Defining the Client in the Public Sector: A Social-Exchange Perspective

Author(s): John Alford

Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2002), pp. 337-346
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 Alford
John
ofMelbourne
University

Defining inthePublicSector:
theClient
A Social-ExchangePerspective

Government urge
reformers "customer
ofa private-sector-style
theadoption butcritics
focus,-- see
tothepublic
itas inappropriate inparticular
sector, because itdevalues
citizenship. article
This
argues
first that most
public-sector interactions
organization-client from
differ theprivate-sector
customer andoffers
transaction ofthese
a topology interactions. itproposes
Butsecond, that
the
centralfeature model-the
ofthecustomer notionofexchange-can bebroadened ina waythat
accentuates ofadministrators'
theimportance totheir
responsiveness Ina social-exchange
publics.
needthings
organizations
government
perspective, from service as cooperation
recipients-such
andcompliance-which are for
crucial effective performance;
organizational those
eliciting things
necessitates notonly
meeting material
people's needsbutalsotheir andnormative
symbolic ones.
in
Engagingthese forms
different ofexchangewith is
clients not necessarily with
inconsistent an
active model.
citizenship

Introduction
Undoubtedly, thecustomer is sovereign forgovernmentbateis a lackofagreement on theverytermsthatapplyto
reformers attheendofthecentury. Underthemarket mod- themembers ofthepublicwithwhomgovernment organi-
els of Reagan and Thatcher, or Clinton's"Reinventingzationsinteract. Labels suchas "customer," "consumer,"9
Government" andBlair's"ThirdWay,""customer focus" "client,""user,'"stakeholder," "citizen,'"taxpayer," or"the
hasbeena burgeoning themeinpublicmanagement (OECD public"areusedinalmostas manywaysas therearewrit-
1987;Flynn1990;Scrivens1991;Wagenheim andReurink ersaboutthem.
1991;Walsh1991;Swiss1992;OsborneandGaebler1992; This articleis a contribution to takingthedebatefor-
Gore1993;BarzelayandMoukhebir1996). ward.First,I buildonthepublicadministration literature's
Thisdevelopment offers an antidote to popularstereo- criticisms of thecustomer model,to offera typologyof
typesofbureaucracy-red tape,officious administrators, themembers ofthepublicwithwhomgovernment agen-
longqueues,and drabuniformity of services.However, cies deal.Thesecriticisms havebeenwidelyaired,butthe
despitetheclaimedattraction of morecustomer-respon- typology brings themtogether ina newframework formak-
sivepublicservices,suchnotionssituneasilywiththepub- ingsenseoforganization-public relationships. In thepro-
lic administrationliterature.Some writersquestionthe cess,I putforward a glossaryoftermsfordescribing dif-
validityofthe"customer" conceptinthespecificcircum- ferent categories withinthepublic.
stancesof thepublicsector(Stewartand Ranson 1988; Butsecond,I proposethatoneofthecrucialfeatures of
Pollitt1990; Swiss 1992;Frederickson 1992,1997; Moe thecustomer model-thenotionofexchange-canbe re-
1994;LynchandMarkusen1994;Pegnato1997;Patterson castina waythatunderlines theimportance ofgovernment
1998).Theypointto a varietyof waysin whichthecus- agencies'responsiveness to theirpublics.This entailsa
tomernotiondoesnotadequately characterizetherelation- broader typeofexchangethantherestricted economicform
shipsbetweengovernment organizations andmembers of
JohnAlfordisa professorofpublicsectormanagement intheMelbourne
thepublic.In particular,it is seen as devaluingcitizens, BusinessSchool, ofMelbourne,
University Hehaspublished
Australia. on
reducing themtopassiverecipients ofservicesrather performance
relationships,
than client-organization monitoring, by
governing
strategic
public management, andpublic-sector man-
personnel
activeagents(Frederickson 1997; Schachter1997; King contract,
agement.He istheco-editor
ofTheContract State:Public
Management and
and Stivers1998; Patterson 1998). Complicating thede- theKennettGovernment (1994).Email:j.alford@mbs.unimelb.edu.au.

