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Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology

© 2020 American Psychological Association 2020, Vol. 2, No. 999, 000
ISSN: 1078-1919 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000491

Rhetorical Expressions of Ethos of Conflict and Policymaking in

Intractable Conflict by Leaders: A Comparative Study of Two Israeli
AQ: 1 Prime Ministers
AQ: au Nimrod Rosler, Hila Hagage Baikovich, and Daniel Bar-Tal
Tel Aviv University

Political leaders serve as agents of peacemaking or conflict maintenance by determining society’s goals
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

and courses of action and then mobilizing society accordingly. We propose at a distance measure that can
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

serve as a proxy to leaders’ position regarding their conflict-related policy. Assuming that support of
societal beliefs of ethos of conflict (EOC) indicates support for the continuation of the conflict we
hypothesize that publicly adhering to existing shared EOC reflects freezing and hence is an indicator of
conflict maintenance policy. Conversely, rhetorically departing from that ethos expresses unfreezing and
indicates a path aimed at conflict resolution. Two Israeli prime ministers, Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud
Olmert, provide us with a remarkable comparative case study; both came from a similar hardline
background and continued supporting these views for decades, but eventually parted in their views. We
analyzed references to beliefs of EOC in their speeches during 3 decades of intense shifts in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The findings support our hypothesis by indicating that Netanyahu who
persistently adhered to the EOC, led obstructionist policies to peace. In contrast, Olmert who increasingly
expressed alternative beliefs supporting peacemaking beginning from the 2000s, led a determined
peacemaking policy as a prime minister. We suggest that understanding leaders’ level of adherence to
AQ: 2 EOC can assist in evaluating their position and efforts in trying to lead peacemaking policy.

Public Significance Statement

The article suggests at a distance measure that can serve as a proxy to leaders’ position and policy
in an intractable conflict. This measure is based on the level of adherence to conflict-related societal
beliefs in the leaders’ rhetoric.

AQ: 3 Keywords: leadership, policymaking, rhetoric, conflict resolution, ethos of conflict

AQ: 4 Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000491.supp

Leaders like Charles de Gaulle, Nelson Mandela, and Fred- did not initiate them, they have continued to maintain them, as
erik Willem de Klerk have led their people away from destruc- for example, Margaret Thatcher in Northern Ireland, or have
tive intergroup conflicts toward peacemaking. However, in even escalated them, as did Vladimir Putin in Chechnya. Al-
Fn1 many cases of violent intractable conflict1, even when leaders though leaders play a crucial role in conflicts and their resolu-

Editor’s Note. Continue the conversation by submitting your comments
and questions about this article/book review to PeacePsychology.org/
peaceconflict. (The Editor of PeacePsychology.org reserves the right to
exclude material that fails to contribute to constructive discussion.)
AQ: 11 NIMROD ROSLER recieved his PhD in conflict research from Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. He is the head of The International Program in
Conflict Resolution and Mediation and Lecturer in the Program in Conflict
Resolution and Mediation at Tel Aviv University. His research interests
includes political and psychological dynamics of intractable conflicts and
their resolution, gender, leadership.
HILA HAGAGE BAIKOVICH received MA in Education from Tel Aviv
University.
X DANIEL BAR-TAL received his PhD in social psychology from
AQ: 12 University of Pittsburgh. Currently, he is a Professor Emeritus at the
School of Education, Tel Aviv University. His research interest
is in political and social psychology studying socio-psychological
foundations of intractable conflicts and peace building, as well as
development of political understanding among children and peace ed-
ucation.
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to
Nimrod Rosler, The International Program in Conflict Resolution and
Mediation, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel.
E-mail: rosler@tauex.tau.ac.il
1
Intractable conflicts are fought over goals viewed as existential, are
violent, perceived as being of zero sum nature and unsolvable, preoccupy
a central position in the lives of the involved societies, require immense
investments of material and psychological resources and last for at least 25
years (Bar-Tal, 2013; Kriesberg, 1998).

