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Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace
Psychology
The Salience of Symbolic and Material Elements of
Transitional Justice in Peace Processes
Yoav Kapshuk and Amal Jamal
Online First Publication, March 5, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000454

CITATION
Kapshuk, Y., & Jamal, A. (2020, March 5). The Salience of Symbolic and Material Elements of
Transitional Justice in Peace Processes. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology.
Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000454
 Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology
© 2020 American Psychological Association 2020, Vol. 2, No. 999, 000
ISSN: 1078-1919 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000454

BRIEF REPORT

The Salience of Symbolic and Material Elements of Transitional Justice in

Peace Processes

Yoav Kapshuk Amal Jamal

Kinneret College on the Sea of Galilee Tel-Aviv University
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

This article uses a new data set of 72 peace processes worldwide to examine if material and symbolic
aspects of transitional justice (TJ) are correlated with peace processes ending in full (comprehensive)
peace agreements. Based on models of multivariate analysis, we found that symbolic elements—truth and
reconciliation—are less salient in partial peace agreements but very salient in full agreements. When
comparing material and symbolic elements of TJ and the ramifications of their integration into peace
processes, we found that the symbolic elements of TJ— but not the material elements of TJ— correlate
with peace processes that end in a full peace agreement. Based on these findings, we argue that, contrary
to most theoretical literature, negotiating on issues of truth and reconciliation are not an obstacle to
ending armed conflicts by achieving full peace agreements.

Public Significance Statement

Little attention has been paid to differentiating between types of TJ aspects and whether including
them in a peace process may lead to different results. Findings demonstrate that issues of truth and
reconciliation should not necessarily be pushed out of the peace negotiation phase.

Keywords: transitional justice, peace processes, truth and reconciliation, conflict resolution

