No, the proposals were not validly adopted by Congress.

It is well-settled in the Constitution that the vote necessary for the amendment of the Constitution is
three-fourths (3/4) vote of both houses voting separately.

In this case, the necessary vote of 3/4 of both houses voting separately was not obtained since less than
¾ of the Senate voted in favor of the proposal.

Therefore, the proposals were not validly adopted.

I would advise those behind the people’s initiative that it is a right given to the people as provided in the
Constitution.

In the case of Lambino V. Comelec, the Court stated that the people may directly propose amendments
to the Constitution by the exercise of people’s initiative provided that at least 12% of the total voters
affirmed through signature and further requirement of at least 3% of the voters for every legislative
district.

Here, the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution provided the required votes of at
least 12% of the total voters and at least 3% of every legislative district are met.

Thus, they can propose amendments through people’s initiative.

I will argue that the new law is invalid because besides being res judicata it is also violative of the
Constitution.

It is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to determine the
validity and constitutionality of laws being enacted by Congress and it has the vested power to struck
down laws in derogation of the Constitution.

In this case, the provision in the subsequent law is already held in a previous ruling of the Court as
violative of the Constitution.

Accordingly, the provision in the new law will be struck again as invalid.

The arguments of Beauty are entirely defensible.

It is a cardinal rule in the Constitution that a challenge or opposition against the election and
qualification of a member of the House of Representative is within the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Furthermore, a winning candidate becomes a member of the House
of Representatives provided there is a valid proclamation, he took an oath and assumed the powers of
his office.

Here, Beauty is already a member of the House of Representatives since she is a winning candidate who
was validly proclaimed, took an oath and assumed the powers related to her office.

Accordingly, Beauty is correct that the jurisdiction is transferred with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.

The observation of Bluebean is partly valid as to his first argument but incorrect as to his second
argument.
It is categorically provided in the Constitution that a partly-list is entitled to a seat in the Congress only if
it obtains at least two (2%) of the votes cast. Moreover, it is not a condition sine qua non for a party-list
to represent any of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.

Bluebean’s first argument is correct since Greenpeas is not entitled to a seat since it failed to obtain at
least 2% of the votes. On the other hand, his second argument is not valid since it is not a condition sine
qua non for a party-list to represent any of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.
Green-Peas as an ideology-based political party may participate in the election of party-list.

Hence, Bluebean’s argument is not entirely correct.

No, the Senator is not right in claiming that the Senate is a continuing body and therefore can detain an
individual in contempt indefinitely

The Court ruled in a similar case that the Senate is not a continuing body since its composition changes
as new members are elected. Furthermore, the Senate cannot indefinitely detain a person held in
contempt since upon adjournment of Congress the detained person must be released.

In this case, the Senate cannot detain Strongwill indefinitely and upon its adjournment it should have
released him from detention.

Thus, the Senator is not correct in his claims.

Yes, the President can still make appointments to the judiciary during the midnight appointment ban
period and there is no prohibition in making an appointment by the President of a relative to the
judiciary.

It is categorically provided in the Constitution that the midnight appointment ban period only applies to
executive positions. Moreover, there is no prohibition in the appointment of a relative of the President
to the judiciary.

Here, the midnight appointment ban period does not apply because it is not an executive position but a
judicial position. In addition, the President can appoint his cousin to the judiciary since there is no
prohibition for him to do so.

Accordingly, the President can make appointments to the judiciary during the midnight appointment
ban and he can appoint his cousin toa position in the judiciary.

No, the President does not have any authority not to released the funds authorized under a Special
Appropriations Act.

It is an elementary principle that the President cannot interfere with the legitimate exercise of legislative
powers of the Congress pursuant to the separation of powers provided in the Constitution.

Here, the Special Appropriations Act is a legitimate exercise of the legislative powers of the Congress

Therefore, the President does not have any authority to interfere with the release of the funds
authorized under the Special Appropriations Act pursuant to separation of powers.

a. Creating or dividing congressional districts in a manner intended to favor a particular party or

candidate.
C. if a law is incomprehensible to ordinary people such that they do not really know what is required
or prohibited, then the law must be struck down.

Yes, the Court can proceed to decide the case even if the law has not yet become effective.

Case law provides that there are exceptions to the rule that four requisites of judicial review is
present for the exercise of judicial powers. One of the exceptions is that the issue presented is one
of transcendental importance.

In this case, although the requisites of actual controversy and locus standi are not present, the issue
presented is one of transcendental importance because it involves the constitutionally protected
and cherished rights of freedom of expression.

Hence, the Court can proceed to decide the case.

The 8-7 decision is not yet promulgated and may be the subject of recall.

It is well-settled that a decision is validly promulgated upon the issuance of the printed decisions of
the Court.

Here, there is not yet any issuance of the printed decisions of the Court.

Hence, there was no valid promulgated decision and therefore, it may be the subject of recall.

No, the decision cannot be promulgated if the decision was not yet finalized at the time the Justice
died.

Jurisprudence provides that decisions not yet finalized at the time a member of the Court died may
be deliberated anew and hence, the previous decision cannot be promulgated.

No, the decision cannot be released to the public if the decision was still being finalized.

The deliberative process privileged is well-entrenched in jurisprudence. This privileged affords the
Court not to be compelled to release to the public its decisions as yet to be finalized as well as its
deliberations on the issues and therefore, the Court cannot be compelled to release the decision.

D. only with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court

B. freedom from prior restraint

I would resolve the issue against DeepThroat.

Under the Compelling state interest test, the constitutional right of press freedom may be
restrained or regulated upon showing that there is a compelling state interest that necessitates the
regulation or restraint.

Here, there is a compelling state interest since there is already an actual public disorder as a
consequence of the statements of Deepthroat as published in his newspaper.

Therefore, the Court in the greater and compelling interest of the community may restrain the
distribution of the newspaper containing the article.
D. the government is prohibited in banning unprotected speech of a substantial amount of
protected speech is restrained or chilled in the process.

Yes, the COA is entitled to receive the rest of its appropriations even without complying with the
DBM policy.

The Constitution guarantees fiscal autonomy and it does not provide for any condition prior to the
released of funds.

Here, the “no report, no release” policy of the DBM is contrary to the Constitution since the
fundamental law itself does not provide for any condition prior to the release of funds.

Hence, the COA is entitled to receive the rest of its appropriations without complying with the DBM
policy.

No, the mall owners and operators cannot be validly compelled to provide free parking to their
customers.

The Court ruled in a similar case that compelling the mall owners to provide free parking space to
their customers is not a valid exercise of police power but an exercise of eminent domain.

Here, the mall owners are correct in arguing that compelling them to provide free parking space is
an invalid taking of their property which necessitates payment of just compensation for being an
exercise of eminent domain. It is not a valid exercise of police power since there is no legitimate
public purpose.

Therefore, the mall owners cannot be compelled to provide free parking space.

Yes, the petition of Survey Galore is meritorious.

Freedom of expression is a constitutionally guaranteed right although not absolute, it cannot be

restrained without a showing of a compelling state interest.

Here, the surveys published by Survey Galore is protected expression under the freedom of
expression clause under the Constitution. Furthermore, there is now showing of a compelling state
interest that will justify its restraint.

Thus, the petition of Galore is meritorious.

C. the acts of subordinates presumptively those of the heads of offices disapproves them

C. to propose constitutional amendments or revisions

I would vindicate the rights of Farmerjoe by arguing that payment of just compensation is not
subject of prescription.

The Constitution clearly provides that payment of just compensation is mandated upon taking of
another’s property by the government and is not subject to prescription or laches.

Here, Farmerjoe is entitled to payment of just compensation and the defense of prescription cannot
be raised.
Thus, payment of just compensation is a matter of right to FarmerJoe.

I will rule in favor of Edward and consider as inadmissible the statements he made to the police
since he was not given his Miranda rights.

It is well-settled that Miranda rights should be given not only during the time of arrest but also at
the time of custodial investigation. Custodial investigation per jurisprudence commences at the time
when the inquiry is no longer a general investigation but points to a particular suspect.

Here, there is showing that custodial investigation already commenced since the investigation and
questioning points solely to Edward and therefore, Edward must be apprised of his Constitutional
rights such as Miranda rights.

Hence, his statements were deemed inadmissible.

Yes, Alienmae can invoke the right against self-incrimination if the fear of incrimination is against his
foreign law.

Section 17 of Article 3 of the Constitution guarantees right against self-incrimination which is

enjoyed by citizens as well as aliens. Furthermore, only questions that is relevant to the present
charge should be propounded against the accused.

Here, Alienmae although an alien, can validly invoke the right against self-incrimination and further
object that only questions relevant to the present charge should be propounded.

Hence, she can invoke the right against self-incrimination.

No, Rosebud is not disqualified to run by reason of citizenship.

In the case of Manzano v. Mercado, the Court clarified that the disqualification provided in the
Constitution pertains to dual allegiance but not dual citizenship since the latter is a product of
application of different laws which is involuntary on the part of the individual.

Here, Rosebud is not disqualified to run since she is still a natural born-citizen. Furthermore, she did
not do an overt and voluntary act of renouncing her Philippine citizenship.

Therefore, Rosebud is not disqualified to run.

