VALUE OF ART

RONELIE VILORIA GROUP

KEMBERLY ALVARADO
QUENIE
WINNIE

The Value of Art

Philosophical discourse concerning the value of art is a discourse concerning

what makes an artwork valuable qua its being an artwork. Whereas the
concern of the critic is what makes the artwork a good artwork, the question
for the aesthetician is why it is a good artwork. When we refer to a work’s
value qua art, we mean those elements of it that contribute to or detract from
that work’s value considered as an artwork. In this way, we aim to exclude
those things that are valuable or useful about an artwork, such as a sculpture’s
being a good doorstop, but that are not relevant for assessment in artistic
terms. Philosophers of art, then, attempt to justify for the critic the categories
or determinants with which they can make an appropriate and successful
appraisal of an artwork.

The philosopher of art’s task is to examine which values can appropriately be

considered determinants of artistic value and, subsequently, what the value of
art might be beyond these determinants. There is substantial disagreement
about which, and how, determinants affect artistic value. Consequently, there
is a vast catalogue of positions to which aestheticians subscribe, and the
terminology can make it difficult to know who is talking about what. To
provide some clarity to the reader in navigating this terminology and
discourse, the end of this article includes an alphabetized summary of those
positions. The various positions are cashed out in reference to mainly visual
art, with some treatment of literature. Although some positions are easily
transferred to other forms of art, some are not.
1. The Nature of Artistic Value
From the outset it should be clear that, when discussing the value of art in
philosophical terms, we are not talking about the money one is willing to
exchange for purchase of an artwork. In fact, this points to a rather peculiar
feature about the value of art insofar as it is not a kind of quantifiable value as
is, say, monetary value. If a dealer were to ask what the value of an artwork is,
we could give them a particular (albeit negotiable) sum, a quantity, something
we can pick out. Philosophically, it does not look like the value of art operates
in the same way. Rather, artistic value just appears to be how good or bad
something is as art. So, for the dealer, Da Vinci’s Salvator Mundi (1500)
might be more valuable than Manet’s Spring (1881) simply because it has
attracted more money at auction. In the way we’re using artistic value,
however, Spring could be a better artwork than Salvator Mundi for a variety
of reasons, thus having greater artistic value.

Artistic value is just a term we use to talk about something’s goodness or

badness as art, and it is something comprised of (a number of) different
determinant kinds of value, such as aesthetic, moral, cognitive, and political
value.

In this way, artistic value is attributive goodness

a. Aesthetic Value and Artistic Value

i. Aesthetic Value
Given art’s intimate tie to the aesthetic, a good place to start the inquiry into
the value of art appears to be aesthetic value. We are concerned in this
subsection with the nature of aesthetic value and what it is as a kind of value,
whereas in 1.a.ii we will examine the contentious question concerning the
relationship between aesthetic and artistic value, such as whether these are
one and the same value. In terms of the value of art, that question is the most
important for our purposes. However, in order to answer it, we need to get a
hold on what aesthetic value actually is. So, what is aesthetic value? Many
agree that this question actually involves two subsidiary questions: first, what
makes aesthetic value aesthetic and, second, what makes aesthetic value
a value? The former has been referred to as
the demarcation or aesthetic question, the latter as the normative question,
terminology that originates in Lopes (2018; see specifically pp. 41-43 for the
proposing of the questions, and pp. 43-50 for a brief discussion of them) and
adopted by subsequent work in philosophical aesthetics (e.g., Shelley, 2019
and Van der Berg, 2019 both provide assessments in terms of these
questions). To be specific, the aesthetic question asks us why some merits
are distinctively aesthetic merits instead of some other kind of merit, whilst
the normative question asks what makes that value reason-giving: how does it
“lend weight to what an agent aesthetically should do?” (Lopes, 2018, p. 42).