The relationship between peace and justice has engaged scholars
in recent years. Scholars note that integrating justice elements,
such as reconciliation, into peace negotiations could negatively
affect parties’ chances of reaching an end of conflict and that,
Editor’s Note. Continue the conversation by submitting your comments
and questions about this article/book review to PeacePsychology.org/
peaceconflict. (The Editor of PeacePsychology.org reserves the right to
exclude material that fails to contribute to constructive discussion.)
X YOAV KAPSHUK received his PhD in political science from Tel-Aviv
University. He is lecturer (assistant professor equivalent) at the School of
Social Sciences and Humanities, Kinneret College on the Sea of Galilee.
His research interests include transitional justice, conflict resolution and
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
X AMAL JAMAL received his PhD in political science from the Free
University of Berlin. He is professor at the School of Political Science,
Tel-Aviv University. His research interests include political democratiza-
tion, identity construction, minority nationalism and struggle for civic
equality.
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to
Yoav Kapshuk, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Kinneret Col-
lege on the Sea of Galilee, Zemach, MP Jordan Valley, Israel 15132.
E-mail: kapshuk@gmail.com
1
therefore, such elements are better addressed after peace is reached
(e.g., Bar-Siman-Tov, 2013). Some scholars emphasize the impor-
tance of justice for creating an atmosphere in which settlements
can be reached (e.g., Kaufman, 2006), but few have referred to the
importance of dealing directly with justice issues during negotia-
tions (e.g., Rouhana, 2011), which is likely tied to the ongoing
dilemma of peace-versus-justice. This dilemma grapples with the
puzzle of how to exact justice for atrocities in an immediate
context in which prosecuting perpetrators could hurt the overall
chances of reaching peace (Seul, 2019). In recent years, instead of
prosecution and retributive justice, perpetrators take accountability
for their atrocities by participating in truth and reconciliation
commissions and compensating and rehabilitating victims and
refugees. This is justice in a restorative sense, transitional justice
(TJ), which relies on nonjuristic mechanisms for addressing large-
scale past abuses. For example, provisions for TJ in the Colombian
negotiations served as an “alternative model for facing crime,
which is based on the social importance of reconciliation between
victim and perpetrator” (Uprimny & Saffon, 2006, p. 3). However,
little attention has been paid to differentiating between types of TJ
elements and whether including them in a peace process may lead
to different results.
The cultural-symbolic element of TJ contains issues such as
recognition of the past by exploring the truth, recognition of
contradictory narratives, and reconciliation processes. The socio-
 2 KAPSHUK AND JAMAL
economic element of TJ contains issues such as material repara-
tions, compensations for victims, and rehabilitation of refugees.
These two elements of TJ are related to what theoretician Nancy
Fraser called “the Redistributive-Recognition Dilemma” (Fraser,
1995, p. 71). The relationship between these two elements and
their influence on achieving peace have not been sufficiently
discussed in the literature. This brief report fills the lacuna.
Achieving peace, as happened in the last peace process in
Colombia, means signing an agreement that marks and constitutes
a complete—not partial— end of the conflict. After the govern-
ment of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia signed several partial peace agreements, in 2016 they
reached their goal of ending the conflict by signing a full (com-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
prehensive) peace agreement. In this brief report, we use a new
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
data set of 72 peace processes worldwide to examine the extent to
which material and symbolic elements of TJ correlated to achiev-
ing full peace agreements. By doing so, we contribute to research
on justice and peace by distinguishing between material and sym-
bolic TJ and between peace processes that reach full agreements
versus peace processes that reach partial agreements in relation-
ship to such TJ elements.
In the first part of this article, we describe material and symbolic
elements of TJ and their presence in peace processes. Then, we
explain our methodology, the database, the data used, and its
variables. Next, we show that symbolic elements are significantly
more salient in peace processes that ended with full peace agree-
ments in comparison to partial agreements, while material ele-
ments are found without much difference in both partial and full
agreements. Based on these findings, we argue that symbolic
elements of TJ are not an obstacle but, rather, can serve as a
predictor for ending armed conflicts by achieving full peace agree-
ments.
Material and Symbolic Elements of
Transitional Justice
Speaking of two kinds of injustices, socioeconomic injustice and
cultural or symbolic injustice, Nancy Fraser (1995) distinguishes
between two correspondingly distinct kinds of remedies. The rem-
edy for economic injustice is a political-economic restructuring of
some sort. The remedy for cultural injustice is some sort of cultural
or symbolic change. Therefore, following historic injustices, there
are usually demands for the recognition of injustice and symbolic
and cultural change on the one hand and for economic and material
change on the other. This could involve upwardly revaluing dis-
respected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups
(Fraser, 1995). Accordingly, the two kinds of TJ function as a
remedy for injustice in peace processes.
The material element of TJ includes two components. One is
reparations for victims of human rights violations that occurred
during armed conflict. Reparations are attempts to provide benefits
directly to the victims of certain types of crimes. Here we focus on
material reparations, namely “[forms] of compensation, that is, of
payments in either cash or negotiable instruments, or of service
packages” (De Greiff, 2006, p. 453). Based on principles of
corrective justice, reparations are part of victims’ rights to receive
compensation. For example, in the peace negotiations between the
government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Martí National