B. Impeachment complaint is referred to Secretary of Justice.

The law exempting certain government institution from payment of court fees is unconstitutional for
being violative of the independence and fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

The Constitution clearly provides that the judiciary is independent from the legislative and executive
pursuant to separation of powers. Furthermore, it enjoys fiscal autonomy without interference by
any government body.

Here, the law is clearly an infringement of the independence and fiscal autonomy of the judiciary
because it is only the judiciary that may determine who may be exempt from paying court fees.

Hence, the law is unconstitutional.

The position of the proponents is tenable.

The Court ruled in a similar case that the area requirement is not necessary condition if the province
is composed of one or more islands.

Here, since the new province is composed of several islands, the area requirement may already be
dispensed

Thus, the proponents’ position is tenable.

No, the claim of Ambassador Gaylor that he is immune does not hold water.

Jurisprudence is settled that diplomatic immunity can be exercised only in the receiving host country
that recognize the diplomat as representative of the other state party and not binding to a third
state country not party to the diplomatic agreement.

Here, the diplomatic immunity of Ambassador Gaylor is only operative within State Hinterlands
since it the receiving host country that recognize him as representative diplomat of State Juvenus.
The immunity cannot be asserted to a third state country not privy to the diplomatic agreement
which in this case is State Paradise.

Therefore, Ambassador Gaylor may be arrested and prosecuted for violation of laws of Sate
Paradise.

I will argue in support of Professor Boombastick that RA 15005 is unconstitutional for being violative
of the Constitution.

It is categorically provided in the Constitution that the Supreme Court has the sole prerogative to
promulgate rules relative to admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. The Congress cannot provide for other qualifications or conditions not
provided by the Supreme Court since it is deemed unlawful interference to the exercise of
prerogatives of the judiciary.

Therefore, RA 15005 is unconstitutional.

A. Yes, Rocket Corporation, a domestic corporation, is allowed to engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers.

It is categorically provided in the Labor Code that only domestic corporations are allowed to
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers local and overseas.

In this case, Rocket Corporation is a domestic corporation.

Therefore, it is allowed to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.

B. Under the Labor Code, recruitment of workers become an act of economic sabotage when the
recruiters and/or the victim-recruitees are two or more in number. It is either illegal recruitment
in large scale or by a syndicate.
No, Carding does not have a cause of action against the company.

It is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that an employee does not have vested right as to working
conditions such as work schedules since it is clearly within the sphere of management prerogatives
of the employer. Furthermore, there is no diminution in pay since overtime pay is not part of the
basic salary of the employee.

Here, the change of work schedule is a management prerogative of the company which is a
constitutionally recognized right of the employer provided that its exercise is reasonable and not
arbitrary. There is no showing in this case of any unreasonableness in the change of working
schedule.

Thus, Carding does not have any cause of action against the company.

No, the arrangement wherein Benito will pay the models with free clothes is not allowed.

It is categorically provided in the Labor Code that salary or wages of employees must be paid in cash
and not in kind.

In this case, Benito has violated the Labor Code when he paid his employees wages not in cash but
in kind.

Accordingly, the arrangement is not valid.

No, Katrina’s objection is not justified.

Labor laws is categorical that bonus is a gift where the employer cannot be compelled to give. It is
clearly within management prerogatives to give bonuses to its employees. There is diminution of
pay in violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code only if it can be established that the benefits arise
from a law, policy or customs that has ripened into company practice.

Here, there is no showing that the giving of the bonuses has ripened into a company practice and
therefore, it falls under the sphere of management prerogative of employer.

Hence, the company is within its rights to modify the bonus scheme.

No, Soledad’s defense is not meritorious.

The Labor Code prohibits the employment of minors below 15 years of age.

Here, Soledad engaged the services of a minor below 15 years of age.

Hence, Soledad is in violation of labor laws.

Yes, there is an employer-employee relationship between Nico and Ador.

Jurisprudence provided for the Four-fold test to determine the existence of employer-employee
relationship. This test includes selection and hiring, payment of wages, power of dismissal and
power of control. Power of control not only as to the result but also as to manner and method of
performance of the work.
Here, applying the Four-fold Test, there is clear employer-employee relationship. Nico has the
power to select, duty to pay wages, power to dismiss and power of control not only as to the result
but also as to the manner and method of performance of the work. The power of control is shown
when Nico changes all of Ador’s plans and ends up designing the arrangements himself with Ador
simply executing his instructions.

Hence, there is employer-employee relationship in this case.

No, there is no need to register Ador with the Social Security System.

Under the Social Security Act of 2018, it is not compulsory to register itinerant casual workers.

Here, Ador is a casual worker only and not a regular employee of Nico.

Therefore, there is no need to register him with the SSS.

I would decide the case in favor of Don Don.

Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that regular employees render services necessary and
desirable for the business or trade of their employer. Moreover, continuous rehiring of employees is
a clear indicium that the services rendered by the employee sis necessary and desirable in the
business or trade of the employer. Furthermore, an employee who performs services for more than
a year is rendered a regular.

Here, Don Don’s rendition of services as a call center agent is necessary and desirable for the
business of employer CallHelp which renders him a regular employee and consequently his
employer is liable for illegal dismissal for terminating his employment without a cause.

Therefore, Callhelp violates the security of tenure of DonDon and is liable for illegal dismissal.

Yes, there is an employer-employee relationship between Star Crafts and the 100 workers from
People Plus.

Jurisprudence provides that there is Labor-Only Contracting if the service contractor only supplies
the principal with employees that will perform services usual and necessary in the business of the
employer. Moreover, in labor-only contracting the principal is the employer while the labor-only
contractor is a mere agent of the employer.

Here, it is clear that there is an employer-employee relationship between Star Crafts and the 100
workers since the service contractor, People Plus, is a mere labor-only contractor and hence only an
agent of the employer. Moreover, the 100 workers are supplied to Star Crafts to perform its usual
business of making lanterns.

Thus, Star Crafts is the employer of the 100 workers.

I will advise Din Din to file a case for illegal dismissal.

The Court ruled in a similar case that promotion is a gift which acceptance may be refused.
Moreover, the employer is liable for constructive or illegal dismissal when the employee is
terminated without just or authorized cause or when the continued employment of employee is
rendered impossible or unlikely.
 Here, Din Din is within her rights when she refused to accept her promotion. Moreover, the
employer terminated her employment without just or authorized cause and her employment was
also rendered impossible or unlikely by his employer.

Hence, she can file for illegal dismissal.

Yes, the preventive suspension of Karina is valid.

It is jurisprudentially settled that an employee may be placed under preventive suspension when her
continued presence in the company may pose danger in the life or property of the employer as well
as his co-employees.

Here, the continued presence of Karina in the newscast company may pose danger in the property
of the employer or interrupt the investigation process.

Thus, the preventive suspension is valid.

Matatag Insurance’s action is valid while Rico’s argument is invalid.

Loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code is a just cause to terminate
employment and it is further provided that for managerial employees, employer only needs to show
the existence of a basis for loss of trust and confidence and therefore, conviction is not condition
sine qua non.

Here, there is a basis for loss of trust and confidence in Rico, a Division manager, when there is a
finding by the company that he physically assaults his staff.

Hence, Matatag’s action of terminating Rico’s employment is valid.

I. I would decide the case in favor of Blank and Bleach.

It is well-settled under the Labor Code that the company is within its prerogative to close its
business whether with or without a cause. In addition, the purchaser company is not required to
assume the employment of the employees of the acquired company.

Here, Blank is within its management prerogative to close and sell its business. Moreover,
Bleach is not mandated by any law to assume the employment of the employees of Blank.

Hence, there is no unlawful termination of employment.

II. The successor-employer doctrine applies when the successor-employer voluntarily assume the
employment of the employees of the previous employer.

Here, the employer continues the duties, terms and conditions of employment of the previous
employer towards its employees unless it provides for the contrary in a subsequent agreement.

Yes, Luisa is entitled to maternity benefits under the SSS Act.

 Under the SSS Act, a covered employee is entitled to maternity benefits provided she paid for at
least three months in the twelve-month period preceding the semester of delivery or
miscarriage. Furthermore, SSS Act is not discriminatory since it does not distinguish between
married and unwed members.

Here, Luisa is entitled to maternity benefits provided she paid for at least three months in the t
twelve-month period preceding the semester of the miscarriage.

Therefore, she is entitled to maternity benefits

No, the GSIS is not correct when it denied the claim.

The Court held in a similar case that PNP officer is on-duty 24/7. Moreover, pacifying fighting
neighbors is service-related since it is incidental to official duty of PNP officers of maintaining peace
and order in the community.

Here, Luis’ act of pacifying fighting neighbors is incidental to his official duty as a PNP officer of
maintaining peace and order in the community.

Hence, Luis’ death is service-related and thus compensable.

No, I do not agree with Victor.

Under the POEA- Standard employment contract and RA 8042, a seafarer is entitled to medical
reimbursement and other benefits it the illness is work-related and it happens during the effectivity
of the contract.

Here, although the illness manifested during the effectivity of the contract, the illness of
tuberculosis of a seafarer cook is clearly not work-related.

Hence, he is not entitled for medical reimbursement

Yes, Victor being unable to work due to prolonged illness for more than 120 days is tantamount to
total permanent disability provided there is compliance with the conditions as provided by law

The Court ruled in a similar case that the company-designated physician should issue a final
assessment before the lapse of 120 days otherwise the seafarer may be entitiled to claim
permanent disability benefits.

