ensuring maritime
security within and defence against small flotillas entering
Kuwaiti waters. The air force regularly deploys aircraft to
GCC air exercises and flew humanitarian flights during
2011 to bring injured Libyans to Kuwait.
ACTIVE 15,500 (Army 11,000 Navy 2,000 Air 2,500)

Paramilitary 7,100
Terms of service voluntary
RESERVE 23,700 (Joint 23,700)

Terms of service obligation to age 40; 1 month annual trg
Army 11,000
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF unit (forming)
MANOEUVRE PBG 8 Um Almaradim (FRA P-37 BRL) with 2 twin lnchr

Reconnaissance with Sea Skua AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr (lnchr only)
1 mech/recce bde LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawahil
Armoured
3 armd bde Air Force 2,500
Mechanised Flying hours 210 hrs/year
2 mech inf bde
FORCES BY ROLE
Light FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 cdo bn 2 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet
Other TRANSPORT
1 (Amiri) gd bde 1 sqn with L-100-30
COMBAT SUPPORT TRAINING
1 arty bde 1 unit with EMB-312 Tucano (Tucano Mk52)*; Hawk
1 engr bde Mk64*
1 MP bn ATTACK HELICOPTER
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
1 log gp 1 atk/trg sqn with SA342 Gazelle with HOT
1 fd hospital TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AS532 Cougar; SA330 Puma; S-92
Reserve AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 1 comd (5–6 SAM bty with PAC-2 Patriot; 5 SAM bty
MANOEUVRE with MIM-23B I-HAWK Phase III; 6 SAM bty with
Mechanised Skyguard/Aspide)
1 bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 66 combat capable
MBT 293: 218 M1A2 Abrams; 75 M-84 (75 more in store) FGA 39: 31 F/A-18C Hornet; 8 F/A-18D Hornet
RECCE 11 TPz-1 Fuchs TPT • Medium 3 L-100-30
AIFV 432: 76 BMP-2; 120 BMP-3; 236 Desert Warrior (incl TRG 27: 11 Hawk Mk64*; 16 EMB-312 Tucano (Tucano
variants) Mk52)*
APC 260 HELICOPTERS
APC (T) 260: 230 M113A2; 30 M577 ATK 16 AH-64D Apache
APC (W) (40 TH 390 Fahd in store) MRH 13 SA342 Gazelle with HOT
ARTY 218 TPT 13: Medium 3 AS532 Cougar; 7 SA330 Puma; 3 S-92
SP 155mm 106: 37 M109A3; 18 (AMX) Mk F3; 51 PLZ45; MSL
(18 AU-F-1 in store) ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-84A Harpoon; AGM-
MRL 300mm 27 9A52 Smerch 114K Hellfire
MOR 78: 81mm 60; 107mm 6 M-30; 120mm ε12 RT-F1 AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH
AIM-7F Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM
AT • MSL 118+
SAM 76: 40 PAC-2 Patriot; 24 MIM-23B I-HAWK Phase III;
SP 74: 66 HMMWV TOW; 8 M901
12 Skyguard/Aspide
MANPATS 44+: 44 TOW-2; M47 Dragon
RCL 84mm ε200 Carl Gustav
AD • SAM 60+
STATIC/SHELTER 12 Aspide National Guard ε6,600 active
MANPAD 48 Starburst; Stinger
FORCES BY ROLE
GUNS • TOWED 35mm 12+ Oerlikon
SPECIAL FORCES
ARV 24+: 24 M88A1/2; Type 653A; Warrior
1 SF bn
MW Aardvark Mk2
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
Navy ε2,000 (incl 500 Coast Guard) 1 armd car bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Other
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 3 security bn
PCFG 2: COMBAT SUPPORT
1 Al Sanbouk (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin lnchr 1 MP bn
with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 Istiqlal (GER Lurssen FPB-57) with 2 twin lnchr with RECCE 20 VBL
MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun APC (W) 97+: 5+ Desert Chameleon; 70 Pandur; 22 S600
PBF 1 Al Nokatha (US Mk V Pegasus) (a further 9 on order; (incl variants)
ISD by end-2013) ARV Pandur
Coast Guard 500 with modernised ex-US M113s. US security assistance

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 continues, with initiatives in 2011 including the arrival
PBF 12 Manta late in the year of a team to conduct counter-terrorism
PB 20: 3 Al Shaheed; 4 Inttisar (Austal 31.5m); 3 Kassir training. The armed forces have also received donations of
(Austal 22m); 10 Subahi equipment from UNIFIL, the UN force in Lebanon.
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 4: 2 Al
Tahaddy; 1 Saffar; 1 other
Paramilitary 20,000
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • SPT 1 Sawahil
The number of troops can increase to 291,735 if conscripts
are recalled.
Foreign Forces
United Kingdom Army 35 Organisations by Service
United States United States Central Command: 23,000;
2 AD bty with total of 16 PAC-3 Patriot; elm 1 (APS)
Army 57,000
HBCT eqpt set (equipment in use). Remaining US log
installations and units supporting US troops in Iraq. FORCES BY ROLE

5 regional comd (Beirut, Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon,
North, South)
SPECIAL FORCES
Lebanon LBN 1 cdo regt
Lebanese Pound LP
5 SF regt
2010 2011 2012
MANOEUVRE
GDP LP 59.1tr 62.5tr Armoured
US$ 38.9bn 41.1bn 2 armd regt
per capita US$ 9,439 9,927 Mechanised
Growth % 7.50 1.50 5 mech inf bde
Inflation % 4.5 5.9 Light
6 mot inf bde
Def exp LP 2.46tn
and North Africa

Air Manoeuvre
Middle East
US$ 1.62bn 1 AB regt
Def bdgt LP 1.74tr 1.69tn 1.73tn Amphibious
US$ 1.15bn 1.11bn 1 mne cdo regt
FMA (US) US$ 100m 100m Other
1 Presidential Guard bde
US$1=LP 1,519.01 1,519.61
5 intervention regt
Population 4,143,101 2 border sy regt
Ethnic and religious groups: Christian 30%; Druze 6%; Armenian COMBAT SUPPORT
4%, excl ε300,000 Syrians and ε350,000 Palestinian refugees 2 arty regt
1 engr regt
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 MP bde
Male 11.8% 4.6% 4.8% 4.5% 19.2% 4.2% COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Female 11.2% 4.4% 4.6% 4.4% 21.5% 4.8% 1 log bde
1 med regt
Capabilities EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
The most capable armed forces in Lebanon are those of MBT 326: 233 T-54/T-55; 93 M48A1/A5
Hizbullah. These have extensively re-armed since the 2006 RECCE 54 AML
war with Israel and have sufficient rockets and missiles AIFV 16 AIFV-B-C25
to pose a significant threat to at least northern Israeli APC 1,240
territory. Although it could not prevent an attack by the APC (T) 1,164 M113A1/A2
modernised Israeli land forces, it has continued to develop APC (W) 76: 1 M3 VTT; 75 VAB VCT
its forces, fortifications and military infrastructure to ARTY 522
impose significant costs on any Israeli ground incursion. TOWED 166: 105mm 13 M101A1; 122mm 41: 8 D-30; 33
Its armed forces are more than capable of protecting its M-30 M-1938; 130mm 15 M-46; 155mm 97: 18 M114A1; 65
political position within Lebanon, where it now is part of M198; 14 Model-50
the government. Meanwhile, the Lebanese regular military MRL 122mm 22 BM-21
is able to meet internal-security requirements for those MOR 334: 81mm 134; 82mm 112; 120mm 88 Brandt
parts of the state not controlled by Hizbullah. But they are AT
not capable of countering Hizbullah influence and activity. MSL • MANPATS 38: 26 Milan; 12 TOW
The army in recent years has seen a number of inventory RCL 106mm 113 M40A1
modernisation drives, such as that to re-equip its APC fleet RL 73mm M-50; 90mm 8 M-69
AD Customs
SAM • MANPAD 84 9K32 Strela-2/2M (SA-7A Grail/SA- PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
7B Grail)‡ PB 7: 5 Aztec; 2 Tracker
GUNS • TOWED 81: 20mm 23; 23mm 58 ZU-23
ARV M113 ARV; T-54/55 ARV reported Foreign Forces
VLB MTU-72 reported
Unless specified, figures refer to UNTSO and represent
MW Bozena
total numbers for the mission in Israel, Syria & Lebanon.
UAV • ISR • Medium 8 Mohajer IV
Argentina 3 obs
Navy 1,100 Australia 12 obs
Austria 7 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Bangladesh UNIFIL 326: 1 FFG; 1 PCO
Belarus UNIFIL 3
PB 11: 1 Aamchit (GER Bremen); 1 Al Kalamoun (FRA Avel
Gwarlarn); 7 Tripoli (UK Attacker/Tracker Mk 2); 1 Naquora Belgium 2 obs • UNIFIL 99: 1 engr coy
(GER Bremen); 1 Tabarja (GER Bergen) Brazil UNIFIL 11

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCT 2 Sour (FRA Brunei UNIFIL 30
Edic – capacity 8 APC; 96 troops) Cambodia UNIFIL 217: 1 engr coy
Canada 7 obs (Op Jade)
Air Force 1,000 Chile 2 obs
3 air bases China, People’s Republic of 4 obs • UNIFIL 344: 1 engr
FORCES BY ROLE bn; 1 fd hospital
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Croatia UNIFIL 1
1 sqn with Hunter Mk6/Mk9/T66 at Rayak; Cessna AC- Cyprus UNIFIL 2
208 Combat Caravan* Denmark 11 obs • UNIFIL 151: 1 log bn
ATTACK HELICOPTER El Salvador UNIFIL 52: 1 inf pl
1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle Estonia 2 obs
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Finland 14 obs
2 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H); 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH- France 3 obs • UNIFIL 1,439: 1 mech inf BG; Leclerc; AMX-
1H); 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H) 10P; PVP; VAB; CAESAR; AU-F1; Mistral
1 sqn with AS330/IAR330SM Puma Germany UNIFIL 232: 2 PC; 1 SPT
1 trg sqn with R-44 Raven II Ghana UNIFIL 876: 1 mech inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Greece UNIFIL 52: 1 PB
AIRCRAFT 7 combat capable Guatemala UNIFIL 3
FGA 4: 3 Hunter Mk6/Mk9; 1 Hunter T66 Hungary UNIFIL 4
ISR 1 Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan* India UNIFIL 896: 1 mech inf bn; elm 1 fd hospital
TRG (3 Bulldog; could be refurbished) Indonesia UNIFIL 1,356: 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; elm 1
HELICOPTERS fd hospital
MRH 9: 1 AW139; 8 SA342L Gazelle (plus 5 Ireland 12 obs • UNIFIL 445 1 mech inf bn
unserviceable – could be refurbished); (5 SA316 Alouette Italy 8 obs • UNIFIL 1,686: 1 inf bde HQ; 1 armd recce bn;
III unserviceable – 3 could be refurbished); (1 SA318 1 armd inf bn; 1 hel bn; 1 sigs coy; 1 CIMIC coy
Alouette II unserviceable – could be refurbished) Korea, Republic of UNIFIL 369: 1 mech inf bn
TPT 29: Medium 13: 3 S-61N (fire fighting); 10 AS330/ Luxembourg UNIFIL 3
IAR330 Puma; Light 16: 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey) (11 Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of UNIFIL 1
more unserviceable); 4 R-44 Raven II (basic trg); (7 Bell
Malaysia UNIFIL 780: 1 mech inf bn
212 unserviceable – 6 could be refurbished)
Malawi 1 obs
Nepal 3 obs • UNIFIL 1,019: 1 inf bn
Netherlands 12 obs
Internal Security Force ε20,000 New Zealand 7 obs
Ministry of Interior Nigeria UNIFIL 1
FORCES BY ROLE Norway 12 obs
Other Combat Forces Portugal UNIFIL 150: 1 engr coy
1 (police) judicial unit Qatar UNIFIL 3
1 regional sy coy Russia 4 obs
1 Beirut Gendarmerie coy Serbia UNIFIL 5
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Sierra Leone UNIFIL 3
APC (W) 60 V-200 Chaimite Slovakia 3 obs
Slovenia 3 obs • UNIFIL 14; 1 inf pl transitional government controls a small number of
Spain UNIFIL 1,069: 1 mech inf bde HQ; 1 armd inf bn formations, including the Tripoli brigade. Other brigades,
Sri Lanka UNIFIL 151: 1 inf coy including the Misrata brigade, are of fluctuating size and
Sweden 6 obs organisation and are not fully under control of the new
Switzerland 11 obs government. A tank company and artillery battery appear
Tanzania UNIFIL 154; 2 MP coy extant, but there is no evidence of their use of any other
combat support.
Turkey UNIFIL 357: 1 engr coy; 1 PB
United States 1 obs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Much equipment was damaged or destroyed during the
civil war. It is not yet clear how much of Libya’s previous
Libya LBY holdings are still operational and available to the new
Libyan Dinar D 2010 2011 2012 government.
MBT some: T-72; T-62; T-55
GDP D 90.3bn -
RECCE some: BRDM-2; EE-9 Cascavel
US$ 70.2bn - AIFV some: BMP-1; BMD

per capita US$ 10,863 - APC
Growth % 4.16 - APC (T) some: M113; BTR-50/BTR-60
Inflation % 2.5 - APC (W) some: EE-11 Urutu; OT-62/OT-64
ARTY
Def exp D ε3.27bn
SP some: 122mm 2S1 Carnation; 152mm: 2S3; M-77 Dana;
US$ ε2.54bn
155mm M109; VCA 155 Palmaria
FMA (US) US$ 0.15m TOWED some: 105mm M101; 122mm D-30; D-74;
US$1=D 1.29 1.24 130mm M-46; 152mm M-1937
MRL some: 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-11; BM-21; RM-
70 Dana
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MOR some: 82mm; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160
Male 16.7% 4.6% 4.7% 4.7% 18.3% 2.2% AT • MSL
and North Africa