Liberation Front, it was agreed that “all those wounded in the war
. . . are incorporated into the social security system of the State or
receive adequate economic compensation. . . .” (The New-York
Agreement, 1991, p. 3). The other material element of TJ is the
rehabilitation of refugees, including restitution, restoration, repa-
triation, right of return, or any other measure that provides assis-
tance to groups who have suffered displacement (Duthie, 2011).
Such was the case in Liberia’s peace process, in which the parties
agreed “to create the conditions that will allow all refugees and
displaced persons to, respectively, voluntarily repatriate and return
to Liberia. . . .” (The Cotonou Agreement, 1993, p. 12).
The symbolic element of TJ also includes two components. One
stems from the parties’ willingness to investigate and let the awful
truth about the conflict be revealed. One way of publicly exposing
this truth is to formally study the conflict’s history, placing an
emphasis on past injustices. This investigation commonly takes the
form of a truth commission (Hayner, 2010). One such example is
the Comprehensive Peace Accord (2006) signed in Nepal that
provided for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The other
component is reconciliation. When parties achieve reconciliation,
their newly formed relationship is characterized by sensitivity and
consideration of the other party’s needs and interests, trust, accep-
tance, and mutual recognition (Jamal, 2001). One example of a
reconciliation agreement can be found in the Peace agreement
between the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and
the National Congress for the Defense of the People (2009).
The debate regarding the relationship between TJ and achieving
peace has focused particularly on the symbolic element of TJ. One
of the key arguments for positing truth as inconsistent with peace
is that truth is subjective and not amenable for consensus. Thus,
most studies dealing with truth and reconciliation processes rec-
ommend that TJ elements be articulated beyond the formal peace
agreement (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2013). However, other scholars who
consider TJ and peace agreements as complementary argue that TJ
is a prerequisite for reaching a full (and permanent) peace agree-
ment (Rouhana, 2011). Others emphasize the importance of sym-
bolic aspects such as reconciliation initiatives, but in the means of
“create[ing] an atmosphere in which a settlement can be reached
[. . .] and not merely about reaching agreements” (Kaufman, 2006,
p. 216).
Methodology
The Transitional Justice of Peace Processes (TJPP) data set
contains armed conflicts that took place between 1989 and 2014.
These conflicts were materially different than those of the Cold
War period, which occurred almost exclusively between govern-
ments and nonstate actors. Additionally, the armed conflicts in the
TJPP include only those in which at least a partial agreement was
signed, indicating that the parties were serious about trying to end
the conflict. We began with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset, Version 2, 2011 (Högbladh,
2012), which includes peace agreements from 1975–2011. We
then added agreements signed between 2012 and 2014 and omitted
agreements signed before 1989. Our TJPP data set includes 200
agreements, which relate to 72 peace processes, 67 between gov-
ernments and nonstate actors and five between states. Two hun-
dred agreements relate to only 72 processes because one peace
process can include many agreements, such as the four peace
 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN PEACE PROCESSES
73.00%
60.00%
56.00%
44.00%
Reparaon/Rehabilitaon Refugee rehabilitaon
Material elements of TJ
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
% from 45 PP end in full agreements
Figure 1. Percentage of the material elements of transitional justice (TJ) from peace processes (PP) ending in
full peace agreement (N ⫽ 45) versus partial agreements (N ⫽ 27). See the online article for the color version
of this figure.
agreements in the Nepal government’s negotiations with the Mao-
ist Communist Party in 2006.
By assigning each agreement to a peace process, the indicator
for the beginning of a peace process is, then, any type of signed
agreement. The indicators for the end of a peace process are either
a full peace agreement, a partial peace agreement subsequently
revoked, or a partial peace agreement that had not reached final-
ization by 2014, the end of the research period. A full agreement
is defined as “an agreement where one or more dyads agrees to
settle the whole incompatibility” regarding government, territory,
or both,1 where incompatibility is defined as “what the parties are
(or claim to be) fighting over.”2 A full peace agreement is usually
signed following partial peace agreements, during which the par-
ties settle parts of the incompatibility (Bell, 2003).
Each peace process may have multiple TJ elements without
relevancy to the stage of the negotiation process in which it was
agreed. Therefore, the single unit of analysis for TJ coding is the
peace process. The data for coding TJ elements in each peace
process was derived from the original wording of peace agree-
ments signed by the multiple parties in each peace process (see the
“Narrative Background” document for a link to all texts of peace
agreements and for TJ elements in each peace process).3
Major Findings
Descriptive Correlations
We coded and grouped TJ elements in peace processes accord-
ing to their categorization as either material or symbolic. Material
elements of TJ were coded as 1 ⫽ reparation for victims (victim
reparation), 2 ⫽ rehabilitation of refugees (refugee rehabilitation),
and 3 ⫽ reparation and/or rehabilitation (reparation/rehabilitation).
Symbolic elements of TJ were coded as 1 ⫽ truth, 2 ⫽ reconcil-
iation, and 3 ⫽ both truth and reconciliation, together (truth and
reconciliation).
Victim reparation is found in 22% of the peace processes
(PPs) that end in partial agreements, compared to 47% that end
in full agreements, as seen in Figure 1. Refugee rehabilitation is
3
80.00%
70.00%
Percentage from PP
60.00%
47.00% 50.00%
40.00%
22.00% 30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Vicm reparaon
% from 27 PP end in paral agreements
found in 44% of PPs that end in partial agreements, compared
to 60% that end in full agreements. The presence of reparation/
rehabilitation, which includes at least one of the previous ele-
ments, is 56% of PPs that end in partial agreements, compared
