Sufi Shrines and The Pakistani State The End of Religious Pluralism 9781788311816 9781786725479 9781786735478 Compress

Umber Bin Ibad is Associate Professor in the History Department at
Forman Christian College University, Lahore, and was previously an

Honorary Research Fellow in the School of Social Sciences, University
of Manchester. He is Associate Editor for The Pakistan Journal of
Historical Studies and has published in The Historian and the Pakistan
Journal of Islamic Research.
‘This is the first study to directly address the relationship between the
state and Sufi shrines in Pakistan. It makes an original contribution to
the field of Sufism Studies and, by examining the relationship between
the state and religion, is relevant far beyond the cases of both of Islam
and Pakistan.’
– Michel Boivin, Director Elect of the Centre for South
Asian Studies, French National Centre for Scientific
Research (CNRS) and School for Advanced Studies
in the Social Sciences (EHESS)
Islamic South Asia Series
Series Editor
Ruby Lal, Emory University
Advisory Board
Iftikhar Dadi, Cornell University
Stephen F. Dale, Ohio State University
Rukhsana David, Kinnaird College for Women
Michael Fisher, Oberlin College
Marcus Fraser, Fitzwilliam Museum
Ebba Koch, University of Vienna
David Lewis, London School of Economics
Francis Robinson, Royal Holloway, University of London
Ron Sela, Indiana University Bloomington
Willem van Schendel, University of Amsterdam
Titles
Sexual and Gender Diversity in the Muslim World: History, Law and
Vernacular Knowledge, Vanja Hamzic
The Architecture of a Deccan Sultanate: Courtly Practice and Royal Authority
in Late Medieval India, Pushkar Sohoni
SUFI SHRINES
AND THE
PAKISTANI
STATE
The End of Religious Pluralism
UMBER BIN IBAD

Published in 2019 by
I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd
London • New York
www.ibtauris.com
Copyright q 2019 Umber Bin Ibad
The right Umber Bin Ibad to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted
by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof,
may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images
in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions.
References to websites were correct at the time of writing.

Library of Islamic South Asia 3
ISBN: 978 1 78831 181 6

eISBN: 978 1 78672 547 9
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by T.J. International, Padstow, Cornwall
To my family and friends
CONTENTS
List of Tables x
Acknowledgements xii
Introduction 1
1. The Colonial State and Shrines 15
2. Double-Reterritorialisation: Drifting Towards the
Nationalisation of Shrines 38
3. Legality, Judicial Processes and Waqf: A Transition
from Moral to Total Control of Shrines 69
4. The Post-Colonial State, Shrines and the Auqaf Department 104
5. Developing and Redefining Shrines in the Post-Zia Period 130
Conclusion 162
Appendix 168
Notes 186
Bibliography 231
Index 243
LIST OF TABLES
Table 5.1 Decade-wise income, expenditures and surplus

relationship 140
Table 5.2 Income from major headings in 1996 143
Table 5.3 Income from major headings in 1986 144
Table 5.4 Zone-wise income in major headings in 1986 144
Table 5.5 Zone-wise income for 1986 145
Table 5.6 Income of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib 146
Table 5.7 Income increase in volume 148
Table 5.8 Zone-wise breakdown of income 1996 and 2006 150
Table 5.9 Expenditure on Data Sahib hospital in ratio
with the income of Data Sahib shrine 150
Table 5.10 Expenditure on Data Sahib hospital in ratio
with the income of Data Sahib shrine 151
Table 5.11 Badshahi Mosque 151
Table 5.12 Zone-wise breakdown of expenditure of 1996
and 2006 153
Table 5.13 Expenses of main headings, 1996 and 2006 155
Table 5.14 Zone-wise breakdown of religious affairs
expenditures, 1996 and 2006 156
LIST OF TABLES xi
Table 5.15 Percentage of social welfare expenditure 159