In terms of the value of art, or artistic value, if we equate aesthetic value with

artistic value, artistic value is going to be grounded in, too, the aesthetic,
formal features of the work which is shaped by one’s narrow or broad view. If
we’re not going to equate the two, then we can say that aesthetic value is one
of many determinants of artistic value, bringing in other determinants such as
cognitive value and moral value. These views come in nuanced forms, as we’ll
now see.

ii. The Relationship

For some aestheticians, the issue with coming to an adequate and appropriate
account of the nature of artistic value and aesthetic value is derivative of the
core issue of defining the very concepts aesthetic and artistic (in section 1.b,
we’ll look at the relationship between the definition of art and the nature of
artistic value). The thought is that if we construct an appropriate definition of,
and relationship between, art and the aesthetic, all issues in aesthetics will
slowly become enlightened.

b. The Definition and Value of Art

Before engaging such questions, we should examine the relationship between
the definition of art and the value of art. As stated in the introduction, what we
have taken artworks to be and what we value about them have been
considered somewhat simultaneous. Rather than historically trace the
definition of art and its correspondence with art’s value, we will focus here on
some issues arising from the relationship between defining art and the value
of art, in keeping with the article’s scope and purpose. First, a theory of art
that picks out artworks based on what we deem to be valuable about them is
called a value definition. It is more likely than not that this definition will also
be a functional theory/definition of art, according to Davies’ (1990, 1991)
delineation of functional and procedural theories of art. A functional theory
defines artworks in terms of what they do, whereas a procedural theory
defines artworks in terms of how they are brought about. Aesthetic theories,
for example, are functional theories. The institutional theory, on the contrary,
is a procedural theory. It is presumably not the case that we value artworks
because they are those things picked out as candidates for appreciation by the
art world (the institutional theory), but it might be the case that we value
artworks because they are sources of aesthetic experiences (a version of the
aesthetic theory).

2. The (Im-)Moral Value of Art

The previous discussions setup, and invite, consideration of what other forms
of value we consider to be contributory to, or detracting from, the value of an
artwork qua art. Throughout the following considerations, the reader should
consider whether the position and its commitments make claims about two
different concerns: whether the value in question impacts the value of the
work as a work of art, or whether we can assess the artwork in terms of that
value, but the value doesn’t impact the value of a work of art as a work of art.
The nature of such an interaction is cashed out with great intricacy in the
numerous positions espoused in considerations of the (im-)moral value of art,
and so it is to this value that we now turn as a good starting point.

a. The Moral Value of Art

The interaction between moral and aesthetic and/or artistic value has received
extensive treatment in the literature and with extensive treatment comes an
extensive list of positions one might adopt. Another entry of the IEP also
considers these positions: Ethical Criticism of Art.  Nonetheless, the
interaction is a considerable source of tension in philosophical aesthetics, and
so I shall highlight and assess the key positions here. Roughly, the main
positions are as follows. Radical Autonomists think that moral assessments of
artworks are inappropriate in their entirety, that is, one should not engage in
moral debate about, through, or from artworks. Moderate Autonomists think
that artworks can be assessed in terms of their moral character and/or
criticism, but this does not bear weight upon their value qua art, that is, their
artistic value. Moralists think that a work’s moral value is a determinant of its
artistic value. Radical Moralists think that the moral assessment of an
artwork is the sole determinant of its artistic value. Ethicists think that,
necessarily, a moral defect in a work is an aesthetic defect, and a moral merit
is an aesthetic merit. Immoralists think that moral defects, or immoral
properties, can be valuable for an artwork qua art, they can contribute
positively to artistic value.

