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Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1554–1564

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Disagreements, face and politeness

Maria Sifianou *
University of Athens, School of Philosophy, Faculty of English Studies, Panepistimioupoli Zographou, 157 84 Athens, Greece
Received 12 November 2011; received in revised form 6 March 2012; accepted 9 March 2012

To the memory of Christina Kakavá, a pioneer in research on disagreements.

Abstract
Disagreement can be defined as the expression of a view that differs from that expressed by another speaker. Yet, in the relevant
literature, disagreement is mostly seen as confrontational and should thus be mitigated or avoided. In CA terms, it is a ‘‘dispreferred’’
second. Similarly, in earlier politeness theories, disagreement is seen to verge on impoliteness. In contrast, recent research has shown
that disagreement need not be seen only in negative terms, that is, it may not necessarily result in conflict and impoliteness, but can be a
sign of intimacy and sociability and may not destroy but rather strengthen interlocutors’ relationships.
This paper suggests that disagreements are complex, multidirectional and multifunctional acts, which prevent straightforward
labelling such as face-threatening/enhancing, (dis)preferred or (im)polite acts. There is inter- and intra-cultural variation depending on
various contextual parameters. Significantly, interlocutors have personal traits and relational histories that predispose them to particular
strategies and specific evaluations. The claim being disputed in any current interaction may have roots not just in previous turns of the
same interaction but also in previous interactions and this should be taken into account when analysing discourse.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: (Dis)agreement; Preferred/dispreferred action; Face; Politeness; Relational history

1. Introduction

Disagreement can be defined as the expression of a view that differs from that expressed by another speaker. Yet, in
the relevant literature, disagreement has mostly been seen as confrontational and should thus be mitigated or avoided.
For instance, Waldron and Applegate, 1994 (quoted in Locher, 2004:94) define disagreement as ‘‘a form of conflict . . .
taxing communication events’’. In CA terms, it is typically understood as a ‘‘dispreferred’’ second (Sacks, 1973/1987;
Pomerantz, 1984), which ‘‘is largely destructive for social solidarity’’ (Heritage, 1984:268). Similarly, in earlier politeness
theories (Brown and Levinson, 1978/1987; Leech, 1983), disagreement is seen to verge on impoliteness and should thus
be avoided in the interest of interlocutors’ ‘face’. However, Schiffrin's (1984) classic work has reversed such views arguing
that disagreement among friends can signal sociability rather than a breach of civility. Ensuing research has also shown
that disagreement need not be seen only in negative terms, that is, it may not necessarily result in conflict and
impoliteness, but can be a sign of intimacy and sociability (see, e.g., Tannen, 1984; Kakavá, 1993a, 2002; Corsaro and
Maynard, 1996; Locher, 2004; Angouri and Tseliga, 2010) and may not destroy but rather strengthen interlocutors’
relationships (Georgakopoulou, 2001).

* Tel.: +30 210 727 7809; fax: +30 210 727 7864.
E-mail address: msifian@enl.uoa.gr.

0378-2166/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2012.03.009
 M. Sifianou / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1554–1564 1555

The aim of this paper is to address some of the issues raised and to suggest that disagreement is a complex,
multidirectional (i.e., may affect either or both aspects of both interlocutors’ face) and multifunctional (i.e., may be a sign of
hostility or affiliation) act. Consequently, it is both ambiguous and polysemous (Tannen, 1994, 2002), and its full
understanding requires much more than single utterances or even complete exchanges since the source of a
disagreement may be located beyond the current exchange. It thus renders context, including personal traits and
relational histories, very significant for understanding its function.
Given the above, it is argued here that early CA research and politeness theories presented a rather restricted view of
disagreements. On the one hand, early politeness theories concentrate primarily on single utterances and the effect
disagreements have on the addressee's positive aspect of face. On the other hand, early CA work focuses on the internal
structural organisation of turns and their sequential organisation in single interactions and sees disagreement as a
‘‘dispreferred’’ second, with the exception of certain turn types, such as compliments, where disagreement is a ‘‘preferred’’
second. As a ‘‘dispreferred’’ second, disagreement is frequently prefaced, softened and delayed in contrast to preferred
actions which are structurally simple, explicit and typically immediate (Sacks, 1973/1987; Levinson, 1983; Pomerantz,
1984:65). Despite the usefulness of such research findings, these early theories do not seem to consider the fact that any
current interaction may also draw on previous exchanges, something that may not be apparent to an outsider. Thus, it
appears that such frameworks cannot account for the complexity of acts like disagreements (see section 3).