inthePublic
theClient
Defining A Social-Exchange
Sector: 337
Perspective

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ofthecustomer transaction.Servicerecipients areconcerned or shewantsto obtainorconsumeit.(Implicitly, thecus-
notonlyabouttheconsumption ofmaterial values,butalso tomercanmakerational judgments, communicate themto
abouttherealizationof symbolic,social,and normative thefirm, andtakedelivery oftheproduct.) Thisis notthe
ones.Government agencieshaveto respondto thosecon- samethingas sayingthatthecustomer has a positivepref-
cerns,notonlybecausetheyaremandated bytheirpolitical erencefortheparticular firmproviding thatservice.Fi-
mastersto do so, butalso because theyneed to elicita nally,as longas it earnsa profit on each transaction, the
broaderrange of thingsfromservice recipientsthan firmseekstomaximize sales ofgoodsorservices-thatis,
money-suchas information, cooperation, compliance, and itwantstoengageinas manyexchangesas itcan-either
co-production, whicharecrucialforeffective organizationalbyincreasing thenumber ofcustomers orbygaining"re-
performance. Encouragingthesedifferent formsof ex- peatbusiness"fromthesamecustomers.
changeis consistent witha modelofactivecitizenship. Thistypeoftransaction is whatsocial-exchange theo-
ristscall "restrictedeconomicexchange,"whichtheysee
as onlyone amongseveraldifferent typesof exchange.
TheCustomer inthePrivate Sector However,economistsand management scholarstendto
Management reformers' archetypal customer is onethat viewitas theonlytype.Buttheinteractions betweengov-
is engagedina market exchangewitha private firm, which ernment organizations and membersof thepublicdiffer
constitutes a relevant startingpointforthisanalysis.Inthis from theprivate-sector customer exchangeinseveralways.
exchange,thecustomer performs twofunctions, whichI These differences correspond to therolesperformed by
distinguish forthepurposesofthisanalysis: members ofthepublic,whichcan be assembledintoa ty-
1. Expressing a preference as towhatvalueheorshewants pologyoforganization-public relationships.
fromthefirm.This entailsfirst forming a preference,
thatis, decidingwhatparticular productor serviceis
desired.Typically, thismeanschoosingfromamonga A Typology ofOrganization-Public
predetermined "menu"ofcompeting product offerings,Relations hips
andtherefore thecustomer's roleis passive.Butsome- Therearetwosetsof differences betweenprivate-sec-
times,itinvolvesconceiving andarticulating a specifi- torcustomers andthe"publics"ofgovernment organiza-
cationofthedesiredgoodorservice,andtothatextent tions.The firsthas to do withwhoperforms theprimary
it is a moreactiverole.Second,it entailsgivingsub- functions referredto above-expressingpreferences and
stanceto thepreference bypayingthesupplierforthe receivinggoods or services-whilethesecondconcerns
goodorservice.Bypaying,thecustomer imparts a jus- thenatureofthosefunctions.
tification forthefirmto supplytheproduct.In econo- In a private-sector transaction, bothare performed by
mists'terms, demandbecomeseffective demand.Con- thesame person:thecustomer. But in thepublicsector,
sequently,customerdemandprovidesthe definitive theyareasymmetrically dividedbetweentwocategories of
signalto a privatefirmaboutwhatvalue it shouldbe actors-thecitizenry andclients-whotogether constitute
producing. The morepeoplewho are willingto back theprimary distinctionin thistypology. On theone hand,
up theirchoicewithharddollars,themoreit makes thevaluedelivered bygovernment is "consumed"bothby
senseforthefirmtoproduce. citizens(whoreceivepublicvalue)andbyclients(whore-
2. Consumingthegood or service,thatis, receivingit ceiveprivate value).On theotherhand,thefunction ofex-
fromthe supplierand derivingvalue fromusingor pressing preferences aboutwhatvalueshouldbe produced
enjoyingit. (including howit shouldbe paid for)is primarily carried
Severalconditionsof thistransaction are noteworthy.outby thecitizenry through thedemocratic politicalpro-
First,itis a reciprocalprocessinwhichthecustomer pro- cess. Putanother way,thecitizenry has thedominant say
videsmoney, totheamountofthepurchaseprice,inreturn notonlyaboutpublicvaluebutalso abouttheprivate value
forthegoods or servicesprovidedby thefirm.Second, thattheclientsare to consume.As a result,thenatureof
bothpartiesreceiveprivatevalue.Thegoodorservicecan organization-public relationships inthepublicsectoris very
be consumedbythecustomer individually,andthemoney different fromthoseintheprivatesector.
can be appropriated by thefirm.Consequently, theex-
changeis direct,inthesensethatthecustomer's moneyis The Citizenry
explicitly relatedto theprivatevaluehe or she receives. In a democracy, thefunction ofexpressing preferences
Third,thecustomer normally has a choiceamonga num- aboutthevaluethatgovernment organizations shouldpro-
berofcompeting suppliersoftheproduct, oratleastamong duceis performed primarily bythecitizenry. Citizenshave
a number ofcompeting substitutes.Moreover, thecustomer theultimate determinant voiceaboutwhatthegovernment
hasa positivepreferenceforthegoodorservice, thatis,he anditsagenciesshoulddo,expressed through theprocesses