b. The Immoral Value of Art

There is something intuitively appealing about the claim that moral merits in
artworks can be artistic merits and, as such, contribute to the value of art. The
same, however, cannot be said of moral defects as meritorious contributions
to the value of art. It seems odd to think that an artwork could be better in
part, or wholly, because of the immoral properties it
possesses. Immoralism, generally, is the position in aesthetics that holds that
moral defects in a work of art can be artistic merits. Despite the instinctive
resistance to such a claim, we need not look far afield to find examples of
artworks that might fit this sort of bill. Consider, for example,
Nabokov’s Lolita, Harvey’s Myra, and Todd Phillips’ Joker. The value of these
works seems to be sourced from, or tied to, their inclusion of immoral
properties, acts, or events.
c. The Directness Issue
What the discussions of moralism and immoralism show is that for a property,
quality, or value to legitimately be considered a determinant of artistic value,
it must affect the value of the work qua art. In several different instances
outlined, it doesn’t look like the moral and/or immoral property/value is
affecting the work’s value qua art, but is instead determining some other
value that we take to be valuable qua art. For example, some properties
(moral or immoral) affect aesthetic value, which transitions to affect artistic
value. It is, therefore, aesthetic value, not moral value, that influences artistic
value. Or, some properties of artworks look to teach us things or cultivate our
understanding, therefore there is a particular cognitive value about them,
which has an effect on the artistic value.

4. The Political Value of Art

a. Epistemic Progress
In light of the continued skepticism about what the cognitivist can and cannot
claim, the views that art can give us experiential and/or propositional
knowledge have decreased in popularity. However, in the context of
contributions to political-epistemic progress, Simoniti (2021) has claimed that
some art not only gives us propositional knowledge of the same standard as
objective means (such as textbooks) of getting at epistemic progress, but that
art sometimes has an advantage over these other forms. Put simply, Simoniti
thinks that artworks can target political discourse and engender similar kinds
of knowledge as do textbooks or news articles, without invoking special or
peculiar art-specific knowledge – a now relatively unpopular view – alongside
being able to plug a gap that objective discourse leaves open.

b. The Pragmatic View

Some artworks make an explicit and direct contribution to political progress
and the rectification of social issues and problems. These works are taken to
be generally captured by the terms socially engaged art and relational
aesthetics. Relational aesthetics (see Bourriaud, 2002, for the seminal work
that introduces this term) tends to refer to those works that do not take on
traditional artistic qualities, devices, practices, mediums, or techniques, but
instead take as their form the interpersonal relations that they affect. For
example, Rirkrit Tiravanija has conducted a series of relational works in
different galleries and exhibitions, constructing makeshift kitchens that serve
Thai food to visitors and staff alike, fostering dialogue between them and
establishing (or furthering) social bonds. Socially engaged works are executed
in ways very similar to social work by engendering direct socially facilitative
effects. This might include Oda Projesi’s workshops and picnics for children in
the community, Women on Waves, the Dorchester Housing Projects, or the
works of 2015 Turner Prize winning collective Assemble. In each instance, the
artist(s) make a direct contribution to the resolution or easing of some social
issue. In this way, their goals are pragmatic, rooted in tangible, actualized
progress, rather than beautiful or formal as we often take artworks to be.

5. Summary of Available Positions and

Accounts
There is a wealth of available views regarding artistic value, its determinants,
its relationship to the value of art, its relationship to aesthetic value, whether
and how determinants can affect it, and so on. Here, I want to provide a brief
outline of the views discussed and available positions/accounts. The purpose
is to provide a brief, working statement about the views at hand. This is
especially useful as sometimes multiple different views can adopt the same
heading term. This set is by no means exhaustive, may be incomplete, and will
be updated as is seen fit.

Aestheticism – aesthetic value and artistic value are one and the same value,
and only aesthetic value matters for determining artistic value (things like
cognitive value, moral value, political value, don’t matter for an
assessment qua art).

Anti-cognitivism – there is no such thing as a distinctively artistic truth, or a

truth that only art can teach us (see Stolnitz, 1992).

Cognitivism – artworks have something to grant to us in terms of knowledge.

This might be new propositional knowledge, experiential knowledge,
specifically artistic knowledge, or the artwork may clarify or strengthen
already-held truths.

Cognitive Immoralism – moral defects in an artwork can be artistically

valuable insofar as they provide some cognitive value (for example, cultivation
of our moral understanding).

Definition-Evaluation Parallelism – what makes an artwork an artwork

is x, x is a value of art, and the value of art is determined by one sole value, x.
Not all value definitions of art conform to definition-evaluation parallelism.