Here, there is no showing that the company-designated physician issued a final assessment as to the
final disability rating of Victor.

Hence, he is deemed suffering from permanent disability.

No, AILU is not justified in declaring a strike without a strike vote and a notice of strike.

The Labor Code categorically provides that notice of strike and strike vote is mandatory in all cases of
strikes.
Here, AILU cannot validly dispensed with a strike vote and notice of strike because in all cases it should
be complied with otherwise the strike is rendered illegal.

Hence, AILU is not justified in declaring a strike without a strike vote and notice of strike.

Yes, the Secretary of Labor is correct in declining jurisdiction over the dispute.

The Court ruled in a similar case that brewer business is not an industry indispensable to national
interest. Furthermore, the Secretary of Labor is given wide discretion in the determination of which
industry is indispensable to national interest.

Here, Lumen’s brewery business is not an industry indispensable to national interest.

Hence, the Secretary of Labor is correct.

No, LB’s act of terminating all those members of AILU on the grounds mentioned is not entirely correct.

Under the Labor Code, the employer is justified in terminating the employment of union members who
committed illegal acts during a strike but not on the ground of participating in an illegal strike.

Here, LB may terminate the employment of those union member who committed illegal acts during a
strike but it cannot terminate those who merely participated in an illegal strike.

Yes, LFEU’s claims are correct.

It is settled under Labor laws that duty to bargain collectively includes the duty to maintain and enforce
the bargaining agreement. Failure to comply with its provision is an unfair labor practice.

Here, both Libra Films and LFEU is obligated to maintain the status quo and enforce the provisions of the
bargaining agreement. For Libra Film’s refusal to comply with the bargaining agreement, it is liable for
unfair labor practice which is a ground in declaration of strike.

Hence, LFEU is correct.

Closed shop clause is distinguished from Maintenance of membership clause as follows:

1. As to covered employees. In closed shop, all current employees and new employees are
required to join the bargaining union while in maintenance of membership only employees who
is not a member of any union is required to join the bargaining union.

Union dues is distinguished from agency fees as follows:

1. As to covered employees. Union dues is required to be paid by union members while agency
fees is required to be paid by non-union members accepting CBA-benefits.
2. As to check-off provision. Check-off is only applicable to union dues.
3. As to individual written authorization. Individual written authorization is necessary in union dues
but not in agency fees.

George can join the can join a union of similarly situated employee following the globe doctrine.
 The Labor laws as well as the Constitution provides right to self-organization not only to its citizens
but also to aliens. Furthermore, it does not distinguish as to nature of employment whether regular
or casual.

George in this case has the right to self-organization.

Hence, George can join a union.

Equity of the incumbent applies to bargaining agent’s right to be the sole and exclusive
representative of the bargaining unit. It further means that no certification election can be filed to
oust the bargaining agent except during the 60-day freedom period.

Yes, the agreement to submit the illegal dismissal case to voluntary arbitration is valid.

The Labor Code declaration of policy provides that it aims to promote voluntary settlement of labor
disputes.

Here, although the illegal dismissal case is within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, it may still be
submitted to voluntary arbitration even during the pendency of the case.

Hence, the agreement is valid.

I would advice the union that the request of XYZ Company should be granted because it is less costly
on the part of both parties and it is will result to less friction between the management and the
labor union representatives that it is an inevitable result if the union persist on its decision to
conduct a strike.

The advantages of voluntary arbitration is it is less costly and more convenient. Its disadvantage is
that it is not a speedy resolution of the labor dispute since both parties will compel the other to
favor its side.

A. Felonies under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code are committed by means of dolo or culpa. It is
committed by means of dolo when there is willful intention to commit a crime; whereas there is
culpa when through lack of foresight or lack of skill a crime was committed.
B. Aberratio Ictus under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code happens when there is mistake in the
blow where the bullet hits an unintended victim. Consequently, the malefactor is liable for all
the consequences of his unlawful act.

Yes, Ms. A can validly put up a defense of Battered Woman Syndrome.

The Court ruled in the case of People v. Genosa that battered woman syndrome can be raised as a
valid defense provided that the battering cycle happened at least twice.

Here, Ms. A is suffering from battered woman syndrome since she is a victim of battery and abuse of his
husband which happened more than twice.

Therefore, she can validly put up the defense of Battered woman syndrome.

The crime committed is homicide.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his
unlawful act whether he intended the results of his act. Moreover, the justifying circumstance of self-
defense is not availing when the unlawful aggression already ceased.

In this case, Macho is liable for the crime of homicide since under the law it is an act of killing a person
other than a relative enumerated under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Macho is not relative of
Ganda as defined under the law since their marriage is void. Moreover, justifying circumstance of self-
defense is unavailing since Macho committed an unlawful act which is Grave threat and following Article
4 he is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act which includes death.

Hence, he committed crime of homicide.

I will charge City Engr. A of the crime of Plunder.

Under RA 7080, Plunder is committed when a public officer alone or in conspiracy with others unlawfully
amass and accumulate ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 Million.

Here, City Engr. A, a public officer, unlawfully amass and accumulated ill-gotten wealth of at least P50
Million which is shown by commission of predicate crimes as enumerated under the law such as
Malversation and bribery.

Thus, City Engr. A may be charge of Plunder.

Yes, City Engr. A is still liable for Plunder even if his net worth is less than P50 Million provided that
pieces of evidence may establish that he unlawfully amasses and accumulates at least P50 Million.

RA 7080 does not provide as an element of the crime that the net worth of the accused must amount to
at least P50 Million, and hence, it is irrelevant for the prosecution of the crime of Plunder.

Madam X alone is guilty of the crime of Qualified theft.

Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, Qualified theft is committed when a person unlawfully
took the personal property of another without consent but without force or intimidation and qualified
by the circumstance of abuse of trust and confidence. Moreover, fencing under the law is committed
when the fence is has knowledge that the property is the subject of the crime of robbery or theft.

Here, Madam X, a bank teller, is in physical possession of the check and she unlawfully took the personal
property of Mamad Y without her consent without the application of force or intimidation and qualified
by the circumstance of abuse of trust and confidence. Moreover, Madam W is not liable as a fence since
she has no knowledge that the check is the subject of the crime of robbery or theft.

Accordingly, Madam X alone is guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft.

I will raise the objection against retroactivity of penal laws.

Revised Penal Code disfavors ex post facto law since it punishes an act which was lawful when done.
Moreover, non-retroactivity of penal laws is the general rule since the contrary is prejudicial to the
accused.

Here, Reporma may raised that the law is an ex-post facto law since it punishes an act which was lawful
when done and raised the defense that the law cannot be applied retroactively.
Hence, he may raise objection against retroactivity of penal laws.

C. Light coercion

Filthy committed the crime of corruption of public officers while Loko and the guard committed the
crime of direct bribery. Loko alone committed the crime of falsification.

Under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code, corruption of public officers is committed when a gift
or promise is given to a public officer to induced him to commit a crime or any unlawful act in
relation with the latter’s public office. On the other hand, direct bribery under Article 210 is
committed when a public officer accepts a gift or promise from another in return for the commission
of crime or unlawful act in relation to the functions of his office. Moreover, falsification is committed
when a document or signature is forged.

Here, Filthy gave money to Loko as an inducement to commit the crime of falsification. Direct
bribery, on the other hand, is committed by Loko and the guard upon acceptance of the money
which is given in consideration of committing a crime. Furthermore, Loko committed falsification of
public document when he forged the signature of the judge.

Hence, Filty is liable for corruption while Loko and the guard is liable for direct bribery.

Guapo and Pogi committed the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape.

The Court has held in a similar case that forcible abduction with rape is complex crime under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code when the forcible abduction is a necessary means to commit rape.

Here, forcible abduction is complexed with the crime of rape since the former in this case is a
necessary means to commit the latter.

Thus, they are liable for the crime of Forcible abduction with rape.

Yes, Guapo and Pogi is liable for Pretty’s death.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code is clear that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his
unlawful act or crime committed.

Here, Guapo and Pogi is liable for all the consequences of the crime of forcible abduction with rape
which in the present case includes the death of Pretty. Moreover, it may be established that the
proximate cause of Pretty’s death is the rape committed by Guapo and Pogi.

Therefore, Guapo and Pogi is liable for Pretty’s death.

A, B, and C is liable for the crime of theft. On the other hand, B is solely liable for the crime of
homicide. A and B is also liable for serious illegal detention. Also, mitigating circumstance of prater
intentionem may be appreciated in favor of B.

Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Pen al Code is committed when the unlawful taking is done
without the employment of violence, force or intimidation. Jurisprudence also provides that there is
no special complex crime of theft with homicide and consequently, homicide committed is charged
separately from theft. On the other hand, serious illegal detention is committed when there is
deprivation of liberty and the presence of enumerated circumstance under the law such as the
victim is a minor. Praeter intentionem is mitigating when the resulting crime is graver than the
intended crime.

Here, A, B, and C as conspirators are liable for theft since they did not employ force to enter the
house and to get the valuables since the facts is clear that doors were open. Applying Article 4,
homicide is further committed by B since he on the occasion of committing the crime of theft killed a
neighbor. Moreover, serious illegal detention is committed by A and B since they unlawfully
deprived the boy of his liberty. In addition, mitigating circumstance may be appreciated in favor of
B.