2. Setting the scene

As Myers (2004:112) observes, disagreement has acquired a bad name, being regarded as a kind of failure between
interactants. For Pomerantz (1984:77) disagreement is dispreferred because disagreeing with one another is
uncomfortable, unpleasant, difficult, risking threat, insult or offence, whereas agreeing with one another is comfortable,
supportive, reinforcing, and perhaps sociable, since it demonstrates that interlocutors are like-minded. In his paper on the
preference for agreement, Sacks (1973/1987:65) notes that this is not a matter of individual preference but rather an
aspect of a formal apparatus, a possible property of the system. In other words, interlocutors design their utterances not
according to personal preference but so that they will elicit agreement (see also Levinson, 1983:307; Atkinson and
Heritage, 1984:53). Thus, for instance, if the speaker believes that the card has been posted to James, s/he will use an
utterance like ‘‘You’ve posted the card to James, haven’t you?’’ This turn design makes a positive response a preferred
second action. If, however, the speaker believes that the card has not been posted, then an utterance such as ‘‘You
haven’t posted the card to James, have you?’’ shows a preference for a negative response. Despite this line of reasoning,
which views preference as a purely structural concept, comments linking preference to social considerations are found
even in early CA work. For instance, Sacks (1973/1987:69) notes that the preference for agreement may stem from social
expectations, because as he says ‘‘it is not that somebody or everybody psychologically does not like to disagree, but they
may not like to disagree because they are supposed to not like to disagree; they are supposed to try to agree perhaps’’.
Thus even though the concept of preference in CA terms is conceptualised and analysed as a structural phenomenon, it is
not entirely devoid of social considerations (see, e.g., Pomerantz at the beginning of this section). Atkinson and Heritage
(1984:55) make social considerations explicit when they state that the institutionalised design features of preferred/
dispreferred actions are oriented to maximising cooperation and to minimising conflict in interactions. Such views have
been further elaborated in recent research (see, e.g., Lazaraton, 1997; Clayman, 2002; Heritage and Raymond, 2005;
Robinson and Bolden, 2010), which links preference with the promotion of solidarity and affiliation and dispreference with
the weakening of solidarity and disaffiliation. Such views imply or explicitly state face considerations (Atkinson and
Heritage, 1984:56; Brown and Levinson, 1987:38; Lerner, 1996); in particular, the need to avoid face-threatening acts and
ultimately conflict in interactions (see section 4).
As is well known, the notion of ‘face’ attracted scholarly attention especially through Brown and Levinson's (1978/1987)
politeness theory who (1987:114) also detected ‘‘preference for agreement’’ in their British English data.1 They present a
number of devices that interlocutors use to avoid disagreement or to concur superficially with the other speaker before
sometimes voicing a strong contrary opinion to that expressed by the other. This aversion to disagreement appears so
strong that, in some cultures at least, a social agreement principle has been suggested as underlying interaction (Yaeger-
Dror, 2002). In contrast, Tannen (2002) notes the pervasiveness of ritualised adversativeness or agonism, in a wide array
of social situations, such as contemporary western academic discourse since the 1990s. Chiu (2008:398) argues that in
problem solving group activities disagreements (more than agreements) increase micro-creativity by stimulating attention
and encouraging group members to consider more aspects of the situation from more perspectives (see also Angouri, this

1
It is interesting to note here that despite Brown and Levinson's (1987:38–39) description of preference organisation as a structural
phenomenon, they illustrate how face considerations appear to determine which of the two alternative seconds will be typically associated
with the preferred format (see Bousfield, 2008:237).
1556 M. Sifianou / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1554–1564