Female 16.0% 4.4% 4.5% 4.5% 17.1% 2.3%
SP some 9P122 BRDM-2 Sagger
Middle East
MANPATS some: 9K11 Maljutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K11
Capabilities Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); Milan
RCL some: 106mm M40A1; 84mm Carl Gustav
Although the National Transitional Council is acting AD • SAM • SP: Crotale (quad); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡;
as interim government, it is not clear that it has any 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin);
meaningful authority over the forces of the former rebels. 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
These consist of a large number of ‘brigades’, most of GUNS
which have little formal structure of command and SP 23mm some ZSU-23-4
control and vary in size from a few tens of personnel to TOWED: 14.5mm some ZPU-2; 30mm M-53/59; 40mm
several thousand. These include the relatively cohesive L/70; 57mm S-60
and capable ‘Misrata Brigade’ and the externally trained RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty)
‘Tripoli Brigade’. Several hundred foreign advisers, many MSL • TACTICAL • SSM some: FROG-7; Scud-B
from Qatar, assisted the rebel forces during the war. It ARV T-54/55 ARV
is not clear how many, if any, remain. Although only a
proportion of Gadhafi-regime weapons were destroyed
Navy (incl Coast Guard) not known
in the fighting, the rebels are mostly infantry mounted in
4×4 ‘technical’ vehicles, largely armed with anti-aircraft EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
cannon. Although it is possible to estimate remaining SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Khyber† (FSU
warships and military aircraft (many were destroyed Foxtrot) each with 10 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4 aft)
during the air campaign), it is not clear if Libya retains any PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
credible air or maritime capability. FRIGATES • FFGM 1 Al Hani† (FSU Koni) with 2 twin
lnchr (with P-15 Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 1 twin
ACTIVE not known lnchr with 9K33 Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin
RESERVE not known 406mm ASTT with USET-95 Type 40 LWT, 1 RBU 6000
Smerch 2, 2 twin 76mm gun
Organisations by Service CORVETTES • FSGM 1Tariq Ibin Ziyad (FSU Nanuchka
II) with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit-M (SS-N-2C
Army not known Styx) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with SA-N-4 Gecko SAM
FORCES BY ROLE PBFG 10:
The old Libyan army effectively ceased to exist as an 4 Al Zuara (FSU Osa II) with 4 single lnchr with P-15
organised force during the 2011 civil war. The new Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM
6 Sharaba (FRA Combattante II) with 4 single with EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 76mm gun AD
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • SAM some:
MSO 4 Ras al Gelais (FSU Natya) SP 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)/9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
AMPHIBIOUS 7 TOWED S-75 Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline)
LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 Ibn Harissa (capacity 1 SA- STATIC S-200 Angara (SA-5A Gammon); S-125
316B Alouette III hel; 11 MBT; 240 troops) Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
LANDING CRAFT 5 GUNS some
LCT 3† C107
UCAC 2 Slingsby SAH 2200
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 19: Deployment
ARS 1 Al Munjed (YUG Spasilac) Philippines
AG 10 El Temsah
IMT 3 obs
YDT 1 Al Manoud (FSU Yelva)
YTB 7
Coastal Defence Mauritania MRT

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PBF 6 Bigliari Mauritanian Ouguiya OM 2010 2011 2012
GDP OM 997bn 1.15tr
Naval Aviation US$ 3.56bn 4.04bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE per capita US$ 1,109 1,230
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Heavy SA321 Super Frelon (air
Growth % 5.19 5.11
force assets)
Inflation % 6.3 6.2
Air Force not known Def exp OM ε30.1bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ ε107m
(many non-operational, serviceability in doubt) US$1=OM 280.41 283.85
AIRCRAFT
FTR some: MiG-23 Flogger; MiG-23U Flogger; MiG-25
Foxbat; MiG-25U Foxbat Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
FGA some: MiG-21 Fishbed; MiG-23BN Flogger H; Mirage
Male 20.3% 5.3% 4.5% 3.7% 12.9% 1.5%
5DP30; Mirage F-1A (F-1AD); Mirage F-1B (F-1BD);
Mirage F-1E (F-1ED); Su-17M-2 Fitter D/Su-20 Fitter C; Female 20.1% 5.4% 4.8% 4.2% 15.2% 2.0%
Su-24MK Fencer D
ISR some MiG-25R Foxbat Capabilities
TPT some: Heavy: An-124 Condor; Il-76 Candid; Medium While Mauritania’s armed forces may be able to cope with
C-130H Hercules; G-222; L-100-20; L-100-30; Light: An-26 some internal-security contingencies, a lack of transport
Curl; L-410 Turbolet
aircraft means the military lacks mobility and deployability
TRG: G-2 Galeb; L-39ZO Albatros; SF-260WL Warrior*
across the country’s extensive territory. Force readiness
HELICOPTERS
appears low, with little combat experience.
ATK: Mi-25 Hind D; Mi-35 Hind
Much of the military’s equipment is outdated.
MRH SA316 Alouette III
Investment in new equipment is sporadic and often lacks
MRH/TPT Mi-8 Hip (med tpt)/Mi-17 Hip H
TPT: Heavy CH-47C Chinook; Light: Bell 206 Jet Ranger direction, although a focus on the air force and navy since
(AB-206); PZL Mi-2 Hoplite the 1990s has marginally improved resource-protection
MSL capabilities and light transport. Patrol craft donated
ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry); 9M17 (AT-2 Swatter) by the EU have been key to the navy’s improvement,
ARM Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) but also signal the lack of funds available for military
AAM • IR AAM R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); modernisation. Mauritania’s capabilities are inadequate
R-550 Magic) IR/SARH AAM R-40/46 (AA-6 Acrid); to secure its territory and resources; combined with the
R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex); R530 perceived regional threat from al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, this has encouraged the US to provide training
Air Defence Command to the armed forces through the Flintlock Joint Combined
Senezh (C2 system, degraded by air strikes in 2011) Exchange Training as part of the Trans-Sahara Counter-
FORCES BY ROLE terrorism Initiative.
AIR DEFENCE
Equipment includes 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)/9K33 ACTIVE 15,870 (Army 15,000 Navy 620 Air 250)
Osa (SA-8 Gecko); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-75 Paramilitary 5,000
Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon) Terms of service conscription 24 months authorised
Organisations by Service Paramilitary ε5,000 active
Army 15,000 Gendarmerie ε3,000

Ministry of Interior
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE
6 mil regions
MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE
Other
Reconnaissance 6 regional sy coy
1 armd recce sqn
Armoured National Guard 2,000
1 armd bn Ministry of Interior
Light Aux 1,000
7 mot inf bn
8 (garrison) inf bn Customs
Air Manoeuvre PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1
1 cdo/para bn Dah Ould Bah (FRA Amgram 14); 1 Yaboub Ould Rajel (FRA
Other RTB 18)
2 (camel corps) bn
1 gd bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
3 arty bn
Morocco MOR
4 ADA bty Moroccan Dirham D 2010 2011 2012
1 engr coy GDP D 767bn 815bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 90.4bn 101bn
MBT 35 T-54/T-55 per capita US$ 2,857 3,147
RECCE 70: 20 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 10 Saladin
Growth % 3.70 4.62
APC
Inflation % 1.0 1.5
and North Africa

APC (W) 25: 5 FV603 Saracen; ε20 M3 Panhard
Middle East
ARTY 194 Def bdgt D 26.9bn 27.0bn
TOWED 80: 105mm 36 HM-2/M-101A1; 122mm 44: 20 US$ 3.16bn 3.34bn
D-30; 24 D-74 FMA (US) US$ 9.0m 9.0m
MOR 114: 60mm 24; 81mm 60; 120mm 30 Brandt US$1=D 8.49 8.10
AT • MSL • MANPATS 24 Milan
RCL 114: 75mm ε24 M20; 106mm ε90 M40A1
AD • SAM 104 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SP ε4 SA-9 Gaskin (reported)
Male 14.1% 4.6% 4.7% 4.5% 18.5% 2.8%
MANPAD ε100 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Female 13.7% 4.6% 4.8% 4.7% 19.6% 3.3%
GUNS • TOWED 82: 14.5mm 28: 16 ZPU-2; 12 ZPU-
4; 23mm 20 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 57mm 12 S-60;
100mm 12 KS-19
Capabilities
ARV T-54/55 ARV reported Morocco’s armed forces are well trained, enjoying a good
relationship with the US and French militaries. The armed
Navy ε620 forces have gained extensive experience in counter-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE insurgency operations in difficult operating conditions
in the Western Sahara. This has given them expertise
in desert warfare and combined air–land operational
PCO 1 Voum-Legleita
experience, although there is little capability to launch tri-
PCC 5: 1 Abourbekr Ben Amer (FRA OPV 54); 1 Arguin; 2
service operations. The country has taken part in many
Conjera; 1 Limam El Hidran (PRC Huangpu)
peacekeeping operations, providing overseas experience for
PB 6: 1 El Nasr (FRA Patra); 4 Mandovi; 1 Yacoub Ould Rajel
thousands of its troops.
However, there has been little experience in state-on-
Air Force 250 state warfare. The military is relatively mobile, relying
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE on mechanised infantry, supported by a modest fleet of
AIRCRAFT medium-lift, fixed-wing transport aircraft and various
TPT 7: Light 6: 2 BN-2 Defender; 2 PA-31T Navajo/ transport helicopters. Air force equipment is ageing, with
Cheyenne II; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 1 Basler BT-67 the bulk of the combat fleet procured in the 1970s and
TRG 8: 4 EMB-312 Tucano; 4 SF-260E 1980s. However, this is being rectified by an order for 24
HELICOPTERS F-16 fighter aircraft that have begun delivery, one of the
MRH 3: 1 SA313B Alouette II; 2 Z-9 benefits of a closer relationship with the US since the early
2000s built amid a shared concern over non-state armed APC (T) 486: 400 M113A1/A2; 86 M577A2
threats. The navy is the least favoured and used of the APC (W) 365: 45 VAB VCI; 320 VAB VTT
three services, with a moderately sized but ageing fleet of ARTY 2,141
patrol and coastal craft that is incapable of preventing fast- SP 282: 105mm 5 Mk 61; 155mm 217: 84 M109A1/A1B;
boat smuggling across the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, 43 M109A2; 90 (AMX) Mk F3; 203mm 60 M110
the navy’s two French-built frigates have, over the past TOWED 118: 105mm 50: 30 L118 Light Gun; 20 M101;
decade, provided a much-improved sea-control capability. 130mm 18 M-46; 155mm 50: 30 FH-70; 20 M114
Morocco is a partner in the FREMM frigate programme. MRL 35 BM-21
MOR 1,706
ACTIVE 195,800 (Army 175,000 Navy 7,800 Air SP 56: 106mm 32–36 M106A2; 120mm 20 (VAB APC)
13,000) Paramilitary 50,000 TOWED 1,650: 81mm 1,100 Expal model LN; 120mm
Terms of service conscription 18 months authorised; most 550 Brandt
enlisted personnel are volunteers AT • MSL 790
RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) SP 80 M-901
MANPATS 710: 40 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 440
Terms of service obligation to age 50

