Journal of Peace Research

2015, Vol. 52(4) 551–562

Annualized implementation data ª The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permission:
on comprehensive intrastate peace sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0022343314567486
accords, 1989–2012 jpr.sagepub.com

Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn & Patrick M Regan

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

Abstract
This article introduces the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM_ID). We present time-series data
on the implementation of 51 provisions in 34 comprehensive peace agreements negotiated in civil wars since 1989.
We follow the implementation process for up to ten years following the signing of each agreement. The data provide
new insights into the types of provisions that are more or less likely to be implemented, how implementation
processes unfold over time, how implementation processes relate to one another, and how implementation affects
various post-accord outcomes. We outline our coding methodology and case selection, and examine descriptive
statistics. We illustrate one potential use of the data by combining eight different provisions into a composite indi-
cator of security sector reform (SSR). A survival analysis finds that implementing security sector reforms contributes
to long-term conflict reduction not only between the parties to the accord but also between the government and
other non-signatory groups in the same conflict.

Keywords
comprehensive peace accord, implementation, negotiated settlement, peace duration, provision, security sector
reform

Introduction reporting of credible information in the post-accord set-

ting, but acknowledge that such devices must ‘be imple-
Research on the implementation of intrastate peace agree-
mented in order to take effect’. It is not only the
ments and the impact of implementation on post-accord
verification mechanism itself that relies on being imple-
conflict dynamics is a field that may be best described as
mented. Verification, the act of monitoring and report-
theory-rich but data-poor. Many of the prominent argu-
ing on levels of compliance, can promote either peace
ments in the literature invoking implementation processes
or conflict depending on what is being reported. Where
predated sufficient data to fully test their arguments.
the conflict actors are complying with the implemen-
Walter (1997: 335), for example, frames credible commit-
tation of the peace agreement and the verification body
ment theory as aiming to provide ‘the conditions under
is accurately sending this information back to the con-
which negotiated solutions, once reached, can be imple-
flict actors, verification can have a stabilizing and
mented’. Hartzell & Hoddie (2003: 321) argue that
peace-promoting effect. However, where implementa-
cumulative power-sharing has a strong peace-promoting
tion is not taking place, and the actors are not comply-
effect, while also noting that peace is unlikely in low
ing with the terms of the agreement, the reporting of
implementation settings: ‘Failure to carry out a particular
this information could constitute a possible reason for
aspect of a peace agreement may occasionally occur even
returning to war.
in those instances in which the peace itself proves durable.’
Mattes & Savun (2010: 9) argue that verification
mechanisms help conflict actors overcome commitment Corresponding author:
problems and information asymmetries through the mjoshi2@nd.edu

