CASE FACTS
Security Bank v. CA Sps. Uy filed a case against Security Bank and Domingo Uy to
enjoin the Security Bank from proceeding with he extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage over a piece of proeprty in Quezon City.
They also sought to annulment the REM alleging that the SPA in
favor of Domingo Uy to mortgage the property for their benefit
and, and not for Jackivi. However, Domingo Uy exceeded his
authority
Domingo Uy filed an Omnibus Motion (Production of Documents
and Suspension and/or Extension of Time to File Answer to Cross-
Claim) on the ground that all documents, papers and instruments
made and executed by SBC on the evaluation, processing and
approval of the loans of Jackivi Trading Center, Inc., the real estate
mortgages (REM) and the Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
themselves must first be produced before he [could] prepare and
file the answer to SBC's cross-claim.It was denied.
Sps. Uy also filed their Motion (For Production, Inspection and
Copying of Documents) praying for the issuance of an order
directing SBC to produce and allow them to inspect and copy the
original and additional mortgage contracts executed by Jackivi
Trading Center, Inc. and/or Jose Tanyao. It was granted. CA
affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan Tantoco, Santiago, et.al are the defendants in a civil case filed by
the PCGG for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and
his cronies.
Tantoco and Santiago filed a MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME
PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF
PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS. It was followed by a
Motion for Leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules
of Court. They sought an answer to the question: "Who were the
Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon.
Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or
authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and
Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in thecase?"
The PCGG filed a motion to strike out said motion and
interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or
"procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is
improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise.
DOCTRINE
THE GRANT OF THE MOTION IS PROPER. Modes of
Discovery enable the parties to inform themselves, even
before the trial, of all the facts relevant to the action,
including those known only to the other litigants. Through
this procedure, "civil trials should not be carried on in the
dark."
Courts are given wide latitude in granting motions for
discovery in order to enable parties to prepare for trial or
otherwise to settle the controversy prior thereto.
The Court agrees with the CA that the documents would
enable DOMINGO UY to intelligently prepare his defenses
against the cross-claim of Security Bank. Meanwhile, the
documents were also necessary for the determination of the
issues raised in the case filed by Sps. Uy.
Litigation is essentially an abiding quest for truth undertaken
not by the judge alone, nut jointly with the parties. Litigants,
therefore, must welcome every opportunity to achieve goal;
they must act in good faith to reveal documents, papers and
other pieces of evidence material to the controversy. In
THE OBJECTION TO THE INTERROGATORIES AND
PRODUCTION DOCUMENTS CANNOT BE
SUSTAINED. Litigation is a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the
facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits.
It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court
the facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court
all the material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing
or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by
clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of
pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts
within his knowledge.
The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy
the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-
trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact
revelation theretofore performed primarily by the
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of
particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be
without legal and factual basis. Also denied was the PCGG's
motion to strike out impertinent pleading.
Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading
denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," as well as a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents.
The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and
granted the motion for production and inspection of documents.
Hence, this petition.
PCGG contends that the interrogatories in question are defective
because they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom
they are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b)
are "fundamentally the same matters . . . (private respondents)
sought to be clarified through their aborted Motion . . . for Bill of
Particulars; and (c0 lacks specifity.
pleadings.The various modes or instruments of discovery are
meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial
hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues
between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the
facts relative to those issues.
In line with the principle of according liberal treatment to
the deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of
discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or
written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to
parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under
Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and
generally, without court intervention.
It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after
jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property
subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to
avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at
that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts
are not clear.
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards
discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or
things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and
mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be
granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is
otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes
serious sanctions on the party who refuses to makes
discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or
part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the
disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or
agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel
discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in
accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery;
refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose
designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts
thereof; staying further proceedings.
limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a
manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject
to the inquiry. Further limitations come into existence when
the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon
the recognized domains of privilege.

ON INTERROGATORIES:
(1) If the party is a juridical entity, the same shall be
answered by any competent officer in its behalf. The same
applies for the PCGG.

(2) A bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-
called evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt proper
subject of discovery.

