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Ann. Rev. Energy. 1980. 5:89-105

Copyright © 1980 by Annual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved

RISKS OF LNG AND LPG +11077

James A. Fay
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Department of Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

INTRODUCTION

As production limits were encountered for traditional fuel sources in the

last few decades, the use of liquefied gases to meet special demands opened
up hitherto untapped marginal supplies of fuel. The most prominent of
these fuels are liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG). Although little used today outside the space program, liquefied
hydrogen is being proposed as a significant liquid fuel for future transporta­
tion vehicles. These fuels have the common property of requiring a lower
than normal temperature, or higher than normal pressure, if they are to be
contained as liquids, which is the only economically feasible form for stor­
age or transportation by vehicle. Even though these fuels may have been
found or produced in a gaseous state and eventually are consumed as gases,
an intermediate conversion to a liquid form is economically and technologi­
cally beneficial to the process of supplying this energy to the final consumer.
Liquid fuels have been in common use for nearly a century, and the
growth in use of LNG and LPG would be unexceptional were it not for the
unusual behavior of these liquids when accidentally released to the environ­
ment. Because of their low boiling points compared with ambient tempera­
tures, spilled LNG and LPG quickly vaporize to the gaseous form. They
are then ripe for combustion by fire or, when further mixed with air,
possibly by explosion. (For example, several investigators ( 1) have predicted
that a rapid spill of 10,000 tons of LNG on water would be completely
vaporized in about five minutes). Although ordinary liquid petroleum prod­
ucts are flammable or even explosive, it has become accepted by the govern­
ment, the public, and the scientific community that LNG and LPG pose
an unusual hazard requiring special care in handling.
89
0362-1626/80/10 10-0089$01.00
 90 FAY

Public dispute about LNG and LPG safety revolves around the question
of whether government regulation of the industry, together with its own
self-regulation, limit the risk of harm to affected populations to a level that
is politically acceptable. This review is concerned principally with the status
of risk analysis for LNG and LPG systems and only tangentially with the
more general problem of the relationship of formal risk analysis to public
acceptability of such systems.
LNG is a form of natural gas obtained at atmospheric pressure by re­
frigerating it to -260oP (-162°C) which permits long-term storage in tanks
(rather than in underground reservoirs) and transportation by marine, road,
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or rail vehicle (rather than by pipeline). It makes possible a mode of distri­

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bution of natural gas energy from well to end consumer that parallels that
of liquid petroleum. But because of its very low temperature (halfway
between absolute zero and the freezing point of water), special and com­
paratively expensive technology is required to store and transport LNG
which deters its more widespread use. Because the fire hazard from
accidental release of LNG is perceived to be more serious than that of
petroleum, public controversy regarding risk acceptance and facility siting
abounds (2).
Transforming natural gas to LNG serves two distinct purposes: (0) It
permits the transoceanic shipment of LNG from distant gas fields in Africa
and the Middle East to markets in Western Europe, the United States, and
Japan, thus supplementing indigenous supplies of natural or synthetic gas
in these industrial nations, and (b) In the United States, especially in the
northeast, LNG stored in peak-shaving facilities is regasified on cold winter
days to help satisfy peak demand for space heating when domestic pipeline
capacity is insufficient. In either case, regasified LNG is distributed by
pipeline to customers.
Modem LNG marine tankers typically carry 125,000 m3 of cargo in five
separate holds (3). Because of its low temperature, the liquid cargo is
contained in cryogenic tanks thermally insulated and, in some instances,
structurally isolated from the hull of the vessel. Special alloys and insulation
are needed for this purpose. Because of the low density of LNG (40% of
that of sea water) and the need for its containment separate from the ship's
structure, these tankers are much bulkier and more expensive than their
crude oil tanker counterparts. Relative to the energy content of their
cargoes, LNG tankers are nearly ten times as costly as oil tankers. Only
about eighty such tankers have been built worldwide to date (2).
Marine importation terminals are sized to match LNG tanker capacity,
commonly providing a total storage volume more than twice that of the
largest tanker supplying the terminal. Because of the economies of scale,
individual storage tanks at LNG terminals are larger than is usual at oil
 LNG/LPG RISKS 91

