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Parliaments, Estates and Representation

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Charles XI and the Swedish Estates

1680–1693
a
A. F. UPTON
a
University of St Andrews , Scotland
Published online: 12 Apr 2010.

To cite this article: A. F. UPTON (2002) Charles XI and the Swedish Estates 1680–1693, Parliaments,
Estates and Representation, 22:1, 71-88, DOI: 10.1080/02606755.2002.9522144

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 Charles XI and the Swedish Estates 1680-1693
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A.F. UPTON

SUMMARY
In this article Anthony Upton examines rhe relations between Charles XI of Swe-
den, who was systematically attempting to extend and justify his absolute powers
after 1680, and the Swedish Estates. It is often assumed that in early modern
Europe the relations of absolute monarchs with their representative assemblies
were antagonistic and constituted a power struggle over the basis of sovereign
power in society. T h e article suggests that the Swedish experience did not conform
to this pattern, but that the king had little difficulty in securing the endorsement of
his Estates for his claims to authority, apparently without resort to force or intimida-
tion on any significant scale. It then suggests ways in which contemporary mentalities,
and the specific situation of Sweden in this period, combined to produce this
outcome.

I INTRODUCTION

In the history of the development of the absolute monarchies of early modern

Europe the successful elimination of the powers of assemblies of Estates features
prominently. But in Sweden after 1680 there was an interesting variation on this
theme. Charles XI and his advisers were self-consciously seeking to assert the
absolute powers of the monarch, which involved downgrading the role of the
Estates in public affairs, but succeeded in doing so with the apparent consent of
the Estates and without any overt use of coercion or force. T h e closest parallel
was the establishment of absolute monarchy in Denmark, where in 1660 the
Estates had declared the monarchy absolute by a coup which did involve the use
of extra-legal persuasions. It is clear that the events in Denmark were well known
in Sweden, but disapproved of. Contemporary Swedes, from Charles XI down,
often said explicitly that the Danish example was not applicable to Sweden. For

A.F. LJpton, LJniversity of St Andrews, Scotland.

Parliaments, Estates and Representdon 22, November 2002. Published for the International Commission
for the History of Representative & Parliamentary Institutions by Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Gower
House, Croft Road, Aldershot, Hampshire G u l l 3HR, Great Britain. Q International Commission for
the History of Representative & Parliamentary Institutions, 2002.
 72 A.R Upton

Sweden was a long-established Rechtsstaat with a written fundamental law, the

Land Law, compiled in the fourteenth century, and printed officially in 1608.
This prescribed a strong, elective monarchy in which the king was bound to rule
according to law and lawful custom. He was to rule with the advice of a council of
native noblemen and ecclesiastics, who held office for life. T h e Crown was given
a substantial landed endowment, which the king administered as he saw fit, but
could not alienate in perpetuity. And for certain weighty matters, making war or
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peace, modifying the laws, or levying extra taxation the king must consult repre-
sentatives of the community of the realm. T h e Land Law said nothing of Estates
or assemblies, for they did not exist when it was compiled. In the intervening
years a hksdag of four Estates had developed as the representative body of the
community. Further, in the sixteenth century a Lutheran Reformation had made
the king the earthly superior of the reformed Church, and the ecclesiastics were
removed from the Council. And in 1543 the Estates had recognized the monarchy
as hereditary in the Vasa family. It was widely accepted in Sweden, as in most of
Europe, that a hereditary monarch derived his authority directly from God and his
prerogatives could not be challenged by his subjects.'
T h e context for the events discussed in this paper was that since 1648, the
Swedish monarchy experienced a chronic financial crisis, because it lacked the
domestic resources to sustain the exalted international position conferred on
Sweden by the Peace of Westphalia. As early as the hksdag of 1650, the three
commoner Estates of clergy, burghers and peasants had proposed to solve this by
a sweeping resumption, reduktion, of the donations made by the Crown, exclu-
sively to the nobility, to reward their services. It was asserted this would be in
conformity with the Land Law and would balance the state budget. T h e contro-
versies raised by the proposal, which was strongly condemned by the nobility,
continued until the new crisis precipitated by the disastrous Northern War of
1675-79. In the two wartime hksdagar of 1675 and 1678 the demand for reduktion
was strongly revived, and reinforced by a new proposal. This was based on the
.allegation that Sweden's military weakness, exposed by the war, was due to the
long regency government of 1660-72. Effective power had been vested in an
oligarchy of aristocratic magnate families and it was alleged that they had abused
their trust by the misapplication of public money for their own private gain. T h e
Estates, in which the commoners were joined by a faction of the younger nobles,
demanded an inquest into the regency, with a view to recovering very large sums
of money, and a committee of Estates had been set up to report on the situation.
By 1680 this committee had drafted a report affirming that there had been wide-
spread financial abuses. During the war the young Charles XI had directed the
war effort with the help of young military men and civil servants and by 1679 had
come to rely almost solely on the advice of the magnate Johan Gyllenstierna, a

' This is an expanded version of the paper delivered at the 50th Conference of ICHRPI in Oslo on
11 August 2000.
On the background to the calling of the riksdug of 1680, see A.F. Upton, Churles X I and Suedish
absolutism (Cambridge, 1YY8), pp. 1-30: J. Rosen, 'Johan Gyllenstiernas program for 1680 Prs riksdag',
Scundiu 16 (1944). pp. 163 ff.
 Charles X I and the Swedish Estates 73

capable organizer. It is on record that in the winter of 1679-80 a series of planning

conferences were held on postwar reconstruction. T h e documentary evidence on
these is thin, but it is likely the plan was for a radical financial reform to rebuild
Sweden’s armed strength and achieve financial and political self-sufficiency. T h e
key reforms would be the implementation of a full reduktion, and the setting up of
a legal process against the members of the regency government: this would re-
cover substantial amounts of money, but in the process would undermine the
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power and influence of the magnate families. Both of these would require the
cooperation of a dsdag. It could be expected that such a programme would enjoy
the enthusiastic support of the commoner Estates, and of a substantial part of the
lesser nobility, while the magnates would be acutely aware of their isolation, and
that only the king was in a position, if he chose, to alleviate any penalties.2