(3) The interrogatories are made to relate to individual

paragraphs of the PCGG’s expanded complaint and inquire
about details of the ultimate facts therein alleged. What the
PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the
interrogatories, on the ground of lack of relevancy, or
privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or
simply to embarass or oppress it.

FURTHER, the fact that the interrogatories deal with factual

matters which will be part of the PCGG’s proof upon trial, is
not ground for suppressing them.

XXX

ON PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS: There is nothing

secret or confidential about these documents. No serious
objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the
private respondents to have copies of those documents in
order to study them some more or otherwise use them during
the trial for any purpose allowed by law.

It is absed on good cause –some of the documents are the

basis of several material allegations of the complaint and
shall be used in evidence by the plaintiff, while ohers are
need in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim.
Eagleridge v. Cameron Granville Eagleridge et,.al filed a Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
Motion for Production. It claims that the motion was filed out of
time; the production of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement
violates parole evidence rule; and the Agreement is privileged and
confidential
THE AGREEMENT IS RELEVANT AND MATERIAL TO
THE ISSUE AND ALLOWING ITS PRODUCTION AND
INSPECTION IS INLINE WITH THE PURPOSE OF
DISCOVERY. The availment of a motion for production, as
one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial
stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within
which the discovery mode of production or inspection of
documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of
court "upon due application and a showing of due cause."
This court held that since the rules are silent asto the period
within which modes of discovery (in that case, written
interrogatories) may still be requested, it is necessary to
determine: (1) the purposeof discovery; (2) whether, based
on the stage of the proceedings and evidence presented thus
far, allowing it is proper and would facilitate the disposition
of the case; and (3) whether substantial rights of parties
would be unduly prejudiced. This court further held that
"[t]he use of discovery is encouraged, for it operates with
desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of the
trial court.
The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal
treatment." The evident purpose of discovery procedures is
"to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges,
to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before civil trials" and, thus, facilitating an amicable
settlement or expediting the trial of the case.
Furthermore, the parol evidence rule does not apply to
Eagleridge et.al who are not parties to the deed of
assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot
be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the
complete terms of the deed of assignment.
Even assuming that the parole evidence rule applies, this
case falls under one of the exceptions - when the party puts
in issue the validity of the written agreement.
The Agreement is not privileged. No law or regulation
considers bank documents such as the LSPA as classified
information.The Special Purpose Vehicle Act does not
explicitly declare these financial documents as privileged
matters.
Go v. PP Go et.al were accused of defrauding Li Luen Ping punsiahble as
Other Deceits under Art. 318.
The complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman
from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the
Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9,
2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his
unavailability.
The private prosecuto filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li
alleging that the latter was being treated for lung infection at the
Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon
doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines
by reason of ill health. It was granted.
The RTC reversed the order because the Rules on Modes of
Discovery does not suppletorily apply in criminal cases. CA
reversed.
Landbank v. Onate Onate opened and maintained 7 trust accounts with Land Bank.
Each trust account was covered by an Investment Mnagament
Account with Fill Discretion, which authorized Land Bank to
invest the fund at the latter’s sole discretion.
Land Bank demanded from Onate the return of P4M that it claims
to have inadvertently deposited to one of the trust accounts as his
additional funds, but wasa ctually the amount of the checks issued
to Land Bank by its corporate borrowers as payment for pre-
terminated loans. However, Onate refused.
Land Bank applied the outstanding balance in all of Onate’s trust
account against his resulting indebtedness, however, Land Bankw
as only able to recopu P1.5M.
IN CRIMINAL CASES, TESTIMONIAL EXAMINATION
SHOULD BE MADE IN COURT, OR AT LEAST
BEFORE A JUDGE.
The Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public
trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The
requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness'
credibility through his manner and deportment while
testifying.
Based on Sec. 15, Rule 119, the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness must take place at no other place than
the court where the case is pending.
To take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere
and not before the very same court where the case is pending
would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment
and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the
prosecution's case against the accused.
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to
apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a
twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to
test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2)
to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.
For entries made in the course of business to qualify under
the exception to the hearsay rule and given weight, the party
offering them must establish that: (1) the person who made
those entries is dead, outside the country, or unable to
testify; (2) the entries were made at, or near the time of the
transaction to which they refer; (3) the entrant was in a
position to know the facts stated therein; (4) the entries were
made in the professional capacity or in the course of duty of
the entrant; and, (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
In this case, Land bank failed to identify the persons who