volume). Thus, rather than being exceptional, disagreement seems to be an essential ingredient in many daily settings,
such as a pub interaction about football teams, talk over coffee after a movie or speculations about election results. It may
also be a building block of various institutional interactions, such as the Prime Minister's Question Time, television talk
shows, academic seminars (Myers, 2004:112), political debates, and many more.
Myers (2004) uses data from moderated focus-group interactions and explores the function of disagreement. He
explains that even though contributors exhibit preference for agreement, they employ various devices to present their
disagreement; if participants always agree, researchers will more frequently collect the views of the talkative, insistent
participants. Thus, on the one hand, participants use the moderator and direct their disagreements to him/her rather than
to other participants and on the other hand, the moderator encourages disagreement in the introduction and in later
interventions (Myers, 2004:113–114). Similar observations have been made in relation to institutional settings, such as
panel discussions and British television news interviews, in which disagreements are seen as an intrinsic feature. The
institutional agent acts as a mediator between interlocutors, who frequently use unmitigated disagreements and who
rarely address each other directly (see, e.g., Greatbatch, 1992; Hutchby and Woffitt, 1998:153).
Evidently, variability is not only demonstrated in different situations within cultures as in the above examples but also
between them. In fact, early research on disagreement (see, e.g., Schiffrin, 1984; Tannen, 1984; Kakavá, 1993a)
presented evidence that interlocutors in certain national groups prefer disagreements over agreements in daily
interactions whose function is sociability rather than disaffiliation. A revealing illustration of this is presented by Smith
(1987:2), drawing on Renwick's (1983) findings: Americans are more inclined to like people who agree with them whereas
Australians tend to be more interested in people who disagree with them. For the former, agreement implies liking and
disagreement rejection, whereas for the latter, disagreement is a source of lively conversation. Despite their being gross
overgeneralisations, such statements point to people's diverse understandings of the function of disagreements. In
relation to Greek, Kakavá (1993b) and Tannen and Kakavá (1992) have shown that disagreements are not dispreferred
acts but rather a means of expressing sociability, especially in intimate settings, such as among family members and
friends. The papers in the special issue of the Journal of Pragmatics (2002) on ‘‘Negation and Disagreement’’, among
many others, provide further evidence for such diverse preferences. Myers (2004:113) makes this point succinctly when
he says that Schiffrin applies her claim cautiously only to ‘Jewish argument’, as a feature of that particular culture, but after
many subsequent studies, one may say that ‘You don’t have to be Jewish to enjoy arguing.’
Talking about cultural preferences, one should be cautious of overgeneralisations because, as Kakavá (2002:1564)
observes, there is both ‘‘inter- and intra-speaker variation’’. Edstrom (2004:1500) notes such overgeneralisations in
relation to Venezuelans and argues that such findings should be reconsidered. However, in the earlier universalistic
outlook of face considerations, situational and cross-cultural variation has been largely ignored. Thus, in recent research,
local practices in specific contexts have emerged as significant determinants of the extent to which disagreement is
viewed as a preferred or a dispreferred option. Exploring disagreements in asynchronous computer mediated
communication, Angouri and Tseliga (2010) argue that disagreement is the norm in the two online fora they investigate
since participants tend to raise highly controversial topics. Exploring data from informal conversations by young Greeks
talking about the future, Georgakopoulou (2001) also notes the salience of disagreements and suggests that, rather than
being expressions of sociability, disagreements are products of contextual exigency and do not threaten interlocutors’
relationships.2 Exploring English and Greek newspaper reports from the vantage point of translation, Sidiropoulou (1994)
observed a tendency among Greeks to engage in denials, contradictions and argumentation. Along similar lines,
Koutsantoni (2005:112) argues that in Greek academic writing, authors tend to be overtly critical of the research of others
and that disagreement and negative evaluation aim at aligning with those who share views and thus at creating a sense of
solidarity with them. In a number of studies, Makri-Tsilipakou (see, e.g., 1991, 1995) has explored the contrasting views of
Greek men and women regarding the expression and function of disagreement, arguing that men usually exploit strong
disagreements without mitigation whereas women tend to employ mitigated ones. These studies seem to confirm that
disagreements in various contexts are not dispreferred actions in Greek. Arguing to win a case is a central skill in classical
rhetoric (Cameron, 2003:30) and, as Hirschon (2001:36) suggests, this tradition still has ‘‘an unacknowledged currency
throughout contemporary Greece’’. Given such research findings, one may be tempted to suggest that Greeks are, on the
whole, confrontational. However, despite evidence from various local contexts, this would still be an example of an
unwarranted overgeneralisation.
In considering agreements and disagreements, the specific social situation is obviously significant since there are
social situations that allow for more disagreements, or even for what Tracy (2008) calls ‘‘reasonable hostility’’, than do
others in which disagreements may not be appropriate. Among other features, such as the topics discussed, context
includes participants who belong to various social, regional, ethnic, and gender groups, factors that may predispose them

2
Chiu (2008:386) also notes that polite disagreements might support social relationships.
 M. Sifianou / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1554–1564 1557

to specific perceptions and practices of disagreements. Significantly, interlocutors have face concerns, personal traits and
relational histories and may be involved in dyadic or multiparty interactions in the private or public domain.
In what follows, I will attempt to touch first on the complexity of disagreements and their grounding in a broad sense of
context and second on their relationship with face and im-politeness. I should clarify from the onset that disagreement
should be understood not as a single speech act but as a situated activity, interactionally managed by interlocutors, an
activity which may have deeper roots and extend beyond the current activity in subtle ways not always discernible to
overhearers or the analyst.