I1 T H E RIKSDAG OF 1680
In the summer of 1680 Stockholm was filled with rumours about an absolutist coup
to be managed by Gyllenstierna on behalf of the king. T h e sudden death of
Gyllenstierna in June, and the disappearance of his papers afterwards, have left no
reliable evidence about his intentions. Contemporaries alleged that he left a written
plan of action, which the king and his advisers attempted to implement. No trace of
such a plan of action has ever been found. But in June Charles XI asked the opinion
of the Council of State on whether the Estates should be summoned. Some council
members expressed anxiety over what the outcome might be, but none of them was
willing to argue against it and October was agreed for the meeting.
A Swedish riRsdag met to consider a set of written propositions presented by
the king and the Council. Each Estate responded separately to these, and the
answers were collected by royal officials into a beslut. This was then formally
agreed by the Estates and the king and became the final Act of the meeting, and
was a binding law for the whole kingdom. T h e riRsdag had also developed a Secret
Committee, selected by the king from members of the nobility, the clergy and the
burghers, to consider foreign policy issues. T h e peasants were not included, as
they were deemed too ignorant to be consulted. From 1675 the Committee also
began the preliminary consideration of the domestic propositions. For the royal
government, its potential as a more manageable forum for decision-making was
well understood, and there are similar developments in other contemporary repre-
sentative institutions. One embittered critic of these, Claes RIlamb, alleged of
the Secret Committee, ‘everything that they wanted was decided in it, so that the
rest of the Estates were only concerned with notification and ratification, but not
discussion, much less amendment’. In reality this was not true of the 1680 d&g,
but became increasingly the practice in subsequent session^.^

For further discussion of the policies of Gyllenstierna, see, G. Rystad, Johan G$/enstiema, rider
och kungamakten: studier in Sveriges inrepolittk 1660-1680 (Lund, 1955); U. Sjodell, Kungamakt och hog
aristokrati: en srudie i Sveriges inre historia under Karl X I (Lund, 1966).
Riksarkivet, Stockholm (hereafter RA), Ridsprotokoll 1680, vol. 72, Lillieflycht, 30 June 1680;
Kungliga Biblioteket (hereafter KB), RPlambska Manuskriptsamlingen, Fol. Nr. 5: 1680 Ars
riksdagsarenden.
 74 A.F Upton

T h e first item dealt with was the inquest into the regency government, and the
king, on the basis of the report of the riRsdag committee which had carried out the
investigation, declared that the delinquency of leading members of the regency
government was clear. Therefore the king recommended the Estates to nominate
judges to a tribunal for assessing and collecting the appropriate penalties. T h e
commoner Estates, who expected substantial sums to be recovered, which in turn
would reduce their burden of taxation, were expected to be enthusiastic, which in
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principle they were. But they objected to the procedure and requested that the
king himself nominate a tribunal. This arose from a characteristic of early modern
assemblies that is often overlooked. They did not necessarily wish to participate
in government, and carry the resultant responsibility for decision-making; they
much preferred that it should fall to the king. This had two consequences: first, in
order to break the deadlock, the king finally had to send a letter to the Estates
commanding them to nominate. Second, it created an opening for the opposition
in the Estate of the nobility, the riddashus, to seek to defeat the proposal. A group
led by the magnate Per Sparre tried to get a vote that the riddashus should consult
the Council. If he could get the Council, known to be strongly opposed to the
tribunal, to join the riddarhus in a remonstrance to the king, it would be difficult
for the king to ignore it. So Sparre pressed for a vote on the grounds that the king
had misunderstood the issues. T h e Marshal of the Nobility, a royal nominee who
presided over debates, objected and the following exchange took place:4
T h e Marshal: We have the king’s majesty’s order about what we should do: I reckon
it would be hazardous to depart from that.
Sparre: It may be that the king’s majesty has not understood the matter: also his
royal majesty could have been misled.
Hans Wachtmeister (a firm royalist): What do you mean, his royal majesty could
have been misled? You must explain that further.
Sparre: I mean that his royal majesty could have been misled since his royal majesty
is a human being, that is what I am saying.
Sparre may have been close to succeeding; he was poised to introduce the ‘evil
counsellor’ argument, and loud support was being expressed, so he pressed for an
immediate vote. But the Marshal could and did save the situation by one simple
assertion. More than once he challenged the protesters, ‘how can we vote on what
the king has commanded?’ To this there was no acceptable reply; for a subject, a
royal command was binding. In the end the opposition gave way, the Council was
not consulted and all the Estates agreed to make their nomination^.^ This episode
is revealing of contemporary mentalities: people were simply unprepared openly
to confront and defy lawful authority. But it had also been a failure for the king;
he was anxious to avoid such confrontations as they undermined the notion of
community consensus that a meeting of Estates was supposed to generate. Charles
XI took care not to have to do it again.

For more detail, see A.F. Upton, ‘The riksdugof 1680 and the establishment o f royal absolutism in
Sweden’, English Historical Review, 102 (1987); Sveriges riddankup- och adeis riksdugsprorocol (hereafter
SRARP), XI11 1680 (Stockholm, 1896), pp. 3,6, 15,33.
Ibid., pp. 3 5 4 0 .
 Charles X I and the Swedish Estates 75