M47 Dragon; 80 Milan; 150 TOW
RCL 106mm 350 M40A1
Organisations by Service RL 700: 66mm 500 M72 LAW; 89mm 200 M20
GUNS 36
Army ε75,000; 100,000 conscript (total SP 100mm 8 SU-100
175,000) TOWED 90mm 28 M-56
FORCES BY ROLE UAV • Heavy R4E-50 Skyeye
2 comd (Northern Zone, Southern Zone) AD • SAM 119
MANOEUVRE SP 49: 12 2K22M Tunguska-M (SA-19 Grison)
Armoured SPAAGM; 37 M-48 Chaparral
12 armd bn MANPAD 70 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Mechanised GUNS 407
3 mech inf bde SP 60 M-163 Vulcan
Mechanised/Light TOWED 347: 14.5mm 200: 150-180 ZPU-2; 20 ZPU-
8 mech/mot inf regt (2–3 bn) 4; 20mm 40 M-167 Vulcan; 23mm 75-90 ZU-23-2;
Light 100mm 17 KS-19
1 lt sy bde RADAR • LAND: RASIT (veh, arty)
3 (camel corps) mot inf bn ARV 48+: 10 Greif; 18 M88A1; M578; 20 VAB-ECH
35 lt inf bn
4 cdo unit Navy 7,800 (incl 1,500 Marines)
Air Manoeuvre EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 para bde PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS
2 AB bn FRIGATES 3
Mountain FFGH 2 Mohammed V (FRA Floreal) with 2 single lnchr
1 mtn inf bn with MM-38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS-
COMBAT SUPPORT 565SA Panther)
11 arty bn FFGHM 1 SIGMA with 2 sextuple lnchr with MICA
7 engr bn SAM, 4 single lnchr with MM-40 Exocet Block II AShM,
1 AD bn 2 triple 324 mm ASTT with Mu-90 LWT, 1 76mm gun
(two more in trials; expected ISD 2012)
Royal Guard 1,500 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 49
FORCES BY ROLE CORVETTES • FSGM 1
MANOEUVRE 1 Lt Col Errhamani (ESP Descubierto) with 2 twin lnchr
Other with MM-38 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr
1 gd bn with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46
1 cav sqn LWT, 1 76mm gun
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PSO 1 Bin an Zaran (OPV 70) with 1 76mm gun (three
MBT 380: 40 T-72, 220 M60A1; 120 M60A3; (ε200 M48A5 more in build; expected ISDs 2012-14)
in store) PCG 4 Cdt El Khattabi (ESP Lazaga 58m) with 4 single
LT TK 116: 5 AMX-13; 111 SK-105 Kuerassier lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
RECCE 384: 38 AML-60-7; 190 AML-90; 80 AMX-10RC; PCO 5 Rais Bargach (under control of fisheries dept)
40 EBR-75; 16 Eland; 20 M1114 HMMWV PCC 12:
AIFV 70: 10 AMX-10P; 30 MK III-20 Ratel-20; 30 MK III- 4 El Hahiq (DNK Osprey 55, incl 2 with customs)
90 Ratel-90 6 LV Rabhi (ESP 58m B-200D)
APC 851 2 Okba (FRA PR-72) each with 1 76mm gun
PB 26: 6 El Wacil (FRA P-32); 10 VCSM (RPB 20); 10 15 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130H Hercules (with side-looking
Rodman 101 radar); Light 21: 4 Beech 100 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King
AMPHIBIOUS 6 Air; 1 Beech 200C King Air; 2 Beech 300 King Air; 3 Beech
LANDING SHIPS 4: 350 King Air; 7 CN-235; 2 Do-28; PAX 9: 1 B-737BBJ; 2
LSM 3 Ben Aicha (FRA Champlain BATRAL) (capacity 7 Falcon 20; 2 Falcon 20 (ELINT); 1 Falcon 50 (VIP); 1
tanks; 140 troops) Gulfstream II (VIP); 1 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream V-SP
LST 1 Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdallah (US Newport)
TRG 64: 12 AS-202 Bravo; 19 Alpha Jet*; 2 CAP-10; 8 T-6C
(capacity 3 LCVP; 400 troops)
Texan; 9 T-34C Turbo Mentor; 14 T-37B Tweet
LANDING CRAFT 2
HELICOPTERS
LCM 1 CTM (FRA CTM-5)
LCU 1 Lt Malghah (FRA Edic) MRH 19 SA342L Gazelle (7 with HOT, 12 with cannon)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4: TPT 70: Heavy 7 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 24 SA330
AK 2; AGOR 1 (US lease); YDT 1 Puma; Light 39: 25 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 11 Bell 206 Jet
Ranger (AB-206); 3 Bell 212 (AB-212)
Marines 1,500 MSL
FORCES BY ROLE ASM AGM-62B Walleye (for F-5E); HOT

MANOEUVRE AAM • IR AIM-9B/D/J Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH
Amphibious R530
2 naval inf bn
Naval Aviation Paramilitary 50,000 active

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Gendarmerie Royale 20,000
HELICOPTERS • ASW/ASUW 3 AS-565SA Panther
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Air Force 13,000
Air Manoeuvre
Flying hours 100 hrs/year on Mirage F-1/F-5A Freedom
1 para sqn
Fighter/F-5E Tiger
Other
FORCES BY ROLE
and North Africa

1 paramilitary bde
Middle East
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 (mobile) paramilitary gp
2 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II 1 coast guard unit
1 sqn (forming) with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mirage F-1C (F-1CH)
1 sqn
1 sqn with Mirage F-1E (F-1EH)
ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with EC-130H Hercules; Falcon 20 (ELINT) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PB33
MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT • TRG 2 R-235 Guerrier
1 flt with Do-28 HELICOPTERS
TANKER/TRANSPORT MRH 14: 3 SA-315B Lama; 2 SA-316 Alouette III; 3 SA-
1 sqn with C-130/KC-130H Hercules 318 Alouette II; 6 SA-342K Gazelle
TRANSPORT TPT 8: Medium 6 SA-330 Puma; Light 2 SA-360
1 sqn with CN-235 Dauphin
1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; Beech 200/300 King Air; Falcon
50; Gulfstream II/III/V-SP Force Auxiliaire 30,000 (incl 5,000 Mobile
TRAINING  Intervention Corps)
1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
ATTACK HELICOPTER Customs/Coast Guard
1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle (Some with HOT) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PB 49: 4 Erraid; 18 Arcor 46; 15 Arcor 53; 12 (other SAR
1 sqn with Bell 205A (AB-205A); Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB- craft)
206); Bell 212 (AB-212)
1 sqn with CH-47D Chinook
1 sqn with SA330 Puma Deployment
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE CÔTE D’IVOIRE
AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable
UN • UNOCI 726; 1 inf bn
FTR 22: 19 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F Tiger II
FGA 31: 4 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon; 16 Mirage F-1C Democratic Republic of the Congo
(F-1CH); 11 Mirage F-1E (F-1EH) UN • MONUSCO 848; 5 obs; 1 mech inf bn; 1 fd hospital
ELINT 2 EC-130H Hercules
TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules Serbia
TPT 49: Medium 19: 2 C-27J Spartan (2 more on order); NATO • KFOR 158; 1 inf coy
Light
Oman OMN 1 inf bde (5 inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 fd engr regt, 1 engr
regt, 1 sigs regt)
Omani Rial R 2010 2011 2012
1 inf bde (3 inf regt, 2 arty regt)
GDP R 22.2bn 25.7bn 1 indep inf coy (Musandam Security Force)
US$ 57.5bn 66.6bn Air Manoeuvre
per capita US$ 19,386 21,983 1 AB regt
Growth % 4.11 4.35 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 ADA regt (2 ADA bty)
Inflation % 3.3 3.8
Def bdgt R 1.62bn 1.65bn 1 tpt regt
US$ 4.18bn 4.27bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FMA (US) US$ 11.85m 13.0m MBT 117: 38 CR2 Challenger 2; 6 M-60A1; 73 M-60A3
US$1=R 0.39 0.39 LT TK 37 Scorpion
RECCE 137: 13 Sultan; 124 VBL
APC 206
Expatriates: 27% APC (T) 16: 6 FV 103 Spartan; 10 FV4333 Stormer
APC (W) 190: 175 Piranha (incl variants); 15 AT-105 Saxon
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ARTY 233
Male 16.0% 5.2% 5.6% 6.3% 20.3% 1.6% SP 155mm 24 G-6
Female 15.2% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 13.6% 1.5% TOWED 108: 105mm 42 ROF lt; 122mm 30 D-30; 130mm
24: 12 M-46; 12 Type-59-I; 155mm 12 FH-70
Capabilities MOR 101: 81mm 69; 107mm 20 M-30; 120mm 12 Brandt
AT • MSL 88
Oman’s armed forces are relatively capable and, although
SP 8 VBL (TOW)
small in comparison to larger regional neighbours, the MANPATS 80: 30 Javelin; 32 Milan; 18 TOW/TOW-2A
military is well-staffed given the country’s population, RL 73mm RPG-7 Knout; 94mm LAW-80
with a strong history of cooperation and training with the AD • SAM 74+
UK armed forces. It retains an effective inventory handled SP 20: up to 12 Pantsyr S1E SPAAGM; 8 Mistral 2
by well-trained personnel. Despite a lack of warfighting MANPAD 54: 20 Javelin; 34 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
experience it maintains a good state of readiness. GUNS 26: 23mm 4 ZU-23-2; 35mm 10 GDF-005 (with
The armed forces have remained well funded. This has Skyguard); 40mm 12 L/60 (Towed)
ensured a steady flow of new equipment, primarily from ARV 11: 4 Challenger; 2 M88A1; 2 Piranha; 3 Samson
the UK and the US, to maintain military effectiveness.
Although focused on territorial defence, there is some Navy 4,200
versatility of roles within the military, with a small EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
amphibious capability, a relatively high proportion of SUBMARINES • SWIMMER DELIVERY VEHICLES 2
airlift and modest sealift and the Royal Guard brigade, Mk 8
which reports directly to the sultan and carries out internal PRIMARY SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
security and ceremonial functions. FFGHM 1 Al-Shamikkh with 2 quadruple lnchr with MM-
40 Exocet Block III AShM, 2 sextuple lnchr with VL MICA
However, there are capability gaps, such as anti-
SAM, 1 76mm gun
submarine warfare, and greater training and equipment
(particularly ISR systems) are required to cope more
CORVETTES • FSGM 2
effectively with security issues such as smuggling across 2 Qahir Al Amwaj with 2 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet
the Strait of Hormuz. Oman is a GCC member. AShM, 2 triple 324mm TT (to be fitted), 1 octuple lnchr
ACTIVE 42,600 (Army 25,000 Navy 4,200 Air with Crotale SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
PCFG 4 Dhofar with 2 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet
5,000 Foreign Forces 2,000 Royal Household 6,400)
AShM, 1 76mm gun
Paramilitary 4,400 PCC 3 Al Bushra (FRA P-400) with 4 single 406mm TT, 1
76mm gun
Organisations by Service PB 4 Seeb (UK Vosper 25m, under 100 tonnes)
AMPHIBIOUS 6
LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Nasr el Bahr (with hel deck)
Army 25,000
(capacity 7 tanks; 240 troops)
FORCES BY ROLE LANDING CRAFT 5: 1 LCU; 3 LCM; 1 LCT
(Regt are bn size) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
MANOEUVRE AK 1 Al Sultana
Armoured AKSH 1 Fulk Al Salamaf
1 armd bde (2 armd regt, 1 recce regt) AGHS 1
AP 2 Shinas (Commercial Tpt - Auxiliary military role Royal Yacht Squadron 150
only) (capacity 56 veh; 200 tps) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • MISC
AX 1 Al Mabrukah (with hel deck, also used in OPV role) BOATS/CRAFT • DHOW 1 Zinat Al Bihaar
AXS 1 Shabab Oman LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3
YAC 2 RY 2: 1 Al Said; 1 (Royal Dhow)
TPT 1 Fulk Al Salamah (also veh tpt) with up to 2 AS332
Air Force 5,000 Super Puma hel
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Royal Flight 250
1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon; AIRCRAFT • TPT • PAX 5: 2 B-747SP; 1 DC-8-73CF; 2
1 sqn with Hawk Mk103; Hawk Mk203 Gulfstream IV
2 sqn with Jaguar S (OS)/Jaguar B (OB) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 6: 3 SA330 (AS330)
TRANSPORT Puma; 2 AS332F Super Puma; 1 AS332L Super Puma
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules;
1 sqn with SC.7 3M Skyvan (7 radar-equipped, for MP) Paramilitary 4,400 active
TRAINING
1 sqn with MFI-17B Mushshak; PC-9*; AB-206 Tribal Home Guard 4,000
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER org in teams of ε100
3 (med) sqn with Bell 205 (AB-205) Jet Ranger; Bell 212
(AB-212); Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR)
Police Coast Guard 400
AIR DEFENCE
PCO 2 Haras
2 sqn with Rapier; Blindfire; S713 Martello
PBF 23: 20 Cougar Enforcer 33; 3 Mk V Pegasus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PB 31: 5 Vosper 75; 1 CG27; 3 CG29; 1 P1903; 14 Rodman
AIRCRAFT 54 combat capable 58; 2 D59116; 5 Zahra
FGA 26: 8 F-16C Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Block
50 Fighting Falcon; 12 Jaguar S (OS); 2 Jaguar B (OB) Police Air Wing
TPT 12: Medium 3 C-130H Hercules; Light 7 SC.7 3M AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T Turbine Islander; 2
Skyvan (7 radar-equipped, for MP); PAX 2 A320-300 CN-235M; 1 Do-228
and North Africa

TRG 36: 4 Hawk Mk103*; 12 Hawk Mk203*; 8 MFI-17B HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 205A; 3 Bell
Middle East
Mushshak; 12 PC-9* 214ST (AB-214ST)
HELICOPTERS
MRH 15 Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR)
TPT 31: Medium 6 NH-90 (20 on order); Light 25: 19 Bell
Foreign Forces
205 (AB-205); 3 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 212 United Kingdom Army 40; Navy 20; Air Force 20; 1
(AB-212) Tristar tkr; 1 Sentinel
AD • SAM 40 Rapier
RADAR • LAND 6+: 6 Blindfire; S713 Martello
MSL Palestinian Territories PT
AAM • IR AIM-9N/M/P Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C
AMRAAM New Israeli Shekel NS 2010 2011 2012
ASM 20 AGM-84D Harpoon; AGM-65 Maverick GDP US$
per capita US$
Royal Household 6,400
Growth %
(incl HQ staff)
Inflation %
FORCES BY ROLE 
SPECIAL FORCES US$1=NS 3.74 3.55
2 SF regt *definitive economic data unavailable
Royal Guard bde 5,000 Population 4,225,710
FORCES BY ROLE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