338 Public
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2002,Vol.62,No.3

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ofpoliticaldeliberation andrepresentation. Thisis analo- ernments oftenfailto articulatecrispmandatesforpublic
gousto theprivate-customer function ofexpressing pref- agencies,leavingtheirposition vague,internally contradic-
erencesaboutwhatgoodsor servicesshouldbe produced tory, or simplyunaddressed. Consequently, publicmanag-
bythefirm, insofaras thewillofthecitizenry constitutesersfindthat,simplyin orderto do theirjobs,theyneedto
an authoritativejudgment thatlegitimizes thevaluesreal- engagewithpoliticians andothers intheir politicalenviron-
ized ordeliveredbygovernment organizations. However, mentin adviceandadvocacyto prompt thecrystallization
itis verydifferentfromthecustomer function ina number ofworkable policies(Moore1995;Reich1988).
ofimportant respects. Collectivechoice is an imperfect expressionof indi-
Mostsignificant is thatthecitizenry is,atleastto some vidualcitizens'expectations ofgovernment, sincethepref-
degree,a collectivity. It is as citizensthatindividuals re- erencesofthoseintheminority areoverruled. Indeed,given
late to thesocietytheyare inescapablya partof (Pollitt thatcitizenshavemultiple concerns aboutwhichtheyhave
1990;Mintzberg 1996).Citizenship bestowsmembershipvaryingwishes,it is unlikelythatanyindividualcitizen
ina national community, whichcarrieswithitcertain rights will be satisfiedwithall thepoliciesof a givengovern-
andresponsibilities, defining whattheindividualandthe ment(Arrow1963).Despitetheimperfections ofthedemo-
community canexpectfromeachother(Held 1984;Faulks craticpoliticalprocess,itis stillthebestwayhumansoci-
1998). The rangeof thoserightsand responsibilities can etieshavedevisedforrepresenting thedesiresof citizens
varyfromtheciviltothepoliticaltothesocialsphere,and and providesthemostauthoritative signalsto publicad-
withitthedomainthatis "public"or collectivein nature ministrators as to what theyshould do. As Winston
(Marshall1950; Ransonand Stewart1994). Determina- Churchillput it,"... democracyis the worstformof gov-
tionbythecitizenry ofwhatgovernment anditsagencies ernment exceptall thoseotherformsthathavebeentried
shoulddo,andhenceoftheextent ofthepublicdomain,is fromtimeto time"(1947,inPartington 1992).
inherently a collectivechoice. Choosinga good or serviceis nottheonlyfacetofex-
This collectivechoiceis notsimplyan aggregation of pressingpreferences thatis differentin thepublicsector;
the preferencesof individualcitizens (Carroll 1995; theotheris payingforit.In theprivatesector,whencus-
Pegnato1997). Such an aggregation wouldbe verydiffi- tomerspay forproducts, theyare simultaneously signal-
cultto achievebecause each citizenhas different wants ingtheirpreferences forthem,andtheydo so moreorless
and aspirations. Collectivechoices,therefore, are neces- voluntarily. But thepictureis less clear-cutin thepublic
sarilytheoutcomeofpoliticalinteraction anddeliberation,sector.Strictly speaking,government activityis paid for
inwhichcitizensortheirrepresentatives engagewitheach by taxpayers, who coincidelargelybutnotexactlywith
otherin advocacy,debate,and negotiation(Lynchand thecitizenry. Individualtaxpayers do notnecessarily en-
Markusen1994; Patterson1998). Sometimesthesepro- dorsethevalue theyare payingfor,and,indeed,do not
cesses manageto reconcileconflictsor identify conver- necessarily payvoluntarily.Rather, theyarelegallyobliged
gentinterests, butoftentheydo not.Whentheydon't,the to pay,sometimesagainsttheirwill.However,decisions
politicalprocessfollowssomeprocedure, usuallyenshrined as towhowillpaytaxesandhowmucheachtaxpayer will
in a constitution,forarriving at an authoritative determi- payultimately aremadethrough thepoliticalprocess,by
nationbywhicha particular policyoptionis chosenfrom thesame people who determine whatvalue government
amonga numberofalternatives. Typically, theprocedure willproduce:thecitizenry. Although anindividual taxpayer
in
is one whichthepreferences the
of majority, construed to
maynotwant spendmoneyon theparticular services
moreorless validly,aresaidtoprevail.Theseprocedures delivered bya government agency, themajority oftheciti-
andtheirconstitutional expressionarethemselves there- zenrymaysupport oratleastacquiesceinthem.
sultof deliberation by citizensand theirrepresentatives, The secondcustomer function is consuming thevalue
bothin framing theminitially and in revisingthemfrom producedby thesupplier.In thepublicsector,boththe
timetotime. citizenry andtheclientsconsumevalueproducedbygov-
Fromthepointof view of anyparticular governmenternment, buteach receivesa different typeofvalue.The
agency,therefore, collectivechoiceis a mediatedprocess citizenry receivespublic value,whereasclientsreceive
becauseitis articulated through thechannelsofrepresenta-privatevalue.
tivegovernment. Theagencyreceivesitsmandate fromthe Publicvalue is necessarily consumedor enjoyedcol-
electedgovernment, notdirectly from thecitizenry.Thefact lectively, whichis whythecitizenry's choicesaboutitare
thatcitizenselectthegovernment givesthemanagers ofa collectiveones.In itsmoreaustereform, itcomprises ben-
particularorganization goodreasontobe sensitive totheir efitsthat individuals can receive only through collective
concerns, butthegovernment has theformalauthority to provision, suchas law andorder(without whichthemar-
determine itsmandate-andin theprocess,togivegreater ketcannotfunction), andremediestomarket failures,such
weight tosomecitizenconcerns thanothers. Ofcourse,gov- as publicgoods,externalities, or distributional inequity