T h e next, and far more important, issue for decision was to get agreement to a
general reduktion of royal donations. For this, the government did have a plan: the
question should be referred to the Secret Committee, which would draft an
agreed proposal to put to the Estates. Ir was known that the commoners had made
this their issue and that the riddarkus was divided and open to manipulation. So
the peasant Estate asked the king to let them join the Committee and they
presented a proposal, nominally their own initiative, though everyone knew it
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must have been drafted by royal officials. T h e tactic misfired; the nobility united
to protest that since they alone were the recipients of donations, it was for them to
decide the issue. Their honour and their liberties as an Estate were being im-
pugned. Their spokesman complained that the peasants’ proposal, ‘will prescribe
to the nobility and almost force them to come to the assistance of our gracious
king and the public, not leaving them the honour ... of being able to do this of
their own initiative’. A diarist member of the Committee wrote, ‘the secret com-
mittee broke off from one another for some days to discuss this most important
matter, each in his own Estate’. T h e riddarhus put aside the issue of reduktion in
order to draft a protest vindicating their liberties against the commoner Estates.
Even the Marshal was carried away by class solidarity in appealing to the Council
to associate itself with their protest and request the king to intervene to put the
commoners in their place. But Charles XI was determined not to get involved. H e
responded: ‘He left it to the Council to decide with its brothers what will serve
and strengthen the kingdom.’6
In the riddarhus the group of royal supporters tried to get discussion of the
reduktion reopened. They were a caucus, mainly young military men with close
relations to the king, led by the admiral, Hans Wachtmeister. Their debating
skills were poor and some tried intimidation. It was claimed one of their number
had been saying that those who opposed reduktion would have their names taken,
and Wachtmeister would report them to the king. This was not denied, but had
little effect, and the business remained blocked. It was resolved by what looks
like a hasty improvisation by Wachtmeister. H e made a proposal, said to be
acceptable to the king, that if the riddarkus would approve a reduktion in principle,
the king would allow small grantees, with donations worth less than 600 daler a
year, to keep them. T h e proposal won general support from the numerous lesser
nobility, but led to protests that it was out of order, which it was, and in the
confusion the opposition walked out of the meeting to appeal directly to the king.
In their absence, those who stayed behind declared Wachtmeister’s proposal car-
ried. When the protesters got to the king, he feigned neutrality and said it was for
their Estate to find an acceptable resolution. T h e minority then went to the
Council for a ruling. T h e Council was openly opposed to radical reduktion, but
aware that many of its members were prime targets of the new regency tribunal.
Their discussion revealed a strong desire not to get involved, so they echoed the

‘RA, R5956, Riksdag-journal, 1680, af Erik Benzelius, 17, 20 Oct. 1680; SRARP, XIII, pp. 55-8,
287, 295, Almogens skrifvelse; L.Thanner, ed., Prasrerstdndets riksdagsprotokoll, IV, 1680-1714
(Norrkoping, 1962), pp. 21, 24-6, 2&9,30 (hereafter PR); RA, Ridsprotokoll, vol. 72, Lillieflycht, 22
October 1680.
 76 A.F: lipron

king: the riddarhus must work out a consensus, while making sure that all the
procedural proprieties were observed. At this, the opposition to the reduktion gave
up, and the riddarhus adopted Wachtmeister’s compromise. T h e commoner Es-
tates expressed their disappointment a t failing to get a full reduktion, but
a c q ~ i e s c e d .This
~ time the king had got what he wanted by manipulating a
divided Estate, not by confrontation.
At the end of the session of 1680, the Estates were ordered to stay in Stock-
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holm because the king wished to clarify the constitutional authority of the
Council of State. This issue appears to have arisen accidentally because the
regency tribunal proposed to indict the Council collectively over decisions it
had approved under the regency. T h e members of the Council took the position
that it was a privileged body. According to the Land Law, its members were
obliged to give their honest opinion on matters of state, and could not subse-
quently be called to account for the consequences. T h e king required that the
Estates answer three questions which he submitted, of which the one that
mattered was whether, according to the Land Law, the king was obliged to
consult the Council on policy matters, and whether h e was bound to follow their
advice. T h e initial debate in the riddarfius revealed widespread confusion. T h e
problem was that the Land Law was ambivalent. It said that t h e king must rule
the kingdom with the advice of the Council; it did not specify that he must
follow its advice. T h e opposition lawyer, Claes RBlamb, argued that logically he
must take the advice, as otherwise he would be ruling against the advice of the
Council, in breach of the law. But against this it could be argued that the Land
Law was devised for an elective kingship. A king by inheritance, who got his
authority directly from God, was answerable to no one on earth; it would be
blasphemy for a subject to presume to judge the actions of his sovereign. Fur-
ther, it was an established axiom of Sweden’s public affairs, that no subject
should seek ‘to bind the king’s hands’, that is, constrain his power to make
decisions. Hence an aimless discussion developed which rambled round the
issues without any agreed result emerging. Even an absolutist like Wachtmeister
was found arguing that there were some cases in which the king should consult,
others where it was optional, though he did not attempt to clarify what criteria
would decide the matter. T h e confusion suggests that most of Sweden’s ruling
elites had never seriously thought about such matters. It was an irony that Per
Sparre gave the clearest answer, that in a hereditary monarchy it did not matter
whether the king consulted the Council or not, ‘since in the one case as the
other, the decision rests with the king’s majesty’.8 T h e riddarhus seemed re-
lieved when the marshal presented a resolution he had worked out with the
king, which was accepted by all the Estates. This Answer and opinion of the
Estates about the form of government and the Council accepted unreservedly the
absolutist position. On the key issue it ~ t a t e d : ~

’SRARP,XIII. pp. 65-77, 80.97.321; RA, Rldsprotokoll, vol. 73, Warrrang, 3 . 4 November 1680.
*KB, Rilambska Manuskiptsamlingen, Fol. Nr. 5: 1680 Ars riksdagsarenden, ch. 3; SRARP, pp.
206, 207, 220.22535.
’Ibid., p. 374.
 Charles X I and the Swedish Estates 77

All decisions in those matters which your royal majesty is pleased, and obliged, for
the good of the kingdom, to refer to the Council altogether depend on your royal
majesty's own good and righteous decision and reasonable command: because your
majesty, as an adult king who rules the kingdom according to law and lawful custom,
as your own hereditary kingdom granted by God, is solely responsible to God for
your actions.
T h e king then moved to strengthen his position by challenging the Council to
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protest; he sent them the resolutions of the Estates, though he did not require the
Council to respond. T h e result showed that several councillors were very con-
scious of how their position had been weakened, but were quite unwilling or
unable to agree on any form of self-defence or remonstrance. In the end the
Council remained silent on the issues. Seeing it was defenceless, the royal gov-
ernment moved to formalize its demotion. T h e king appointed new members
committed to his policies, and the irreconcilable members were induced to peti-
tion for leave to retire. In 1682 a royal decree announced that it was to be
renamed 'The King's Council', whose functions were basically to advise the king
when he requested it. T h e Council was then integrated into the restructured
machinery of royal government.'" There was now no remaining autonomous pub-
lic institution with a legal right to be involved in policy-making, except the
Estates themselves.
RAlamb commented on this episode, 'it is scarcely to be presumed that any
responsible inhabitant of Sweden would freely and deliberately, without prepara-
tion or force, have been willing to submit himself and his heirs to slavery and
serfdom'. It seems more plausible to assume that the Estates did not see what
they had agreed to in that light. They had cheerfully helped to eliminate one of
the few remaining checks and balances on the uncontrolled use of royal power.
But they had not ceded any part of their own authority, and seem to have re-
garded the affair as a settling of accounts between the king and a discredited
Council oligarchy. T h e complacence of the Estates in 1680 rested on the assump-
tion that the king would indeed continue to rule according to law and lawful
custom, and that was the only security they needed. In theory the doctrine of
royal absolutism is inconsistent with the concept of a rule of law, since it leaves no
earthly agency which can restrain the sovereign's actions. But the records show
that in its daily practice, the government of Charles XI was careful to respect law
and custom, and that the king personally made real efforts to ensure that the laws
were administered impartially to all his subjects.