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552
Like most types of reform, implementation is likely to
be most resisted where it is most needed. Hence, attempts
to evaluate the effects of particular provisions without
sufficient information on implementation can lead to the
making of type I and type II errors. This stems from the
fact that accord content tends to be problem-driven and
the same processes that motivate conflict actors to negoti-
ate certain content will motivate other actors who may
have greater control over the actual implementation pro-
cess. Stated differently, those policy sectors that are most
likely to be targeted with reforms will often be controlled
by the very actors who have the most to lose from the
reforms being implemented. With respect to interpreting
research findings, this means that a provision that fails in
one setting could have been more successful in a less chal-
lenging setting, and vice versa. These concerns have led
some analysts to conclude that any ‘policy debate which
ignores implementation is vacuous’ (Bird, 2004: 166).
The qualitative nature of most of the scholarship on
implementation, though rich, makes it difficult to sys-
tematically control for the large number of confounding
variables that surround the implementation process (e.g.
Bekoe, 2003, 2008; Boltjes, 2007; DeRouen et al.,
2010; Stedman, Rothchild & Cousens, 2002).
To assist in closing the gap between theory and evi-
dence regarding peace agreement implementation, we
introduce new data from a project on the implementation
of 51 types of provisions found in comprehensive peace
agreements (CPAs) signed between 1989 and 2012 (Joshi
& Darby, 2013). In the next section, we discuss how our
dataset differs from existing sources. We then cover the
methodology used to generate the data and present some
descriptive statistics. Lastly, we give a brief example of
how the data can be used by creating a composite indica-
tor of eight security sector reform (SSR) provisions.
Existing implementation data
There are two existing data sources that include informa-
tion about the content of peace accords and two existing
data sources that provide information on the implementa-
tion of one or more types of provisions found within peace
accords. Högbladh (2012) and Joshi & Darby (2013) pro-
vide data on the types of provisions found within peace
accords, but do not provide quantitative data on their
implementation. Current sources of implementation data
cover three types of power-sharing provisions found in
peace accords. Hoddie & Hartzell’s (2003) data on
Sharing and Dividing Military Power was the first attempt
to collect implementation data on a particular type of pro-
vision across a sample of peace accords. A second
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journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(4)
implementation data source is Jarstad & Nilsson’s
(2008) Implementation of Pacts (IMPACT) dataset
which contains implementation data for three types of
power-sharing provisions (military, political, and territor-
ial) found in accords signed between 1989 and 2004.
The new dataset expands upon these existing sources in
two main areas. First, the new data cover the implemen-
tation of political, military, and territorial power-
sharing, plus 48 additional types of negotiated provisions.
The second major difference is that the new dataset is a
time series and provides annual implementation data for
those provisions. The new data’s longitudinal format is
an especially important feature given that particular pro-
visions in peace agreements are designed by the actors
to be implemented in certain sequences that build confi-
dence, enhance security, and accomplish other reform-
oriented objectives. Implementation processes often
unfold in a reciprocal fashion where actors tie their con-
tinued participation and compliance in the process to
their rival’s current level of participation and compliance.
For example, following the 1997 General Agreement in
Tajikistan, ‘the UTO asserted that its forces could not
give up their weapons and demobilize before the opposi-
tion received the 30 per cent of governmental positions
due to it’ (Smith, 1999: 245). The ability of researchers
and practitioners to study basic dynamics, such as how
past implementation processes influence future imple-
mentation processes, has been limited by data constraints.
Case selection, provisions, and coding rules
The new dataset stems from a project developed to be a
resource to scholars and practitioners surrounding issues
of accord design and implementation in intrastate armed
conflicts.1 The project generates data on a population of
agreements that are ‘comprehensive’ in two dimensions:
(a) the major parties to the conflict were involved in the
negotiations that produced the agreement; and (b) the
substantive issues underlying the dispute were included
in the negotiations.2 A ‘major party’ is one that has
1
All of our accords (cases) were negotiated in civil conflicts that meet
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) definition and criteria
for an intrastate conflict resulting in at least 25 battle deaths in a
year (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013).
2
Our definition of a ‘comprehensive peace agreement’ is different
from the UCDP’s use of the term ‘comprehensive’. The UCDP
Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh, 2012) uses the term
‘comprehensive’ to describe accords that include all conflict dyads
in the conflict ID as signatories. If the main group(s) are
represented we consider it to be an inclusive accord even if some
smaller groups are not participants.
Joshi et al. 553

Table I. List of comprehensive peace agreements

Country Peace agreement Date
Angola Lusaka protocol 15 Nov 1994
Angola Luena memorandum of understanding 4 Apr 2002
Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord 2 Dec 1997
Bosnia and Herzegovina General framework agreement 21 Nov 1995
Burundi Pretoria protocol on outstanding political and security issues in Burundi 2 Nov 2003
Cambodia Framework for comprehensive settlement of the Cambodia conflict 23 Oct 1991
Côte d’Ivoire Ouagadougou political agreement 4 Mar 2007
Congo Agreement on ending hostilities in the Republic of Congo 29 Dec 1999
Croatia Erdut agreement 12 Nov 1995
Djibouti Agreement for the reform and civil concord 12 May 2001
Djibouti Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale 26 Dec 1994
El Salvador Chapultepec peace agreement 16 Jan 1992
Guatemala Accord for a firm and lasting peace 29 Dec 1996
Guinea-Bissau Abuja peace agreement 1 Nov 1998
India Bodo accord 20 Feb 1993
Indonesia MoU between Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement 15 Aug 2005
Lebanon Taif accord 22 Oct 1989
Liberia Accra peace agreement 18 Aug 2003
Macedonia Ohrid agreement 13 Aug 2001
Mali National pact 11 Apr 1992
Mozambique General peace agreement 4 Oct 1992
Nepal Comprehensive peace agreement 21 Nov 2006
Niger Agreement between the Republic Niger government and the ORA 15 Apr 1995
Papua New Guinea Bougainville peace agreement 30 Aug 2001
Philippines Mindanao final agreement 2 Sep1996
Rwanda Arusha accord 4 Aug 1993
Senegal General peace agreement between the Republic of Senegal and MFDC 30 Dec 2004
Sierra Leone Lomé peace agreement 7 Jul 1999
Sierra Leone Abidjan peace agreement 30 Nov 1996
South Africa Interim constitution 17 Nov 1993
Sudan Sudan comprehensive peace agreement 9 Jan 2005
Tajikistan General agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord 27 Jun 1997
Timor-Leste (East Timor) Agreement on the question of East Timor 5 May 1999
United Kingdom Good Friday agreement 10 Apr 1998