made the entries in the passbooks nor established that they
are already dead or unable to testify.
 Landbank filed a complaint for collection of sum of money. Onate
answered claiming that the setoff had no legal or factul bases.
Upon motion, a Board of Comissioners was created to examine the
records of the 7 trust accounts. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in
favor of Onate. Hence, this petition.
Land Bank argues that the entries in the passbooks were made in
the regular course of business and should be accepted as prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Labote v. Pagsanjan PH Tourism Authority (PTA) administers tourism zones, such as
the PTA Complex in Pagsanjan, Laguna.
PTA helped the Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative
(PTCC) by allowing the latter to operate a restaurant on the
Complex and the boat rise servcies to guests, paying a certain
percentaige of its earning to the PTA.
PTA was reorganized and Laborte was designated as the Area
Manager for CALABARZON. He served a notice to PTCC to
cease its operations in the PTA Complex because it will undergo
rehabilitation.
PTCC filed a complaint for Injunction. A TRO was issued by the
RTC. The PTA opposed. PTCC filed a Petition for Contempt with
Motion for Early Resolution. It alleged that Laborte and his
Furthermore, while the deposit entries in the bank’s
passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption of
regularity, the same do "not indicate or explain the source of
the funds being deposited or withdrawn from an individual
account. They are mere prima facie proof of what are stated
therein – the dates of the transactions, the amounts deposited
or withdrawn, and the outstanding balances. They do not
establish that the total amount deposited or withdrawn, and
the outstanding balances. They do not establish whether the
amount deposited came from the proceeds of the pre-
terminated loans of Land Bank’s corporate borrowers.
As a bank and custodian of records, Land Bank could have
easily produced documents showing that its borrowers pre-
terminated their loans, the checks they issued as payment for
such loans, and the deposit slips used in depositing those
checks. But it did not.
Also, Land Bank failed in its contractual duties to maintain
accurate records of all investments and to regularly furnish
Oñate with financial statements relating to his accounts. It
laso agreed to submit the case on the bases of the report of
the Board of Commissioners, hence, the latter’s findings are
binding on Land Bank.
THE COURT MUST RELAX THE APPLICATION OF
THE RULES. The court considers the evidence only when it
is formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the trial court to base its findings of
fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence
offered by the parties. A piece of document will remain a
scrap of paper without probative value unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which it is offered. The formal offer of
evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the
presentation of an evidence which may not be admissible for
the purpose it is being offered.
However, there are instances when the court may relax the
foregoing rule. For evidence to be considered despite failure
to formally offer it, the following must concur:
 lawyers defied the TRO and proceeded to close the restaurant and
prohibited its boatmen from operating.
The RTC ruled in favor of PTCC. CA affirmed. Laborte claims that
Atty. Cabrera, their former counsel, failed to file their formal offer
of evidence and to make a manifestation that they were adopting in
the trial proper the evidence they presented during the hearing on
the application for the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Such
amounts to gross and inexcusable negligence, and should not
prejudice them.
Gumabon v. PNB Gumabon filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against
PNB and its manager, Fernandez because of PNB’s refusal to
release Gumabon’s money in a consolidated savings account and in
two foreign exchange time deposits, evidenced by Foreign
Exchange Certificates of Time Deposit (FXCTD).
Gumabon, her mother, and her two siblings deposited with PNB
$27k+. They also maintained 8 savings accounts in the same bank.
Gumabon decided to consolodate all savings accounts and to
withdraw P2M.
Gumabon presentedher FXCTDs but failed to withdraw because
the bank had to verify and ivestigate before allowing the same.
After a month, the savings accounts were consolidated and a
passbook was issued therefor.
PNB informed Gumabon that it refused to honor its oblgiations
under the FXCTDs and that PNB withheld the released of the
remaining balance in the savings account because Gumabon pre-
terminated, withdrew, and/or debited sums against her deposits.
The RTC ruled in favor of Gumabon. The CA reversed. Hence, this
petition.
(1) The same must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded; and
(2) The same must have been incorporated in the records of
the case.
In this case, the records show that petitioner were able to
present evidence that have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded.
There were also several pieces of evidence that were not
objected to by PTCC.
GUMABON IS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT. The CA
considered pieces of evidence which are inadmissible under
the Rules of Court.
PNB failed toe stbalish the fact of payment ot Gumabon.It is
a settled rule in evidence that the one who alleges payment
has the burden of proving it.
For the payment of the balance of the saving account, PNB
presentedthe manager's check to prove that Gumabon
purchased the check using the amounts covered by the
Gumabon's two savings accounts which were later part of
Gumabon's consolidated savings account. The PNB also
presented the miscellaneous ticket to prove Gumabon's
withdrawal from the savings accounts.
The RTC denied the admission of the manager's check and
the miscellaneous ticket since the original copies were never
presented. Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with
two qualifications: (a) relevance and (b) competence.
Evidence is relevant if it has a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce a belief in its existence or nonexistence. On the
other hand, evidence is competent if it is not excluded by the
law or by the Rules of Court.
One of the grounds under the Rules of Court that determines
the competence of evidence is the best evidence rule.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the
original copy of the document must be presented whenever
the content of the document is under inquiry. However, there
are certain exceptions:
(a) when the original has been lost, or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;