111 T H E RIKSDAC OF 1682-83

T h e next meeting of the Estates in 1682 showed how the royal government had
strengthened its control over affairs. T h e king had no hesitation now in making
his wishes clear; the Marshal of the Nobility was better prepared and exercised
effective leadership in the riddarhus and in the Secret Committee, where he

l o 0. Sjogren, Karl den e&e och menska folket pa" ham rid (Stockholm, 1897), pp. 319, 321; RA,
Lagkommissionen 1686-1736 protokoll: the king's letter, 11 March 1682.
 78 A X [Ipron

presided. There was now a declared policy of confining serious debate to the
Secret Committee, and the king had found a competent political manager in Olav
Tegner, burgomaster of Stockholm, who organized the commoner Estates in a
united front in support of the royal programme. There were two potentially
contentious issues in the propositions, and the first was how to raise the man-
power for the standing army that was being developed. Traditionally Swedish
monarchs had resorted to conscriptions, which were legally regarded as a form of
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taxation that required the consent of the Estates. Once more the peasant Estate
was used to propose an alternative system, under which peasant households were
grouped in rotas, each of which undertook to maintain a soldier in perpetuity. In
return the burden of conscription would be discontinued. When they were chal-
lenged, the peasant Estate could say that they had already discussed the matter
with the king, who had expressed his preference for the new method. T h e riddarhus
were strongly opposed: they preferred conscription, because under it their tenants
enjoyed valuable exemptions and reduced rates; further, they were able to select
who was to go, a useful disciplinary tool. A few also raised the constitutional
implication. T h e need to sanction conscriptions constituted an assurance that the
riksdag would be summoned regularly. But basically the riddarhus saw the pro-
posal as an attack on their liberties. T h e Marshal then suggested a compromise:
they should make the king a counter-offer of a permanent authorization by the
Estates to order conscriptions when he saw fit. As some opposition persisted, and
called for a ballot vote, the Marshal refused; those who were opposed must be
prepared to stand on one side and be counted. Nobody was willing to do this, so a
permanent conscription was approved unanimously. T h e peasant Estate sent a
deputation to the riddarhus insisting on their proposal. T h e Marshal spoke for his
brethren and said, ‘it cannot be your intention to violate our privileges’. T h e
deputation, confident it had the king’s support, replied, ‘a new situation demands
a new law’. T h e king then suggested the peasant Estate be invited to attend the
Secret Committee and that a solution be worked out there. At the meeting
Tegner led the united commoners to outvote the nobility and resolve in favour of
the rota system. There was an appeal to the king to settle the disagreement, but
he declined: ‘the Estates should agree among themselves, and he neither can nor
will express himself more particularly’. T h e outcome was a face-saving device
that meant the surrender of the riddadus: the king could negotiate separately
with the communities in each province, and agree with them either a rota or a
permanent conscription. With few exceptions that meant that the rota system was
adopted, and the tenants of the nobility lost their privileged status.ll
T h e Estates then moved on to the budgetary problems. T h e Secret Committee
was given a detailed financial statement stressing how the weight of the accumu-
lated public debt was causing continuing deficit. T h e riddarhus had prepared a
programme for raising taxation on all four Estates. T h e king had suggested that
the peasant Estate continue to attend the Committee, and Tegner worked to
produce an alternative proposal, supported by all the commoner Estates, which

” SRARP, XIV, pp. 16, 23-5, 27, 44;H.H. Liden, ed., Handlingar om Riksdagen 1682 (Norrkoping,
1788). diary of Erik Duraeus, pp. 14, 17-18, 23.
 Charles X I and the Swedish Estates 79

naturally sought to throw the burden on the nobility. T h e regency tribunal must
proceed more rigorously, the interest on the public debts could be reduced, and if
this was not enough, then the exemptions from reduktion granted in 1680 should
be withdrawn. At first the riddarhus refused to consider the proposal, but the
commoner Estates went to the king to explain it, and ‘his royal majesty conde-
scended to declare his satisfaction, assuring the Estates of his royal grace’. T h e
riddarhus wanted to form a committee to prepare a remonstrance, but the Marshal
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refused to allow this; the king wished for an open debate on the Secret Commit-
tee proposals. This became heated and a unique incident occurred. Anders
Lilliehook, an experienced lawyer and crown servant, alleged that the royal offi-
cials, in enforcing the 1680 settlement, had been changing the legal rules. He
claimed this was intolerable, because if the laws were to be changed, it could only
be done with the consent of the Estates. This clearly involved consideration of
the extent of sovereign power, and the king took it as a challenge. H e wrote to the
riddarhus to demand whether they agreed with Lilliehook that the king’s powers
to make laws were limited, and whether they thought it lawful for a subject
publicly to judge the actions of the sovereign. In reply the riddarhus utterly
repudiated Lilliehook’s speech: in a grovelling apology member after member
expressed his utter abhorrence of such notions.12 Having wrong-footed the
riddarhus, the king demanded a new constitutional declaration on the royal pow-
ers to make law. He claimed that the sovereign had uncontrolled power to make
law a t his discretion. This overrode the explicit requirement of the Land Law that
in making new laws, the king must consult the community of the realm. T h e
riddarhus was unhappy about this and drafted a formula saying that while the king
had unlimited power to issue administrative rules in particular instances, in the
case of a general public law any change should be referred to the Estates. T h e
effectiveness of royal control was apparent when, in the draft text put before the
Estates, the requirement was reduced to a humble petition. In the case of a new
general law, the king would be requested to communicate the proposal to the
Estates, not for their consent, but ‘as faithful subjects to return their humble
opinion, without any presumption and without the slightest detriment to your
royal majesty’s right and sovereignty’. In other words, the king had unrestricted
legislative authority. l 3
Discussion moved back to the commoner Estates’ proposal, and the riddarhus
sought to make a stand on their exemptions from the reduktion granted in 1680,
arguing that as part of the 1680 riksdag beslut they were binding. T h e Marshal tried
to discourage them: ‘it is better not to tie the king’s majesty’s hands ... the less we
argue the greater the protection we can expect of the king’s majesty’. This was
enough to divide the nobility; the riddarhus did draft a protest based on their legal
right, but the king declined to receive it, because it was not unanimous. They
gave up and the debate went back to the Secret Committee, which got a further
letter from the king requesting a definition of his powers to grant or resume crown