terminals, having typical storage capacities o f 105 m3• Like the tanks aboard
ships, they are constructed of special materials and require a complex
configuration. Three such terminals are currently in use in the United
States, on the east coast, and similar terminals are located in Japan and
several European nations.
Peak-shaving terminals are smaller in size, although a few have storage
tanks of more than 50,000 m3 capacity. At these terminals pipeline gas is
liquefied during summer months and stored for wintertime use. (In New
England, some terminals are supplied directly with LNG trucked from the
import terminal in Everett, Massachusetts.) In addition, peak-shaving ter­
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minals ship LNG by truck to nearby satellite terminals for use during
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periods of peak demand. More than 100 such terminals are located in 3 1
states of the United States (2).
The LNG industry is comparatively new; most of its growth occurred in
the last decade. Spurred by the declining production of gas in the United
States and its scarcity in Europe and Japan, and, of course, by the availabil­
ity of natural gas in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East, expansion
has been limited only by the necessity to develop new technology and the
difficulty of acquiring capital, which is so intensively used in this industry.
But two major accidents in the United States-a tank failure and fire in
Cleveland in 1944 (4) and an explosion and fire in an empty LNG tank in
Staten Island in 1973 (5), both involving substantial loss of life-have raised
questions about the safety of LNG systems, which has affected both the rate
of construction and the selection of sites for LNG terminals in the United
States in recent years (6).
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is the liquid form of a fuel or petrochemi­
cal feedstock, consisting mostly of propane, which is separated from oil or
gas streams at the wellhead or produced during the petroleum refining
process. If stored at atmospheric pressure it must be cooled to -44°F
(-42°C) but, unlike LNG, it can also be stored as a liquid at normal
temperatures under an absolute pressure of about 8 atm. When stored under
pressure, LPG tank volumes usually do not exceed that of railway tank cars,
about 40 m3• Much larger terminal storage tanks are refrigerated, as are
most transoceanic LPG tankers.
LPG is stored and distributed like any other petroleum product, except
for the special structural and handling requirements imposed by its low
temperature or high pressure. But unlike LNG, LPG is not gasified for
distribution by pipeline to the end consumer (except when used as a natural
gas supplement) and therefore requires many small-scale shipments by rail
or road tank vehicles. Transoceanic tanker shipments are currently fewer
than those of LNG, and LPG tankers are, on average, smaller than their
LNG counterparts.
 92 FAY

Whether stored under pressure or as a refrigerated fluid, accidental re­

lease of LPG results in its rapid evaporation and potential for combustion.
Numerous LPG fires involving rail or road vehicles have been experienced,
but only one refrigerated storage tank failure, at a refinery in Qatar, has
occurred. Some LPG accidents have been accompanied by explosions (7).
Although the US LPG distribution system is more widespread than that
for LNG and the number of LPG accidents much more numerous (albeit
of smaller size), the siting of LNG import, peak-shaving, and satellite
terminals has aroused much more controversy regarding its safety, for
several reasons. The unusual size and shape of LNG storage tanks attracts
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attention and inquiry. LNG is not used by end consumers, who are familiar
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with LPG storage in homes and recreational vehicles. Equally significant,

however, is the distinct difference between LNG and LPG in regard to the
manner in which US government agencies regulate the construction, opera­
tion, and pricing practices of the respective industries.
At both state and federal level, LNG is regulated as a form of natural
gas whose distribution and sales fall within the scope of public utility law
(8). The process of granting permits under these laws necessarily requires
a substantial review of safety, environmental, and pricing issues. These
procedures open up to public scrutiny the evaluations of public safety
impact undertaken by applicants and regulatory agencies, and permit inter­
vention in the regulatory process by citizen groups or individuals who might
be exposed to risk. Because of the direct involvement of government agen­
cies, controversies over LNG facilities frequently (if not invariably) become
political issues.
In contrast, LPG distribution is no more regulated than is distribution
of any other petroleum product of equivalent flammability. Provided the
usual construction and operating standards for vehicles and storage facili­
ties are observed, no overall regulatory evaluation of LPG facilities, includ­
ing safety and environmental effects, is required by law. Because such
requirements are absent, little public information exists on LPG risks and
public controversy over facilities is almost nonexistent.
Although this review concerns the evaluation of risk associated with both
LNG and LPG systems, it concentrates principally on LNG, for which a
much greater amount of information exists. It is to be expected that future
LPG risk analysis, as well as that for combustible petrochemicals, such as
ethylene, propylene, etc, will follow the pattern set by LNG.
- Formal risk analysis involves two stages of evaluation. The first, conse­
quence analysis, determines the extent of hazards associated with a posited
list of credible accidents and their possible ensuing events. The second stage
requires the assignment of probabilities to event sequences and the compu­
tation of expectation values of damage criteria, such as human casualties
 LNG/LPG RISKS 93

or deaths, as the summed products of consequences and probability. This

review follows this same order of presentation, without necessarily implying
acceptance of the validity or significance of current risk analyses. Final
remarks attempt an overall assessment of the usefulness of LNG and LPG
risk analysis to public risk evaluation.