sufficient mobilizational capacity and influence to alter
the outcome of a peace process – for better or worse
(Darby & Mac Ginty, 2000: 7). By ‘substantive’ issues,
we refer to those issues underlying the dispute and rep-
resenting the main areas of contention between the war-
ring parties. The project identifies 34 CPAs reached
between 1989 and 2012 that meet these conditions.
These 34 cases are listed in Table I.3
There are potential biases that our selection criteria
may create. While it is reasonable to expect that more
inclusive and more substantive agreements (CPAs) will
3
Our list has 32 agreements that overlap with the UCDP Peace
Agreement Dataset (Högbladh, 2012) and two that do not
(Indonesia’s 1999 East Timor Accord and Lebanon’s 1989 Taif
Accord).
experience less resistance or receive more support, we did
not consider the outcome of an accord or levels of post-
accord violence in the selection process. We find that the
sample is only slightly less subject to breakdown than
other samples of accords. For example, 29% of our CPAs
are followed by at least minor armed conflict compared
to 40% in the entire UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset
(Högbladh, 2012).4 Hartzell & Hoddie (2007: 78) have
38 settlement cases (1945–99) of which 34% were fol-
lowed by renewed armed conflict. Mattes & Savun
(2010) have 51 cases (1945–2005) of which 33% were
followed by renewed armed conflict.
4
This is the percentage arrived at after excluding the 20 interstate
peace agreements contained in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset.

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554 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(4)

The PAM project collected implementation informa- Table II. Categories and provisions
tion for 51 different types of provisions that represent the
A. Ceasefire Indigenous minority rights
corpus of issues addressed in CPAs. These are listed in Ceasefire Internally displaced persons
Table II. We consider a provision to be a goal-oriented Media reform
reform or stipulation that is costly to one or both conflict B. Institutions (13 provisions) Minority rights
actors and that falls under a relatively discrete policy Boundary demarcation Official language and symbol
domain (e.g. executive branch reform, police reform).5 Civilian administration reform Refugees
In negotiations, most proposals will fall under the policy Constitutional changes Reparations
jurisdiction of some interest group that will band Decentralization/federalism Right of self determination
Dispute resolution committee Women’s rights
together and lobby against it. Police reform, for example, Electoral or political reform
will be resisted (at a minimum) by the police officers that Executive branch reform E. External arrangements
will be affected by the reforms. For this reason, we con- Interethnic state relations (7 provisions)
sider that the most meaningful reforms that make their Judiciary reform Commission to address
way from negotiations into formal agreements are those Legislative branch reform damages/loss
that are costly to one or both conflict actors. Costly pro- Power-sharing: transitional International arbitration
visions that are mutually accepted signal commitment to government commission on land
Territorial power-sharing Regional peacekeeping force
the peace process. We identify six categories of provi-
Truth or reconciliation UN peacekeeping force
sions that constrain or bind different constituencies to mechanism UN transitional authority
the implementation process. The grouping into cate- UN, international or internal
gories permits the conceptual linking to particular sectors C. Security (7 provisions) verification
in observing the impact of implementation, but the data Demobilization Withdrawal of troops
do not require the adoption of our categorization. Disarmament
In the first phase of the project, each of the 34 CPAs Military reform F. Other arrangements
was coded according to the project’s typology resulting Paramilitary groups (8 provisions)
Police reform Review of agreement
in 724 provisions being coded across all the agreements;
Prisoner release Ratification mechanism
the average number of provisions in a CPA is 21. Next, Reintegration Arms embargo
event-based historical narratives were written on the Detailed implementation
implementation of each provision on an annual basis for D. Rights (15 provisions) timeline
a period up to ten years. This process generated several Amnesty Donor support
thousand yearly narratives that formed the basis of a qua- Children’s rights Economic and social
litative database.6 These narratives were then coded to Citizenship development
generate a dataset amenable for comparative and statisti- Cultural protections Independence referendum
Education reform Natural resource usage
cal analysis.7 Based upon specific benchmarks of imple- Human rights
mentation for each type of provision, the annual level of
implementation was coded using an ordinal scale. We
recorded whether implementation was initiated or not, camps or passing legislation that removes the restrictions
and if initiated, the level of implementation in place by necessary to begin implementation. If an initiation event
the end of the year. Initiation had to represent some was recorded for the current year, the coder recorded
observable event that started the implementation pro- whether the aggregate level of implementation achieved
cess, such as choosing locations for demobilization as of that year could be considered minimum, intermedi-
ate or full.
5
When an implementation process was initiated but
In contract law, the term ‘provision’ is used in legal instruments to
stipulate that something be provided or performed by one of the
progress in the year was not considered viable for reach-
signatories. A provision is coded only once in an agreement ing full implementation, it was coded minimum. A non-
regardless of the number of specific reforms falling under the viable implementation rate is one that if continued
provision. When evaluating the implementation status of a would not likely produce full implementation. If the
particular provision, we attempt to take into account as many of implementation process fulfills some of the major steps
the stipulations falling under a provision as possible.
6 necessary for reaching full implementation, but is still
For many provisions, fewer than ten narratives were written because
full implementation was achieved before the ten-year mark. short of completion, it was coded intermediate. Full
7
These narratives are available online at (https://peaceaccords. implementation represents a completed or nearly com-
nd.edu). pleted process. Our coding procedure also allows for