to 73% that end in full agreements. The rationale for coding a
variable that includes at least one of the two stems from the
common condition in which there may be overlap between
variables. In many PPs, the element for refugee rehabilitation
had been included in the element for victim reparations, or vice
versa. One such example is the case of the negotiations to end
the armed conflict in Burundi between the government and
rebel groups. In the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agree-
ment for Burundi (2000, p. 12), parties agreed to “[study the]
ways of indemnifying and compensating returnees for property
in the country of asylum they are unable to take with them,
profit from or sell.”
One symbolic element of TJ is truth, which is found in 15%
of PPs that end in partial agreements, compared to 40% that end
in full agreements, as seen in Figure 2. Reconciliation is found
in 22% of PPs that end in partial agreements, compared to 60%
that end in full agreements. The presence of the element that
includes both truth and reconciliation is in 7.5% of PPs that end
in partial agreements, compared to 38% that end in full agree-
ments. The rationale for coding a variable that includes both
truth and reconciliation (and not at least one of them, as with the
material elements) stems from our theoretical understanding
that the elements of truth and reconciliation are complementary.
An example of a combination between truth and reconciliation
is the peace negotiation between the Guatemalan government
and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. In 1994, the
1
This is based on the definition of “full peace agreements” by the UCDP
Peace Agreement Dataset, Version 2, 2011 (Högbladh, 2012, p. 10).
2
This definition is based on the UCDP/Peace Research Institute Oslo
Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4, 2014 (Pettersson & Wal-
lensteen, 2015, p. 8).
3
The “Narrative Background” document is available upon request by
the authors.
 4 KAPSHUK AND JAMAL
60.00%
40.00%
22.00%
15.00%
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Truth Reconciliaon
Symbolic elements of TJ
% from 45 PP end in full agreements
Figure 2. Percentage of the symbolic elements of transitional justice (TJ) from peace processes (PP) ending in
full peace agreement (N ⫽ 45) versus partial agreements (N ⫽ 27). See the online article for the color version
of this figure.
parties signed an agreement to create a truth and reconciliation
commission.4
Multivariate Analysis
This analysis examined the importance of the symbolic and
material elements of TJ, using logistic regression and the TJPP
data. The unit of observation in this statistical analysis was a PP.
The outcome variable was the presence of a full agreement in the
PP. The independent variables were material and symbolic ele-
ments of TJ. It was also assumed that other factors (control
variables) may be of importance for reaching full peace agree-
ments. We divided these factors into those which deal with the
peace process and those which deal with the armed conflict.
Factors relating to the peace process include mediation, power
sharing, and the duration of these processes. Armed-conflict fac-
tors include incompatibility, the duration of a conflict, and mass
killings. Another dimension of the process taken into consideration
was the state or geographic area. This dimension includes the level
of democracy, GDP, and the world region in which the conflict
occurred. Operationalization of all variables is described in the
Appendix.5
Analytical Findings
The results from the logistic regression model are reported in
Table 1. In Model 1, we ran all three variables of symbolic TJ and
two variables of material TJ. The reason not to include the variable
reparation/rehabilitation was the high correlation coefficient be-
tween this variable and the variable refugees’ rehabilitation (0.77)
and the moderate correlation with victims’ reparation (0.55). This
correlation stems from the coding of material TJ, which is not
mutually exclusive, in comparison with the mutually exclusive
coding of the variables in symbolic TJ. For this reason, we in-
cluded the variable victims’ reparation and/or refugees’ rehabili-
tation (see reparation/rehabilitation) in Model 2, but not each
70.00%
60.00%
Percentage from PP
50.00%
38.00% 40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
7.50% 10.00%
0.00%
Truth&Reconciliaon
% from 27 PP end in paral agreements
separately. The findings in both models indicate that both truth and
reconciliation and reconciliation (without truth) are significant.
Similar results were found in the three other models. Model 3
contained the region control variables, which were found insignif-
icant. To make the model less cumbersome, we included only two
variables of TJ: reparation/rehabilitation and truth and reconcilia-
tion. Model 4 was identical to Model 1 but with the addition of an
index variable. Since the index included the other five TJ variables
and, thus, had a high correlation coefficient for some of them, it
was found insignificant. Model 5 was also identical to Model 1;
however, instead of the data of the 72 PPs, we ran the model on the
67 PPs; this did not include the five PPs of interstate conflicts.6
To summarize the findings from all models, truth and reconcil-
iation was positive and significant. Reconciliation (without truth)
was also positive and significant, while truth (without reconcilia-
tion) was mostly found to be negative and insignificant. The
variables victims’ reparation, refugees’ rehabilitation, and repara-
tion/rehabilitation, which are all material elements, were found to
be insignificant.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our data show that material TJ elements appear in peace pro-
cesses that end with partial as well as with full peace agreements.
This enables us to argue that material elements of TJ are not more
important in peace processes that reach full agreement. In com-
parison, when running the same test for the symbolic elements of
4
Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past
Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused Guate-
malan Population to Suffer, 1994: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/
Gua%2019940623.pdf.
5
The data that support the findings of this study are available on request
from Yoav Kapshuk.
6
The five PPs corresponded to interstate conflicts: Chad-Libya,
Ecuador-Peru, Cameroon-Nigeria, Eritrea-Ethiopia, and Djibouti-Eritrea.
 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN PEACE PROCESSES 5

