Sub: - 23111

Q1. Explain the role of PSM (process safety management) in safety. Explain
its advantages and disadvantages.

Ans :- Process Safety Management( PSM):

Purpose:
The major objective of process safety management (PSM) of highly hazardous chemicals is
to prevent unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals especially into locations that could
expose employees and others to serious hazards. An effective process safety management
program requires a systematic approach to evaluating the whole chemical process. Using this
approach, the process design, process technology, process changes, operational and
maintenance activities and procedures, Non routine activities and procedures, emergency
preparedness plans and procedures, training programs, and other elements that affect the
process are all considered in the evaluation.

Application:
The various lines of defense that have been incorporated into the design and operation of the
process to prevent or mitigate the release of hazardous chemicals need to be evaluated and
strengthened to ensure their effectiveness at each level. Process safety management is the
proactive identification, evaluation and mitigation or prevention of chemical releases that
could occur as a result of failures in processes, procedures, or equipment.The process safety
management standard targets highly hazardous chemicals that have the potential to cause a
catastrophic incident. The purpose of the standard as a whole is to aid employers in their
efforts to prevent or mitigate episodic chemical releases that could lead to a catastrophe in the
workplace and possibly in the surrounding community.To control these types of hazards,
employers need to develop the necessary expertise, experience, judgment, and initiative
within their work force to properly implement and maintain an effective process safety
management program as envisioned in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) standard.The OSHA standard is required by the Clean Air Act Amendments, as is
the Environmental Protection Agency's Risk Management Plan, which will be proposed in
1992. Employers who merge the two sets of requirements into their process safety
management program will better assure full compliance with each as well as enhance their
relationship with the local community.Although OSHA believes process safety management
will have a positive effect on the safety of employees and will offer other potential benefits to
employers, such as increased productivity, smaller businesses that may have limited
resources to them at this time, might consider alternative avenues of decreasing the risks
associated with highly hazardous chemicals at their workplaces. One method that might be
considered is reducing inventory of the highly hazardous chemical. This reduction in
inventory will result in reducing the risk or potential for a catastrophic incident. Also,
employers, including small employers, may establish more efficient inventory control by
reducing, to below the established threshold, the quantities of highly hazardous chemicals
onsite. This reduction can be accomplished by ordering smaller shipments and maintaining
the minimum inventory necessary for efficient and safe operation. When reduced inventory is
not feasible, the employer might consider dispersing inventory to several locations onsite.
Dispersing storage into locations so that a release in one location will not cause a release in
another location is also a practical way to reduce the risk or potential for catastrophic
incidents.
Exceptions :The PSM standard does not apply to the following:

 Retail facilities;
 Oil or gas well drilling or servicing operations;
 Normally unoccupied remote facilities;
 Hydrocarbon fuels used solely for workplace consumption as a fuel (e.g. propane used
for comfort heating, gasoline for vehicle refueling), if such fuels are not a part of a
process containing another highly hazardous chemical covered by this standard; or
 Flammable liquid stored in atmospheric tanks or transferred, which are kept below
their normal boiling point without benefit of chilling or refrigerating and are not
connected to a process.

Q2. What is the role of training in safety? Explain different types of training
conducted in industry.

Ans :- Training must include instruction on how to handle upset conditions as well as what
operating personnel are to do in emergencies such as pump seal failures or pipeline ruptures.
Communication among operating personnel and workers within the process area performing
Nonroutine tasks also must be maintained. The hazards of the tasks are to be conveyed to
operating personnel in accordance with established procedures and to those performing the
actual tasks. When the work is completed, operating personnel should be informed to provide
closure on the job.

Employee Training:
All employees, including maintenance and contractor employees involved with highly
hazardous chemicals, need to fully understand the safety and health hazards of the chemicals
and processes they work with so they can protect themselves, their fellow employees, and the
citizens of nearby communities. Training conducted in compliance with the OSHA Hazard
Communication standard (Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1910.1200) will
inform employees about the chemicals they work with and familiarize them with reading and
understanding MSDSs. However, additional training in subjects such as operating procedures
and safe work practices, emergency evacuation and response, safety procedures, routine and
Nonroutine work authorization activities, and other areas pertinent to process safety and
health need to be covered by the employer's training program.
In establishing their training programs, employers must clearly identify the employees to be
trained, the subjects to be covered, and the goals and objectives they wish to achieve. The
learning goals or objectives should be written in clear measurable terms before the training
begins. These goals and objectives need to be tailored to each of the specific training modules
or segments. Employers should describe the important actions and conditions under which
the employee will demonstrate competence or knowledge as well as what is acceptable
performance.
Hands-on training, where employees actually apply lessons learned in simulated or real
situations, will enhance learning. For example, operating personnel, who will work in a
control room or at control panels, would benefit by being trained at a simulated control panel.
Upset conditions of various types could be displayed on the simulator, and then the employee
could go through the proper operating procedures to bring the simulator panel back to the
normal operating parameters. A training environment could be created to help the trainee feel
the full reality of the situation but under controlled conditions. This type of realistic training
can be very effective in teaching employees correct procedures while allowing them also to
see the consequences of what might happen if they do not follow established operating
procedures. Other training techniques using videos or training also can be very effective for
teaching other job tasks, duties, or imparting other important information. An effective
training program will allow employees to fully participate in the training process and to
practice their skills or knowledge.
Employers need to evaluate periodically their training programs to see if the necessary skills,
knowledge, and routines are being properly understood and implemented by their trained
employees. The methods for evaluating the training should be developed along with the
training program goals and objectives. Training program evaluation will help employers to
determine the amount of training their employees understood and whether the desired results
were obtained. If, after the evaluation, it appears that the trained employees are not at the
level of knowledge and skill that was expected, the employer should revise the training
program, provide retraining, or provide more frequent refresher training sessions until the
deficiency is resolved. Those who conducted the training and those who received the training
also should be consulted as to how best to improve the training process. If there is a language
barrier, the language known to the trainees should be used to reinforce the training messages
and information.
Careful consideration must be given to ensure that employees, including maintenance and
contract employees, receive current and updated training. For example, if changes are made
to a process, affected employees must be trained in the changes and understand the effects of
the changes on their job tasks. Additionally, as already discussed, the evaluation of the
employee's absorption of training will certainly determine the need for further training.

Contractors:
Employers who use contractors to perform work in and around processes that involve highly
hazardous chemicals have to establish a screening process so that they hire and use only
contractors who accomplish the desired job tasks without compromising the safety and health
of any employees at a facility. For contractors whose safety performance on the job is not
known to the hiring employer, the employer must obtain information on injury and illness
rates and experience and should obtain contractor references. In addition, the employer must
ensure that the contractor has the appropriate job skills, knowledge, and certifications (e.g.,
for pressure vessel welders). Contractor work methods and experience should be evaluated.
For example, does the contractor conducting demolition work swing loads over operating
processes or does the contractor avoid such hazards?
Maintaining a site injury and illness log for contractors is another method employers must use
to track and maintain current knowledge of activities involving contract employees working
on or adjacent to processes covered by PSM. Injury and illness logs of both the employer's
employees and contract employees allow the employer to have full knowledge of process
injury and illness experience. This log contains information useful to those auditing process
safety management compliance and those involved in incident investigations.
Contract employees must perform their work safely. Considering that contractors often
perform very specialized and potentially hazardous tasks, such as confined space entry
activities and Nonroutine repair activities, their work must be controlled while they are on or
near a process covered by PSM. A permit system or work authorization system for these
activities is helpful for all affected employers. The use of a work authorization system keeps
an employer informed of contract employee activities. Thus, the employer has better
coordination and more management control over the work being performed in the process
area. A well-run and well-maintained process, where employee safety is fully recognized,
benefits all of those who work in the facility whether they are employees of the employer or
the contractor.
Q3. What is the role of instrumentation in safety? Explain its advantages.

Ans :- Instrumentation for safe and efficient operation of plants

Accidents continue to happen because too many owner/operators still use injuries and
fatalities as the predominant metric for safe operation. This focus on direct impact can lead to
acceptance of loss of containment events and tolerance for latent weaknesses in process
safety management (PSM). Knowledge of gaps in equipment integrity and management
systems shouldn’t depend on catastrophic events. Injuries and fatalities should occur so
infrequently that impact data are meaningless for trending performance.
Accidents often occur when equipment is improperly designed, installed, operated,
tested and maintained. Adequate theory and standards are available to ensure safe operation
of process equipment. The problem isn’t bad people and lack of competency — it’s that the
systems governing equipment integrity aren’t rigorous enough to ensure the required
reliability.
A plant must use a rigorous quality management system to sustain equipment reliability;
otherwise, accidents will occur when enough latent conditions in equipment, procedures and
personnel training accumulate. It’s essential to take a proactive approach — not just
monitoring for behaviors, errors and failures that are known root causes for process safety
incidents but also identifying improvement opportunities to counter this accumulation and
minimize risk.
Plan
W.E. Deming believed that 85% of a worker’s effectiveness is determined by the system he
works within, only 15% by his own skill1. Planning ensures that work processes yield
equipment that operates consistently in a safe manner, fulfills government and jurisdictional
requirements, and meets recognized good engineering practices. The output of planning is a
management system of policies, practices and procedures that seeks to identify and control
releases of highly hazardous chemicals. Recommended work practices and activities are
provided for instrumented protective systems in “Guidelines for Safe and Reliable
Instrumented Protective Systems”2 by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and
for safety instrumented systems (SIS) in
There is no substitute for knowledge only a small amount of knowledge can prevent mistakes
leading to process hazards. Unfortunately, many owner/operators are losing process
knowledge and history as operators and technical staffs retire or simply leave for better jobs.
Errors accumulate unless there’s continuous analysis and improvement of safety practices.
Counteracting loss of expertise as well as equipment degradation through age and
obsolescence requires significant effort.
Written process safety information (PSI) covering the process hazards, technology and
equipment provide the foundation for sustaining internal process knowledge. A written
design basis should define the PSI for the safety equipment and should be traceable to the
process hazards analysis. For SIS, the design basis is the hardware and software safety
requirements specification3. It should be maintained under revision control for the equipment
life.
Do
This phase implements the systems defined in the Plan phase. From a project perspective,
detailed engineering is completed, yielding an ISS installation that conforms to the design
basis. Detailed engineering includes sufficient information to ensure the ISS is properly
specified, constructed, installed, commissioned, operated and maintained. Equipment
installed in ISS should be proven to provide the required performance in similar operating
environments.
Equipment classification also must consider the core attributes of protection layers, namely
independence, functionality, integrity, reliability, auditability, MOC and access security. To
counteract the unknown, owners/operators should rely on a defense-in-depth strategy of
multiple independent protection layers to lower operational risk. An independent and separate
safety instrumented system (SIS) is essential to ensuring safe and reliable operation. Defense-
in-depth also seeks to minimize common cause, common mode and systematic errors that
cause multiple layers to fail. Detailed design should provide an ISS equipment list identifying
the equipment by a unique designation (e.g., the tag number) and the required inspection and
proof test interval.
Validation activities should include an input-to-output test of each new or modified ISS to
demonstrate and document that the equipment is installed according to specification and
operates as intended for each operating mode. It’s crucial to satisfactorily complete validation
prior to the initiation of any operating mode where a hazardous event could occur.
Check By what method?

Only the method counts. The Check phase applies metrics to assess performance against
requirements. Sustainable operation is achieved by focusing on metrics providing real-time
indication. Table 1 provides example metrics for the ISS. CCPS has suggested additional
metrics.Overwhelming task. Sometimes technical personnel want to measure everything just
because they can. It’s important to carefully choose metrics so that just the right amount of
meaningful data is collected. All systems involving humans and machines suffer some degree
of variation in output quality. Good metrics drive personnel to do the right thing by
identifying and correcting variation outside what’s considered acceptable. Measuring the
wrong things can undermine process safety. It’s unfortunate but true that personnel will
behave contrary to reason and the best interest of the company if necessary to “make their
numbers.”

OR

 Instrumentation for safe plant operation :

Chemicals are also classified as under :

1. According to their Physical Statei.e. solid, liquid or gases. Fine particles of solid
like powder, dust, fumes and smoke are called particulate matter. Their suspension in
air or gas also exists. Liquids are classified as acid; alkali, solvent, suspension, liquid
mixture, aerosols etc. Gases are classified as inert (N21 C02), reactive, toxic, irritant,
corrosive etc.

2. Noxious Gases :
(1) Irritant gases – Cl2, NH3, SO2, NO2, COCL2, Aldehydes etc.
(2) Systemic poisons – C6H6, CS2, PH3, Stibine, Mn, Nickel carbonyl, Arsine,
Halogenated hydrocarbons etc.
(3) Simple asphyxiants – N2, CH4, CO2 etc.
(4) Chemical asphyxiants - CO, H2S, HCN etc.
3. Dust (Particulate Matter):
(1) Causing plenumoconioses - Coal, Silica, Asbestos etc.
(2) Causing Asthma - Cotton, Flour, TDI etc.
(3) Causing allergy - fungal spores, bird fanciers, lung, bagassation etc.
 (4) Causing lung cancer - Chromium, Asbestos, Benzene etc.
4. Biological Agents and Diseases :
(1) Virus Rickettisia - Psittacosis, rabbis etc.
(2) Bacteria - Anthrax, Woolsorter's disease, Leptospirosis or Weal's disease,
Brucellosis, Tetanus etc.
(3) Fungi - Ringworm, Moniliasis etc.
(4) Parasites - Hookworm
(5) Plant products - Dermatitis due to mango tree and cashew seed processing.
For details see the Schedule given under the Rules for manufacture, use, import,
export and storage of hazardous micro-organism, genetically engineered organism or cells
(Some physical, chemical or biological agents cause skin diseases (dermatitis) and
alcoholism, sickness or accident may also cause health effects.

Q4. Explain the Bhopal gas disaster.

 Ans :- BHOPAL TRAGEDY

If we see the history of worst chemical disasters, in industries the first thing that comes to our
memory is one at Bhopal.On the night of Dec. 2nd and 3rd, 1984, a Union Carbide plant in
Bhopal, began leaking. due to run-away reactions, temperature and pressure rise and the
safety valve lifted to the atmosphere. About 25-27 tons of the deadly gas methyl isocyanate
spread through the city of Bhopal.Half a million people were exposed to the gas. Protective
systems that should have prevented or minimized discharge were out of service. Refrigeration
system to cool the reactor was down. Scrubbing system to absorb the released vapour was not
immediately available. Flare system to burn vapours getting past the scrubber was out of
service.
Lessons we learned Form Bhopal Tragedy
1)Reduce inventory of hazardous material (MIC)
2)Keep all the safety related equipment in order
3)Keep residential areas away from the plant
4) Proper Management
Another worst chemical disaster: that comes to our mind was;

Q5. Explain the role of hazardous area classification in safety. State its
advantages.

Ans :- Introduction
Electrical and electronic equipment such as motors, generators, transformers, circuit breakers,
fuses, switches, relays, solenoids and resistors produce significant amounts of heat, arcing
and sparking during normal and abnormal operation, which could pose a substantial risk of
fire or explosion in facilities where chemicals are manufactured, processed or utilized. To
minimize the risk of fires or explosions that could result from this arcing, sparking and heat
dissipation, it is critically important that electrical/ electronic equipment be designed, tested
and labeled as being acceptable for use in the areas in which they are installed. This holds
especially true for hazardous (classified) locations, i.e. locations where flammable,
combustible or ignitable gases, vapors, liquids, dust, fibers or flyings may be present.
Hazardous area classification is the evaluation and classification of hazardous (classified)
locations using scientific and engineering principles, within facilities where chemicals are
manufactured, processed or utilized. Hazardous areas are classified solely for the purpose of
ensuring the safe and proper specification and installation of electrical/ electronic equipment
located within them.
A hazardous area classification is typically shown on plan view drawings of the facility (and
sometimes on elevation drawings) that are commonly referred to asarea classification
drawings/diagrams. Based upon the area classification drawings, electrical/ electronic
equipment can be properly specified and installed such that the risk of fires or explosions is
greatly reduced.
Hazardous (Classified) Locations
Article 500 of the National Electrical Code (NEC) (reference 1) defines the requirements for
the safe and proper specification and installation of electrical/electronic equipment in
hazardous (classified) locations. NEC Article 500.5 (A) states that "Locations shall be
classified depending on the properties of the flammable gas, flammable liquid-produced
vapors, combustible liquid-produced vapors, combustible dust or fibers/flyings that may be
present, and the likelihood that a flammable or combustible concentration or quantity is
present. Each room, section, or area shall be considered individually in determining its
classification."
Hazardous Area Classification
Each room, section and area within a facility where chemicals are processed or utilized are
evaluated individually and assigned a Class I, II or III, Division 1 or 2, Group A, B, C, D, E,
F or G classification based on several criteria: (1) the types of chemicals that are present; (2)
the probability of their presence during normal and abnormal operation; (3) the volume being
processed or utilized; and (4) the physical properties (concentrations, densities, pressures,
temperatures and flows) that are observed during normal and abnormal plant operating
conditions.
Class I Locations
A Class I location is a location where fire or explosion hazards may exist due to flammable
gases, vapors or flammable liquids. NFPA 497 (reference 2) provides recommended practice
for the classification of Class I hazardous (classified) locations. NEC Articles 500 and 501
define the requirements for the safe and proper specification and installation of
electrical/electronic equipment in Class I locations. NFPA 497 and NEC Articles 500 and 501
are relied upon heavily when performing area classifications and when specifying
electrical/electronic equipment for safe and proper installation in Class I locations. Figure 1
(below) is an example of an area classification diagram for a Class I area.
Figure 1 - Area Classification Diagram for a Class I Area (Flammable Liquid)
Class I Division 1
A Class I, Division 1 location is a location in which ignitable concentrations of flammable
gases, flammable liquid-produced vapors, or combustible liquid-produced vapors may exist
under normal operating conditions.
Class I Division 2
A Class I, Division 2 location is a location in which ignitable concentrations of flammable
gases, flammable liquid-produced vapors, or combustible liquid-produced vapors may exist
under abnormal operating conditions.
Class I Group Designations
Class I flammable gases, vapors and liquids are grouped into one of four (4) groups (Groups
A, B, C or D) based on their physical properties and the ease in which they can be ignited.
Table 4.4.2 in NFPA 497 (reference 2) shows the physical properties and Group
classifications of many commonly used flammable gases, vapors and liquids. Acetylene is an
example of a Group A flammable gas. Hydrogen is an example of a Group B flammable
gas. Carbon Monoxide is an example of a Group C flammable gas. Gasoline is an example of
a Group D flammable liquid.
Class II Locations
A Class II location is a location where fire or explosion hazards may exist due to combustible
dust. NFPA 499 (reference 3) provides recommended practice for the classification of Class
II hazardous (classified) locations. NEC Articles 500 and 502 define the requirements for the
safe and proper specification and installation of electrical/electronic equipment in Class II
locations. NFPA 499 and NEC Articles 500 and 502 are relied upon heavily when performing
area classifications and when specifying electrical/electronic equipment for safe and proper
installation in Class II locations. Figure 2 (below) is an example of an area classification
diagram for a Class II area.

Figure 2 - Area Classification Diagram for a Class II Area (Combustible Dust)

Class II Division 1
A Class II, Division 1 location is a location in which combustible dust is in the air
under normal operating conditions in quantities sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable
mixtures, or where accumulations on electrical equipment are sufficient to interfere with the
safe dissipation of heat generated by the equipment.
Class II Division 2
A Class II, Division 2 location is a location in which combustible dust due to abnormal
operating conditions may be present in the air in quantities sufficient to produce explosive or
ignitable mixtures, or where accumulations on electrical equipment may be sufficient to
interfere with the safe dissipation of heat generated by the equipment.
Class II Group Designations
Class II combustible dusts are grouped into one of three (3) groups (Groups E, F or G) based
on their physical properties and the ease in which they can be ignited. Table 5.2.2 in NFPA
499 (reference 3) shows the physical properties and Group classifications of many commonly
used combustible dusts. Titanium is an example of a Group E combustible dust. Carbon
Black is an example of a Group F combustible dust. Nylon Polymer is an example of a Group
G combustible dust.
Class III Locations
A Class III location is a location where fire or explosion hazards may exist due to ignitable
fibers or flyings. NEC Articles 500 and 503 define the requirements for the safe and proper
specification and installation of electrical/electronic equipment in Class III locations.
Non-hazardous (Unclassified) Locations
Any area which cannot be classified as a Class I, II or III hazardous (classified) location is
considered to be an unclassified or non-hazardous area.
Conclusion
Electrical and electronic equipment such as motors, generators, transformers, circuit breakers,
fuses, switches, relays, solenoids and resistors produce significant amounts of heat, arcing
and sparking during normal and abnormal operation, which could pose a substantial risk of
fire or explosion in facilities where chemicals are manufactured, processed or utilized. To
minimize the risk of fires or explosions that could result from this arcing, sparking and heat
dissipation in hazardous (classified) locations, it is critically important that
electrical/electronic equipment be designed, tested and labeled as being acceptable for use in
the areas in which they are installed.
Hazardous area classification drawings provide a road map that ensures that
electrical/electronic equipment can be safely and properly specified and installed in
hazardous (classified) locations such that the risk of fires or explosions is greatly reduced.
Work with a qualified engineering testing lab that has the expertise, experience and
capabilities necessary to perform accurate and practical area classifications for hazardous
(classified) locations within any process facility.

Q6. Explain the selection criteria for plant siting and layout for a major
petrochemical plant.

Ans :- Criteria for sitting & Layout of Chemical and Petrochemical Plants :
SITING CRITERIA: There are 4 Siting Criterias as under:
General Guidelines :

1. Land availability and its cost.

2. Raw material availability.
3. Labour availability (Also the quality of labor-Strike).
4. Infrastructure availability (Different for different Products & even Models).
5. Access to market. (Not in Andaman Nikobar)
6. Transport facilities.
7. Drinking and process water facilities. (Igatpuri Plant laid down pipeline from a river
for making water available)
8. Sewage and Drainage.
9. Place for solid and liquid waste disposal. (Govt. approved facility distance like Taloja,
Pune Ranjangaon)
10. Interlinking with other plants.(Suppliers & Venders & Purchasers)
11. Surrounding population density and distance from the public.(In case of nuclear plant
or
MAH Units like one in Manmad Petroleum unit)
12. Distance from highway and railway and from transport centers.(Cost cutting Factor)
13. Suitability of climate, environment and factors related to ecology, geology, and
micro& macro biology.
14. Government policy advantages like subsidies (M&M Haridwar –Some taxrelaxation),
incentives and zoning (area reservation eg. SEZ) if prescribed.
15. Other techno-economic criteria.

Q8. Explain any two unit operation in the industry with safety aspects.

Ans:- FERTILISER INDUSTRY:

Fertilisers are natural (manure) or artificial. Artificial fertilizers are produced in

chemical plants and they may be organic or inorganic,
nitrogenous, phosphatic, potash and trace element fertilizers.
In the warehousing stage, phosphate. Potassium-salt and other
dusts are released. In chemical processing plant, air pollution
by toxic gases (Fluorine compounds, H2SO4, NO, HCI, CO
and NH3, gases) and dust, high air temperature and noise are
noticed. Closed and efficient ventilation is necessary. In
finishing processes, weighing, bagging and storing, gaseous
emissions and fluorine compounds are released. Phosphates
and other raw materials contain 10% or more free silica which
may cause pneumoconiosis. The dust of soluble fertilizers
causes irritation. The safety measures include:
1. Mechanizations and automation of production processes, provision of remote control,
careful assembly and safe operation of equipment and heat insulation.
2. Process segregation and walls and floor covering to absorb fluorine compounds.
3. Gen. Ventilation, exhaust ventilation of enclosed plant, cleaning of exhaust air and
waste water.
4. Education and personal hygiene.
5. Use of PPF and safety showers.
6. Safety and sanitary supervision.
7. Pre and post medical examination including radiographs of the locomotors system and
lungs.
IS : Fertilizer - Glossary 1304, sampling and tests 6092, bagged, handling and storage 5985,
mixtures 7863, 9024, effluents - tolerances 2590, treatment and disposal 9841, application
equipment glossary 9855, Metering mechanism plate type 12599, feed roller type 12613,
Urea ammonium phosphate based 8359, nitrophosphate based 7131, seed drills 6316, 6813,
Phosphaticfertilizer industry. Limits of emissions 8635. –

PESTICIDE INDUSTRY (INSECTICIDE): Pesticide is a chemical used to destroy

an organism detrimental to human interest. It includes insecticides, fungicides, herbicides,
rodenticides, bactericides, miticides, nematocides, moUuscicides. They are generally
halogenated (Cyclodienes, Bischlorophenyls, Cycloparaffins, Organo-chlorines and
Chlorinated terpenes) or Organophosphorus (Parathion, malathion, TEPP, OMPA, DDVP,
abate, ciodrin etc. ) type. They are classified as extremely hazardous, highly hazardous,
moderately hazardous, slightly hazardous etc. For these classifications and their details
including Lethal Dose values see Reference No. 1 given at the end of this Chapter. Strict
safety rules are necessary during their processing, handling, packaging etc. Exhaust
ventilation and use of PPE are essential.

