Court Supreme Court En Banc

Citation GR No. 104639

Date July 14, 1995
Petitioner Province of Camarines Sur through its Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
Provincial Treasurer
Respondents Court of Appeals and Tito Dato
Ponente Kapunan, J.
Relevant Qualification in an appropriate examination
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 On January 1, 1960, private respondent Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then
governor of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.
 On October 12, 1972, he was promoted and was appointed Assistant Provincial warden by then
Governor Felix Alfelor, Sr. Because he had no civil service eligibility for the position he was
appointed to, private respondent Tito Dato could not be legally extended a permanent
appointment. Hence, what was extended to him was only a temporary appointment. Thereafter,
the temporary appointment was renewed annually.
 On January 1, 1974, Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from
temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service
examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not favorably
acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito Dato did not possess the
necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His appointment therefore
remained temporary.
 Thereafter, no other appointment was extended to him.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN private respondent was a permanent employee of petitioner province of Camarines Sur YES
at the time he was suspended

 Private respondent does not dispute the fact that at the time he was appointed Assistant
Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for
the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment
temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of
the appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is
of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did notipso facto
convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. (Tolentino v. De Jesus , 56 SCRA 167
[1974]; Jimenez v. Francisco, 100 Phil. 1025 [1957]). In cases such as the one at bench, what is
required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the
temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority

 In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986] the Court ruled that CSC has the
power toapprove or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make
the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an
employee. The CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if
it finds the person qualified it must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The
duty of the CSC is to attest appointments. (Villanueva v. Balallo, 9 SCRA 407 [1963]) and after
that function is discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases. (Villegas v.
Subido, 30 SCRA 498 [1969]). In the case at bench, CSC should have ended its participation in
the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status
 of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the communication on
March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the
discretion vested solely upon the latter.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and the petition
for mandamusinstituted by herein private respondent Tito Dato is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 78239
Date February 9, 1989
Petitioner Salvacion A Monsanto
Respondents Fulgencio S Factoran, Jr.
Ponente Fernan, C.J.
Relevant topic General disqualifications
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further
ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing
the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately. 
 Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended
on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on
December 21, 1984.
 By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
 Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of
the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal
in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as
assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. In other words,
without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach
and the status of her employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when pardon was
issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak
of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly
dismissed the same.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is YES
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment

 Notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full

agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted
felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction  although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. 

 The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection,
safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests.
To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to
be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction. 
  For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from
public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed.
Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of
her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the
pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer,
she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 

Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. 

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 83896
Date February 22, 1991
Petitioner Civil Liberties Union
Respondent The Executive Secretary
Ponente Fernan, C.J.
Relevant topic Prohibition on holding more than one office
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by
Pres. Cory Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the order are as follows:

o Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of
the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
o Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed
in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than
two positions other than his primary position.
o Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or
controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN Executive Order No. 184 is unconstitutional YES

 the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held
without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by
virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-
officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." 27 An ex-
officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment.28 To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary
of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officioChairman of the Board of the Philippine
Ports Authority,29 and the Light Rail Transit Authority

 In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more
than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
 mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

 The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will result from a strict
application of the prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the
Government, considering that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices held in an  ex-
officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified
in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional
compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall
under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.
With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships
or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it
to say that the feared impractical consequences are more apparent than real.

 Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring
full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived
from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and
responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental offices or employment. He should be
precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be
derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of
our national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained
from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle

RULING:

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order
No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento and Griño-Aquino, JJ., took no part.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 184740
Date February 11, 2010
Petitioner Dennis Funa
Respondents Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Office of the President, Sec. Leandro Mendoza in his
official capacity as Sec. Of DOTC, Usec. Maria Elena Bautista, in her official capacities as
Usec of DOTC and as OIC of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA)
Ponente Villarama, J.
Relevant Prohibition on holding more than one office
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:

On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice
Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the
department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006. 1

On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.2

On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed
the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.

On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the
MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.3 and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on
February 2, 2009.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN Respondent Bautista’s designation as Usec of DOTC and OIC of Marina is YES
unconstitutional

 Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered
by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the
exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed
by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an
ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union. 
 The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. 30 Apart from their bare
assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of
MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an
 ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport.
 Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in
the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme
Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.