(b) when the original is in the custody or under the control

of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other

documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and cralawlawlibrary

(d) when the original is a public record in the custody of a

public officer or is recorded in a public office.

In this case, PNB failed to prove that the exceptions apply.

The PNB's failure to give a justifiable reason for the absence
of the original documents and to maintain a record of
Gumabon's transactions only shows the PNB's dismal failure
to fulfill its fiduciary duty to Gumabon.

ON PAYMENT OF FXCTD: PNB presented a foreign

demand draft which Gumabon allegedly purchased with the
funds of such FXCTD. A SOA wasl also presented to show
that there was a fund transfer involving the contested
amount. To further support its claim, the PNB annexed the
affidavit of the PNB New York's branch officer about the
fund transfer. The PNB, however, failed to formally offer
the affidavit as evidence.

The SOA is inadmisble because it fails to qualify as relevant

evidence. It does not show which of the amount stated
therein came from the funds of the FXCTD.

The affidavit is inadmissible because it was not formally

offered.

Courts are mandated to rest their factual findings and their

judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. The formal offer enables the judge to
know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. It also affords the opposing parties

Raymundo v. Lunaria Raymundo et.al approached Lunaria to help them find a buyer for
their property in Marilao, Bulacan. Lunaria was promised a 5%
commission if he finds a buyer.
Lunaria found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito. A deed of sale was
executed and registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Raymundo advised Lunaria to go to the bank to receive the partial
payment for their commission and to return after 7 days to get the
remaining balance.
After 7 days, Lunaria returend. He found out that the check
covering the balance of their commission was given to LOURDES,
one of the co-owners. Lunaria tried to retrieve the check but
LOURDES refused.
Hence, an action for collection of sum of money was filed. The
RTC ruled in favor of Lunaria. CA affirmed.
LORUDES claims that there was subsequent verbal agreement
entered into by the parties after the execution of the written
agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agent’s
commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for
Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share
given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in consideration for the help
she would extend in t he processing of documents of sale of the
property, the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and in securing an order from the court. The 1/5
the chance to examine the evidence and to object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate
court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court. Unless the
excpetion applies – where the following must concur: a) the
evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and (b) the evidence must have been incorporated
in the records of the case.
In this case, the afidavit was not includd in the formal offer
of evidence. Although the affidavit was included in the
records and identified by Fernandez, it remains inadmissible
for being hearsay. Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is
merely hearsay evidence when its affiant or maker did not
take the witness stand.
THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT APPLY –
(1) parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, "at or
before" the execution of the parties’ written agreement, other
or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract. In this case, the claimed
verbal agreement was agreed upon not prior to but
"subsequent to" the written agreement; (2) the validity of the
written agreement is not the matter which is being put in
issue here.
Assuming that the parole evidence rule applies, the evidence
presented feel short in providng the subsequent verbal
agreement. No written evidence was hown to show that there
was an agreement on the sharing of the commission. They
merely presented LOURDES RAYMUNDO who testified
that she was given 2/5 share of the commission pursuant to
the verbal sharing scheme because she took care of the
payment of the capital gains tax, the preparation of the
documents of sale and of securing an authority from the
court to sell the property.
By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence as
a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.
It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence". It is evidence
 commission given to Hipolito, on the other hand, will be used by
him for the payment of realty taxes.
Lordes claims that the same is not covered by the parol evidence
rule.