I z SRARP, XIV, pp. 49, 52, 53-5, 62, 227, 239; F.F. Carlson, Sveriges historia under Ronungarna af
PfuhisRa huset, 7 vols (Stockholm, 1855-89), 111, pp. 70-71.
l 3 SRARP, XIV, pp. 63-6, 229; Carlson, Sveriges historia, 111, pp. 71-3.
 80 A.F lipton

lands. With the commoners, led by Tegner, putting on pressure, it was inevitable
that a further declaration of the Estates affirmed that the king had complete
discretion over granting or resuming crown lands. This meant that he could now
disregard the restrictions in the 1680 be~lut.‘~T h e repercussions of the Lilliehook
affair were so advantageous for the king that they raise the suspicion that it could
have been a contrived provocation. Lilliehook was too senior and experienced in
the law and public service not to have realized the implications of what he was
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saying. It was also strange that his examples of alleged illegalities were poorly
chosen: it transpired that the practices in question had been in general use in the
Courts for 20 years past, without protest. Finally, after he had followed the advice
of the riddarhus to apologize and throw himself on the king’s mercy, which he did,
Lilliehook was given a major public employment within months.
T h e Estates, or rather the riddarhus, for there is no indication that the com-
moner Estates had any reservations about acknowledging these extensions of
royal sovereignty, had abandoned important powers, namely to consent to new
legislation and to control the disposal of crown lands, without any serious attempt
to defend them. It is obvious there were non-specific threats in the background,
as in the hints from the marshal that it might be safer for the riddarhus to cooper-
ate with the king than seek to dispute with him. This must have been compounded
by the ferocity of the king’s reaction to the Lilliehook incident. But it was appar-
ent that even politically active members of the Estate were mentally prevented
from challenging the prevailing orthodoxy of divine right kingship. They knew
what they had lost, Carl Oxenstierna remarked, over the reduktion issue, ‘if a
riksdagAct is not valid as law, it does not matter what we resolve’.15It must also be
considered that there was no dispute between the community of the realm and
the king over basic policy; all agreed on the necessity of restoring Sweden’s
military capacity and self-sufficiency. T h e controversies arose over how to share
out the burdens, and this seemed to focus the thinking of the Estates on how to
protect their sectional interests relative to each other. So the riddarhus instinc-
tively treated the conscription problem as one of defending the liberties of the
Estate against commoner encroachment. In short, there seems to have been no
basis for forming a broad common front of the Estates even to query the justifica-
tion for the royal demands.
At the end of the session the king underlined the fullness of his control. H e had
been requested by the Estates to draft a Testament which would prescribe the
procedures to be followed after his decease, including arrangements for a possible
regency. This he did, but told the Estates that he had noted with concern how his
father’s Testament had been criticized and overturned by the Estates on his death
in 1660, and some very offensive speeches recorded in the minutes of the Council
and the Estates. H e called on all concerned to review their minutes and repudiate
the unacceptable material. Suitable expressions of regret and abhorrence were
drafted to be included in the beslut. When this came to the riddarhus for confirma-

I4SRARP, XIV, pp. 51, 77-9: Carlson, Sveriges historia, 111, 56-7: Liden, Handlingor om Riksdagen,
pp. 33, 35.
l 5 SRARP, XIV, p. 82.
 Charles XI and the Swedish Estates 81

tion, the Marshal said, pointedly, ‘the king’s majesty will not compel anyone to
sign it’. Not only did they all sign without comment, but added that in future
anyone who ‘is so presumptuous that he venture to speak anything against our
most gracious king’ would be held guilty of sedition.16 T h e implications of this for
free discussion in a future riksdag were clear enough.

IV T H E RIKSDAG OF 1686
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T h e records of this session reflect a radical compression of discussion in the full

meetings of the Estates. This was because the king renewed his insistence that
issues be settled first in the Secret Committee, which had been restructured: the
members from the nobility were increased to 29, but of these 16 were full-time
servants of the Crown; in 1680 only five crown servants had sat on the Commit-
tee. Clergy and Burgher representation was reduced, while the peasant Estate
was again excluded from the Committee. T h e brief period of commoner activism
had ended, Tegner had been ennobled, and the commoners were no longer
needed to pressure the riddark.
When the Marshal informed the riddarhs that in this session the king wished
all decisions to be drafted in the Committee, there was protest. Leijonhufvud
asked ‘What have we come here for today, if we cannot, as the king’s majesty
permits, say what we think?’ T h e minute states, ‘there was long and noisy confu-
sion so that nobody’s speech could be noted down’. Eventually a majority defied
the Marshal and insisted on drafting a letter of protest to the king. T h e Marshal
hurried off to consult the king, and returned repeating that the king wished
business settled in the Committee. Still the majority insisted on a protest, but the
Marshal responded, ‘we hear the king’s Majesty’s will; will they sign it, unless that
happens I am not going to carry any memorandum’. T h e revolt collapsed, because
none of the protesters was willing to sign. A little later the Marshal gave them a
lecture on authority, and suggested cooperation worked best: ‘I perceive that with
God and with kings, we achieve nothing by disputing, but through prayer.’17
But there was lively debate in the Secret Committee. T h e core issue was the
final resolution of the budgetary problem and as before the king submitted a
detailed financial statement, and identified the crown debt as the continuing
obstacle. T h e king asserted that this must be tackled; as the Marshal reported to
the Committee, it was the king’s will ‘that the Estates shall not disperse until they
devise measures that will secure the paying off of the debt’. For the commoner
Estates this meant increased taxation and the king specified how much each must
raise. They went through the motions of bargaining, but the nobility in the
Committee were active, together with the Marshal, in persuading them to comply.
For the nobles a package of measures was proposed which combined higher
taxation, a retrospective reduction of interest rates on the debt, and the outright