Statutory Provisions:Schedule 15, Rule 102, GFR, Sch.l5, Rule 114, MFR and Sch.29,Rule
95, TNFR give statutory provisions for manufacture and handling of dangerous pesticides
listed in Appendix-1 to that Schedule. Appendix-11 gives cautionary placard.
The measures include prohibition of employment of women and young persons, air
space of 500 m3 or more per person, efficient exhaust draft on charging, discharging,
blending and powder or liquid preparation, sound and sloping floor with gutters and drainage,
daily washing, workbenches of stainless steel, waste container with lid and waste disposal by
burning, safe disposal of empty containers, no manual or direct handling, protective clothing
and their daily washing, medical facilities including doctor and antidotes and medical
examination - pre employment, quarterly examination and record in Form 20, GFR additional
rest interval of 10 minutes before each meal and before the end of the day's work, washing
and bathing facilities with at least 50% bathrooms and 1 place for 5 workers with clean
towels, soap and nail brushes, prohibition of food and drink in workrooms, cloak room for
clothing and PPE, mess room with incharge person and prior permission o? the CIF to start
manipulation of a new pesticide i.e. not listed in Appendix 1.Sch.l5, u/r 102, GFR defines
"pesticides" as agents used for the purpose of destroying or arresting the growth or increase
of harmful organism and defines "dangerous pesticides" as those listed in Appendix-1 as
under:
Appendix-1, List of Dangerous Pesticides
(Under GFR & MFR both)
Prathion Mercury compounds
Diazinon Methyl bromide
Hexaethyltetraphosphate Cyanides
Tetrathyl pyrophosphate Chlordane
Tetraethyl ditripyrophosphate Endrin
Demeton (systex) Aldrin
Schradan (OMPR) Dieldrin
Para-Oxon (E. 600) Texaphene
Methyl Parathion Dinitro-o-cresol
Dimefox Arsenical compounds
Sulphotepp Cryloite
EPN Pentachlorophenol
Nicotine or its compounds Carbojuran
This list gives commonly better to refer the exhaustive Insecticides Act. used pesticides. It is
list u/s 3(e) of the

Sch.l5, u/r 114, MFR, defines "dangerous pesticides" as those defined in Sec. 3(e) of
the Insecticides Act 1968 or any other substance declared as such by the CIF in writing. List
of Insecticides u/ s 3(e) of the Act is very long with addition from time to time.
Sch.29, u/r 95, TNFR does not give Appendix1 i.e. a list of dangerous pesticides but
defines dangerous pesticides' as any product proposed or used for controlling, destroying or
repelling any pest or for preventing growth or mitigating effects of such growth including any
of its formulations which is considered toxic under and is covered by the Insecticides Act,
1968 and the rules made there under any other products as may be notified from time to time
by the State Government.
"Manipulation" includes mixing, blending, formulating, filling, emptying, packing or
otherwise handling.
Appendix-11, Cautionary Placard is similar in all above three State Rules and is reproduced
below:
Q9. Explain the role of P and ID in safety. State its advantages.

Ans :- A Definition of P&ID

A piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) is a drawing in the process industry. A P&ID
shows all piping, including the “physical sequence of branches, reducers, valves, equipment,
instrumentation and control interlocks.” A P&ID is used to operate the process system, since
it shows the piping of the process flow along with the installed equipment and

instrumentation. P & IDs play a key role in

maintaining and modifying the process they describe, because it is important to demonstrate
the physical sequence of equipment and systems, including how these systems connect. In
terms of processing facilities, a P&ID is a visual representation of key piping and instrument
details, control and shutdown schemes, safety and regulatory requirements, and basic start-up
and operational information.
Items to Include In a P&ID
The following list outlines the items that typically are found in a P&ID:

 Instrumentation and designations

 Mechanical equipment with names and numbers
 All valves and their identifications
 Process piping, sizes, and identification
 Vents, drains, special fittings, sampling lines, reducers, increasers, and swaggers
 Permanent start-up and flush lines
 Flow directions
 Interconnections references
 Control inputs and outputs, interlocks
 Interfaces for class changes
 Computer control system
 Identification of components and subsystems delivered by the process
Codes, Tags, and Labels for P&IDs
As you can imagine, a P&ID involves various symbols to represent all of the included parts,
components, and information. Their symbology is defined on separate drawings referred to as
“lead sheets” or “legend sheets.” Lead sheets should be customized to each company’s
process plants, though in general, the P&IDs are based on a core set of standard symbols and
notations. The most important part of the lead sheets is that they are organized logically so
that it is possible to easily locate the symbols and tags. While it’s a good practice to have lead
sheets for the major equipment in a factory, it may not be necessary because this major
equipment already should be tagged and named with general specifications for identification

purposes.
Because a P&ID contains such important information, it is critical to the workings of the
process industry that the process plant apply tags or labels to keep track of all of the
equipment, piping, valves, devices, and more. Those labels must match the symbology and
should not fail, so that the plant’s operations run smoothly and efficiently. That’s why the
unique identifiers involved in the P&ID, tagging, and labeling process are critical. In fact,
there are three main reasons that the tagging should be done correctly:
 The P&ID and tags ensure that even collections of similar objects have unique tags so
that identical valves, pumps, instruments, etc., can be uniquely identified
 The P&ID and tags make it possible to assemble the process plant in a structured manner
so that additions, deletions, changes, etc., are possible from a whole-unit scale down to a
single valve on a pipe at any location
 The P&ID and tags contain scores of metadata that provides, or links to, more details
including specifications, materials of construction, data sheets, etc.
Best Practices for Tagging Equipment When Considering P&ID
Using a numeric-only system for tagging equipment is the best way for process industries to
avoid the problems with labeling by abbreviated names. Structured tag systems are more
intuitive for every team that deals with the equipment, including developers, operators, and
maintenance. The equipment tag format should be a series of three numbers, beginning with
an area number, followed by an equipment type code, and then ending with a unique
sequence number.

 Area numbers represent an area that may be determined by the physical, geographical, or
logical grouping location by the plant site
 Equipment types are fairly straightforward, but if equipment has multiple functions, users
should determine how to select the most suitable equipment type code
 Sequence numbering is the consecutive numbering of similar equipment in any given
area, and it’s important to being the sequence at 01 so that all equipment can have it sown
sequence number

Q10. Explain any two unit process in the industry with safety aspects.
Ans :- POLYMER PLANTS :
In organic chemistry certain giant molecules such as starch, rubber, plastic .or resin,
synthetic fibres, cellulose, proteins are called polymers and plants manufacturing them are
polymer plants. Thus rubber manufacturing plant, synthetic yarn (nylon, terylene etc.) unit,
plastic, resin or silicon making factory or a starch manufacturing factory can be called a
polymer plant.
The polymer (bigger) molecules are built up of smaller units joined together and form a
repeating structure. The repeating structure or the recurring unit in a given molecule is called
the monomer, and the entire molecule composed of several such repeating units is called a
polymer. Thus we can say that rubber is a polymer of isoprene, starch of a-glucose and
cellulose of (3-glucose. Polymerization process is of three types (1) Addition polymerization
i.e. the combination of monomers either of the same kind or different kind by a process of
addition involving no loss of fragments, for example, ethylene - polythene. (2)
Copolymerization involves two different types of monomers, for example, vinyl chloride
with vinyl acetate. (3) Condensation polymerization means the combination of monomers by
a process involving loss of a simple fragment or a molecule of water. The terminal units of
the polymer chain may be different from the units inside. For example, polyester from a
dialcohol and diacid. The alkyd resins are such polymers obtained from phthalic acid and
glycol or glycerol. Linear polymers are thermoplastic and cross-linked polymers are
thermosetting. Proteins, starch and cellulosic fibres, plastics and resins are used to make
thousands of industrial products.

PESTICIDE INDUSTRY (INSECTICIDE): Pesticide is a chemical used to destroy

an organism detrimental to human interest. It includes insecticides, fungicides, herbicides,
rodenticides, bactericides, miticides, nematocides, moUuscicides. They are generally
halogenated (Cyclodienes, Bischlorophenyls, Cycloparaffins, Organo-chlorines and
Chlorinated terpenes) or Organophosphorus (Parathion, malathion, TEPP, OMPA, DDVP,
abate, ciodrin etc. ) type. They are classified as extremely hazardous, highly hazardous,
moderately hazardous, slightly hazardous etc. For these classifications and their details
including Lethal Dose values see Reference No. 1 given at the end of this Chapter. Strict
safety rules are necessary during their processing, handling, packaging etc. Exhaust
ventilation and use of PPE are essential.

Q11. what are the safety measures taken in pesticides industries.

Ans :- PESTICIDE INDUSTRY (INSECTICIDE): Pesticide is a chemical used to

destroy an organism detrimental to human interest. It includes insecticides, fungicides,
herbicides, rodenticides, bactericides, miticides, nematocides, moUuscicides. They are
generally halogenated (Cyclodienes, Bischlorophenyls, Cycloparaffins, Organo-chlorines
and Chlorinated terpenes) or Organophosphorus (Parathion, malathion, TEPP, OMPA,
DDVP, abate, ciodrin etc. ) type. They are classified as extremely hazardous, highly
hazardous, moderately hazardous, slightly hazardous etc. For these classifications and their
details including Lethal Dose values see Reference No. 1 given at the end of this Chapter.
Strict safety rules are necessary during their processing, handling, packaging etc. Exhaust
ventilation and use of PPE are essential.

Statutory Provisions:Schedule 15, Rule 102, GFR, Sch.l5, Rule 114, MFR and Sch.29,Rule
95, TNFR give statutory provisions for manufacture and handling of dangerous pesticides
listed in Appendix-1 to that Schedule. Appendix-11 gives cautionary placard.
The measures include prohibition of employment of women and young persons, air
space of 500 m3 or more per person, efficient exhaust draft on charging, discharging,
blending and powder or liquid preparation, sound and sloping floor with gutters and drainage,
daily washing, workbenches of stainless steel, waste container with lid and waste disposal by
burning, safe disposal of empty containers, no manual or direct handling, protective clothing
and their daily washing, medical facilities including doctor and antidotes and medical
examination - pre employment, quarterly examination and record in Form 20, GFR additional
rest interval of 10 minutes before each meal and before the end of the day's work, washing
and bathing facilities with at least 50% bathrooms and 1 place for 5 workers with clean
towels, soap and nail brushes, prohibition of food and drink in workrooms, cloak room for
clothing and PPE, mess room with incharge person and prior permission o? the CIF to start
manipulation of a new pesticide i.e. not listed in Appendix 1.Sch.l5, u/r 102, GFR defines
"pesticides" as agents used for the purpose of destroying or arresting the growth or increase
of harmful organism and defines "dangerous pesticides" as those listed in Appendix-1 as
under:
Appendix-1, List of Dangerous Pesticides
(Under GFR & MFR both)
Prathion Mercury compounds
Diazinon Methyl bromide
Hexaethyltetraphosphate Cyanides
Tetrathyl pyrophosphate Chlordane
Tetraethyl ditripyrophosphate Endrin
Demeton (systex) Aldrin
Schradan (OMPR) Dieldrin
Para-Oxon (E. 600) Texaphene
Methyl Parathion Dinitro-o-cresol
Dimefox Arsenical compounds
Sulphotepp Cryloite
EPN Pentachlorophenol
Nicotine or its compounds Carbojuran
This list gives commonly better to refer the exhaustive Insecticides Act. used pesticides. It is
list u/s 3(e) of the

Sch.l5, u/r 114, MFR, defines "dangerous pesticides" as those defined in Sec. 3(e) of
the Insecticides Act 1968 or any other substance declared as such by the CIF in writing. List
of Insecticides u/ s 3(e) of the Act is very long with addition from time to time.
Sch.29, u/r 95, TNFR does not give Appendix1 i.e. a list of dangerous pesticides but
defines dangerous pesticides' as any product proposed or used for controlling, destroying or
repelling any pest or for preventing growth or mitigating effects of such growth including any
of its formulations which is considered toxic under and is covered by the Insecticides Act,
1968 and the rules made there under any other products as may be notified from time to time
by the State Government.
"Manipulation" includes mixing, blending, formulating, filling, emptying, packing or
otherwise handling.
Appendix-11, Cautionary Placard is similar in all above three State Rules and is reproduced
below:
Cautionary Placard:
1. Pesticides are generally poisonous substances.
2. Therefore in rooms where these are handled(a) do not chew, eat, drink Or smoke;
keep food or drink away from pesticides. (b) use the protective wear supplied e.g.
gloves, aprons, clothes, boots, etc
3. Before meals or when any part of the body has come in contact with the pesticides,
wash with soap and water.
4. Before leaving the factory, take a bath and change your clothing.
5. Do not use any container that has contained a pesticide as a pot for food or drink.
6. Do not handle any pesticide with bare hands; use a handled scoop.
7. Avoid spilling of any pesticide on body, floor or table.
8. Maintain scrupulous cleanliness of body and clothing and of your surroundings.
9. In case of sickness like nausea, vomiting or giddiness, inform the manager who will
make necessary arrangements for treatment.
Effects and Controls :
Pesticides and agrochemicals enter into the body through inhalation, ingestion or skin
absorption. They are classified as toxic, harmful, corrosive, irritant, flammable, explosive or
oxidizing. Toxicity is mostly denoted by LD,, or LC,, values. All agrochemicals should be
labelled, transported safely and correctly stored in a room (locked and cool). Containers
should be opened only after wearing correct respirator (positive air pressure), neoprene or
plastic hand gloves, aprons, boots etc. Protective clothing are always essential while handling
pesticides. Inhalation of vapour should be avoided. Contact with skin, eyes and clothing
should also be avoided. Contaminated clothing should be immediately changed, the entire
body .should be thoroughly washed with soap and water. After working with pesticides,
shower bath should be taken and clothing should be changed. Contaminated equipment
should be cleaned with soap or soda ash.
Local exhaust ventilation on filling line must be effective.
Types of effects may be acute (immediate) or chronic (prolonged or slow delayed). Some
common symptoms are - dizziness, headache, shaking and weakness. More toxic effects may
cause convulsions, irrational behaviour or unconsciousness.
First-aid treatment includes - removal of affected person to a safe, clean and airy
place, washing of the part affected and to put the person in recovery position (slipping on
shoulder). On swallowing, vomiting should be induced if person is in consciousness. Medical
charcoal and plenty of water may also be 'given.
Effect of organophosphorous pesticides is to reduce cholinesterase level in body and it can be
noticed by pin-point in pupils (eyes).
Blood cholinesterase activity test should be carried out every 15 days. If the level is
found less than 62.5%, the worker must be transferred to another place where no exposure is
possible. After medical treatment and. safe report he can be put back to his plant. But
meantime the engineering controls should be provided or revised to eliminate the exposure.
Leakage and spillage must be removed. Defect in PPE should be checked and removed.
An Office Circular dated 27-7-1995 of Factory Inspection Office, Bharuch, sent to
pesticide factories, seems to be more important and suggests following safety measures :
1. For filling bottles or small containers of liquid, granules or powder, automatic filling
machines with closed chamber and attached local exhaust ventilation must be used.
Weighing, plugging and sealing operations and conveyor movement should also be automatic
and under suction chamber so that a worker has not to touch Anything and no spillage,
vapour or dust shall touch his body.
2. To fill barrel or big container a chamber with exhaust hood and ventilation should be
used.
3. To contain or collect leaking liquid small bund and pit shall be provided.Spilled pesticide
should be neutralized or washed with dry clean cloth and stored in a dust-bin with spring-lid.
Then it should be safely disposed or burnt out.
4. Workers engaged to shift, move, clean or pack the filled (plugged) container or to clean
any spillage, shall be given goggles, long sleeved shirt and pent, good quality rubber hand
gloves, waterproof suit or apron, gumboot and air-line respirator. Safety showers and
bathrooms shall be provided.
5. Illiterate, untrained and temporary contract workers are exposed to more risk. Therefore
such training should be given to them so that they can read or understand the necessary
precautions.
6. Pedestal or positive air fan removes the vapour or dust from one worker to another.
Therefore it is inadvisable. Exhaust or negative air suction and air-line respirators are the
effective remedies. Exhaled air should be passed through carbon bed filter or effective
absorber and final vent discharge should be within safe limit.
7. Regular air monitoring at work place, ppm record and leakage checking are necessary.
8. A record of full name, address, signature, date of joining and photograph of all the
workers at the time of first employment are useful to detect cases of delayed effects or after-
service effects.
9. If pre-employment and subsequent medical examination shows blood cholinesterase level
less than 62.5%, that worker should not be employed in pesticide work. If RBC level is also
low, the worker should be kept away for 3 months from such process. Sufficient stock of
PAN, Atropine etc. (antidotes) should be kept in the factory first-aid centre.
10. The workers must be aware that in case of symptoms (dizziness, headache, vibration,
vomit etc.), which doctor they have to approach. They will follow the medical advice.
11. In each shift, qualified and trained supervisor shall strictly supervise the working
conditions, work habits, methods, use of PPE, washing, cleaning and no smoking, eating or
drinking in work area.
Specified medical treatment is as under :
1. In case of skin contact of-organo-phosphorous, it should be immediately treated with
solution of 5-10% ammonia or 2-5% chloramine.
2. Give injection Atropine sulphate according to age, 2 to 4 mg intravenous or intramuscular.
Continue this injection every 5 to 10 minutes till pupils size and heart beats become normal.
3. Give injection PAM (2-Pyridine AldoximeMethochloride) in glucose slowly.
Toxogonin is a condensation product of Pyridine aldoxime and dichlorodimethyl ether.
4. Maintain fluid and electrolyte balance.
5. Give antibiotic medicine to prevent secondary infection.
6. Give Frusemide if lungs are swallowed or water filled.
7. If breathing stops, artificial respiration must be tried till doctor comes. The patient should
be kept in a cool and quiet place. Give oxygen if difficulty is in breathing. If breathing
trouble is more, the victim should be shifted to hospital and put on ventilator.
Q12. What are the safety precaution to be taken in the process and
operations involving explosive chemicals?

Ans :- Safety in chemical industry:

1. Study and identify chemical hazards using material safety data sheet (MSDS) and a
system of classification, packaging and labeling should be developed.
2. Select safer technology.
3. Select safer sitting of chemical industry for minimum loss to men, material,
environment etc.
4. Take all safety precautions at Design and construction stage.
5. Workplace hazards inside the factory should be controlled by good engineering
controls, (SOPs) safe operating procedure and using personal protective equipment.
6. All requisite safety devices, fittings, instruments, equipment, machines etc., must be
provided and well maintained.
7. Workers must be properly Educated & trained for safe operation of the plant such as
proper Warning signs, color codes, Safety Work Permit Systems, fire fighting.
8. Conduct Mock-drills of MAH Unit & Potential Emergencies due to Chemical
Hazards to know everybody their role in emergency planning and control.
9. Safe Storage, handling & transportation of hazardous chemicals within and out-side
factory premises.

10. Safe Storage, disposal of hazardous wastes within and outside factory
premises.(Sewage &Haz-Sludge)

11. Well monitoring and control of hazardous substances/Waste at work places

(Inspection, Audit & Analysis / ETP & STP) and of occupational ill-effects and
diseases by pre and periodical medical examinations of the workers.

Q13. Explain UVC (unconfined vapour cloud) formation in chemical industry.

Ans :- vapor cloud explosion

A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) results from the ignition of a flammable mixture of vapor,
gas, aerosol, or mist, in which flame speeds accelerate to sufficiently high velocities to
produce significant overpressure.

VCEs are generally associated with the release of a sufficient quantity of flammable gas or
vaporizing (flashing) liquid from a:

storage tank

process or transport vessel

piping system

vapor cloud explosion

Buildings may be damaged and people may be injured by:

 the blast wave

additional indirect effects from missile generation, crater formation, ground shock, and fire.
Generally:  as the blast wave travels farther away from the center of the explosion it loses
energy  the magnitude of overpressure and other effects decreases as the distance increases
from the explosion source

Five conditions for Vapour Cloud Explosions

1. The released material must be flammable and at suitable conditions to form a vapor cloud
(the reactivity of the unburned material is important )

2. An ignition source is needed to initiate the explosion. Higher energy ignition sources can
lead to a more severe explosion than do lower energy sources.

3. Ignition of the flammable vapor cloud must be delayed until a cloud of sufficient size has
formed. If ignition occurs as the flammable material is escaping, a large fire, jet flame, or
fireball might occur, but a VCE is unlikely. The probability of explosion rather than fire
increases with the size of the cloud, since the quantity of the mixture within the flammable
range increases.

4. Turbulence is required for the flame front to accelerate to the speeds required for a VCE;
otherwise, a flash fire will result. This turbulence is typically formed by the interaction
between the flame front and obstacles such as process structures or equipment.

5. Confinement of the cloud by obstacles can result in rapid increases in pressure during
combustion. Absence of confining obstacles limiting the pressure increases. The degree of
confinement in process plants, with their congested equipment layout and built-up structures,
is generally high

Q14. Explain in brief the safety precaution while transfer of flammable

chemicals.

Ans :- Avoid accumulation of vapours and to control sources of ignition including:

 open flames
 electrical equipment
 sources of static electricity
 Accounts of a few of the fires that have occurred in our laboratories may be found
in Anecdotes(link is external).
 Pouring flammable liquids can generate static electricity. The development of static
electricity is related to the humidity levels in the area. Cold, dry atmospheres are more likely
to facilitate static electricity. Bonding or using ground straps for metallic or non-metallic
containers can prevent static generation.
 Whenever possible use plastic or metal containers or safety cans.
 When working with open containers, use a laboratory fume hood to control the accumulation
of flammable vapor.
 Use bottle carriers for transporting glass containers.
 Use equipment with spark-free, intrinsically safe induction motors or air motors to avoid
producing sparks. These motors must meet National Electric Safety Code (US DOC, 1993)
Class 1, Division 2, Group C-D explosion resistance specifications. Many stirrers, Variacs,
outlet strips, ovens, heat tape, hot plates and heat guns do not conform to these code
requirements.
 Avoid using equipment with series-wound motors, since they are likely to produce sparks.
 Do not heat flammable liquids with an open flame. Steam baths, salt and sand baths, oil and
wax baths, heating mantles and hot air or nitrogen baths are preferable.
 Minimize the production of vapors and the associated risk of ignition by flashback. Vapors
from flammable liquids are denser than air and tend to sink to the floor level where they can
spread over a large area.
 Electrically bond metal containers when transferring flammable liquids from one to another.
Bonding can be direct, as a wire attached to both containers, or indirect, as through a
common ground system.
 When grounding non-metallic containers, contact must be made directly to the liquid, rather
than to the container.
 In the rare circumstance that static cannot be avoided, proceed slowly to give the charge time
to disperse or conduct the procedure in an inert atmosphere.

Q15. State the safety precaution to be taken while handling of acid/alkali

chemicals.

Ans :- What Exactly is Hydrochloric Acid & Where is it Found?

Hydrochloric acid sounds like a scary substance and, in fact, it can be. However, you may be
surprised to learn that hydrochloric acid is a common liquid used in several industries around
the world. Approximately 20 million tons of hydrochloric acid are produced globally each
year, and you can even find it in your own home! These hydrochloric acid safety tips can help
you handle this toxic substance safely and appropriately, whether you encounter it at home or
in the workplace.