Table 1
Multivariate Regressions for Predicting the Chances of Reaching Full Peace Agreements

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Truth ⫺0.80 (1.37) ⫺0.87 (1.37) ⫺0.77 (1.37) 0.34 (1.78)

Reconciliation 1.36ⴱⴱ (0.82) 1.28ⴱ (0.79) 1.15ⴱ (0.84) 1.56ⴱⴱ (0.83)
Truth and reconciliation 2.74ⴱⴱⴱ (1.1) 2.81ⴱⴱⴱ (1.02) 2.55ⴱⴱⴱ (1.05) 2.41ⴱⴱ (1.16) 2.89ⴱⴱⴱ (1.11)
Victims’ reparation 0.19 (0.77) ⫺0.06 (0.81) 0.18 (0.77)
Refugees’ rehabilitation 0.46 (0.69) ⫺0.01 (0.87) 0.79 (0.72)
Reparation/rehabilitation 0.55 (0.74) 0.47 (0.77)
Index 0.37 (0.43)
Peace process years (PPYs) ⫺0.27ⴱⴱ (0.13) ⫺0.28ⴱⴱ (0.13) ⫺0.27ⴱⴱ (0.13) ⫺0.27ⴱⴱ (0.13) ⫺0.26ⴱⴱ (0.13)
Power sharing 1.17ⴱ (0.84) 1.14ⴱ (0.83) 1.09ⴱ (0.82) 1.10ⴱ (0.85) 1.04 (0.85)
Third-party mediation ⫺1.14 (0.98) ⫺1.10 (0.92) ⫺0.72 (0.94) ⫺1.16 (0.96) ⫺1.29ⴱ (0.99)
Mass killing ⫺0.11 (0.21) ⫺0.09 (0.21) ⫺0.01 (0.25) ⫺0.09 (0.21) ⫺0.06 (0.22)
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Conflict length ⫺0.01 (0.03) ⫺0.01 (0.03) ⫺0.03 (0.03) ⫺0.01 (0.03) ⫺0.01 (0.03)
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Incompatibility (government or territory) 1.20ⴱ (0.77) 1.25ⴱ (0.80) 0.72 (0.92) 1.28ⴱ (0.79) 1.11ⴱ (0.81)
Democracy level (the year before the PPY) ⫺0.02 (0.09)
GDP (the year before the PPY) 0.0 (0.0)
Geographic areas variables not significant
Constant 0.91 (1.08) 0.82 (1.09) 1.19 (1.20) 0.79 (1.08) 0.77 (1.08)
Pseudo R-squared (PR2) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27
N 72 72 72 72 67
Note. Values presented are coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis).
ⴱ
p ⬍ 0.1. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ 0.05. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ 0.01.