3. Disagreements and context

Disagreements bring to the fore the importance of both linguistic and extra-linguistic context in interaction, a broad,
multifaceted and much-debated issue (see, e.g., McHoul et al., 2008; Fetzer and Oishi, 2011). However, ‘‘how to theorize
context and how to treat context in analysis is perhaps one of the most enduring controversies in pragmatics, discourse
analysis, and sociolinguistics’’ (Kasper, 2006:301). It is fair to say that neither Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) nor Leech
(1983) ignores the significance of context, but attempt to capture it by incorporating in their models three broad social
variables (i.e., social distance (D), relative power (P) and weight of imposition (R) the former and social distance, authority
and cost-benefit the latter). Despite widespread criticism that these context variables have been treated as rather static
entities, Brown and Levinson (1987:74–80) make it clear that these are not stable valuations. As they (1987:79) illustrate
‘‘situational factors enter into the values for P, D, and R, so that the values assessed hold only for S and H in a particular
context, and for a particular FTA’’ (see also Kasper, 2006). However, despite their usefulness, these variables may still be
inadequate to account for the immense complexity of context (see, e.g., Duranti and Goodwin, 1992; Fetzer, 2004). For
instance, in relation to social distance, it has been argued (see, e.g., Slugoski and Turnbull, 1988; Brown and Gilman,
1989) that it should be distinguished from affect, since greater liking entails the use of greater politeness, irrespective of
the degree of familiarity. Brown and Levinson (1987:16) themselves concede that affect may be an independent variable
influencing the choice of politeness strategy, and of any ensuing judgements, as noted by Mills (2003:104). ‘‘It is very likely
that in almost every speech encounter between S and H, some kind of attitudinal ‘bond’ develops (negative or positive)
that may influence the course (and other elements) of things they are made of’’ (Kopytko, 1995:484). This is significant in
the case of disagreements, since (dis)liking another person will affect both the production and evaluation of a
disagreement. As Kienpointner (2008:246) notes, the emotional relationship between interlocutors influences the
cooperative or antagonistic ambience of an interaction.
The relationship between power and disagreement has been explored thoroughly by Locher (2004), whose view of
power is not restricted to interlocutors’ social status but encompasses power over people as exercised in social practice,
irrespective of one's social status. Achievement of power has been viewed as a possible goal in disagreement. For
instance, Rees-Miller (2000) views power and weight of imposition as important factors influencing the choice of a specific
strategy of disagreement and Grimshaw (1990) suggests that power and affect constitute the major constraints in conflict
talk.
The upshot of the above is that in order to adequately understand local phenomena, we need access to global aspects
of a relationship, such as power and affect, and knowledge as to if and how these are enmeshed with relational histories.
This does not mean that power and affect or relational histories are stable, transferred unchanged from one interaction to
the next but rather that there is a certain core construct which may be renegotiated in the course of a local interaction. To
achieve this renegotiation, interlocutors draw on various resources, both internal and external to the specific interaction
(see, e.g., Spencer-Oatey, 2002, 2005; Culpeper, 2008; Angouri and Tseliga, 2010).
I will start with a brief consideration of the impact of the local linguistic context and proceed to some of its extra-linguistic
features. Unlike other acts, such as requests, disagreements are reaction acts to a preceding prompt (Kakavá, 1993a:36;
Locher, 2004:99). Interestingly, this prompt is not of a specific type, since any verbal or non-verbal preceding act type can
serve as an initiator of disagreement, if contradicted (Maynard, 1985:3). This makes the emergence of a disagreement
highly unpredictable, especially from the analyst's perspective. In addition, opposition may be related not just to a
prior turn but also to a series of prior turns through format tying, that is, by reusing and transforming phonological, syntactic
or semantic material in them (see, e.g., Corsaro and Maynard, 1996). Besides, disagreements are not simply accepted or
rejected but tend to initiate longer sequences. Disagreeing seconds are frequently followed by the original speaker's
further contribution. These change the specifications of context, so that ensuing disagreements may become more and
more explicit without mitigation (cf. Kotthoff, 1993:195). Research into both children's disputes (see, e.g., Goodwin, 1993)
and on conflict interactions between adults in both institutional and casual settings (see, e.g., Kotthoff, 1993; Hutchby,
1996; Gruber, 1998) has shown a reversal of the preference pattern in such contexts: disagreements are enacted as
preferred acts, whereas agreements are enacted as dispreferred acts. Such findings indicate the significance of the local
interactional context in which antagonists may be expected to support their own positions rather than agree with their
opponents (Kotthoff, 1993; Locher, 2004:143).
1558 M. Sifianou / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1554–1564