Hydrochloric Acid and Uses & Attributes

Hydrochloric acid is a colorless to light yellow water-soluble liquid with a pungent, irritating
odor. Produced as early as the 16th century, hydrochloric acid was historically known as
“spirits of salt”and is sometimes called muriatic acid. It is used for a variety of purposes and
is available at concentrations from 10 to 34 percent depending on its application.
Hydrochloric acid is used for:

 Steel pickling
 Producing organic compounds (for PVC, activated carbon, ascorbic acid, and
pharmaceuticals)
 Producing water treatment chemicals
 Regulating water pH
 Leather processing
 Salt purification
  Household cleaners
 Building construction
 Oil well acidizing
 Producing gelatin products
Safety & Health Hazards Associated with Hydrochloric Acid
Hydrochloric acid is a hazardous liquid which must be used with care. The acid itself
is corrosive, and concentrated forms release acidic mists that are also dangerous. If the acid
or mist come into contact with the skin, eyes, or internal organs, the damage can be
irreversible or even fatal in severe cases. The use of personal protective equipment is
essential.

How to Handle Hydrochloric Acid Safely

Safety is of utmost importance when handling dangerous chemicals like hydrochloric acid.
The Environmental Protection Agency regulates hydrochloric acid as a toxic substance, and it
should be treated as such. It is recommended that you wear the following protective
equipment when using hydrochloric acid of any concentration:

 Vapor respirator
 Rubber gloves
 Boots
 Full suit
 Face shield
If using hydrochloric acid at your workplace, it is highly recommended you have access to an
eye-flush station in case of accidental exposure. You should also review all Hydrochloric
Acid MSDS information before making contact.

If using hydrochloric acid household cleaners in your home, follow the label directions and
safety instructions closely. (It is usually recommended that you first dilute the cleaner to
reduce its concentration.) It is still important to wear protective clothing when using diluted
acid, to ensure that it doesn’t come into contact with your skin, eyes, or mouth.

Proper Care for Hydrochloric Acid Exposure

Depending on the concentration of the hydrochloric acid you are working with, accidental
exposure can occur as skin contact, eye contact, ingestion or inhalation of acidic vapors. Each
of these types of exposure can pose serious hazards to your health and should be managed
immediately.

Skin Contact – If hydrochloric acid comes into contact with your skin, flush immediately
with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes, and remove any contaminated clothing. In case
of serious skin contact, use water, a disinfectant soap, and anti-bacterial cream. Seek
immediate medical attention.

Eye Contact – If hydrochloric acid or acidic mists get into your eyes, immediately flush with
plenty of water for at least 15 minutes. Seek immediate medical attention.
 Ingestion – If swallowed, do not induce vomiting. Seek immediate medical attention.

Inhalation – If you inhale hydrochloric acid vapors or mists, seek fresh air and medical
attention immediately.

Hydrochloric Acid Storage and Disposal

Hydrochloric acid should be stored in a cool, dry, well-ventilated area away from sources of
moisture. Keep away from incompatible materials such as oxidizing agents, organic
materials, metals and alkalis. Hydrochloric acid has the ability to corrode metallic surfaces.
Keep container tightly closed and store in a safe place.

Learn more about Hydrochloric Safety from the MSDS Experts

Whether you encounter hydrochloric acid in diluted household cleaners at home or in

concentrated forms at your workplace, safety is extremely important when handling this
toxic, corrosive liquid. For more information about hydrochloric acid uses, safety, or
disposal, search our database of MSDS information.

Q16. Explain CMV Rule for transportation of hazards chemicals.

Ans :- Transportation of hazardous chemicals

District Collector should monitor the following points of Central Motor Vehicle Rules
(CMVR) 1989 to reduce the road disasters carrying chemicals.
Recommendations for Authorities
The primary concern regarding non-compliance by the consignors, transporters and drivers is
the lack of enforcement of the applicable legal requirements and also lack of awareness
amongst the stakeholders.
The implementation of the Rules 131 to 133 of CMVR, 1989, providing details of
responsibility of consignors, transporters and drivers of the goods carriage transporting
HAZCHEM shall be strengthened. Further, the states can also put additional restrictions in
the permit condition while granting permits to the transporters.
Training:
 Comprehensive training of inspection staff issuing fitness certificates regarding design
codes, their requirement for the inherent safety of the container and the vehicle, etc.
 Traffic policeman should be more stringent for HAZCHEM transporting tankers and must
see to it that these tankers do not violate any rules. Moreover, a traffic policeman should
not allow these tankers in crowded places/routes, for any reason whatsoever. Traffic
policeman could be allowed to penalise the driver in case of illegibility of the emergency
information panel and also if the class label is missing as per the provisions on the vehicle.
 Comprehensive training of the traffic inspectors regarding the applicable of legal
requirements.
 Training of inspectors regarding HAZCHEM as per the CMVR so as to make them
understand the consequences of non-compliance.
 Elaborate training programmes for community leaders, panchayats, NGOs and other
identified prominent persons in the areas is necessary after a directory of information
 (containing the names, addresses, telephone numbers, etc.) is prepared. A small booklet in
the vernacular on dos and don'ts for the local public should be brought out and circulated.
 The Regional Transport Officer (RTO) should carry out the proper verification and
examination of the tankers/trucks before issuing a new license/permits.
Recommendations for MAH Units
MAH units are not only the recipients but also the consignors of HAZCHEM. It is in their
business interest that the goods dispatched, reach the destination safely, in time and without
any problem en route. Their role is by far the most important in terms of improving the status
of implementing various legal requirements. Keeping this in mind, the following are the
major recommendations for the MAH units (consignors) of HAZCHEM.
Check driver's license for its validity, provide a certificate to the effect that he has
successfully undergone the requisite training for transportation of hazardous goods and
endorse his license, authorising him to drive vehicles carrying HAZCHEM.
1. Check documents and inspect vehicles with check lists.
2. Implement vehicle entry, loading/unloading check list.
3. Check compatibility with material last transported with the one intended to be loaded.
4. Place appropriate fire extinguishers.
5. Provide separate earthing to tank and hoses.
6. Provide stop blocks to prevent rolling of vehicles. Loading/unloading operation to be
carried out under supervision.
7. Make the driver read the Transport Emergency Card (TREMCARD) while the
loading/unloading operation is carried out.
8. Seal and lock valves after loading. The Emergency Information Panel (EIP) should be
checked and if found inappropriate, new panels should be pasted on all three places.
Appropriate class labels should be pasted.
9. Communicate the route and scheduled halts to driver and transporter.
10. Implement a computerised system for records. Although it may not be possible for all
the units to implement such computerised systems, alert security staff and proper
maintenance of records can easily achieve the objective. Train security staff in checking
the documents and vehicles.
11. Selection of transporters should be on the basis of their credibility rather than solely on
quotes.
Recommendations for Transporters
1. Need to take a proactive role in keeping their vehicles fit, providing necessary fire
extinguishers, PPEs, antidotes, emergency kits, spark arrester and training to drivers for
safe transportation of hazardous goods.
2. Careful driver selection.
3. Vehicle maintenance, display of appropriate EIP and class label, proper painting.
4. For transport of dangerous goods, the endeavour should be to find dedicated transport
tanker vehicles or at least for dedicated use of specific material only. Inter changeability
at times may cause mishaps/accidents.
5. HAZCHEM should also be lettered in the vernacular for better understanding by the
public at large.
6. Ensure availability of all relevant documents and inform the driver of the chemical being
transported, associated hazards and safety precautions to be taken during the journey.
 7. Provide route map to the driver (finalised in consultation with the consignor) and a
timetable for each trip.

The photo is displaying two EIPs on one tanker, it is not clear whether the tanker is carrying
chemical -1 or chemical - 2. Such situation can only be avoided jointly by RTO, transport
contractor and consignor with proper enforcement of CMVR.

Recommendations for Drivers

Trained and experienced personnel of MAH units are not normally available at accident site
en route to transport. The response of driver, cleaner, public and response in teams are
therefore, of very high significance. Drivers on the other hand, are the weakest link in the
entire process of HAZCHEM transportation due to the lack of proper training, low level of
education, lack of awareness of the applicable legal requirements and a host of other factors
such as rash driving, drinking habits, tendency for pilferage to make a quick buck, etc. All the
efforts of consignors, transporters and authorities are diluted if the driver does not have safe
driving habits, parks the vehicle incorrectly and/ or leaves his vehicle unattended. The rules
applicable to drivers for improving the level of safety in HAZCHEM transportation as per
Central Motor Vehicle Rules (CMVR) are fairly comprehensive and proper enforcement can
definitely bring about the desired change.
1. Driver training and involvement in mock drills are necessary and must be initiated on a
priority basis.
2. The driver should be trained to maintain a record of inspection round the Clock at least
every two hours, to check the pressure, temperature of the product to see that no leaks
are developed and to check the temperature of hubs and tires or to spot any other
abnormality in the vehicle.
3. The drivers and cleaners should necessarily maintain and use PPEs to meet specific
requirements during chemical spills/ accidents.
 4. Driver training efforts must be updated, specifically for non-petroleum tankers, where
training is lacking.
5. Though it is mandatory to keep fire extinguisher(s) and a first-aid box in the driver's
cabin, sufficient attention is not given in training the driver in their use. Even the
selection of the correct fire extinguisher for different types of fires is unknown to the
driver. The fire extinguishers should be related to the HAZCHEM being transported,
which makes dedicated use of the vehicle important.
DC should also review the following points:
1. Narrow roads increase the traffic density, the travel time and also the accident potential.
Infrastructure in terms of proper roads and lights in population pockets needs to be
provided for safe HAZCHEM transportation.
2. The highway patrol should ensure the smooth flow of traffic on the highways and
highway rescue squads need to be set up at critical locations for rendering prompt
response during accidents.
3. Police awareness about the provisions under the CMVR requires a major initiative, as it
is poor. Police academies could be used for the purpose and special drives aimed at
police forces should be made.
4. The regulatory authorities, mainly the police, are not adequately aware of the CMVR
HAZCHEM provisions and are therefore not able to enforce the rules sufficiently. This
is necessary and must be accomplished on a mass basis. Communication System: the
HAZCHEM transported from a source unit to the ultimate destination will have a
dedicated consignment tracking system within and also be linked to fire, police and
emergency control rooms including medical services. The mechanism will be worked
out with the due diligence of all stakeholders and in consultation with all authorities
concerned.
5. Global Positioning System (GPS) type communication and information management
systems for HAZCHEM fleet tracking, monitoring and accident management is
recommended
6. The Regional Transport Officer (RTO) should carry out the proper verification and
examination of the tankers/trucks before issuing a new license/permit.

Q17. Explain the role of compatibility in safety.

Ans :- Process safety in the laboratory – “Wherever you work – in a process plant, a
research laboratory, a pilot plant, a quality control laboratory, a maintenance shop, or
anywhere else – make sure you fully understand the hazards associated with all of your
materials, equipment, and operations. You can’t manage the risk from a hazard that you don’t
know about!”
Understanding chemical compatibility – “This is important information to understand so you
can take proper precautions to make sure that incompatible materials are not inadvertently
mixed. That can happen when making material transfers such as unloading shipments into
storage tanks or other containers, when containers are stored adjacent to each other in
warehouses or production areas, and when products are transferred to tank farms for storage
before being shipped.”
Dangerous chemical reactions at home – “Did you know that mixing some household
cleaners could be fatal?”
 A little static can cause a big fire – “Static charge is generated by contact and separation of
two different materials. Once generated, charge may remain on the materials until it finds a
lower electrical potential, then it discharges. The spark can have enough energy to ignite
flammable vapors, gases, or a combustible dust cloud.”
Can you recognize a change – “On the passenger vessel that experienced the engine fire,
couplings on three of the four engines had been replaced with threaded hose fittings and
rubber hoses. One of those hoses failed and sprayed fuel directly onto the hot engine exhaust,
which likely provided the ignition source.”
15 years of the “Process Safety Beacon” – “When you read a Beacon, think about what you
can learn from it, even if it discusses an incident which happened in a very different kind of
plant.”
Subscribe to this author's posts feed via RSS

Related Posts:

 Hazards of high oxygen concentration, mixing incompatible…

 Process safety newsletters
 Aging equipment, vulnerability, near misses, runaway…
 Second investigation report released regarding U Hawaii…
 OPRD’s safety notables from the literature

Q18. Explain the safety precaution in storage of flammable gases.

Ans :- Follow these seven general safety recommendations:

1. Know and understand the properties, uses, and safety precautions before using any gas or
gas mixture. Consult the Air Products Safety Data Sheet (SDS) and Safetygrams for safety
information on the gases and equipment you will be using.

2. Determine the appropriate equipment required to use the product and know how to safely
operate the equipment.

3. Be aware of potential hazards and develop plans to cover possible emergencies. Use
emergency drills to practice implementing these plans. Inform local hospitals, fire
departments, and other emergency response organizations of the gases in use so that they,
too, will be prepared in the event of an emergency.

4. Provide personal protective equipment (PPE) and the required training for its use. Require
personnel to wear the proper PPE for each task. Locate other safety equipment such as fire
extinguishers, eye wash stations, and showers at appropriate locations. Thoroughly inform
everyone about the hazards of the gases they are using and how to respond to an emergency.

5. Follow all national, state, and local regulations pertaining to the storage, use, and disposal
of compressed gases and cryogenic liquids. This document highlights the recommendations
set forth in ISO Standard 11625, “Gas Cylinders—Safe Handling.” In the United States, this
document is published by the Compressed Gas Association as Pamphlet P-1, “Safe Handling
of Compressed Gases in Containers,” and has been incorporated into the regulations, making
the contents of the document legal requirements in the United States, not recommendations.
Other regional organizations such as the Asian Industrial Gases Association (AIGA),

the European Industrial Gases Association (EIGA), and the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) also provide guidance for the storage and use of compressed gas
cylinders.

6. If you are unfamiliar with the hazards associated with a particular gas, contact your
supplier for additional information.

7. Use appropriate equipment when handling portable cylinder banks. They have a high
center of gravity, and extreme care must be taken during their movement. Portable banks may
fall over when being moved if they are stopped suddenly by an object or crack in the floor.

Storage

Take the following precautions to prevent injuries caused by asphyxiation, fire, explosion,
high pressure, and improper handling of compressed gas cylinders.

NEVER

• Allow storage temperature to exceed 125°F (52°C).

• Permit smoking or open flames in oxidizer or flammable gas storage areas.

• Expose cylinders to corrosive materials such as ice melting compounds.

• Store only the amount of compressed gas required for the specific application.

• Store cylinders away from heavily traveled areas and emergency exits.

• Provide adequate access for cylinder handling.

• Visually inspect stored cylinders on a routine basis, or at least weekly, for any indication of
leakage or problems.

• Restrict access to cylinder storage areas.

• Protect cylinders from wet or damp ground.

ALWAYS

• Store cylinders in accordance with ISO Standard 11625 or CGA Pamphlet P-1.

• Store cylinders upright with valve outlet seals and valve protection caps in place. See Air
Products’ Safetygram-14, “Don’t Turn a Cylinder Into a Rocket.”

• Secure cylinders when in storage, transit, or use.

• Store cylinders in areas designated for that purpose.

• Segregate full and empty cylinders.

• Store cylinders in a dry, cool, wellventilated, secure area protected from the weather and
away from combustible materials.

• Ensure that there is adequate separation from combustibles as specified by national

regulations.

• Monitor the atmosphere in areas where gases may vent and collect.

• Use a first-in, first-out (FIFO) inventory system to prevent full containers from being stored
for long periods of time.

Q19. Explain UN classification of hazards chemicals.

Ans :-
Q20. What are the safety aspects in plant start up and shutdown?

Ans:- 4.1 Safe Start-up & Shutdown Procedures:

Start-up or restart operation after a short or long shutdown and shutdown procedures need
special precautions.Starting sequence should be well defined, written and known to the
workers involved in this work. Starting in sequence of utilities like water, air, power; purging,
charging, slow and gradual heating, monitoring of pressure, temperature, flow and reaction
rate, cooling if necessary, starting of exhaust system, scrubber or condenser etc., observing
noise, vibration, speed, alignment, synchronizing etc. are all important.
During start-up if drains remain open, vent valves remain closed, wrong valves are operated,
unwanted material enters e.g. oxygen instead of nitrogen as blanketing over flammable
reaction, water where it is incompatible, air instead of steam or steam instead of air, excess or
less charging of material or catalyst, delayed cooling or heating, not starting of any pump or
instrument, no indication or alarm due to failure or malfunctioning of instrument in the
beginning, no starting of local exhaust or scrubber when it is essential and failure of interlock
or trip resulting in unwanted mixing or reaction, mixing of air with hydrocarbons, contacting
hot oil and water, thermal or mechanical shocks etc. are some of the examples of possible
disorders.
Correct identification of pipelines, valves and gauges, correct sequence of control operation,
correct charging or addition-rate and instead of relying on instruments only Counter-check of
other parameters and strict manual observation and satisfaction are requisite precautions for
safe start-up procedure.
Attention should be paid on preparatory activity, verifying content, removal of air or venting,
purging and disposal of purged material, removal or addition of water, slow and sequential
starting of heating or cooling, gradual reaching of working parameters and normal operation.
Other points needing attention in start-up are removal of shutdown blinds, providing running
blinds, opening of scrubber or discharge line valve, opening of isolation valve before safety
valve, starting of local exhaust ventilation, pump cooling and priming, readiness of Fire
Fighting equipment, leak detection, opening vents and drains before allowing steam in the
system, partial opening of steam valves, introducing steam from the bottom part, observance
of level and overflow if any, safe increase in loading, avoidance of incompatible material,
avoidance of moisture and impurities in breathing air, purging of blow down tanks and flare,
removing air from vacuum equipment, inspecting joints and valves for leakage, verifying
steam traps working for condensate discharge, safe displacement of steam, water or purge gas
after their use, removing residual water before, introducing hot oil (initially cold oil should be
introduced), using heat-exchanger for indirect and gradual heating or cooling etc.
Shutdown operation needs sequential steps like cooling and de-pressuring, pumping out,
removal of residual content e.g. hydrocarbons, corrosive or toxic chemicals, water, oil,
pyrophoric catalyst, disposal of effluents and sludge, drainage and blinding and isolation
activities.Heat source should be cut off, cooling may be continued till required, where
vacuum is possible due to cooling, inert gas or air (if compatible) should be introduced to
maintain atmospheric pressure, pumping out material after cooling and de-pressuring and
pumped out hot oil should be cooled below its flash point. Residual hydrocarbons can be
removed by purging with steam, water or water followed by steam. After purging, air should
be allowed into the system. Residual water should be removed. Lastly running blinds should
be removed and shutdown blinds should be installed.
If the shutdown is required due to any fault, the cause of the fault should be found, studied
and removed before restarting the plant.

Q21. Explain the role of maintenance in safety.

Ans :- Maintenance work can be hazardous. Although it is estimated that 6% of the working
population are involved in maintenance work (not always all the time), it is estimated that,
throughout Europe, between 15 and 20% of injuries at work happen during maintenance
work.
This is for three main reasons. Firstly maintenance work can often involve many of the most
dangerous activities such as work at height, electricity, and dangerous equipment. Secondly,
maintenance work is often not risk assessed before it is done, Thirdly, much of it is done by
contractors who are unfamiliar with that workplace.
Maintenance workers are also far more likely to get occupational diseases such as
mesothelioma, hearing loss, and musculoskeletal disorders.
But while maintenance activities can put workers at risk, not carrying out maintenance may
put even more workers at risk, as people will have to work with dangerous equipment. A
planned maintenance programme is therefore part of a good safety culture, but must be done
safely.
What is maintenance?
All workplaces have some type of maintenance work in their premises. It includes
maintaining all types of equipment, buildings, means of transport.
There are two types of maintenance work. These are routine or preventative maintenance
work which is often planned and required to ensure that everything keep on working, and
corrective maintenance, which takes place when things break down or go wrong.
Maintenance therefore covers a huge range of activities such as repair work, servicing,
replacing, inspecting and testing.
Risks
Because maintenance work is so varied the types of hazards that can be created will always
be unique which is why the individual risks always have to be assessed and controlled,
however among the specific problems that workers are likely to face are the following:
Access - both access to and around the building as well as access to the equipment that needs
maintained can be a problem. Some maintenance activities will involve working in confined
places where access can be a problem. There are also other specific risks from work in
confined spaces, in particular asphyxiation, and separate regulations apply to this work.
Work at height - a lot of maintenance work has to be done above ground level, such as
windows or on roofs, often in very risky locations that were not designed to have someone
working there.
Chemical and dust exposure - often maintenance workers are exposed to chemicals that are
toxic either because they are used in the process that is being maintained or because they are
used to clean or maintain the equipment. This is not only an issue in factories but also in
offices and schools where maintenance workers often use chemicals to repair or clean office
equipment. In addition many maintenance workers are exposed to dust. Maintenance workers
have higher rates of skin and breathing problems.
Asbestos - this is present in over a million workplaces and often it is un-marked. Many
employers do not know it is there or do not tell any contractors working on the premises.
Maintenance workers, especially plumbers, fitters and carpenters are at greatly increased risk
of asbestos related diseases.
Equipment and machinery - If equipment has not been fully disconnected and isolated there
will always be a risk it could be turned on by mistake. There is therefore the risk both of
moving parts and also electrocution.
Musculoskeletal problems - a lot of maintenance work can involve bending or repetitive
work, often with a lot of force. In addition it may have to be carried out in a cramped space.
This increases the likelihood of musculoskeletal problems.
Biological hazards - some maintenance work, including plumbing and air conditioning
maintenance puts the person at risk of contact with legionella. Maintenance workers are also
at increased danger from a range of other diseases including tetanus and some lung disorders.
Noise - some maintenance work has to be carried out close to noisy equipment, or can
involve a lot of drilling or hammering. Hearing loss can be an issue.
Inspecting the workplace - a checklist for health and safety
representatives
When inspecting the workplace, health and safety representatives are encouraged to include
the inspection regime as well. Often that will involve asking for the risk assessments and
records. You should also check the accident book. Among the things you should be looking
out for are:

 Does your employer have a maintenance programme for all buildings and equipment?
 Are all routine or standard maintenance tasks risk assessed and are the risk
assessments up to date?
 Have all control measures that arise from the risk assessment been put in place and
are they working?
 What procedures are in place to ensure that non-routine maintenance work is risk
assessed?
 Is maintenance activity logged and monitored?
 Are all maintenance workers fully trained and provided with the appropriate
equipment and PPE?
 Are other workers trained on how maintenance work can affect them?
 Are all potential hazards (such as asbestos) identified and clearly marked so that
maintenance workers will be aware of them?
 What arrangements are in place to ensure that external contractors are competent and
informed about any potential risks within the workplace?
 Have there been any injuries, illnesses or near misses reported relating to maintenance
activities, or a lack of maintenance work, since your last inspection?

Q22. Explain colour code system. What are its advantages in safety?

Ans :- Colour Coding identification of contents::

Indian Standards :
IS to be followed are : Code of practice for safety colours and safety signs 9457,
Pipelines, identification, colour code 2379, Standard colours for building and decorative
finishes 1650, pipelines in thermal power plants 9404, Identification for canisters and
cartridges 8318 and Gas cylinders and related medical equipment 3933.
Colours to Identify Hazards :Colour coding is most desirable and useful for safety
purposes. Standard colours are used to identify hazards as follows :

Red - Fire protection, prohibition, danger, emergency stops on machines,

red cross on medical facilities.

Yellow - Risk, danger or caution, hazards of slipping, falling, striking etc.,

flammable liquid storage, yellow band on safety cans, material
handling equipment viz. lift trucks, cranes, crane hooks, caution,
transport equipment, obstructions, change in floor level, stair
nosing etc.

Green - Safety equipment not identified elsewhere, safety board, safe

 condition.

Blue - Warning and information signs, bulletin boards, rail road uses. It
indicates safety colour only if used with a circular sign.

Orange - Dangerous parts of machines or energized equipment such as

exposed edges of cutting devices, inside of movable guards,
enclosure doors, transmission guards, electric installations.

Purple - Radiation Hazards

Black & White - Housekeeping and traffic markings. Also used as contrast colours.