MANOEUVRE
Male 18.4% 5.9% 5.2% 4.2% 15.7% 1.5%
Light
1 gd bde (2 gd regt, 1 armd sqn, 1 cbt spt bn) Female 17.4% 5.6% 4.9% 4.0% 15.0% 2.2%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LT TK 9 VBC-90
Capabilities
APC (W) 73: ε50 Type-92; 14 VAB VCI; 9 VAB VDAA The Palestinian Authority’s National Security Force is a
ARTY • MRL 122mm 6 Type-90A paramilitary organisation intended to provide internal se-
AT • MSL • MANPATS Milan curity support within Gaza and the West Bank. However,
AD • SAM • MANPAD 14 Javelin since 2007 the Gaza strip has been run by Hamas, which
GUNS • SP 9: 20mm 9 VAB VDAA seems to be transitioning from solely a terror group to a
paramilitary guerrilla organisation. This includes improve-

ments to its command and control structure, the acquisi- Qatar QTR
tion of better weapons and the creation of a training pro-
Qatari Riyal R 2010 2011 2012
gramme. The Hamas military wing, Izz al-Din al-Qassam,
is seen by the organisation as its best-trained and most-dis- GDP R 463bn 630bn
ciplined force. It was deployed against Fatah in June 2007 US$ 127bn 173bn
and it will bear the brunt of any engagement with the IDF, per capita US$ 73,912 93,554
as during Operation Cast Lead in 2008. It relies on weapons
Growth % 16.64 18.75
smuggling and domestic manufacture, and rockets con-
tinue to be fired from Gaza into Israel. Inflation % -2.4 2.3
Def exp R 11.4bn 12.6bn
ACTIVE 0 Paramilitary 56,000 US$ 3.12bn 3.45bn
Precise personnel strength figures for the various
Palestinian groups are not known US$1=R 3.65 3.64
Organisations by Service Ethnic groups: Nationals 25%; Expatriates 75% of which Indian
18%; Iranian 10%; Pakistani 18%
There are few data available on the status of the organisa-
tions mentioned below. Following internal fighting in June Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
2007, Gaza is under the de facto control of Hamas, while
Male 11.2% 4.1% 5.3% 7.8% 37.1% 0.9%
the West Bank is controlled by the emergency Palestinian
Authority administration. Female 10.5% 3.0% 3.0% 3.1% 13.3% 0.6%
Paramilitary Capabilities
Qatar maintains a small military with limited capability,
National Forces ε56,000 (reported) although its equipment is relatively modern and its forces
GENERAL SECURITY are well trained and motivated. As with other small Gulf
Presidential security 3,000 states, Qatar relies on its international alliances, primarily
SF 1,200 with the US and through the GCC, to guarantee its security.
Police 9,000 However, a high proportion of government spending goes
to defence, so the Qatari military has been able to maintain
Preventative Security n.k.
an adequate defence capability despite its small size. Some
Civil Defence 1,000 equipment, particularly main battle tanks and fast missile
AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; craft, are ageing, but high-technology weapons, such as
Stinger reported Exocet anti-ship missiles, make these platforms capable
The Al-Aqsa Brigades profess loyalty to the Fatah group of fulfilling their primary role of border and maritime
that dominates the Palestinian Authority. The strength of security.
this group is not known. The armed forces suffer from a number of capability
Hamas groupings include internal-security groupings gaps, particularly in air defence, and the age of some
such as the Executive Force (est strength: 10–12,000; major equipment may hamper its ability to perform in high-
equipment include: artillery rockets, mortars, SALW) and tempo operations. A substantial boost to spending and
the al-Qassam Brigades (est strength: 10,000; major equip- procurement is unlikely without a more immediate external
ment include: mines and IEDs, artillery rockets, mortars, stimulus. However, the air force has seen investment in
SALW) recent years, with the arrival of C-17 transports, which
– along with Mirage 2000 aircraft – were deployed on
operations over Libya to enforce UNSCR 1973. Later in the
year, the chief of staff also admitted that Qatar deployed
‘hundreds’ of ground troops to conduct liaison duties.
Army 8,500
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF coy
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 AT bn, 1 mor sqn)
Mechanised TRANSPORT
3 mech inf bn 1 sqn with C-17; C-130J (4 on order, delivery to begin by
Light end 2011)
1 (Royal Guard) bde (3 inf regt) 1 sqn with A-340; B-707; B-727; Falcon 900
COMBAT SUPPORT ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 fd arty bn 1 ASuW sqn with Commando Mk3 with Exocet;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SA342L Gazelle with HOT
MBT 30 AMX-30 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
RECCE 68: 12 AMX-10RC; 20 EE-9 Cascavel; 12 Ferret; 8 Some sqn with Commando Mk2A; Commando Mk2C;
V-150 Chaimite; 16 VBL AW139; SA341 Gazelle
AIFV 40 AMX-10P EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC 226 AIRCRAFT 18 combat capable
APC (T) 30 AMX-VCI FGA 12: 9 Mirage M-2000ED; 3 Mirage M-2000D
APC (W) 196: 36 Piranha II; 160 VAB TPT 8: Heavy 2 C-17 Globemaster; Medium (4 C-130J on
ARTY 89 order); PAX 6: 1 A340; 2 B-707; 1 B-727; 2 Falcon 900
SP 155mm 28 (AMX) Mk F3 TRG 6 Alpha Jet*

TOWED 155mm 12 G-5 HELICOPTERS
MRL 4 ASTROS II ASuW 8 Commando Mk3
MOR 45 MRH 34: 21 AW139 being delivered; 2 SA341 Gazelle; 11
SP • 81mm 4 VAB VPM 81 SA342L Gazelle
81mm 26 L16 TPT • Medium 4: 3 Commando Mk2A; 1 Commando Mk2C
120mm 15 Brandt AD • SAM 75: 24 Mistral
AT • MSL 148 SP 9 Roland II
SP 24 VAB VCAC HOT MANPAD 42: 10 Blowpipe; 12 FIM-92A Stinger; 20 9K32
MANPATS 124: 24 HOT; 100 Milan Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
RCL 84mm ε40 Carl Gustav MSL
ARV 3: 1 AMX-30D; 2 Piranha ASM AM-39 Exocet; Apache; HOT
AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; ARH Mica
and North Africa

Navy 1,800 (incl Marine Police)
Middle East
1 HQ located at Doha Deployment
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 LEBANON
PCFG 7: UN • UNIFIL 3
4 Barzan (UK Vita) with 2 quad lnchr with MM-40
Exocet AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 Foreign Forces
76mm gun
United Kingdom Air Force: 4 C-130J
3 Damsah (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad lnchr with
United States US Central Command: 678; elm 1 (APS)
MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
HBCT set (equipment in use); USAF CAOC
PB 3 Q-31 series
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCT 1 Rabha
(capacity 3 MBT; 110 troops)
Marine Police
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PBF 4 DV 15
PB 7: 4 Crestitalia MV-45; 3 Halmatic M160
Coastal Defence
FORCES BY ROLE
MISSILE
1 bty with 3 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MSL • AShM Some MM-40 Exocet AShM
Air Force 1,500

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER & FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
1 sqn with Mirage M-2000ED; Mirage M-2000D

Saudi Arabia SAU 20,000 Air Defence 16,000 Industrial Security Force
Saudi Riyal R 2010 2011 2012 9,000 National Guard 100,000) Paramilitary 15,500
GDP R 1.68tr 2.10tr
US$ 447bn 559bn Organisations by Service
per capita US$ 17,373 21,402
Growth % 4.15 6.47 Army 75,000
Inflation % 5.4 5.4 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Def exp R 170bn
Armoured
US$ 45.2bn 3 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 tk bn, 1 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn,
Def bdgt a R 170bn ε173bn 1 AD bn, 1 AT bn,1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1
US$ 45.2bn ε46.2bn med coy)
Mechanised
US$1=R 3.76 3.75

5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 1 tk bn, 3 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn,
a
Defence and security budget 1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1
Population 26,131,703 med coy)
Light
Ethnic groups: Nationals 73% of which Bedouin up to 10%, Shia
1 (Royal Guard) regt (3 lt inf bn)
6%, Expatriates 27% of which Asians 20%, Arabs 6%, Africans 1%,
Europeans <1% Air Manoeuvre
1 AB bde (2 AB bn, 3 SF coy)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Aviation
Male 15.1% 5.0% 5.7% 6.0% 21.5% 1.5% 1 comd (1 atk hel bde, 1 tpt hel bde)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Female 14.4% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 15.5% 1.4%
1 arty bde (5 fd arty bn, 2 MRL bn, 1 msl bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities
MBT 565: 115 M1A2 Abrams (200 more in store); 450
Saudi Arabia has the best-equipped military forces in the M60A3; (145 AMX-30 in store)
Gulf region, and is a GCC member. The Saudi inventory is RECCE 300 AML-60/AML-90
generally more modern and better maintained than its neigh- AIFV 780: 380 AMX-10P; 400 M2 Bradley
bours’. However, coordination and cooperation between the APC 1,800
regular armed forces remains poor and decision-making at APC (T) 1,650 M113A1/A2/A3 (incl variants)
the highest levels is hampered by inter-service competition APC (W) 150 M3 Panhard; (ε40 AF-40-8-1 Al-Fahd in store)
as well as the age and infirmity of senior ministers. ARTY 855
Air force priorities are air defence and deterrence, not SP 155mm 170: 60 AU-F-1; 110 M109A1B/A2
expeditionary air operations. The same is true of the less TOWED 50: 105mm (100 M101/M102 in store); 155mm
well equipped naval forces. The land forces are configured 50 M114 (40 FH-70; 27 M198 in store); 203mm (8 M115
militarily and geographically to meet threats such as in store)
instability at key borders. The ability of the armed forces MRL 60 ASTROS II
to effectively utilise its advanced inventory was questioned MOR 437
by operations against Houthi rebels in late 2009 and early SP 220: 81mm 70; 107mm 150 M30
2010; these appeared to demonstrate the capabilities of TOWED 217: 81mm/107mm 70 incl M30 120mm 147:
the air force, but land forces reportedly struggled to fight 110 Brandt; 37 M12-1535
effectively in the mountainous terrain of the south. Saudi AT • MSL 2,240+
Arabia relies on overseas partners to ultimately guarantee SP 290+: 90+ AMX-10P (HOT); 200 VCC-1 ITOW
its security in the face of any substantial threats and assist MANPATS 1950: 1,000 M47 Dragon; 950 TOW-2A
its military development. The Saudi armed forces retain a RCL 450: 84mm 300 Carl Gustav; 106mm 50 M40A1;
good relationship with overseas militaries, in particular the 90mm 100 M67
US, the UK and France, which affords combined training RL 112mm ε200 APILAS
possibilities as well as access to equipment. AD • SAM 1,000+
The country’s air-defence network is extensive and SP Crotale
highly capable. Meanwhile, the armed forces require a MANPAD 1,000: 500 FIM-43 Redeye; 500 FIM-92A Stinger
range of lift to be able to deploy across the country. Airlift RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder/AN/TPQ-37
capability is good, meaning a moderate power-projection Firefinder (arty, mor)
capability exists, but sealift is inadequate to sustain a MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 10+ CSS-2 (40 msl)
large force overseas for any period of time. The National AEV 15 M728
Guard was the primary contributor to the Peninsula Shield ARV 283+: 8 ACV ARV; AMX-10EHC; 55 AMX-30D; Leclerc
Force that entered Bahrain in March 2011, but given the ARV; 130 M88A1; 90 M578
proximity of the island to the country, no significant VLB 10 AMX-30
support or sustainment is necessary. MW Aardvark Mk2
HELICOPTERS FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

ATK 12 AH-64 Apache 2 sqn with F-15S Eagle;
MRH 21: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2 (medevac); 15 Bell 406CS 3 sqn with Tornado IDS; Tornado GR1A
Combat Scout 2 sqn with Typhoon (1 training/OCU, second unit
TPT • Medium 34: 12 S-70A-1 Desert Hawk; 22 UH-60A forming)
Black Hawk (4 medevac) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with E-3A Sentry
Navy 13,500 TANKER
Navy HQ at Riyadh; Eastern Fleet HQ at Jubail; Western
Some sqn with KC-130H Hercules (tkr/tpt); KE-3A
Fleet HQ at Jeddah
(1 sqn due to begin forming 2011 with A330 MRTT)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRANSPORT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Al Riyadh with 2 quad 3 sqn with C-130E Hercules; C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30
lnchr with MM-40 Exocet Block II AShM, 2 8-cell VLS Hercules; CN-235; L-100-30HS (hospital ac); VC-130H
with Aster 15 SAM, 4 single 533mm TT with F17P HWT, (VIP)
1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS365N Dauphin 2 hel) TRAINING