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Joshi et al.
reversals in the implementation process, which occur
with some regularity. If a reversal took place, it was
coded as a minor or major reversal. A minor reversal is
a retrenchment in the implementation process that falls
within the same implementation category (i.e. minimal,
intermediate or full) whereas a major reversal suggests a
change from one category to another. This data collec-
tion methodology yielded a dataset containing a total
of 314 accord-year observations.
Three examples from Bangladesh, Angola, and the
United Kingdom illustrate aspects of the coding metho-
dology. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord called for the
formation of an internal verification committee to mon-
itor and report on the implementation of the accord. The
historical record for 1998 indicates that the committee
was established, and included an appointee of the Prime
Minister, the Chairperson of the Task Force on Refu-
gees, and Shantu Larma, President of the PCJSS (the
rebel group). A UN report stated that the committee
held several meetings in 1998, which were considered
non-functional, and no minutes or records were kept.
Multiple sources report that the committee did not meet
again for 11 years. Based on these narratives, the verifica-
tion provision was coded as initiated in 1998 and achiev-
ing minimum implementation that year.
The Lusaka Protocol in Angola contained a provision
for the establishment of a power-sharing government
under which UNITA members would receive 17 posi-
tions in the executive branch and 70 parliamentary posi-
tions. Numerous sources indicate that none of the
minister positions for UNITA officials were filled in
1994, 1995 or 1996. In 1997, President Dos Santos
announced that his new cabinet contained 11 UNITA
positions. Later that year, it was reported that some of
the parliamentary seats were filled. Based on these annual
narratives, the power-sharing provision in the Lusaka
Protocol was coded as not yet initiated in 1994, 1995,
and 1996, with initiation and an intermediate level of
implementation achieved in 1997.
Consider another example from the Good Friday
Agreement in Northern Ireland which provided for the
formation of a power-sharing government based on the
d’Hondt system. Table III gives an example of the data
structure for the coding of this particular provision in
this case. The narratives reveal major steps toward full
implementation in 1998: based on the Northern Ireland
Assembly Elections of June, the first minister and the
deputy first minister were chosen and appointed to their
positions. The appointment of the remaining ten minis-
ters was delayed until 1999. We consider implementation
to be intermediate in 1998 and fully implemented in
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555
Table III. Illustration of implementation coding for power-
sharing transitional government in Good Friday Agreement
Year Implementation Reversal
1998 2 0
1999 3 0
2000 3 0
2001 3 0
2002 3 2
2003 1 0
2004 1 0
2005 1 0
2006 1 0
2007 3 0
1999. However, in response to the IRA’s continued refu-
sal to decommission their weapons, the UK suspended the
power-sharing arrangement toward the end of 2002. It
was not fully restored until the end of 2006. We code a
major reversal in 2002 that is also reflected in the imple-
mentation score changing from full to minimal imple-
mentation for a period of four years. It is clear from
these cases that implementation can be a prolonged pro-
cess with abrupt changes. In the next section, we examine
some broad patterns of variation in implementation across
a sampling of provisions and agreements.
Description of data
The new dataset’s ordinal and longitudinal structure
allows numerous ways of exploring variation in imple-
mentation processes.
Figure 1 displays the top 26 most commonly negoti-
ated provisions in CPAs and their frequency, sorted by
how many achieved full implementation by year ten or
the last year of observation.8 It is rather clear from these
data that inserting a provision into a peace accord does
not guarantee that high levels of implementation will
take place. For example, when an accord stipulates
changes falling under media reform and judicial reform,
they are fully implemented only 7% and 19% of the
time, respectively. When accords call for the decentrali-
zation of state power, the central government gives up
that power as stipulated 15% of the time (decentraliza-
tion is never initiated 40% of the time). Other types of
8
Several accords could not be followed for the full ten years. Ivory
Coast (2007), Senegal (2004), Indonesia Aceh (2005), and Nepal
(2006) were signed after 2003. For Sudan (2005) we report the
year before the creation of South Sudan in 2011. For Angola
(1994) and Sierra Leone (1996) we report the last year before
major civil war resumed.
556 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(4)