White is a contrast colour for red, green and blue. Black is a contrast colour for yellow.The
piping in a plant may carry harmless or hazardous contents. Therefore it is highly desirable to
identify them. Some standard colour coding is as follows:

Content in the piping Colour

Flammable or water for fire protection Red

Dangerous (hazardous chemical) Yellow

Safe (water, air) Green

Protective material (inert gas) Blue

The proper colour may be applied to the entire length of the pipe or in bands 20-25 cm wide
near valves, pumps and at repeated intervals along the line. The name of the specific material
should be stencilled in black at readily visible locations such as valves and pumps. Piping less
than 3/4 inch diameter is identified by enamel on metal tags. Anti-resistant colours should be
used where acids and other chemicals may affect the paints.
Following colour coding is also useful in identifying pipelines (IS:2379):

S. No. Material Colour

1. Water Sea green

2. Steam Aluminum, IS 2339

3. Air Sky blue

4. Acids Dark violet

5. Alkalis Smoke grey

6. Gases Canary Yellow

7. Hydrocarbons/ organic compounds Dark admiralty grey

8. Mineral, vegetable and animal oils, combustible liquids. Light Brown

9. Other liquids / gases which do not need identification Black

Entire length or a portion, more than 30 cm, of a pipeline should be painted so that it should
not be mistaken for a colour band. The colour bands are superimposed on the ground colour,
applied at start, near valves, joints, bends and end points. For a longer pipe, interval may be
50 m. Minimum width of colour band should be as under :

Introducing a colour-coded system is a highly beneficial addition for a wide range of sectors.
The process of colour segregation ensures safe hygiene in a number of processes including,
cleaning, cooking, hygiene, uniform clothing and equipment.

4 Benefits of Colour-Coded Equipment:

1. Prevent Cross Contamination

2. Identify high risk, low-risk areas
3. Hygienic Waste Management
4. Safe Segregation of Cleaning Equipment

Colour-coded equipment can assist in minimising the risk of product cross-contamination

from bacteria, allergens and foreign bodies. Consequently this improves food safety, saves on
expensive recalls and protects business reputation.

Food Handling

To ensure safe food handling, colour-coded cooking utensils, cleaning equipment and waste
management tools help to create a safe and hygienic environment.

Cooking utensils such as chopping boards, thermometers and knives can be segregated into a
colour coded system to reduce the risk of cross contamination. Different colours should be
used to segregate; raw meats, cooked meats, fish, dairy and prevent allergen contamination.
As well as this, colour-coded cleaning systems can be used to establish that a certain
colour equipment is used for toilet areas, and not then used to clean kitchen areas. Cleaning
utensils such as brooms, mops, spillage kits and waste disposals systems are available
in colour coding to ensure contamination is not transferred during the cleaning process.

Uniform Segregation

For businesses that need to segregate high risk areas from low risk, colour coded workwear
can be used to contain bacteria within certain environments. Disposable PPE and polycotton
lab coats can be used as part of a colour coding system. The use of disposable PPE such as
overcoats, gloves and hair nets can ensure the containment of certain bacteria, allergens etc,
as the items are disposed of within a specific environment.

For a successful colour-coded system:

• Keep the system simple, limit the number of colours for each and every step of a
complicated process

• Pick logical colours per area

• Re-inforce colour-coding with good signage

• Be sure tools and storage areas match

• Regularly review and monitor colour-coding plan

Q23. Explain the role of safety relief system in safety.

Safety Relief Valves: Purpose &

Ans :-

Function Guide
The primary function of Safety Relief Valves is the protection of life, property and
environment. A Safety Relief Valve is a (safety) device designed to protect a pressurised
vessel or system against over-pressure should all other safety systems fail.

Safety Relief Valves

An overpressure incident is defined by any situation/condition which would cause the
pressure in a vessel or system to increase beyond its specified design pressure or maximum
allowable working pressure (MAWP). A Safety Relief Valve is designed to open and relieve
excess pressure from vessels or equipment ...and then to re-close and prevent the further
release of fluid, gas, or steam once normal conditions have been restored.

There are a number of reasons why the pressure in a vessel or system can exceed a
predetermined limit. A PI Standard 521 | I SO 23251 Sect. 4 provides a detailed guideline
about causes of overpressure.

The most common are:

 Blocked discharge

 Exposure to external fire, often referred to as “Fire Case”

 Thermal expansion


 Chemical reaction

 Heat exchanger tube rupture
A Safety Valve is in many cases the last line of defence for a system or operation. It is vitally
important that the Safety Valve is certified to, and capable of, operating at ALL times and
under ALL circumstances. A typical example of this would be the event of power failure,
when system controls are non-functional ...in this situation the sole source of power for the
Safety Relief Valve must be the process fluid or substance itself. The Safety Relief Valve
must open at a predetermined set pressure, flow a rated capacity at a specified overpressure,
and close when the system pressure has returned to a safe level.

Since reliability is directly related to the functionality and performance of the device, it is
important that the design of the Safety Relief Valves is as uncomplicated and efficient as
possible.

Safety Relief Valves: Testing

One of the critical quality characteristics of a Safety Relief Valve is its functional tightness,
i.e. the tightness between the seat and the disc. On gastight safety valves, tightness is
measured using the internationally accepted air bubble count test (also known as “Kellogg
Test”) as per the API 527 standard (American Petroleum Institute Seat Tightness of Pressure
Relief Valves).

Seetru have developed an automatic, electronic system for recording the Kellogg Bubble
Count; our trademarked ComputestTM fast operating system automatically measures and
calculates the bubble count / leak rate in a manner compliant with the requirements of API
527.

The informative and comprehensive display:

 Manages the test sequence


 Shows the bubble leak rate


 Provides a Pass / Fail Indication

Seetru Valve Assembly

Safety Relief Valve Design: Selection

Safety Valves are sophisticated instruments, to ensure their safe operation it is important that
they are always dealt with by competent specialist engineers, this applies to their selection,
installation and maintenance.

The use of Safety Relief Valves across a very broad spectrum of industries and applications
means that considerations with regards to design must be correctly evaluated. Valves need to
be available with a large variety of options for construction materials, sealing materials,
connections ...and must be able to tolerate wide variances in both pressure and temperature.

We have been designing and manufacturing Safety Valves for over 65 years and have an
extensive range of devices which have many National and International approvals such as US
National Board (ASME Section VIII Division I) and of course the European Pressure
Equipment Directive 97/23/EC, update soon to be to introduced under PED 2014/68 enabling
European CE mark; and, Russian EAC (TR CU) Customs Union certification and declaration.
This allows Seetru to offer their products into the global marketplace.

The extensive ranges of products include Safety Valves in the key materials of construction
including bronze, brass and stainless steels, Safety Valve Pressures: 0.2 bar g. 500 bar g. |
Safety Valve Temperatures: 196° C +250°C.

Safety Relief Valve Design: Technology

The generation of compressed gas has considerable cost and therefore reliability of safety
valve performance is essential to the optimization of running costs. Where possible, the
safety valve should provide reliable and repeatable leak tight performance up to the Safety
Valve’s set pressure: elastomeric seals are particularly suited for this demand. It is also
essential that the flow capacity of the Safety Valve matches that of the application: if the
valve capacity is too low it may not protect the system and personnel adequately against
overpressure; if the flow capacity of the valve is too large it may chatter (open and close
quickly and repeatedly) in operation – this may cause damage and subsequently result in
valve failure.

In the early 1960s, Seetru pioneered the use of elastomeric seals in safety valves for use in the
compressor industry across Europe. The key benefit of elastomeric seals in compressor
applications is that they will seal fully, reliably and repeatably. It is, of course, necessary to
select a sealing technology that is suitable for the duty: here, the seal material must be
suitable for the temperature and medium, i.e. the compressed fluid and any other substances
that may be contained in the fluid, such as lubricating oils or gas contaminants. While
modern elastomeric seals have very extensive performance envelopes (temperature and
chemical compatibility etc.), it may still be necessary to use plastic or metal sealing
technology in order to deal with aggressive or difficult applications.

Safety Valves have to be of the highest quality and provide a long term reliable operation
solution. The company’s range of elastomeric safety valves for compressed air and gas
applications incorporate proprietary compact design technology which is highly efficient and
cost effective, and incorporates the exclusive Tutchtite® seal technology for repeatable
bubbletight sealing performance.

Another example of Safety Valve innovation is a range of specialist ultralow emission safety
valves for refrigeration applications: these world leading safety valves are tested during
assembly using gas spectrometry leak detection, to ensure leakage rates of less than 3 grams
of gas per year.

Seetru Valve Refurbishment

Safety Relief Valve Design: Evolution

Although generally speaking the design and manufacture of Safety Relief Valves is varied
and remains driven by the individual requirements of specific applications, some
manufacturers have developed multipurpose devices which aim to provide a more complete
and practical solution.

In keeping with this, we have developed our own range (The LGS™ Safety Valve range)
which incorporates all of our technological advances into a more versatile system. This
Safety Valve range has been designed with a robust and reliable construction so as to be
suitable for the widest possible range of industrial applications, while also achieving a broad
variation in flow characteristics ...coping with both low volume and high relief operations. A
‘single trim’ design ensures that all components are common across Liquid, Gas & Steam
applications.

Safety Relief Valve Training

 It is worth mentioning that Seetru offer a range of training courses through its online division
BEI Services (Blupax Engineering and Industrial Services). BLUPAXTraining (BEI
Services: http://blupax.com/blupax) are able to offer a wide spectrum of specialist safety
valve training courses. We offer personal development training at locations throughout the
UK, subjects include: Safety Relief Valves, Safety Pressure Devices, Practical Workshop
instruction.

Q24. What is flare? Explain the role of flare in safety.

Ans :- Flare Systems - Purpose

 A system of Process Safety Management (PSM) critical A system of Process Safety
Management (PSM) critical mechanical equipment that gathers and safely burns
mechanical equipment that gathers and safely burns hydrocarbons from pressure
hydrocarbons from pressure-relieving and vapor relieving and vapor- depressurizing
systems depressurizing systems
 Must be continuously available Must be continuously available
 Must be reliable for years Must be reliable for years
 Capable of performing through all operating Capable of performing through all operating-
plant emergency conditions, including a site emergency conditions, including a site-wide
general power wide general power failure or a weather event including a hurricane failure
or a weather event including a hurricane
 Difficult to add equipment or modify because they are very Difficult to add equipment or
modify because they are very infrequently out of service as they serve many units that
infrequently out of service as they serve many units that are infrequently out of service.

Typical Flows to Flare Systems

 Typical Flows to Flare Systems „
 Emergency „
o Pressure relief flows Pressure relief flows „
o Emergency depressurization Emergency depressurization „
 Episodic
o Venting required for maintenance Venting required for maintenance „
o Venting required for regeneration Venting required for regeneration „
o Shutdown/Start Shutdown/Start-up operations (de up operations (de -inventorying)
inventorying)
 Continuous Continuous– 99+% of Typical Operation 99+% of Typical Operation „
o Sweep gas through the flare system piping Sweep gas through the flare system
piping
o Process venting (continuous analyzer flows, gas Process venting (continuous
analyzer flows, gas seals, certain types of pressure control) seals, certain types of
pressure control) „
o Pressure Relief Valve leakage Pressure Relief Valve leakage.
 Flare System Major Components
 „Every flare system is unique and different Every flare system is unique and different
 „Every flare system contains differential components Every flare system contains
differential components
  „Series of collection headers from sources Series of collection headers from sources
 „Knockout drum Knockout drum
 „Stack
o „Flare Tip Flare Tip
o „Liquid seal Liquid seal
o „Purge reduction device (stack seal) Purge reduction device (stack seal)
 „Integrated pilot system Integrated pilot system
 „Monitoring and operation instrumentation Monitoring and operation instrumentation
 „Flare hydrocarbon recovery systems Flare hydrocarbon recovery system.
 Hydraulic Design Hydraulic Design
 Flare header is sized to limit the back pressure of each Flare header is sized to limit
the back pressure of each
 Pressure relief device during various emergency events. Pressure relief device during
various emergency events.
 The hydraulic design is a li The hydraulic design is a line sizing / rating problem ne
sizing / rating problem
 Design minimizes the differential pressure to ensure Design minimizes the differential
pressure to ensure
 Each pressure relief device functions properly each pressure relief device functions
properly
 Design is based on specific Design is based on specific line size, line length and line
size, line length and
 Maximum expected relief load for each relief event maximum expected relief load for
each relief event.
Hydraulic Issues Hydraulic Issues:
Hydraulic issues specific to flare header design: Hydraulic issues specific to flare header
design:
 Different relief events govern the size of various Different relief events govern the
size of various
 sections of the collection header sections of the collection header
 A variety of materials discharge to the flare system A variety of materials discharge to
the flare system
 Potential pressure discontinuities where pipe flows meet Potential pressure
discontinuities where pipe flows meet
 Volume expansion throughout header piping Volume expansion throughout header
piping
 High velocity and significant acceleration effects High velocity and significant
acceleration effects
Knock-Out Drum Out Drum
 Separates liquid from gas (2 phase separation) Separates liquid from gas (2 phase
separation)
 Prevents liquids from being discharged to atmosphere Prevents liquids from being
discharged to atmosphere
 Prevents or reduces smoke because of reduced liquid Prevents or reduces smoke
because of reduced liquid in the flame in the flame
 Increases flare tip life Increases flare tip life
 Allows draining of liquid prior to flare Allows draining of liquid prior to flare
 For reprocessing For reprocessing
 For disposal For disposal
Flare System Purge Requirements
 „Purge gas composition Purge gas composition
 „Non
 -condensing condensing
– typically natural gas or nitrogen typically natural gas or nitrogen
 „Non
 -corrosive corrosive
 „Non
 -reactive to other gasses in the system reactive to other gasses in the system
 „Purge gas locations Purge gas locations
 „Upstream or downstream of a liquid seal Upstream or downstream of a liquid seal
 „End of major header or branch End of major header or branch
 „Purge must be continuous and measurable Purge must be continuous and measurable
 „Purge gas sweeps the header of O Purge gas sweeps the header of O 2, corrosive,
reactive, , corrosive, reactive, or inert components
Purge Requirements: „
 System Requirements (manufacturer specified) System Requirements (manufacturer
specified)
 „Type of stack seal for air intrusion Type of stack seal for air intrusion
 „Flame stability Flame stability
 „Flare System Cooling Flare System Cooling
 „Offset pressure reduction after a hot release Offset pressure reduction after a hot release
 „Protect system until liquid seal can be re Protect system until liquid seal can be
reestablished established.
Flare Types Flare Types
 Single point Single point
 With or without smoke suppression With or without smoke suppression
 Vertical, elevated discharge point, but may be Vertical, elevated discharge point, but
may be horizontal (pit) horizontal (pit)
 May stage two single point flares for better control May stage two single point flares for
better control
 Multi-point
 Improved burning through multiple burning points Improved burning through multiple
burning points
 Smokeless Smokeless
 Divided into stages to facilitate better burning Divided into stages to facilitate better
burning
 Must operate with high back pressure Must operate with high back pressure
 Enclosed Enclosed
 Conceals flame from direct view Conceals flame from direct view
 Reduction in noise level Reduction in noise level
 Minimization of radiation Minimization of radiation.
Flare Tip Design
Provides safe and efficient burning of flare gases over Provides safe and efficient
burning of flare gases over wide flow conditions wide flow conditions
 Steam or air injection provided for smokeless operation Steam or air injection
provided for smokeless operation for most operating scenarios for most operating
scenarios
 Smokeless operation a function of flow Smokeless operation a function of flow
  Smokeless operation a function of gas composition Smokeless operation a function of
gas composition
 Maintain flame stability Maintain flame stability
 May require multiple flares and types May require multiple flares and types.
Flare System Operational Controls
 Steam or air flow to flare tip Steam or air flow to flare tip
 Cooling (minimum flow) Cooling (minimum flow)
 Protection for metal Protection for metal
 Eliminate internal burning (center steam) Eliminate internal burning (center steam)
 Smoke control Smoke control
 Upper steam Upper steam
 Steam Air tube steam (larger tip size only) Steam Air tube steam (larger tip size only)
 Center steam Center steam
 Keep steam hot (minimize condensate) Keep steam hot (minimize condensate)
 Water seal level Water seal level
 Flow and temperature control Flow and temperature control
 Staging control Staging control
 Knock
 -out drum liquid flow out drum liquid flow
 Assist gas flow Assist gas flow
 Collection header purge Collection header purge
 Oxygen level in flare header Oxygen level in flare header
 Pilot ignition Pilot ignition 29
Flare System Monitoring Instrumentation Flare System Monitoring Instrumentation
 Flare system operation monitoring Flare system operation monitoring
 Video camera Video camera
 Pilot gas flow and temperature Pilot gas flow and temperature
 Relief gas flow, pressure, temperature and composition Relief gas flow, pressure,
temperature and composition
 Knock
 -out drum level out drum level
 Water seal level, pressure, and temperature Water seal level, pressure, and
temperature
 Steam flow to flare Steam flow to flare
 Collection header purge gas flow Collection header purge gas flow
 Flare gas recovery Flare gas recovery
 Control and monitoring equipment may not be available for Control and monitoring
equipment may not be available for maintenance with flare system in service
maintenance with flare system in service
 Each flare system monitoring requirement is unique and Each flare system monitoring
requirement is unique and can be different
Flare Recovery System
 Gas collection for routine operations limited in outlets when Gas collection for routine
operations limited in outlets when
 pressure is low pressure is low
 Low pressure streams generally have 1 of 4 outlets Low pressure streams generally
have 1 of 4 outlets
 Lower pressure system (often not available) Lower pressure system (often not
available)
  Eduction to higher pressure system Eduction to higher pressure system
 Compressor to increase pressure Compressor to increase pressureFlare
 Eduction has some, but limited, applicability Eduction has some, but limited,
applicability.
 Pressure of eduction must be considered Pressure of eduction must be considered.
 Acceptability of stream being educted Acceptability of stream being educted.
 High H2S in stream is often a factor High H2S in stream is often a factor
 Compressor can be a viable option Compressor can be a viable option.
 Wet Gas compressor for FCCs is an example of viable Wet Gas compressor for FCCs
is an example of viable Option„If no compressor nearby, cost of new compressor
often is If no compressor nearby, cost of new compressor often isprohibitive
prohibitive32.
 Flare Recovery System Flare Recovery System.
 Flare hydrocarbon gas recovery systems Flare hydrocarbon gas recovery systems
 More common in refineries More common in refineries.
 „Less common in chemical plants Less common in chemical plants.
 Flaring generally last preferred destination Flaring generally last preferred destination
 Any gases sent to flare are lost product for company Any gases sent to flare are lost
product for company.
 Flaring has regulatory, environmental and community Flaring has regulatory,
environmental and community.
 impacts that companies prefer to not have impacts that companies prefer to not have.
Flare Operation Flare Operation
 „Maintain stable flame Maintain stable flame
- EPA 40 CFR 60.18 defines EPA 40 CFR 60.18 defines
 requirements for stable flame: requirements for stable flame:
 „Have a continuous pilot with monitoring Have a continuous pilot with monitoring
 „Limits minimum heat content of flare gas: Limits minimum heat content of flare gas:
 „200 BTU/scf for non 200 BTU/scf for non
 -assist flare assist flare
 „300 BTU/scf for assist flare 300 BTU/scf for assist flare
 „Maximum exit velocity based on heat content of flare Maximum exit velocity based
on heat content of flare
 gas (60 gas (60
– 400 FPS) 400 FPS)
 „Flame may not always be visible Flame may not always be visible
 „Hydrogen Hydrogen Low BTU gas Low BTU gas
- e.g. CO e.g. CO35
 Operation Operation -Weather Effects Weather Effects
 „Wind
 „Alter flame shape Alter flame shape
 „Sheer unburned hydrocarbons Sheer unburned hydrocarbons
 „Extinguish pilot flame Extinguish pilot flame
 „Physical damage to equipment Physical damage to equipment
 „Rain
 Extinguish pilot flame Extinguish pilot flame
 „Extreme conditions (i.e. hurricane) Extreme conditions (i.e. hurricane)
 „Loss of steam Loss of steam
 „Loss of power Loss of power
Q25. State the safety precautions to be taken while working on pipelines.

Ans :- Precautions for working on pipelines: Before commencing any work

(including minor repairs) on Pipe Lines/Installations, or opening any pipe Line for the same,
the Engineer/Supervisor In-Charge of the work must ensure that:
The Liquid or Gas Supply to the line is stopped, the control valve is properly closed & Liquid
or Gas line is properly and effectively blanked.
The Liquid or Gas line has been purged/flushed with nitrogen, other similar gas or
steam/water, as the case may be.
In case of flammable Liquid &Gas, the operations involving open flames, sparks, welding
etc. are stopped. Hot lines in the vicinity of the job have been screened. Sigris, burners etc.
are removed.
A Fire Fighting Team of two persons with two fire extinguishers is standing-by near the job
site.After completion of work the Liquid or Gas valve is opened only by an authorized
person.
The provisions of Rule 73-C of the Maharashtra Factories Rules 1963 are fully complied
with.

Q26. What is fire? Explain different types of fire.

Ans :- Classes of Fire and Extinguishers

Class of Description Extinguishing IS No.
fire Medium
A Fires involving ordinary combustible Water type 934
materials like wood, paper, textiles, (Soda acid)
fibres and vegetables etc. where the Water type (gas 940
cooling effect of water is essential for pressure)
the extinction of fires. Water type (constant 6234
air pressure),
Anti – freeze types
and
Water buckets
B Fire in flammable liquids like oils, Chem. Foam 933
grease, solvents, Petroleum products, Carbon dioxide 5507
varnishes paints etc. where a 10474
blanketing effect is essential. 2878
8149
Dry Powder 2171
4308
Dry Powder 10658
Mechanical foam 10204
Halon 1211 11108
Sand buckets
C Fires involving gaseous substances Carbon dioxide 2878
under pressure where it is necessary to 8149
dilute the burning gas at a very fast Dry powder 2171
 rate with an inert gas or powder. Dry powder 4308
Halon 1211 11108
D Fire involving metals like magnesium, Dry powder 2171
aluminum,zinc, potassium etc., where Special dry powder 4861
the burning metal is reactive to water for metal fire 11833
and which requires special Sand buckets
extinguishing media or technique.
E Fires involving electrical equipment Carbon dioxide 2878
where the electrical non-conductivity Dry chemical 2171
of the extinguishing media is of first powder 4308
importance. Halon 1211 11108
When electrical
equipment is de-
energized, same as
for Classes A & B
Sand buckets.
* Class E is omitted is some literature (eg. IS: 2190)

Class K is suggested for fire involving cooking oils.

Table B :Types of Extinguishers and suitability for Fire (IS:2190)

Type of Extinguisher IS No. For type of Fires

A B C D
1. Water type (Soda acid) 934 S NS NS NS
4406 * *
2 Water type (gas cartridge) 940 S NS NS NS
3 Water type (stored pressure) 6234 S NS NS NS
4 Chemical foam type 933 NS S NS NS
5507
10474
5 Mechanical foam type 10204 NS S NS NS
6 Dry powder type 2171 NS S NS NS
10658
7 Dry powder type 11833 NS NS NS S
8 CO2 type 2878 NS S S NS
8149
9 Halon 1211 type 11108 NS S S NS
* S = Suitable , NS = Not Suitable

Q27. Define deflagration and detonation.

Ans :- Deflagration:It is an explosion with a resulting shock wave moving at a speed less
than the speed of sound in unreacted medium.
 Deflagration is very rapid auto combustion of particles of explosive as a surface
phenomenon. It may be initiated by contact of a flame or spark but may be caused by impact
or friction. It is a characteristic of low explosives.
Deflagration or detonation is a form of explosion, the former is due to low burning
velocity (flame speed as I m/s) while the later is due to high burning velocity (flame speed as
2000-3000 m/s). A detonation generates high pressure and is more destructive than a
deflagration. The peak pressure caused by a deflagration in a closed vessel can reach up to
70-80 kPa (8 bar), whereas in case of detonation it easily reaches up to 200 kPa (20 bar).
A deflagration can turn into a detonation while travelling through a long pipe. In that
case deflagration velocity exceeds that mentioned above.
Detonation:It is an explosion with a resulting shock wave' moving at a speed more than
the speed of sound in unreacted medium.
Detonation is extremely rapid, self-propagating decomposition of an explosive
accompanied by a high pressure-temperature wave that moves at from 10009000 m/sec. It
may be initiated by mechanical impact, friction or heat. It is a characteristic of high
explosives which varies considerably in their sensitivity to shock, nitro-glycerine being one
of the most dangerous in this regard.Whether a deflagration or detonation takes place depends
on the material involved and the conditions under which it occurs. A vapour phase explosion
requires some degree of confinement for a detonation to take place.
Detonation of a gas-air mixture is possible directly by a powerful ignition source or
by transition from deflagration. Such transition requires a strong acceleration of the flame
front. It is possible in pipelines but rarely possible in vessels.
A number of substances are listed which can produce detonation in gas-air mixture.
Some commonly known substances are:
Acetone Ethylene
Acetylene Hydrogen
Benzene Methane
Chloroform Methanol
Cyclohexane Naphthalene
Diethyl ether Trichloro ethylene
Detonation usually occurs at well below the upper explosive limits. Separate Detonation
Limits are available for some substances as under:
Substance Detonation Limits (%) Explosive Limits (%)

Lower Upper LEL UEL

Acetylene 4.2 50 3 82

Ether 2.8 4.5 1.8 48

Hydrogen 18.3 59 4 75

Though upper detonation limits are normally below upper explosive limits, exceptions have
been reported.