Viewed from a CA perspective (see, e.g., Drew and Heritage, 1992), context involves the sequential structure in which
an action occurs allowing, in some cases, ‘‘certain restricted aspects of context to appear in the analysis’’ (McHoul,
2008:823). More specifically, context consists of the turns preceding and following the action in question, since the details
of the talk itself reveal what the interlocutors consider to be the salient features of context, to which they are, therefore,
oriented. This facilitates their identification by the analyst without recourse to external information (Schegloff, 1992:110).
In fact, utterances are ‘‘doubly contextual’’. They are ‘‘context shaped’’ and ‘‘context renewing’’ (Drew and Heritage,
1992:18). Even though, the insights and astute observations of fine discoursal details of CA are significant, it should
be noted that a disagreement emerging in the current interaction may have roots not just in previous turns of the same
interaction but also in previous interactions whose effect may not be discernible to the analyst. So what I am claiming
here is that many of our interactions are not finished texts but have roots in previous ones and provide sources for future
ones. As Graham (2007:758) argues, ‘‘all interactions are contextualized and interpreted within the frame of previous
interactions and the expectations that grow out of them’’. Dersley and Wootton (2001:612, 613) further contend that
the termination of a current interaction does not mean that the dispute has been resolved. It sets up expectations that the
issue may be readdressed on some future occasion.
More importantly perhaps, context involves participants who typically have personal traits and may have relational
histories,3 which predispose them to particular strategies (see, e.g., O’Driscoll, 2011:34). Some individuals are more
argumentative than others, and some may be aversive to any kind of opposition. Moreover, ‘‘some people object to certain
kinds of FTAs more than others’’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987:78). It is highly likely that such personal traits will influence
both interlocutors’ linguistic behaviour. Some people construct relationships where they frequently argue and others
where they do not. In each case, their (dis)agreement will be construed and evaluated differently and will have a different
impact on their interaction and relationship. Moreover, speakers in solidarity relationships will (dis)agree differently, and
the impact of their disagreement will be different from that of speakers in antagonistic relationships. For instance, in long-
term relationships, interlocutors share the knowledge of specific interactional norms. They know the extent to which
mitigated or unmitigated disagreements are acceptable and when the boundaries of politic behaviour will be overstepped
to jeopardise their relationship. Thus, individual differences as to how people react to prompts and in their relational
histories should be taken into account because they affect the development and outcome of any interaction. Moreover,
such differences affect judgements relating to politeness or impoliteness, since such evaluations are made against the
standards of personal traits rather than according to what is generally appropriate for others in the given context, as Mills
(2003:108) suggests. Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2009:282) also pinpoints the significance of one's interlocutor's identity in
the interpretation of what is said. I will not provide any specific examples here, but I assume that we can all recall
disagreeing exchanges in departmental meetings and other gatherings, where interlocutors’ known personal traits and
relational histories are clearly discernible. In such cases, our judgements as overhearers or analysts will be influenced by
these known features.
In addition, the term ‘participants’ is not restricted to the two interlocutors. Our actions and thoughts may be influenced
by those present even if they do not participate in the interaction directly (Watanabe, 2011:316–317). The presence of
third parties may influence the construction, interpretation and outcome of a disagreement. In fact, third parties may
be decisive in the resolution or escalation of a conflict. Kangasharju (2002) investigates disagreements in Finnish
committee meetings and focuses on the formation of alliances between interlocutors arguing that in multiparty interactions
the practices used differ from those used by a dyad.4 In her investigation of disagreement strategies among three
generations of Greek-Australian women, Petraki (2005:295) claims that the second generation acts as a mediator of a lot
of talk in narratives. She suggests that the dynamic of these interactions might have been different had this age group not
been present.
The topic discussed may also contribute significantly to the emergence of disagreement in interaction (Schiffrin, 1984;
Kakavá, 1993b; Locher, 2004). Empirically speaking, one could presume that less controversial topics will generate mild
disagreements.5 However, as Kakavá (1993b) shows, this is not always the case and attributes this to cultural and
contextual parameters, of which, I would say, individual traits and relational histories might be key factors. For instance,
Kakavá (1993b) discusses an example, where the colour of a belt led to a dispute with strong forms of disagreements
between two brothers. She ascribes this to the participants’ argumentative style and Greek socio-cultural norms, which
allow opposition without it being a threat to amiability. Her example reminds me of a lengthy argument I once witnessed
between a couple, which escalated into a dispute over the colour of a coat. (Colours seem to be very important topics for
disagreement in Greek!). In this instance, the interlocutors’ argumentative style was one source of the dispute, but more

3
This obviously does not mean that we have relational histories with all our interlocutors. We interact with strangers or may be involved in
interactions for task-oriented activities with temporary partners in non-relational contexts (see Gross et al., 2004).
4
For a detailed account of institutional, multiparty interactions and what she calls ‘‘collaborative disagreement’’, see Geyer (2008).
5
Obviously whether a topic is controversial or not depends to a large extent on who the interacting individuals are.
 M. Sifianou / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1554–1564 1559

importantly, I believe, was their acrimonious relationship, since their opposition was a lot deeper than the actual colour of
the coat.
Another key factor in relation to the topic is how it relates to the speaker's beliefs and knowledge. Infante and Rancer
(1996) discern two traits in aggressive communication: (a) attack on the position taken by others, which they call
‘argumentativeness’ and (b) attack on the other's self-concept, which they call ‘verbal aggressiveness’. Scott (2002)
distinguishes between types of disagreements, of which ‘personal challenge disagreements’ may be directed towards
either a viewpoint or piece of evidence or to the integrity of the other and thus to his/her viewpoint.6 One may assume that
attacks on the position taken by one's interlocutor will be evaluated less negatively by the recipient than those on his/her
overall self-concept. Such evaluations are again closely related to individual differences. Some people may be more
prepared to revise their opinions and admit less than full knowledgeability than others. Self-concept involves various
aspects, such as ‘approval’, ‘reliability’, ‘competence’ and ‘moral face’ (Ting-Toomey, 2005:81), any of which may be a
more weighty consideration for different individuals. Such differences may in turn signal a power game where the stronger
wins, attempting to construct a certain identity for him/herself and for his/her interlocutors. Nevertheless, all these are
intertwined with personal characteristics and relational history between interlocutors. As Tannen (2002) says, dynamic
disagreement can be a power game, a show of solidarity or both at once.
The above only scratches the surface, but it seems clear to me that a combination of some of these factors influences
the construction of disagreements, and although some may be seen as mild and receive minimum attention in interaction,
others may represent a more serious, on-going opposition. They may add to the development of a dispute or conflict and
may or may not result in the breach of an extant relationship. This interconnectedness of various factors turns the analyst's
job into a complex undertaking; it inevitably makes the detection of the interaction of all these factors exceedingly difficult
especially when examining just one exchange. Thus, ethnographic information is sine qua non to corroborate detailed
analysis of discourse data (see, e.g., Haugh, 2007:311; McHoul, 2008).