1

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2 ROSLER, HAGAGE BAIKOVICH, AND BAR-TAL
tion, previous studies have rarely tried to compare those who
have led potentially opposing policies, nor have they presented
indicators to exemplify the difference between these leaders
(for e.g., Aronoff, 2014; Hermann & Gerard, 2009). In order to
fill this gap, our current study aims at using empirical indicators
to differentiate between rhetorical expressions of societal be-
liefs2 held by leaders who maintain the conflict and those who
try to peacefully resolve it.
We suggest that the policy goals of leaders regarding intractable
conflict can be inferred from their rhetorical adherence to the
shared societal beliefs of ethos of conflict that supports continua-
tion of the conflict. Ethos of conflict (EOC) is defined as the
configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a
particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the
future in the context of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, Sharvit,
Halperin, & Zafran, 2012). It is an ideological system that under-
lies attitudes and behaviors.
Leaders express their political views about the conflict in their
speeches, hence providing their followers with the rationale for the
direction they intend to take. When leaders decide to continue the
conflict, they must at least maintain and even strengthen the
adherence of society members to the EOC, which plays a func-
tional role in its preservation. But when embarking on the road to
peace, the leader must change the rhetoric, preparing followers for
the new and dramatic process of societal change (Rosler, 2016a).
As a case study for our exploratory research, we have selected two
Israeli prime ministers with very similar backgrounds, who both
led Israel after the groundbreaking Oslo Accords signed between
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993.
But first we lay our conceptual framework, offering an exami-
nation of how leaders can maintain or peacefully resolve intracta-
ble conflicts, and how we can assess their held beliefs at a distance.
Then, we briefly describe the two leaders who constitute our case
study. Next, we present the method and findings of the empirical
study we conducted to examine how each leader related to the
EOC in their speeches over three decades. In the discussion, we
consider the policy each leader implemented in managing the
conflict and discuss whether their rhetorical adherence to the EOC
can therefore serve as a proxy to their policy goals. Finally, we
discuss the paper’s contribution to the fields of peace studies and
leadership.
Conceptual Framework
Ethos of Conflict and Political Leadership in
Intractable Conflicts
Intractable conflicts engender harsh conditions and therefore
society members experience severe and continuous negative psy-
chological effects, such as chronic threat, stress, uncertainty, and
hardship (e.g., de Jong, 2002; Hobfoll et al., 1991; Lavi & Bar-Tal,
2015). Due to their existential and violent nature, these conflicts
require willingness to invest enormous efforts and resources in
their maintenance. Hence, a leader must prepare very persuasive
narratives and then messages in order to achieve high levels of
continuous mobilization for the conflict.
In order to adapt to the harsh conflict situation, societies en-
gulfed by intractable conflicts develop an EOC that responds to the
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individual and collective needs of society members (Bar-Tal,
2013). EOC is composed of eight major themes about issues
related to the conflict, the in-group, and its adversary: (a) societal
beliefs about the justness of one’s own goals, which outline the
contested goals, indicate their crucial importance, and provide
their explanations and rationales; (b) societal beliefs about security
stress the importance of personal safety and national survival, and
outline the conditions for their achievement; (c) societal beliefs of
positive collective self-image concern the ethnocentric tendency to
attribute positive traits, values, and behavior to one’s own society;
(d) societal beliefs of victimization concern the self-presentation of
the in-group as the victim of the conflict; (e) societal beliefs of
delegitimizing the opponent concern beliefs that deny the adver-
sary’s humanity; (f) societal beliefs of patriotism generate attach-
ment to the country and society, by propagating loyalty, love, care,
and sacrifice; (g) societal beliefs of unity refer to the importance of
ignoring internal conflicts and disagreements during intractable
conflicts to unite the society’s forces in the face of an external
threat; finally, (h) societal beliefs of peace refer to peace in
amorphous terms as the ultimate desire of the society. These
themes have been found to be dominant in various societies
engaged in intractable conflict (for e.g., Hadjipavlou, 2007; Mac-
Donald, 2002; Slocum-Bradley, 2008). They are imparted to mem- AQ: 5
bers of societies involved in intractable conflict from an early age,
reinforced and maintained by agents of socialization through their
life and eventually many of them hold them as central ideological
beliefs with high confidence (Bar-Tal, 2013).
Since the beliefs of the EOC become major building blocks of
need satisfaction and structuring social identity during intractable
conflicts, political leaders use the themes of the EOC in order to
demonstrate in-group loyalty, strengthen socionational unity and
solidarity, and effectively mobilize society members for the con-
flict (Rosler, 2016a).
However, the societal beliefs of the EOC become major barriers
to conflict resolution when a possibility to resolve the conflict
emerges (Maoz & McCauley, 2008; Rosler, Sharvit, & Bar-Tal,
2018; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015). They provide one-sided, biased
and distortive narrative and when become hegemonic society
members limit their information processing, by obstructing and
inhibiting the penetration of information contradicting EOC beliefs
that could potentially contribute to the development of the peace
process (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). This state of mind indicates
freezing reflected in the continued reliance on the held societal
beliefs supporting the conflict, the reluctance to search for alter-
native information and resistance to persuasive arguments contra-
dicting held positions (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Porat, Halp-
erin, & Bar-Tal, 2015).
Unfreezing of Barriers and Leadership
Peacemaking requires as the necessary phase the unfreezing of
the held societal beliefs supporting the continuation of the conflict.
The unfreezing process consists of opening the set mind to con-
sider alternative and even contradictory ideas and information that
2
Societal beliefs are defined as shared cognitions by the society mem-
bers that address themes and issues that the society members are particu-
larly occupied with, and which contribute to their sense of uniqueness
(Bar-Tal, 2020).

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ETHOS OF CONFLICT AND POLICYMAKING BY LEADERS
may result with the change of the held beliefs and attitudes
(Kruglanski, 2004). It occurs in at least two ways: Fast and slow.
The fast way takes place following a constitutive event that causes
wide resonance, has relevance to the well-being of society mem-
bers and of society as a whole, involves society members, occupies
a central position in public discussion and the public agenda, and
implies information that forces society members to reconsider, and
often change, their held sociopsychological repertoire (Bar-Tal,
2013). Major event can be a war, a specific battle, major atrocity,
reconciling visitor statement of a leader, and so forth The slow way
takes place following accumulation of experiences and informa-
tion that force an individual to reconsider his or her views.
The unfreezing in the case of intractable conflict may commence at
the grassroots level, but ultimately it requires the support of leaders
who make policy and must carry out top-down persuasion in order to
mobilize society members to support negotiation (Bar-Tal, 2019;
Rosler, 2016a). Leaders going through unfreezing and embarking on
the road to peacemaking have to present new ideas about the rival, the
conflict goals, and its peaceful resolution. This is not a simple mission
because it may challenge leaders’ political legitimacy and decrease
public support, in addition to the intrapersonal conflict they them-
selves may experience (Rosler, 2016a).
Almost all the empirical studies investigating ways to overcome
these barriers have been conducted among members of societies
involved in conflicts (e.g., Gayer, Landman, Halperin, & Bar-Tal,
2009; Hameiri, Porat, Bar-Tal, Bieler, & Halperin, 2014). But the
study of leaders has been relatively omitted. In order to address
this gap in the literature, it is important to establish a proxy of their
policy goals by analyzing how leaders signal their intention to
maintain the conflict or to embark on the road of peace through
their rhetorical adherence or departure from the societal beliefs of
EOC. We next address the issue of examining leaders’ beliefs from
a distance, using their public rhetoric.
Assessing Political Leaders at a Distance
Since political leaders are, to a large extent, decision-makers,
determining the course of action taken by their society (Rhodes &
’t Hart, 2014), political psychologists have searched for objective,
at a distance measures that can be later related to their political
behaviors and policy. Much of the research has focused on psy-
chological variables that can be roughly grouped into two main
categories: a. personality variables such as motives (e.g., Spangler
& House, 1991; Winter, 1991, 1996) and traits (e.g., Hermann,
1980; Rubenzer, Faschingbauer, & Ones, 2000); and b. social
cognitions (e.g., George, 1969; Holsti, 1977; Suedfeld, Tetlock, &
Ramirez, 1977; Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998). The first line
suggests ways to measure their motives and other characteristics at
a distance, using systematic content analysis, as well as correla-
tions between them and leaders’ behaviors. For example, examin-
ing conflict-related decision-making, Winter (1991, 1996) found
that higher power motivation of US presidents correlates positively
with war and aggression, while higher affiliation correlates with
peacemaking and arms control. In another line of studies, Hermann
and Gerard (2009) suggested that leaders with ideologue style are
more likely to engage in violent struggles than strategic and
pragmatic leaders, who are more prone to accommodate and com-
promise. Research on social cognitions—mostly elaborated within
the framework of the operational code3— examines psychological
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3
concepts such as beliefs, attitudes and perceptions that construct a
leader’s worldview regarding politics and their effects on decision-
making (George, 1969; Holsti, 1977; Walker et al., 1998). Apply-
ing the operational code to Israeli leaders who were involved in
peacemaking, Crichlow (1998) characterized Rabin and Peres as
idealist and pragmatic idealist style leaders, respectively, who
converged in a cooperative orientation.
In contrast to these two directions we focus on the specific
system of societal beliefs (EOC) related to concrete context of
severe violent and lasting intergroup conflict. This system was
found to be related to individuals’ judgment, evaluation and be-
haviors (Bar-Tal et al., 2012: Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011) and
therefore we suggest that it can also be used in determining the
direction that leaders take with regard to the ongoing conflict.
Following Schafer’s recommendation that “the best way to
assess the prevailing social cognitions of the state is to look at
formal, prepared speeches by the decision-making elite” (2000, p.
517), the current study examines the public speeches (rather than
spontaneous materials) of two leaders with very similar back-
grounds regarding the Israeli-Palestinian intractable conflict. Our
purpose is to detect whether their level of adherence to the
EOC—an additional set of beliefs— has changed over the years.
We assume that leaders who adhere to the EOC beliefs and
maintain them publicly despite major events and information that
indicate the possibility of resolving the conflict exhibit cognitive
freezing. Hence, we suggest that they will perpetuate the conflict.
Alternatively, leaders who decrease their adherence to the EOC
and even move toward alternative ethos of peace (EOP) in their
rhetoric become open to the flow of information and begin the
process of cognitive change that results in unfreezing. Therefore,
we suggest that the latter may eventually initiate concrete peace-
making steps. These leaders need to change their rhetoric and
communicate the transformation of their goals to society members.
We are aware of course of a change in an opposite direction as
well. Individuals including leaders may move their positions from
adhering to EOP to moving to support EOC. This direction of
change took place to many Israeli Jews after the failure of Camp
David meeting with the goal to resolve peacefully the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict between the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
and the Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat in July 2000
and the outbreak of the second very violent Palestinian uprising in
the fall of 2000 (Bar-Tal & Raviv, in press; Halperin & Bar-Tal,
2007). The line of empirical research that examines the level of
change in societal beliefs as expressed in leaders’ (and even in
society members’) rhetoric can provide proper cues in diagnosing
where a leader is heading in dealing with the intractable conflict.
The Current Study
Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Olmert served as Israeli prime
ministers in the period that followed the Oslo Accords, marking
the beginning of the peace process between Israel and the Pales-
tinians. The comparison between the two leaders is based on their
similar political and ideological backgrounds. Of similar age, both
3
Operational code is defined as “political leader’s beliefs about the
nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to
which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct
strategy” (George, 1969, p. 197).

