The past several years of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy were quite eventful.

Its relations with

the three big players, Iran, Turkey, and Russia, have been transformed changing many
aspects of Baku’s position in the South Caucasus.
It has long been argued that the Second Karabakh war could bring an end to Azerbaijan’s
multi-vector foreign policy. Signs were there. The Shusha Declaration signed with Turkey
cemented an official alliance between the two states. Russia’s military presence in Karabakh
caused grievances and fears in Baku over Moscow’s intentions to prolong its stay beyond
2025 when the peacekeeping mission’s first term ends. Moreover, Baku often alluded to the
Russian peacekeepers’ suspicious behavior in Karabakh or even unwillingness to play a
stabilizing power. Russian troops too occasionally accused Azerbaijani troops violating the
status quo, which usually caused negative sentiments in Baku.

To the south, Azerbaijan experienced pressure from Iran when the Islamic Republic staged
massive military drills near Azerbaijan’s borders. Through the true reason was most likely
Ankara’s growing clout in the South Caucasus, Tehran pushed the narrative of alleged Israeli
and Western influence to the north of its borders. The end result of the diplomatic and
military escalation with Tehran was Baku’s realization of the need for ever greater
cooperation with Ankara. These developments, so it was thought, would cause a major shift
in Baku’s thinking – greater reliance on Turkey which, in turn, would cause tensions with
Moscow and Tehran. To many, the end of a multi-vector foreign policy Azerbaijan has so
assiduously worked to develop seemed imminent.

That is why Baku’s February 2022 agreement with Moscow, which coincided with the
Kremlin’s decision to recognize two Donbas entities of Ukraine, surprised many. The
document is about building intensive cooperation in virtually every aspect of bilateral
relations. But what is more interesting are the clauses on foreign policy coordination. The two
countries agreed to avoid making foreign policy moves that would endanger each other’s
interests. The new agreement underscored the transactional nature of Azerbaijani-Russian
ties. Officially the countries have not been allies or even partners, but both have not been
geopolitical competitors either. This added flexibility to the bilateral relations which helped
stabilize the ties when they appeared to be deteriorating. Moreover, the two states’ leaders
have good personal ties and Azerbaijan seems to understand vital Russian concerns on the
matters of foreign policy such as Western military and security influence in Moscow’s
immediate neighborhood. But perhaps a major rationale behind the agreement could have
been the growing need in Azerbaijan to reassure Russia that the ever closer ties with Turkey
are not necessarily directed against Moscow’s influence. It also partially soothes Moscow’s
fears that in 2025 Baku could demand the withdrawal of the peacekeepers from Karabakh.

The agreement could in a way lessen the dangers Russia could pose, though it is also well
understood in Baku that Moscow is notorious for fleeting the rules of international relations
and signed agreements.

On a broader Eurasia-wide geopolitical level Baku’s thinking was also based on hard facts of
the last several years. Before the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February Moscow
seemed powerful. The collective West was striving to find avenues for cooperation with
Russia whether in energy or security. Divisions within the trans-Atlantic community, though
not as palpable as during Trump’s presidency, nevertheless diluted the salience of this
military and economic space. No veritable resistance to Russia’s moves in its immediate
neighborhood seemed realistic. This sentiment was also well reflected in how the West
distanced itself from the developments which led to the 2020 Karabakh war and especially
during the post-war period when Turkey (indirectly) and Russia dominated the diplomatic
process.

Thus, a mixture of necessity and inevitability drove Azerbaijan into closer cooperation with
Russia. Increasingly reliant on military tools in keeping the South Caucasus under its
influence, Moscow needed an agreement which would add a flavor of diplomacy, soft power,
and most of all prestige it has been lacking. The agreement is a success for Russia because it
could help Moscow to lay the ground for post-2025 peacekeeping presence in Karabakh.

The signed agreement does not, however, mean that in the longer run relations between
Azerbaijan and Russia are going to be stable. Tensions will be there as it is deeply
uncomfortable for Baku to have Russian troops in Karabakh. The contact line is the area
where mutual accusations and even limited military escalation could be taking place.

On a wider level the core reason is that Russia is suspected of not being interested in pushing
for a real, long-lasting peace in the South Caucasus. The railway revival project championed
by Moscow following the November 2020 ceasefire agreement is not progressing
sufficiently. Nor are Armenia-Azerbaijan talks are producing expected results. As a reflection
of the stalled negotiations on connectivity, Azerbaijan and Iran recently signed an agreement
which essentially expands the transit through the Iranian territory between Nakhichevan and
Azerbaijan proper.

Moreover, despite the February agreement, Russia will remain highly sensitive about Baku’s
allied relationship with Ankara. This will make Russian-Turkish competition more intense,
albeit always covered under seemingly diplomatic coordination as the region’s two big
powers. The Kremlin understands that the Shusha Declaration is more concrete in its essence
than the February agreement.

Russia has some options to counter the saliency of Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance. And it is not
only about Armenia-Russia allied ties, but increasingly so about the potential Iran-Russia
cooperation as both fear Ankara’s influence in the South Caucasus.

Thus, Azerbaijan is now back to some kind of normalcy in its foreign policy. Multi-vectorism
remains an effective tool, though the tilt toward closer ties with Turkey is more salient than
before. Ties with Russia will remain close, but it will be increasingly difficult to navigate
them amid signs (however early they might be at the moment) that trust between the two
states might be eroding.