TJ, we found that truth and reconciliation are found in much higher
rates in peace processes that end with full agreements than with
partial agreements. Based on the models of multivariate analysis
presented here and utilizing logistic regressions, we found that
symbolic elements are less salient in partial agreements but very
salient in full agreements. When comparing material and symbolic
elements of TJ and the ramifications of their integration in peace
processes on reaching full agreements, we found that the symbolic
elements of TJ— but not the material elements of TJ— have a
correlation with peace processes ending in a full peace agreement.
This finding enables us to argue that symbolic elements of TJ are
at least not an obstacle for ending armed conflicts by achieving full
peace agreements. This means that contrary to most theoretical
literature, they should not necessarily be pushed to the postconflict
phase. However, to strengthen this argument, there remains the
need to establish a more direct and positive relationship between
the two variables. Such a task necessitates further research. That
said, attention must also be devoted to the implementation of the
postagreement stage, which requires a separate study and analysis.
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Appendix
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Operationalization of Variables
Peace Negotiation Process (PP) Variables
The power-sharing variable was assigned (1/0) as either PP that
included or did not include agreements on power-sharing elements,
respectively. According to the literature, agreements on the inclu-
sion of power-sharing elements increase parties’ chances of reach-
ing a full agreement. The mediation variable was assigned (1/0) as
either PP that included or did not include mediation, respectively.
Mediation is often conducted by a third party, such as the United
Nations or the United States, which usually contributes to parties
reaching peace agreements. Regarding peace process duration, our
assumption is that the longer the process, the less likely parties are
to reach a full agreement, as illustrated by the Oslo process in
Israel/Palestine.7
Armed-Conflict Variables
The incompatibility variable distinguishes between conflicts
over government or territory (0/1). Conflicts over territory are
more difficult to resolve due to practical, but mainly emotional-
symbolic, complications. The other two variables examined re-
late to the intensity of conflict: conflict duration and the pres-
ence of mass killing. Most literature suggests that the more
intense the conflict, the more hostile the parties, making it
more difficult to end conflict. Others, however, argue that the
more intense the conflict, the more parties tend to realize the
chances of one-sided victory are slim; therefore, they are more
willing to compromise.8
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.1.1.697.6250&rep⫽rep1&type⫽pdf
State/Area Variables
The first state/area variable examined was level of democracy,
assuming that the more democratic the regime, the greater its
tendency to compromise. The second variable was state/area’s
level of economic development, represented by its GDP. We
hypothesized that this would affect the likelihood of a full agree-
ment. The third variable was the region, of which there are five:
Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Asia, Africa south of
the Sahara, and the Americas. This variable is considered based on
the assumption that regional cultural differences would affect the
likelihood of a full agreement.9
7
The data source for all variables was the UCDP Data Sets.
8
The data source for government/territory and duration of conflict was
the UCDP Data Sets. The source for mass killing was the PITF Database
(2015; political instability task force, GenoPoliticide, 2014 dataset). We
use the magnitude scaling of this database (1–5) to code mass killing of
civilians.
9
These variables were included only in Model 3 for robustness check.
The data source for the first variable is the Polity IV Project (2014).
Democracy level was examined per each year prior to the peace process
year and coded according the Polity IV Database, between ⫺10 (totalitar-
ian regime) and ⫹10 (democratic regime). The data source for the second
variable is GDP tables from the United Nations website: https://unstats.un
.org/unsd/snaama/dnltransfer.asp?fID ⫽ 9. Per capita GDP was examined
per each year prior to the peace process year and coded with reference to
per capita GDP in the United States. The data source of the third variable
is the UCDP Encyclopedia.