4. Disagreements and face

Disagreements are very good examples of the multidirectionality and multifunctionality of speech acts. By
multidirectionality, I mean that disagreements can affect either or both aspects of both interlocutors’ face, and by
multifunctionality, I refer to the fact that disagreements can serve a variety of functions, such as designating hostility or
affiliation. As is well known, the concept of ‘face’ is consistently linked to that of ‘politeness’ since the emergence of Brown
and Levinson's (1978/1987) theory of politeness (O’Driscoll, 2011:21). The relationship between (dis)agreement and face
will be considered in this section whereas that of politeness and (dis)agreement will be discussed in the following one.
Even though disagreements have been conceptualised primarily as acts threatening the addressee's positive aspect
of face and should thus be mitigated or avoided in favour of agreements, this is only part of the story. More specifically, for
Brown and Levinson (1987:66), disagreements are positive-face threatening acts because the speaker conveys to the
addressee that s/he is wrong, misguided or unreasonable about an issue, thus revealing a lack of concern for that person's
feelings and/or wants. To redress such threat, Brown and Levinson (1987:112–113) propose two positive politeness
strategies: ‘‘Seek agreement’’ (e.g., by engaging in safe topics) and ‘‘Avoid disagreement’’ (e.g., by using token
agreement, hedging, and white lies). Thus, the desire to agree is presented so strongly as to allow for pseudo-agreement
and even white lies. Likewise, Leech (1983:132, 133, 138) identifies ‘‘a tendency to exaggerate agreement with other
people, and to mitigate disagreement’’. His Politeness Principle includes a ‘‘Maxim of agreement’’ in assertives, which
includes two submaxims: ‘‘minimize disagreement between self and other’’ and ‘‘maximize agreement between self and
other’’, the first of which seems more important than the second.
On a theoretical level, it sounds reasonable to assume that disagreements threaten the addressee's positive aspect of
face because they undermine the option of claiming common ground. Moreover, those who are interested in maintaining
social approval may avoid argumentativeness, as Infante and Rancer (1996:326) report. However, such contentions
ignore the possibility that even agreements may be face threatening if, for instance, they are interpreted as insincere,
manipulative or ingratiating. Moreover, agreements may also be self-face threatening acts if one feels impeded in voicing
one's own views openly and freely (cf. Georgakopoulou, 2001:1897).
Emphasis on the positive face threat of disagreements also overlooks the likelihood of their being acts threatening the
addressee's negative aspect of face if they are understood as pressuring him/her to accept a different line of thought.
Moreover, the impact of disagreement is not restricted to the addressee's face. A disagreement may also threaten both
aspects of a speaker's face. It may threaten its positive aspect since, in disagreeing, the speaker may signify that s/he is

6
Scott (2002) distinguishes between two primary types of disagreement: backgrounded and foregrounded, which form a continuum of
increasing explicitness and escalating hostility. Within foregrounded disagreements, she identifies three patterns: collegial disagreements,
personal challenge disagreements and personal attack disagreements.
1560 M. Sifianou / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1554–1564