FRIGATES • FFGHM 4 Madina (FRA F-2000) with 2 3 sqn with Hawk Mk65*; Hawk Mk65A*
quad lnchr with Otomat Mk 2 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with 1 sqn with Jetstream Mk31
Crotale SAM, 4 single 533mm ASTT with F17P HWT, 1 Some sqn with MFI-17 Mushshak
100mm gun (capacity 1 AS365N Dauphin 2 hel) 1 sqn with Cessna 172
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 30 2 sqn with PC-9
CORVETTES • FSG 4 Badr (US Tacoma) with 2 quad TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple
2 sqn with AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell
324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun
412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR): AS-61A-4
PCFG 9 Al Siddiq (US 58m) with 2 twin Mk140 lnchr with
RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PB 17 (US Halter Marine) AIRCRAFT 296 combat capable
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 FTR 82: 57 F-15C Eagle; 25 F-15D Eagle
and North Africa

MCC 4 Addriyah (US MSC-322) FGA 163: 71 F-15S Eagle; 70 Tornado IDS; 22 Typhoon
Middle East
MHC 3 Al Jawf (UK Sandown) ISR 10 Tornado GR1A*
AMPHIBIOUS 8 AEW&C 5 E-3A Sentry
LCU 4 1610 (capacity 120 troops) ELINT 3: 2 RE-3A/1 RE-3B
LCM 4 LCM 6 (capacity 80 troops) TKR/TPT 7 KC-130H Hercules
TKR 8: 7 KE-3A, 1 A330 MRTT (total of 6 on order)
AORH 2 Boraida (mod FRA Durance) (capacity either 2
TPT 53 Medium 35: 29 C-130H; 2 C-130H-30 Hercules; 4
AS365F Dauphin 2 hel or 1 AS332C Super Puma)
YAC 2 L-100-30HS (hospital ac); Light 18: 13 Cessna 172; 4 CN-
YTB 2 235; 1 Jetstream Mk31
YTM 11 Radhwa TRG 101: 25 Hawk Mk65* (incl aerobatic team); 16 Hawk
Mk65A*; 20 MFI-17 Mushshak; 40 PC-9
Naval Aviation HELICOPTERS
HELICOPTERS MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR)
MRH 34: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2; 15 AS565 with AS-15TT TPT 30: Medium 10 AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Light 20: 20
AShM; 13 Bell 406CS Combat Scout
Bell 212 (AB-212)
TPT • Medium 12 AS332F Super Puma/AS532B Super
MSL
Puma with AM-39 Exocet AShM
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
Marines 3,000 AShM Sea Eagle
FORCES BY ROLE LACM Storm Shadow
MANOEUVRE ARM ALARM
Amphibious AAM • IR AIM-9P/AIM-9L Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7
1 inf regt with (2 inf bn) Sparrow; AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (W) 140 BMP-600P Royal Flt
AIRCRAFT • TPT 20; Medium 4 VC-130H; Light 3: 1
Air Force 20,000 Cessna 310; 2 Learjet 35; PAX 13: 1 B-737-200; 2 B-747SP; 4
FORCES BY ROLE BAe-125-800; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 A340; 2 Boeing 737-BBJ;
FIGHTER 1 Gulfstream GIV
1 sqn with F-15S Eagle HELICOPTERS • TPT 3+; Medium 3: 2 AS-61; 1 S-70
4 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle Black Hawk; Light Some Bell 212 (AB-212)
Air Defence Forces 16,000 18 harbour def units

Some coastal def units
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT
AIR DEFENCE
Some MP units
16 bty with PAC-2; 17 bty with Shahine/AMX-30SA; 16
bty with MIM-23B I-HAWK; 73 units (static defence) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
with Crotale/Shahine HELICOPTERS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ASW 6 AS332F Super Puma with AM-39 Exocet AShM
AD • SAM 1,805 TPT • Medium 6 AS332B Super Puma
SP 581: 40 Crotale; 400 FIM-92A Avenger; 73 Shahine; 68
Coast Guard 4,500
Crotale/Shahine
TOWED 224: 128 MIM-23B I-HAWK; 96 PAC-2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANPAD 500 FIM-43 Redeye PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53 (100+
NAVAL 500 Mistral small patrol boats are also in service)
GUNS 1,070 PBF 6: 4 Al Jouf; 2 Sea Guard
PB 47: 39 Simonneau; 6 StanPatrol 2606; 2 Al Jubatel
SP 942: 20mm 92 M163 Vulcan; 30mm 850 AMX-30SA

TOWED 128: 35mm 128 GDF Oerlikon; 40mm (150 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8: 3 UCAC; 5
L/70 in store) LCAC Griffin 8000
RADARS • AD RADAR 80: 17 AN/FPS-117; 28 AN/TPS- LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4: 1 AXL; 3 AO (small)
43; AN/TPS-59; 35 AN/TPS-63; AN/TPS-70
General Civil Defence Administration Units
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 10 Boeing Vertol 107
Industrial Security Force 9,000+
The force is part of a new security system that will Special Security Force 500
incorporate surveillance and crisis management. APC (W): UR-416
National Guard 75,000 active; 25,000 (tribal

levies) (total 100,000) Deployment
FORCES BY ROLE BAHRAIN
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised GCC • Peninsula Shield ε1,000 (SANG)
3 mech bde (4 combined arms bn)
Light Foreign Forces
5 inf bde (3 combined arms bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)
Other United States US Central Command: 435
1 (ceremonial) cav sqn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECCE 450 LAV-25 Coyote Syria SYR
AIFV 1,117 IFV-25
Syrian Pound S£ 2010 2011 2012
APC • APC (W) 1,410: 1,120 Piranha II; 290 V-150 Commando
(810 in store) GDP S£ 2.76tr 3.02tr
ARTY US$ 58.3bn 62.1bn
TOWED 108: 105mm 50 M102; 155mm 58 M198 per capita US$ 2,624 2,760
MOR 81mm
Growth % 3.23 -2.02
AT • MSL • MANPATS 116+: 116 TOW-2A (2,000 msl);
M47 Dragon Inflation % 4.4 6.0
RCL • 106mm M40A1 Def exp S£ 109bn
AD • GUNS • TOWED 160: 20mm 30 M167 Vulcan; 90mm US$ 2.3bn
130 M2 Def bdgt S£ 89.5bn 100bn
ARV LAV-R ARV; V-150 ARV; Piranha ARV reported
US$ 1.89bn 2.06bn
US$1=S£ 47.43 48.51
Paramilitary 15,500+ active
Border Guard 10,500
FORCES BY ROLE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Subordinate to Ministry of Interior. HQ in Riyadh. 9 Male 18.1% 5.6% 5.4% 4.7% 15.4% 1.7%
subordinate regional commands Female 17.2% 5.3% 5.1% 4.5% 15.1% 2.0%
MANOEUVRE
Other Capabilities
Some mobile def (long range patrol/spt) units
2 border def (patrol) units The Syrian armed forces have spent much of 2011 engaged
12 infrastructure def units in internal security activities and brutal armed repression
of protesters. Elite units have demonstrated loyalty 1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with SS-21)
to the Assad regime and ruthlessness in suppressing 1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with Scud-B/C)
demonstrators. Conventional army units, seen as less
reliable, have been kept away from the centres of dissent. Reserves
Even so, a growing number of defections, mostly from FORCES BY ROLE
junior officers and soldiers, have been recorded, raising COMMAND
questions about the army’s cohesiveness. A proportion 1 armd div HQ
of conscript and regular personnel have refused to fight. MANOEUVRE
Armoured
There is some evidence that a ‘Free Syrian Army’ composed
4 armd bde
largely of defectors from the regular forces has a limited 2 tk regt
capability to mount small-scale attacks on government Light
forces. It is not clear that the regime has sufficient loyal 31 inf regt
forces to guarantee survival against a sustained campaign COMBAT SUPPORT
of protest or an active armed insurgency, particularly if 3 arty regt
violence spreads further across the country. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Since the unhindered 2007 destruction, by airstrike, of MBT 4,950: 1,500–1,700 T-72 T-72M; 1,000 T-62K/T-62M;
the alleged Syrian nuclear reactor at Deir Al Zoir – which 2,250 T-55/T-55MV (some in store)
was widely believed to have been carried out by Israel – the RECCE 590 BRDM-2
conventional balance has moved further in Israel’s favour, AIFV up to 2,450 BMP-1/BMP-2/BMP-3
with doubts over Syrian air defence raised by that raid, and APC (W) 1,500: 500 BTR-152; 1,000 BTR-50/BTR-60/BTR-
the combat capability of Syrian land forces being eroded 70
by the adverse effects of their current internal-security ARTY up to 3,440+
operations. However, capability acquisitions continue, and SP 500+: 122mm 450+: 400 2S1 Carnation (Gvosdik);
in late 2011 it was reported that Syria was due to procure 50+ D-30 (mounted on T34/85 chassis); 152mm 50 2S3
the Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missile for the Bastion (Akatsiya)
coastal defence system from Russia. TOWED 2,030: 122mm 1,150: 500 D-30; 150 (M-30)
M1938; 500 in store (no given designation); 130mm
ACTIVE 295,000 (Army 220,000 Navy 5,000 Air 700-800 M-46; 152mm 70 D-20/ML-20 M1937; 180mm
and North Africa

30,000 Air Defence 40,000) Paramilitary 108,000 10 S23
Middle East
MRL up to 500: 107mm up to 200 Type-63; 122mm up
RESERVE 314,000 (Army 280,000 Navy 4,000 Air
to 300 BM-21 (Grad)
10,000 Air Defence 20,000)
MOR 410+: 82mm; 120mm circa 400 M-1943; 160mm
Terms of service conscription, 30 months
M-160 (hundreds); 240mm up to 10 M-240
AT • MSL 2,600
Organisations by Service SP 410 9P133 BRDM-2 Sagger
MANPATS 2190+: 150 AT-4 9K111 Spigot; 40 AT-5
Army 220,000 (incl conscripts) 9K113 Spandrel; AT-7 9K115 Saxhorn; 800 AT-10
FORCES BY ROLE 9K116 Stabber; 1,000 AT-14 9M133 Kornet; 200 Milan
COMMAND RL 105mm RPG-29
3 corps HQ AD • SAM 4,184+
SPECIAL FORCES SP 84: 14 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 20 9K31 Strela-1
1 SF div (10 SF gp) (SA-9 Gaskin); 20 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 30 9K35
MANOEUVRE Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)
Armoured MANPAD 4,100+: 4,000+ 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7
7 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde) Grail)‡; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 100 9K36 Strela-3
1 (Republican Guard) armd div (3 armd bde, 1 mech (SA-14 Gremlin)
bde, 1 arty bde) GUNS 1,225+
1 indep tk regt SP ZSU-23-4
Mechanised TOWED 23mm 600 ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm
3 mech div(-) (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde) 600 S-60; 100mm 25 KS-19
Light MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 94+: 18 Scud-B/Scud-C/
4 indep inf bde Scud-D; 30 look-a-like; 18 FROG-7; 18+ SS-21 Tochka
5 (Border Guard) lt inf bde (under command of the (Scarab); 4 P-35 (SS-C-1B Sepal); 6 P-15M Termit-R (SS-C-3
General Security Directorate for border sy) Styx) (ε850 SSM msl total)
COMBAT SUPPORT ARV BREM-1 reported; T-54/55
2 arty bde VLB MTU; MTU-20
2 AT bde
1 (coastal defence) AShM bde with SS-C-1B Sepal and Navy 5,000
SS-C-3 Styx EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with FROG-7) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32:
CORVETTES • FS 2 Petya III (1†) with 1 triple 533mm TPT 23: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; Light 13: 1 An-24 Coke; 6
ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1†, 2 twin An-26 Curl; 2 PA-31 Navajo; 4 Yak-40 Codling; PAX 7: 2
76mm gun Falcon 20; 1 Falcon 900; 4 Tu-134B-3
PBFG 22 TRG 81: 40 L-39 Albatros*; 35 MBB-223 Flamingo (basic);
16 Osa I/II with 4 single lnchr with P-15M Termit-M (SS- 6 MFI-17 Mushshak
N-2C Styx) AShM HELICOPTERS
6 Tir with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) ATK 33 Mi-25 Hind D
AShM MRH 70: 40 Mi-17 Hip H; 30 SA342L Gazelle
PB 8 Zhuk TPT • Medium 40 Mi-8 Hip
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7: MSL
MHC 1 Sonya ASM Kh-25 (AS-7 Kerry); HOT
MSO 1 Natya AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
MSI 5 Yevgenya (AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-40/46 (AA-6 Acrid); R-23/24
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny B (AA-7 Apex); R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
(capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Air Defence Command 60,000