Q28. Explain BLEVE and VCE.

Ans :- BLEVE (Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion ):

Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE), also referred as a fireball, is a
combination of fire and explosion with an intense radiant heat emission within a relatively
short time interval.
When a tank or pressure vessel containing liquid or liquefied gas above its boiling
point (so heated) fails or ruptures the contents release as a turbulent mixture of liquid and gas,
expanding rapidly and dispersing in air as a cloud. When this cloud is ignited, a fireball
occurs causing enormous heat radiation intensity within a few seconds. This heat is sufficient
to cause severe skin burns and deaths within a few hundred meters depending on the mass of
the gas involved. A BLEVE involving a 50- tone propane tank can cause '"third-degree burn
at @ 200 mt and blisters at @ 400 mt
Road/rail accident to a tank car/wagon or due to weakening of structure by fire or
physical impact on a overstressed vessel/tank can cause a BLEVE.

Some reported major BLEVE examples are as under:

Year Location Chemical Death Injury

1966 Feyzin, France LPG (Propane) 18 90

1969 Laurel, Miss LPG 2 -

1970 Cresent City, III LPG 0 66

1971 Houston, Tex Vinyl chloride 1 -

1972 New Jersey Propylene 2 -

1985 Mexico City LPG 650 2500

vapor cloud explosion

A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) results from the ignition of a flammable mixture of vapor, gas,
aerosol, or mist, in which flame speeds accelerate to sufficiently high velocities to produce
significant overpressure. VCEs are generally associated with the release of a sufficient quantity of
flammable gas or vaporizing (flashing) liquid from a:

 storage tank

 process or transport vessel

 piping system

Buildings may be damaged and people may be injured by:  the blast wave additional indirect
effects from missile generation, crater formation, ground shock, and fire. Generally:

 as the blast wave travels farther away from the center of the explosion it loses energy

 the magnitude of overpressure and other effects decreases as the distance increases from the
explosion source.

Five conditions for Vapor Cloud Explosions

1. The released material must be flammable and at suitable conditions to form a vapor cloud (the
reactivity of the unburned material is important)

2. An ignition source is needed to initiate the explosion. Higher energy ignition sources can lead to a
more severe explosion than do lower energy sources.

Q29. What is dust explosion? How it taken place?

Ans :- Dust Explosion: It is possible due to flammable dusts of wood, coal, food(starch,
flour, sugar, cocoa, feed stuffs), chemicals, plastics (urea formaldehyde, resin, polyethylene,
polystyrene), metals(aluminum, magnesium) etc.
It results from rapid combustion of fine solid particles like iron, aluminum, wood,
starch etc. Many solid particles when reduced to fine powder becomes very flammable and
explosive.
At a starch/corn plant at Ceder Rapids, Iowa in 1919, 43 people were killed and at
Peking, Illinois in 1924, 42 people were killed due to dust explosion.
At a starch plant at Ahmedabad, 29 workers injured and out of them 20 died due to
starch dust explosion on 19-12-1991.
Explosion characteristics of dust suspension are as under:
1. Explosibility classification.
2. Minimum explosible concentration.
3. Minimum ignition temperature.
4. Minimum ignition energy.
5. Maximum permissible oxygen concentration to prevent ignition.
6. Explosion pressure characteristics.
(a) maximum explosion pressure.
(b) maximum rate of pressure rise.
(c) average rate of pressure rise.

Sources of ignition for dust explosions are :

(1) Flames, heat or hot surfaces
(2) Welding and cutting
(3) Mechanical sparks
(4) Self-heating
(5) Static electricity and
(6)Electricalequipment.
Preventive methods for dust explosion include:
(1) Avoidance of dust suspensions
(2) Wet process
(3) Elimination of source of ignition and
(4) Inserting.
Methods of protection against dust explosion include;
(1) Isolation
(2) Containment
(3) Explosion suppression and
(4) Explosion venting.
Dust fires can occur in dust deposits and are of two types - flaming and smouldering fires.

Q30. Explain the role of fire detection and alarm system in safety.

Ans :- Fire Detection and Alarm Systems:Various types of detectors are available
operating on principles of thermal expansion, thermoelectric sensitivity, thermo conductivity
or photosensitivity to detect presence of smoke, increase in temperature, light intensity or
total radiation. Their types are: Thermal expansion detectors. Radiant energy detectors.Light
interference detectors and ionization detectors. They should be properly located depending
upon their range. They simply give alarm and cannot extinguish fire. They make us alert for
fire fighting.

Fire detectors (A & B) and LPG detector (C)

Though fire detection and alarm systems are separate systems but the latter has to operate just
after the former operates. Therefore they are considered together. IS 2175 and 2189 also deal
with them together.
Two main functions of any fire detection system are
1. To give alarm to start up extinguishing procedure, and

51
2. To give early warning to area occupants to escape.
It is wrong to speak 'fire detectors'. Actually they detect sensible heat, smoke density or flame
radiation to operate before actual fire follows. Their 'sensor' detects measurable quantity of
these parameters. A decision making device coupled with the sensor, compares the measured
quantity with a predetermined ' value, and when it is different, an alarm is sounded. A
detector both detects and signals.
Human being is a good detector as he can act m a flexible way i.e. run away, put out
the fire or call the fire department. No other detector can work in such selective manner.
Selection of the type of detector is important For example, low risk areas need
thermal detectors, a ware house may have infrared and ionization detectors and a computer
area requires ionization or combination detectors.
Location and spacing should be determined to obtain the earliest possible
warning.Sensitivity, reliability, maintainability and stability are important factors for
selection.
Fire process has four stages - incipient stage, smouldering stage, flame stage and heat
stage. Many types of fire detectors are available for various situations and useful at different
stages of a fire (see part 1.4). Thermal detectors are of fixed temperature detectors, rate-
compensated thermal detectors, rate of rise thermal detectors, line thermal detectors and the
bulb detection system.
Smoke detectors are of photoelectric type and are of two classes - The beam
photoelectric or reflected beam photoelectric detectors.
Flame detectors are of infrared (IR) or ultraviolet (UV) type.
Ionization (combustion products) detectors are the
single chamber or dual chamber ionization detector and the
low-voltage ionization detector.
Fire Alarm system may be separate to run manually or
connected with fire detectors and operable automatically. All
workers must be made aware of the sound pattern and its
meaning. Fire alarm sound should be distinguishable from
other sound m that area. It should be clearly audible to all
facility personnel. Sound for beginning of fire and end of fire
should be kept different.

Q31. Explain the role of firefighting system in industry.

Ans :- Industrial plants

production systems, CNC centres, presses, turbines, generators, pumps, engine test cells
Fuels and lubricants are fire loads frequently used in the industry. Devastating fires may be
caused by hot surfaces in combination with leakages. The often very lengthy refurbishment
times for destroyed machines create great difficulties for operators. The use of gas
extinguishing systems is mostly associated with risks and they can often only be used with
pre-warning times.

Depending on the specific requirements, FOGTEC systems can be designed as room or object
protection systems. The benefits for operators are as follows:

52
 Immediate cooling of protected area or machine
 Short downtimes
 Very small system size; minor interference with machinery
 Low operating costs
 Low-cost re-commissioning of the FOGTEC system
 No personnel protection measures required
 No heat stresses on materials or machines due to uniform cooling
Fire protection in the food industry
industrial fryers and kitchen deep fryers
Oil fires are very difficult to control with conventional fire fighting systems. A very high
temperature is reached within a short time and the fires spread very rapidly. FOGTEC high
pressure water mist systems are able to fight oil fires immediately and effectively since the
small droplets immediately atomise on the surface of the oil, thereby suffocating the fire. This
prevents oil explosions in buildings, while re-ignitions are suppressed.

 For industrial frying lanes, deep fat fryers in kitchens, ovens, etc.
 Use of pure water Less risk of re-ignitions due to uniform cooling of metallic surfaces and the
oil
 No partitions are required
 No time-consuming cleaning work as with chemical agents
 Only short business interruptions
Painting areas
high risk of fire due to combustible solvents
Modern painting areas enable very high production quantities, meaning downtimes are cost-
intensive incidents for operators. The use of solvents, which are mostly combustible, during
the painting process result in a multitude of special fire protection requirements.

This is where FOGTEC high pressure water mist can offer ideal protection. Unlike with a
gas, the water mist is dispersed very quickly into the respective areas without any pre-
warning times. In addition, the high pressure water mist enables a very rapid cooling effect
that presents no danger to operators. In turn, unlike with sprinkler systems, only very small
quantities of water are used so that water damage and the amount of contaminated water are
kept to a minimum.
 Minimal production interruptions in case of fire
 Simple integration due to small components
 No pre-warning times
 Low-cost re-commissioning of the fire fighting system in case of a fire
Public infrastructure
Fire prevention in metro stations
An effectively functioning infrastructure is of major importance in modern society. This
includes, in particular, underground and metro stations. Fires in these types of facilities with
large gatherings of people and unfavourable escape conditions constitute a major safety risk.
Later disruptions to railor road traffic due to costly repair measures and road closures result
in major economic damage, not just for operators but also for all passengers and local
companies.
FOGTEC water mist can be used in stations and buildings to protect against a wide range of
risks. This is the case for platform areas, track beds, vehicles, equipment rooms, shopping

53
 areas, tunnels, etc. FOGTEC experts have a wealth of know-how at their disposal that we
pass on to our customers thanks to decades of research, comprehensive fire tests and the
numerous FOGTEC water misting systems that have already been installed:
 Consultations on directives and legal issues worldwide
 Compensation options for construction measures
 Reduction of escaping smoke
 Fire hazard analyses
 Development of fire protection concepts
 Computer simulations (CFD)
 Fire tests
 Design and installation of firefighting systems
Conveyor systems
conveyor belts and assembly lines
A fire may quickly spread to large areas via conveyor belts and assembly lines. The fire risk
can be reduced by the use of fire-resistant conveyor belts, but it cannot be fully prevented. In
addition, conveyor belts of this type age significantly more quickly and are less flexible. They
also cannot provide protection against conveyed goods that are on fire.
FOGTEC water mist systems are particularly suitable for especially critical areas in a
conveyor system such as drives, bearings and wall penetrations, but also for overall
protection:
 Local, precise installation
 Less water used
 Shorter downtimes; minimal space requirements
 No pre-warning times
 Reduced cleaning requirements
Cable tunnels
a company’s central nervous system
Even today, cables tunnels and ducts are rarely protected using a fire fighting system due to
the fear of water damage even though such areas often accommodating the entire power
supply and the majority of the data transmission cables. A fire in cable ducts can bring a
company to a standstill. FOGTEC water mist, with its special properties, creates optimal
protection for cable ducts and increases their availability significantly:
 Minimal water damage in buildings
 Tolerant to forced ventilation or openings
 No pre-warning time or danger for personnel
 Installation usually only required below the ceiling
 Water mist spreads even into areas below cable trays
IT environment
Fire prevention for data centres, communication systems, IT areas
Data centres and rooms with switching units constitute a particular hazard due to possible
short circuits or system overloads. Insufficient heat extraction or a defective cooling system
will increase this risk in buildings. Failures of such areas present considerable difficulties for
operators. This applies for banks, authorities, insurance companies and equally to internet
service providers.

Once a fire has broken out, there is a risk of data loss due to fire or water damage. In
addition, soot particles and corrosive gases will form due to the plastics used for cable

54
 insulation, for instance, which can damage IT systems in the long term. Sprinklers are often
unsuitable for IT areas due to the expected water damage. The use of gas extinguishing
systems can also be problematic since enclosures can often not be guaranteed in the long term
and gas does not develop sufficient cooling effect.

High pressure water mist systems offer ideal protection in buildings:

 100% environmentally friendly, with no hazards to people
 Can be triggered without any pre-warning time
 No partitions are required
 No limitations with regard to surface area protected
 Use as room protection as well as for the protection of raised floors
 Binding of soot particles and delution of smoke gases reduces damages
 Minimal water damage
 No dependency on extinguishing gas manufacturers
 No corrosive by-products from extinguishing agents
Fire protection in buildings
offices, hotels, hospitals, museums, archives, stations
The safety of people has utmost priority when it comes to fire protection in public buildings.
In cultural institutions, the protection of unique works of art, books or of entire heritage
buildings also needs to be addressed.

High pressure water mist technology offers the following:

 It can significantly reduce thermal radiation for escaping people due to its intensive cooling
effect.
 Water damage can be kept to a minimum. High pressure water mist systems require only
approximately 10% of the water needed for conventional sprinkler systems. This means less
damage, lower repair or restoration costs and shorter downtimes or interruptions to
operations.
 It is more compact than conventional systems, simpler and more aesthetic in terms of
integration into existing or new buildings.
 The high pressure level enables protection of buildings the height of a TV tower using just
one pump unit in the basement.
 The better cooling and shielding effect of the fine, high pressure water mist enables more
aesthetic materials to be used.

Q32. Explain pressure vessel hazards and controls.

 Ans :- Pressure system hazards and control:

General safety requirements for compressed air :
1. All pipes, hoses, and fittings must have a rating of the maximum pressure of the
compressor. Compressed air pipelines should be identified (psi) as to maximum working
pressure.
2. Air supply shutoff valves should be located (as near as possible) at the point-of-operation.
3. Air hoses should be kept free of grease and oil to reduce the possibility of deterioration.

55
4. Hoses should not be strung across floors or aisles where they are liable to cause personnel
to trip and fall. When possible, air supply hoses should be suspended overhead, or
otherwise located to afford efficient access and protection against damage.
5. Hose ends must be secured to prevent whipping if an accidental cut or break occurs.
6. Pneumatic impact tools, such as riveting guns, should never be pointed at a person.
7. Before a pneumatic tool is disconnected (unless it has quick disconnect plugs), the air
supply must be turned off at the control valve and the tool bled.
8. Compressed air must not be used under any circumstances to clean dirt and dust from
clothing or off a person’s skin. Shop air used for cleaning should be regulated to 15 psi
unless equipped with diffuser nozzles to provide lessor pressure.
9. Goggles, face shields or other eye protection must be worn by personnel using
compressed air for cleaning equipment.
10. Static electricity can be generated through the use of pneumatic tools. This type of
equipment must be grounded or bonded if it is used where fuel, flammable vapors or
explosive atmospheres are present.

Q33. Explain the checklist for testing pressure vessel.

Ans :-

Pressure Vessel Compliance Checklist

This checklist is to be used annually for reviewing compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Re
National and International Standards.

The purpose of this checklist is to ensure that all required pressure equipment is appropriately inspected, tested, main

Operational Area Date

(School/ Department/ Research Group/ Completed by

Project/ Area)
Authorised by
(Line-manager/ Lab Management)

Types of pressure vessels within the Location of vessels

area:
(Identify building and room number

If the answer to any of the following questions is ‘no’ please rectify or seek advice from HSEM regarding how to
Checklist

1 LEGISLATION AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Have all pressure vessels used within the department/area been assessed to Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
determine their current hazard rating using the Curtin Pressure Vessel
Register?
Have all pressure vessels been added to the Pressure Vessel Register Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐

56
 If the answer to any of the following questions is ‘no’ please rectify or seek advice from HSEM regarding how to
Checklist

maintained by HSEM?
Have all pressure vessels & pressure systems that require design registration Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
been registered with Worksafe WA?
Have all pressure vessels and pressure systems that require plant registration Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
been registered with Worksafe WA?
Have all alterations to the design of individual pressure vessels been re- Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
registered with Worksafe WA?
The Worksafe WA Commissioner has been notified of all pressure vessels that Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
have been permanently removed from service?
Are current information files available for each pressure vessel within your Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
area that is listed on the Curtin Pressure Vessel Register? These files should
contain:
 Manufacturer’s operational manual/instructions
 Registration certificates
 Inspection & testing schedule & reports
 Maintenance & alteration reports
 Copies of relevant communications re the vessel
 Training records

2 INSPECTION, TESTING & MAINTENANCE

Is an inspection, testing and maintenance plan in place for all pressure vessels Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
within the area?
Have all required inspections, testing and maintenance been completed this Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
year on those pressure vessels as scheduled?
Have all corrective actions identified through inspection, testing and Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
maintenance processes been completed? If not please provide further
information.
3 FACILITIES and EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Are appropriate procedures in place and available for use to manage any Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
incident involving a pressure vessel?
Are suitable fire and emergency equipment available within each area where Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
pressure vessels are located?
Are suitable first aid kits available in the area to manage any injuries related Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
to use of pressure vessels?
Are suitable spills kits available within each area to handle chemical spills Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
related to pressure vessel incidents?
4 RISK ASSESSMENT and SAFE WORK PROCEDURES
Has a HAZOP or other suitable hazard identification tool been used to assess
the use of the pressure vessel and suitable controls been implemented prior Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
to commissioning the pressure vessel?
Are suitable personal protective equipment available for use where pressure Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐

57
 vessels are located?
Is suitable signage in place on entry doors to denote the types of personal Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
protective equipment required to be used with each pressure vessel?
Chemical Risk Assessments have been completed for all chemicals required to Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
be used within each pressure vessel?
All chemicals used within pressure vessels comply with regulation 5.1-5.7 of Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 in relation to the provision of
SDS, duties of manufactures and importers, registering of unlisted hazardous
substances, labelling of hazardous substances and use of generic names?
Safe Operating procedures are in place for each pressure vessel and available Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
near where the pressure vessel is to be used?
5 AREA and HEALTH MONITORING

Is area monitoring or health surveillance in place if required? Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐

Has all monitoring equipment been inspected & calibrated by suitably Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
qualified providers and maintained as per the manufacturer’s requirements
this year?
Has all required health surveillance been undertaken this year and records Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
stored within departmental secure information systems?

6 TRAINING
Supervision procedures are in place to ensure adequate supervision of Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
students at all times when working with pressure vessels?
Have all operators completed the required orientation & training to safely Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
operate pressure vessels?
Where high risk pressure vessels are used, have all operators completed a Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
certificate of competency or other suitable training?
7 DISPOSAL
Are suitable chemical waste containers available for bi-products of pressure Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
vessel use?
Have all de-registered pressure vessels that have been permanently removed Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
from service been made safe prior to disposal?
Has the Pressure Vessel Register been modified to indicate that all de- Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A ☐
registered pressure vessels have been permanently removed from service?
Manager/Supervisor Acknowledgement:

Name: Signature: Role:

Comments:

58
Record Keeping: It is the responsibility of the Faculty/Area to store all relevant records regarding the
purchase, registration, re-registration, maintenance, use, de-registration and removal from site of
pressure vessels in a pressure vessel information file.

Q34. Explain the safety aspects in bulk storage of gases.

Ans :- Dispense gas cylinders are heavy and are filled with gas held under high
pressure.

Standard size dispense gas cylinders weigh about 16kg when empty and around 20kg when
filled (depending on the gas or gas mixture), and larger cylinders can be nearly five times
heavier.

Perhaps even more importantly, they are filled with gas held at high pressure and, if a
cylinder discharges or ruptures there are likely to be serious consequences.

Gas cylinders must be handled and stored carefully in accordance with the Manual Handling
Regulations 1992 and other health and safety guidelines.

Trust the experts

BOC Sureflow's dedicated Sales Service Personnel are fully trained in manual handling
procedures. They will deliver your cylinders and are on-hand to offer advice and guidance on
all aspects of managing and handling dispense gases and equipment in the cellar, safely.

Guide to manual handling procedures

ALWAYS keep cylinder stocks to the necessary minimum for your volume of trade

only use cylinders filled by a reputable gas supplier who fills and regularly tests
ALWAYS
cylinders in accordance with current safety regulations

ALWAYS return gas cylinders to the supplier you purchased them from – and to no-one else

have spare washers available to replace worn washers which may cause leaks at
ALWAYS
the cylinder connection

NEVER fill one gas cylinder from another - this is extremely dangerous

NEVER carry gas cylinders in a car or other closed vehicle

NEVER connect gas cylinders to any equipment other than the primary regulator

NEVER drop, throw or mishandle cylinders

59
NEVER use cylinders for anything other than storing and delivering dispense gas

NEVER oil or lubricate cylinder valves

In the cellar

The cellar, where cylinders are stored, handled or connected, should be checked periodically
to make sure it is a safe working environment.

Here are some of the safety precautions which should be observed to avoid risks to people
working in the cellar:

ALWAYS restrict entry to the cellar, allowing only trained persons to enter and work there

ALWAYS display appropriate warning signs and safety procedures

ALWAYS ensure the cellar is adequately ventilated

ALWAYS clean up spillages immediately to prevent slipping hazards

ALWAYS ensure the cellar has adequate lighting

ALWAYS secure cylinders safely, whether in use or not

NEVER stand cylinders on uneven floors. The cylinder may fall, causing injury or damage

obstruct access to or from the cellar, which can prevent escape in the event of an
NEVER
emergency

Safe handling of dispense gas cylinders

Incorrect handling of heavy, awkward cylinders can cause personal injury; particularly to the
back, neck or arms. The risks involved in moving cylinders will differ depending on the
nature of the cellar.

In underground cellars, manoeuvring cylinders in the drop of a stair requires special

consideration.

Large cylinders should only be stored in underground cellars where there is suitable access
and lifting equipment to move or handle them safely.

ALWAYS use protective gloves and footwear when handling cylinders

ALWAYS use suitable equipment such a trolley or mechanical lift for moving large cylinders

60
ALWAYS carry cylinders close to the body

secure cellar flaps during delivery of cylinders and protect the opening with
ALWAYS
barriers

Q35. What is corrosion? Explain any two types of corrosion.

Ans :- CORROSION TYPES AND PREVENTION

Posted on June, 2017
In a previous post, we discussed the basics of corrosion -- from the fundamental chemical
reaction to the types of environments in which corrosion can occur. As corrosion most often
occurs in aqueous environments, we now explore the different types of degradation a metal
can experience in such conditions:
UNIFORM CORROSION
Uniform corrosion is considered an even attack across the surface of a material and is the
most common type of corrosion. It is also the most benign as the extent of the attack is
relatively easily judged, and the resulting impact on material performance is fairly easily
evaluated due to an ability to consistently reproduce and test the phenomenon. This type of
corrosion typically occurs over relatively large areas of a material’s surface.
PITTING CORROSION
Pitting is one of the most destructive types of corrosion, as it can be hard to predict, detect
and characterize. Pitting is a localized form of corrosion, in which either a local anodic point,
or more commonly a cathodic point, forms a small corrosion cell with the surrounding
normal surface. Once a pit has initiated, it grows into a “hole” or “cavity” that takes on one of
a variety of different shapes. Pits typically penetrate from the surface downward in a vertical
direction. Pitting corrosion can be caused by a local break or damage to the protective oxide
film or a protective coating; it can also be caused by non-uniformities in the metal structure
itself. Pitting is dangerous because it can lead to failure of the structure with a relatively low
overall loss of metal.