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4 ROSLER, HAGAGE BAIKOVICH, AND BAR-TAL
grew up in politically active hardline families. Netanyahu and
Olmert entered the political arena in the right-wing Likud party at
a young age, establishing themselves as leading political figures
opposing any territorial concessions. Later, during the 1990s, both
of them became part of the vocal and vehement opposition to the
Oslo Accords that was a constitutive event in Israel, without
changing their views of the conflict, and led the campaign against
their approval and implementation. In fact none of the major
events that took place in the eighties and nineties like the first
Lebanon War in 1982, the first Palestinian uprising in 1987–90,
the Gulf war in 1990 that involved also Israel, or Madrid peace
conference with the participation of Israel and Arab countries in
1991 had any effect on the political views of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict by the two figures.
During the second half of the 1990s, in his first tenure, Netan-
yahu reluctantly accepted the Oslo Accords, while simultaneously
attempting to slow down and even reverse the process (Bar-Tal &
Raviv, in press). At the beginning of the 21st century, their
ideological paths began to part when Olmert gradually started
voicing growing support for territorial compromises with the Pal-
estinians, while Netanyahu maintained his views toward the con-
flict with the Palestinians almost intact, notwithstanding tactical
adaptations (for elaboration, see Aronoff, 2014; Kimhi, Yehoshua,
& Oliel, 2017; Ziv, 2013). Olmert’s shift became clear, starting
from 2003, when he served in Ariel Sharon’s government and
started to enthusiastically promote the unilateral pullout from Gaza.
While Netanyahu’s views regarding the conflict, especially dur-
ing his first term as Prime Minister, have been studied to some
extent (cf. Aronoff, 2014; Kimhi, 2001; Lochery, 2000), those of
Olmert have received minor empirical attention (Ziv, 2013). The
current study therefore aims to compare the views of the two
leaders regarding the conflict as reflected in their speeches along
the years and to examine whether change occurred in their content.
We therefore hypothesized that Netanyahu would adhere to the
ethos beliefs in his speeches, while Olmert’s rhetoric would reflect
moving toward alternative ethos of peace (EOP) societal beliefs
thus reflecting unfreezing.
Method
Materials
The basic materials of the study included public political, com-
prehensive, and lengthy speeches by Netanyahu and Olmert ad-
dressing the Israeli public in Hebrew and referring to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The research period was confined to the years of
political activity by both leaders, therefore starting with Netanyahu’s
appointment as an Israeli diplomat in the US in 1982 and ending with
Olmert’s conviction in 2014. In order to obtain all of the speeches by
the two leaders from the research period, we conducted an archival
search.4 Out of the entire corpus of speeches, we sampled speeches
according to the following criteria: (a)The central topic of each speech
is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (b) The speeches are taken from
across the political career of each leader to enable examination of
change or stability over time. (c) Equal number of speeches by each
leader before and after the shift that occurred in 2003 in the Likud’s
government policy toward a unilateral pullout from Gaza. (d) The
speech is in Hebrew and addresses the Israeli public. (e)The speeches
are comparable in length.
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An important point has to be made with regards to the selection
of speeches: in the first period up to 2003 the speeches of both
leaders were identical and repetitive in their content, and therefore
we had no reason to select many of them. Thus, they were selected
randomly according to the presented criteria. Only at the beginning
of 2003 we identified a change in Olmert’s speeches, and thus we
randomly sampled from this period additional speeches according
to the same criteria. From this point we began to analyze closely
the change process in his rhetoric. Accordingly, we selected a
sample of 10 speeches by Benjamin Netanyahu from June 5, 1987
until June 26, 20145 (mean of word count ⫽ 2135.20; SD ⫽ Fn5
1210.64) and 10 speeches by Ehud Olmert from June 29, 1982
until September 19, 2010 (mean of word count ⫽ 2012.90; SD ⫽
775.64).6 The speeches were spread over the investigated period to Fn6
ensure representation of their views over time (see Table S1 in
online supplemental materials, for details of each speech). Five
speeches by each leader took place before 2003, and five for each
leader after 2003.
Analytic Framework
In order to examine the content of the societal beliefs as they
appear in the speeches of the two leaders and whether they
changed at specific points of time, we used a directed approach to
content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) which enabled us to
empirically examine an existing framework, while utilizing a de-
ductive category application (Mayring, 2000). This analytical ap-
proach has been previously undertaken to examine the content and
frequency of EOC beliefs’ appearance in oral and written texts
(Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Rosler, 2016a, 2016b). Since the guide AQ:6-7
theory, EOC (Bar-Tal, 2013), relates to societal beliefs in intrac-
table conflicts—for example, de-legitimization of the rival—we
used “neutral” operational definitions—for example, out-group
image (see Rosler, 2016a). The coding scheme for analyzing the
content of the speeches therefore included eight categories, while
each coding category was divided into two subcategories, one
referring to conflict-based meaning and the second referring to change
and peace. The details and definitions of the categories are provided
in Table S2 in online supplemental materials, as they allowed the
categorization of the themes found in the content analysis.
The speeches by the two leaders were analyzed both qualita-
tively and quantitatively. The qualitative analysis included several
steps. First, after compiling all the speeches, each speech was
carefully read and sentences that appeared to refer to one or more
of the coding categories and subcategories were highlighted and
labeled accordingly. In many cases, each highlighted part of the
text referred to more than one coding category or subcategory.
4
The archives include the Israeli State Archive, the Interdisciplinary
Center Herzliya archive, the Israeli Parliament archive on the internet
(http://online.knesset.gov.il/app/#/search), and the media center of the Is-
raeli Prime Minister’s Office on the internet (http://www.pmo.gov.il/
MEDIACENTER/SPEECHES/Pages/default.aspx), and YouTube website
(https://www.youtube.com/).
5
At this time Benjamin Netanyahu was prime minister after being
elected a second time to the office in February 2009 and then a third time
in January 2013.
6
Ehud Olmert began serving as prime minister in January 4, 2006, after
PM Sharon suffered a stroke. He was accused of corruption and resigned
in September 2008. On August 30, 2009 he was indicted and then con-
victed in 2014.
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ETHOS OF CONFLICT AND POLICYMAKING BY LEADERS 5