provisions are consistently implemented in full. When Ceasefire 22

29
an accord stipulates the granting of amnesty to former UN, intl., or internal verification 20
26
combatants (sixth most frequent), it is fully implemented Electoral or political reform 17
26
70% of the time. Both sides release prisoners (fourth Prisoner release 15
20
most frequent), when called to do so, around 75% of the Constitutional changes 15
19
time. Where a CPA establishes a power-sharing transi- Amnesty 14
20
tional government, the arrangement is fully implemen- Donor support 13
19
ted 65% of the time. Not coincidently, these three Dispute resolution committee 13
19
provisions are typically scheduled to be implemented Demobilization 13
25
in the first year of the implementation process, and are Timeline for implementation 11
24
more likely to garner the attention of third-party over- Reintegration 11
27
seers. This reflects a general pattern in the data as well. Power-sharing transitional government 11
17
While it is useful to have a broad overview of the most Military reform 11
26
negotiated provisions and how many reach full imple- Disarmament 10
28
mentation, Figure 1 conceals the fact that the highest Withdrawal of troops 9
14
point of implementation reached by most provisions falls Refugees 9
22
somewhere between no implementation and full imple- Police reform 9
24
mentation. Of the 724 provisions that were coded, 353 Internally displaced persons 8
24
provisions or 49% were considered fully implemented by Paramilitary groups 7
16
year ten or the last year of observation (whichever came Econ. & soc. development 5
23
first). There were 166 provisions (23%) coded as inter- Civilian administration reform 5
18
mediate at the end of the examination period, 108 pro- Education reform 4
15
visions (15%) coded minimal, and 97 provisions (13%) Judiciary reform 3
16
never initiated. Just under half of all provisions negoti- Human rights 3
21
ated in CPAs are fully implemented, and 28% of all Decentralization / federalism 3
20
provisions are either never initiated or minimally imple- Media reform 1
14
mented. Figure 2 provides a disaggregated view of the
implementation of power-sharing transitional govern- No. fully implemented No. accords with provision
ments. As seen, there were five instances of a power-
sharing government being partly established, two with Figure 1. Most frequently negotiated provisions in CPAs
minimal implementation, and three with intermediate Figure includes 26 provisions with frequency of 14 accords or above.
implementation. Moreover, 11 of the 17 accords with Implementation measure taken by year ten or the last year of obser-
power-sharing provisions were fully implemented. In all vation. List sorted on number of fully implemented provisions.
but one case, implementation was initiated. The data
also suggest that power-sharing governments, in particu-
lar, are vulnerable to reversals (not shown in the figure);
there were seven instances of reversals coded for this No. of accords 17
provision. Full 11
The longitudinal structure of the new data allows us to Intermediate 3
examine implementation processes over time. Figure 3 Minimum 2
displays annual levels of implementation for a set of six Not initiated 1
provisions. The implementation line for each provision
represents the average level of implementation each year
for that provision across all the CPAs that contain it. As Figure 2. Disaggregation of power-sharing transitional gov-
ernment implementation
seen in Figure 3, very different trajectories are observed
Bars represent the highest level of implementation achieved by year
across different provisions. Power-sharing governments,
ten or the last year of observation.
as mentioned, tend to be implemented early (50% estab-
lished by the end of year one, 60% established by the end Commissions (TRC) are 50% implemented, on average;
of year two, and 80% implemented by year four). For by year ten the average level of implementation is 60%.
other provisions in Figure 3, progress is slower and the tra- Provisions that grant indigenous minority rights never
jectory flatter. At year three, Truth and Reconciliation exceed implementation levels of 30% over ten years.