LNG RISK
LNG Hazards
In a series of predominantly experimental investigations, Burgess and co­
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workers (9-11) first showed the dominant features of LNG spills: rapid
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boiling of the liquid whether spilled on land or the surface of water, horizon­
tal spreading of the evolved vapor because of its negative buoyancy, dilution
of the vapor as it drifts downwind by mixing with ambient air, ignitability
of the vapor cloud or plume, and the possibility oftlameless vapor explosion
of the LNG liquid under certain circumstances. Subsequent field tests of
LNG spills up to 10 m3 in volume on land and water confirmed these earlier
findings, adding more specific information on boiling rates and dispersive
properties of the vapor cloud (12, 13). [For a comprehensive review of past
and current test programs, see USDOE (14).]
This experimental research became the basis for a qualitative, generalized
description of the physical behavior of spilled LNG. When suddenly spilled
on water, the less dense LNG spreads laterally across the water surface,
boiling at a constant mass rate per unit of contact area. The evolved vapor,
being more dense than air, also spreads laterally, simultaneously mixing
with air. As a consequence, the vapor cloud depth is much less than its
width. The vapor cloud drifts in the direction of the wind and atmospheric
turbulence dilutes its vapor concentration. Within the limit of travel where
ignitable proportions are encountered, the cloud remains at ground level.
When spilled on land within a confining enclosure, the LNG boiling rate
decreases with time because of heat conduction into the soil, but the vapor
cloud or plume behavior is not significantly different in character from that
for a water spill.
The difficulty and expense, to say nothing of the danger, of testing LNG
spills of more than a few cubic meters in volume led to the development of
analytical models for predicting the behavior of spills of volumes up to
lOs m3 on land or water (12, 13, 15-19). [For a comparative review of the
water spill models, see Havens (1).] While there is general agreement among
the models on the time to evaporate an LNG spill, there is a wide disparity
in the prediction of the distance of travel of the vapor cloud or plume
beyond which no significant portion of the cloud is flammable (1). As this
distance defines an outer limit to the region surrounding a spill where a fire
 94 FAY

risk exists, the disagreement among model predictions foreshadows a dis­

agreement about risks. The basis of the disparity among model predictions
lies in the different assumptions concerning the fluid mechanics of the
mixing of the vapor with the surrounding atmosphere, leading to signifi­
cantly different results for very large spills (which have not been tested) but
not for small spills.
The combustion ·of LNG spills is considered to follow several alternative
scenarios. If ignition occurs at the spill site, a pool fire will be established
above the liquid pool, whether on land or water, lasting until the LNG is
completely consumed. If ignition occurs in a portion of a continuous plume
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extending downwind from the boiling pool, a flame may propagate upwind
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to the spill site, consuming the remaining LNG. It is generally accepted,

without experimental proof, that a vapor cloud may propagate a flame even
after its originating pool has been exhausted provided it contains ignitable
proportions of vapor (5-15% of gas in air).
While the hazard from a flame sweeping through a ground level vapor
cloud or plume is obvious, it is acknowledged that thermal radiation from
pool fires or cloud flames can cause skin bums or ignite combustible materi­
als at some distance from a flame or fire. Measurements of LNG pool fire
shape and radiation have been used as the basis of modeling radiant heat
hazards from large scale spills (9, 13, 20).
Based upon observations of combustion following a sudden accidental
release of LPG or liquid rocket fuels, it has been suggested that LNG may
bum in what has been termed a "fireball" mode, i.e. a rising, approximately
spherical diffusion flame in which a fuel rich vapor cloud burns as it entrains
surrounding air (2 1). Combustion of this type has not been observed in any
LNG spill tests to date. Based upon an extrapolation of the scaling laws
confirmed in small scale tests, the burning time in the fireball mode is quite
short-about one minute for the vapor evolved from a 1()4 ton spill (21).
Radiation from such fireballs has been predicted, based upon small scale
tests and use of black body models (22, 23).
Natural gas explosions within closed spaces are not uncommon. But the
production of pressure or blast waves by the rapid combustion of un­
confined LNG vapor has only been observed once in an accidental release,
although such unconfined vapor cloud explosions have been frequently
observed for spills of other combustible hydrocarbons (7). The under­
standing of the cause of such explosions is too limited to predict whether
unconfined LNG vapor clouds formed from large spills would be capable
of exploding (24). On the other hand, considerable effort has been expended
on determining whether uniform mixtures of LNG vapor and air, enclosed
in plastic bags, can be detonated, i.e. propagate a supersonic combustion
wave. Indirect evidence indicates that a large enough sample will detonate
 LNG/LPG RISKS 95