 The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members
of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the
times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the
Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision,
and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos
regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the
governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or
positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of
this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one
of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and
in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional
Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which
were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
governmental offices and employment.38 Our declaration in that case cannot be more explicit:
 But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see
it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as
Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with
her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc RESOLUTION
Citation GR No. 175352
Date January 18, 2011
Petitioner Dante Liban, Reynaldo Bernardo, Salvador Viari
Respondents Richard Gordon, Philippine National Red Cross
Ponente Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Relevant topic Prohibition on holding more than one office
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by
respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15,
2009 (the Decision), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-
intervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latter’s Manifestation and Motion to
Admit Attached Position Paper filed on December 23, 2009.

 In the Decision, the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he
accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as "the office of the PNRC
Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution." The Decision,
however, further declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation
Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation."

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN chairmanship of the Philippine National Red Cross falls within the prohibition of holding NO
more than one office

 A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of
structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State
and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui
generis.

 A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected component of the Red
Cross movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First Geneva Convention, especially in times of
armed conflict. These provisions require that the staff of a National Society shall be respected
and protected in all circumstances. Such protection is not ordinarily afforded by an international
treaty to ordinary private entities or even non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This sui
generis character is also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva Convention which holds that an
Occupying Power cannot require any change in the personnel or structure of a National
Society. National societies are therefore organizations that are directly regulated by
international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities, including
NGOs

 The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a
private institution and a public service organization because the very nature of its work
implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State. In carrying out their major
functions, Red Cross Societies give their humanitarian support to official bodies, in general
having larger resources than the Societies, working towards comparable ends in a given sector.
  In the Decision, the Court, citing Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, 19 explained that the purpose
of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations was to
prevent the granting of special privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups, which were
denied to other groups. Based on the above discussion, it can be seen that the PNRC Charter
does not come within the spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not grant special
privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the
common good.

 So must this Court recognize too the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and
respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations

 In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in
the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court
cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that
the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to
provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic
manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the
international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must
therefore stay

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J. Gordon’s Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration and movant-intervenor PNRC’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in
G.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95, as amended,
the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not
have been passed upon by this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis¸ being neither strictly
private nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive
portion of the Decision should therefore be MODIFIED by deleting the second sentence, to now read as
follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 203372, G.R. No. 206290, G.R. No. 209138, G.R. No. 121030
Date June 16, 2015
Petitioner Atty. Cheloy Velicaria-Garfil; Atty. Dindo Venturanza; Irma Villanueva and Francisca
Rosquita; and Eddie Tamondong, respectively
Respondents Office of the Pres. And Hon. SolGen Cadiz; Office of the Pres., Leila de Lima in her
capacity as Sec. Of the DOJ, Claro Arellano, in his capacity as Prosecutor General, and
Richard Anthony Fadullon, in his capacity as the OIC of the Office of the Prosecutor of
Quezon City; CA and the Office of the Pres.; and Exec. Sec. Paquito Ochoa, Jr.,
respectively
Ponente Carpio, J.
Relevant Acceptance of appointment
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:

Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government
offices.

The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and
the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President
of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing,
and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban
on midnight appointments.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the midnight appointments of petitioners are void for violation of Section 15, Article VII of YES
the 1987 Constitution.

 Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that takes

several steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception
provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President signing
an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the appointment
paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee, and
acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or
her assumption to office.
  The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be
understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of
the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment
paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the
appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as
a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. 

 Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath
amount to acceptance of the appointment.60 An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a
public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.

 Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very evil which we
seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of acceptance will only provide
more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision in the breach. The inclusion of acceptance
by the appointee as an integral part of the entire appointment process prevents the abuse of the
Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively easy to antedate appointment papers and make it
appear that they were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to simulate the
entire appointment process up until acceptance by the appointee.

 Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They
cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the
appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of
office during the appointment ban

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, and 212030 are DENIED, and the petition in
G.R. No. 209138 is DISMISSED. The appointments of petitioners Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (G.R.
No. 203372), Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (G.R. No. 206290), Irma A. Villanueva, and Francisca B.
Rosquita (G.R. No. 209138), and Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (G.R. No. 212030) are declared VOID. We
DECLARE that Executive Order No. 2 dated 30 July 2010 is VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR Nos. 191002, 191032, 191057, 191449, 191342, 191420, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
Date April 20, 2010
Petitioner Arturo de Castro; Jaime Soriano; PHILCONSA, John G. Peralta, Atty. Amador Tolentino
and Atty. Roland Inting, Philippine Bar Association
Respondents Judicial Bar Council (JBC) and PGMA
Ponente Abad, J.
Relevant Restrictions on the power to appoint
topic
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Appointment of the chief justice of the SC just as PGMA was outgoing
 Various parties questioned the legality/validity of the appointment/designation of a chief justice by
the outgoing president.