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Joshi et al. 557

Power-sharing transitional govt. UN peacekeeping TRC mechanisms

100 100 100

80 80 80

% Implemented

% Implemented
% implemented

60 60 60

40 40 40

20 20 20

0 0 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10
Post-accord years Post-accord years Post-accord years

Indigenous minority rights Media reform Natural resources

100 100 100

80 80 80
% Implemented

% Implemented
% implemented

60 60 60

40 40 40

20 20 20

0 0 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10
Post-accord years Post-accord years Post-accord years

Figure 3. Average level of annual implementation for a sample of six provisions

Just as individual provisions take very different imple-
mentation paths over time, so it is with peace accords in
their entirety when we consider the implementation of
each of their respective provisions. Figure 4 depicts the
temporal variation in the level of aggregate implementa-
tion across six CPAs over a ten-year period.9 Scholars
who have studied these particular peace processes in
some depth will immediately recognize familiar inflec-
tion points and periods of stagnation that are clearly
visible in the data. As already discussed, Northern
Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement experienced rapid
implementation in the first three years but the process
stalled for several years over the decommissioning of IRA
weapons and the suspension of the power-sharing arrange-
ment. In the Nepalese case: ‘Considerable progress was
achieved in the implementation of this agreement between
2006 and 2008’ (Trachsler, 2012: 2), but the ‘peace pro-
cess has since reached an impasse’. These charts show how
the data from individual provisions can be aggregated to
create a ‘holistic’ view of implementation. In the next sec-
tion, we give an example of how the data might be used to
summarize the measurements of several provisions that are
theorized as being part of a similar process.

9
We created an aggregate implementation score by summing the
implementation scores for each provision in each accord each year
and dividing that sum by the number of provisions in each accord
multiplied by three (full implementation). This yields a normalized
percentage that ranges from 0% to 100%. For example, Lebanon’s
Taif Accord contains 18 different provisions. The highest possible
score in year one if every provision is fully implemented is 54
(18*3). The actual score for year one is 13 which yields (13/
54*100) an aggregate implementation rate of 24%.
Application of the data
Although provisions in peace accords are usually studied
on an individual basis, many are implemented as part of
a larger multidimensional process. One such process is
security sector reform, or SSR, a concept that gained pro-
minence in the mid-1990s, and refers to that ‘set of pol-
icies, plans, programs, and activities that a government

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558 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(4)

Guatemala 1996 Northern Ireland 1998 Mali 1992

100 100 100

80 80 80
% implemented

% implemented

% implemented
60 60 60

40 40 40

20 20 20

0 0 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10
Implementation year Implementation year Implementation year

Niger 1995 Lebanon 1989 Nepal 2006

100 100 100

80 80 80
% implemented

% implemented

% implemented
60 60 60

40 40 40

20 20 20

0 0 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8
Implementation year Implementation year Implementation year

Figure 4. Annual variation in the level of aggregate implementation of six CPAs

undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, 9

and justice’ (Howk, 2009: 5). Schnabel & Ehrhart (2005: 8
8
6) treat comprehensive SSR as almost a necessary condi- 7
tion: ‘[e]ffective peacebuilding requires a thorough reform 7
6
Number of accords