Hence, A, B, and C as conspirators are liable for the crime of theft.

Loko is liable for trafficking in persons and Ganda’s minority aggravates the crime he committed.

Under RA 9208, trafficking in persons is committed when a person induced another through
violence, fraud or intimidation for purposes of prostitution

Here, Loko is liable for trafficking in person since he induced Ganda through fraud to engage in
prostitution. In addition, Ganda’s minority is an aggravating circumstance which may affect the
penalty to be imposed.

Hence, Loko is liable for trafficking in persons.

D. Impossible Crime

Pogi committed the crime of serious illegal detention with rape.

Under the Revised Penal Code, serious illegal detention is committed when there is unlawful
deprivation of liberty and the presence of the enumerated circumstances under the law such as
detention for more than three days and where the victim is female. In addition, special complex
crime of serious illegal detention with rape is committed when rape is committed by reason or on
the occasion of the detention.

Here, Pogi unlawfully deprived Sexy of her liberty with the presence of circumstance of detention of
more than three days and the victim is a female. Moreover, rape is committed on the occasion of
the serious illegal detention.

Hence, Pogi committed the crime of serious illegal detention with rape.

Puti committed the impossible crime of murder

Under Article 4, paragraph 2 impossible crime is committed when the crime is not committed
because of physical or legal impossibility or the employment of ineffectual or inadequate means.

Here, Puti committed an impossible crime of murder since non-toxic solution is ineffectual for the
purposes of killing Pula.

Hence, Puti is liable for his criminal propensity.

No, Malo is not correct in his claim that he can no longer be charged under the Revised Penal Code
for the same act.
Jurisprudence dictates that there is no double jeopardy when the elements of the crimes charge are
different and when the first crime is not included or does not include the other crime charged.
Moreover, there is no prohibition in the prosecution for the same act if it is punishable under the
Revised Penal Code and in other special penal law.

Here, violation of RA 3019 is malum prohibitum punishable under a special penal law, whereas
bribery is malum in se punishable under the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the elements of the said
crimes are different. Furthermore, bribery is not included or does not include violation of RA 3019.

Therefore, he can be charge for the same act under the Revise penal Code.

No, Malo cannot be charge of Estafa.

Under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a), Estafa by false pretense is committed when he made an express
representation that he has an influence or power.

Here, there is no showing that Malo expressly represent that he has an influence over the judge
since he only promised that he will convince the judge.

Hence, he cannot be charge if estafa.

C 14 year old

Mr. Ed is criminally liable for the crime of violation of BP 22 and estafa by issuance of bouncing
check under Article 315 paragraph 2(d).

Under BP. 22 the mere act of issuing a bouncing check consummates the crime. On the other hand,
estafa by issuance of bounce check under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) is committed when a check was
issued in consideration of a previously incurred debt or obligation. Moreover, demand letter is not
condition sine qua non if notice of dishonor was proved received by the accused. Partial payment is
not aa defense in the criminal case only in civil case.

Here, Mr. Ed committed estafa when he issued a check the following day in consideration of a
previously incurred debt to the owner of the store. In addition, he is also criminally liable for
violation of BP 22 when he issued the other bounced check at the time of purchase. Demand letter is
not material in this case.

Hence, Ed is liable for BP 22 and estafa.

Yes, Pierce is correct in his defense of diplomatic immunity.

It is well-settled jurisprudentially that our criminal laws do not apply to representatives of another
state.

Here, Pirece is a diplomat.

Therefore, he is not covered by our criminal laws.

Tonio may be charge of the crime of violation of Anti-Fencing Law.

Under PD. 1612, Fencing is committed when an accused has knowledge that the property he
received or bought is a fruit of the crime of theft or robbery.
Here, assuming Tonio has knowledge that the painting is the fruit of theft or robbery, he may be
charge of violation of Anti-Fencing law.

Manolo is criminally liable for Trespass to dwelling.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery is committed when the accused unlawfully
takes another’s personal property and not when he took his own property. Moreover, trespass to
dwelling is committed when the accused unlawfully entered another’s dwelling without the owner’s
consent.

Here, Manolo is not liable for robbery since he took his own property. On the other hand, he is
criminally liable for Trespass to dwelling when he surreptitiously entered the dwelling of Tonio.

Hence, he is liable for trespass to dwelling.

The defense of Clepto that there was no theft is not meritorious.

It is clear under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code that injury or prejudiced to the owner of the
property is not an element of the crime of theft.

Here, the crime of theft is already consummated the moment Clepto took a purse without paying for
it. Inkury or prejudiced to the store owner is not material in the crime of theft since it is not an
element of the crime.

Accordingly, Clepto’s defense is not meritorious.

C dweeling

The judge may appreciate the circumstance of recidivism and habitual delinquency.

Recidivism under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is present when the accused is previously
convicted of final judgment of a crime falling under the same title of the Revised Penal Code. On the
other hand, habitual delinquency is present when the accused committed the crimes of theft,
robbery estafa, falsification, serious and less serious physical injuries for more than three times.

Here, during the trial of AA for the crime of theft, there is a showing that AA was previously
convicted of the crime of robbery which together with theft falls under the same Title ten of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, habitual delinquency may also be appreciated since AA previously
committed the crime of theft, estafa, and robbery for three times in the past.

Hence, recidivism and habitual delinquency may be appreciated.

Mr. White and Mr. Blue is liable for the crime of Homicide as prinicipal by direct participation for the
death of Mr. Green.

Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, principal by direct participation directly commits the
crime while principal by inducement induced the commission of the crime.

Here, Mr. White and Mr. Blue are principal by direct participation since they directly committed the
crime of homicide while Mr. red cannot be held liable as principal by inducement since his
statement is not that powerful and unequivocal to induce the Mr. White and Mr. Blue to commit the
crime.

Hence, only Mr. White and Mr. blue can be held as principals in the crime of homicide.

Mr. White and Mr. Blue are liable for physical injuries or attempted homicide depending on the
presence of intent to kill.

Under the Revised Penal Code there is attempted homicide when the accused with intent to kill
inflicted an injury to the victim but the wound is not mortal. On the other hand, physical injuries is
committed when the victim suffered injuries but without intent to kill on the part of the accused.

Here, there is no showing that there Mr. White and Blue has intent to kill Ms. Yellow.

Hence, they are liable only for the lesser crime of physical injuries.

No, the prosecutor is not correct in filing a case of impossible crime to commit kidnapping.

Kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is committed when the accused unlawfully
deprives the victim of his liberty. On the other hand, Impossible crime under Article 4 is committed
when there is legal or factual impossibility to commit the crime.

Here, there is no legal or factual impossibility to commit the crime since the crime of kidnapping is
already consummated when Enrique unlawfully deprived the child of her liberty.

No, the prosecutor cannot file a case for grave coercion.

Under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, grave coercion is committed when the accused
compels or prohibits another to perform an act which is against the latter’s will.

Here, there is not compulsion or prohibition to perform an act against the latter’s will.

Hence, grave coercion cannot be filed.

A. Yes, although the penalty imposed is life imprisonment, the privilege mitigating circumstance of
minority may be appreciated.

Although generally privilege mitigating circumstance is not applicable in crimes punishable

under special law. As an exception, Section 98 of RA 9165 converts the penalty of life
imprisonment to reclusion perpetua and hence this special law adopts the technical
nomenclature of penalties under the revised penal Code and consequently privileged mitigating
circumstance may be appreciated.

B. Yes, Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.

Although Indeterminate Sentence law is not applicable if the penalty prescribed by law is Life
imprisonment, however, since under Section 98 it converts life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua and with the appreciation of the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority lowers
the penalty by one or two degrees; hence, Indeterminate sentence law is applicable.
 C.A cannot apply for probation.

An accused is not eligible for probation if the penalty imposed is more than six years. In
addition, filing of a notice of appeal is a waiver of the application for probation.

Here, the A cannot apply for probation since the penalty imposed on him is more than six years
and he already filed a notice of appeal which is deemed a waiver of application for probation.

Hence, he cannot apply for probation.

A will serve his sentence in agricultural penal facilities or bahay pag-asa for children in conflict
with the law.

Case law provides that service of sentence of minor is held in agricultural penal camp or facilities
pursuant to the positivist theory of criminal law and the avowed declared policy of the law to
rehabilitate and reform child in conflict with the law.

The defenses of Mr. Gray are untenable.

The Revised Penal Code provides a prima facie presumption that the holder or user of a check or forged
document is the author of the crime of falsification. Moreover, injury is not an element of the crime of
estafa or attempted estafa.

The first defense of Mr.Gray is untenable since being the user or holder of the forged check he is
presumptively the author of the falsification. His second defense does not have any merit since injury is
not an element of the crime of attempted estafa.

Hence, Mr. Gray’s defenses are untenable.

Mr. Gray is not correct in his claim that there was entrapped illegally.

The Court held in a similar case that there is a presumption of forgery since the first check is a forgery
there is a probable cause that the second check is also a forgery.

Here, the first check is forged by Mr. Gray and hence, the police officers is justified in the conduct of the
entrapment.

Hence, Mr Gray is not correct.

Yes, Carlo can claim the insurance benefit.

Under Section 10 of the Insurance Code, insurable interest is present when a person insured the life of a
person to whom he depended financially for support.