While coding each highlighted part of the text, the entire speech
was also treated as a single segment, enabling a holistic analysis of
meaning (Berg & Lune, 2012; Krippendorff, 2012; Reicher &
Hopkins, 1996). Next, all the highlighted parts in one speech were
rigorously reviewed in order to identify the themes of the speech
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
All of the speeches were independently coded by two research-
ers (first and third authors) proficient in the theoretical model and
in qualitative methodology (Tappan, 1997). In about 90% of the
cases, there was agreement between the evaluators, indicating high
intercoder reliability. In cases of disagreement, a third evaluator
(second author) decided how to categorize the text after reviewing
the coding of the two researchers. Furthermore, the third evaluator
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decades, and in each of the two periods— before and after 2003—
and allows a comprehensive picture of the appearance of the
societal beliefs in Netanyahu’s speeches. In addition, the right
column of this table displays the findings of the Mann–Whitney U
tests we conducted to examine whether the mean frequency of
each of the 16 subcategories changed between the two periods.
The findings presented in Table 1 illustrate that the subcategory
of security from the EOC was by far the most frequently expressed
in Netanyahu’s speeches, followed by peace from the EOC as
well. The rest of the subcategories from the EOC, except for
patriotism, also appeared in his speeches but at mean frequencies
of less than 6%. Conversely, Table 1 shows that none of the
subcategories from the EOP appeared in Netanyahu’s speeches

reviewed the data and research process overall to strengthen the except for peace that appeared at a mean frequency of less than
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validity of the study following the peer debriefing procedure
(Creswell & Miller, 2000).
The quantitative analytical procedure included examining the
frequency of each coding subcategory in each of the speeches. The
frequency was calculated by dividing the number of words labeled
as referring to a subcategory in a speech by the total number of
words in that speech. Furthermore, we compared the frequencies
of the subcategories within the speeches of each leader in two
periods using Mann–Whitney U independent-sample tests: before
and after the shift in the policy of the 2003 Likud government. The
Mann–Whitney U test is a powerful nonparametric test that is
adequate for small sample sizes (Nachar, 2008).
Results—Benjamin Netanyahu
Frequency of the Appearance of the Societal Beliefs in
Totality and by Period
T1 Table 1 assembles the appearance frequencies of each of the
subcategories in the analyzed units in total items, over three
2%. Table 1 also shows that there was no statistically significant
change in the mean frequency of each of the subcategories in
Netanyahu’s speeches before and after 2003.
Next, we discuss the content of the subcategories most fre-
quently found, while bringing examples from his speeches that
illustrate their expressions.
Content of the Societal Beliefs in the Speeches
Security. The most prevalent societal belief in Netanyahu’s
speeches related to the theme of security from the EOC, that is,
repeatedly emphasizing the existential threats that Israel confronts,
the need to defend its security and the high status of the Israeli
army. The theme appeared in each and every speech that was
analyzed, appearing with high frequency in most of them. Netan-
yahu stressed existential threats to Israel’s security, along with the
required conditions to ensure the country’s safety: Israel’s right to
defend itself by all means, maintaining its current geopolitical
borders, its strong military power, and its close ties with the US.
The threats might change from time to time. But in his view, each

Table 1
Frequency (in Percentages) of the Subcategories Observed in the Speeches of Netanyahu Before and After 2003

Before 2003 (n ⫽ 5) After 2003 (n ⫽ 5)