if initiated by a sufficiently intense explosive charge (25, 26). So far, no

detonation has been observed when only a flame or spark is used to ignite
an unconfined LNG vapor cloud.
LNG storage tanks on land are commonly surrounded by a dike or berm
to limit the spread of liquid should there be a substantial leakage from the
storage vessel. While the dike is built to enclose a volume capable of con­
taining the full capacity of the tank, the fluid dynamics of a sudden, cata­
strophic release may breach the containment system if improperly designed
(8). Modeling of LNG vapor plume formation and dispersion (based in part
on small scale tests) from sudden releases into containment areas surround­
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ing storage vessels ( 13) is used in risk analysis of terminals.

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Extensive experimental investigations have shown that LNG samples

containing substantial percentages of ethane and heavier hydrocarbons can
undergo a flameless vapor explosion when spilled on water ( 10, 1 1, 27-29).
The explosive energy release is believed to result from superheating of the
LNG by water to an unstable thermodynamic state, whereupon the super­
heated liquid spontaneously vaporizes, generating a pressure wave. The
thermodynamic conditions necessary for such flameless vapor explosions
have been well documented for light hydrocarbon liquefied gases and their
mixtures, including LNG (28). For LNG compositions normally carried
and stored in commercial quantities, vapor explosions are not expected to
occur.

LNG Risk Analysis

Several studies, undertaken to determine the overall risks of specific
proposed import terminals (e.g. 18, 30-33), consider the marine vessels,
unloading facilities, land storage tanks, and processing facilities as the
system whose risks are to be quantified. The principal measure of risk is
thermal injury (by flame radiation or impingement) to humans located on
land beyond the site boundaries. The aggregate system risk is portrayed as
a "risk profile", i.e. the annual probability of an accident whose severity
exceeds a specified value, as measured by human fatalities or casualties.
For convenience, the analyses consider the marine vessels and the land
storage tanks as separate subsystems whose risk may be independently
evaluated. Accidents involving simultaneous or related LNG releases from
both components are not usually considered. Small spills from either source
are considered to pose no risk, so that only large scale spills involving loss
of all of the contents of a tank or hold are analyzed.
The release of the contents of one hold (or at most two) of an LNG tanker
is initially assumed to be the result of either a collision with another vessel,
a grounding, or a ramming of a stationary obstacle (such as a bridge
abutment). To determine the conditions of ship motion which could result
 96 FAY

in a tank rupture from accidents of these types, a semiempirical model of

ship structure deformation is used which is based upon experience with
petroleum tankers. The model relates the volume of ship structure which
is grossly deformed to the kinetic energy available in the moving ship (or
ships) prior to the accident. Because LNG tankers have a structure to
contain the cargo which is separate from that which provides longitudinal
strength and watertight integrity, more structural material must be de­
formed before a cargo hold is penetrated in a ship collision involving an
LNG tanker than would be the case for an ordinary oil tanker. The model
thus defines a minimum energy needed to penetrate an LNG tanker hold
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and therefore a minimum relative speed between the colliding vessels. This
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minimum speed needed for penetration decreases with an increase in the