l 6 Ibid., pp. 131, 14041, 143-8, 149-52, 159, 161: Carlson, Sweriges hisroria, 111, pp. 85-8: Liden,
Handlingurom Riksdugen, pp. 76, 78, 88, 91, 97-8, 100, 106.
”SXARP, XV, pp. 52, 84, 86: RA, R2375, Secreta Utskottets Protocol1 1686, meetings of 3, 4
November 1686; 0. Lindqvist, Jukob Gyllenborg och reduktionen: Rope-, punte-, o d nsrtrionsgodsen i
riifstepolitiken 1680-1692 (Lund, 1956). pp. 120-23.
 82 A.R Upton

repudiation of part of it. This would involve a legal subterfuge based on the
medieval rule of alterurn tanturn under which, when interest payments equalled
the capital sum advanced, all remaining payments went to redeem the capital. If
this were applied retrospectively to existing debts, many would already have been
fully repaid. T h e nobility formed the majority of the public creditors and, while
ready to accept most of the package, resisted alterurn tantum. They argued that it
was absurdly obsolete, it could not be used to defeat valid legal contracts, and its
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application would destroy public credit for the future. T h e nobility would accept
retrospective reduction of interest on the debt from 8 per cent to 5 per cent, but a
determined opposition was led by Lovisin, and clearly won the argument that
repudiation by using alterurn tanturn was blatantly unlawful. Contract must be
inviolable, ‘and the king’s majesty himself has passed many judgements to this
effect’. This was so obviously correct that in the end the Marshal conceded defeat
and fell back on the argument of last resort. He said that the critics might be right,
and alterurn fanfurn might be unlawful but, ‘even if we find the law itself gives
support to that view, there is public necessity, which is a more powerful and a
heavier law’. T h e Marshal had not improvised this argument on the spur of the
moment; it was an orthodox part of European political thinking about sovereign
power, which asserted that in public affairs necessity was the supreme law. It was
a proposition any educated person could subscribe to, and it secured a majority
vote in the Committee for the full programme. When this came to the riddarhus,
the Marshal declared that ‘everyone is free to speak his mind’. But nobody did;
the principal creditors asked permission to consult together privately, and re-
turned to announce their acceptance: they had decided ‘of a good and free will, to
surrender their right’.’*
T h e riddarhus had probably imagined that this was the end of the royal de-
mands on reduktion, but it was not. T h e royal advisers had discovered further
devices to extend its reach. T h e first rested on technical arguments over the
terms of the contracts when crown properties had been sold for cash advances.
These properties carried two kinds of rents, the ‘certain rents’ and the ‘uncertain
rents’, and purchasers had taken both. It was now asserted that the right interpre-
tation of the sales contracts gave the purchaser only the ‘certain rents’ and they
would be liable to repay the excess income they had taken. When this came to the
riddarhus, the creditors were warned by the Marshal, ‘they should be careful not
to stand too hard on their rights, that way they would be in peril of not being let
off accounting’. T h e creditors got the message, and surrendered: they would
redeem their alleged excess returns by surrendering the properties forthwith. T h e
final blow followed quickly; it was pointed out by the crown officers that in the
past crown properties were sometimes mortgaged for a 41/2per cent return, and
sometimes for 3 per cent. T h e Committee was asked to say which rate of return
had been more advantageous for the public interest. T h e Committee had little
choice but to agree that, from the public point of view, 3 per cent was the more
advantageous rate. This implied that creditors who had taken 4% per cent might

’’ RA, R2375, meetings of 24, 25, 27,30 September 1686,4,5, 7, 8 October 1686.
 CharJes X I and the Swedish Estates 83

be required to repay their excess profits. When this came from the Committee to
the riddarhw there was again a noisy protest, the Marshal asserting that the
Committee’s decision could not be challenged. At most the king would accept
petitions from any who felt aggrieved. In the inconclusive debate, the minute
records that ‘there was such prolonged disturbance that no speeches could be
taken down’. A written protest was introduced, and the Marshal hurried to the
king for consultation. On his return he declared that the king would only accept a
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protest if all the supporters signed it. At that, since again no one would identify
themself in this way, resistance collapsed. But the anger must have got through to
the king, for when he formally accepted the decision of the Estates, he promised
not to pursue the 4% per cent purchasers for repayment. Rosenhane replied for
the nobility, presumably without irony, how grateful they were that ‘the king’s
majesty’s grace ... has graciously sought to consider their well-being, and taken
them more to his heart, than his own i nter e~ t’. ’ ~
T h e submission of the Crown’s creditors in 1686 was particularly significant,
since the properties concerned were not donations, but had been purchased for
cash, and were held by contracts under the king’s hand and seal. Although the
Marshal had virtually admitted that some of the demands made in the Crown’s
proposals to the Estates were illegal, his resort to the argument from necessity and
the inability of the opponents to maintain their position in face of it, seems to
reflect their internalised acceptance of the unlimited authority of a Christian
prince, who ruled by divine right and was God’s deputy on earth. Given this
attitude, there was no basis in law or the constitution on which they could sustain
resistance. T h e one comfort left to the riddarhus was that with the measures of
1686, the reduktion was completed. It was now possible for the king, if he saw fit,
to recover all the properties that had ever been held by the crown and in this area
there were no further demands he could make.

V T H E RlKSDAG OF 1689
This session was called to meet a crisis in foreign policy, a very real threat of war
with Denmark over the Holstein dispute. But it affords interesting illustrations of
how the new subordination of the Estates to their absolute sovereign had been
accepted. All the business of the session was resolved in the Secret Committee.
This began by going through the ritual of hearing the royal propositions on
foreign policy. T h e minute records: ‘Some thought there could be some discus-
sion, but at last it was considered wisest to recommend everything concerning
these public affairs to the king’s majesty’s prudent discretion.’20T h e Marshal was
taken aback by the passivity of the Committee and said that the king was asking
the Committee for comment. The n the archbishop took him at his word and put
the case for a pre-emptive attack on Denmark. Now the Marshal felt that things
were getting out of hand and said, ‘we are debating much too extensively, to
discuss whether it is now time to begin a war is a matter we must refer to the

‘9 SRARP,XV, pp. 47-53.67-78, 86. 257.

