90062 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No.
239 / Tuesday, December 13, 2016 / Notices
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Public Action Requested
PHMSA advises offerors of DOT–39
cylinders having an internal volume
exceeding 75 cubic inches (in3) (1.23 L)
that such cylinders should not be filled
with liquefied flammable compressed
gas. PHMSA further advises the public
not to use any DOT–39 cylinder with an
internal volume greater than 75 in3 (1.23
L) containing a liquefied flammable
compressed gas.
Safety Concern
The release of a liquefied flammable
compressed gas from or rupture of such
a cylinder having an internal volume
exceeding 75 in3 (1.23 L) is a safety
concern that could result in extensive
property damage, serious personal
injury, or even death. A liquefied
flammable compressed gas has a stored
energy that is several times greater than
that of a non-liquefied compressed gas.
Further, a DOT–39 cylinder can have a
volume of up to 1,526 in3 (25 L) at a
service pressure of 500 psig or less and,
as such, can have up to 22 times the
stored energy of a DOT–39 cylinder
limited to 75 in3 (1.23 L). Additionally,
because of the design specifications that
allow for thinner walls when used at
lower pressure, the cylinders may be at
greater risk from corrosion or puncture.
Given the known risks associated with
cylinders that are filled with liquefied
flammable compressed gases, PHMSA is
issuing this safety advisory notice to
inform offerors and users of DOT–39
cylinders that cylinders with an internal
volume of 75 in3 (1.23 L) or more
should not be filled with liquefied
flammable compressed gas.
Background
This safety advisory notice is being
issued in part because of concern over
confusion about the regulatory
requirements when using DOT–39
cylinders for liquefied compressed
gases. Historically, the Hazardous
Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR
parts 171–180) limited the internal
volume of a DOT–39 specification
cylinder to 75 in3 (1.23 L) when used for
certain liquefied flammable compressed
gases. This size limitation applied when
DOT–39 cylinders were used for gases
that were subject to Note 9 following the
table at § 173.304(a)(2) or liquefied
pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES
petroleum gas as addressed in
§ 173.304(d)(3) (The table is currently
located at § 173.304a).
In an October 30, 1998 notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM), the
Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA)—the
predecessor agency to PHMSA—
VerDate Sep<11>2014 15:08 Dec 12, 2016 Jkt 241001
proposed to extend the 75 in3 (1.23 L)
volume limitation of DOT–39 cylinders
to all liquefied flammable compressed
gases by revising § 173.304 to delete
Note 9 from the table at § 173.304(a)(2)
and adding §§ 173.304a and 173.304b.1
RSPA received several comments in
opposition to extending the limit to all
liquefied flammable compressed gases
which would have been codified in
§ 173.304a(a)(3). RSPA published a final
rule on August 8, 2002 and, based on
the opposing comments, decided not to
extend the 75 in3 (1.23 L) limitation to
all liquefied flammable compressed
gases in a DOT–39 cylinder at that time.
However, in the process of publishing
the final rule, the agency inadvertently
omitted the 75 in3 (1.23 L) limitation for
liquefied flammable compressed gas and
liquefied petroleum gas.2
On November 13, 2014, PHMSA
accepted a petition for rulemaking (P–
1622) from Worthington Cylinders to
address this error in a rulemaking. On
July 26, 2016, PHMSA published in the
Federal Register an NPRM titled,
‘‘Hazardous Materials: Miscellaneous
Amendments Pertaining to DOT
Specification Cylinders (RRR),’’ [81 FR
48977; Docket No. PHMSA–2011–0140
(HM–234) 3] that again proposes to
extend the limit on the internal volume
of DOT–39 cylinders to use with all
liquefied flammable compressed gases,
thus correcting the inadvertently
omitted size limitation and expanding
the applicability to capture those
liquefied flammable compressed gases
(e.g., difluoromethane (Refrigerant gas R
32)) either not reflected in the
§ 173.304a(a)(2) table or not considered
a liquefied petroleum gas.
Issued in Washington, DC on December 5,
2016.
William S. Schoonover,
Acting Associate Administrator for
Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
[FR Doc. 2016–29813 Filed 12–12–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
1 NPRM—Hazardous Materials: Requirements for
DOT Specification Cylinders (HM–220D) [63 FR
58460].
2 Final Rule—Hazardous Materials: Requirements
for Maintenance, Requalification, Repair and Use of
DOT Specification Cylinders (HM–220D) [67 FR
51625]
3 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-07-26/
pdf/2016-16689.pdf.
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2016–0065]
Pipeline Safety: High Consequence
Area Identification Methods for Gas
Transmission Pipelines
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA); DOT.
ACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory
Bulletin.
SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this
advisory bulletin to remind gas
transmission pipeline operators of
certain previously issued guidance and
provide operators with additional
guidance for the identification of High
Consequence Areas (HCAs) along
pipeline right-of-ways. This advisory
bulletin provides suggestions for
accurately mapping and integrating
HCA data, documenting how mapping
systems are used, periodically verifying
and updating their mapping systems,
utilizing buffer zones (tolerances) to
provide additional protection around
the calculated potential impact radius
(PIR) along their pipelines, and ensuring
the accuracy of class locations. The
bulletin emphasizes that HCA
identification relies on pipeline-specific
information regarding the location, size,
and operating characteristics of the line,
as well as the identification of
structures, specified sites, and their
intended usage along the pipeline right-
of-way.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Allan Beshore by phone at 405–834–
8344 or email at allan.beshore@dot.gov.
All materials in this docket may be
accessed electronically at http://
www.regulations.gov. Information about
PHMSA may be found at http://
www.phmsa.dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A key component of PHMSA’s
pipeline safety regulations is its
integrity management (IM) program. For
gas transmission pipelines, this program
is outlined in Subpart O of 49 CFR part
192 and is based on the concept that
pipeline operators need to identify those
segments of their pipeline systems that
pose the greatest risk to human life,
property, and the environment, and to
take extra precautions to ensure their
safety. These higher-risk areas are
known as ‘‘HCAs.’’ Each operator is
required to survey its entire pipeline
system to identify all pipeline segments
13DEN1
 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 239 / Tuesday, December 13, 2016 / Notices
that could affect HCAs. Since the
greatest risk posed by gas transmission
pipelines is the risk of fire and
explosion resulting from pipeline leaks
and ruptures, gas HCAs consist of
highly populated areas and ‘‘identified
sites’’ where people regularly gather or
live.
An operator’s first step in developing
a robust IM program is to properly
identify and map all HCAs and perform
periodic updates to the evaluation
process to maintain accurate and
current information. Subpart O of part
192 allows operators flexibility in
making determinations to identify HCAs
by defining two different identification
methods, generally referred to as
Method 1 or Method 2.
Both methods require the operator to
determine ‘‘identified sites’’ and
calculate a PIR, using a formula to
calculate the radius of a circle within
which the potential failure of a pipeline
could have significant impact on people
or property. While Method 1 includes
all pipe segments within Class 3 and
Class 4 locations1 and ‘‘identified areas
within a PIR in Class 1 and 2 locations,’’
Method 2 includes ‘‘identified sites’’ 2
within a PIR only, regardless of the class
location, or the combination of
‘‘identified sites’’ with 20 or more
buildings intended for human
occupancy.
A review of PHMSA and state data
from ‘‘first-round’’ IM inspections
indicates a large percentage of intrastate
and small operators have been
inconsistent in determining HCAs using
‘‘identified sites,’’ and operators that
initially used Method 1 to identify
HCAs have since transitioned to Method
2.
On July 17, 2003, (68 FR 42458)
PHMSA published an advisory bulletin
titled ‘‘Identified Sites as Part of High
Consequence Areas for Gas Integrity
Management Programs’’ to provide
1 Under 49 CFR 192.5, all transmission pipelines
fall into one of four ‘‘class locations.’’ Class 1
locations are offshore areas and all segments (‘‘class
location units’’) one mile in length that contain 10
or fewer buildings intended for human occupancy
Class 2 locations are units with more than 10, but
fewer than 46, such buildings. Class 3 locations are
units with 46 or more buildings or an area where
the pipeline lies within 100 yards of either a
building or a small, well-defined outside area (such
as a playground or recreation area) that is occupied
by 20 or more people on at least 5 days a week for
10 weeks in any 12-month period. Class 4 locations
are units where buildings with 4 or more stories are
pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES
prevalent.
2 ‘‘Identified sites’’ is a defined term under 49
CFR 192.903 in PHMSA’s IM regulations and refers
generally to the type of specific areas included
under the Class 3 location definition above, plus
facilities occupied by persons who are confined, are
of impaired mobility, or would be difficult to
evacuate, including schools, prisons, nursing
homes, etc.
VerDate Sep<11>2014 15:08 Dec 12, 2016 Jkt 241001 PO 00000
guidance to gas transmission operators
on the steps PHMSA expected them to
take to determine ‘‘identified sites’’
along their pipelines. PHMSA intended
the guidance in the advisory bulletin to
support operators in identifying these
sites for planning their IM programs and
determined that certain measures, if
properly applied, would satisfy the
intent of the regulation.
On December 15, 2003, (68 FR 69778)
PHMSA published a final rule titled:
‘‘Pipeline Integrity Management in High
Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission
Pipelines)’’ that provided requirements
for the identification of HCAs and
further explanation of how best to
conduct the identification process.