FORCES BY ROLE
Naval Aviation AIR DEFENCE
HELICOPTER 2 AD div (total: 25 AD bde (total: 150 SAM bty with S-125
ASW 13: 2 Ka-28 Helix A (air force manned); 11 Mi-14 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-75 Dvina
Haze (SA-2 Guideline); some ADA bty with 9K32 Strela-2/M
(SA-7A Grail/SA-7B Grail)‡)
Air Force 40,000 (incl 10,000 reserves); 60,000 2 AD regt (2 SAM bn with (2 SAM bty with S-200 Angara
Air Defence (incl 20,000 reserves) (total (SA-5 Gammon))
100,000) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Flying hours 15 to 25 hrs/year on FGA/ftr; 70 hrs/year; AD • SAM 4,707
50 hrs/year on MBB-223 Flamingo trg ac SP 195 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
TOWED 468: 320 S-72 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); 148 S-125
FORCES BY ROLE Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
FIGHTER STATIC/SHELTER 44 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)
2 sqn with MiG-23 MF/ML/UM Flogger MANPAD 4,000 9K32 Strela-2/2M (SA-7A Grail/SA-7B
2 sqn with MiG-25/MiG-25R/MiG-25U Foxbat (non- Grail)‡
operational)
2 sqn with MiG-29A/U Fulcrum A Paramilitary ε108,000
6 sqn with MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed; MiG-21U Mongol A Gendarmerie 8,000
2 sqn with MiG-23BN/UB Flogger Ministry of Interior
4 sqn with Su-22 Fitter D
1 sqn with Su-24 Fencer
Workers’ Militia ε100,000
People’s Army (Ba’ath Party)
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76 Candid
1 sqn with Falcon 20; Falcon 900 Foreign Forces
1 sqn with Tu-134B-3 UNTSO unless specified. UNTSO figures represent total
1 sqn with Yak-40 Codling numbers for mission in Israel, Syria and Lebanon.
TRAINING Argentina 3 obs
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros* Australia 12 obs
ATTACK HELICOPTER Austria 7 obs • UNDOF 374; elm 1 inf bn
3 sqn with Mi-25 Hind D
Belgium 2 obs
2 sqn with SA342L Gazelle
Canada 7 obs • UNDOF 3
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Chile 2 obs
6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H
China, People’s Republic of 4 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Croatia UNDOF 95; 1 inf coy
Denmark 11 obs
FTR 85: 50 MiG-23MF/ML/UM Flogger; 35 MiG-29A/U
Fulcrum; (30 MiG-25 Foxbat non-operational); (2 MiG- Estonia 2 obs
25U Foxbat non-operational) Finland 14 obs
FGA 240: 105 MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed; 15 MiG-21U Mongol France 3 obs
A; 50 MiG-23BN/UB Flogger; 50 Su-22 Fitter D; 20 Su-24 India UNDOF 192; elm 1 log bn
Fencer Ireland 12 obs
ISR (8 MiG-25R Foxbat* non-operational) Italy 8 obs
Japan UNDOF 31; elm 1 log bn in the short term. As such, the country will most probably
Malawi 1 obs continue to rely on surplus stocks of US, French and Italian
Nepal 3 obs equipment for its arsenal, and will continue to use its
Netherlands 12 obs ageing combat equipment for the foreseeable future.
New Zealand 7 obs ACTIVE 35,800 (Army 27,000 Navy 4,800 Air 4,000)
Norway 12 obs Paramilitary 12,000
Philippines UNDOF 343; 1 inf bn Terms of service 12 months selective
Russia 4 obs • Army/Navy 150, naval facility reportedly
under renovation at Tartus Organisations by Service
Slovakia 3 obs
Slovenia 3 obs Army 5,000; 22,000 conscript (total 27,000)
Sweden 6 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
Switzerland 11 obs SPECIAL FORCES
United States 1 obs
1 SF bde
1 (Sahara) SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Tunisia TUN Mechanised
3 mech bde (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1
Tunisian Dinar D 2010 2011 2012 AD regt, 1 engr bn, 1 log gp)
GDP D 63.4bn 66.3bn COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr regt
US$ 43.9bn 47.3bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 84: 30 M60A1; 54 M60A3
Growth % 3.05 0.01 LT TK 48 SK-105 Kuerassier
Inflation % 4.4 3.5 RECCE 60: 40 AML-90; 20 Saladin
Def exp D APC 268
APC (T) 140 M113A1/A2
and North Africa

US$
APC (W) 128: 18 EE-11 Urutu; 110 Fiat 6614
Middle East
FMA (US) US$ 15.0m 4.9m
ARTY 276
US$1=D 1.44 1.40 TOWED 115: 105mm 48 M101A1/A2; 155mm 67: 12
Population 10,629,186 M114A1; 55 M198
MOR 161: 81mm 95; 107mm 48 (some SP); 120mm 18
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Brandt
Male 11.3% 4.6% 4.8% 5.0% 21.4% 3.4% AT • MSL 590
Female 10.6% 4.3% 4.5% 4.8% 21.5% 4.0% SP 35 M901 ITV TOW
MANPATS 555: 500 Milan; 55 TOW
Capabilities RL 89mm 600: 300 LRAC; 300 M20
AD • SAM 86
Small and relatively poorly equipped by regional SP 26 M48 Chaparral
standards, Tunisia’s armed forces are reliant on conscripts, MANPAD 60 RBS-70
and much of the equipment across the three services is GUNS 127
outdated and in some cases approaching obsolescence. In SP 40mm 12 M-42
terms of internal security, the military’s role is limited as TOWED 115: 20mm 100 M-55; 37mm 15 Type-55 (M-
the National Guard, arguably better trained and designed 1939)/Type-65
to act as a counterbalance to the armed forces, takes the RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty)
lead on domestic stability. AEV 2 Greif
Nonetheless, the army was integral to the ‘Jasmine ARV 3 Greif; 6 M88A1
Revolution’ of January–February 2011, as it refused to
fire on protesters and verbally leant its support to the Navy ε4,800
demonstrations. The military was also utilised during the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Libyan uprising in 2011, with the army and air force able PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25
to patrol the borders relatively successfully and the navy PCFG 3 La Galite (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad
competently dealing with migrant flows and search-and- Mk140 lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
rescue operations in Tunisian waters. Tunisia’s armed forces PCG 3 Bizerte (FRA P-48) with 8 SS 12M AShM
were well suited to these constabulary roles, with more PCF 6 Albatros (GER Type 143B) with 2 single 533mm TT
traditional military roles such as high-tempo warfighting PB 13: 3 Utique (mod PRC Haizhui II); 4 Istiklal; 6 V Series
largely beyond their current capabilities. Modernisation of LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7:
the military’s current equipment may be undermined by AWT 1
the 2011 revolution, which will hamper economic growth AGS 1
ABU 3
AX 1 Salambo (US Conrad, survey) United Arab Emirates UAE
YTB 1
Emirati Dirham D 2010 2011 2012
Air Force 4,000 GDP D 1.11tr 1.32tr

FORCES BY ROLE US$ 302bn 358bn
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK per capita US$ 60,684 69,528
1 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II Growth % 3.23 3.30
TRANSPORT
Inflation % 0.9 2.5
1 sqn with C-130B Hercules; C-130H Hercules; G-222;
L-410 Turbolet Def bdgt a D 31.8bn 34.2bn
1 liaison unit with S-208A US$ 8.65bn 9.32bn
TRAINING US$1=D 3.67 3.67
2 sqn with L-59 Albatros*; MB-326B; SF-260 a
Excludes possible extra-budgetary procurement funding
1 sqn with MB-326K; MB-326L
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Population 5,148,664

2 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; AS365 Dauphin 2; AB-205 Ethnic groups: Nationals 24%; Expatriates 76% of which Indian
(Bell 205); SA313; SA316 Alouette III; UH-1H Iroquois; 30%, Pakistani 20%; other Arab 12%; other Asian 10%; UK 2%;
UH-1N Iroquois other European 1%
1 sqn with HH-3E Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 10.4% 2.9% 5.5% 10.7% 38.6% 0.6%
Female 10.0% 2.4% 3.3% 4.1% 11.2% 0.3%
FTR 12: 10 F-5E Tiger II; 2 F-5F Tiger II
ATK 3 MB-326K
TPT 18: Medium 16: 5 C-130B Hercules; Hercules; 1 Capabilities
C-130H Hercules; 5 G-222; Light 5: 3 L-410 Turbolet; 2 The UAE maintains a capable military. Although
S-208A objectively small in personnel numbers, the armed forces
TRG 30: 9 L-59 Albatros*; 4 MB-326B; 3 MB-326L; 14 comprise a relatively large percentage of the population
SF-260 (about 1%), and maintain an extensive array of high-
HELICOPTERS quality equipment. Arms purchases will continue in the
MRH 10: 1 AS365 Dauphin 2; 6 SA313; 3 SA316 Alouette near future. In common with other regional states, and
III perhaps in line with regional threat perceptions, the UAE
SAR 11 HH-3 Sea King has expanded its air-defence capabilities with purchases in
TPT • Light 33: 6 AS350B Ecureuil; 15 Bell 205 (AB-205); recent years of Patriot missile systems. It is a GCC member.
10 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 Bell 212 (UH-1N Iroquois) However, the UAE comprises seven separate emirates
MSL • AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder joined in a federation, each retaining influence within the
overall command structure through regional commands,
Paramilitary 12,000 essentially nominally independent forces maintained
by three emirates (in 1976, the Abu Dhabi Defence Force
National Guard 12,000 became the Western Command, Dubai Defence Force
Ministry of Interior
became the Central Command and the Ras al-Khaimah
Mobile Force became the Northern Command). Although
PCC 6 Kondor I (GDR)
under the aegis of the federal Union Defence Force, this
PCI 15: 5 Bremse (GDR); 4 Gabes; 4 Rodman; 2 Socomena
situation leads to greater autonomy and influence from
HELICOPTERS • MRH 8 SA318 Alouette II/SA319
these emirates on procurement and organisation. The
Alouette III
country was one of the leading proponents of Arab
participation in operations in Libya in 2011, sending six
Deployment F-16s and six Mirage fighter aircraft in support.
Côte D’Ivoire ACTIVE 51,000 (Army 44,000 Navy 2,500 Air 4,500)
UN • UNOCI 3; 5 obs The Union Defence Force and the armed forces of the UAE
(Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Ajman,
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Umm al-Qawayn and Sharjah) were formally merged
UN • MONUSCO 31 obs
in 1976 and headquartered in Abu Dhabi. Dubai still
maintains independent forces, as do other Emirates to a
lesser degree.
Army 44,000 (incl Dubai 15,000)

FORCES BY ROLE Navy ε2,500

GHQ Abu Dhabi EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE SUBMARINES • SWIMMER DELIVERY VEHICLES ε10
Armoured PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
1 armd bde
CORVETTES 3
Mechanised
FSGHM 1 Baynunah with 2 quadruple lnchr with MM-
3 mech bde
40 Exocet Block III AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-
Light
162 ESSM SAM, 1 21-cell MR49 lnchr with RIM 116B
2 inf bde
SAM, 1 76mm gun
Aviation
FSGM 2 Muray Jib (GER Lurssen 62m) with 2 quad
1 bde with AH-64D Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L
lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with
Black Hawk
Crotale SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
Other
PCFGM 2 Mubarraz (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin
1 Royal Guard bde
lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with
COMBAT SUPPORT
Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun
1 arty bde (3 arty regt)

PCFG 6 Ban Yas (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin lnchr
1 engr gp
with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
Dubai Independent Forces PB 6 Ardhana (UK Vosper 33m)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES •
FORCES BY ROLE
MHO 2 Al Murjan (Frankenthal class Type 332)
MANOEUVRE
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 28
Mechanised
LCP 16: 12 Ghannatha (capacity 40 troops); 4 (Fast Supply
2 mech inf bde
Vessel multi-purpose)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LCU 5: 3 Al Feyi (capacity 56 troops); 2 (capacity 40
MBT 471: 390 Leclerc; 36 OF-40 Mk2 (Lion); 45 AMX-30 troops and additional vehicles)
LT TK 76 Scorpion LCT 7
RECCE 89: 49 AML-90; 24 VBL; 16 TPz-1 Fuchs (NBC); LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4: 1 YDT; 1 YTB; 2 YTM
(20 Ferret in store); (20 Saladin in store)
and North Africa