Eliminativism – aesthetic value and artistic value are one and the same thing,
and as such talk of artistic value is redundant (things like cognitive value,
moral value, and political value might matter for the eliminativist, if they
commit to a broad notion of aesthetic value).

Error-theory about artistic value – aesthetic value is what we mean by

value qua art, there is no such thing as artistic value. We are in error when we
talk about it.
Ethicism – moral merits are always aesthetic merits, and moral defects
are always aesthetic defects.

Immoralism – moral defects in an artwork can be aesthetic/artistic merits.

Interactionist – (about moral value) someone who thinks that the moral value
of an artwork interacts with that artwork’s aesthetic/artistic value.

Moderate Autonomism – aesthetic value is all that matters for artistic value,
but artworks might be assessed with reference to the moral domain. However,
the latter has no bearing on the artistic value of the work (its value qua art)

Moderate Moralism – in some cases, a work of art is susceptible to treatment

in the moral domain, and this can affect its artistic value (its value qua art).

Neo-cognitivism – artworks can be cognitively valuable, and their artistic

value augmented as a result, insofar as they can serve to clarify or improve
knowledge we already possess.

Pluralism about artistic value – there are many determinants of artistic value,
such as aesthetic value, cognitive value, moral value, and political value.

Pragmatic View of Artistic Value – artistic value, explicitly and solely for the
set of socially engaged artworks, is the positive cognitive, ethical, or political
effect they entail. This view should not be used to apply to other kinds of art,
such as painting, sculpture, music, and so on (see Simoniti, 2018).

Radical Autonomism – aesthetic value is all that matters for artistic value,
and any assessment of morality with regard to an artwork is
inappropriate even if one does not think it bears weight on artistic value.

Radical Moralism – the artistic value of a work of art is determined by, or

reducible to, its moral value.

Robust Immoralism – moral defects in an artwork give rise to artistic value

insofar as a work achieves aesthetic success through aesthetic properties that
arise because of them. For example, fictional murder may be valuable insofar
as it invites excitement, vivacity, or mystery.

The Trivial Theory (of artistic value) – artworks have lots of different
determinant values, none of which are specific to, or characteristic of, art.