Categories x៮ (SD) Average rank Rank sum x៮ (SD) Average rank Rank sum M–W U

Conflict subcategories
Conflict goals 8.4 (17.15) 5.5 27.5 3 (4.12) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Negative image of out-group 3.6 (4.97) 5.5 27.5 3.2 (4.87) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Positive in-group image in conflict 4.4 (6.07) 5.9 29.5 1.2 (1.78) 5.1 25.5 10.5
Security by force 50.8 (33.58) 5.1 25.5 54.4 (41.75) 5.9 29.5 10.5
Exclusive victimhood 3.6 (3.51) 6.8 34 0.4 (0.89) 4.2 21 6
Patriotism for the conflict 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Unity for the conflict 6.8 (10.94) 6.4 32 1.2 (2.68) 4.6 23 8
Failed past attempts and longing for peace 4 (7.87) 4.6 23 20 (22.07) 6.4 32 8
Change and peace subcategories
Change in the in-group’s goals 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Legitimation and differentiation of out-group 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Positive in-group image in peace 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Security through peace and change 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Mutual victimhood 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Patriotism for the in-group 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Unity in change 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Realistic peace through negotiation 0 (0) 5 25 3.4 (7.60) 6 30 10
Note. Italic ⫽ the most frequent subcategories; M–W U ⫽ Mann–Whitney U test; x៮ (SD) ⫽ mean (standard deviation).
ⴱ
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6 ROSLER, HAGAGE BAIKOVICH, AND BAR-TAL
is very serious, and intends to annihilate the State of Israel. He had
already related to this theme early in his political career, when he
said in 1987:
The number of predators daring to attack us on the battlefield
has declined from five countries during the War of Independence
in 1948, to three in the Six-Day War, to two in the Yom Kippur
War in 1973, to one (Syria) in the Lebanon War in 1982. (Netan-
yahu, 5 June 1987)
In a more recent speech, Netanyahu referred once again to the
various enemies surrounding Israel, stressing its vital ongoing need
for security, while placing Israel’s eastern border on the Jordan
River:
The first challenge is to defend our borders [. . .] The forces of
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extreme Islam have already been knocking at our doors in the
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north and in the south; in Lebanon and in Syria, the Shiite forces
of Hezbollah and Iran are arming and making ready for the future
campaign against us [. . .] and in Gaza, the Hamas and the Islamic
Jihad movements are working against us. (Netanyahu, 20 July
2014)
The fact that the theme of security remained constant during the
whole research period notwithstanding the dramatic changes that
were taking place in the conflict powerfully reflects Netanyahu’s
adherence to this key theme that is used as a central rationale for
avoiding peace making. It also expresses the dominance of this
theme in his perceptions regarding the conflict, and therefore the
need to mobilize the Israeli public to continuously manage the
conflict by military means. The extensive use of threats raises fear
and insecurity among the Israeli public and is one of the most
motivating factors in personal and collective considerations in
elections and in many other decisions in different areas of life
(Bar-Tal & Raviv, in press).
Peace. Another societal belief that has received numerous
references in Netanyahu’s speeches through the years relates to the
theme of peace. Interestingly, in the vast majority of his speeches,
Netanyahu has referred to peace as an abstract and utopian wish,
exactly as this theme is defined in the EOC. He depicts Israeli Jews
as peace-loving people, who reluctantly have had to take part in the
violent conflict due to circumstances beyond their control. In 1987,
he said:
An agreement of this kind will distance the thinking of our
enemies that the day may come when they will be able to annihi-
late us, and the moment will draw near when we may achieve a
real peace. (Netanyahu, 5 June 1987)
Netanyahu has tended to emphasize peace in his postelection
speeches, probably reacting to favorable public opinion toward
peace in 1996, and to pressures from the American administration
in 2009. In these speeches, he relates to alternative ideas about the
meaning and specific aims of peace: applying the interim agree-
ments with the Palestinians and negotiating final status issues with
them in 1996, and the creation of a Palestinian state in his speech
in 2009. Although this could reflect a change to a certain degree,
in both speeches he avoids providing further details about these
alternatives and their implications, while keeping his references to
them on the very general level as a wish. In 1996, for example, he
refers very broadly to the issues that will potentially be negotiated
with the Palestinians under specific conditions:
I would like to turn to our neighbors in the Palestinian Authority
here today and say to them: On this basis of maintaining security,
we are ready to open a real partnership for peace with you, good
APA NLM
neighborly relations and cooperation. The government of Israel
will negotiate with the Palestinian Authority on condition that it
fulfills all of its obligations. (Netanyahu, 18 June 1996)
Netanyahu’s persistent avoidance of presenting a clear and
detailed vision of the peace process in his speech once again
reflects his adherence to the EOC.
Justness of own goals. The theme of justness of own goals
has received minor reference in his speeches. Importantly, Netan-
yahu’s right-wing ideological values regarding Israel’s right to the
entire land of Israel, with Jerusalem as its eternal and undividable
capital, and for building Jewish settlements in the West Bank,
remained intact in his speeches as part of this theme throughout the
research period. This theme can be found in the two following
examples:
We will encourage pioneering settlement in the land of Israel: in
the Negev and in the Galilee, in Judea and Samaria, and in the
Golan [. . .] But more than anything else, we will safeguard and
strengthen Jerusalem, the eternal capital of the Israeli nation, as a
united and intact city under the sovereignty of the State of Israel.
(Netanyahu, 18 June 1996)
The connection of the Jewish nation to the land of Israel has
continued for more than 3,500 years. Judea and Samaria, the places
where Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, David and Solomon, Isiah and
Jeremiah walked, are not alien to us. This is the land of our
forefathers. (Netanyahu, 14 June 2009)
Other societal beliefs. Four further societal beliefs (positive
self-image, delegitimization of the rival, unity, and victimhood)
from the EOC have appeared less often in Netanyahu’s speeches.
Still, noting these themes reflects his adherence to the EOC, since
there has been no change in their rhetorical prevalence during the
three decades that were studied. Thus, for example, the theme of
delegitimization of the rival appeared early on in Netanyahu’s
rhetoric, when he depicted Israel’s enemies as a “predator fish” –
de-humanizing them:
In his books, Max Nordau described a scientific experiment
conducted by a well-known scientist [. . .] The scientist put two
fish into a container of water; one was a predator and the other was
innocent, and a transparent glass partition separated them. The
predator fish identified its prey, attacked him immediately, and
encountered the glass partition. . .The number of “predator fish”
attacking Israel has lessened and lessened. (Netanyahu, 5 June
1987)
Netanyahu referred to the societal belief about the importance of
unity against the rival in half of his speeches. Interestingly, in his
speech from 2009 in which he, for the first time, expressed support
for the two-state solution, Netanyahu seemingly tried to decrease
the value complexity (see George, 1980) between the whole land
of Israel, and peace, by repeatedly referring to the themes of unity
and security:
Our connection to the land of Israel, and the Palestinian popu-
lation living here have created deep differences of opinion in
Israeli society. But the truth is that there is much greater unity than
disagreement. I have come this evening to express this unity: the
principles of peace and security on which there is wide agreement
in Israeli society, and it is those principles which guide our
policies. (Netanyahu, 14 June 2009)
In conclusion, Netanyahu’s adherence to the societal beliefs of
the EOC is evident when analyzing his speeches over the period of
three decades. He has rhetorically emphasized and repeated the
 APA NLM
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ETHOS OF CONFLICT AND POLICYMAKING BY LEADERS 7

themes of security and peace from the EOC and has referred to
other themes from that ethos as well. Although he has made
adaptations and incorporated the idea of a two-state solution into
some his speeches beginning in 2009, he has made almost no
reference to alternative beliefs that could support peacemaking.
Results—Ehud Olmert
Frequency of the Appearance of the Societal Beliefs in
Totality and by Period
The frequencies of the subcategories that appeared in Olmert’s
T2 speeches are presented in Table 2 in the same manner as those of
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generally negated the goals of the Palestinians in his speeches,
referring to them as illegitimate and as risking Israeli goals in the
conflict. During the Oslo Accords, which reflected compromises
aimed at partially achieving both parties’ goals, he related to the
beliefs regarding his own group goals especially by negatively
referring to the Israeli-Palestinian agreement:
This agreement, which is called an interim Israeli-Palestinian
agreement for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is an agreement
which assumes a solid basis for the practical division of Jerusalem
and the expropriation of significant sections of the city to sover-
eign Palestinian rule. (Olmert, 5 October 1995)
The difficult and complex process of change is reflected in his
speeches from the early years of the 21st century when he ceased