of a society’s security sector’. Others are more skeptical 6

about the concept (Scheye & Peake, 2005: 296). Despite 5
5
what has been written on the topic, the implementation of 4
only one security-related provision (military power-shar- 4
ing) has been the subject of a quantitative analysis (Hod- 3
die & Hartzell, 2003; Jarstad & Nilson, 2008). 2
2 2
Based on several definitions of SSR and its elements
(Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005: 6; Newman, Paris & 1
Richmond, 2009: 8), we identify eight provisions in our 0
dataset mentioned as falling under security sector reform 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, military Number of SSR provisions in CPAs
reform, police reform, ceasefire, paramilitary groups,
withdrawal of troops). We found that many of these Figure 5. Frequency of SSR provision in CPAs
eight provisions are typically negotiated as a cluster. As
seen in Figure 5, none of our CPAs contained only one Moreover, we found that the implementations of SSR
SSR provision and over 75% of CPAs (26) contained five provisions are highly correlated. Table IV shows a pair-
or more SSR provisions. wise cross-correlation of the eight SSR provisions. The

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Joshi et al. 559

Table IV. Pairwise correlation of implementation of eight security sector provisions

Military Police
Ceasefire Demobilization Disarmament reform Paramilitary reform Reintegration Withdrawal
Ceasefire 1
Demobilization 0.4096* 1
Disarmament 0.2566* 0.5748* 1
Military reform 0.5387* 0.5197* 0.2725* 1
Paramilitary 0.3799* 0.3625* 0.2796* 0.4153* 1
Police reform 0.3773* 0.4212* 0.4160* 0.4707* 0.4718* 1
Reintegration 0.4145* 0.6482* 0.3901* 0.3738* 0.2471* 0.3310* 1
Withdrawal 0.0527 –0.0711 –0.0354 –0.0874 0.0931 0.1666* –0.1979* 1
*p < 0.05.

Table V. Implementation of SSR provisions and recurrence of armed conflict

Between signatories Between state and non-signatories

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

SSR implementation (0–100%) – – 0.032*** – – 0.054**
(0.007) (0.021)
SSR implementation w/o mil. reform (0–100%) – 0.031*** – – 0.079** –
(0.009) (0.026)
Military reform implementation (0–100%) 0.018* –0.001 – 0.004 –0.024 –
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
UN peacekeeping implementation (0–100%) – – 0.005 – – –0.001
(0.005) (0.009)
Conflict deaths (in 1,000) 0.000 –0.000 –0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
War duration (in months) –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Infant mortality rate (in 100,000) –0.015 –0.015** –0.016*** –0.030* –0.010 –0.015
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012)
Territorial conflict (1, 0) 1.000 0.804 0.847 –0.946 0.418 –0.299
(0.931) (0.608) (0.712) (1.047) (0.997) (0.945)
Polity2(t–1) 0.118** 0.069 0.086* 0.029 –0.018 0.025
(0.053) (0.036) (0.045) (0.079) (0.060) (0.075)
Constant 2.606 1.981 1.999* 5.684** 1.198 2.221
(1.636) (1.041) (0.921) (2.024) (1.589) (2.199)
Observations/Time at risk 219 219 219 211 211 211
No. subjects at risk 34 34 34 34 34 34
Failures 10 10 10 11 11 11
Scale parameter (p) 1.377 1.946 1.960 0.844 1.131 1.042
Wald w2 71.52 103.42 112.91 15.63 50.13 49.18
Probability of w2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

fact that many of these eight provisions are usually negoti-
ated together and their implementation is highly correlated
suggests both interdependency and the influence of
systemic-level risk factors that would not adversely affect
the implementation of only one provision. These results
indicate ideal conditions for creating a composite indicator.
To make a composite SSR implementation index we
summed the implementation score for each of the eight
provisions each year and divided that score by 24, the high-
est SSR implementation score possible.10 The actual range
of the SSR index extends from 0% to 91.67%. Our
10
Results from using a measure of this index derived by dividing the
summed implementation score by (actual SSR provisions * 3) instead
of (8*3¼24) produced almost identical results.