Defining
theClient
inthePublic
Sector:
ASocial-Exchange
Perspective
339

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(StokeyandZeckhauser1974; Stewart andRanson1988, thantogenerate greater demand(Flynn1990,134;Walsh
17; Walsh1991, 14-15; Hughes1994; SmithandHunts- 1991,14).Atthesametime,itimposesparticular concep-
man1997).In thesecases,government intervention isjus- tionsoffairness in thewayitrationsbyapplying eligibil-
tifiedbecause,withoutit,individualswouldnotreceive ityrulesthatprescribe whodeservesservicesandwhodoes
thevaluetheywantforthemselves. not(Pollitt1990, 127-28) and thatimposemoreor less
Butthe"preferences" ofindividual citizensarenotsim- onerousobligations on clients.
plyexpressionsofthevaluetheymightwishtoconsume Finally,theassumption thatthecustomer has a positive
themselvesas a resultof governmental action.Citizens preference fortheservicedoes nothold whenthe"ser-
have desiresor aspirationsforthesocietyas a whole- vice" entailscoercingthe"client"againsthis or herwill
thatis, conceptionsof how thingsshouldbe ordered,of (Pollitt1990;Pegnato1997;Patterson 1998).Considerthe
who shouldgetwhat,or newvaluesthatshouldbe real- "clients"ofa prison:theprisoners. Typically,theyhavea
ized-that are foundedin social or normative commit- definite aversionto theservicebeingdelivered-indeed,
mentsorgoals. In itssharpestform,somecitizensmight someof themare activelyengagedin trying to avoidre-
supporta particular policy,eventhoughtheypersonally ceivingit(Lamb 1987;Flynn1990;Moore1994).In fact,
lose outfromitsimplementation, because theysee it as thiselement ofcoercionappearsintheworkofmanytypes
inherently worthwhile or beneficialto the societyas a ofpublicorganizations, notjustthoseengagedin law en-
whole-for example,a richpersonsupporting progres- forcement. Moore (1994, 301) employstheusefulterm
siveincometax,or a childlesspersonadvocatinggreater "obligatees"to characterize thesemembersof thepublic
publicexpenditure on education. whomtheorganization is subjectingto legal obligations.
More obviousexamplesincludeprisonersand thosear-
Clients restedbythepolice.Buttheyalso includepeoplesubject
Although citizensrelatetothegovernment organization totherequirements ofregulatory agencies,andindeedall
thoseitdealswithatits"business
collectively, end"(Moore who deal with government organizations thatmakesome
1995) in moredirectinteractions lookmorelikethecus- use ofpublicpoweras partoftheirwork(Sparrow1994;
tomersin theprivate-sector marketexchange,becauseit Moore1995,37).
dealswiththemas individuals. Buttheirrelationships with
theorganization areofvarying types,constituted bysome A Typology
mixture ofthreedifferent roles. Thesedifferent rolescan be classifiedin a typology of
One roleis thatofpayingcustomer, just likethaten- organization-public relationships.In thistypology, there
countered byprivate-sector firms.Forexample, masstransit is a primary distinctionbetweenthosewhoreceivepublic
commuters directly exchangemoneyforsubwayor bus value fromthegovernment organization-citizens-and
trips,theyhavea positivepreference fortheserviceatthe thosewhohavetheirprivatevalueaffected-clients. The
in
price question,and the transitauthority seeks to maxi- latter
category comprises thosewith whom theagency deals
mize itsclientele(and henceitsfarerevenues)withinits atits"businessend"(Moore1995),its"public-in-contact"
costconstraints. However,theclientsofpublicorganiza- (Blau and Scott1963,59) withwhomit has moredirect
tionsare hardlyever,if at all, solelypayingcustomers. interactions. Withinthatcategory, a secondary distinction
Mass transit systemsaretypically subsidizedbythepub- is drawnamongthreeroles:payingcustomers, beneficia-
lic pursebecausetheycreatepublicvalue,suchas mitiga- ries,and obligatees.Of course,in any givenactivityor
tionof trafficcongestionand airpollution(Maddisonet transaction, a government organizationis interacting with
al. 1995;Delucchi1997).To theextent theyaresubsidized, at leasttwoof theseroles,and in theprocessis simulta-
commutersreceivepartof the servicewithoutpaying neouslyaffecting bothprivateandpublicvalue.Members
moneydirectly. of thepublicare bothcitizensand clients,and as clients
In fact,mostpublic-sector consumers do notpaymoney theymay,forexample,be bothpayingcustomers andben-
inreturn fortheservice,andconsequently thereis no eco- eficiaries,orbeneficiaries andobligatees.
nomicexchangebetweentheorganization andtheclient- In thistypology, onlythepayingcustomerseemsto
forexample,pupilsatgovernment schoolsorsocialsecu- conform totheprivate-sector market model-and thatrole
rityrecipients (Scrivens1991; Lamb 1987; Stewartand is alwaysmixedwithsomeotherthatdoes notconform.
Ranson 1988). Consumersin thesecases are betterde- All of theotherrolesdivergefromit in one or morere-
scribedas beneficiaries who receivea serviceor benefit spects.In thecase ofthecitizenry, thecollectivenatureof
butgiveno moneydirectly totheorganization inreturn.In thevalueprovided vitiatesthelinkbetweenindividual pay-
suchcases,theorganization cannotbe said tobe seeking mentand benefit, thereby makingtheexchangeindirect.
tomaximizesales.Instead,itsconcernis torationitsser- Beneficiaries andobligateesdo notpaymoneyfortheser-
vices,whicharelimitedbyitsbudgetary resources, rather vice, and therefore thereis no directexchange.Further,