Netanyahu in the previous results section. The findings illustrate to object to the basic goal of the Palestinians and was publicly
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that the subcategory of peace from the EOP was most frequently
expressed in Olmert’s speeches, followed by in-group goals from
the EOP as well, in addition to in-group image and out-group
image from the EOC. The subcategories of security and victim-
hood from the EOP, as well as security and unity from the EOC
have also appeared in his speeches but at mean frequencies of less
than 4.5%. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the mean frequency
appearance of peace, of in-group goals, and of security subcate-
gories has increased statistically significantly from the period prior
to 2003 (0% for all of them) to the period following 2003 (about
42%, about 24%, and about 8% accordingly). In addition, there has
been a clear decrease from the first to the second period in the
mean frequency of in-group image and out-group image from the
EOC, although not reaching statistical significance.
We now discuss the content of the societal beliefs most fre-
quently found in Olmert’s speeches, while bringing examples from
his speeches that illustrate the change that has occurred in them.
Content of the Societal Beliefs in the Speeches
Justification of own group goals. As a mirror image of
justifying Israel’s goals, until the end of the 20th century, Olmert
willing to accept the concept of a Palestinian state. However, as his
attitude change was only starting to unfold, he still considered the
historical justification for a Palestinian state as invalid, unlike the
justified link of the Jewish people to East Jerusalem and the West
Bank.
The major rhetorical justification that appeared in his
speeches during the first decade of the 21st century for sup-
porting a change in the Israeli goals and advocating peaceful
conflict resolution relied on the demographic argument. Olmert
acknowledged that maintaining Israel as a Jewish-democratic
state required making compromises to allow the creation of a
Palestinian state:
We agreed to a compromise many years ago, as we knew that,
in the long run, we would not be able to hold on to all of the areas
of the land of Israel, since, in the end, demography will overwhelm
our untarnished, pure and justified dreams. (Olmert, 10 December
2003)
Reflecting his unfreezing process, in his speeches from 2003
and on, Olmert referred to the theme of new peaceful goals, based
on economic and regional cooperation, for example, in a speech
from 2006:

Table 2
Frequency (in Percentages) of the Subcategories Observed in the Speeches of Olmert Before and After 2003

Before 2003 (n ⫽ 5) After 2003 (n ⫽ 5)

Categories x៮ (SD) Average rank Rank sum x៮ (SD) Average rank Rank sum M–W U

Conflict subcategories
Conflict goals 0 (0) 5 25 0.4 (0.89) 6 30 10
Negative image of out-group 18.6 (17.17) 7.4 37 0.8 (1.79) 3.6 18 3
Positive in-group image in conflict 23 (31.50) 6.5 32.5 0 (0) 4.5 22.5 7.5
Security by force 7.8 (8.32) 6.8 34 1 (2.24) 4.2 21 6
Exclusive victimhood 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Patriotism for the conflict 1.4 (3.13) 6 30 0 (0) 5 25 10
Unity for the conflict 4.4 (9.84) 6 30 0 (0) 5 25 10
Failed past attempts and longing for peace 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Change and peace subcategories
Change in the in-group’s goals 0 (0) 3.5 17.5 23.6 (20.22) 7.5 37.5 2.5ⴱ
Legitimation and differentiation of out-group 0 (0) 4.5 22.5 1.6 (2.30) 6.5 32.5 7.5
Positive in-group image in peace 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Security through peace and change 0 (0) 3 15 8.4 (6.69) 8 40 0ⴱⴱ
Mutual victimhood 0 (0) 4 20 6.6 (12.03) 7 35 5
Patriotism for the in-group 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 0 (0) 5.5 27.5 12.5
Unity in change 0 (0) 5 25 2.2 (4.92) 6 30 10
Realistic peace through negotiation 0(0) 3 15 41.8 (33.53) 8 40 0ⴱⴱ
Note. Italic ⫽ the most frequent subcategories; M–W U ⫽ Mann–Whitney U test; x៮ (SD) ⫽ mean (standard deviation).
ⴱ
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8 ROSLER, HAGAGE BAIKOVICH, AND BAR-TAL
We can help you formulate an economic rehabilitation plan for
the Gaza Strip and areas of Judea and Samaria. We can assist you
in establishing industrial areas, with the cooperation of the Euro-
pean Community, which will create places of employment, income
and a life of dignity, without continuing to be dependent on the
employment infrastructure within the borders of Israel. (Olmert, 27
November 2006)
Security. Although Olmert referred to the theme of security
less frequently than Netanyahu in his speeches, the shift in content
starting in 2003 clearly demonstrates the change in his beliefs. In
his early speeches from the First Lebanon War period, Olmert
suggested that security could be achieved by military means,
ultimately through annihilation of the PLO:
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What still remains is the mission to totally eliminate the orga-
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nization of murderers, the PLO, as a military force, and to the
extent possible, also as a political force. (Olmert, 29 June 1982)
In his speeches from the 1990s he mentioned the existential
threats that the compromises, which were part of the Oslo Accords,
might pose to Israel, thus reflecting the negative relations he
perceived at that time between security and peacemaking. How-
ever, from 2003 he started to relate to alternative beliefs pertaining
to security that support peacemaking. Initially, he referred to
territorial compromises and political initiatives, rather than mili-
tary ones, as guarantees to secure Israel’s future. Still, at that time,
Olmert emphasized that Israel had to rely strictly on itself in order
to achieve security, and not to consider the other side:
We must take the initiative and determine the outlines of the
solution which we think is essential to ensure the continued exis-
tence of the State of Israel as a strong, secure Jewish democratic
state that can continue to realize its destiny in its land without the
threat of those who wish to annihilate us. And so, in order to do
this, we will have to withdraw to a different border than we have
today. (Olmert, 10 December 2003)
Later, Olmert began referring to the interdependent nature of
security and peace, with security as leverage to resolving the
conflict. After becoming prime minister in 2006, he further devel-
oped this idea, depicting peace as potentially ensuring Israel’s
security. However, Olmert continued to relate to the importance of
maintaining Israel’s military might alongside the contribution of
peace to its security. Thus, the combination of the two, as he
emphasized in a 2008 speech, could ultimately avoid violent
conflict altogether and secure Israel’s future:
The question that must guide every government and every prime
minister in Israel is not just how to ensure a victory for the Israel
Defense Forces in the next war, but primarily, how to ensure that
the next war will not break out. And they are interdependent.
(Olmert, 18 December 2008)
Peace. While in his early speeches, Olmert refrained from
mentioning peace, beginning in 2003, he presented peace as a
complex and realistic construct and it has become the most per-
vasive theme characterizing his rhetoric. In a speech from 2003,
Olmert said:
We will have to make compromises [. . .] which are very pain-
ful. And yes, there will be settlers who were sent as emissaries of
the government and with its approval, who will have to move to
other places in Israel, since there is no other way. (Olmert, 10
December 2003)
APA NLM
Later, he presented the benefits and costs of peace, while dem-
onstrating understanding for the needs and goals of the other side.
In a speech from 2008, for example, he referred to the complex yet
unavoidable nature of peace in realistic terms:
We must shake off our illusions and understand that economic
development, as an organic part of a political process leading to the
establishment of a neighboring Palestinian state, friendly and sus-
tainable, is certainly essential and desirable. (Olmert, 18 December
2008)
Moving toward a detailed presentation of the concept of peace
in his speeches, Olmert demonstrated the crystallization of a new
set of beliefs regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that he was
promoting.
Other societal beliefs. Societal beliefs referring to other EOC
themes, such as positive self-image and delegitimization of the
other side also appeared in his speeches. Interestingly, the theme
of victimhood was not referred to in any of Olmert’s speeches that
were analyzed. The theme of delegitimization of the other side was
found in several speeches, as both before and during the formula-
tion of the Oslo Accords, he negatively labeled the Palestinian
leader Yasser Arafat a murderer and a liar, blaming him for the
continuing conflict:
Do you imagine that we will make peace with Mahmoud Dar-
wish and his blood-drenched patron, Arafat? Do they want peace?
Do they want to sit at the table? They want us to fly away like
words in the wind, to disappear and leave. (Olmert, 28 March
1988)
Other examples of using EOC societal beliefs can be found in
Olmert’s early speeches. Referring to the belief of positive self-
image, for example, he emphasized the virtues of Israeli society
that were salient during the First Lebanon War:
While IDF soldiers are on their mission on behalf of the nation
and the government to protect the country’s security, the most
beautiful and noble qualities of this people in the State of Israel are
usually revealed, as they are expressed first and foremost of course
in the battlefield. (Olmert, 28 June 1982)
However, alternative societal beliefs supporting peace were
found in his speeches after 2003, although to a lesser extent
than previously mentioned alternative beliefs. Still, the rhetor-
ical use of these alternative beliefs further reflects Olmert’s
unfreezing process during the last decade, analyzed in this
study. Thus, for example, the theme of unity was transformed in
his speeches to an acknowledgment of the diversity of opinions
in Israeli society regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
while containing the differences in favor of peacemaking (see
Rosler, 2016a):
I believe that these things suggest hope, suggest another hori-
zon. They will not be easy. They will obligate us among ourselves
to show maximum consideration and understanding of the distress
of those for whom this solution is difficult, but we have no other
way (Olmert, 10 December 2003).
Another example of Olmert’s development of a new alternative
ethos is found in his reference to victimhood in his later speeches.
At first, he was willing to acknowledge the suffering experienced
by Palestinians, putting the blame on them and justifying it by
referring to Israel’s security needs. However, later, Olmert was
already willing to express empathy for the difficult experiences of