AIFV 430: 15 AMX-10P; 415 BMP-3 Naval Aviation
Middle East
APC 892 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Learjet 35A
APC (T) 136 AAPC (incl 53 engr plus other variants) HELICOPTERS
APC (W) 756: 90 BTR-3U Guardian; 120 EE-11 Urutu; ASW 7 AS332F Super Puma (5 in ASUW role)
370 M-3 Panhard; 80 VCR (incl variants); 20 VAB; MRH 11: 7 AS565 Panther; 4 SA316 Alouette III
76 RG-31 Nyala
ARV 46 Air Force 4,500
ARTY 561+ Flying hours 110 hrs/year
SP 155mm 221: 78 G-6; 125 M-109A3; 18 Mk F3 FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 93: 105mm 73 ROF lt; 130mm 20 Type-59-I FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MRL 92+: 70mm 18 LAU-97; 122mm 48+: 48 Firos-25 (est 3 sqn with F-16E/F Block 60 Fighting Falcon
24 op); Type-90 (reported); 227mm 20 HIMARS being 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-9DAD/EAD/RAD
delivered; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch SEARCH & RESCUE
MOR 155: 81mm 134: 20 Brandt; 114 L16; 120mm 21 2 flt with AW109K2; AW139
Brandt TRANSPORT
AT • MSL 305+ 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules; L-100-30
SP 20 HOT 1 sqn with CN-235M-100
MANPATS 285+: 30 HOT; 230 Milan; 25 TOW; (Vigilant 1 (Spec Ops) sqn with AS-365F Dauphin 2; AS-550C3
in store) Fennec; AW-139; Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; CH-47C
RCL 262: 84mm 250 Carl Gustav; 106mm 12 M-40 Chinook; DHC-6-300 Twin Otter
AD • SAM • MANPAD 40+: 20+ Blowpipe; 20 Mistral TRAINING
GUNS 62 1 sqn with Grob 115TA
SP 20mm 42 M3 VDAA 1 sqn with Hawk Mk63A/C*
TOWED 30mm 20 GCF-BM2 1 sqn with Hawk Mk102*
MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 6 Scud-B (up to 20 msl) 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
AEV 53 ACV-AESV TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ARV 143: 8 ACV-AESV Recovery; 4 AMX-30D; 85 BREM-L; 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey
46 Leclerc ARV EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS AIRCRAFT 178 combat capable
ATK 30 AH-64D Apache FGA 139: 54 F-16E Block 60 Fighting Falcon (Desert
TPT 15 Heavy 4 CH-47F Chinook Medium 11 UH-60L Eagle); 25 F-16F Block 60 Fighting Falcon (13 to remain in
Black Hawk US for trg); 16 Mirage 2000-9DAD; 44 Mirage 2000-9EAD
ISR 7 Mirage 2000 RAD*

TPT 31: Heavy 3 C-17 Globemaster III; Medium 6: 3 Yemen, Republic of YEM
C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light
Yemeni Rial R 2010 2011 2012
22: 2 Beech 350 King Air; 8 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan;
7 CN-235M-100; 1 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 4 DHC-8 Dash GDP R 6.88tr 8.08tr
8 (MP) US$ 31.4bn 37.1bn
TRG 74: 12 Grob 115TA; 20 Hawk Mk63A/C*; 12 Hawk per capita US$ 1,336 1,538
Mk102*; 30 PC-7 Turbo Trainer Growth % 8.02 -2.47
HELICOPTERS
Inflation % 11.2 19.0
MRH 31: 4 AS-365F Dauphin 2 (VIP); 18 AS-550C3
Def bdgt R 400bn 445bn
Fennec; 9 Bell 412 Twin Huey
TPT 35: Heavy 12 CH-47C Chinook (SF): Light 12: 3 US$ 1.83bn 2.04bn
AW109K2; 8 AW139 (incl 2 VIP); 1 Bell 407 FMA (US) US$ 12.5m 35.0m
MSL US$1=R 219.04 217.67
ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-114 Hellfire; Hydra-70;
Hakeem 1/2/3 (A/B) HOT
LACM Black Shaheen (Storm Shadow/SCALP EG variant) Ethnic groups: Majority Arab, some African and South Asian
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; IIR/ARH
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Mica; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM
Male 21.9% 5.7% 5.0% 4.5% 12.4% 1.2%
Air Defence Female 21.1% 5.5% 4.9% 4.1% 12.2% 1.4%
FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE Capabilities
2 AD bde (3 bn with I-HAWK MIM-23B)
Yemen’s armed forces are under-equipped, poorly trained,
3 (short range) AD bn with Crotale; Mistral; Rapier; RB-
and in light of events in 2011, will have problems with
70; Javelin; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
morale across the force. Despite a relatively high level
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE of defence spending compared to GDP, the country’s
AD • SAM underdeveloped economic status means that the state is
SP Crotale; RB-70 unable to exercise full control over internal security. The
TOWED I-HAWK MIM-23B; Rapier army is the best equipped of the services, but still relies
MANPAD Javelin; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) on Soviet-era equipment. The importance of tribal ties
NAVAL Mistral
within Yemen, combined with a conscription service
that was reintroduced in 2007, highlights the difficulties
Paramilitary facing the military in encouraging loyalty to the armed
Coast Guard forces and morale. This was compounded in early 2011
Ministry of Interior by the instability that beset the country as part of the Arab
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53 Awakening, as a number of high-ranking military officers
PBF 9 (ITA Baglietto) deserted the president, defections were reported across
PB 44: 2 Protector; 16 (US Camcraft ’65); 5 (US military units and, in certain cases, loyal military units
Camcraft ’77); 6 Watercraft 45; 12 Halmatic Work; 3 Al exchanged fire with defectors. The Yemeni air force and navy
Saber (a further 9 are in build; ISD by 2013) are unable to fulfil their core roles of defending territorial
sovereignty, with insufficient equipment and training.
UAE National Infrastructure Authority Given the size of the country, airlift is almost non-existent,
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS leading to severe problems in rapid internal military
PBF 7 MRTP 16 (a further 27 are in build) deployments. Some of the combat aircraft, meanwhile –
particularly the aged MiG-21s – are unreliable. The navy’s
Deployment Chinese-supplied Hounan class patrol boats may well be
unserviceable and, while international maritime forces on
AFGHANISTAN counter-piracy duties do liaise with representatives from
NATO • ISAF 35 the Yemeni Coast Guard, the rest of the small naval force
faces challenges in monitoring and securing the country’s
Foreign Forces extensive coastline. In an unusual privatisation of the
military, four naval patrol boats are hired by Yemen LNG,
Australia 313; 1 tpt det with 3 C-130 Hercules; 1 MP det
a Total-led foreign investment, to provide security outside
with 2 AP-3C Orion
a maritime exclusion zone around the LNG plant.
France 800: 6 Rafale, 1 KC-135F; 1 (Foreign Legion) BG (2
recce sqn, 2 inf sqn, 1 aty bty, 1 engr coy) ACTIVE 66,700 (Army 60,000 Navy 1,700 Air Force
South Korea: 140 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School) 3,000, Air Defence 2,000) Paramilitary 71,200
United States: 140; 2 bty with MIM-104 Patriot Terms of service conscription, 2 years
Organisations by Service ARV T-54/55 reported

VLB MTU reported
Army 60,000 (incl conscripts)
Navy 1,700
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 SF bde PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22
MANOEUVRE PCO 1 Tarantul† with 2 twin lnchr (fitted for P-15
Armoured Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM)
8 armd bde PBF 6 Baklan
Mechanised PB 15: 3 Hounan† with 4 single lnchr (fitted for C-801
6 mech bde (CSS-N-4 Sardine) AShM); 10 P-1000 (Austal 37.5m); 2
Light Zhak (FSU Osa II) (1†)
16 inf bde MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES •
Air Manoeuvre MSO 1 Natya (FSU)
2 cdo/AB bde AMPHIBIOUS

Other
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 NS-722 (capacity 5 MBT;
1 (Central Guard) gd force
110 troops)
COMBAT SUPPORT
LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 Deba
3 arty bde
1 SSM bde
2 AD bn Air Force 3,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
MBT 856: 50 M60A1; 60 T-72; 66 T-80; 200 T-62; 450 FIGHTER
T-54/T-55; 30 T-34 3 sqn with F-5E Tiger II; MiG-21 Fishbed; MiG-29SMT/
RECCE 130: 80 AML-90; 50 BRDM-2 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum
AIFV 200: 100 BMP-1; 100 BMP-2 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
APC 258 1 sqn with Su-22 Fitter D/Su-22UMS Fitter G
APC (T) 60 M113A TRANSPORT
and North Africa

APC (W) 180: 60 BTR-40; 100 BTR-60; 20 BTR-152; (470 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; C-130H Hercules; Il-76
Middle East
BTR-40/BTR-60/BTR-152 in store) Candid
PPV 18 YLAV Cougar ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ARTY 1,307 3 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H); Bell 212; Ka-27; Mi-8 Hip;
SP 122mm 25 2S1 Carnation Mi-17 Hip H; Mi14PS; Mi-35 Hind
TOWED 310: 105mm 25 M101A1; 122mm 200: 130 D-30; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
30 M-1931/37; 40 M-30 M-1938; 130mm 60 M-46; 152mm AIRCRAFT 79 combat capable
10 D-20; 155mm 15 M114 FTR 10 F-5E Tiger II
COASTAL 130mm 36 SM-4-1 FGA 69: 15 MiG-21 Fishbed; 4 MiG-21U Mongol A*; 15
MRL 294: 122mm 280 BM-21 (150 op); 140mm 14 BM-14
MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 1 MiG-29UBT; 30 Su-22 Fitter D; 4
MOR 642: 81mm 250; 82mm 144 M-43; 107mm 12;
Su-22UM3 Fitter G
120mm 136; 160mm ε100
TPT 12: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; Medium 3: 2 An-12 Cub; 1
AT • MSL • MANPATS 71: 35 AT-3 9K11 Sagger; 24 M47
C-130H Hercules; Light 6 An-26 Curl
Dragon; 12 TOW
TRG 36: 24 L-39C; 12 Z-242
RCL 75mm M-20; 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11
HELICOPTERS
RL 66mm M72 LAW
ATK 8 Mi-35 Hind
GUNS 50+
ASW 1 Ka-27 (tpt role)
SP 100mm 30 SU-100
TOWED 20+: 85mm D-44; 100mm 20 M-1944 MRH 10 Mi-17 Hip H
AD • SAM ε800 TPT 26: Medium 9 Mi-8 Hip; Light 6: 2 Bell 212; 4 Bell
SP 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 205 (UH-1H)
Gopher)
MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36 Strela-3 Air Defence 2,000
(SA-14 Gremlin) AD • SAM:
GUNS 530 SP 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin);
SP 70: 20mm 20 M163 Vulcan; 23mm 50 ZSU-23-4 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)
TOWED 460: 20mm 50 M-167 Vulcan; 23mm 100 ZU- TOWED S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-
23-2; 3 Goa)
37mm 150 M-1939; 57mm 120 S-60; 85mm 40 M-1939 MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail); 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-
KS-12 14 Gremlin)
MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 28: 12 FROG-7; 10 SS-21 Scarab MSL • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); AIM-9
(Tochka); 6 Scud-B (ε33 msl) Sidewinder; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
Paramilitary 71,200+ Democratic Republic of the Congo

UN • MONUSCO 6 obs
Ministry of the Interior Forces 50,000
LIBERIA
Tribal Levies 20,000+ UN • UNMIL 1
Yemeni Coast Guard Authority ε1,200 South sudan

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 UN • UNMISS 2; 6 obs
PBF 4 Archangel (US) sudan
PB 10: 2 Marine Patrol; 8 various UN • UNAMID 5; 24 obs
UN • UNISFA 2 obs
Deployment WESTERN SAHARA
COTE D’IVOIRE UN • MINURSO 8 obs
UN • UNOCI 1; 7 obs
Table 26 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Middle East and North Africa
Designation Type Quantity Contract Supplier Prime Order First Notes
Value Country Contractor Date Delivery
Due
Algeria (ALG)
T-90S MBT 300 US$1bn RUS Rosoboron 2006 2006 Deliveries ongoing
export
S-300PMU-2 SAM 8 US$1bn RUS Rosoboron 2006 2008 1st battery delivered 2008
export
Pantsir-S1 AD 38 US$500m RUS Rosoboron 2006 2010 Delivery underway
export
n.k. LPD 1 EUR 400 ITA Orizzonte 2011 2015 Contract signed in July 2011. To be
million Sistemi based on San Giusto class
(US$550 Navali
million)
Su-30MKA FGA ac 16 US$1bn RUS Rosoboron 2010 2011 Delivery to be complete by end 2012
export
Yak-130 Trg ac 16 US$250m RUS Rosoboron 2006 2011 Incl simulator. First delivered late
export 2011
Bahrain (BHR)
M113A2 APC n.k. n.k. TUR FNSS 2007 n.k. Refit with MKEK 81mm mortars
Upgrade
Egypt (EGY)
M1A1 Abrams MBT 125 US$349m US General 2007 2009 Co-production with Cairo plant. Final
Dynamics delivery due 2011
and North Africa