In the preamble of the rule, PHMSA
provided the basis for defining an
identified site as follows:
Define an identified site as any of the
following within a Potential Impact
Circle:
1. A facility housing persons of
limited mobility that is known to public
safety officials, emergency response
officials, or local emergency planning
committee, and which meets one of the
following three criteria: (a) Is visibly
marked, (b) is licensed or registered by
a Federal, state, or local agency, or (c)
is listed on a map maintained by or
available from a Federal, State, or local
agency, or
2. An outdoor area where people
congregate that is known to public
safety officials, emergency response
officials or local emergency planning
committee and which is occupied by 20
or more people on at least 50 days per
year, or
3. A building occupied by 20 or more
people 5 days per week, 10 weeks in
any 12-month period (the days and
weeks need not be consecutive).
To assist operators in meeting the
requirements of the regulation, PHMSA
introduced a ‘‘buffer zone’’ concept.
This additional safety margin was
intended to compensate for inaccuracies
(e.g., incorrect pipeline center data or
mapping errors) when implementing the
regulation and determining the PIR. As
defined in § 192.903, a PIR is the radius
of the potential impact circle (PIC),
measured in feet surrounding the point
of failure, within which the potential
failure of a pipeline could have
significant impact on people or
property. Part 192 provides the formula
for determining a PIR that takes into
account the Maximum Allowable
Operating Pressure (MAOP) in the
pipeline segment in pounds per square
inch, the nominal diameter of the
pipeline in inches, and a numeric factor,
Frm 00172 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\13DEN1.SGM
90063
which varies for other gases depending
upon their heat of combustion.3
Following the publication of the
regulations and advisory bulletin,
PHMSA inspections have revealed that
operators may need further guidance
regarding the identification of HCAs, as
operators have been inconsistent in
determining HCAs using ‘‘identified
sites.’’
Additionally, in CY 2015, the
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) published SS–15–01, ‘‘Safety
Study: Integrity Management of Gas
Transmission Pipelines in High
Consequence Areas.’’ The study was
conducted in response to concerns
about deficiencies in operators’ IM
programs that had been identified by the
NTSB in three gas transmission pipeline
accidents from the previous 5 years.
Recommendation P–15–06, issued as a
part of the study, recommended that
PHMSA ‘‘[a]ssess the limitations
associated with the current process for
identifying high consequence areas, and
disseminate the results of [the]
assessment to the pipeline industry,
inspectors, and the public.’’ PHMSA has
noted that proper identification of an
HCA and periodic verification relies on
two key types of information: (1)
Pipeline-specific information that
includes the accurate location of the
centerline of the pipeline, the nominal
diameter of the pipeline, and the
pipeline segment’s MAOP; and (2) all
the structures and their usage (including
occupancy) located along the pipeline.
PHMSA subject matter experts
performed an assessment of the impact
of these two issues on identifying HCAs
using Methods 1 and 2 as defined in
§ 192.903, by reviewing failure
investigations, inspector experiences,
and Gas IM inspection results and has
documented these insights in this
advisory bulletin. PHMSA will be
including these insights in updated
inspection materials, as appropriate.
PHMSA is publishing this advisory
bulletin to meet NTSB Recommendation
P–15–06 by providing operators with
additional guidance on how to improve
the accuracy of their class location
identification process, which may also
lead to operators improving HCA
identification.
3 Operators transporting gas other than natural gas
must use section 3.2 of ASME/ANSI B31.8S
(incorporated by reference, see § 192.7) to calculate
the impact radius formula. For flammable gases,
additional information on factors may be found in
TTO–13, Potential Impact Radius Formulae for
Flammable Gases Other Than Natural Gas Subject
to 49 CFR 192, June 2005, Table 7.1 which can be
found in http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/gasimp/docs/
TTO13_PotentialImpactRadius_FinalReport_
June2005.pdf).
13DEN1
 90064 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 239 / Tuesday, December 13, 2016 / Notices
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2016–07)
To: Owners and Operators of Natural
Gas Pipelines.
Subject: High Consequence Area
Identification Methods.
Advisory: PHMSA is issuing this
advisory bulletin to inform owners and
operators of gas transmission pipelines
that PHMSA has developed guidance on
the identification and periodic
verification of HCAs, including the
application of a buffer zone to the PIR,
and information regarding the accuracy
of class locations. PHMSA is
recommending that operators review
and consistently monitor class location
and PIR data on an annual basis as part
of their IM program. PHMSA anticipates
this annual review will improve the
accuracy of operator HCA
determinations.
A review of early PHMSA inspections
has shown that many operators (28%)
did not have procedures to adequately
describe how to identify HCAs, using
Method 1 or Method 2. To effectively
use Method 2, operators should have a
detailed and documented process in
place to monitor the conditions
surrounding their pipelines, including
the existence of ‘‘identified sites.’’