Here, although Bianca is not the legal spouse of Carlo, he can still insure the life of Bianca since he
depended on Bianca for financial support.
Therefore, Carlo can claim the insurance benefit.

I will decide against the application for Mineral Production sharing Agreement.

In the case of Narra Nickel Mining v. Redmont, the Court ruled that as a general rule control test is used
to determine the ownership of the corporation. As an exception, grandfather rule only applies when
there is doubt as to the ownership structure of the subject company.

Here, there is doubt as to the ownership structure of O Corp, P Corp, and Q Corp.

Hence, it is proper to apply the grandfather rule.

Majority vote of the board directors of the company and at least two thirds of the outstanding capital
stock.

No, Medici is not correct in its claim that the special commercial court has no jurisdiction over the
dispute.

Under BP 129 as amended, special commercial court is vested with jurisdiction over intra-corporate
dispute. Intra-corporate dispute is defined under the Revised Corporation Code as an issue between
directors, officers, stockholders and the corporation.

Here, the dispute is intra-corporate in nature since it is between a stockholder and the corporation.

Hence, the special commercial court has jurisdiction over the dispute.

B. From the date the SEC issues a certificate of incorporation under its official seal.

No, Jack Insurance is not correct in denying the claim.

The Insurance Code is categorical in providing that a comprehensive motor vehicle insurance policy
covers all kinds of contingency unless there is an exempting stipulation.

Here, the subject insurance is a comprehensive motor vehicle insurance policy which means that theft
clause is included in its coverage since there is no showing that there is contrary stipulation. Moreover,
there is theft since Jess only gave de facto possession of the car for purposes of repair and
improvement.

Hence, Jack insurance is not correct in denying the claim.

I will advice KU to file a complaint for trademark infringement.

In the case Ecole Cuisine v. Renaud, the Court rule that a well-known mark although not registered in
the Philippines is entitled to protection against infringement since the Philippines is a signatory to the
Paris Convention

Here, assuming that it can be establish that KU is a well-known mark, Jinggy may be held liable for
trademark infringement.

Hence, KU may file for trademark infringement.

C. Motor Vehicle Liablility Insurance

No, Matino is not correct in denying the insurance claim.

The Court held in a similar case that an exempting stipulation in an insurance contract is construed
strictly against the insurance company who prepared the contract. In addition, if a contingency is
not included in the exempting stipulation in the insurance contract then it is conclusively presumed
that it is covered by the contract.

Here, the exempting stipulation only provided for malicious damage but did not include theft. In this
case the loss is caused by theft and since theft is not excluded in the coverage it is deemed covered
by the insurance.

Hence, insurance company is liable.

A general creditor on debtor’s property

Yes, the planholders are correct.

Under the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act, the stay order does not apply to trustees in a
trust relationship.

Here, the planholders are not creditors of PA Assurance but are in reality trustees of the plans.

Hence, the stay order does not apply to the plan holders.

Actually serving in the board

The actions of the executive committee are valid except as to the declaration of the cash dividend.

Under the Revised Corporation Code, the executive committee is allowed to approve business
transactions which are usual and ordinary in the regular course of trade or business of the
corporation and are matters which are within the competence of the board of directors to decide
and approve.

Here, purchase of delivery van for use in the business, declaration of bonus, and purchase of
condominium unit are actions within the competence of the board of directors and consequently, is
also within the competence of the executive committee. Moreover these matters are usual and
ordinary in the regular course of trade or business of the corporation. However, the declaration of
cash dividend cannot be designated with the executive committee since it is expressly provided in
the Code that it is to be approved by majority of the board of directors.

Hence, the declaration of cash dividend by the committee is not valid.

No, RN is not correct in its claim that the premium remained unpaid.

In the case of Masagan Telemart v. UCPB, the Court ruled that although as a general rule a check is
not payment unless encashed, premium is deemed paid when the check is in the possession and
control of the insurer.

Here, the check is the possession and control of RN and it can deposit the check anytime.
Hence, premium is deemed paid.

Assuming the check is dated October 15, 2013, the premium here is not deemed paid.

Jurisprudence dictates that in post-dated check there is no vested right yet until the lapse of the
date indicated in the check.

Here, if the check is post dated there is no legal control by the insurer.

Hence, no premium is deemed paid.

I will decide to dismiss the complaint filed by the 2003-2004 directors.

The Revised Corporation Code provides that derivative suit is proper when the suit is brought in the
name and in behalf of the corporation provided there is exhaustion of intracorporate remedies.

Here, the requisites for filing a derivative suit is not present. The suit is not in behalf of the
corporation since the purpose of the suit is to vindicate the rights of the former directors of the
corporation.

Hence, the complaint should be dismissed.

D. Unfair competition

ATI is correct in its refusal to pay the claim because it is already barred by the statute of limitations.

The Court has held in a similar case that an arrastre operator is a common carrier since it carries
goods indiscriminately for compensation. Furthermore, one-year prescriptive period under COGSA
applies since the goods is shipped from a foreign port to the Philippines.

Here, ATI as a common carrier and NA insurance are bound by the one-year prescriptive period
under the COGSA. NA Insurance failed to brings its claim within the prescriptive period.

Hence, NA’s claim is already barred.

The proper test to be applied is the Dominancy Test.

In the case of Skechers v. Inter-Pacific, the Court applied Dominancy test since the stylized “S” is the
prevailing dominant mark in the skechers logo.

Here, the stylized “S” mark is the prevailing dominant mark. The dominancy Test is proper since the
stylized”S” will lead to confusing similarity wherein average consumer will be lead to believe that
the products are the same.

Hence, dominancy test should be applied.

Yes, the SEC should accept the Articles of Incorporation.

There is no prohibition under the Revised Corporation Code that only Philippine citizen are eligible
to be incorporators.

Here, the foreigners are not prohibited to become incorporators.

Hence, the SEC should accept the Articles of incorporation.

Yes, Geutze can serve as the Chairman of the Board as the same time President and General Ma
nager of the Corporation.

There is no prohibition in the Revised Corporation Code for a Chairman not to be eligible to serve at
the same time as the President and General manager of the corporation.

Hence, Guetze can serve as the Chairman, President and General Manager all at the same time.

No, the Articles of Incorporation cannot be amended to reduce the number of directors to two.

Under the Revised Corporation Code, the directors in a stock corporation must be at least five in
number.

Here, reduction of the number of directors to two will violate the provision that the directors in a
stock company must be at least five in number.

Hence, directors cannot be reduced to two.

No, Ilocano is not liable under the policy.

The Court held in a similar case that a warranty or condition provided in the insurance contract
should be complied with and failure to comply will avoid the insurance contract since this increased
the risk insured against without the consent of the insurer.

Here, PAM by transferring the property to another building violated the express stipulation in the
insurance contract thereby increasing the risk insured against.

Hence, Ilocano is not liable.

Yes, Sotero may validly designate her niece as beneficiary.

It is well-settled under the Insurance Code that in life insurance, the insured may designate anyone
ad his beneficiary regardless of insurable interest of the beneficiary in his life.

Here, Sotero may validly designate her niece as beneficiary in the life insurance policy although the
latter does not have any insurable interest on the life of the insured.

Hence, she may validly designate her niece.

Yes, the incontestability period sets in even in cases of fraud.

Section 48 paragraph 2 of the Insurance Code provides the insurance contract is incontestable upon
lapse of two years from the time of perfection whether fraud is employed by the insured.

Here, the insurer can no longer contest on the basis of fraud the insurance contract since more than
two years has passed from the perfection of the contract.

Hence, the incontestability period already sets in.

Yes, Aban is entitled to claim the proceeds the policy.

A beneficiary is entitled to claim the proceeds of the policy upon the happening of the death of the
insured.
 Majority of the directors present at the meeting at which there is quorum.

No, the RTC is not correct in its claim that the parent and the wholly owned subsidiary is one and the
same entity in the eyes of the law without need of a finding of fraud.

Jurisprudence dictates that the general rule is separate entity doctrine. Piercing of the veil of
corporate fiction only applies when there is probable cause that the other juridical entity is an
adjunct or a dummy formed for the purpose of protecting fraud and defending crime.

Here, although the FB owns majority of the stocks of D-Securities, ownership alone is not sufficient
to conclude that the two entity are one and the same.

Hence, FB may not be held liable for the debts of D-Securities.

No, DMP is not correct.

The stay order is applicable to monetary claims against the company under rehabilitation.
Moreover, the stay order is prospective in nature.

Here, the extrajudicial foreclosure happens before the issuance of Stay order by the court.
Moreover, the subsequent actions pertains to recording of the property under the name of the
buyer and hence, not a monetary claim against the corporation.

Hence, DMP is not correct.

I will decide the case against CGM, Inc.

The Insurance Code is categorical that payment of indemnity by the insurance company is the
operative fact that subrogates it to the right of the insured and makes the entity liable for the loss
liable to reimburse the insurance company

Here, payment of insurance indemnity by the ELP Insurance to the insured is the operative fact to
entitle it to step into the shoes of the insured by virtue of subrogation.

Hence, CGM is laible to reimburse ELP.

Yes, KK is liable for copyright infringement.

There is copyright infringement under the Intellectual Property Code when there is sale of a copy of
the work of an author without his consent for profit.