61
CREVICE CORROSION
Crevice corrosion is also a localized form of corrosion and usually results from a stagnant
microenvironment in which there is a difference in the concentration of ions between two
areas of a metal. Crevice corrosion occurs in shielded areas such as those under washers, bolt
heads, gaskets, etc. where oxygen is restricted. These smaller areas allow for a corrosive
agent to enter but do not allow enough circulation within, depleting the oxygen content,
which prevents re-passivation. As a stagnant solution builds, pH shifts away from neutral.
This growing imbalance between the crevice (microenvironment) and the external surface
(bulk environment) contributes to higher rates of corrosion. Crevice corrosion can often occur
at lower temperatures than pitting. Proper joint design helps to minimize crevice corrosion.
INTERGRANULAR CORROSION
An examination of the microstructure of a metal reveals the grains that form during
solidification of the alloy, as well as the grain boundaries between them. Intergranular
corrosion can be caused by impurities present at these grain boundaries or by the depletion or
enrichment of an alloying element at the grain boundaries. Intergranular corrosion occurs
along or adjacent to these grains, seriously affecting the mechanical properties of the metal
while the bulk of the metal remain intact.
An example of intergranular corrosion is carbide precipitation, a chemical reaction that can
occur when a metal is subjected to very high temperatures (e.g., 800°F - 1650°F) and/or
localized hot work such as welding. In stainless steels, during these reactions, carbon
“consumes” the chromium, forming carbides and causing the level of chromium remaining in
the alloy to drop below the 11% needed to sustain the spontaneously-forming passive oxide

layer. 304L and 316L are enhanced chemistries of 304 and 316 stainless that contain lower
levels of carbon, and would provide the best corrosion resistance to carbide precipitation.
STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (SCC)
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is a result of the combination of tensile stress and a corrosive
environment, often at elevated temperatures. Stress corrosion may result from external stress
such as actual tensile loads on the metal or expansion/contraction due to rapid temperature
changes. It may also result from residual stress imparted during the manufacturing process
such as from cold forming, welding, machining, grinding, etc. In stress corrosion, the

62
majority of the surface usually remains intact; however, fine cracks appear in the
microstructure, making the corrosion hard to detect. The cracks typically have a brittle
appearance and form and spread in a direction perpendicular to the location of the stress.
Selecting proper materials for a given environment (including temperature and management
of external loads) can mitigate the potential for catastrophic failure due to SCC.
GALVANIC CORROSION
Galvanic corrosion is the degradation of one metal near a joint or juncture that occurs when
two electrochemically dissimilar metals are in electrical contact in an electrolytic
environment; for example, when copper is in contact with steel in a saltwater environment.
However, even when these three conditions are satisfied, there are many other factors that
affect the potential for, and the amount of, corrosion, such as temperature and surface finish
of the metals. Large engineered systems employing many types of metal in their construction,
including various fastener types and materials, are susceptible to galvanic corrosion if care is
not exercised during the design phase. Choosing metals that are as close together as
practicable on the galvanic series helps reduce the risk of galvanic corrosion.
CONCLUSION
In aqueous environments, metals may be exposed to not only uniform corrosion, but also to
various types of local corrosion including pitting, crevice, intergranular, stress, and galvanic
corrosion. In areas where corrosion is a concern, stainless steel products offer value and
protection against these threats. Stainless’ favorable chemical composition makes it resistant
to many common corrosives while remaining significantly more affordable than specialty
alloys such as titanium and Inconel® alloys.
Stainless steel is a highly alloyed, low-carbon steel with a high (at least 11%) chromium
content. When exposed to an oxygenated environment, the chromium reacts to form a passive
oxide layer on the metal’s surface, slowing further oxidation and providing a self-healing
quality, which helps resist uniform and local corrosion. Nickel helps to stabilize the
microstructure, increasing SCC resistance. Manganese, in moderate quantities and in
association with nickel, will perform many functions attributable to nickel and helps prevent
pitting. The addition of molybdenum (the additional element in Type 316 SS that increases its
performance with respect to Type 304 SS), helps increase resistance to pitting and crevice
corrosion. Reduced levels of carbon, such as those found in 304L and 316L will help prevent
intergranular corrosion. Lastly, nitrogen, although not a major element of stainless steel’s
composition, increases pitting resistance. Choosing stainless steel can help greatly reduce the
risk of corrosion and yield long-term savings by avoiding the costs associated with
reinstallation of inferior products.

Q36. Explain the bulk storage of acid with safety aspects.

Ans :- Chemical Storage

Proper chemical storage is as important to safety as proper chemical handling. Often,

seemingly logical storage ideas, such as placing chemicals in alphabetical order, may cause
incompatible chemicals to be stored together.
General Guidelines
Follow these guidelines for safe chemical storage:

63
  Read chemical labels and MSDSs for specific storage instructions.
 Store chemicals in a well-ventilated area; however, do not store chemicals in a fume
hood.
 Maintain an inventory of all chemicals in storage.
 Return chemical containers to their proper storage location after use.
 Store glass chemical containers so that they are unlikely to be broken.
 Store all hazardous chemicals below eye level.
 Never store hazardous chemicals in a public area or corridor.

Separating Hazardous Chemicals

In addition to the guidelines above, there are storage requirements for separating hazardous
chemicals. Because an alphabetical storage system may place incompatible chemicals next to
each other, group chemicals according to their hazard category (i.e., acids, bases, flammables,
etc.).
Follow these guidelines to ensure that hazardous chemicals are stored safely:

 Separate acids from bases. Store these chemicals near floor level.
 Isolate perchloric acid from organic materials. Do not store perchloric acid on a
wooden shelf.
 Separate highly toxic chemicals and carcinogens from all other chemicals. This
storage location should have a warning label and should be locked.
 Separate acids from flammables.
 Do not keep peroxide-forming chemicals longer than twelve months.
 Do not allow picric acid to dry out.
 If flammables need to be chilled, store them in a laboratory-safe refrigerator, not in a
standard refrigerator.
 Flammables should be stored in a flammable storage cabinet.
 Store reactive materials seperate from corrosives or flammables.
 Store Nitric acid (reactive and corrosive) separately from other acids and flammables.

Chemical Classifications and Segregation

The Chemical Hygiene Plan for Texas State University provides the segregation and color
code program we use to store chemicals in labs.
The following table provides examples of incompatible chemicals:

HEMICAL INCOMPATIBLE WITH . . .

Acetic acid Chromic acid, nitric acid, hydroxyl compounds, ethylene glycol, perchloric acid, peroxides, permanga
Acetylene Chlorine, bromine, copper, fluorine, silver, mercury
Acetone Concentrated nitric and sulfuric acid mixtures
lkali metals Water, carbon tetrachloride or other chlorinated hydrocarbons, carbon dioxide, halogens
Ammonia Mercury, chlorine, calcium hypochlorite, iodine, bromine, hydrofluoric acid
Chlorates Ammonium salts, acids, powdered metals, sulfur, finely divided organic or combustible materials
Ammonia, acetylene, butadiene, butane, methane, propane (or other petroleum gases), hydrogen, sodiu
Chlorine
benzene, finely divided metals, turpentine

64
HEMICAL INCOMPATIBLE WITH . . .
Cyanide Acids
Fluorine Most other chemicals
Nitrates Sulfuric acid
Oxygen Oils, grease, hydrogen, flammable liquids, solids, or gases
rchloric acid Acetic anhydride, bismuth and its alloys, alcohol, paper, wood, grease, oils,
Sodium Carbon tetrachloride, carbon dioxide, water
Sulfides Acids

Chemical Compatibity Chart

Below is a chart adapted from NFPA regulations which demonstrates how chemicals should
be stored by hazard class. This chart is not complete but it will aid in making decisions about
storage. For more complete information please refer to the MSDS for the specific chemical.
Group/ Color Hazard Class Storage Location Special Instructions

Code

G Grey, General On shelves or in Presents no more than moderate

Green, cabinets hazard in any of categories. For
Orange general chemical storage.

B Blue Health Hazard On shelves or in Toxic if inhaled, ingested or

cabinets absorbed through skin. Store in a
secure area.

Y Yellow Reactive On shelves or in Reactive & oxidizing reagents.

cabinets May react violently with air, water
or other substances. Store away
from flammables or combustibles.

R Red Flammable In flammable Store in area segregated for

storage cabinet flammable reagents.

W White Corrosive/ *In corrosive May harm skin, eyes, & mucous
storage cabinet membranes. Store away from red,
Contact Hazard
yellow, and blue coded reagents.

*Within this storage group you must segregate acids and bases. In addition, nitric acid is
always to be stored alone.

 Storage location should clearly indicate which group/code is stored in that

location. Each shelf or cabinet should indicate the color.

65
  Groups should always be separated by a vertical divider not horizontal divider. (see
diagrams below)
 Each chemical container should be clearly labeled by its storage color.
 Ideally liquids should be isolated by secondary containment.

Shelf/Cabinet Diagram 1: Correct

G-Grey Storage B-Blue Storage Y-Yellow Storage

G-Grey Storage B-Blue Storage Y-Yellow Storage

Shelf/Cabinet Diagram 1: Incorrect

W-White Storage B-Blue Storage B-Blue Storage

R-Red Storage Y-Yellow Y-Yellow Storage

Storage

(from pg 20 Appendix A of the Texas State University-San Marcos Chemical Hygiene Plan)

66
 Q37. Explain the mechanism of stems explosion.

Ans :- STEAM EXPLOSION:

If a steam explosion occurs in a confined tank of water due to rapid heating of the water,
the pressure wave and rapidly expanding steam can cause severe water hammer. This was the
mechanism that, in Idaho, USA, in 1961, caused the SL-1 nuclear reactor vessel to jump over 9
feet (2.7 m) in the air when it was destroyed by a criticality accident. In the case of SL-1, the
fuel and fuel elements vaporized from instantaneous overheating.
Events of this general type are also possible if the fuel and fuel elements of a liquid-cooled
nuclear reactor gradually melt. Such explosions are known as fuel–coolant interactions
(FCI).[citation needed] In these events the passage of the pressure wave through the
predispersed material creates flow forces which further fragment the melt, resulting in rapid
heat transfer, and thus sustaining the wave. Much of the physical destruction in the Chernobyl
disaster, a graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled RBMK-1000 reactor, is thought to have been
due to such a steam explosion.
In a nuclear meltdown, the most severe outcome of a steam explosion is early containment
failure. Two possibilities are the ejection at high pressure of molten fuel into the containment,
causing rapid heating; or an in-vessel steam explosion causing ejection of a missile (such as the
upper head) into, and through, the containment. Less dramatic but still significant is that the
molten mass of fuel and reactor core melts through the floor of the reactor building and reaches
ground water; a steam explosion might occur, but the debris would probably be contained, and
would in fact, being dispersed, probably be more easily cooled. See WASH-1400 for details.
Steam explosions are often encountered where hot lava meets sea water. Such an occurrence is
also called a littoral explosion. A dangerous steam explosion can also be created when liquid
water encounters hot, molten metal. As the water explodes into steam, it splashes the burning
hot liquid metal along with it, causing an extreme risk of severe burns to anyone located nearby
and creating a fire hazard.

Q. Sampling of liquefied flammable gas.

Ans- Sampling liquefied gases such as Chlorine, Liquefied Petroleum Gas

(LPG) and other is very challenging mainly because these are toxic
chemicals and no exposure is allowed.
New Technology
Consult this page to understand how BIAR COLUMBIA-LY sample
container provide a sufficient vapor space to prevent over-pressure from
volumetric expansion.
To improve the current sample method by simplifying the process, reducing
potential leak points and improving the general quality of the equipment, we
propose using one of our valve with a sample cylinder and associated
accessories such as bayonet connection and safety plug.
To provide volume for product expansion, the valve must be installed on a
vertical pipeline or at 90° on a horizontal pipeline as illustrated on the left.

67
Purely from the sample process point of view, the simplest and
recommended way is to install the valve directly on the process
line. However, if this is not possible, another recommended way
is to install the valve on a fast loop between the high-pressure
and low-pressure sides of the pump in a re-circulation line.
Assuming the valve is installed directly on the process line or on
a fast loop with constant product flow-through, the steps to grab a
sample will be the following:

1. Remove the safety plug from the bayonet connection

(secondary containment)
2. Remove the safety cap from the sample cylinder
3. Connect the sample cylinder
4. Open the sample cylinder
5. Open the sample valve

68
 6. Wait a defined amount of time to make sure the desired
sample amount is collected
7. Close the sample cylinder
8. Close the sample valve
9. Disconnect the sample cylinder
10. Put the safety cap back on the sample cylinder
11. Put the safety plug back on the sample valve

This new method represents less steps than traditional Sample

Methods and each steps are intuitive. Furthermore, only the
desired amount of product is extracted from the process line, thus
eliminating the need to recycle unwanted residue.

Q. Safe unloading of a flammable liquid tank-lorry.

Ans-

3.14.2 Loading/Unloading Procedures – 40 CFR 112.7(h)(2) & (3)

All suppliers must meet the minimum requirements and regulations for tank truck loading/unloading
established by the U.S. Department of Transportation. Procedures will be established so that the
vendor(s) understands the site layout, knows the protocol for entering the Site and unloading
product, and has the necessary equipment to respond to a discharge from the vehicle or fuel
delivery hose.

The departmental manager or his/her designee supervises oil deliveries for all new suppliers, and
periodically observes deliveries for existing, approved suppliers. Vehicle/equipment filling operations
are performed by operating personnel trained in proper discharge prevention procedures. The driver
or equipment operating personnel will remain with the vehicle/equipment at all times while fuel is
being transferred. Transfer operations are performed according to the minimum procedures
outlined in the table below.

Task Description Procedures

Prior to loading/unloading  Visually check all hoses for leaks and wet spots.
 Verify that sufficient volume is available in the storage tank or truck.
 Secure the tank vehicle with wheel chocks and interlocks.
 Verify that the vehicle’s parking brakes are set.
 Verify proper alignment of valves and proper functioning of the pumping system.
 Establish adequate bonding/grounding prior to connecting to the fuel transfer point.
 Turn off cell phone.

69
During loading/unloading  Driver must stay with the vehicle at all times during loading/unloading activities.
 Facility manager or designee should observe the delivery driver during loading/unloading.
 Periodically inspect all systems, hoses and connections.
 When loading, keep internal and external valves on the receiving tank open along with the pressure
relief valves.
 When making a connection, shut off the vehicle engine. When transferring Class 3 materials, shut
off the vehicle engine unless it is used to operate a pump.
 Maintain communication with the pumping and receiving stations.
 Monitor the liquid level in the receiving tank to prevent overflow.
 Monitor flow meters to determine rate of flow.
 When topping off the tank, reduce flow rate to prevent overflow.
After loading/unloading  Make sure the transfer operation is completed.
 Close all tank and loading valves before disconnecting.
 Securely close all vehicle internal, external, and dome cover valves before disconnecting.
 Secure all hatches.
 Disconnect grounding/bonding wires.
 Make sure the hoses are drained to remove the remaining oil before moving them away from the
connection. Use a drip pan.
 Cap the end of the hose and other connecting devices before moving them to prevent uncontrolled
leakage.
 Remove wheel chocks and interlocks.
 Inspect the lowermost drain and all outlets on tank truck prior to departure. If necessary, tighten,
adjust, or replace caps, valves, or other equipment to prevent oil leaking while in transit.

Q. Explain the different types of pressure relief systems provided in your plant.

Ans- Types of pressure relief devices

The two primary types of relief devices are the relief valve and rupture disk.

Relief valves
The three basic types of pressure-relief valves are conventional spring loaded, balanced spring loaded, and
the pilot operated.

 Conventional spring loaded. In the conventional spring-loaded valve (Fig. 1), the bonnet, spring, and
guide are exposed to the released fluids. If the bonnet is vented to the atmosphere, relief-system
backpressure decreases the set pressure. If the bonnet is vented internally to the outlet, relief-system
backpressure increases the set pressure. The conventional spring-loaded valve is used in
noncorrosive services and where backpressure is less than 10% of the set point.
 Balanced spring-loaded. The balanced spring-loaded valve incorporates a means to protect the
bonnet, spring, and guide from the released fluids and minimizes the effects of backpressure. The disk
area vented to the atmosphere is exactly equal to the disk area exposed to backpressure. These
valves can be used in corrosive or dirty service and with variable backpressure.
 Pilot operated. The pilot-operated valve is combined with and controlled by an auxiliary pressure pilot.
The resistance force on the piston in the main valve is assisted by the process pressure through an
orifice. The net seating force on the piston actually increases as the process pressure nears the set
point.

70
 

Fig. 1—Conventional spring-loaded pressure-relief value.

Rupture disk devices

The rupture-disk device is a nonreclosing differential-pressure device actuated by inlet static pressure. The
rupture disk is designed to burst at set inlet pressure. The device includes a rupture disk and a disk holder.
The rupture disk may be used alone, in parallel with, or in conjunction with pressure-relief valves. They are
manufactured in a variety of materials with various coatings for corrosion resistance.

Relief system considerations

The entire relief system must be considered before selecting the appropriate relief device. The relief
headers should be designed to minimize pressure drop, thus allowing for future expansion and additional
relief loads.

 Conventional spring-loaded-relief-valve considerations. Conventional valves require the relief header

backpressure (superimposed plus built up) to be less than 10% of the set pressure of the lowest-set
relief valve tied into the header.
 Balanced-spring-loaded-valve considerations. Balanced spring-loaded valves allow the use of smaller
relief headers because of the larger pressure drops allowed, under maximum relief-flow conditions, as
a result of higher allowable backpressure (40%). Balanced valves and relief headers are designed as a
system to operate at a higher backpressure. The balanced valve is more expensive than conventional
valves; however, the total cost of the use of balanced valves plus the smaller header system may be
lower. Capacity is reduced at the larger backpressure, so it may not be the solution for all
backpressure problems. In the bellows model, the bellows is a flexible pressure vessel that has a
maximum backpressure limit that is lower in larger valve sizes. Bellows are available in a limited
number of materials and may deteriorate rapidly under certain exposure conditions. Bellows should be
checked periodically for leakage. A leaking bellow does not provide backpressure compensation, and it
allows the relief header to leak to the atmosphere. The balanced valve commonly is used to tie a new
low-pressure-relief load into an existing heavily loaded relief header or to protect the relief-valve top
works from corrosive gases in the relief header.
 Pilot-operated-valve considerations. Pilot-operated valves should be considered for all clean services
within their temperature limitations. They are well suited for pressures below 15 psig and are available
with the pilot-pressure sensing line connected to either the valve inlet or to a different point. Pilot-
operated valves provide tight shutoff with very narrow margins between operating pressure and set
pressure.

Special considerations
When selecting the appropriate relief devices to handle the imposed loads, several issues must be
considered.

Set pressure
Relief devices are normally set to relieve at the MAWP. The greater the margin between the set pressure
and the operating pressure, the less likelihood there is of leakage. Aside from the requirements to

71
compensate for superimposed backpressure, there is no reason to set a relief device at less than the
MAWP.

Backpressure
The backpressure at the outlet of every relief device should be such that the device can handle its design
capacity with the calculated backpressure under the design relief conditions.

Dual relief valves

It is common practice to install two relief valves in critical process applications where a shutdown cannot be
tolerated. The intent is that if the first relief valve lifts and fails to reseat, a second relief can be switched
into service before the first valve is removed for maintenance, without shutting down or jeopardizing the
process. This is accomplished by piping the relief valves in parallel and by putting a "car sealed" full-port
ball or gate block valve on the inlet and outlet of each relief valve. One set of block valves is sealed open
and the other sealed closed. ASME-approved selector valves are available, which simplify relief-valve
switching. This provides an interlock of parallel inlet and outlet block valves and ensures full protection for
the process equipment.

Multiple relief valves

Multiple relief valves are required when the relief load exceeds the capacity of the largest available relief
valve. It is good practice to install multiple relief valves for varying loads to minimize chattering on small
discharges. ASME Sec. VIII, Division 1, 3 and RP 520, Part 1,[2] both stipulate a 10% accumulation above
the MAWP for a single relief valve and a 16% accumulation above the MAWP for multiple relief valves. The
primary relief valve must be set at or below the MAWP. Supplemental relief valves should have staged
pressures. The highest pressure may be set no higher than 105% above the MAWP. If different-sized relief
valves are used, the smallest relief valve should be set to the lowest pressure.

Sizing the relief device

The most difficult factors for specifying a relief device are determining the limiting cause of pressure relief,
determining the relief load and properties of the discharge fluid, and selecting the proper relief device.
When the loads are known, the sizing steps are straightforward. RP 520, Part 1, provides formulas for
determining the relief-valve orifice area for vapor, liquid, and steam relief.[2]Fig. 2 shows standard orifices
available by letter designation, orifice area, and body size. The size of a relief valve should be checked for
the following conditions.

Fig. 2—Pressure-relief value orifice designations.

Blocked discharge
One design condition for the sizing of a relief valve is to assume that it must handle the total design flow
rate (gas plus liquid) into the component. It is possible to isolate a process component or piping segment
for maintenance by blocking all inlets and outlets. On startup, all outlet valves could be left closed
inadvertently. If the inlet source can be at a higher pressure than the MAWP of the process component,

72
only a properly sized relief valve could keep the process component from rupturing as a result of
overpressure.

Gas blowby
On tanks and low-pressure vessels normally receiving liquids from higher-pressure upstream vessels, the
maximum flow rate through the relief valve often is determined by gas blowby. This situation occurs when
the level controller or level control valve of the upstream vessel fails in the open position or a drain valve
from an upstream vessel fails in the open position, allowing liquid and/or gas to flow into the component
evaluated. Under blowby conditions, both the normal liquid and gas outlets on the component being
evaluated are functioning properly. However, the gas flow into the component could greatly exceed the
capacity of the normal gas outlet. This excess gas flow must be handled by the relief valve to keep from
exceeding the component’s MAWP. Gas-blowby conditions also can occur when a pressure regulator
feeding a component fails in the open position, creating a higher than designed inlet flow rate of gas.

Gas-blowby rate is the maximum that can flow given the pressure drop between the upstream component
and the component being evaluated. In computing the maximum rate that can flow because of pressure
drop, consideration should be given to the effects of control valves, chokes, and other restricted orifices in
the line. A more conservative approach would be to assume that these devices have been removed or
have the maximum-sized orifice that could be installed in the device.

Fire or thermal expansion

The pressure in process components exposed to the heat from a fire will rise as the fluid expands and the
process liquid vaporizes. For tanks and large low-pressure vessels, the need to vent the liberated gas may
govern the size of the vent or relief valve. Fire sizing a relief valve only keeps pressure buildup to less than
120% of the MAWP. If the component is subjected to a fire for a long time, it may fail at a pressure less
than the MAWP because a metal’s strength decreases as temperature increases.

On components that can be isolated from the process, it is possible for the process fluid contained in the
component to be heated. This is especially true for cold (relative to ambient) service or when the
component is heated (such as a fired vessel or heat exchanger). It is also true for compressor cylinders
and cooling jackets. The relief valves on such components should be sized for thermal expansion of the
trapped fluids. This normally will not govern the final size selected unless no relief valve is needed for the
other conditions

Q. Explain the fire-fighting system provided in your plant.

Ans- General Fire Fighting Equipment

Fire fighting systems and equipment vary depending on the age, size, use and type of building
construction. A building may contain some or all of the following features:

 fire extinguishers
 fire hose reels
 fire hydrant systems
 automatic sprinkler systems.

Fire extinguishers

Fire extinguishers are provided for a 'first attack' fire fighting measure, generally undertaken by the
occupants of the building before the fire service arrives. It is important that occupants are familiar with
which extinguisher type to use on which fire.

Most fires start as a small fire and may be extinguished if the correct type and amount of extinguishing
agent is applied whilst the fire is small and controllable.

73
The principle fire extinguisher types currently available include:

Extinguishing Agent Principle Use

Water wood and paper fires - not electrical
Foam flammable liquid fires - not electrical
Carbon dioxide electrical fires
Dry Chemical flammable liquids and electrical fires
Wet chemical fat fires - not electrical
Special Purpose various (eg metal fires)

Fire extinguisher locations must be clearly identified. Extinguishers are colour coded according to the
extinguishing agent.

It is the policy of the Community Safety and Resilience Department that fire extinguishers be logically
grouped at exits from the building, so that occupants first go to the exit and then return to fight the fire,
knowing that a safe exit lies behind them, away from the fire. In some instances this will be at odds with the
prescriptive requirements of Australian Standard AS2444 Portable fire extinguishers and fire blankets -
Selection and location, which simply specifies a distance of travel to a fire extinguisher rather than their
location in relation to escape paths. Blind compliance with the standard has the potential to place the fire
between the occupant and the safe escape path.