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ETHOS OF CONFLICT AND POLICYMAKING BY LEADERS
the other side without blaming them, along with the depiction of a
realistic peace between the two parties:
We understand the Palestinians’ distress and feel deep empathy
for the suffering that many of them have experienced as an
inseparable part of the dispute between us. We have never ignored
their suffering or discounted their distress. (Olmert, 8 October
2007)
To recap, Olmert’s speeches reflect a clear process of unfreez-
ing. Until 2003, he referred to several EOC themes, but from that
point, he began to express alternative beliefs supporting peace-
making. Relying on themes such as complex and realistic peace or
fostering security through peacemaking, he aimed at mobilizing
the Israeli public to support the peace policy he led as the prime
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minister.
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Discussion
Adhering publicly to widely shared EOC beliefs that are func-
tional for coping with the intractable conflict, leaders use them
rhetorically to mobilize society members for continuing the con-
flict, not seeing any option to resolve it peacefully (Haslam,
Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Rosler, 2016a). But these beliefs also
serve as a major barrier to peace making, especially when such a
possibility appears. However, if they wish to overcome these
barriers and lead the complex process of peacemaking, leaders
must become open-minded to new ideas about the conflict and
their rival and share it with their followers by publicly using the
EOP (Bar-Tal, 2013). We therefore suggest that their rhetorical
reference to EOC or EOP can serve as a proxy to their policy
direction in the conflict. Two Israeli prime ministers, Benjamin
Netanyahu and Ehud Olmert, provide us with a noteworthy com-
parative case study. Analyzing speeches of three decades, we
tested our hypothesis by examining whether each leader adhered to
beliefs of the EOC or experienced an unfreezing process that led to
the formation of alternative societal beliefs supporting peacemak-
ing.
The analysis of their speeches confirmed our research hypoth-
eses regarding the converse processes of cognitive freezing and
unfreezing among political leaders in intractable conflicts. From
the 1980s to 2002, both leaders referred in their speeches to themes
reflecting the EOC. Netanyahu emphasized the existential threats
to Israel’s security, Israel’s right to the entire land of Israel and to
build settlements, while relating to peace as a utopian wish. In his
speeches during that period, Olmert delegitimized Palestinian lead-
ers, praised the virtues of Israeli society, and presented the security
threats created by the Oslo process.
To test our hypothesis that adherence to EOC beliefs will be a
proxy of policy aiming at maintaining the conflict, we now turn to
examine their policy regarding the conflict. Indeed, during those
years both Netanyahu and Olmert rejected peacemaking goals, and
fervently opposed the Oslo Accords signed by Israeli Prime Min-
ister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in 1993.
During his first term as prime minister, although Netanyahu faced
internal and international pressure to continue the peace process
with the Palestinians, he conducted a policy that was probably
crafted to bring it to a halt (Aronoff, 2014; Ziv, 2013). While
serving as the mayor of Jerusalem, Olmert pushed various policies,
aimed at undermining any potential territorial compromises with
the Palestinians over the eastern parts of the city, such as the
APA NLM
9
construction of new Jewish neighborhoods and promoting legisla-
tion relating to these steps (Ziv, 2013). Taking together the find-
ings relating to their rhetoric and their policies regarding the
conflict during the first research period, the study supports our
hypothesis.
In the second research period, starting from 2003, the rhetorical
themes in their speeches became increasingly dissimilar. Netan-
yahu retained his core rhetorical themes of security and peace from
the EOC, while making several adaptations to the latter. On the
other hand, Olmert began to express new alternative beliefs nec-
essary for peacemaking, such as expressing a complex and realistic
perception of peace and justifying peaceful goals.
The actual policies of both leaders as prime ministers during the
second period indeed manifest the extent to which their rhetorical
adherence to the EOC can serve as an indicator to where they stand
regarding the conflict thus further supporting our hypothesis. In his
second term, Netanyahu made symbolic gestures, apparently to
appease American pressure to resume the peace process, but even-
tually demonstrated no substantial changes in his policy toward the
conflict (Aronoff, 2014; Ziv, 2013). Moreover, after accepting the
two-state solution in a 2009 speech, he retracted this position
publicly on the eve of the 2015 election (Ravid, 2015). In his
fourth term as prime minister, beginning in 2015, he has been
leading obstructionist policies regarding the conflict, continuing
the delegitimization of the Palestinians, and eventually even noting
the possibility of annexing part of the West Bank to the State of
Israel (Bar-Tal & Raviv, in press). With time, especially after
Donald Trump was elected as the president of the United States in
2016, Benjamin Netanyahu has become an ideological leader of
the Greater Israeli policies that advocated unlimited Jewish settle-
ment in West Bank, annexation of Jordan Valley to the State of
Israel, prevention of the establishment of Palestinian state and
institutionalization of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by its
recognition by foreign states. The unequivocal support of these
goals by Donald Trump, who even formally gave them recognition
in his peace plan published in January 2020, enabled their realiza-
tion in line with the ethos of conflict premises.
Olmert, on the other hand, during his premiership, embraced a
determined policy aimed at resolving the conflict. After abandon-
ing his predecessor’s unilateral policy, he initiated in 2007 intense
and direct negotiation with the President of the Palestinian Na-
tional Authority Mahmoud Abbas that covered all of the main
issues under contention, with the intention to end the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Toward the end of his term, Olmert presented
a comprehensive peace proposal to the Palestinians, which he was
not able to finalize (Golan, 2015; Ziv, 2013). With time, he even
has become one of the leading figures of the peace camp advo-
cating peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a
personal interview carried by the last author, he described his
change of beliefs and attitudes as a long process of accumulating
information and experiences in the domestic setting, where his
wife and daughter were both long time peace activists. A special
weight he gave to the realization that because of the demographic
changes, indicating that the Palestinians will become a majority in
the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea,
Israel will lose either its Jewish nature or the democratic nature.
Both possibilities were perceived by him as a great danger to the
Jewish people in Israel.