 Section 15 of Article VII provides:

 Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
o Section 4(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.


ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments in the judiciary NO

 Valenzuela should be read and appreciated for what it is a ruling made on the basis of the Courts
supervision over judicial personnel that upholds the election ban as against the appointment of
lower court judges appointed pursuant to the period provided by Section 9 of Article VIII

 The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their
avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction. 

 For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express
extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary
under the principle of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.

 Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9,
both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the
period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot
supply the omission, for doing so would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of
the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are,
given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in
them.9Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to express
the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the
thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible,
 either with or without the omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary
source of the legislative intent is in the language of the law itself.

 Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. 

RULING:

It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because
all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are
now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.

The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair. 

The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any
claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the
present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None
of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed
the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their
retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up
the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official
duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC
Date November 9, 1998
Petitioner
Respondents
Ponente Narvasa, J.
Relevant topic Restrictions on the power to appoint
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:

The Relevant Constitutional Provisions

The provision of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as follows: iii

Section 15, Article VII:

“Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to execute positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.”

Section 4 (1), Article VIII:

“The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.”

Section 9, Article VIII:

“The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of
the list.“

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec.15, Article VII of the YES
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
WoN he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of
public service

 The Court’s view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
—”(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term”—the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so;
and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of
 Article VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every
six years.

 Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1)
those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to
those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar
to those which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:

 As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions
which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so
long as they are “few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,” x can be made
by the outgoing President. 

RULING:

The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the
Chief Justice on May 14, 1998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Consequently,
they come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be
for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the
making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there
is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the appointments signed
by His Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively, and to order them, forthwith on being served  with notice of this decision,
to forthwith CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to which they were
respectively appointed on March 30, 1998. This, without prejudice to their being considered anew by the
Judicial and Bar Council for re-nomination to the same positions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 110598
Date December 1, 1994
Petitioner Mona Tomali
Respondents CSC, Office on Muslim Affairs, and Rocaina Lucma
Ponente Vitug, J.
Relevant topic Revocation of appointment where apppointee has assumed office
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 On 01 July 1990, petitioner Mona A. Tomali was appointed Development Management Officer II
("DMO II") in the Office on Muslim Affairs ("OMA"). The appointment was extended by then OMA
Executive Director Dimasangcay A. Pundato. She assumed the duties and functions of the office
four months later, or on 01 November 1990, at which time, the appointment had not yet been
transmitted to the Civil Service Commission ("CSC") for approval.
 Prior to her assumption to the new position, petitioner had worked in different capacities with the
Mindanao State University starting as Records Clerk (01 June 1983 to 31 December 1986), Clerk
Typist (02 January 1987 to 30 June 1989), and, finally, as "Budget Assistant" (01 July 1989 to 31
October 1990).1
 On 16 July 1991, the new Director of the OMA, Dr. Ali Basir Lucman, revoking the previous
incomplete appointment of petitioner, appointed private respondent Rocaina M. Lucman to the
position in question (DMO II). Petitioner, on 29 July 1991, sent public respondent OMA a letter
protesting her replacement. On 01 August 1991, the Chief of the Human Resources Management
Division of the OMA communicated to petitioner the disapproval/expiration of her
appointment.2 Forthwith, private respondent took her oath of office and assumed the duties and
functions of DMO II.

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the OMA Executive Director may, in the exercise of sound discretion, cancel or revoke YES
the said incomplete appointment and appoint another person

 An appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for
approval in order to determine, in main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold
the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are
followed

 Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is
essential in order to make it fully effective.  Without the favorable certification or approval of
8

the Commission, in cases when such approval is required, no title to the office can yet be
deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be
recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority.   Until an appointment has become a
9

completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure.