340 Public
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obligateescannotbe saidtohavea positivepreference for tinctively publiccategoriesofcitizens,beneficiaries, and
theservice.In short, themembers ofthepublicwithwhom obligatees.
government agenciesdealdo notexhibit theessentialchar- First,social exchangeacknowledgesa broaderset of
acteristicsofcustomers. "thingsthatcan be exchanged"thanonlytangibleitems
The proponents ofmarketand customer-focus models suchas moneyorgoodsandservices.Forexample,people
attempt toovercomethisreality bycallingforclientswho maygiveeachotherthings thathavesymbolic significance,
currently do notpay forservicesto be transformed into such as havingtheirparticular statusrecognizedor en-
payingcustomers by givingthemvouchersor otherdis- hanced;thathaveintrinsic value,suchas friendship orre-
cretionary funds,withwhichtheycan actas purchasers in spect;or thathavemoralor normative value,suchas af-
themarket fortheirservices(Savas 1977;ChubbandMoe firming fairness.In fact,socialexchangecan be anything
1990;OsborneandGaebler1992).Butsuchmeasuresare thepartiesvalue.One implication ofthisis thatexchanges
onlyapplicabletobeneficiaries, nottoobligatees, as even arenotconfined to thosebetweenbuyersand sellers,but
OsborneandGaeblerrecognize(1992, 186). In anycase, can occurbetweenanytypesofparties.
evenifvoucherswork,theydo noteliminatetheroleof Second,socialexchangecaninvolvemorethantwopar-
thebeneficiary; all theydo is displaceit.Whenpublic- tiesandmorecomplexformsofreciprocity. The private-
housingtenantsreceivevouchersinsteadof directly pro- markettransaction is an exampleof whatLevi-Strauss
vided housing,theyare stillbeneficiaries-butof the ([1949] 1969) definesas "restricted exchange":It occurs
voucher-giving agencyrather thanthehousingprovider. betweenonlytwopartieswhohavea mutually reciprocal
In summary, theprivate-sector customer modelhaslim- relationship. In restrictedexchange,thepartiesattempt to
itedvalidityinthepublic-sector context;therefore,a cus- maintain especiallyinrepeatable
equality, exchanges.The
tomerfocusbased on economicexchangeis of doubtful prevailing normis thatneither shouldseek"togainadvan-
usefulnessin government. However,to rejecta focuson tage at the expense of theother ... [A] breachoftheruleof
exchangewouldbe to turnourbackson a usefulwayof equalityleads to emotionalreactions"(Ekeh 1974, 51).
thinking aboutrelations between government organizationsReciprocity underthisruleis typically confinedto short
andtheirclients. Themind-set associatedwithanexchange intervals: The partiesadopt a quid pro quo mentality,
ex-
focusstresses respectforthewishesofthemembers ofthe plicitlycalculating whateachis givingorreceiving inthe
publicwithwhoma government agencydeals(Thompson shortterm.
1993; Kettl1995). Whatgivesthisconceptionextrasig- However,Levi-Strauss identifies anotherformthathe
nificanceis thatpublic-sector clients-even whenthey calls "generalized exchange" ([1949] 1969,220), which
don'tpaymoneyforservices-maybe important suppli- involvesatleastthreeactorswho"do notbenefit eachother
ersof otherthingstheorganization needs,suchas infor- directly butonlyindirectly" (Ekeh 1974,48). Thisis rep-
mation,compliance, cooperation, orproductive effort.To resented, forexample,in a four-person exchangeas A -*
fosterthesecontributions, an organization mustofferthe B C D A, where means"givesto."Thissetof
-* -> -* -*
clientthingsthathe orshevalues.Thisdoesnotmeanthat exchangesdoes notentailquid proquo and can involve
clientsare Pavloviandogs who mindlesslyrespondto delayedreciprocity, buttheoverallresultovertimeis that
stimuli;theyhave mindsof theirown,and theymayor all of itsparticipants havebothgivenandreceivedsome-
maynotchoosetoprovidethesethings. Theagency, there- thingin a circularprocess.In thisprocess,reciprocity is
fore,hastoworkatobtaining theirconsentandmusttryto notmutualbutunivocal.
be as cognizantas possibleofwhattheywant(Kotler1972). Bothaspectsofsocialexchange-itsbroadersetofval-
ues exchangedand its generalizednature-typically en-
tailmorediffuseand deferred reciprocity thaneconomic
A Broader Notion ofExchange exchange.Exchanging lesstangible valuesmeansthatcal-
Whatis needed,therefore, is to disentangle theessen- culationoftheprecisebenefits givenandreceivedis more
tiallyusefulnotionofexchangefromthedistinctively pri- difficult, whereasgeneralized exchangenecessarily entails
vate-sector confinesof themarket.A way of doingso delayedreciprocity. Insteadof havinga short-term quid
emergesfromsocial-exchange theory, an important body proquo mentality, peoplehopetheymaybenefitat some
ofthought foundedin anthropology and sociology(Ekeh unspecifiedtimein thefuture, and obligationsare dis-
1974;Turner1982).In thecourseofresearchanddebates chargedless preciselyand overtime.Such relationships
sinceWorldWarI, contending theorists haveextended the dependon trustbetweentheparties,"thebeliefthatindi-
idea ofexchangeconsiderably (Frazer1919;Malinowski vidualsare creditworthy and can be trusted to payback
1922; Mauss [1925] 1954; Levi-Strauss[1949] 1969; whattheyowe" (Ekeh 1974,59).
Homans1961,1962;Blau 1964;Ekeh1974).Thesebroad- At thispoint,theskepticmightquestionwhether such
enedexchangeconceptscanbe usefully appliedtothedis- processescan legitimately be characterized as exchange.