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10 ROSLER, HAGAGE BAIKOVICH, AND BAR-TAL
In sum, we can conclude that both leaders held their hawkish
views for a long time without being influenced by the changing
context. They ignored a series of major events that took place from
the 1980s till 2000, adhering to their ideological views. Benjamin
Netanyahu had a number of opportunities to embark on the road of
peace that he resisted. During the time of President Clinton in the
late 1990s, he yielded to his pressure and then returned to his
ideological way. Of special note is the pressure carried by the
President Obama that resulted in the vague declaration about the
support to the vision of the two state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in 2009. Then when the concrete negotiations
began with the mediation of the US secretary of state John Kerry
in 2013–2014, he resisted making needed compromises, giving
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away his vision. In contrast, Ehud Olmert, as the prime minister,
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seized the opportunity provided by the President W. Bush in the
Annapolis conference in 2007 that aimed to revive the peace
process. He began serious negotiations with the Palestinian Au-
thority President Mahmoud Abbas that unfortunately did not come
to their successful conclusion because of the corruption accusation
that forced Olmert to resign. Benjamin Netanyahu won the election
in 2009 and his obstructionist—ideological road has prevailed.
Through all the years of his life, Benjamin Netanyahu consistently
and continuously have adhered to the societal beliefs of ethos of
conflict, demonstrating dogmatic personal tendency (Bar-Tal &
Raviv, in press).
Taken together, our findings indicate unique insights for detect-
ing and diagnosing the direction leaders are heading in their
management of conflicts that can be drawn from their rhetorical
use of EOC or its alternatives. They provide a well-validated
observation because the data for the study was collected during the
same period and the same context. Thus the results are absolutely
comparable and the future developments only substantiated their
validity.
Theoretical and Applied Implications
Our findings hold theoretical significance for the fields of peace
psychology and leadership research. Previous research on over-
coming psychological barriers to conflict resolution has focused
mostly on the individual level of change among members of
society (e.g., Hameiri et al., 2014). The framework presented in
this research offers application of the ideas regarding unfreezing
and its role in promoting peacemaking to the level of leaders. It
emphasizes the role of unfreezing as expressed in public rhetoric
of leaders in serving as a proxy to peace-oriented policies. In
addition, it utilizes a comparative perspective on two real-world
leaders to examine this framework. More generally, our research
further consolidates the importance of examining different levels
of analysis to explain the complex process of peacemaking.
The research framework also contributes to the field of exam-
ining leaders at a distance. While past research has mostly focused
on the personality traits and motives (e.g., Hermann, 1980) or on
general belief system of leaders (e.g., George, 1969), our approach
suggests the importance of specific set of conflict-related societal
beliefs, that is, EOC, to understanding conflict-related policies. It
uniquely combines theoretical conceptions taken from the domain
of peace psychology regarding conflict and unfreezing with lead-
ers’ at a distance measures that can be later related to their political
behavior.
APA NLM
Limitations and Future Directions
In the current research, we used a mostly qualitative design
based on a sample of speeches spreading over three decades by
two leaders in an intractable conflict. While this design enabled us
to test our hypothesis in a real-world context and examine the
content of the speeches in a holistic manner, future research could
use quantitative methods. Computerized content analysis of
speeches that examines the relations between the level of use of
EOC and EOP in speeches and conflict-related policy by leaders in
larger number of cases would be enlightening.
Furthermore, in order to evaluate leaders’ level of unfreezing at
a distance we focused on the specific set of conflict-relations
societal beliefs of EOC that found to be highly correlated with
conflict-related policies (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Future re-
search could also profitably combine this evaluation with other at
a distance measures that were found to be related to leaders’
conflict-related policies, such as the operational code (e.g.,
Crichlow, 1998). Together, such measures could indicate possible
relations between general beliefs about the nature of politics,
specific beliefs about a conflict, and decision-making in that con-
flict.
Summary
Our findings hold significance in the realms of leadership and
peacemaking. Resolving intractable conflicts requires dedicated
and brave leaders who are willing to put tremendous efforts into
overcoming solid barriers and breaking the cycle of violence.
Since leaders set the policies of conflict resolution and help guide
their constituents toward transforming perceptions and attitudes,
understanding leaders’ positions on change can assist in evaluating
the prospects for peace in their environment. We are suggesting an
effective intercultural yardstick that assesses the political position
of a leader toward an intractable conflict. The level of adherence
to EOC or to EOP signals whether a leader bravely embarks on a
road toward peace or fixates on continuing the bloody conflict.
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