2o RA, R2377, Secreta Utskottets Protocol1 1689, meetings of 8, 9 February 1689.
 84 A.F: Upton

king’s majesty’s gracious pleasure’. Although this was apparently a contradiction

of the Land Law, which was quite clear that decisions about making war were
matters on which the king must consult the community of the realm, it stifled the
debate; speakers backed off and the Committee affirmed once more that they
would refer all issues to the king for decision. T h e role of the Estates, who had
this right to be consulted on peace and war, was now to hear and applaud what the
king had decided.
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T h e internal propositions too were geared to the threat of war. T h e royal

government presented the Committee with a detailed account of how the re-
sources voted in 1686 had been used, but went on to specify what further
contributions were now needed, and the amount each Estate was expected to
subscribe. After conventional protests from the commoner Estates about how
impoverished they were, the package was agreed. Then came the usual follow-
up: the king submitted a carefully costed budget for a one-year campaign against
Denmark. H e suggested that the Estates should guarantee in advance to fund
this, though if there were no war, the grant would be remitted. T h e Clergy and
Burghers hesitated, but their attempts to frame a joint counter proposal did not
succeed. T h e riddarhus pressed hard for acceptance, and the Committee agreed
unanimously to the proposaLzl But the king was not finished; in thanking the
Estates for their grants, which would cover a short war, he asked what they would
propose if the war were prolonged. T h e Marshal acknowledged that it was usual,
in case of war, to call the Estates to a riksdag, but ‘it would be better, since the
Estates were now in session, to consult about possible eventualities’. What he was
suggesting was that they agree now, in case of prolonged war, a further package of
extraordinary taxation. T h e riddarhus proved compliant and drafted proposals that
effectively authorized the king to raise in wartime any extra money he needed,
and the Estates would guarantee repayment. But the commoner Estates were
unhappy. When this proposal came to the Secret Committee, the archbishop
asked the Marshal, ‘Is it the king’s will and command!’ T h e Marshal was aware
that the tax contributions of the Estates were by custom voluntary free gifts, and
replied, ‘I never said it was the king’s majesty’s command, but that the king finds
it good.’ That ended the discussion; this proposal too was carried unanimously.
T h e Estates were aware that by giving the king a blank cheque to raise all the
money he needed, they had compromised their last major constitutional right, to
give or withhold their consent to taxation. They tried to limit the damage by a
proviso that their grant applied exclusively to the current war danger.22 ‘This our
supply will not occasion any damage or prejudice for us, or our privileges, now or
in time to come, and that between meetings of Estates, no one venture to inter-
pret it otherwise ... than the words clearly authorise and intend’. They were not
quite ready yet for the total surrender of their right to be consulted over extraordi-
nary taxation. But they had demonstrated in their actions their complete inability
to challenge any royal demand that could plausibly be represented as promoting

21 Ibid., meetings of 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20 February 1689; SRARP,XV, pp. 320-23; PR, IV, p. 334.
22 RA, R2377, meetings of 27, 28 February 1689, 1, 2 , 4 , 5 March 1689; SRARP,XV, pp. 334-7, 339,
421; PR, IV, pp. 349-51.
 Charles X I ond the Swedish Estates 85

the kingdom’s welfare and security. T h e delegates of the riddarhus had consist-
ently taken the lead in supporting the royal policies in the Secret Committee, and
the minutes of the full sessions of the riddarhus and the clergy Estate show that
no discussion developed there, except on details specific to their own Estate. T h e
session of 1689 had approached the ideal of the absolute ruler working in total
harmony with his grateful and obedient subjects.
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VI T H E RIKSDAG OF 1693
T h e last riksdag of the reign was unique, in that no business of substance was put
before it. It was called to solemnize the funeral of the queen, and used as a public
relations exercise to extol the merits of Charles XI and his government. It showed
how the rikxdag, like the Council of State before it, had had its independent
powers eroded and become integrated into the machinery of royal government.
T h e propositions to the Secret Committee were fuller than ever, though those on
foreign affairs now said clearly that the king was not asking for the opinion of his
Estates, but was seeking to keep them informed. T h e internal propositions cov-
ered every aspect of what the government had done since 1689 and explained the
reasons for it, while pointing out how successful they had been. They stated that
although the facts would have justified the king in calling for further extraordi-
nary taxation to complete his achievement, he was graciously pleased not to do so,
in view of the heavy sacrifices of the subjects since 1680. T h e king expressed his
confidence that ‘the kingdom’s Estates will show themselves so much more will-
ing in time of need to give support to the king’s majesty with a substantial aid’.
T h e Marshal guided the Committee through the reading of the reports, but there
was no discussion, and to make sure of the outcome he proposed that the reply be
drafted not by the whole Committee, but a special sub-committee of six, which
the Marshal nominated.23
There is no record of the deliberations of the sub-committee, but it took only
two days to complete its draft responses to the propositions. On foreign policy
they included a statement sometimes presented by historians as a new declaration
of sovereignty. But the context makes it clear that it was only a comment on what
everyone understood to be the rights of a Christian prince. T h e passage simply
noted how gracious it was of the king to have condescended to inform his subjects
about his actions, because by the laws of God and Nature and right of inheritance,
as recognized by the Estates in 1680 and 1682, he was ‘an absolute and sovereign
king, responsible for his actions to no one on earth, but has power and authority
according to his pleasure, and as a Christian ruler, to direct and rule his kingdom’.
Nothing new was being claimed, and the linkage with 1680 and 1682 showed this;
he still ruled according to law and lawful custom. When the Secret Committee
received the draft, it accepted it without comment. T h e Secret Committee also
approved the draft reply on internal affairs without comment, ‘only it was min-
uted that there should be an insertion in it, namely that the Estates undertake to
execute the contingency grant agreed in 1689, which was immediately included