Fire hose reels

Fire hose reels are provided for use by occupants as a 'first attack' fire fighting measure but may, in some
instances, also be used by firefighters.

When stowing a fire hose reel, it is important to first attach the nozzle end to the hose reel valve, then close
the hose reel valve, then open the nozzle to relieve any pressure in the wound hose, then close the nozzle.
This achieves two principle objectives:

 A depressurised hose and hose reel seal will last longer than if permanently pressurised.
 When the hose reel is next used, the operator will be forced to turn on the isolating valve, thus
charging the hose reel with pressurised water supply, before being able to drag the hose to the
fire. A potential danger exists if the operator reaches the fire and finds no water is available
because the hose reel valve is still closed.

Because hose reels are generally located next to an exit, in an emergency it is possible to reach a safe
place simply by following the hose.

In South Australia, a unique floor mounted swivel hose guide is often employed which lays the hose at floor
level, prior to being dragged by the operator. In practice for a single person, this makes withdrawal of the
hose much easier than does the traditional high level swinging arm hose guide.

Fire hydrant systems

Fire hydrant systems are installed in buildings to help firefighters quickly attack the fire. Essentially, a
hydrant system is a water reticulation system used to transport water in order to limit the amount of hose
that firefighters have to lay, thus speeding up the fire fighting process.

Fire hydrants are for the sole use of trained firefighters (which includes factory fire fighting teams). Because
of the high pressures available serious injury can occur if untrained persons attempt to operate the
equipment connected to such installations.

Fire hydrant systems sometimes include ancillary parts essential to their effective operation such as
pumps, tanks and fire service booster connections. These systems must be maintained and regularly
tested if they are to be effective when needed.

74
The placement of such equipment needs to closely interface with fire service operational procedure; simply
complying with deemed to satisfy code provisions is a potential recipe for disaster. For any advice
regarding these systems, old or new, please ask the intended users; contact the Community Safety and
Resilience Department.

Automatic Sprinkler Systems

Time is essential in the control of fire. Automatic sprinkler systems are one of the most reliable methods
available for controlling fires. Today's automatic fire sprinkler systems offer state of the art protection of life
and property from the effects of fire. Sprinkler heads are now available which are twenty times more
sensitive to fire than they were ten years ago.

A sprinkler head is really an automatic (open once only) tap. The sprinkler head is connected to a
pressurised water system. When the fire heats up the sprinkler head, it opens at a pre-set temperature,
thus allowing pressurised water to be sprayed both down onto the fire and also up to cool the hot smoky
layer and the building structure above the fire. This spray also wets combustible material in the vicinity of
the fire, making it difficult to ignite, thereby slowing down or preventing fire spread and growth.

When a sprinkler head operates, the water pressure in the system drops, activating an alarm which often
automatically calls the fire service via a telephone connection.

Some people say sprinklers cause a lot of water damage. As has been explained, only those sprinkler
heads heated by the fire operate; all sprinklers in a building do not operate at once. Usually non-fire water
damage only occurs if the occupants carelessly damage the system. Firefighters use much more water
than a sprinkler system. The combined damage from a fire and the water used by firefighters dramatically
exceeds that likely from a properly installed sprinkler system.

Because, historically, complete extinguishment of fires has not been achieved, it is traditional to consider
that sprinklers only control fire growth until intervention occurs by the fire service. Today, some sprinkler
systems are designed for early suppression and are considered to have failed if they do not extinguish the
fire.

Sprinkler systems are usually installed in high or large buildings and high fire hazard occupancies.
Statistics show that in a majority of cases where sprinklers are installed the fire has been controlled by one
sprinkler head alone.

Q. Statutory requirements for pressure vessels.

Ans- Safety and Health Codes Board to formulate rules, regulations, etc.; cost of
administration.
A. The Board is authorized to formulate definitions, rules, regulations and standards which
shall be designed for the protection of human life and property from the unsafe or dangerous
construction, installation, inspection, operation, maintenance and repair of boilers and
pressure vessels in this Commonwealth.
In promulgating such rules, regulations and standards, the Board shall consider any or all of
the following:
1. Standards, formulae and practices generally accepted by recognized engineering and safety
authorities and bodies.
2. Previous experiences based upon inspections, performance, maintenance and operation.
3. Location of the boiler or pressure vessel relative to persons.
4. Provisions for operational controls and safety devices.
5. Interrelation between other operations outside the scope of this chapter and those covered
by this chapter.

75
6. Level of competency required of persons installing, constructing, maintaining or operating
any equipment covered under this chapter or auxiliary equipment.
7. Federal laws, rules, regulations and standards.
Installations, repairs and alterations to conform to rules and regulations; existing
installations:
(a) No boiler or pressure vessel which does not conform to the rules and regulations of the
Board governing new construction and installation and which has been certified by the Board
shall be installed or operated in this Commonwealth after twelve months from July 1, 1973.
Prior to such date no boiler or pressure vessel shall be installed and operated unless it is in
conformity with the rules and regulations established pursuant to this chapter which were in
existence on July 1, 1972.
(b) This chapter shall not be construed as in any way preventing the use, sale or reinstallation
of a boiler or pressure vessel constructed prior to July 1, 1972, provided it has been made to
conform to the rules and regulations of the Board governing existing installations prior to its
reinstallation or operation.
(c) Repairs and alterations shall conform to the rules and regulations set forth by the Board.
Exemptions.
The provisions of this article shall not apply to any of the following:
1. Boilers or unfired pressure vessels owned or operated by the federal government or any
agency thereof;
2. Boilers or fired or unfired pressure vessels used in or on the property of private residences
or apartment houses of less than four apartments;
3. Boilers of railroad companies maintained on railborne vehicles or those used to propel
waterborne vessels;
4. Hobby or model boilers as defined in
5. Hot water supply boilers, water heaters, and unfired pressure vessels used as hot water
supply storage tanks heated by steam or any other indirect means when the following
limitations are not exceeded:
a. A heat input of 200,000 British thermal units per hour;
b. A water temperature of 210 degrees Fahrenheit;
c. A water-containing capacity of 120 gallons;
6. Unfired pressure vessels containing air only which are located on vehicles or vessels
designed and used primarily for transporting passengers or freight;
7. Unfired pressure vessels containing air only, installed on the right-of-way of railroads and
used directly in the operation of trains;
8. Unfired pressure vessels used for containing water under pressure when either of the
following are not exceeded:
a. A design pressure of 300 psi; or
b. A design temperature of 210 degrees Fahrenheit;
9. Unfired pressure vessels containing water in combination with air pressure, the
compression of which serves only as a cushion, that do not exceed:
a. A design pressure of 300 psi;
b. A design temperature of 210 degrees Fahrenheit; or
c. A water-containing capacity of 120 gallons;
10. Unfired pressure vessels containing air only, providing the volume does not exceed eight
cubic feet nor the operating pressure is not greater than 175 pounds;
11. Unfired pressure vessels having an operating pressure not exceeding fifteen pounds with
no limitation on size;
12. Pressure vessels that do not exceed:
a. Five cubic feet in volume and 250 pounds per square inch gauge pressure;

76
 b. One and one-half cubic feet in volume and 600 pounds per square inch gauge
pressure; and
c. An inside diameter of six inches with no limitations on gauge pressure;
13. Pressure vessels used for transportation or storage of compressed gases when constructed
in compliance with the specifications of the United States Department of Transportation and
when charged with gas marked, maintained, and periodically requalified for use, as required
by appropriate regulations of the United States Department of Transportation;
14. Stationary American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) LP-Gas containers used
exclusively in propane service with a capacity that does not exceed 2,000 gallons if the owner
of the container or the owner's servicing agent:
a. Conducts an inspection of the container not less frequently than every five years, in which
all visible parts of the container, including insulation or coating, structural attachments, and
vessel connections, are inspected for corrosion, distortion, cracking, evidence of leakage, fire
damage, or other condition indicating impairment;
b. Maintains a record of the most recent inspection of the container conducted in accordance
with subdivision a; and
c. Makes the records required to be maintained in accordance with subdivision b available for
inspection by the Commissioner;
15. Unfired pressure vessels used in and as a part of electric substations owned or operated by
an electric utility, provided such electric substation is enclosed, locked, and inaccessible to
the public; or
16. Coil type hot water boilers without any steam space where water flashes into steam when
released through a manually operated nozzle, unless steam is generated within the coil or
unless one of the following limitations is exceeded:
a. Three-fourths inch diameter tubing or pipe size with no drums or headers attached;
b. Nominal water containing capacity not exceeding six gallons; and
c. Water temperature not exceeding 350 degrees Fahrenheit.
Employment and appointment of inspectors and other personnel; inspections; reports.
The Commissioner is authorized to employ persons to enforce the provisions of this chapter
and the regulations of the Board. He shall be authorized to require examinations or other
information which he deems necessary to aid him in determining the fitness, competency, and
professional or technical expertise of any applicant to perform the duties and tasks to be
assigned.
The Commissioner is authorized to appoint a Chief Inspector and to certify special inspectors
who shall meet all qualifications set forth by the Commissioner and the Board. Special
inspectors shall be authorized to inspect specified premises and without cost or expense to the
Commonwealth. Reports of all violations of the regulations or of this chapter shall be
immediately made to the Commissioner. Other reports shall be made as required by the
Commissioner.
Examination of inspectors; certificate of competency required.
A. All applicants for the position of inspector authorized by § 40.1-51.9 shall be required to
have successfully completed an examination monitored by the Examining Board and to have
received a certificate of competency from the Commissioner prior to commencing their
duties. A fee as set under subsection A of shall be charged each applicant taking the
inspector's examination.
B. Each inspector holding a valid certificate of competency and who conducts inspections, as
provided by this chapter, shall be required to obtain an identification card biennially, not later
than June 30 of the year in which the identification card is required. Application for the
identification card shall be made on forms furnished by the Department upon request. Each
application shall be submitted to the Department, accompanied by a post-office money order

77
or check drawn to the order of the Treasurer of Virginia in the amount as set under subsection
A
Financial responsibility requirements for contract fee inspectors.
A. Contract fee inspectors inspecting or certifying regulated boilers or pressure vessels in the
Commonwealth shall maintain evidence of their financial responsibility, including
compensation to third parties, for bodily injury and property damage resulting from, or
directly relating to, an inspector's negligent inspection or recommendation for certification of
a boiler or pressure vessel.
B. Documentation of financial responsibility, including documentation of insurance or bond,
shall be provided to the Chief Inspector within thirty days after certification of the inspector.
The Chief Inspector may revoke an inspector's certification for failure to provide
documentation of financial responsibility in a timely fashion.
C. The Safety and Health Codes Board is authorized to promulgate regulations requiring
contract fee inspectors, as a condition of their doing business in the Commonwealth, to
demonstrate financial responsibility sufficient to comply with the requirements of this
chapter. Regulations governing the amount of any financial responsibility required by the
contract fee inspector shall take into consideration the type, capacity and number of boilers or
pressure vessels inspected or certified.
D. Financial responsibility may be demonstrated by self-insurance, insurance, guaranty or
surety, or any other method approved by the Board, or any combination thereof, under the
terms the Board may prescribe. A contract fee inspector whose financial responsibility is
accepted by the Board under this subsection shall notify the Chief Inspector at least thirty
days before the effective date of the change, expiration, or cancellation of any instrument of
insurance, guaranty or surety.
E. Acceptance of proof of financial responsibility shall expire on the effective date of any
change in the inspector's instrument of insurance, guaranty or surety, or the expiration date of
the inspector's certification. Application for renewal of acceptance of proof of financial
responsibility shall be filed thirty days before the date of expiration.
F. The Chief Inspector, after notice and opportunity for hearing, may revoke his acceptance
of evidence of financial responsibility if he determines that acceptance has been procured by
fraud or misrepresentation, or a change in circumstances has occurred that would warrant
denial of acceptance of evidence of financial responsibility under this section or the
requirements established by the Board pursuant to this section.
G. It is not a defense to any action brought for failure to comply with the requirement to
provide acceptable evidence of financial responsibility that the person charged believed in
good faith that the owner or operator of an inspected boiler or pressure vessel possessed
evidence of financial responsibility accepted by the Chief Inspector or the Board.

Right of access to premises; certification and recertification; inspection requirements.

A. The Commissioner, his agents or special inspectors shall have free access, during
reasonable hours to any premises in the Commonwealth where a boiler or pressure vessel is
being constructed, operated or maintained, or is being installed to conduct a variance review,
an owner-user inspection agency audit, an emergency repair review, an accident
investigation, a violation follow-up, and a secondhand or used boiler review for the purpose
of ascertaining whether such boiler or pressure vessel is being constructed, operated or
maintained in accordance with this chapter.
B. On and after January 1, 1973, no boiler or pressure vessel used or proposed to be used
within this Commonwealth, except boilers or pressure vessels exempted by this chapter, shall
be installed, operated or maintained unless it has been inspected by the Commissioner, his

78
agents or special inspectors as to construction, installation and condition and shall be
certified. A fee as set under subsection A of § 40.1-51.15 shall be charged for each inspection
certificate issued. In lieu of such fees both for certification and recertification, an authorized
owner-user inspection agency shall be charged annual filing fees as set under subsection A of
§ 40.1-51.15.
C. Recertification shall be required as follows:
1. Power boilers and high pressure, high temperature water boilers shall receive a certificate
inspection annually and shall also be externally inspected annually while under pressure if
possible;
2. Heating boilers shall receive a certificate inspection biennially;
3. Pressure vessels subject to internal corrosion shall receive a certificate inspection
biennially;
4. Pressure vessels not subject to internal corrosion shall receive a certificate inspection at
intervals set by the Board, but internal inspection shall not be required of pressure vessels, the
content of which are known to be noncorrosive to the material of which the shell, heads or
fittings are constructed, either from the chemical composition of the contents or from
evidence that the contents are adequately treated with a corrosion inhibitor, provided that
such vessels are constructed in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Board;
5. Nuclear vessels within the scope of this chapter shall be inspected and reported in such
form and with such appropriate information as the Board shall designate;
6. A grace period of two months beyond the periods specified in subdivisions 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
this subsection may elapse between certificate inspections. The Chief Inspector may extend a
certificate for up to three additional months beyond such grace period subject to a satisfactory
external inspection of the object and receipt of a fee as set under subsection A of § 40.1-51.15
for each month of inspection beyond the grace period.
D. Inspection requirements for operating equipment shall be in accordance with generally
accepted practice and compatible with the actual service conditions and shall include but not
be limited to the following criteria:
1. Previous experience, based on records of inspection, performance and maintenance;
2. Location, with respect to personnel hazard;
3. Qualifications and competency of inspection and operating personnel;
4. Provision for related safe operation controls; and
5. Interrelation with other operations outside of the scope of this chapter.
E. Based upon documentation of such actual service conditions by the owner or user of the
operating equipment, the Board may, in its discretion, permit variations in the inspection
requirements as provided in this section.
F. If, at the discretion of the Commissioner, a hydrostatic test shall be deemed necessary, it
shall be made by the owner or user of the boiler or pressure vessel.
G. All boilers, other than cast iron sectional boilers, and pressure vessels to be installed in
this Commonwealth after the six-month period from the date upon which the rules and
regulations of the Board shall become effective shall be inspected during construction as
required by the applicable rules and regulations of the Board.
H. Ninety-one days after expiration of a certificate for any boiler or pressure vessel subject to
this section, the Commissioner may assign an agent or special inspector to inspect such boiler
or pressure vessel, and its owner or operator shall be assessed a fee for such inspection. The
fee shall be established in accordance with subsection A of § 40.1-51.15.
Issuance of certificates; charges:
The Commissioner may designate special inspectors and contract fee inspectors to issue
inspection certificates for boilers and pressure vessels they have inspected. If no defects are
found or when the boiler or pressure vessel has been corrected in accordance with

79
regulations, the designated special inspector or contract fee inspector shall issue a certificate
on forms furnished by the Department. The designated special inspector or contract fee
inspector shall collect the inspection certificate fee required under § 40.1-51.10 at the time of
the issuance of the certificate and forward the fee and a duplicate of the certificate to the chief
inspector immediately.
Each designated special inspector or contract fee inspector may charge a fee as set under
subsection A of § 40.1-51.15 for each certificate issued, but the charge shall not be
mandatory. No charge shall be made unless the inspector has previously contracted therefor.
Suspension of inspection certificate; injunctive relief.
A. The Commissioner or his authorized representative may at any time suspend an inspection
certificate when, in his opinion, the boiler or pressure vessel for which it was issued, cannot
be operated without menace to the public safety, or when the boiler or pressure vessel is
found not to comply with the rules and regulations herein provided. Each suspension of an
inspection certificate shall continue in effect until such boiler or pressure vessel shall have
been made to conform to the rules and regulations of the Board, and until such inspection
certificate shall have been reinstated. No boiler or pressure vessel shall be operated during the
period of suspension.
B. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, in the event of
violation of any provision of this chapter or the regulations promulgated thereunder, the
Board or the Commissioner may petition any appropriate court of record for relief by
injunction, without being compelled to allege or prove that an adequate remedy at law does
not exist.
Owner-user inspection agencies.
Any person, firm, partnership or corporation operating pressure vessels in this
Commonwealth may seek approval and registration as an owner-user inspection agency by
filing an application with the chief inspector on forms prescribed and available from the
Department, and request approval by the Board. Each application shall be accompanied by a
fee as set under subsection A of § 40.1-51.15 and a bond in the penal sum of $5,000 which
shall continue to be valid during the time the approval and registration of the company as an
owner-user inspection agency is in effect. Applicants meeting the requirements of the rules
and regulations for approval as owner-user inspection agencies will be approved and
registered by the Board. The Board shall withdraw the approval and registration as an owner-
user inspection agency of any person, firm, partnership or corporation which fails to comply
with all rules and regulations applicable to owner-user inspection agencies. Each owner-user
inspection agency shall file an annual statement as required by the rules and regulations,
accompanied by a filing fee as set under subsection A of § 40.1-51.15.
Violation for operating boiler or pressure vessel without inspection certificate; civil
penalty.
A. After twelve months following July 1, 1972, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm,
partnership or corporation to operate in this Commonwealth a boiler or pressure vessel
without a valid inspection certificate. Any owner, user, operator or agent of any such person
who actually operates or is responsible for operating such boiler or pressure vessel thereof
who operates a boiler or pressure vessel without such inspection certificate, or at a pressure
exceeding that specified in such inspection certificate shall be in violation of this section and
subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100. Each day of such violation shall be deemed a
separate offense.
B. All procedural rights guaranteed to employers pursuant to § 40.1-49.4 shall apply to
penalties under this section.

80
C. Investigation and enforcement for violations of this section shall be carried out by the
Department of Labor and Industry. Civil penalties imposed for violations of this section shall
be paid into the general fund.

Posting of certificate.
Certificates shall be posted in the room containing the boiler or pressure vessel inspected. If
the boiler or pressure vessel is not located within the building the certificate shall be posted in
a location convenient to the boiler or pressure vessel inspected, or in any place where it will
be accessible to interested parties.
When inspection certificate for insured boiler or pressure vessel invalid.
No inspection certificate issued for an insured boiler or pressure vessel based upon a report of
a special inspector shall be valid after the boiler or pressure vessel for which it was issued
shall cease to be insured by a company duly authorized to issue policies of insurance in this
Commonwealth.

Q. Working of nitrogen blanketing of a storage tank.

Ans- Many industries store liquids, gases and even slurries in storage tanks
or vessels. Often, when the storage material comes in contract with
oxygen, the substance oxidizes and degrades, or potentially creates a
hazardous situation.

Nitrogen Blanketing
Nitrogen blanketing or tank padding is a process of introducing an inert gas, such as nitrogen
to a storage tank to counter the effects of oxygen on the storage material.

Tank blanketing, nitrogen blanketing, or tank padding is a process of

introducing an inert gas, such as nitrogen (the most cost effective), to a
storage tank to counter the effects of oxygen on the storage material which
is usually a liquid. When purging a tank with an inert or inactive gas, the
storage vessel material does not come in contact with the oxygen. For this
reason, the life of the product is prolonged, and potential explosive
conditions are mitigated.

Refineries, pharmaceutical companies, the petrochemical industry use tank

blanketing to prevent contact with oxygen and as a way to avoid potentially
hazardous conditions. The blanketing process controls the atmosphere
above a combustible or flammable liquid, and this reduces the ignition
potential. Manufacturers use the method for storage of adhesives,
chemicals, fuels, pharmaceuticals, photographic chemicals, inks, and
soaps.

81
Industries that use Blanketing

 Food and beverage industry

 Petroleum industry
 Pharmaceutical industry
 Petrochemical industry
Food and Beverage
Food manufacturers use tank blanketing for storing cooking oils, fats, foods
and purified water to reduce oxidation, increase product shelf life or
prepare the product for transportation or final packaging. The FDA
regulates gas-blanketing systems in the food industry, and the
manufacturer must follow strict maintenance programs to comply with all
product-contact regulations regarding filter specifications purity and toxicity.
When using inert gases, such as nitrogen, strict protocols much be followed
to ensure that workers are not exposed to harmful or lethal doses of any
non-breathable substance. Additionally, in the United States, OSHA
regulates any commercial use of tank blanketing.

Tank Blanketing Systems

Tank blanketing systems are found on fixed roof tanks. The system
includes a valve that controls the nitrogen coming into the tank. The valve
is continuously adjusted to maintain a small constant positive pressure in
the vapor space of the tank. Usually, under static conditions the valve is
closed, shutting off the flow. If there is leakage in the vessel, the pressure
will drop, and to compensate, a low flow of nitrogen into the vessel will
occur. Similarly, if the temperature drops, there is a decrease of pressure
in the vapor space and nitrogen will flow into the tank.

When emptying the tank, significant flow rates of nitrogen can result. In this
case, it is essential to maintain a positive pressure in the tank. If the tank
pump-out rate is higher than the rate of nitrogen flow replacement, a
negative pressure can cause the tank to suck in and collapse.

The Sage thermal mass flow meter is available with remote electronics permitting the display to be
at ground level rather than near the top of the tank, where the flow meter will likely be installed.

Thermal Mass Flow Meters for Tank Blanketing

Facilities management is often interested in measuring the flow of the inert
gas (nitrogen) to monitor consumption. Thermal mass flow meters can
measure and totalize the amount of inert gas. They also can alert the

82
operator if the gas is leaking to prevent losses. Some systems use the
expensive Coriolis meter, in which case the thermal mass flow meter offers
significant savings.

The Sage thermal mass flow meter is available with remote electronics
permitting the display to be at ground level rather than near the top of the
tank, where the flow meter will likely be installed.

The Sage meter measures flow rate providing a 4-20 mA signal and also
shows totalized flow on the display with a pulse output which can be
received by the customers’ external totalizer.

Considerations for Flow Meter Selection

 Mass flow measurement without the need for temperature and

pressure correction
 Approved for use in Class I Div. 1 and Class I Div. 2 hazardous area
 No moving parts reduce maintenance; advantageous over positive
displacement flow meters or turbine meters
 Calibrated for nitrogen gas composition
 Wide turndown for precision measurement at low or high flow
 Temperature compensation for accuracy and repeatability with
changing process and ambient temperatures
 Easy in-situ calibration verification method to verify the accuracy, and
operation of the sensor and transmitter
The Sage thermal mass flow meters meet and exceed the selection
considerations for measuring nitrogen gas flow in tank blanketing
applications. Sage Metering is the only manufacturer offering an easy, in-
the-pipe method to verify that the meter is accurate and that both the
sensor and transmitter are clean and operational.

Recommended Sage Models for Nitrogen Blanketing

Sage Prime – The flow meter’s sensor type will depend on the pipe size
going to the tank blanketing valve (typically ½” or 1”). A Sage Prime with
an in-line flow body would be used on either a ½” or 1” line while the Prime
with insertion probe could be used for pipes 1” and larger.