Here, KK committed copyright infringement since she sold copy of the books without the consent of the
author for profit. Fair-use for research or classroom purposes is not availing since there are numerous
copies sold for profit.

Hence, KK is liable for copyright infringement.

No, I will not grant the petition.

Jurisprudence has held that the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT)
is not binding to Court. Moreover, petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity must be alleged and proven in court.

Here, the decision and the church annulment proceedings of the NAMT do not bind the Court.
The ground alleged in the petition must be proved in Court.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

No, the provision in the will is not valid.

The Civil Code provision on succession categorically provides that the testator can prohibit the
partition of his estate only for a period of 20 years but not indefinitely.

Here, the provision in the will of Crispin to preserve the property for his grandchildren and
future generations of grandchildren is equivalent to prohibition of partition of the said property
for an indefinite period of time.

Hence, the provision is not valid.

No, the donation of the real property is not valid.

Article 749 of the Civil Code is clear that donation of real property to be valid must be in public
document.

Here, the donation of real property to the church is not valid since it is not in public instrument.
The donation in this case is in a private instrument since it was not notarized and it cannot be
notarized without the parties who executed and signed the document.

Thus, the donation is not valid.

No, the contention of Nante is not tenable.

It is well-settled under the Civil Code provision on sale that in a contract to sell ownership is not
yet transferred to the vendee since it will be conveyed only upon full payment. On the other
hand, in a contract of sale, ownership is transferred at the moment of the meeting of the minds
of the parties as to the object of the contract and the consideration to be given. Moreover, the
failure to complete payment is not a suspensive condition that will prevent the contract from
acquiring binding force since it is already a perfected one.

Here, the contention of Nante that the contract was one to sell is not correct since it is clear in
the deed of sale that it is a contract of sale since ownership of the parcel of land is conveyed and
 transferred outright. Moreover, failure of Monica to pay the balance of the purchase price did
not prevent the contract from acquiring binding force since it is already a perfected contract
upon meeting of the minds of the parties.

Thus, the contention of Nante is not tenable.

B. It annuls the institution of heirs.

I will grant the motion for partial reconsideration.

The Family Code does not provide as a condition precedent that there must be liquidation,
partition and distribution pf property before issuance of decree of absolute nullity of marriage.

Here, the Court provide a condition that is not provided under the law and hence decree of
absolute nullity of marriage be issued without liquidation, partition, and distribution of property
being conducted first.

Accordingly, motion for partial reconsideration may be granted

A. The contract that was perfected by Cris and the hotel is a necessary deposit.

The Court has held in a similar case that a contract of necessary deposit is perfected between
the hotel and the customer when the key of the latter’s car is surrendered to the hotel’s parking
attendant.

Here, it is clear from the facts that Cris surrendered the key of his car to the hotel’s parking attendant.

Hence, there is a contract of necessary deposit between the parties.

B. The hotel is liable for the indemnification of the value of the car plus damages if any.

It is categorically stated in the Civil Code provision on necessary deposit that the depositary is
liable for indemnification of the value of the thing deposited and damages suffered by the
depositor if any.

Here, the hotel as depositary filed in its obligation to safeguard and preserve the thing
deposited and consequently, it is liable to indemnify Cris, the depositor, of the value of his car as
well as damages if any.

Therefore, hotel is liable for indemnification of the value of the car plus damages

No, the allegation of Ruth is not tenable.

Case law holds that right of first refusal must be stipulated in the original contract and it is binding
without separate consideration. It is different from option contract since the latter to bind the offeror
must be accompanied by a consideration distinct from the purchase price.

Here, the facts are clear that Ruth has no right of first refusal neither is she entitled to a right to a
perfected option contract. There is a mere offer to sell by Tess to Ruth without Ruth accepting the offer.
Moreover, is not accompanied by consideration distinct from the purchase price and hence, Tess in this
case can sell the lot even before the lapse of the one-year period stated in her offer to sell.

Thus, there is no violation of right of first refusal in this case.

I will decide the case against the spouses.

Under Maceda Law, upon failure to pay installments the buyer is given a grace period of 60 days to
complete the payment.

Here, the spouses failed to pay the balance within the grace period since already a year has passed
before they offer their payment.

Hence, the spouses has no cause of action for specific performance

No, the consignation is not valid.

The Civil Code provision on obligation and contracts provides that there is a valid consignation if the
obligor refuses to accept the payment without justifiable reason and the tender was made first before
consignation in court and provided notice of consignation is serve to the obligor

Here, although the first requisite of tender and subsequent refusal is met, however, the further requisite
of notice to the obligor was not met.

Hence, the consignation is not valid.

Light and view

No, the obligation of J.C Construction to MSI is not extinguished by novation.

The Civil Code provision on obligation and contracts provides that novation by substitution of debtors
requires the concurrence or express consent of the creditor.

Here, there is no showing that there is an express consent given by the creditor in the substitution of
debtor.

Hence, the obligation is not extinguished by novation.

No, the contention of Edith and Philip is not valid.

It is well-entrenched in the Civil Code provision on Succession that in reserva troncal the subject
property received by a prepositus form an ascendant is inherited through intestate succession of
another ascendant of the prepositus and is reserved for the benefit of the relatives within the third
degree of consanguinity of the prepositus.
Here, the property although received by Jun from another ascendant which in this case is his father, it
was not after his death inherited through intestate succession by her Aunt Peachy since under the law
on intestate succession she is not entitled alone to the said property. In other words the property is not
a proper subject of reserve troncal.

Hence, the contention that it is subject to reserva troncal is not valid.

A. Yes, because of Article 2206 of the Civil Code which allows the surviving heirs to demand
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

Yes, the action filed by FMI will prosper.

The Civil Code provision on easements provide that sale of an owner of one of his several properties
wherein an easement is apparent at the time of sale conveys to the buyer the right over the easements.

Here, the facts clearly show that there is an apparent easement constituted by the owner of the two lots
at the time of sale to condominium owners and hence, it must be binding and enforceable to the buyer
of the adjoining servient lot.

Hence, the action filed by FMI will prosper.

No, the chest containing the pieces of jewelry and money cannot be considered hidden treasure.

The Civil Code provision on property defines hidden treasure as a jewelry and money whose lawful
ownership is not apparent.

Here, the lawful ownership of the chest containing jewelry and money is apparent and determinable
since the chest is found in the backyard of the Spouses Manuel it is presumed that they are the owner.

Hence, the chest containing jewelry and money is not a hidden treasure.

The Spouses Manuel has the right to claim ownership of the chest.

The Civil Code provision on property provides that the owner of the land is deemed the owner of the
surface and underground.

Here, the chest is found within the backyard of the Spouses Manuel and since they are the owner of the
land they are also deemed to be the owner of anything found in its surface and underground.

No, the contention of Carlito is not tenable.

Jurisprudence has held that the benefit of Article 159 of the Family Code applies only to heirs who are
dependent on the deceased financially for support.

Here, Lucas as the grandson of the deceased is not dependent on the latter financially for support.

Hence, the residential house may be subject to partition.

No, the act of Francisco and his men is not lawful.

The Court has held in a similar case that although the owner has the right to enforce his ownership over
his property, it is not proper, however, to use force to enforce it. The owner is provided with a remedy
under the law which is to file a case for unlawful detainer.

Here, Francisco unlawfully took the law into his own hands and applied unnecessary force to regain
possession of his property .

Hence, the act of Francisco and his men is not lawful.

A. Depositor until full payment of what may be due him

No, there is no valid waiver of the right to sue the school.

Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that for waiver to be valid the following must be established: 1.)
there is an existing and umistakable right; 2.) there is knowledge of the existence of such right; 3.) there
is waiver of such right is voluntary; and 4.) the waiver is not contrary to law, morals, public policy.

Here, fourth requisite of valid waiver is absent. The waiver in this case is contrary to public policy.

Hence, there is no valid waiver of the right to sue the school.

Avulsion

No, I will not grant the application for land registration of Cornelio.

It is clear under CA No. 141 that the land subject of the land registration must be declared alienable and
disposable agricultural land before or at the time of application; otherwise, it cannot be subject of
appropriation since it being a property of public dominion it is beyond the commerce of man.

Here, the subject land is not declared alienable and disposable at the time of application for registration.

Therefore, the applicant for land registration should be denied.

No, Cornelio cannot acquire said agricultural land through acquisitive prescription whether ordinary or
extraordinary.

The Civil Code provision on prescription clearly states that acquisitive prescription only applies to private
property and hence, cannot be applied to property of public dominion.

Here, the agricultural land is not a private property but a property of public dominion.

Accordingly, it cannot be acquired through acquisitive prescription.

B. No, the marriage is not valid because one essential element of marriage is absent

No, it is not necessary for Ted to file a petition for judicial recognition of decree of divorce before he can
contract a second marriage in the Philippines.

Article 15 of the Civil Code categorically provides that legal capacity is governed by law of the country
where one is a citizen.
Here, the legal capacity of Ted to contract a second marriage in the Philippines is governed by the law of
Canada where he is a citizen. If it can be proved that the Canadian law provides that Ted is legally
capacitated to marry after his decree of divorce was issued, then he may validly contract a second
marriage in the Philippines. This legal capacity may be further proved by a certification from consul or
embassy of Canada certifying as to his legal capacity to contact marriage

Hence, it is not necessary to file a petition for judicial recognition of decree of divorce.