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560
Between signatories
1 1
0.8
0.6
Survival
0.4
0.2
0 0
0 2 4 6
Analysis time
SSR implementation rate=0
SSR implementation rate=25
SSR implementation rate=50
SSR implementation rate=75
Figure 6. Effects of implementing SSR reform on recurrence of armed conflict over a decade
dependent variables capture the presence of at least minor
armed conflict between the signatories to the accord and
between the state and non-signatory groups within
the same conflict ID over a decade – as specified in the
UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset (Themnér &
Wallensteen, 2013).
We estimated three Weibull models (accelerated failure
time (AFT) metric form) for each dependent variable. We
include a number of standard control variables from the
civil war literature. In the majority of cases, there was vio-
lence beyond the 25 battle-death threshold in the year that
the peace accord was signed. Following convention, all of
the cases are allowed to survive at least one year (Jarstad
& Nilsson, 2008). This also allows fair time for implemen-
tation to get underway. Therefore, the presence or absence
of armed conflict begins to be observed in year two.
The results from these models are presented in
Table V. We started our empirical tests by including
in Model 1 the implementation of military reform,
which can include military power-sharing or the down-
sizing of the military. Military reform, by itself, is statis-
tically significant which is consistent with earlier findings
(Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008).
Model 2 includes the newly created SSR implementation
index (excluding military reform) alongside the
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journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(4)
Between non-signatories
0.8
0.6
Survival
0.4
0.2
8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10
Analysis time
SSR implementation rate=0
SSR implementation rate=25
SSR implementation rate=50
SSR implementation rate=75
implementation of military reform, and Model 3 includes
the SSR index with military reform included. The SSR
index is highly significant (p < 0.001) in every model with
the relationship running in the expected direction; mili-
tary reform, however, falls from statistical significance in
Models 2 and 4. This example illustrates that the imple-
mentation of related provisions can have a ‘cumulative’
effect (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003) where the combined
effects of several interrelated provisions is greater than the
effect of any individual indicator. This same logic suggests
that interdependency can be disabling when a failure
occurs in one provision that negatively impacts concur-
rent implementation processes. Interestingly, in Models
5 and 6 our results suggest that high levels of SSR imple-
mentation reduce conflict not only between the groups
that negotiated the accord but also between the govern-
ment and non-signatory groups (i.e. other factions or
splinter groups within the same conflict ID). These results
are presented graphically in Figure 6 (derived from Mod-
els 3 and 6). We now turn to some concluding remarks.
Conclusion
Mediators and civil war actors often spend years in nego-
tiations trying to reach mutually acceptable terms on a
Joshi et al.
wide variety of conflict issues. Theoretical efforts to
understand civil war have analyzed violence as a result
of bargaining failures that prevent the warring parties
from being able to reach mutually acceptable terms ex
ante. Despite the practical and theoretical importance
attributed to the particular set of terms that are reached
between conflict actors in negotiations, the amount of
research devoted to the implementation of these terms
has been limited due to data constraints. The structure
of the data we introduce allows researchers and practi-
tioners the ability to study implementation at several dif-
ferent levels of analysis. Researchers can focus on a
particular agreement and its provisions, or one type of
provision across all the accords that contain it, or a group
of provisions and their joint implementation at a
particular point in time. The data also offer a systematic
methodology for evaluating and measuring agreement
implementation in contemporary peace processes. Given
the impressive body of scholarship produced in the last
ten years on just a handful of the types of provisions
found in CPAs, we envision many potential applications
of the new data and a deepening of our understanding of
implementation processes writ large.
Replication data
The dataset, codebook, and code files for the empirical
analysis in this article can be found at http://www.
prio.org/jpr/datasets and https://peaceaccords.nd.edu.
Acknowledgements
The PAM project was established by John Darby with
funding from the Kroc Institute and the United States
Institute of Peace (USIP-149-06F). Additional funding
came from the National Science Foundation (0921818).
We thank Peter Wallensteen, Erik Melander, and Desirée
Nilsson for excellent comments and suggestions.
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MADHAV JOSHI, b. 1974, PhD in Political Science
(University of North Texas, 2010); Research Assistant
Professor and Associate Director, Peace Accords Matrix
(PAM) Project, Joan Kroc Institute for International Peace
Studies, University of Notre Dame; current interests: peace
agreement design and implementation, peacebuilding,
Maoist insurgency in Nepal.
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journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(4)
JASON MICHAEL QUINN, b. 1975, PhD in
Comparative Politics (University of North Texas, 2010);
Research Assistant Professor, Joan Kroc Institute for
International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame;
current interests: intrastate peace processes.
PATRICK M REGAN, b. 1956, PhD in Political Science
(Michigan, 1992); Professor of Political Science and
Peace Studies, Joan Kroc Institute for International
Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame; current
interests: civil wars, interventions, the study of peace,
climate change.