not a person to be liked or approved of, and it may also threaten its negative aspect if one feels forced to disagree in order
to protect one's own face or to help the other protect his/her own face in some way. Concessions may indicate that
speakers are unable to defend their own face, so that these become self-face threatening acts (Kotthoff, 1993:209;
Locher, 2004:97). As Bousfield (2007:28) contends, in conflictive discourse, there may be a principle of ‘‘self-
preservation’’ provoking self-defensive, disagreeing moves to deprecatory offensive assessments.
Besides being an exclusively face-threatening act, disagreement may serve face-enhancing functions if it is intended
to display interest in the other. In other words, disagreement may indicate the addressee's interest through his/her
involvement in interaction rather than indifference through a straightforward agreement or even silence. Moreover,
disagreements may aim at the joint scrutiny of different perspectives of the issue under discussion in order to reach a
solution beneficial to the addressee (cf. Georgakopoulou, 2001). Disagreements are also face-saving acts as a response
to self-deprecating remarks (Pomerantz, 1984). In such contexts, an agreement would be tantamount to endorsing
the speaker's self-belittling remarks.7 Consequently, disagreements are not only face-threatening acts, but they can also
be face-saving acts, protecting the addressee's face. Moreover, they may also protect the speaker's face. By disagreeing,
speakers may try to protect their own face. For instance, agreeing with a compliment would be equivalent to self-praise
which is also face-threatening (Pomerantz, 1984).
Speakers may also disagree in order to achieve their goal or to present themselves as skilful contesters, who are
capable of engaging in an intellectual discussion, thus attempting to enhance their own face. Self-affirmation may be a
socially approved attribute in some contexts and this may be achieved through disagreement among other devices
(Hernández-Flores, 2008:700). As Kotthoff (1993:209) argues, once an argument episode has been established,
interlocutors are expected to defend their position and thus enhance their own face. Related is Kampf and Blum-Kulka's
(2011) observation about Israeli politicians who threaten their opponent's face in order to enhance their own and attain
visibility. Thus, disagreements are delicate acts, since, in any given context, speakers have to balance their own face
needs with those of their addressees. In fact, in the social sciences, even hostile conflict is seen as valuable since ‘‘it
preserves group structure through the venting of feelings that might ultimately destroy a group if allowed to build up too
long’’ (Nelson, 2001:4). Even ‘‘democracy can merit from heated disagreement’’ (Papacharissi, 2004:262).
The above considerations reflect what both Goffman (1955/1972:323, 325) and Brown and Levinson (1978/1987:61)
state; namely, that in interactions interlocutors are expected to behave in a way that maintains both their own face and that
of their interlocutor. In other words, interlocutors develop a defensive and a protective orientation, respectively, and both of
these are expected to be taken at the same time in any interaction. Along similar lines, for Leech (1983), politeness aims at
achieving maximum benefit for both speaker and addressee at minimum cost. However, despite such explicit statements,
most early politeness research has concentrated on speakers’ efforts to protect the face of their addressees.
This is expressed explicitly in Leech's (1983:133) suggestion that politeness may be focused more strongly on the other
than on the self. This neglects the speaker's face and the complex interplay between speaker's and addressee's face
(see, e.g., Muntigl and Turnbull, 1998; Stewart, 2008; Kecskés, 2010). Chen (2001) attempts to remedy this imbalance
and proposes an addition to Brown and Levinson's theory, which he calls ‘‘self-politeness’’ and which Hernández-Flores
(2008) calls ‘‘self-facework’’.
Thus, it appears that acts like disagreements are highly complex and prevent their being simply labelled face-
threatening, impolite acts. In fact, any act can only be interpreted as an FTA in context, despite the fact that in Brown
and Levinson's conceptualisation most, if not all, of our acts are seen as face-threatening acts irrespective of context
(see, e.g., Sifianou, 2010). Moreover, it seems that disagreements are more related to face concerns than to politeness
per se, which as O’Driscoll (2011) illustrates, are not the same thing. As he (2011:22) argues, face and politeness are
related but their relationship is ‘‘one of mutual hyponymy not a causal one’’. We may thus talk of degrees of constructive or
destructive disagreements in context rather than of specifically face-threatening acts damaging the addressee's positive
aspect of face. However, since early politeness research presented communication primarily as a smooth process
between co-operative interactants there was little room left for viewing the complexity of disagreements.

5. Disagreements and politeness

The variety of functions of disagreements and their implications for both interlocutors’ face are related to issues of
politeness (see, e.g., Locher, 2004). Turning to disagreements and politeness, we enter the thorny area of what
constitutes politeness. Though rarely defined explicitly, politeness has been conceptualised as a means of avoiding
conflict (see, e.g., Leech, 1983:113; Kasper, 1990:194). Interestingly, even though (dis)agreement has been treated as a
sub-strategy or a maxim of secondary importance, it does, in fact, constitute one of the cornerstones of early theoretical

7
This is not the case in therapy contexts where a patient's self-deprecation is not followed by a disagreement but constitutes a topic for serious
discussion (Kotthoff, 1993:196). This observation reflects the significance of the local context where a (dis)agreement occurs.
 M. Sifianou / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1554–1564 1561

frameworks; since disagreement may lead to conflict, politeness is there to avoid it. As Locher (2004:96) observes, if one
is to follow not only Leech's agreement maxim but also his approbation and tact maxims, one will try to redress
disagreement.
In earlier work (Sifianou, 1992:213), I expressed a reservation as to whether ‘‘Seek agreement’’ and ‘‘Avoid
disagreement’’ are positive politeness devices. Theoretically speaking, it is evident that they are since their employment
assumes some degree of common ground between interlocutors. However, it now seems clearer to me that this is not
necessarily the case. Such devices are individually-, situationally-, and culturally-specific tendencies rather than universal
politeness strategies. Politeness enters the scene mainly through context and the context-bound linguistic realisation of
disagreements. This is reminiscent of Ide's (1989:239) contention that, in Brown and Levinson's work, there is confusion
between ‘behaviour’ and ‘linguistic’ strategies. Behaviour strategies, such as ‘‘Notice, attend to H’’ and ‘‘Seek agreement’’
are mitigated or aggravated through linguistic devices which render them positively or negatively polite or impolite in
the specific socio-cultural context in which they occur. Moreover, ‘‘Seek agreement’’ and ‘‘Avoid disagreement’’ could
be negative politeness strategies in that they avoid imposition by wasting the addressee's time. What makes them positive
politeness devices is probably the breadth of positive politeness (O’Driscoll, 2007:474; Sifianou, 2010), which in many
respects represents ‘‘the normal linguistic behaviour between intimates’’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987:101). Based on the
multiplicity of linguistic features that can occur with disagreements, Scott (2002) suggests that disagreements are not a
uniform phenomenon and, therefore, draws a number of distinctions (see note 4). All this may suggest that ‘‘Seek
agreement’’ and ‘‘Avoid disagreement’’ cannot be classified unquestionably as positive politeness devices.
Agreements are seen as a characteristic way of claiming common ground. However, a device for seeking agreement,
such as raising ‘‘safe topics’’ – chatting about the weather or the beauty of gardens – may sustain the expression of
agreement but it also implies distance. These are not the kinds of topics that reflect or allow one to establish an intimate
relationship with somebody else. Such strategies may be useful to use with strangers or in initial stages of a relationship
but are rather inadequate to sustain rapport and solidarity. The same seems to be true of ‘‘token agreement’’ and ‘‘white
lies’’, which are other means of avoiding disagreement but they lack the frankness that is required and may be valued in
some contexts. In addition, telling the truth does not have the same index of face-threat in all contexts. Viewing
disagreements from this vantage point means that disagreements may have a bearing on connection and solidarity
between interlocutors. Thus, they are not necessarily impolite acts that should be avoided.