Yes, both the acknowledgment and the donation mortis causa are valid.

It is provided under the Family Code that acknowledgement of illegitimate filiation may be executed and
later proved through a private written instrument signed by the putative parent.

Here, the acknowledgment of an illegitimate child is executed by the putative parent in a private written
instrument and hence, valid.

On the other hand Article 40 of the Civil Code provides that the unborn child has a presumptive
personality for all purposes favorable it.

Here, the donation mortis cause is favorable to the unborn child and hence, it has a presumptive
personality to be the recipient of the donation provided acceptance is made by her mother in behalf of
the unborn child.

B, Yes, it is valid if there is no express prohibition for subleasing in the lease contract.

I will decide the case in favor of Maria for the portion of the pro-indiviso portion of the property that
may be allocated to Fe in the partition.

Jurisprudence has held that a co-owner can sell his pro-indiviso share of the co-owned property even
without the consent of the other co-owners.

Here, the sale of the lot to Maria is valid as to extent of the pro-indiviso portion of the property that may
be allocated to Fe in the partition.

Hence, the sale to Maria is valid up to the extent of share of Fe in the partition.

I will deny the petition for adoption.

The Domestic Adoption Act is categorical that both spouses must file for joint adoption.

Here, Maria and Daniel being married should have filed for joint adoption, however in this case, Maria
failed to join his husband in the petition.

Hence, I will deny the petition.

The contractual relationship between Timothy and Kristoffer is that of partnership.

The Civil Code provision on partnership provides that two or more persons bind themselves to
contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the profit
among themselves.
Here, Timothy and Kristoffer bind themselves to contribute money, property or industry to a common
fund with the intention of dividing the net profit seventy percent for Kristofer and thirty percent for
Timothy.

Hence, a contract of partnership was executed.

No, the revocation of the SPA granted to John Paul is not proper.

It is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that a contract of agency cannot be unilaterally revoked if another

contract dependent on it.

Here, the contract of agency cannot be unilaterally revoked because another contract which in this case
is the contract entered with Atty. Audrey depends on the existence on continuity of the contract of
agency between Joe Miguel and John Paul.

Accordingly, the revocation of the SPA is not proper.

4:38

Yes, the joint will executed by Alden and Stela who were both former Filipinos is valid.

The prohibition in execution of joint will under Article 819 of the Civil Code applies only to Filipino
citizens.

Here, Alden and Stela are no longer Filipino citizens.

Therefore, the joint will they executed is valid.

Yes, the joint will can produce legal effect in the Philippines with respect to the properties of Alden and
Stela found here.

It is true that under Article 16 of the Civil Code properties found in the Philippines are governed by lex
rei sitei or the law of the place where the property may be found however, the exception is Article 15
nationality principle in relation to Article 16 paragraph 2 which provides that the intrinsic validity, order
of succession is governed by the national law of the decedent.

Here, if the US law, the national law of the decedent allows joint will, the disposition and stipulation
found in it may be enforced within the Philippines.

Hence, it may produce legal effect in the Philippines.

The sale of a parcel of land by Marco is void.

It is clearly provided under the Family Code that in regime of absolute community of property the
consent of both spouses is necessary in the disposition of property that is part of the absolute
community; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Here, in the absence of marriage settlement, the regime of absolute community governs the property
relation of the spouses since they are married after the effectivity of the Family Code. Consequently, the
sale of the parcel of land in this case is void since there is no consent given by Gina.

Hence, the sale is void.

I would rule in favor of the legitimate family.

The Family Code categorically provides that petition for recognition of illegitimate filiation must be
brought during the lifetime of the putative father in the absence of proof of acknowledgment in a public
or private written instrument executed and signed by the putative father.

Here, there is no showing of existence of public or private written instrument and the only proof of the
illegitimate child is the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and hence,
he should have brought his petition during the lifetime of his putative father.

Hence, the ruling is in favor of the legitimate family.

Yes, I will approve such compromise provided it is not in violation of public policy.

In a similar case the Court ruled that compromise is valid as there is nothing that prohibits it under the
law.

No, Article 147 on co-ownership cannot apply to Bert and Joe.

It is clear that Article 147 applies to man and woman who lived together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage and who are both legally capacitated to contract marriage.

Here, Bert and Joe are not legally capacitated to contract marriage by reason of gender.

Hence, Article 147 cannot apply to them.

The boy raised by Bert and Joe did not acquire any successional rights.

Jurisprudence dictates that legal adoption creates relationship similar to that of legitimate children.

Here, the boy was not legally adopted since no proceedings under the Domestic Adoption Act was filed
by Bert and Joe and consequently no relationship similar to that of legitimate children is created.

Hence, the boy did not acquire successional rights.

No, they would not have been legally allowed to jointly adopt the boy.

According to Domestic Adoption Act, petition for joint adoption may only be filed by married spouses.

Here, Bert and Joe are not married and are not allowed to marry each other under the Family Code.

Hence, they cannot jointly adopt the boy.

I will rule against Mrs. L.

Article 391 of the Civil Code establishes prima facie presumption of death under exceptional
circumstances such as death in relation to loss due to sea voyage commencing at the time of loss and
not upon the lapse of four years.
Here, Captain L is legally presumed dead when the vessel was lost during a sea voyage.

Hence, Mrs. L cannot claim monthly allotment for the next four years.

I will grant the appeal filed by the OSG.

The Court ruled in the recent case of Andal v. Tan-Andal that psychological incapacity must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence and cannot merely depend on the findings of a psychologist. Moreover, in
plethora of cases, sexual infidelity is not considered as an indicium of psychological incapacity since it is
not grave and legally incurable

Here, mere reliance on the findings of the psychologist did not establish clear and convincing evidence
of psychological incapacity of Glenda. Moreover, her sexual infidelity is not grave and irreparable.

Hence, the appeal of OSG should be granted

The buyer has a legal right of retention of the house with respect to the necessary expenses they
incurred.

The Civil Code provision on property provides that builders in good faith is entitled to a right of retention
of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses and useful improvements made on
the property.

Here, the Mr. and Mrs. A has the right to retain the property until they are reimbursed by Mr. and Mrs.
X of the necessary expenses they made on the subject property.

Hence, the buyer may retain the property.

No, the buyers cannot be made to immediately vacate the property on the ground that the sale was not
perfected.

It is clear under the Civil Code provision on sale that there a contract of sale is perfected at the moment
of the meeting of the minds of the parties as to the object and consideration. Moreover, the payment in
a contract of sale is not a suspensive condition the happening of which makes the contract acquire
binding force.

Here, the facts clearly show that a contract of sale was perfected between the parties. Non-payment by
Mr. and Mrs. A is not a suspensive condition that will prevent the perfection of the contract since the
contract of sale is already perfected upon the meeting of the mind of the parties.

Hence, the buyers cannot be made to vacate the property.

Y and Z is not correct in their claim the co-ownership is valid for 20 years.

Under the Civil Code provision on co-ownership, co-owners are allowed to enter into an agreement not
to divide and partition the property for a period not exceeding 10 years. Moreover, a co-owner may at
any time ask for partition of the co-owned property subject to limitations as provided by relevant law.

Here, the agreement not to divide and partition entered by X, Y, and Z is valid for the first ten years but
invalid as to the excess. Moreover, X may ask for partition of the property on the 8 th year, however, he
may be liable for damages for breach of the agreement.
Hence, Y and Z is not correct.

No, Maria cannot be made to reconvey the property by putting up the defense of acquisitive
prescription.

The Court has held in a similar case that the possessor of a real property in the concept of an owner may
acquire legal rights over the property by acquisitive prescription upon the lapse of ten years provided
there is good faith and just title.

Here Maria can raise the defense of acquisitive prescription since the facts are clear that Maria is in
possession of the real property in the concept of an owner for more than ten years and there is just title
by virtue of donation and she is in good faith.

Hence, Maria cannot be made to reconvey the property.

Yes, I agree with X that she is not liable for a fortuitous event.

The Civil Code provision on obligation and contracts provide that there is legal delay when there is
judicial or extrajudicial demand made by the debtor to the creditor unless the exception provided by the
Code applies where demand is not necessary to make the creditor in default.

Here, the general rule applies since the exception enumerated under the law finds no application. X is
not yet in default since no demand was made by Karla for the delivery of the dress and the mere lapse
of the agreed date of delivery will not ipso facto make X in default.

Hence, X is not liable.

The sale is voidable but Jackie can no longer recover the property.

Under the Civil Code provision on contracts, a contract of sale is voidable if one of the parties is not
legally capacitated to enter into a contract. In addition, the party who can raise minority as a defense
has five years from attainment of age of majority to annul the contract and recover the property.

Here, the sale is void since Jackie is a minor at the time she entered into the contract of sale. However,
she can no longer annul the contract and recover the property since more than five years has passed
from the time she attained the age of majority.

Hence, the sale is voidable but she can no longer recover the property.

No, Iya cannot demand from Betty P250,000 as her share in the debt.

It is clear under the Civil Code that a co-debtor whose debt is condoned cannot ask for reimbursement
from his co-debtor since condonation is essentially gratuitous.

Here, Iya whose debt was condoned by creditor Jun cannot ask for reimbursement from her co-debtor
Betty since the condonation is essentially gratuitous.

Therefore, Iyan cannot demand from Betty her share in the debt.