Defining
theClient
inthePublic
Sector:
ASocial-Exchange
Perspective
341

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Theyseema longwayfromAdamSmith'sfamouschar- Take thecase of welfarerecipients. The agencypays
acterizationof barter:"Give me thatwhichI want,and benefits torecipients, notintheexpectation theywillgive
you shallhavethiswhichyouwant"([1776] 1970, 118). itmoneyinreturn, butrather tofulfill a mandateendowed
Indeed,social-exchange theoristssuchas Homans(1961, uponitthrough thepoliticalprocessbythecitizenry. The
1962) havetakenissuewiththenotionofgeneralized ex- citizenryreceivespublicvaluein return fortheauthority
change,insisting thatexchangecanbe seenonlyas a two- andresourcesitbestowson theagency.First,itreceivesa
partyinteraction.'Butitshouldbe recognizedthatgener- kindof social insurance: Everycitizencan feelreassured
alizedexchangeis notjusta theoretical construct. It is an thata safetynetis present. It also receivesa mitigation of
empirical observableinnumerous
reality, anthropologicalnegativeexternalities in thatpeoplewhohavesomeform
fieldstudies(Malinowski1922;Levi-Strauss [1949]1969; of incomesupportare less likelyto engagein theft or to
Ekeh1974).Moreimportantly, itembodiesthesamecriti- sleepinthedoorways ofmiddle-class taxpayers. Less eco-
cal elementofreciprocity as restrictedexchange:thatthe nomicis thesocialcohesionthatthecitizenry secures,in
givingbyeachpartyto theexchangeis conditionalupon thattheverypoorareless likelyto be alienatedfromthe
thatoftheotherparties,albeitnotas precisely. Inrestrictedsocialorder-andtherefore lesslikelytoengageinactsof
exchange,whether eachactoris willingtogivesomething rebellion-iftheyperceivethatitwillprovidethemwitha
is directlyconditional upon whether theotheractorhas basicmeansofexistence.Thishas beenan explicitratio-
alreadygivenorwillgivesomething inreturn. In general- nale forsocial welfareforcenturies (Pivenand Cloward
ized exchange,each actor'swillingness to giveis height- 1972;Gough1979).Attheotherendofthescale arenor-
ened by his or herperception thatotheractorshave al- mativeandsymbolic values,suchas theaffirmation ofthe
readygivenor are likelyto givesomething as partof the humanrights ofthosewhoareunemployed anddisadvan-
circularprocess.Thus,whenA givestoB, A hasan expec- taged,and of thecivilizednatureof thesocietyin which
tationthatB will thereby be prompted to giveto C, and we live.
thatat somestagein thefuture someonein thecyclewill Atfirstsight,thispublicvaluecouldbe seenas partofa
giveback to A. If B does notgiveto someoneelse, and directexchangebetweenthecitizenry andthewelfarede-
continuesnotto do so, thenas thisbecomesapparent, A partment: The citizenry providesmoneyforwelfarepay-
willbe lessinclinedtogivetoB. Whatwillencourage A to ments,and in return receivespublicbenefits. But it also
B
expect to giveis thepresenceof norms the
among par- could be seen in terms of a less direct exchange. In return
tiesthatattachvaluetothegrouptheycomprise, itsrules, fortheirwelfarechecks,clientsdo notreciprocate directly
and itscommonpurposes.Thesenorms,whichunderpin tothewelfare department, butindirectly tothecommunity
whatPutnam(1995) calls social capital,will in turnbe at largein theirmyriadactsof"consent"to thesocialor-
fostered bytheexperienceofsuccessfulreciprocity. der and its laws. To theextenttheydo so, thecitizenry
Thisbroadened conception ofexchangesuggestsa way perceivesthatthewelfare department is doingitsjob prop-
ofthinking aboutbeneficiaries andobligateesas clients, erly,and in turnit bestowsitsconsentand resourceson
and whyitmightbe important and usefulforpublicad- thatdepartment.
ministrators to be responsiveto themeven thoughthey In social-exchange terms,thiscan be characterized as
are notthesame as payingcustomers. It also helpssitu- generalized exchange:The government organization pro-
ate theirrolesin relationto thoseofcitizens.Let us take videspublicvalueto thecitizenry in theveryact ofpro-
each in turn. vidingprivatevalueto itsbeneficiary clients.Thisgener-
alized exchangeis diffuseand deferredin nature;the
citizenrydoes notexpectto appropriate thepublicvalue
Exchange and Beneficiaries immediately, nordoes itcalculateitinpreciseterms.
We havenotedthatbeneficiaries do notpaymoneyfor
thebenefits orservicestheyreceive.Viewedfromthisref-
erencepoint,government agencieshaveno financialin- Exchange andObligatees
centivetopayattention toclients'needs.Theymaybe re- Theotherbusiness-end role,whichdepartsfromthatof
sponsivetoclientsbecauseoftheprofessional orpersonal payingcustomer, is thatofobligated. Herethe"client"does
normsof theirstaff,buttheyhave no vestedinterest in notreceivevaluedgoods,buton thecontrary usuallyre-
doinganything forthembeyondtheirlegislative mandate ceiveswhatheorshereasonably regards as "bads."A pris-
andadministrative rules.However, ifwe acknowledge that oner,forexample,mainlyreceivestherestraint ofliberty.
beneficiary-serving agenciesareengagedinexchangepro- A prisonis notseekingtoobtainrepeatbusiness, andthere-
cessesinvolving morecomplexsetsofvaluesandparties, forethesatisfaction ofinmatesis notitsfirstobjective.It
thenorganizations mayfinditintheirinterest toservecli- seemsquitewrongina descriptive sense,therefore, tocall
entsas wellas possible. obligateesclients.However, thefactthatmanyregulatory