Therefore, PHMSA is reminding
operators of the existing guidance for
making those determinations and is
providing additional recommendations
on how to improve the accuracy of HCA
identification. Specifically:
• PHMSA expects that most large
operators will use a geographic
information system or similar mapping
software for segment identification.
Operators should be able to demonstrate
the usability of their system and show
a graphical overlay of HCAs with their
pipeline system.
• An operator not using geographic
information system or similar mapping
software should describe or demonstrate
how it performed its HCA segment
identifications.
• For both geographic information
system-based and non-geographic
information system-based HCA
identification processes, the operator
should address how it will deal with
tolerances (or buffers) on top of the
calculated PIR regarding the accuracy of
measured distances to structures and
the location of the pipeline centerline.
PHMSA recognizes that global
pmangrum on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES
positioning system measurements and
maps have some limitations in their
accuracy; however, the rule applies to
pipelines—and distances from those
pipelines—as they actually exist in the
field.
PHMSA also reminds operators of the
need to continually improve the
VerDate Sep<11>2014 15:08 Dec 12, 2016 Jkt 241001
accuracy of their pipeline data. As
technology advances, pipeline operators
have more access to tools that provide
improved accuracy for determining
class locations (including the
determination of the centerline of the
pipeline), the application of aerial
photography, pipeline operating
characteristics (diameter, grade, MAOP),
population studies, and mapping
software. It is important that operators
continuously improve the accuracy of
the data and conduct the required class
location studies as required in
§ 192.609, along with the confirmation
or revision of MAOP in § 192.611, as
this affects the operation of their
pipelines. Operators should include
provisions in their continuing
surveillance monitoring procedures
(§ 192.613) to constantly monitor the
surrounding conditions, report that
information, and update their maps
each calendar year. This is similar to the
requirements for including newly
identified areas for segments in HCAs
(§ 192.905(c)) and for filing annual
report information relating to the
performance of IM plans (§ 191.17).
Operators must use MAOP when
calculating PIR, and accurate pipeline
data is necessary to ensure that
operators are correctly applying the
MAOP value in the PIR calculation
when determining whether areas qualify
as HCAs. PHMSA also recommends that
operators review their pipeline
centerline and map data to account for
any potential inaccuracies or data
limitations and to add an appropriate
buffer zone to the calculated PIR. This
would establish a PIR that includes any
areas that could potentially be excluded
due to data limitations.
A list of PHMSA-provided frequently
asked questions on this subject can be
found on the gas IM site at: https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/gasimp/
index.htm. Gas IM Frequently Asked
Question Number 174 reminds
operators that they should consider the
uncertainties in the distances they
measure or infer when evaluating PICs
and consider geographic information
system accuracy in locating HCAs:
‘‘. . . Operators may use a
combination of techniques in order to
account for these inaccuracies. For
instance, aerial photography may be
used as an initial screen. Field
measurements (such as pipeline locators
along with chainage measurements or
survey quality range finders) may be
used to verify if structures near the edge
of the PIC (i.e., within the range of
mapping/geographic information system
inaccuracies) are actually inside or
outside the PIC. PHMSA will inspect
each operator’s approach to assure that
PO 00000 Frm 00173 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703
the operator’s process is adequate to
identify all covered segments.’’
PHMSA recommends operators
frequently and consistently review their
data—including class location data—for
potential inaccuracies or limitations,
and add a buffer zone to the calculated
PIR to help ensure proper HCA
identification. The purpose and usage of
buildings, open structures, and outside
areas can shift over time, changing the
number of ‘‘identified sites’’ in a PIR,
and therefore, whether an area is an
HCA. PHMSA believes that if operators
review class location and PIR data on an
annual basis as a part of their IM
programs, the accuracy of HCA
determinations will be greatly
improved.
Issued in Washington, DC, on December 8,
2016, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety.
[FR Doc. 2016–29880 Filed 12–12–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Secretary of
Transportation
Notice of Funding Availability for the
Small Business Transportation
Resource Center Program
AGENCY: Office of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization
(OSDBU), Office of the Secretary of
Transportation (OST), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of funding availability
for the Northwest Region SBTRC.
SUMMARY: The Department of
Transportation (DOT), Office of the
Secretary (OST), Office of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization
(OSDBU) announces the opportunity for
business centered community-based
organizations, transportation-related
trade associations, colleges and
universities, community colleges, or
chambers of commerce, registered with
the Internal Revenue Service as 501 C(6)
or 501 C(3) tax-exempt organizations, to
compete for participation in OSDBU’s
Small Business Transportation Resource
Center (SBTRC) program in the
Northwest Region (Alaska, Idaho,
Oregon, and Washington).
DATES: Complete Proposals must be
received on or February 3, 2017, 6:00
p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST).
Proposals received after the deadline
will be considered non-responsive and
will not be reviewed.
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