No, Cita cannot demand from Pedro to pay the entire obligation.
The Civil Code provision on contracts provide that in the absence of a stipulation in the agreement
expressly providing for solidary liability, it is presumed that the liability of the debtors is joint.
Consequently, in joint liability debtors are only bound to pay a proportionate part of the debt.

Here, the liability of the debtors is joint since there is no stipulation providing for solidary liability.

Hence, Cita can demand Pedro to pay only proportionate part of the debt.

Yes, Kyla can demand that Y deliver the portrait she has paid for since she was dealing with the business
establishment.

Case law dictates that if the obligation is contracted without considering the individual qualifications or
skills of the obligor, the obligee may ask another to do the job. Moreover, a partnership as an entity is
separate and distinct from the partners and the liability of the partnership is not the liability of the
partners.

Here, Kyla entered into a contract with the partnership and not with partner X.

Hence, Kyla can demand that the partnership deliver the portrait.

Yes, joint venture is considered a partnership.

The Court has held in various cases that corporations are currently allowed to enter into partnership and
joint venture is a temporary or partnership for a limited duration.

Yes, the action of the parents may prosper

Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that the employer is solidarily liable for
the negligence or fault of his employees on the basis of quasi-delict.

Here, the parents of the boy may on the basis of quasi-delict file an action for damages against the
employer bus company.

Hence, the action may prosper.

Yes, the parents of the boy can still make the bus company liable subsidiarily if the driver cannot pay the
award for damages without the need to file a separate civil action.

The Court has held in a similar case that a bus company in criminal case for reckless imprudence may be
held subsidiarily liable if the driver cannot pay the award for damages.

Here, the bus company may be held subsidiarily liable in the criminal case to pay for the award of
damages if the driver cannot pay.

Hence, the parents of the boy can still make the bus company subsidiarily liable.

I disagree with Julia’s claim.

Natural obligation under the Civil Code is performed voluntarily by the debtor who has knowledge that
she is not under the obligation to perform. Moreover, a debtor can recover payment made by mistake.

Here, Sara made the payment of interest by mistake and since the payment is erroneous on her part it is
not deemed voluntarily made and hence, it is not in payment of a natural obligation.
Hence, Julia may ask to return the interest paid.

Civil Obligations under Article 1157 are obligations which are provided by law, contracts, quasi-
contracts, quasi-delict and delict whereas natural obligation refers to obligation not owing but due to
morality and equity is voluntarily performed.

No, the agreement Donna signed with Jane is not valid because it is pactum commissorium

It is well-entrenched in the Civil Code that pactum commissorium is a void stipulation since it is against
public policy.

Here, the stipulation in the agreement is pactum commisorium since it ipso facto transfers the
ownership of the jewelry to Jane upon non-payment.

Hence, the agreement as to pactum commissorium is not valid.

No, Donna cannot redeem the jewelry by paying the buyer Juana the amount she owed Jane.

The Civil Code provides that the consent of the creditor is mandatory in novation or subrogation of
creditors.

Here, the consent of Jane in the subrogation is not secured by Donna.

Hence, the redemption is not valid.

No, the deed of sale is not valid since it against public policy.

The Civil Code provides that the winner must return to the loser the payment the latter made since it is
against public policy.

Here, the deed of absolute sale is not valid since the consideration which is in winnings in gambling is
against public policy and consequently, Z may ask for annulment and reconveyance of his property.

Hence, deed of sale is not valid.

No, the client cannot unilaterally rescind the authority he gave in favor of his lawyer.

Jurisprudence has held that a special power of attorney cannot be unilaterally revoked by the principal if
the another contract depends on it.

Here, the contract for payment of attorney’s fees depends on the contract of agency.

Hence, the client cannot unilaterally rescind the agency.

No, I do not agree with X.

Case law provides that in voluntary trust agreement, the trustee cannot acquire legal rights over the
property unless he renounced the trust and ten years has passed from the time of renunciation.

Here, although X impliedly renounced the trust by registering the property in his name, however,
prescriptive period of ten years has not yet passed.

Hence, X did not acquire legal rights over the property.

Yes, the stipulation In a deed of sale that title to the property be directly issued in the buyer’s name is
valid.

The Court has held in a similar case that if a sale was made during the pendency of registration
proceedings the seller may petition the land registration court for substitution of applicant.

Direct attack on title is an action filed in court wherein the primary issue is the ownership of the
property. On the other hand, a collateral attack on title is an action where the principal issue is not the
ownership of the property since it is only asserted as a minor issue in the case.

No, it is not a collateral attack since the motion was filed by Juan in the same registration case where
ownership of the property is the principal issue.

Jurisprudence provides that motion filed by a buyer in the same registration case is deemed a direct
attack since it raises as an issue the ownership over the subject property.
No, the court is not correct in taking cognizance of the Joint Motion for Reconsideration.

The Rules of Civil Procedure provides that absence without justifiable reasons during the promulgation
of judgment precludes the accused from availing post-conviction remedies.

Here, Balatong and Labong were absent without justifiable reasons during the promulgation of
judgment and consequently, are precluded from availing post-conviction remedies such as Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, the court is not correct.

No, Balatong and Labong cannot appeal their conviction.

Jurisprudence is clear that post-conviction remedies are not available to the accused after his unjustified
absence during promulgation of judgment.

Here, appeal by Balatong and Labong is a post-conviction remedy.

Hence, appeal is not available to both of them.

I will resolve the case in favor of McJolly.

In the case of Jason Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, the Court ruled that the defense of double jeopardy is
meritorious since previous conviction in the first information involving the same criminal act precludes
conviction in the subsequently filed information.

Here, McJolly was previously convicted for Reckless imprudence resulting in Slight physical injuries and
hence, prosecution and conviction on the basis of the second information for the same criminal act of
Reckless imprudence is prohibited.

Hence, the case is in favor of McJolly.

I will resolve against Rene.

The Rules on Evidence clearly provides that dying declaration is an exception to hearsay rule. Dying
declaration is admissible if the declarant with knowledge of her impending death made known to
another the cause of or circumstances of her death.

As to Rene’s first claim of error. Here, Kulasa made known to Asintado the cause and circumstances
surrounding her impending death.

Jurisprudence has held that confession to the press is admissible as confession since it is voluntary and
was not vitiated or compelled by force, violence or intimidation by police officers.

As to Rene’s second error. Here, Rene’s confession may be considered against him since it was
voluntarily given and not vitiated by force, violence, or intimidation.

Hence, I will resolve against Rene.

C. Non-pro tunc
I would recommend to Maria to file a summary proceeding for collection of sums of money under the
Rules on Summary Procedure, to file a case under Rules of Procedure on Small Claims, or file an unlawful
detainer case.

Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, collection under this rule can be summarily adjudicated if the
plaintiff aims only to collect the unpaid rentals and interest. On the other hand, plaintiff may opt to file
under the Rules on Procedure for Small Claims provided the amount does not exceed P100,ooo. In
addition, if the tenant refuses to pay within one year from last demand, unlawful detainer case may be
filed.

Here, Maria may file a collection case under Rules on Summary Procedure which is summary in nature
or file under Rules on Small Claims provided that her claim of rentals in excess of P100,000 is waived.
Moreover, an unlawful detainer case may be filed by Maria if the tenant fails to pay within one year
form last demand.

The proper venue of the judicial remedy of collection under Rules on Summary Procedure or Rules on
Small Claims is the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant at the option of the plaintiff. On the other
hand, the proper venue of the unlawful detainer case is the Municipal Courts of the place where the real
property is situated.

Here, the venue of the collection case under the Rules on Summary Procedure or Small Claims is the
residence of the Plaintiff which is in this case is Quezon City or the residence of the defendant which in
this case is Marikina City, at the option of the Plaintiff Landlord as represented by Maria.

The venue of the unlawful detainer is Municipal Court of the place where the real property subject of
the action is situated which is Las Pinas City in this case.

B preliminary attachment

The grounds invoked by Co Batong are not proper

Under the Rules of Court the jurisdiction inl libel cases pertains to the Regional Trial Court of the place
where the libelous article is first printed or published regardless of the amount of damages sought in the
complaint.

Penduko’s first ground is not proper since the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction in libel cases.

Under the Rules on Civil Procedure in relation to libel under the Revised Penal Code, venue in libel cases
pertains to the place where the libelous articles are first printed and published.

Here, second ground is not proper since venue is properly laid which in this case is Paranaque City, the
place where the libelous articles are first printed and published.

Hence, the grounds invoked are not proper.

Yes, Johnny’s notarial will may be probated in the Philippines.

Jurisprudence has held that a notarial will of a foreigner may be probated here in the Philippines if the
foreigner owns property in the Philippines.
Here, Johnny owns properties in the Philippines.

Hence, his notarial will may be probated in the Philippines.

Yes, Anastacia is qualified to be the executrix of Johnny’s will since she is a resident of the Phillipines.

Under the Rules on Settlement of Estate, executor chosen by the testator must be a resident of the
Philippines regardless of his nationality.

Here, Anastacia is a resident of Fort Bonifacio, Philippines.

Hence, she is qualified to be the executrix of Johnny’s will.

Yes, Agente is correct.

Under the Rules on Civil Procedure, summons must be served at the same time writ of preliminary
attachment is served otherwise the court did not acquire jurisdiction