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andenforcement agenciesdo so (Sparrow1994) suggests In the process of engagingin this exchange with
theremaybe something usefulabouttheidea.Wecanmake obligatees, theagencyalsoparticipates inonewiththeciti-
senseofthisif,following social-exchange theory, we ac- zenry. Inreturnfortheirauthority andresources, theagency
knowledge a broader setofvaluesthatmight be exchanged. providesthemwithpublicvalue. In general,thispublic
In thisbroaderconception, theclientprovidesnotmoney value consistsof compellingmembersof societyto act
butcompliance-specifically, positiveactionsthatarecon- consistently withlaws,whichareusuallyenactedinorder
sistentwiththeorganization's requirements. The organi- to enhancepublicvalue. It also includesprovidingthe
zationis seekingnotrepeatsalesbutongoingcompliance, meansto punishbreachesof suchlaws. Fromtheopera-
without whichitcannoteffectively function. tionofa prison,thecitizenry receivesa guarantee thatits
One wayforan agencyto securethatcomplianceis to lawshaveteeth,as wellas reassurance thatdangerousof-
displayor exerciseitscapacityto applycoercivepowers fendersare keptout of thecommunity whiletheyare a
in
againstthosewhodo notcooperate, theexpectation to
that threat society and the prospect ofrehabilitating them.It
obligateeswillperceivethelikelysanctionsto outweigh also receivesnormative value in theformof affirmation
thebenefits theymight gainfrom noncompliance. Theprob- thatitsprisonsexhibittheattributes ofa fairandjustsoci-
lem withthisapproachis thatif obligateesare willfully etyinthemanner oftheiroperation.Thus,theprisonagency
resistant,securing complianceis verycostly.Forexample, is engagedin exchangesbothwiththecitizenry and with
it is difficultto operatea prisonunlesstheprisonersat itsinmates.
leastacquiescein itsprocedures and routines.If theydo In fact,veryrarelyis a specificpersonsolelya benefi-
not,prisonmanagement mustdeploymoreprisonofficers ciaryor an obligated.Typicallyhe or she playsbothof
andinstallandmaintain moreelaboratefacilities (Wilson theserolesat thesame time.Take,forinstance,welfare
1989,18).A similarargument canbe advancedaboutother recipients.They are not only beneficiaries,but also
agencieswhosefunction is toimposelegalobligations. If obligatees.This arisesbecause servicesto beneficiaries
theobligateesareresistant, creating complianceis costly are rationedusingeligibility criteria,whichthewelfare
(Diver 1980;BardachandKagan 1982; Grabosky1995). department has toenforce.Prospective orcurrent benefi-
The challenge,therefore, is to elicitfromthemsomede- ciariesmustreportdetailsof theircircumstances-such
greeofcooperation withtheagency. as otherincome,dependents, ormedicalconditions-hon-
Cooperationis likelyto be forthcoming to theextent estlyand accuratelyand refrainfromclaimingbenefits
theagencytreatstheobligateesin a customer-like man- whentheyarenoteligible.To theextenttheyare subject
ner,withintheconfinesofitscoerciverole(Lipsky1980, to theserules,benefitrecipients are also obligatees,and
58-59). Thismeansunderstanding obligatees'needsand thewelfaredepartment has theresponsibility to secure
rightsand seekingto satisfythemto theextentitcan do theircompliancewiththeserules.It can applycoercive
so, givenitsprimary responsibility to imposelegalobli- powers,suchas inspectionsand prosecutions, to detect
gations.In particular, itmeansapplying,andbeingseen and punish"welfarecheats."But it can also seek to un-
to apply,itscoercivepowersas faras possiblein a man- derstandthefactorsthatmakeit difficult forsomeben-
nertheobligatedregardsas fairandjust.Thereis consid- eficiaries tocomply-suchas lackofinformation orcom-
erableresearchevidencethatmostpeople will comply plexprocedures-andby addressingthemtryto makeit
withlegal sanctions,even if theyare personallydisad- easierforclientsto comply.In otherwords,it can also
vantagedbydoingso, iftheyregardthemannerinwhich elicitcompliancefromitsbeneficiaries andobligateesby
thosesanctionsareappliedas fair(Tyler1990;Ayresand treating themlikecustomers.
Braithwaite 1992).
Therewill,of course,alwaysbe some proportion of
obligateeswhoarewillfully resistant,andtheagencywill Implications forPublicManagement
haveto exercisecoercivepowersagainstthem.In doing Both beneficiaries and obligateessharewithpaying
so, itwillnotbe engaginginexchange,sinceitis notgiv- customers thefactthatatleastpartoftheir nexuswithpublic
ingtheseobligateesanything valuable,butratherdimin- organizations is one ofexchange,andforthatreasonthey
ishingthevaluetheyenjoy.The applicationof coercion, meritthelabel of "clients."Wheretheydiffer is in what
therefore, fallsoutsidethenotionofexchangeas itis prop- they exchange and the type of exchange. Both beneficia-
erlyunderstood. Rather, itis theapplication offairness in riesand obligateesprovidecooperationand compliance
dealingswithobligateesthatcan validlybe construed as withagencyrequirements and/orcitizens'expectations,
partof an exchangeprocess,in thatto treatpeoplejustly rather thanmoney. Becausecompliance enablestheagency
and respectfully is to give themsomething valuable.In to achieveitspurposesmorereadily,it is a valuablere-
return forfairness, theagencyreceivesmorewilling-or source-and sometimesa criticalone-just as customer
at leastless grudging (andless costly)compliance. revenueis toa private firm. In somecases,clientscan also