Q. sprinkler system for a flammable hydrocarbon storage tank.

83
Ans- Foam/water sprinkler systems are more economical than a water-only system, when evaluated
for the same risk. They provide for actual extinguishment of the fire and a lower water demand. The
conversion assists in the reduction of property loss, loss of life and in many cases the reduction of
insurance rates. In most instances, fires cause more than structural and inventory damages. Many
manufacturing and storage facilities have various flammable products that are protected by water
sprinkler systems alone. The water sprinkler system may extinguish the fire; however, this type
system has the two potential problems. If the water only system is not capable of quick
extinguishment, the product containers can erupt and spill. Also it typically requires a great deal of
water to extinguish a flammable liquid that is miscible in water or in many cases, the flammable
liquid floats on the water and then the water becomes the vehicle that spreads the fire. Both the
large amounts of water and the flammable liquids are normally washed into the local drain systems
which can contaminate the water supplies and aquifers. Along with the financial loss of the
manufacturing/storage facilities and products, there is the expense of contamination cleanup. Foam
systems can facilitate in quick extinguishment and water reduction. In a single year, the National Fire
Protection Association documented fires that involved flammable liquids with direct losses of over
$1 billion. The extended losses including the close of businesses, cost of environmental cleanup and
increased insurance costs are inconceivable. When a water sprinkler system is converted to a water/
foam system, explicit standards and regulations must be met. These include NFPA Standards; 13
Installation of Sprinkler Systems, NFPA 16 Installation of Foam-Water Deluge Systems and Foam -
Water Spray Systems and NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code. These NFPA standards
are to be used in conjunction with local authority regulations or with the facilities insurance
company requirements. Before any conversion procedures are instituted, consult with the governing
authorities for design approval. 2 The in-line balanced proportioner system (ILBP)

Many flammable liquids, being water miscible, require a special foam in the foam/water sprinkler
system. In the past, it used to be the 3% - 6% AR-AFFF concentrate proportioned at 6% that was
most common. Today however, the 3% AR-AFFF is most widely used. This product is proportioned at
3% for both hydrocarbons and polar solvents. Either of these concentrates are very effective on fires
involving water miscible/polar solvent liquids, standard hydrocarbon or Class A type fires. Where
polar solvent liquids are stored, the 3% concentrate system is the most economical because less
foam concentrate and smaller foam pumps or bladder tanks are required. The Balanced Pressure
Proportioning foam system is the most effective and efficient method of mixing foam concentrate
with the water supply. With this method, the foam concentrate is introduced into the sprinkler riser
at a similar pressure as the water. The concentrate flows into a ratio controller, also called a
proportioner, which is installed in the sprinkler riser. The ratio controller meters the correct quantity
of foam concentrate into the water as the water flows through the ratio controller to the sprinkler
heads. It is very important to determine the system demand which will dictate the size of the ratio
controller installed in the riser. It is most important that the foam concentrate is fed into the ratio
controller at a pressure which is similar to the water pressure as it enters into the same ratio
controller. This is accomplished by using either a Bladder Tank or a positive displacement foam
pump with any Inline Balanced Pressure Proportioner (ILBP.) Using the bladder tank system, the
foam concentrate is stored in a flexible bladder which is installed inside a pressure vessel. When the
system is installed correctly, a portion of the pressurized water supply is routed into the bladder
tank which forces the foam concentrate out of the bladder through piping and into the ratio

84
controller. When the system water pressurizing the bladder tank fluctuates, the pressure of the
foam concentrate discharging out of the bladder tank fluctuates simultaneously.

The in-line balanced proportioner system (ILBP) incorporates an atmospheric foam concentrate
storage tank and uses a positive displacement foam pump to pump the concentrate from the tank to
the ILBP unit which is installed in the sprinkler riser. The pump is to have the capacity to supply foam
to the entire sprinkler system. A pressure balancing valve is installed in each ILBP and reacts
accordingly to the pressure demands of the foam/ water sprinkler system. If the volume of
concentrate is not required due to a low demand from the sprinkler system, the unused foam
concentrate is returned back to the atmospheric storage tank via a pressure control valve which is
installed in the concentrate return line. An ILBP is normally more suitable on a closed head foam/
water sprinkler system or where a bladder tank can not be located in close proximity to the sprinkler
riser and the concentrate has to be pumped some distance from the concentrate supply tank to
where the ratio controller is installed. The ILBP system requires a reliable foam concentrate pump
and if electric driven, a dedicated electrical supply. Bladder tanks will work as long as there is
sufficient water pressure and the necessary minimum flow rate is achieved through the ratio
controller which will enable accurate proportioning. The system can be balanced hydraulically to
enable the foam concentrate and the water to meet at the ratio controller at similar pressures.

With the new technology, improved foam concentrates and methods of injecting the foam
concentrate into the water supply, it has provided many opportunities to convert existing water
sprinkler systems to foam at an acceptable cost. The cost of the conversion is outweighed by the
multiple benefits provided to the owner of the facility once the conversion takes place. For more
information or technical assistance contact Buckeye and we will assist you in designing a suitable
and cost efficient system that complies with all relevant NFPA Fire Codes

Q. Safety features of LPG tank farm.

Ans- LPG TANK FARM

Introduction:-

We BNH Gas Tanks are exporter and manufacturer of LPG Tank Farm at cheap cost. The tanks are
as per customer’s requirement.

We are pioneer in building LPG TANK FARM for receiving LPG by ship for storage and distribution
purpose on turnkey basis. The terminals are designed based on the customers’ requirements like
Total storage capacity to be stored, Minimum quantity of LPG that can be received at the Tank
Farm in each consignment, Land available, Distribution network available for refilling and resale of
bulk LPG, Ease of operation and maintenance, Automation of the entire Tank Farm for effective
operation and safety of the terminal, we offer efficient systems for Tank Farm management and
inventory management.

We carry out the design and construction of terminals and storage facilities for complete Tank
Farmon turnkey basis for various products like crude oil, petroleum products and LPG, Ammonia
etc by incorporating enhanced control systems and a good maintenance program.

85
Special features of the LPG Tank Farm are as follows:

1) Facility to unload LPG from ship into storage tanks

2) LPG Storage tanks or Spheres of various capacities like 2000, 3000, 5000, 10000 Tons etc
3) Facility to load LPG from storage tanks into LPG semitrailers for distribution purpose
4) Facility to fill LPG from storage tanks into small cylinders with testing facility for filled cylinders
5) Fire fighting and water sprinkler system
6) Gas leak detection system
7) Tank gauging system to determine the quantity of LPG in each tank on your computer
8) High level alarm system to sound alarm when level in tank reaches 85%
9) Other instrumentation and electrical system but without civil work
10) Reloading the LPG back into small barges for local distribution on small islands.

Applications

Oil terminals, LPG storage, crude oil tanks, Petroleum products like Diesel, Petrol, Jet fuels,
Kerosene, Ammonia, Ethylene, Propylene, etc
Mounded bullets provide intrinsically provide passive and safe environment and eradicates the
possibility of boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEEVE) though handling LPG possesses
various challenges, due to its inherent dangerous properties, modern state of art safety features is
taken into consideration while designing the facilities using various international codes.

Storage type

LPG can be stored in Terminals in various ways like LPG sphere, LPG Mounded vessels, Above
ground LPG storage tanks etc.

The scope of EPCC Contracts include:

• Design and Detailed Engineering
• Fabrication, Testing, Procurement, Erection, of Piping and storage tanks s.
• Safety measures like Fire Fighting etc.
• Supply and Installation of safety System.
• Ground Improvement & Civil works
• Electrical and Instrumentation work

LPG Tank Farm projects executed:

• 5 x 1500 cum. Mounded LPG Bullet Terminal.

• 12 x 500 cum. LPG above ground Storage Terminal.
• 4 x 1000 m3 LPG Storage Bullets Terminal
• 12 x 400 cum. LPG storage Tank Farmat port.
• 4 x 2000 cum.LPG port facility.
• 2 x 8500 cum. LPG sphere for Tank Farm
• 4 x 5000 cum LPG spherical tanks for LPG Tank Farm

Other tank Farm projects executed as per API 650 Norms:

• 3 x 7500 cum. Petroleum product tank farm .

• 4 x 4 Million gallons Petrol and Diesel tank farm .
• 4 x 2 Million gallons Kerosene , Petrol , Diesel and Jet fuel tank farm
• 10 x 8000 cum. Crude oil tank farm .
• 2 x 2000 cum.Ethanol tank farm .
• 5 x 15000 cum. Molasses tank Farm
• 4 x 5000 cum Edible oil tank Farm

Technical Specification:

Design Code ASME, PD 5500, AD Merkbaltter and others.

Design Pressure 17.16 Bar

86
Design Temperature -20 Deg C to + 55 Deg C
Volume 500 M3 to 20000 M3 TOTAL STORAGE
We carry out Mechanical Design Calculations and prepare the Fabrication Drawings get it certified
by reputed international Third party inspection agency like BV, DNV, SGS, TUV and others. The
capacity of these tanks range from 50m3 to 5000m3 as per customers’ requirement. We
undertake complete Design, Material Procurement, Supply, Fabrication, Erection, Inspection,
Testing & Commissioning of LPG Tank Farms .

Safety Features provided for LPG Tank farms

The Tank Farmis provided with various safety measures like:

• Fire fighting and water sprinkler system
• Gas leak detection system
• Asset management system
• High integrity design; and
• Comprehensive emergency systems.
• Tank gauging system to prevent accidental overfill
• High level alarm system to sound alarm when level in tank reaches 85%
• Safety valves located on storage tanks
• Excess flow check valves on all outlets to prevent excess flow of LPG in case of downstream
rupture or likewise situation
• Deluge system
• High temperature protection system
• High pressure protection system
• Flame detection system
• Emergency stop switches at strategic location
• Audio and visual alarm system for entire plant

COMPARISON OF OUR LPG TANK FARM WITH MULTIPLE STORAGE TANKS

AS COMPARED TO TANK FARM WITH SPHERES:

1) Least initial investment and financial risk

2) Minimum time for construction

3) LPG Multiple storage tanks makes the project faster, economical, easier and will in turn help the
company to start the Tank Farm as soon as possible which in turn will generate good immediate
returns.

4) LPG Multiple Storage tanks are much safer since it weight is distributed evenly on a larger area
thus reducing chances of collapse as compared to sphere, especially in small islands prone to earth
quakes, cyclones and Tsunami as can be verified from the recent incident in Japan where a row of
LPG sphere went under severe fire condition.

5) Multiple LPG storage tanks have an added advantage that the load is distributed over a larger
area thus the problem of uneven settlement / collapse is largely reduced.

6) In case of installations with Multiple LPG storage tanks if there is any problem / maintenance /
repair / breakdown of any one tank the outlet and inlet valves of the same can be closed and the
tank can be isolated, also in case of emergency the LPG product in the tank under repair /
maintenance can be easily transferred to another tank located in the same plant thus increasing
safety of the plant. Whereas in case of sphere if there is any problem with the sphere or its valves
or pipeline the entire plant comes to a stand still (This is a loss to the company in terms of
business loss, product loss, as well as extra demurrage that the company may have to pay to the
shipping company if unfortunately the LPG ship also arrives the same time when the sphere has
generated a possible breakdown). But in case of multiple storage tanks even if one of the tank
generate a possible breakdown and the LPG ship also arrives the same time still the LPG from the
ship can be unloaded to the remaining tanks and the company will have to incur least loss due to
ship demurrage.

87
7) Though there is a common notion that for the same volume a sphere has the least surface area
and least thickness and hence lesser weight and less cost but our past experience suggests that
weight saved in making a sphere as compared to storage tank is lost as wastage in the
development of various sections (petals and crown) thus leaving little or no benefit of the weight
saved.

8) The fabrication cost increases considerably in case of sphere as compared to multiple LPG
storage tanks, since the sections have to be pre fabricated at shop, shipped to site, adjusted,
assembled and welded at site piece by piece in proper sequence, heat treated, radiographed and
tested at site. Fabrication of sphere requires lot of time since the petals / sections are required to
be assembled piece by piece in proper sequence and completion of one stage is entirely dependent
on completion of the earlier stage as so on and so forth. More over there is a continuous
requirement of close monitoring, blockage of all construction equipments and manpower till the
entire completion of work sequence by sequence, this makes the fabrication of sphere still more
costlier and time consuming as regards to blockage of manpower, machinery rent etc.

Petroleum Products Tank Farm:

• Petroleum products tank farm

• Tank farm for storage and distribution of petrol, diesel, kerosene, jet fuel etc
• Tank farm for crude oil
• Tank farm for Ethanol
• Tank farm at airports for fuel storage
• Pumping stations and related installations
• Loading platforms for tankers
• Oil separation facilities
• Infrastructural works

Q. Safety and process control system for a continuous distillation column.

Ans- n industry, distillation constitutes one of the most important and widely used unit operations. It
is one of the oldest unit operation used in industry as well as studied by any chemical engineer. In
spite of this, there are still many aspects of the process, which are still not fully understood. One of
the important aspects that still need attention is the operation and control of the process. In order
to properly study the operation and control aspects of the process, the dynamic behavior during
actual operation has to be understood. The dynamic behavior of a distillation process was known to
be highly non-linear especially when involving high purity separation. Most of the current application
for distillation control is based on linear controller such as Proportional (P), Proportional-Integral-
Derivative (PID) type controller. In any single distillation operation, several controllers were used in a
distributed control system. The controllers were employed to maintain several important
operational parameters such as level, temperature (or product composition) and pressure according
to operational limits, and product and safety requirements. This pilot scale Continuous Distillation
Column (Model: SE 999) has been designed and constructed with the intention of exploring the
behaviour and performance of various control strategy that can be employed on a distillation
process. The pilot plant consists of the following major items: a) One (1)-glass column (dia. 150 mm)
with 15 sieve trays b) One (1)-thermosyphon reboiler unit c) One (1) total condenser unit d) Three
(3)-heat exchangers: one feed preheater, two product coolers e) Five (5) hold up tanks: one reflux
drum, one bottom hold up tank, one feed tank and two product tanks f) Nine (9) centrifugal pumps
and one (1) vacuum pump with necessary piping connections. Various instrumentations consisting of
measurement sensors and control valves are installed at the unit. These instrumentations includes:
a) Five (5) flow sensorss b) Twenty-one (21) temperature sensors c) Five (5) level sensors d) Three (3)
pressure sensors e) Six (6) control valves All instrumentations are linked to a PC based Distributed

88
Control System (DCS). Apart from the instrumentations above which are used for control purposes,
there are other instrumentation installed for safety reason and they are: a) Pressure relief valve for
the distillation column unit b) High pressure alarm for the distillation unit c) Low and High Level
alarm indicator for all hold up and feed tanks The computer attached to the distillation unit serves as
a data retriever/logger for the unit and as a central controller which monitor and control the
operation of all the distributed controller, set for any experimental run. The computer allows for the
flexibility of changing the controller set up, thus enabling different control scheme to be tested and
their performance explored. All process input and output signals are interfaced to a distributed I/O
subsystem linked to the computer. The distributed I/O subsystem receives 4 to 20 mA and mV input
signals and outputs 4 to 20 mA control signals. All pumps controls and alarm monitoring are also
connected. PROCESS DESCRIPTION The Pilot scale distillation column is designed and constructed
with the intention of exploring the behaviour and performance of various control strategy that can
be employed on a distillation process.

EXPERIMENTAL CAPABILITIES Continuous Distillation Operations a) Determination of the distillation

and concentration levels b) Determination of the number of stages in the distillation and
concentration section Process Control a) Cut Control to overhead b) Cut Control to bottoms c) Cut
Control to overhead with feed compensation d) Cut Control to bottoms with feed compensation e)
Temp Control to overhead cut f) Temp Control to bottoms cut g) Temperature Control to reflux rate
h) Temperature Control to reboil rate i) DPT Control j) Basic Process Control for Distillation Column
SPECIFICATIONS a) Buble Cap Distillation Column: Diameter : 150 mm Plates : 15 Material : glass b)
Reboiler: Size : 0.3 m2 Material : glass c) Condenser: Size : 2.5 m2 Material : glass d) Relux Drum:
Range : 15 Litres Material : Stainless steel e) Feed Preheat Heat Exchanger: Size : 0.2 m2 Material :
glass f) 2 Product Tank: Range : 75 Litres each Material : Stainless steel g) Feed Tank: Range : 75
Litres Material : Stainless steel h) Dosing Tank: Range : 50 Litres

i) Bottom Product Cooler: Size : 0.2 m2 Material : glass j) Pump: Type : a) Feed pump b) Two product
transfer pumps c) Bottom product pump d) Vacuum pump OPTIONAL ITEMS -SG STEAM GENERATOR
36 kW electrical steam generator -DAS SOLDAS DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM i) A PC with latest
Pentium Processor ii) An electronic signal conditioning system iii) Stand alone data acquisition
modules iv) Windows based software ♦ Data Logging ♦ Signal Analysis ♦ Process Control ♦ Real-Time
Display ♦ Tabulated Results ♦ Graph of Experimental Results - CAL SOLCAL COMPUTER AIDED
LEARNING SOFTWARE i) Interactive multimedia features ii) Graphical simulation iii) Experiment
results samples iv) Full experiment manuals REQUIREMENTS Steam : 55 kg/hr at 10 barg Electrical :
230VAC/50Hz/15Amps 415VAC/50Hz/60Amps (for Boiler) Water : 1.5 m3/hr @ 20 m.

Q. Preparing a reactor for confined space entry for repair work.

Ans- The important thing to remember is that each time a worker plans to enter any work space,
the worker should determine if that work space is considered a confined space. Be sure that the
confined space hazard assessment and control program has been followed.

The next question to ask is - Is it absolutely necessary that the work be carried out inside the
confined space? In many cases where there have been deaths in confined spaces, the work could
have been done outside the confined space.

89
 Before entering any confined space, a trained and experienced person should identify and evaluate
all the potential hazards within the confined space. An important step in determining the hazards
in a confined space is air testing.

Air quality testing

The air within the confined space should be tested from outside of the confined space before entry
into the confined space. Care should be taken to ensure that air is tested throughout the confined
space - side-to-side and top to bottom. A trained worker using detection equipment which has
remote probes and sampling lines should do the air quality testing. The sampling should show that:

 The oxygen content is within safe limits - not too little and not too much.
 A hazardous atmosphere (toxic gases, flammable atmosphere) is not present.
 Ventilation equipment is operating properly.

The results of the tests for these hazards are to be recorded on the Entry Permit along with the
equipment or method(s) that were used in performing the tests.

Air testing may need to be ongoing depending on the nature of the potential hazards and the nature
of the work. Conditions can change while workers are inside the confined space and sometimes a
hazardous atmosphere is created by the work activities in the confined space.

It is important to understand that some gases or vapours are heavier than air and will settle to the
bottom of a confined space. Also, some gases are more light, than air and will be found around the
top of the confined space. Therefore, it is necessary to test all areas (top, middle, bottom) of a
confined space with properly calibrated testing instruments to determine which gases are present.
If testing reveals oxygen-deficiency, or the presence of toxic gases or vapours, the space must be

90
 ventilated and re-tested before workers enter. If ventilation is not possible and entry is necessary
(for emergency rescue, for example), workers must have appropriate respiratory protection.

NEVER TRUST YOUR SENSES TO DETERMINE IF THE AIR IN A CONFINED SPACE IS SAFE!
YOU CAN NOT SEE OR SMELL MANY TOXIC GASES AND VAPOURS, NOR CAN YOU
DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF OXYGEN PRESENT.

How are hazards controlled in confined spaces?

The traditional hazard control methods found in regular work sites can be effective in a confined
space. These include engineering controls, administrative controls and personal protective
equipment. Engineering controls are designed to remove the hazard while administrative controls
and personal protective equipment try to minimize the contact with the hazard.

However, often because of the nature of the confined space and depending on the hazard, special
precautions not normally required in a regular work site may also need to be taken. The
engineering control commonly used in confined spaces is mechanical ventilation. The Entry Permit
system is an example of an administrative control used in confined spaces. Personal protective
equipment (respirators, gloves, ear plugs) is commonly used in confined spaces as well.
How is air quality maintained?
Natural ventilation (natural air currents) is usually not reliable and sufficient to maintain the air
quality. Mechanical ventilation (blowers, fans) is usually necessary to maintain air quality.
 If mechanical ventilation is provided, there should be a warning system in place to immediately
notify the worker in the event of a hazard or a failure in the ventilation equipment.
 Care should be taken to make sure the air being provided by the ventilation system to the
confined space is ’clean’.
 Ease of air movement throughout the confined space should be considered, because of the
danger of pockets of toxic gases still remains even with the use of mechanical ventilation.

91
 Do not substitute oxygen for fresh air. Increasing the oxygen content will significantly increase
the risk of fire and explosion.
 The use of mechanical ventilation should be noted on the entry permit.
The following paragraphs provide information on ventilation, isolation and respirators. All these
are important for air quality maintenance and safety of workers. All these are monitored and
regulated as per regulations of industrial health and hygiene.

Ventilation
Ventilation by a blower or fan may be necessary to remove harmful gases and vapours from a
confined space. There are several methods for ventilating a confined space. The method and
equipment chosen are dependent upon the size of the confined space openings, the gases to be
exhausted (e.g., are they flammable?), and the source of makeup air.
Under certain conditions where in flammable gases or vapours have displaced the oxygen level, but
are too rich to burn, the forced air ventilation may dilute them until they are within the explosive
range. Also, if inert gases (e.g. carbon dioxide, nitrogen, argon) are used in the confined space, the
space should be well ventilated and re-tested before a worker enters.

A common method of ventilation requires a large hose, one end attached to a fan and the other
lowered into a manhole or opening. For example, a manhole would have the ventilating hose run to
the bottom to blow out all harmful gases and vapours (see diagram). The air intake should be
placed in an area that will draw in fresh air only. Ventilation should be continuous where possible,
because in many confined spaces the hazardous atmosphere will be formed again when the flow of
air is stopped.

Isolation
Isolation of a confined space is a process where the space is removed from service by:
 Locking out by electrical sources, preferably at disconnected switches remote from the
equipment.
 Blanking and bleeding pneumatic and hydraulic lines.
 Disconnecting belt and chain drives, and mechanical linkages on shaft-driven equipment where
possible.
 Securing mechanical moving parts within confined spaces with latches, chains, choke, blocks, or
other devices.

92
 Locking out by electrical sources, preferably at disconnected switches remote from the
equipment.
 Blanking and bleeding pneumatic and hydraulic lines.
 Disconnecting belt and chain drives, and mechanical linkages on shaft-driven equipment where
possible.
 Securing mechanical moving parts within confined spaces with latches, chains, choke, blocks, or
other devices.

Respirators
Respirators are devices that can allow workers to safely breathe without inhaling toxic gases or
particles. Two basic types are air-purifiers, which filter dangerous substances from the air, and air-
suppliers, which deliver a supply of safe breathing air from a tank or an uncontaminated area
nearby.

93
Selecting the proper respirator for the job, the hazard, and the person is very important, as is
thorough training in the use and limitations of respirators. Questions regarding the proper selection
and use of respirators should be addressed to a certified industrial hygienist, or to the NIOSH
Division of Safety Research, 944 Chestnut Ridge Rd., Morgantown, West Virginia 26505.

ONLY AIR-SUPPLYING RESPIRATORS SHOULD BE USED IN CONFINED SPACES WHERE THERE IS NOT ENOUGH
OXYGEN

94
 How are fire and explosion prevented?
Work where a flame is used or a source of ignition may be produced (hot work) should not normally
be performed in a confined space unless:
 All in flammable gases, liquids and vapours are removed prior to the start of any hot work.
Mechanical ventilation is usually used to
- keep the concentration of any explosive or flammable hazardous substance
- less than 10% of its Lower Explosive Limit
- make sure that the oxygen content in the confined space is not enriched.
- Oxygen content should be less than 23% but maintained at levels greater than 18%. (These numbers can vary
slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.)

 Surfaces coated with combustible material should be cleaned or shielded to prevent ignition.

While doing the hot work, the concentrations of oxygen and combustible materials must be
monitored to make certain that the oxygen levels remain in the proper range and the levels of the
combustible materials do not get higher than 10% of the Lower Explosive Limit. In special cases it
may not be possible, and additional precautions must be taken to ensure the safety of the worker
prior to entering the confined space.

If a potential flammable atmosphere hazards are identified during the initial testing, the confined
space should be cleaned or purged and ventilated and tested again before entry to the confined
space is allowed. Only after the air testing is within allowable limits entry should occur as the gases
used for purging can be extremely hazardous.

How are energy sources controlled?

All potentially hazardous energy sources must be de-energized and locked out prior to entry to the
confined space so that equipment cannot be turned on accidentally.

95
96