PEOPLE V. CODARES Elsa filed a case for rape against her father, Nestor. She testified
(cringing decision) that she had been repeatedly raped by Nestor since she was 8 years
old, the latest molestation being committed when she was already
16yo. She did not tell her mother about the rape.
However, she was prompted by her conscience and her fear that her
sisters might suffer the same fate in the hands of their father so she
revealed her ordeal to her two grandmothers. Upon examination it
was discovered that Elsa has healed lacerated hymen .
Nestor was the lone witness for the defense and he denied the
accusation of rape. He testified that since the birth of Elsa, she
stayed with her maternal grandmother, Leonora. According to him,
Elsa only went to live with her parents for a year, in 1992. Elsa
only return to her parents’ house on November 17, 1996. The trial
court convicted Nestor of rape and imposed death penalty.
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
NESTOR is not GUILTY OF RAPE.
In rape committed through force or intimidation, the
prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was
actually employed by Nestor upon his victim to achieve his
end. Failure to do so is fatal to prosecution’s cause. In this
case, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of
sufficient force or intimidation that would have created a
state of fear in the mind of Elsa.The rule on moral
ascendancy does not apply in this case, Nestor could have
hardly wielded any moral ascendancy or parental influence
over Elsa as evidence by the unrefuted testimony of Nestor
that since her birth, Elsa lived with her grandmother and
stayed in the house of her parents for only one year in 1992,
when she was only 12 years old.
Nestor does not deny having sexual intercourse with Elsa.
He claims that she consented to the sexual act. The
prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that Elsa
resisted the sexual advances of Nestor when she was
allegedly raped. There was no evidence of Nestor’s use of
force or threat in having sex with her.
In a criminal case, every circumstance or evidence favoring
a man’s innocence must be taken into account. If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or

PEOPLE V. LORENZO A tricycle driver reported to SPO1 Eclipse a stabbing incident.
While going to the crime scene, he met PO1 Dolores who
surrendered a blood-stained bolo and knife, and told him “I killed
my husband”. SPO1 Eclipse called for Bgy. Capt. Liban to come
out of his house since bloodied PO1 Dolores’ husband is on the
ground in front of the Bgy. Capt.’s store. PO1 Dolores again in the
hearing of the Bgy. Capt, said, “I’m surrendering because I killed
my husband” PO1 Dolores was charged with parricide.
PO1 Dolores (1) alleges that it was their neighbor Robert who
killed Agapito and (2) emphasizes the inconsistency SPO1
Eclipse’s testimony as to what she actually told him, i.e., that she
“injured” her husband or “killed” him; claiming that Bgy. Capt.
Liban’s testimony must corroborate Eclipse’s testimony or the
confession of PO1 Dolores since without such corroboration,
Eclipse’s testimony would have no probative value.
more interpretations, one of which is consistent with
innocence and the other with guilty, then the evidence does
not pass the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. Thus, the presumption of innocence
founded on the basic principle of justice as embodied in the
Constitution prevails in the present case.Where the
prosecution has failed to discharge the onus probandi for a
pronouncement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused will result in acquittal.
The theory of DOLORES is a product of a misunderstanding
of Sec 3, R133, RoC: SEC. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not
sufficient ground for conviction.—Anextrajudicial
confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient
ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence
of corpus delicti.”
What must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession
and NOT the testimony of the person to whom the
confession is made, and the corroborative evidence required
is not the testimony of another person who heard the
confession but the evidence of corpus delicti.
 Except when expressly required by law, the testimony of a
single person, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the
court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
is sufficient to convict. In determining the value and
credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered.
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti,  PO1
Dolores herself does not question its presence because she
knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in this
case. 
Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a
crime has been committed.
It is made up of 2 elements; that:
(a) a certain result has been proved (e.g. a man has died/
building burned), and
(b) some person is criminally responsible for the act.