theClient
Defining Sector:
inthePublic ASocial-Exchange 343
Perspective

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
provideco-production of services(Whitaker 1980;Parks also broadervaluessuchas fairness andnormative values
et al. 1981; Brudneyand England1983), as occurs,for (Wilson1973; Moore 1995). Particularly, understanding
instance,whentaxpayers spendtimeand effort complet- thedifferent typesofclients-bothwhattheyexpectand
ingtheirincometaxreturns accuratelyandpromptly. Both whattheycan offer-provides a framework fortailoring
beneficiaries andobligateesareengagedinexchangeswith thespecificvaluecreatedtothegroupsin question.
theirfellowcitizensintheveryprocessofinteracting with Finally,unliketherestricted exchangeembodiedinthe
theagency,thatis, in generalizedexchangesratherthan private-sector customer model,theprocessesofbroadened
simplyrestricted ones.Theseexchangesaremorediffuse exchangeamonggovernment agencies,beneficiaries,
and/
and oftendeferred, buttheyare nonetheless identifiableorobligateescanhelpina modestwaytofoster moreposi-
exchanges, whichcan be influenced bymanagers. tivecitizenship. The way thegovernment agencyelicits
Of course,exchangeis nottheonlytypeofinteractioncontributions fromclients,suchas cooperation orcompli-
thatbeneficiaries and obligateeshave withgovernmentance,can enhancethelegitimacy ofgovernment. Because
agencies.Theycan also be subjectto coercionthatis de- theyhavemindsoftheirown,clientsmayormaynotcon-
signedtocompelthemto complywithlawsor agencyre- tribute, butthelikelihood theywilldo so is enhancedifthe
quirements. Moreover, citizensandclientsmaycooperate agencyacknowledges notonlytheir materialneedsbutalso
witha government agencybecausetheyidentify withits theirintrinsic, social,andnormative values-forexample,
purposesorattachlegitimacy togovernment-motivations by treating themwithrespector by adoptingpurposes
thatneither exchangenorcoercionadequately encompass. whichrepresent largerconcerns. Theseacknowledgments
It has to be recognized,therefore, thatexchangetheory arelikelyto fosterthecredibility ofgovernment as an in-
does notaccountforall oftherelationships betweengov- stitution. Theyalso raiseawarenessofcollectivepurposes
ernment organizations andclients. beyondmaterialself-interest. Moreover,some (although
Nevertheless, theconceptsof social exchangeand the not necessarilyall) of the contributions a government
typologypreviouslyoutlinedare of morethantermino- agencyseeksfromclients,suchas co-production of ser-
logicalsignificance. Theyhaveimplications for how pub- viceoutcomes, The
entailactivebehaviors. clientsarenot
licadministrators conceiveofandperform theirtasks.First, simplyconsuming goodsor services,butcontributing by
thetypology can facilitate
greater clarityaboutwhois to positiveactionsto collectivepurposes:forexample,by
be servedby thepublicagency.It underlines thereality reporting crimesor suspectedchildabuse by neighbors,
thatpublicadministrators servemultiplepublics,butit by recycling trash,or by supporting schoolactivities.As
offers a morestructured wayofcomprehending themthan thetypology makesclear,theroleofcitizenis notthesame
merelyseeingthemall as amorphous"stakeholders." In as thatof client.Butbecauseall citizensare also clients,
particular, a betterunderstanding
it facilitates of there- theyare subjectto theappealsthatagenciesmaketo cli-
spectiveclaimsof thesedifferent typesof customers on ents.To thatextent,agenciespursuinga broadenedcon-
organizational bothby distinguishing
efforts, themcon- ceptionofexchange mayencourage toengagemore
citizens
ceptually butalsobyrecognizing thespecificwaysinwhich withtheinstitutions andprocessesofgovernment.
theyareinterrelated. Thisenablesa recognition thatsome-
timeswhatclientswantmaybe atoddswithwhatcitizens
want,andthelatter'sclaimsgenerally takepriority. Butit Notes
also enablesexploration ofwaystoenhancevalueforone
1. Some marketing writershave acknowledgeda broadened
groupwhilenotdiminishing itforothers. conception ofexchangethatdrawsonsocialexchangetheory
Second,theconceptsofsocialexchangereveala wider (Kotlerand Levy 1969; Kotler1972; Bagozzi 1975). How-
variety ofcontributions fromclientsthansimplyobtaining ever,theirapplication oftheseconceptstopublic-sectorsitu-
revenuefromthem,suchas cooperation, compliance,or ationshas been less thansatisfactory becausetheytendto
co-production. To theextent theseothertypesofcontribu- focuson privateratherthanpublicvalueandhavedifficulty
tionsaugment, orreducethedemandsupon,theresources comingtogripswithsituations wherethemember ofthepub-
oftheorganization, clientscanoffer of
something valueto lic is subjected to coercion.
iteveniftheydo notpaymoneyforservices.Putanother
way,publicagencieshavean operationalincentive topay
attention toclients'needs.
Third,a social-exchange perspective enablesadminis-
trators to adopta moreencompassing view aboutwhat
valuetheirorganizations orprograms aresupposedtopro-
videinordertofosterthedesiredcontributions byclients.
Theycan offer notonlyeconomicgoodsandservices,but

344 Public Review

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