Value Definitions of Art – what makes an artwork an artwork is x, and x is

also a (or the) value of art. If x is the sole determinant of the value of art, then
the value definition is an instance of definition-evaluation parallelism.
 6. References and Further Reading
 Abell, C. (2012) ‘Art: What it Is and Why it Matters’. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research. Vol. 85 (3) pp. 671-691
 Bourriaud, N. (2009) Relational Aesthetics. Dijon: Les Presses du réel
 Bueno, O. (2002) ‘Functional Beauty: Some Applications, Some Worries’. Philosophical
Books. Vol. 50 (1) pp. 47-54
 Bullough, E. (1912) ‘“Psychical Distance” as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic
Principle’. British Journal of Psychology. Vol. 5 (2), pp. 87-118
 Carroll, N. (1996) ‘Moderate Moralism’. British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 36 (3), pp.
223-238
 Carroll, N. (2004) ‘Non-Perceptual Aesthetic Properties: Comments for James
Shelley’. British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 44 (4) pp. 413-423
 Carroll, N. (2012) ‘Recent Approaches to Aesthetic Experience’. The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism. Vol. 70 (2) pp. 165-177
 Carroll, N. (2015) ‘Defending the Content Approach to Aesthetic
Experience’. Metaphilosophy. Vol. 46 (2) pp. 171-188
 Currie, G. (2020) Imagining and Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press
 Davies, S. (1990) ‘Functional and Procedural Definitions of Art’. Journal of Aesthetic
Education. Vol. 24 (2) pp. 99-106
 Davies, S. (1991) Definitions of Art. London: Cornell University Press
 Dickie, G. (1964) ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude’. American Philosophical
Quarterly. Vol. 1 (1) pp. 56-65
 Diffey, (1995) ‘What can we learn from art?’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol.
73 (2) pp. 204-211
 Du Bois, W. E. B. (1926) ‘Criteria of Negro Art’. The Crisis. Vol. 32 pp. 290-297
 Eaton, A. W. (2012) ‘Robust Immoralism’. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
Vol. 70 (3) pp. 281-292
 Gaut, B.(2007) Art, Emotion, Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
 Gisbon, J (2008) ‘Cognitivism and the Arts’. Philosophy Compass. Vol. 3 (4) pp. 573-
589
 Goldman, A. (2013) ‘The Broad View of Aesthetic Experience’. The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism. Vol. 71 (4) pp. 323-333
 Hamilton, A. (2006) ‘Indeterminacy and reciprocity: contrasts and connections between
natural and artistic beauty’. Journal of Visual Art Practice. Vol. 5 (3) pp. 183-193
 Hanson, L. (2013) ‘The Reality of (Non-Aesthetic) Artistic Value’. The Philosophical
Quarterly. Vol. 63 (252) pp. 492-508
 Hanson, L. (2017) ‘Artistic Value is Attributive Goodness’. The Journal of Aestheitcs and
Art Criticism. Vol. 75 (4) pp. 415-427
 Hanson, L. (2019) ‘Two Dogmas of the Artistic-Ethical Interaction Debate’. Canadian
Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 50 (2) pp. 209-222
 Horton, R. (2013) ‘Criteria of Negro Art’. The Literature of Propaganda. Vol. 1 pp. 307-
309
 Hulatt, O. eds. (2013) Aesthetic and Artistic Autonomy. New York: Bloomsbury
Academic
 Kant, I. (1987) Critique of Judgement translated by Werner Pluhar. Cambridge: Hackett
Publishing Company.
 Kieran, M. (2003) ‘Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Immoralism’ in Bermudez,
L., Gardner, S. eds. (2003) Art and Morality London: Routledge
 Kulka, T. (2005) ‘Forgeries and Art Evaluation: An Argument for Dualism in
Aesthetics’. The Journal of Aesthetic Education. Vol. 39 (3) pp. 58-70
 Lopes, D. (2013) ‘The Myth of (Non-Aesthetic) Artistic Value’. The Philosophical
Quarterly. Vol. 61 (244) pp. 518-536
 Lopes, D. (2018) Being for Beauty. Oxford: Oxford University Press
 Matravers, D. (2014) Introducing Philosophy of Art: in Eight Case Studies London:
Routledge
 McGregor, R. (2014) ‘A Critique of the Value Interaction Debate’. British Journal of
Aesthetics. Vol. 54 (4) pp. 449-466
 Parsons, G., Carlson, A. (2008) Functional Beauty. Oxford: Oxford University Press
 Ryle, G. (1949/2009) The Concept of Mind: 60th Anniversary Edition Oxford:
Routledge
 Sauchelli, A. (2012) ‘Ethicism and Immoral Cognitivism: Gaut versus Kieran on Art and
Morality’. The Journal of Aesthetic Education. Vol. 46 (3) pp. 107-118
 Shelley, J. (2003) ‘The Problem of Non-Perceptual Art’. British Journal of Aesthetics.
Vol. 43 (4) pp. 363-378
 Shelley, J. (2019) ‘The Default Theory of Aesthetic Value’. British Journal of
Aesthetics. Vol. 59 (1) pp. 1-12
 Sibley, F. (1959) ‘Aesthetic Concepts’. Philosophical Review. Vol. 68 (4) pp. 421-450
 Sibley, F. (2001) Approach to Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
 Simoniti, V. (2018) ‘Assessing Socially Engaged Art’. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism. Vol. 76 (1) pp. 71-82
 Simoniti, V. (2021) ‘Art as Political Discourse’. British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 61 (4)
pp. 559-574
 Stecker, R. (2019) Intersections of Value: Art, Nature, and the Everyday. Oxford:
Oxford University Press
 Stolnitz, J. (1960) Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism. Boston: Houghton Miffin
 Stolnitz, J. (1978) ‘”The Aesthetic Attitude” in the Rise of Modern Aesthetics’. The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. Vol. 36 (4) pp. 409-422
 Stolnitz, J. (1992) ‘On the Cognitive Triviality of Art’. British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol.
32 (3) pp. 191-200
 Thomson-Jones, K. (2005) ‘Inseparable Insight: Reconciling Cognitivism and
Formalism in Aesthetics’. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. Vol. 63 (4) pp.
375-384
 Van der Berg, S. (2019) ‘Aesthetic hedonism and its critics’. Philosophy Compass. Vol.
15 (1) e12645
 