size of the colliding partner; it is about five knots for the longest vessels
likely to be encountered (32, 33). The model predicts that tank penetration
by grounding or ramming is impossible (32). It is usually assumed that hold
failure will not be propagated by the contact of released LNG with the
vessel structure.
Subsequent to a marine spill of a volume equal to that of a single hold,
two alternative combustion scenarios are considered. In the first, ignition
occurs (with an assumed a priori probability) at the spill site and the LNG
bums as a pool fire. Alternatively, a vapor cloud or plume drifts downwind
from the spill site and may be ignited by sources (principally on land) with
an assumed temporal and spatial probability distribution, provided the
vapor concentration has not been diluted below the lower flammability limit
of 5% LNG vapor in air.
The number of human fatalities or casualties is determined separately for
each alternative. For the pool fire at the accident site, the radial distance
within which the thermal radiation flux exceeds an assumed criteria level
for fatal or injurious skin bums defines the geographical circle surrounding
the assumed site inside of which residents are counted as fatalities or casual­
ties (30, 32). For the vapor cloud or plume it is assumed that any person
within the ignitable region will be a casualty because of contact with a flame
that propagates throughout the cloud (30--33). It is commonly assumed that
persons indoors are protected from radiation hazard but not flame hazard.
The probability of collision between an LNG tanker and another vessel
is based upon the reported frequency of vessel collisions and the amount of
traffic expected to be encountered along the proposed tanker route in the
vicinity of the terminaL For the busier US harbors, historical collision rates
between ocean going vessels are in the range of 10-5 to 10-4 per transit (32).
Based upon the model for the LNG cargo tank rupture as a consequence
of a collision, and assumptions regarding ship vessel speeds in harbors, the
 LNG/LPG RISKS 97

probability of discharge of the LNG in a cargo tank as a consequence of

a collision is estimated as about once in ten collisions. Thus the probability
of an LNG spill following a collision would be lQ-6 to 10-5 per transit (32,
33).
Land storage tank failures which would result in the discharge of the
vessel contents into the volume enclosed by the dike or berm of the second­
ary confinement system surrounding the tank are considered to pose two
alternative hazards. If ignited at the source, a pool fire would be established
with potential damage from thermal radiation beyond the terminal bounda­
ries. If not immediately ignited, a vapor plume would extend downwind,
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which might be ignited and propagate a flame back to the source.

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Among the possible causes of storage tank failure that have been consid­
ered are natural events (e.g. earthquake, hurricane, tornado, tidal wave, and
flood) and man-made events (e.g. aircraft or missile impact and sabotage).
Only for proposed California terminals (18, 30) has earthquake rupture
been considered as an event having a nonzero probability, although all US
terminals would have to meet some seismic standards. One study estimates
the probability of a catastrophic tank failure, given an earthquake that
exceeds the design value, as 10-2 (30). The annual probabilities of failure due
to aircraft striking a storage tank are typically estimated to be about
10-5 per year. As a consequence, land storage tank failure rates from all
causes except sabotage are estimated not to exceed about 10-5 per year
(30, 33).
Risk from LNG systems has been aggregated under two categories,
societal risk and individual risk. Given the set of all events, their conse­
quences and probabilities, total societal risk is the sum over all events of the
product of the probability and the consequences (as measured by fatalities
or casualties) of each event. Individual risk, on the other hand, is specific
to a chosen geographic location. It is the sum of the probabilities of all
events of the set, that cause a casualty or fatality at the given location.
Societal risk is often presented as a cumulative probability distribution
of casualties or fatalities, i.e. the yearly probability of an accident with
consequences exceeding a given value, as measured in casualties or fatalities.
The area under such a curve is then the expected value of annual casualties,
which is a measure of societal risk.
A simple single measure of societal risk, which is useful for the purpose
of comparing various risk analyses, is the annual probability, P, of an
accident causing one or more casualties. For all studies, the major contribu­
tors to P appear to be a marine spill followed by a vapor cloud drifting
downwind from the spill site and a marine spill at or near the terminal that
ignites at the spill site. Land storage tank failures seem not to be important
 98 FAY

components of P. Because the geographical area of hazard for either of these

events is of the order of several square kilometers and extends well beyond
the boundaries of the terminals that have been studied, where it is to be
expected that at least one person will be exposed to the hazard, P is very
nearly a measure of the probability of a marine spill with either of these
consequences.
Table I compares values of P determined in four studies. The wide
differences in P (over three orders of magnitude) reflect significant differ­
ences in assumptions regarding the probabilities of various events rather
than different characteristics of the terminals. For Canvey Island (33), a
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probability of release from the LNG tanker while at the unloading jetty is
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assumed to be 3 X 10-5 per berthing, while for the other studies this proba­
bility is assumed to be zero. The contribution to P from a vapor cloud
drifting downwind from the spill site is directly dependent on the assumed
probability that the cloud is not ignited at the source. Values of 1% (31),
10% (32), and 30% (33) have been used for this probability. None of these
values is based upon any empirical evidence such as the frequency of
ignition of oil spills. There are also different criteria used for defining a
casualty or fatality as a function of thermal radiation intensity or exposure
to a flame, e.g. 4.7 kw/m2 in (30) and 17 kw/m2 in (31, 32).
In addition to differences in various event probabilities, which will affect
the calculated value of P, the studies conducted so far explicitly disregard
certain events by assigning zero probability to them. It is claimed that
sabotage of storage tanks should not be difficult (8), but no methodology
for assessing such risks has been advanced. Unconfined vapor cloud explo­
sions (as distinct from detonations), which are not uncommonly encoun­
tered in the release of other combustible materials (7), have not been
considered despite the significant amount of experience with this phenom­
ena. Except for some aspects of the Canvey Island study (33), no large scale
releases resulting from a sequence of events starting with a minor spill or
malfunction have been considered.