PEOPLE V. BASE Base and a group of men aboard a jeep arrived at the residence of
Julianito. Juanito was suddenly shot by the men and then they sped
away. A team of PC and Police elements was immediately
dispatched to track down the assassins of Julianito Luna and in due
time the motor vehicle of the assassins was recovered in the
premises of the house of Mrs. Quizon parked but without the
assassins. The motor vehicle was brought to the camp, but the
police stayed at the house of Quizo. When Base came back for the
vehicle, he was arrested.
While in the camp, Elberto Base executed a written Sworn
Statement with the assistance and presence of Atty. Reyes, who
testified in court, to the effect that he assisted the accused in the
execution of his statement.The statement of Elberto Base shows
that he was well aware of the intended plot to kill Julianito, by
admitting that a week before the killing he was with the assassins
surveying the residence of Julianito.He also admitted to be with
accused Lazaro and Patrocinio when the jeep in question was
borrowed by the two and was with accused Lazaro and Patrocinio
when they left Pasay City in proceeding to Batangas that day when
Julianito was shot.Accused Base also admitted that he was left on a
shed in Ibaan, Batangas when Frederick Lazaro and Patrocinio
returned to Rosario and when they came back, he was fetched and
was with them in going to Batangas in the house of Vale and later
on in Lipa City where they left the jeep in the premises of the
house of Quizon. And finally Base admitted in his statement that he
was told to recover the jeep. However, these statements were
subsequently denied by Base, alleging that he was tortured when he
executed the abovementioned statement.
ZABALA V. PEOPLE Alas and Zabala were neighbors. Alas would call Zabala to repair
Sec 3, R133, RoC does not mean that every element of the
crime charged must be clearly established by independent
evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that
there should be some evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession.
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by the
accused is sufficient ground for conviction –YES
When, as in this case, an extrajudicial statement satisfies the
requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a
high order because of the strong presumption that no person
of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to
a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. The
defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by
means of force, duress, promise or reward."
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that
“an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall
not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti."
In this case the prosecution presented other evidence to
prove the two elements of corpus delicti, to wit: a.] a certain
result has been proven, i.e. a man has died; and 2.] some
person is criminally responsible. In this case, it is indubitable
that a crime has been committed and that the other pieces of
prosecution evidence clearly show that accused-appellant
had conspired with the other accused to commit the crime. In
fact, he was seen by the prosecution witnesses in the
company of his other co-accused.
Furthermore, Atty. Reyes and the interrogator, Sgt.
Mercado, testified to the voluntariness of his confession. In
this regard, it must be stressed that the aforementioned rule
merely requires that there should be some other evidence
"tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the
confession.
All told, an overall scrutiny of the records of this case leads
us to no other conclusion but the correctness of the trial
court in holding that the accused-appellant and his co-
accused committed murder.
Whether or not the circumstancial evidence in the case
his vehicle and allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get
cash whenever spare parts are to be bought. When he returned from
work, he discovered that his money, P68,000, which he kept in an
envelope inside his closet, was missing.  circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial
During that time, there were 5 persons living in their house: Alas,
his parents, his son, and his aunt. Piñon (Zabala’s alleged
girlfriend) testified that she saw him climb the fence and enter the
house of Alas. When he returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in
his pocket. The next day, Zabala bought two Nokia mobile phones.
Zabala testified that on that day he was with his conductor plying
the route of his driven jeepney. They did not drop by the house of
Alas. Neither did he meet Piñon. Zabala was then charged with
theft.
The evidence of the prosecution purports to establish the following
narrative: (1) that Alas hides P68,000 in cash in his closet inside
their house; (2) that Zabala is aware that Alas hides money in his
bedroom closet; (3) that on the night of the incident, Zabala was
with his then girlfriend, Piñon; (4) that Zabala climbed through the
fence of Alas’s house and successfully gained entrance to his
house; (5) that Zabala later went out of the house with a bulge in
his pockets; and (6) that day, Zabala and Piñon went shopping for a
cellphone. The trial court held that these series of circumstances are
sufficient to support a conviction
warrants the conviction of Zabala for theft.-NO
Lozano v. People: To sustain a conviction based on
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as
the guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude
the possibility that some other person has committed the
crime.
The prosecution failed to establish, by
circumstantialevidence, that petitioner is guilty of theft.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this Court finds that the
prosecution failed to present sufficient circumstantial
evidence to convict the Zabala of the offense charged. We