6. Concluding remarks

What emerges from the above discussion is that context is not a simple, static and straightforward given, and
disagreement is not an inherently face-threatening or impolite act that should be avoided, delayed or always mitigated.
What is face-threatening or impolite emerges in situated activities which are dependent on prior related ones and which
inform those which may follow. This means that we cannot divorce face considerations and linguistic politeness from the
overall linguistic and social context in which an exchange occurs.
The import of examining longer stretches of discourse in context sounds like a truism nowadays. Drawing on the
linguistic pragmatics that was prevalent at the time, namely, speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics, Brown and
Levinson (1978/1987) and Leech (1983) focused on speakers’ single utterances rather than longer exchanges and on
harmonious interaction, with politeness being used to secure it. However, Brown and Levinson acknowledge the
significance of longer linguistic units, endorsing the conversation analytic approach. To this end, they put forward, even
though they do not expand on the concept of ‘face-threatening intention’ (instead of FTA), since, as they argue, ‘‘FTAs do
not necessarily inhere in single acts’’ (Brown and Levinson, 1987:10, 233).
In this paper, I have tried to go a step further in relation to disagreements and argue that examining longer stretches
of discourse in their local linguistic contexts is evidently not enough. As Marquez-Reiter and Frohlich (forthcoming)
insightfully observe, interactions, in long term relationships, can be seen as turns in an ongoing exchange interspersed
with ‘pauses’ of minutes, hours or days. Though the significance of context is amply recognised, it has to be
understood in very broad terms. In some cases, at least, we may have to go beyond the local encounter or even a
series of encounters since our analyses should consider participants’ personal traits and relational histories. Mills
(2003) provides a number of examples in which elements in current interactions draw from issues brought up in
previous ones, and Coulmas (1981:11) says that in Japanese the sense of obligation is not expressed only when the
favourable act is performed but also when the interlocutors meet again. Such examples demonstrate that our daily
encounters are not finished products but processes related to previous and future ones. Greetings and partings, which
initiate and terminate encounters, are means to this end (Goffman, 1955/1972:343). If this is so, then what is a face-
threatening or a face-enhancing act, polite or impolite act may not relate exclusively to every specific interaction. It may
draw on previous interactions and may be renegotiated locally. In this sense, then, disagreements cannot be labelled
face-threatening or face-enhancing acts, preferred or dispreferred seconds, based only on what is produced in each
specific encounter.
1562 M. Sifianou / Journal of Pragmatics 44 (2012) 1554–1564

However, considering the above, one cannot but agree with Wortham (2005:32), who observes that ‘‘once we leave the
boundaries of the speech event as the focus of analysis, we seem to have opened Pandora's Box’’ because a number of
challenging questions arise. What kind and how much data would be adequate for an informed analysis? Should analysts
restrict themselves to analyses of personal instances for which they have access to details concerning personal traits and
relational histories? I must confess that I consider answers to such questions rather hard to provide. Obviously not all
possible features of context, individual traits and aspects of relational histories are always relevant or are made salient.
However, I consider personal traits and relational histories significant resources for a viable interpretation by the analyst
because participants may draw on features from both the sequential and the situational context and also from the history
of their interactions both within and prior to the current exchange (see, e.g., Haugh, 2007:311; Arundale, 2010:2096).
I have also suggested that disagreement should be seen as indicating face concerns rather than those necessarily
related to politeness. Face and im-politeness are related but the former is broader (see, e.g., Watts, 2003:130; Sifianou,
2011:53; cf. O’Driscoll, 2011:23) and, I believe, can better account for the complexity of disagreements.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my colleagues Eleni Antonopoulou, Villy Tsakona and Angeliki Tzanne for our
lengthy discussions and for their constructive comments on this paper. My sincere thanks are also due to Robert F. Halls
for his suggestions for stylistic improvement. I should also record my special thanks to the editors of this volume who
invited me to contribute to the panel they organised on ‘‘Disagreement on and off line’’ during the 5th International
Symposium on Politeness (30 June to 2 July 2010 in Basle), and who gave me the opportunity to explore an issue that I
have been pondering for some time. Last but not least, my thanks go to the delegates of the panel, Jo Angouri, who read
the paper there in my absence and to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.

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