Table 1 Calculated annual probability of an accident at LNG terminals

causing one or more casualties

Location Ref. Probability

Canvey Island, U.K. 33 2 X 10-3

Everett, Mass.a 32 2 X 10-5
Pt. Conception, Calif. 30 10-6
Matagorda Bay, Texasa 31 5 X 10-7

3Quoted figure is for fatalities. Casualty probability would be slightly

higher.
 LNG/LPG RISKS 99

A general critique of LNG risk analyses given by Fairley (34) supports

these observations. He notes the lack of inclusion of all possible contribu­
tions to the probability of an accident and the necessity to make use of the
widest possible base of experience in order to substantiate the event
probabilities (e.g. ignition probabilities at the spill site). He also emphasizes
that the use of judgmental estimates of probabilities provides opportunities
for bias and presents difficulties for substantiation of the risk analyses. To
some extent, all of the risk analyses (18, 30-33) suffer from one or more of
these defects, as does the risk analysis for road tanker transport described
below (35).
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The risk from land transportation of LNG by road tankers servicing an

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LNG import terminal has been examined in two studies (33, 35). The
Canvey Island study (33) considers only truck accidents in the vicinity of
the terminal and concludes that their risks are negligible compared with
other sources. The second study (35) reviews the societal risks associated
with the entire system of landside transport, including up to 20,000 ship­
ments per year averaging about 90km of travel per shipment, from an LNG
import terminal located in Everett, Massachusetts. It concludes that the
societal risk probability, P, is 5 X 10-3 accidents per year causing one or
more casualties, or 2.5 X 10-7 such accidents per year per truck shipment.
This overall conclusion apparently depends directly upon an assumption
that the probability of a catastrophic spill of the full contents of a truck (40
m3) is 3 X 10-9 km-I, or 2.7 X 10-7 per average truck shipment of 90 km,
and implies that catastrophic spills are the principal cause of one or more
casualties per accident. It is interesting to note that the societal risk, as
measured by P, for the posited 20,000 annual shipments from the Everett
terminal, is 200 times the value of P estimated for the marine transportation
and land storage system for that same terminal (see Table 1).
The methodology used in this study (35) for analyzing the risk from road
tankers parallels closely that used for marine spills. The major hazard arises
from a fire at the spill site or from a combustible vapor cloud drifting
downwind from the spill. Because of the much smaller maximum spill
volume from a road tanker, compared with a marine vessel, the areas
affected by fire hazard are much smaller. Also, the probability of a major
spill per transit is much smaller (3 X 10-7 for a truck compared with 1�
to 10-5 for a tanker). Nevertheless, the much larger number of annual truck
shipments offsets these factors in determining the value of P.
The very substantial differences in calculated risk among the several
studies examining similar systems reinforces the Fairley criticism that judg­
mental bias and lack of experiential substantiation of both probabilities and
consequences greatly vitiates the value of these studies. There does not
 100 FAY

appear to be any trend in the later studies toward meeting the Fairley
criteria for substantive adequacy.

LPG RISK

LPG Hazards
As explained in the introduction, LPG hazards are similar in kind to those
encountered with LNG and hence the methods used in analyzing the conse­
quences of accidental LPG spills (35, 36) have been patterned after those
described above in the section on LNG hazards. The number of studies
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specifically related to LPG is relatively small, presumably because the