23 RA, R2378, Secreta Utskottecs Protocol1 1693, meetings of 4, 7 November 1693.

 86 A.F: Upton

and read’.24This meant that the Estates gave up their last scrap of authority to
control extraordinary taxation in time of war. T h e king was now entitled to levy
whatever he needed in time of war, under the guarantee of repayment by the
Estates, and the authorization was open ended. When the Secret Committee
report came to the riddarhus, it was read, with a running commentary from the
Marshal, which included the remark, ‘the more we increase his royal majesty’s
power and authority, the happier we ourselves and all the kingdom’s inhabitants
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are’. At the end the Marshal asked the riddar-hus if anyone wished to comment: ‘to
this few said anything, except some individuals who said there was nothing to
comment on’. Both the sovereignty declaration and the grant of unlimited war-
time taxation went through the riddarhus without any meaningful discussion. T h e
minute of the clergy Estate shows the same response there.25 This outcome
seems to confirm what the real agenda of the riksdag of 1693 had been. It was a
carefully orchestrated publicity exercise, to point up the merits and achievements
of absolute monarchy as practiced in Sweden by the paragon of Christian princes,
Charles XI.

CONCLUSION
These events, in which an established system of national representation by
Estates, who had clear legal rights to participate in making public policy and
control the raising of extraordinary taxation, was induced to surrender those
rights to an absolute king, and accept a change in status from a partner in
government to a passive instrument of royal policy, are a historical curiosity. It is
striking that no significant force or violence was involved, though there was
certainly some bullying and intimidation. But in the whole process no one was
imprisoned, nor put on trial, nor forced into exile. T h e only victims were the
small group of Council magnates, who were first ruined by the tribunal penal-
ties and the reduktion and then forced to retire into private life. To understand
this, the underlying political balance of political power must be appreciated, for
it wholly favoured the king. Meetings of Estates were sporadic and at the king’s
pleasure, but the king was the permanent head of government, in total control
of patronage and official favours. T h e members of the nobility who were hit by
the tribunal and the reduhion had only one road to recovery, and it led through
royal favour. T h e y could plead for personal exemptions or remissions, which
Charles XI rarely conceded. But they could also make whatever career was on
offer in crown service, and it was a characteristic of Charles XI that he does not
seem to have harboured personal animosities. Almost anyone who offered loyal
service was accepted. Consequently members of the riddarhus had the most
powerful incentives to avoid falling into disfavour and to prove cooperative -
which most, sensibly, did.

24 Carlson, Historia, IV, pp. 244-6; SRARP, XVI, pp. 24, 25; L. Thanner, ‘Suveranitetsforklaring Ar
1693. Tillkomst och innebord’, Karolinska Forbundets Arsbok (1954). pp. 7, 10-11, 24-9; RA, R2378,
meeting of 9 November 1693.
z5 SRARP, XVI, pp. 15-18, 20, 22, 26-7, 79-81.
 Charles X I and the Swedish Estates 87

T h e Swedish scenario had never been a confrontation about political power

between the king and the Estates. No one, not even Claes RBlamb, seriously
disputed that the kings of Sweden were monarchs by divine right, with all the
prerogatives that implied, and that their subjects had no right to criticise or
restrain them. That would be to bind the king’s hands. Further, Charles XI always
had the initiative, he set the agenda and, more importantly, he had a political
programme which he pursued with consistency and vigour throughout his reign,
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namely to strengthen his monarchy so that it could ensure the external and
internal security of the kingdom. This aim was universally approved. T h e Estates
had no alternative programme; their disputes were about means, not ends. And
while the king was single-minded, the Estates were disunited by their sectional
interests and in the case of the riddarhus by its internal divisions. T h e royal
government could and did exploit those weaknesses. But above all the Estates
had no desire to share in the executive government of the kingdom. Thus in 1680
they approved of levying penalties on the regency government, but tried to avoid
being involved in imposing them. This was an ingrained attitude. In 1680, when
the clergy Estate discussed the propositions on foreign affairs, they concluded
that their Estate lacked the ability to decide such issues, and resolved, ‘we
therefore refer everything back to the king’s majesty’s own discretion’. They did
not want to take responsibility. T h e peasant Estate invariably used this evasive
tactic to avoid getting involved in contentious issues. They would say, ‘we are
poor ignorant men and do not understand these matters and are content to follow
the resolution of our brother Estates’. But when it came to an issue that did
concern them, usually their tax burdens, the peasant Estate were tough and
shrewd negotiators, and generally had more success than the other Estates in
winning concessions from the king. There were members of the Estates who
were politically aware, and concerned about the loss of influence. This appeared
most clearly in 1682, after the Lilliehook incident, when the riddarhus was reluc-
tant to abandon the right, enshrined in the Land Law, to give consent to new
legislation - but they were not willing to confront the king on the issue. Generally
the Estates were very willing to contest with one another over rights and privi-
leges, and in such cases the king was the umpire. But never at any point did the
four Estates unite to oppose a royal demand. In the crucial arguments of 1680
about the reduktion the riddarhus focused on the alleged infringement of its liber-
ties by the commoner Estates; they did not assert their property rights to their
donations against the king. T h e magnates in the Council of State, who might
have joined the riddarhus in opposing or limiting the reduktion, tried to safeguard
their personal interests by refusing to get involved. It may be concluded that this
indicates that, as a society, early modern Sweden was not political in the modern
sense. T h e society was a collective organism, not an association of individuals. In
the body politic, a favourite metaphor, or the great chain of being, another favour-
ite, everyone had an appointed place in an ordered hierarchy, sanctioned by God.
Power and authority were transmitted downwards from the head. Estates could
and did indulge in demarcation disputes about their relative functions within the
system. But they did not venture to challenge the basic structure. T h e power of
the prevailing mentality was well illustrated in 1719, when the absolutist system
 88 A.F: Upron

collapsed in Sweden. T h e preacher Jaspar Svedberg probably spoke for the great
majority of his fellow Swedes, represented by the clergy and peasant Estates,
when he told the riksdag2'
... we have no permit to take from the ruler the power that God in His Word has
ascribed to him ... the King stands in God's place on earth. His power is of God ...
We must believe and adhere to what the spirit of God says: in the word of a king is
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power, and who shall say to him, what is it you are doing?

26 G. Wetterberg, ed., Jaspar Svedbergs lefperernes beskrifning, I Text (Lund. 1941), pp. 579-81.