 Petitioner faults public respondents for their failure to have her appointment properly
attended to and timely acted upon and for, in effect, allowing her in the meanwhile to assume
the office in question. In Favis vs. Rupisan,   this Court has said:
11

o The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-
observance of the pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal
requirement, on the necessity of approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service of
 appointments, ineffective and unenforceable. The employee, whose appointment
was not approved, may only be considered as a de facto officer.
 Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She assumed the position four
months after her appointment was issued or months after that appointment had already
lapsed or had become ineffective by operation of law. Petitioner's appointment was issued
on 01 July 1990, but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was submitted to the CSC, a fact
which she knew, should have known or should have at least verified considering the
relatively long interval of time between the date of her appointment and the date of her
assumption to office. The CSC, such as to be expected, disapproved the appointment   in 12

consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807

 The rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a discretionary act, performed by an
officer in whom it is vested according to his best judgment, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess all the qualifications required therefor. 14 There is nothing on record to
convince us that the new OMA Director has unjustly favored private respondent nor has
exercised his power of appointment in an arbitrary, whimsical or despotic manner.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari  is DISMISSED. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A
 Court Supreme Court En Banc
Citation GR No. 176707
Date February 17, 2010
Petitioner Arlin Obiasca
Respondents Jeane Basallote
Ponente Corona, J.
Relevant topic Revocation of appointment where appointee has assumed office
Prepared by Allen Cledera

FACTS:
 Before the Court is a petition forcertiorari

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO:

ISSUE  HELD
WoN the delibarate failure of the appointing authority (or other responsible officials) to submnit NO
respondent’s appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance made her
appointment ineffective and incomplete

 Under the facts obtaining in this case, respondent promptly assumed her duties as Administrative
Officer II when her appointment was issued by the appointing authority. Thus, her appointment
took effect immediately and remained effective until disapproved by the CSC.34 Respondent’s
appointment was never disapproved by the CSC. In fact, the CSC was deprived of the
opportunity to act promptly as it was wrongly prevented from doing so. More importantly, the CSC
subsequently approved respondent’s appointment and recalled that of petitioner, which recall has
already become final and immutable.
 In appointing petitioner, the appointing authority effectively revoked the previous
appointment of respondent and usurped the power of the CSC to withdraw or revoke an
appointment that had already been accepted by the appointee. It is the CSC, not the
appointing authority, which has this power.50 This is clearly provided in Section 9, Rule V of
the Omnibus Rules:
o Section 9. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or
revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and effect until
disapproved by the [CSC]. xxxx (Emphasis supplied)

 Thus, the Court ruled in De Rama v. Court of Appeals51 that it is the CSC which is authorized
to recall an appointment initially approved when such appointment and approval are proven
to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations.
 Petitioner seeks to inflexibly impose the condition of submission of the appointment to the
CSC by the appointing authority within 30 days from issuance, that is, regardless of the
negligence/diligence of the appointee and the bad faith/good faith of the appointing authority
to ensure compliance with the condition. However, such stance would place the
appointee at the mercy and whim of the appointing authority even after a valid
appointment has been made. For although the appointing authority may not recall an
appointment accepted by the appointee, he or she can still achieve the same result through
underhanded machinations that impedes or prevents the transmittal of the appointment to
the CSC. In other words, the insistence on a strict application of the condition regarding the
submission of the appointment to the CSC within 30 days, would give the appointing
authority the power to do indirectly what he or she cannot do directly. An administrative rule
that is of doubtful basis will not only produce unjust consequences but also corrupt the
 appointment process. Obviously, such undesirable end result could not have been the
intention of the law.
 The power to revoke an earlier appointment through the appointment of another may not be
conceded to the appointing authority. Such position is not only contrary to Section 9, Rule V
and Section 1, Rule IV of the Omnibus Rules. It is also a dangerous reading of the law
because it unduly expands the discretion given to the appointing authority and removes the
checks and balances that will rein in any abuse that may take place. The Court cannot
countenance such erroneous and perilous interpretation of the law.
 Accordingly, petitioner’s subsequent appointment was void. There can be no appointment to
a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or her appointment
validly terminated, before another can be appointed to succeed her.

RULING:

In sum, the appointment of petitioner was inconsistent with the law and well-established jurisprudence. It
not only disregarded the doctrine of immutability of final judgments but also unduly concentrated on a
narrow portion of the provision of law, overlooking the greater part of the provision and other related rules
and using a legal doctrine rigidly and out of context. Its effect was to perpetuate an injustice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
N/A