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regulation of LPG safety is less prominent than that of LNG; also there is
a much smaller scientific base for LPG hazard assessment. Major attention
has been given to vaporization rates in water spills (37) and to the possibili­
ties of fiameless vapor explosions (28) described above.
But not all LPG effects have their LNG counterpart. When LPG is stored
as a pressurized liquid at normal temperature, a sudden major failure of the
storage vessel will result in the rapid expulsion of its contents. A portion
of the liquid rapidly vaporizes as its pressure is reduced. The violent motion
of the discharge disperses the remaining liquid, forming a cloud of droplets
and vapor mixed with air. If ignition occurs simultaneously with the dis­
charge, a fireball is formed. Such an event has been termed a "boiling liquid,
expanding vapor explosion," or BLEVE (38). A three-stage model describ­
ing the formation of a BLEVE cloud, corroborated by small-scale experi­
ments, has been suggested by Hardee & Lee (38). Their model predicts that
mixing of the contents of an LPG truck with air in a typical accident can
be accomplished in about 30 sec, a process that proceeds independent of
atmospheric turbulence or gravitational spread as is usually considered in
LNG or refrigerated LPG spills on water or land. Hardee & Lee (39) also
analyze the resulting fireball, calculating that a railroad tank car of LPG
could bum in less than 10 sec and form a fireball whose maximum radius
would be 400 ft. Again this analysis is consistent with a few smaller scale
experiments.
The violence of BLEVEs has prompted Reid (40) to propose that, for a
sudden depressurization of an LPG tank, an unstable superheated liquid
may be formed that explosively releases energy, aiding the fracturing of the
pressure vessel. This may account for the tank fragment projectiles which
sometimes are generated in LPG BLEVE accidents.
Explosion and, possibly, detonation of LPG vapor clouds have been
observed at accident sites (7). While these observations are consistent with
the detonability of LPG air mixtures (26), there is no quantitative model
that can be used to predict the explosive yield or the conditions that will
 LNG/LPG RISKS 101

lead to an explosion following upon an ignition (as distinct from an initia­

tion caused by a high explosive trigger).

LPG Risk Analysis

A risk analysis for an LPG storage and transshipment complex at Canvey
Island (33) constitutes the only substantial study of an LPG system. About
20,000 tons of butane and propane are stored at four adjacent locations,
mostly as refrigerated liquid. For all activities, the combined annual proba­
bility, P, of an accident causing one or more casualties was calculated to
be about 1.4 X 10-3. The principal sources of risk were the marine operations
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involving landing and loading or unloading of vessels. It is noteworthy that

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the societal risk, as measured by P, for the LPG operations is comparable

to that calculated for the LNG terminal at Canvey (see Table 1).
Simmons (36) has examined the societal risk associated with the trans­
port of LPG by road tank truck in the United States. Based upon reported
historic rates of LPG spills and leaks from tank trucks, historic evidence
on ignition at reported spill sites, an analysis of vapor plume dispersion, and
assumptions about population density, societal risk profiles were con­
structed. The annual probability, P, of accidents involving one or more
fatalities was calculated to be about 1<r1. The average annual fatalities
calculated from the risk profile was in agreement with reported historic
data.
A more detailed risk analysis of LPG trucking as compared with LNG
trucking has been carried out (35). It was found that the calculated societal
risk index, P, was nearly the same for either cargo. As was the case for LNG
truck accidents, the principal determinant of P was the probability (per
truck mile of travel) of a major spill of the cargo.
Compared to LNG, LPG risk analysis for large systems is less developed.
The few studies made to date lead to the conclusion that LPG systems are
at least as risky, and possibly much more risky, than equivalent LNG
systems. Since there exists a substantial record of LPG accidents of many
kinds, sizes, and effects, there is an opportunity to improve the quality of
risk analysis by examining in more detail the risks of LPG systems.

RISK ACCEPTANCE AND RISK PERCEPTION

The risk analyses of LNG and LPG systems have been undertaken predom­
inantly for the purpose of supplying information on the safety aspects of
proposed facilities as a component of a regulatory or permitting process
which often involves public review. They may be described fairly as objec­
tive analyses, in the sense that the methodology invokes accepted scientific
principles, although subjective choice of values of various parameters may
 102 FAY

be extensively invoked. Irrespective of the scientific quality of such analyses,

it is worth inquiring as to their usefulness in informing public discussion and
decision making regarding LNG and LPG facilities.
Various criteria have been proposed for determining the public accept­
ability of a risky project. According to one scheme (41) these would include
a cost-benefit balance (cost of risk reduction less than increase in benefits),
revealed preference (risks no greater than presently tolerated for equivalent
benefits), expressed preference (people say that risk is acceptable), and
comparison with natural hazards (risk less than those of natural hazards).
Each of these criteria has its advantages and drawbacks, and none appears
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to be superior as a general approach (41). Where risk acceptance has been