find that the pieces of evidence presented before the trial
court fail to provide a sufficient combination of
circumstances, as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The foregoing narration––based on the testimonies of the
two witnesses of the prosecution, even if given full faith and
credit and considered as established facts––fails to establish
that Zabala committed the crime of theft. If at all, it may
possibly constitute evidence that petitioner committed an
offense, but not necessarily theft.
In the case before the Court, the evidence presented by the
prosecution fails to establish the corpus delicti of theft.
First, nobody saw Zabala enter the room of Alas. The
members of the family who were said to be in the house
were not put on the witness stand. Second, the evidence
presented is insufficient to determine without a reasonable
doubt that the cash was lost due to felonious taking and that
Zabala committed the felonious act. Third, Pinon’s
testimony fails to establish that the pocket of Alas indeed
contained the stolen money. Forth, the rule in circumstantial
evidence is that evidence must exclude the possibility that
some other person committed the crime. In the case here, the
prosecution failed to prove that it was impossible for some
other person to have committed the crime.
GUEVARRA V. PEOPLE
HKSAR V. HON. OLALIA AND JUAN
ANTONIO MUNOZ
Rodolfo and his son Joey Guevarra were charged for frustrated
homicide of Erwin Ordoñez and homicide of David Ordoñez.
The Guevarras pleaded not guilty and alleged that these were acts
of self-defense. They claim that Erwin, David, and Philip threw
stones at the house of the Guevarras. They broke the gate and
entered the compound. Rodolfo talked to them, but he gets struck
on the hand by David. Rodolfo then goes to their silung and there,
he gets the bolo and stabs Erwin and David out of self-defense.
Erwin testified that they were just walking when he heard that
David was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. He was also attacked
by Rodolfo and was dragged inside
The lower courts gave great weight to the the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on Erwin (13 stab wounds on his arm and back)
and on David (10 stab wounds on his back and stomach) show that
there was no self-defense. These show that the assault was no
longer an act of self-defense.
Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)
counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent”. He also
faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hong Kong.
Whether or not Rodolfo and Joey are really guilty of the
crimes? –YES
The petitioners’ intent to kill was clearly established by the
nature and number of wounds sustained by their victims.
Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons
may consist, among other things, of the means used by the
malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and
the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim.
The ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which
eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab
wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution’s theory
that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David
and Erwin. In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre–trial
that “the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordoñez
would have caused his death were it not for immediate
medical attendance.”
By invoking self–defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted
to the commission of the acts for which they were charged,
albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof
shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and
frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were
attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the persons resorting to self–defense.Of all the burdens
the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the
element of unlawful aggression. These circumstances
established by the prosecution that Erwin and David were
merely passing by, coupled with the nature and number of
wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the
petitioners did not act in self–defense in killing David and
wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real
aggressors.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Olalia erred in admitting Munoz to
Bail? –NO
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of
Warrants of arrest were issued against him.DOJ received from the
Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to
NBI which, in turn, filed with the RTC an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent, which was granted.
Munoz was arrested Munoz filed with CA a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest. CA declared the Order of Arrest
Void. DOJ filed with SC a petition for review on certiorari praying
that the Decision of the CA be reversed. SC granted the petition of
the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against
private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on
April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, HKSAR filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of Munoz. Munoz
filed a petition for bail which was denied, on that basis that there
is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private respondent is a high "flight risk."
The case was raffled to Judge Olalia. Munoz filed MR and was
granted. Munoz was allowed to post bail. HKSAR filed  filed an
urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but was denied. HKSAR
now filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases.
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a
new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court
to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail
on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."