S-125 Pechora SAM 30 n.k. RUS Oboronit 1999 n.k. Upgrade to Pechora-2M. Thirty btn
Middle East
(SA-3 Goa) Upgrade elniye to be upgraded in three stages. First
Sistemy stage completed 2006. Second stage
ongoing
Ambassador PCFG 4 US$1.3bn US VT Halter 2008 2012 Phase II of the Fast Missile Craft (FMC)
Mk III Marine project. First vessel delivered Oct
2011
n.k. PCC 4 US$20.2m US Swiftships 2011 n.k. Delivery to be complete by 2014
F-16C/D Fighting FGA ac 20 n.k. US Lockheed 2010 n.k. Sixteen F-16C and four F-16D. To be
Falcon Martin complete by 2013
C-295 Tpt ac 3 n.k. ESP EADS-CASA 2010 2011 First ac delivered Sep 2011;
remainder due late 2011
Iraq (IRQ)
BTR-4 APC (W) 420 US$2.5bn UKR Khariv 2010 2011 Contract value includes six An-32
Morozov tpt ac
Swiftships 35m PB 15 US$181m US Swiftships 2009 2012 For navy. Initial order was for
nine vessels. Option for further
three exercised with another
option for three more. First vessel
commissioned Sep 2010. As of Oct
2011, six had arrived in Iraq
F-16C/D Fighting FGA ac 18 εUS$3bn US Lockheed 2011 n.k. -
Falcon Block 52 Martin
Beech 350ER Tpt ac 6 US$10.5m US Hawker 2008 2010 Five Extended Range (ER) ISR ac; one
King Air Beechcraft lt tpt ac, plus spares and spt
C-130J Super Tpt ac 4 US$292.8m US Lockheed 2009 2012 Delivery to begin late 2012 and
Hercules Martin continue through 2013
C-130J-30 Tpt ac 2 US$140.3m US Lockheed 2009 n.k. For air force
Martin
Due
An-32 Tpt ac 6 US$2.5bn UKR Antonov 2010 2011 Three aircraft complete, further two
ASTC/Aviant near completion. As of late 2011
delivery delayed by row between
purchaser and manufacturer.
Contract value includes 420 BTR-4
APC
Lasta-95 Trg ac 20 see notes SER UTVA 2007 2010 Option for further 16. Part of
US$230m deal. First 3 delivered Aug
2010
EC635 Tpt Hel 24 €360m FRA Eurocopter 2009 n.k. Cost incl training and maintenance
(US$490m)
Bell 407 Tpt Hel 24 US$60.3m US Bell 2009 n.k. For air force. FMS contract
Israel (ISR)
Arrow 2 ATBM/BMD n.k. n.k. ISR/US IAI 2008 n.k. Number and cost not known
Merkava Mk IV MBT up to 400 n.k. ISR n.k. 2001 2004 Estimated 50–60 tk per year over
four years
Dolphin (Type SSK 3 €1bn GER HDW 2006 2012 With Air-Independent Propulsion
800) class (US$1.21bn) (AIP) system. Third boat confirmed
by German defence minister in July
2011; contract not yet signed
F-35 Lightning II FGA ac 20 US$2.75bn US Lockheed 2010 2016 Option for a further 75
Martin
C-130J Hercules Tpt ac 1 US$98.6m US Lockheed 2010 2013 -
Martin
C-130J-30 Tpt ac 1 US$76.2m US Lockheed 2011 n.k. Contract includes long-lead items for
Hercules Martin additional C-130J-30 ac
Skylark I-LE ISR UAV 100 n.k. ISR Elbit 2008 n.k. Delivery in progress. Part of Sky Rider
Systems programme
Hermes 900 ISR UAV n.k. US$50m ISR Elbit 2010 2010 Price includes additional Hermes 450
Systems UAVs. Deliveries to occur 2010–13
Jordan (JOR)
YPR-765 AIFV 510 n.k. NLD n.k. 2010 2010 Order includes 69 M577s and
unknown number of YPR-806s.
Deliveries to be complete by 2014
M109A2 155mm SP 121 n.k. NLD n.k. 2010 2010 Deliveries to be complete by 2014
Arty
Kuwait (KWT)
Mk V PBF 10 US$461m US USMI 2009 July 2011 For navy. Final delivery due 2013
KC-130J Tkr ac 3 US$245m US Lockheed 2010 2013 Deliveries to be complete in early
Martin 2014
Lebanon (LBN)
T-72 MBT 31 Free transfer RUS n.k. 2010 n.k. Delivery status unclear
Mi-24 Hind Atk Hel 6 Free transfer RUS n.k. 2010 2010 In place of previously offered MiG-29
Fulcrum ac. Delivery status unclear
Libya (LBY)
Molniya-class PCGM 3 est $150m– RUS Vympel 2009 n.k. Contract status unclear following
$200m regime change
Yak-130 Trg ac 6 εUS$100m RUS Rosoboron 2010 2011 Contract status unclear following
export regime change
Due
Morocco (MOR)
FREMM DDGHM 1 €470m FRA/ITA DCNS 2008 2012 Vessel launched in September 2011.
(US$676m) Delivery now expected 2013. Ship
named Mohammed VI
SIGMA FFGHM 3 €600m NLD Schelde 2008 2011 (Ship Integrated Geometrical
(US$875m) Modularity Approach) First vessel
launched Jul 2010. Final delivery due
2013
OPV-70 PSO 4 US$140m FRA STX 2008 2010 First vessel launched Aug 2010;
contract to be completed by 2014
F-16C/D Block 52 FGA ac 24 US$841.9m US Lockheed 2008 2011 Inc. mission equipment and spt
Fighting Falcon Martin package. Eighteen Cs and six Ds. First

deliveries 2011
C-27J Spartan Tpt ac 4 €130m ITA Alenia 2008 2010 Three in service as of late 2011; final
(US$166m) Aeronautica aircraft anticipated by year end
T-6C Texan Trg ac 24 US$37m+ US Hawker 2009 2010 Twenty delivered as of late 2011, with
Beechcraft remainder expected early 2012
Oman (OMN)
Project Khareef FFGHM 3 GB£400m UK BAE Systems 2007 2011 First vessel (Al-Shamikh) launched Jul
(US$785m) 2009; delivered 2011. Second vessel
(Al-Rahmani) launched Jul 2010
C-130J-30 Tpt ac 1 n.k. US Lockheed 2009 2012 -
Hercules Martin
C-130J-30 Tpt ac 2 n.k. US Lockheed 2010 2013 Delivery due in 2013 and 2014
and North Africa

Hercules Martin
Middle East
NH90 TTH Tpt Hel 20 n.k. NLD EADS 2003 2010 First delivered Jun 2010
Qatar (QTR)
AW139 MRH Hel 18 €260m ITA/UK Agusta 2008 2010 Twelve delivered by end 2011
(US$413m) Westland
AW139 MRH Hel 3 n.k. ITA/UK Agusta 2011 n.k. -
Westland
Saudi Arabia (SAU)

LAV II APC (W) 724 US$2.2bn CAN General 2009 2011 For national guard
Dynamics
(GDLS)
M113 APC (T) 300 US$200m TUR FNSS 2007 2008 Upgrade. Follow-on contract could
Upgrade upgrade entire fleet of 2,000 M113.
Delivery status unclear
CAESAR 155mm 155mm SP 100 n.k. FRA Nexter 2006 2009 For national guard; to replace M198.
arty Systems First four delivered March 2010.
Deliveries to be completed by 2011
Eurofighter FGA ac 72 GB£4.43bn Int’l Eurofighter 2005 2008 Project Salam. First 24 delivered
Typhoon (US$8.9bn) by Sept 2011. Orignal plan to final
assemble remaining 48 in SAU
dropped
Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C ac 1 US$670m SWE Saab 2010 n.k. -
A330 MRTT Tkr/Tpt ac 6 US$600m FRA EADS 2008 2011 Three more purchased July 2009
for undisclosed fee. First delivery
expected 2011
S-76 Tpt Hel 15 n.k. US Sikorsky 2007 n.k. For Interior Ministry
UH-60L Black Tpt Hel 22 US$286 m US Sikorsky 2008 2010 Delivery to be complete in 2012
Hawk
Due
UH-60L Black Tpt Hel 2 US$28.6m US Sikorsky 2011 2012 Delivery to be complete in 2012
Hawk
Syria (SYR)
Buk-M2 SAM n.k. US$200m RUS Rosoboron 2007 2008 Delivery status unclear
export
96K6 Pantsir- AD 36 US$730m RUS Rosoboron n.k. 2007 Delivery reported to have begun in
S1E (SA-22 export late 2009; status unclear
Greyhound)
Tunisia (TUN)
C-130J Hercules Tpt ac 2 n.k. US Lockheed 2010 2013 To be delivered 2013–14
Martin
SA342L Gazelle MRH Hel 6 n.k. FRA Aerotec 2010 n.k. Delivery status unclear
United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Patriot Advanced AD System 10 fire US$3.3bn US Raytheon 2008 2009 To replace HAWK. Incl 172 PAC-3 msl
Capability (PAC) 3 units, 172 and 42 launcher mod packs, plus
msl some GEM-T msl. Final delivery due
2012
96K6 Pantsir-S1E AD 50 US$734m RUS Rosoboron 2000 2004 To be mounted on MAN SX 45 8×8
export trucks. First four delivered Mar 2009
Agrab (Scorpion) 120mm SP 48 AED390m RSA/SGP/ IGG 2007 2008 Delivery status unclear
MMS Mor (US$106m) UAE/UK
Agrab Mk2 120mm SP 72 US$214m RSA/SGP/ IGG 2011 n.k. -
(Scorpion) MMS Mor UAE/UK
Javelin MANPAT 100 (US$135m) US Raytheon/ 2008 2009 1,000 msl
Lockheed
Martin
Abu Dhabi-class FFGHM 1 n.k. ITA Fincantieri 2009 2011 Launched Feb 2011
Baynunah-class FSGHM 6 AED3bn FRA/UAE ADSB 2003 2006 First of class built in FRA, others to
(US$820m) be built in UAE. First vessel delivered
2010; second vessel 2011. Delivery
expected to be complete by 2014
Falaj II FS 2 AED430m ITA Fincantieri 2009 2012 First vessel to be launched Dec 2011;
(US$117m) second Apr 2012. Delivery of both
vessels scheduled for late 2012
Project PBFG 12 AED771m UAE ADSB 2009 2011 ISD for all vessels expected 2012
‘Ghannatha’
Project Al Saber PB 12 AED127m UAE ADSB 2008 2011 For coast guard
(US$34.6m)
Saab 340 Erieye AEW&C ac 2 SEK1.5bn SWE Saab 2009 2011 First delivered Apr 2011
(US$234m)
A330 MRTT Tkr/Tpt ac 3 n.k. Int’l EADS 2008 2011 Delivery now scheduled for 2012.
Order for three more possible
C-17 Tpt ac 2 n.k. US Boeing 2010 2012 -
Globemaster III
C-130 J-30 Tpt ac 12 AED5.9bn US Lockheed 2009 n.k. Acquisition deferred to an as yet
Hercules Martin unspecified date
PC-21 Trg ac 25 CHEfr500m CHE Pilatus 2009 2011 First aircraft flew in 2011. Deliveries
($492.4m) under way
UH-60M Black Tpt Hel 10 n.k. US Sikorsky 2007 2010 Delivery status unclear
Hawk
UH-60M Black Tpt Hel 14 US$171m US Sikorsky 2009 n.k. To be delivered by end 2012
Hawk

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This article was downloaded by: [Nanyang Technological University]

On: 13 March 2012, At: 02:22

The Military Balance

Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa

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and North Africa

and North Africa

Sub-Total 107.97 91.09% 116.42 91.21% –1.01%

one of the highest levels of inflation in the world

2010 and 2011 mirrored these underlying trends. Levant (Jordan,

(at 44%, the largest increase in the region), Iraq (8.9%)

and North Africa

and North Africa

Saudi Arabia The primary responsibilities of the Saudi Arabian

and North Africa

and North Africa

300 AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles

and North Africa

RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) to age 50 Navy ε6,000

FRIGATES • FFM 3 TRANSPORT

PB 9 Kebir AIR DEFENCE

and North Africa

Navy 700 AAM • IR AAM AIM-9P Sidewinder SARH AAM

38m) FORCES BY ROLE

and North Africa

1 SSM bde with Scud-B

TT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity 1 SH-2G Super Seasprite HELICOPTERS

and North Africa

Norway MFO 3 imposition of a UN embargo on most major conventional

and North Africa

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 125,000+

ARTY 8,798+ mech but all are predominantly infantry)

FORCES BY ROLE LANDING CRAFT 10

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Marines 2,600

and North Africa

TRAINING Paramilitary 40,000-60,000

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

unwillingness of senior military officials to delegate MLRS 122mm some BM-21

and North Africa

Ministry of Interior Forces 531,000 Capabilities

Australia 35; 1 sy det with ASLAV • UNAMI 2 obs

Strategic Defences Air Manoeuvre

Organisation and structure of formations may vary APC 1,265

and North Africa

AX 1 FGA 251: 25 F-15I Ra’am; 78 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 48

Airfield Defence 3,000 active (15,000

and North Africa

MANOEUVRE PB 7: 3 Al Hussein (UK Vosper 30m); 4 Abdullah (US

Navy ε500 Paramilitary 10,000 active

Civil Militia ‘People’s Army’ ε35,000 reservists US$1=D 0.29 0.28

Afghanistan Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

CÔTE D’IVOIRE Female 12.7% 3.8% 5.2% 5.7% 10.7% 1.2%

and North Africa

ACTIVE 15,500 (Army 11,000 Navy 2,000 Air 2,500)

RESERVE 23,700 (Joint 23,700)

MANOEUVRE PBG 8 Um Almaradim (FRA P-37 BRL) with 2 twin lnchr

Coast Guard 500 with modernised ex-US M113s. US security assistance

installations and units supporting US troops in Iraq. FORCES BY ROLE

and North Africa

(GER Bremen); 1 Tabarja (GER Bergen) Brazil UNIFIL 11

US$ 70.2bn - AIFV some: BMP-1; BMD

and North Africa