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addressed in the LNG and LPG risk analyses reviewed above, attention has
been focused on a comparison of individual risk (as measured by the annual
probability of a fatality or casualty to an individual from a proposed project
or facility) with that from natural hazards (e.g. lightning stroke) and man­
made hazards (e.g. automobile accidents and fires). Not only does this
approach fail to address the full range of possible criteria that have been
shown to possess some value, but it fails to account for some elements of
the risk problem that are especially salient to LNG and LPG, such as the
equity issue (lack of proportionate distribution of risks and benefits among
all individuals at risk) and the "zero-infinity dilemma" (very high conse­
quence, low probability accident).
There is also some empirical evidence that objective risk, as measured by
historic fatality or casualty rates, is not equivalent to perceived risk as
determined by attitudinal surveys of the general public (42). While some of
the difference can be ascribed to public misconception regarding the relative
sizes of fatality rates, there is also evidence that other factors than fatality
rate affect the perception of risk (42). While none of these studies has
directly considered public perception of LNG or LPG risks, the available
evidence clearly points to a significant distinction between risk perception
and objective risk assessment for all types of risks to which the public is
exposed.
There is a view that risk analysis can play but a very limited role in the
adjudication of controversies related to public risk acceptance. Nelkin &
Pollak (43) claim that "recent disputes have taught us a lesson-that deci­
sions about risk are not simply matters of sufficient technical evidence or
adequate information. Substantive issues are at stake which embody highly
controversial political and social values." Bazelon (44) notes that an impor­
tant role for the courts is to force a more explicit acknowledgment of where
and how value jUdgements have been used in decision-making process and
to guard against their incorporation into apparently objective scientific
assessments. The history of LNG controversies (2) illustrates well the value
of these cautionary comments on the limits of the usefulness of risk analysis.
 LNG/LPG RISKS 103

CONCLUSION

Since the use of LNG and LPG as fuels is likely to increase and will
certainly persist for some time to come, assessment of the safety of
LNG/LPG systems will continue to draw attention. Even in the absence
of major accidents in this industry in the future, continuing public concern
about large hazardous facilities (e.g. petrochemical plants and nuclear reac­
tors) is quite likely to force continuing review of operating and design
standards for LNG/LPG facilities. Are we adequately equipped to evaluate
Annu. Rev. Energy. 1980.5:89-105. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

the risk of existing systems and those that may be proposed in the future?
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Scientific investigations to date appear to have identified the major haz­

ards. Except for the dispersive behavior of vapor clouds-a not insignificant
factor in risk evaluation-the consequences of spills are well circumscribed
by current analyses. The physically significant effects accompanying nonex­
plosive combustion of spilled material are fairly well documented. Yet
potentially substantial uncertainties remain.
Catastrophic spills of 1()4-10s m3 on land or water are possible, given the
current size of storage vessels. Almost all experimental spills have used less
than 10 m3 of liquid. There is thus some uncertainty regarding the accuracy
and validity of extrapolation of current empirical information and physical
models to spills of catastrophic size. Furthermore, it is not impossible that
new phenomena may become evident in large scale spills which are not
easily observable in small scale tests. The substantiation of the consequence
analysis needed for the system risk analysis cannot yet be regarded as
satisfactory.
The less likely but still possible explosive or fireball combustion modes
are not well understood in respect to their inception. The troubling experi­
ence with such violent combustion of similar combustible vapors suggests
that this possibility will need futher definition.
Extant LNG and LPG risk analyses illustrate the difficulties of substan­
tiating the numerous event probabilities and the determination of all event
sequences that can lead to hazardous consequences. Their disparate results
show that significant improvements are needed. Most importantly, a de­
tailed critique of past efforts and a determination of an exhaustive set of
criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a risk analysis should precede any
further attempts to improve on existing studies.
Like other hazardous systems, LNG/LPG facilities raise issues of public
risk whose dimensions extend well beyond those measurable through scien­
tific study of hazards to the public. Risk analysis, properly done, can
provide one measure among many needed to help resolve the difficult politi­
cal and social choices that must be made. It remains to be seen whether the
possible improvements in the scientific underpinnings of risk assessment
 104 FAY
will facilitate the resolution of public controversy over hazardous facilities,
such as are involved in LNG and LPG systems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The preparation of this review was supported by the Division of Environ­
mental Control Technology, US Department of Energy, under contract
EE-77-S-02-4202.AOO3. The opinions expressed in this article are those of
the author.
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