Author Information
Harry Drummond
Email: harry.drummond@liverpool.ac.uk
University of Liverpool
U.K.
Meaning of Art

The word ‘Art’ is derived from the Greek word ‘ ar ‘ which means to create, to make,
or to fit.
Here also ‘art’ has two meaning:
Art is creation of beauty which gives pleasure.
As some special ability, some skill, some craft.

4 core values

1. Appreciating similarities and celebrating different sets

2. Respect for self and other
3. Social responsibility
4. Learning with fun and without barries

Introduction
Art is a part of human life by birth. Art has been following humans like a shadow.
Without art
humans cannot imagine life’s origin. It is only art which teaches a lesson of culture to
persons. In
18th and 19th century we come to know that how art has contributed in shaping the
human life. In
Vedic era it was found to be developed in special forms. During present times also
women in
villages paint their house walls and floor with beautiful natural colours’ by drawing
birds,
animal, flowers and plants. On the other hand, people living in villages have simple
life away
from certifiable outlooks and brands. Special kind of decorations, kind of shapes
painted of walls
and floors, explains the inner, beauty of simple people and their imaginations which is
expressed
through creativity. Utensils and such articles and playing stuff are made from wood
and waste
material i.e. piece of cloth any dry grass. Art cannot be expressed in few words, it is a
broad
concept. Art is followed by every breath of men. Whatever a person does in his daily
life, is art.

Aims of Arts
1.
Art develops the aesthetic sense some of the child. He deals with beauty and learns to
recognize beauty. He becomes able to tell the difference in beautiful and ugly. By an
by
the child is able to keep into the inner beauty and does not deceived by the surface
beauty. Inner beauty is the character of the object the child has observed.
2.
Art works as co- ordinate in all the senses of the child. When the child is doing work
of
art his heads. The others sense like sense of sight sense of hearing, sense of touch etc
all
are at work.
3.
Child is born with fourteen instincts and as many emotions attached with them. Art
trains
the emotions, in desirable ways, and saves the child in becoming emotional in his
coming
life, child in growing age feels some movement in his growing part of body.
4.
Arts helps in cultivating self-discipline. The child, at its tender age, has extra energy
and
that energy should be utilized in a desirable manner. Art provides a right direction and
a
proper channel for tidal flow of such energy. Child is well absorbed in the works of
art
because he goes on producing something. He expresses whatever he thinks in his
mind by
doing so he satisfies his creative urge.
5.
Through arts child develops a desirable character. He becomes disciplined, co –
operative, flexible, adjustable and able to face the difficulties of life. His anger is
subsidies he is never proud, becomes soft spoken and never harsh with anybody.
6.
Art inculcate power of expression, artistic personality and creative power. Such
virtues
are very useful in later life. As a student the child creates new forms, new designs and
compositions.
7.
An art develops love for world and cultivates national and international
understanding.
When child examines the classical and traditional art of India, in exhibitions, he
compares it with the art of other countries.

ART FOR EDUCATION

Keeping student in school

According to Davis 3, some student find School frustrating and one thing skipping
them in school is the classroom they enjoy.
Often find with art giving student a boost of confidence on average one fourth of the
student who are currently in our high school will not graduate

4 core values

5. Appreciating similarities and celebrating different sets

6. Respect for self and other
7. Social responsibility
8. Learning with fun and without barries