Table A.1 Punjab Religious Affairs 1 (mosques and shrines) 168
Table A.2 Punjab Religious Affairs 2 (academies and religious
institutes) 170
Table A.3 Shrines taken over in the first year of 1960
in Lahore and Gujranwala zones 172
Table A.4 Property details of the shrine of H. Data Ganj
Bakhsh Sahib taken over by Auqaf Department 175
Table A.5 Details of zones and sectors of Punjab Auqaf
in the 1970s and 1980s 176
Table A.6 Zones and circles under Punjab Auqaf
Department after 1993 176
Table A.7 Income and Expenditure of Lahore Zone of
1996 and 2006 178
Table A.8 Income and Expenditure of Gujranwala Zone of
1996 and 2006 179
Table A.9 Income and Expenditure of Bahawalpur Zone
of 1996 and 2006 180
Table A.10 Income and Expenditure of D.G Khan
Zone of 1996 and 2006 181
Table A.11 Income and Expenditure of Faisalabad
Zone of 1996 and 2006 182
Table A.12 Income and Expenditure of Multan Zone
of 1996 and 2006 183
Table A.13 Income and Expenditure of Pakpattan
of 1996 and 2006 184
Table A.14 Income and Expenditure of Sargodha
Zone of 1996 and 2006 185
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book became possible because of the support of many individuals

and institutions. Starting as a PhD thesis, the work gradually took its
present shape. Without the support and guidance of Dr Tahir Kamran,
the Professor of History at Government College University, I could not
have carried out my work. The idea itself came out of a discussion that
took place in his office, along with Dr Virinder Kalra of Manchester
University.
I was lucky to spend six months at Manchester University with
Dr Kalra. His wonderful hospitality and intellectually stimulating
company made my stay not only enjoyable but also productive. Several
ideas discussed in this work are the outcome of our conversations.
His emphasis on shrines as pluralistic and syncretic spaces, often
transcending articulated religious boundaries, made me aware of the
need for caution when finding my way towards understanding the site of
shrine. He was never reluctant to engage in discussion and was always
there to push me to improve my position. He was also kind enough to
read my drafts and critique them to help me improve.
My friend, Dr Hussain Ahmed Khan encouraged me to shape my
thesis into its present form. His diligence and editing skills caused me
to revise and edit the work many times. His book, Artisans, Sufis and
Colonial Art Institutions in Nineteenth Century Punjab, remained a guide to
me. I could not have created a presentable work without his patience and
help. Equally, my friend Ghulam Ali Shair read the chapters many times
and helped me improve them further. His many long, sometimes late-
night, sessions helping me work on the text afforded me much-needed
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xiii
moral assistance. Further, the professional efforts of Sophie Rudland,

Kavita Bhanot and Pat FitzGerald made this work publishable.
It is not easy to extract information from a state department in
Pakistan. For facilitating this task I am thankful to the staff of the
relevant state departments, especially those in the Auqaf Department,
Punjab Public Library and Punjab Secretariat Library. The staff not only
bore my presence patiently, but some also guided me to important
information. I am thankful to Tariq Mahmood Pasha, the Secretary
of the Auqaf Department, Qazi Abdur Razzak, a kind-hearted officer
from Auqaf head office, Ghafir Shahzad, Deputy Director Projects, the
managers of the shrines and the staff of Data Darbar library and Ulema
Academy. I must also not forget the hospitality of Dr Babar, who not
only provided me with important data but also facilitated my visit to
Data Darbar hospital.
I am thankful to the many unseen hands that have made it easier
for me to complete my work. I am grateful to my colleagues and
friends, Dr Farzand Masih, Khizar Jawad, Dr Syeda Arifa Zehra, Saadia
Sumbal, Dr Yaqoob Bangish, Dr Ryan Brasher, Asim Shaukat, Dr Ali
Qasmi and Dr Sikandar Hayat. I am also thankful to the Rector,
Dr James Tebbe of Forman Christian College.
Finally, I am deeply indebted to my family, especially my mother,
wife and daughters. Without the constant encouragement of my wife,
Nadia, and her patience and trust in me, I could not have carried out the
lengthy task of working on this book.
INTRODUCTION
In the context of politico-religious extremism and the prevalence of

militant Islam1 in Pakistan, there has been a search within the political
space for alternative Islamic ideologies.2 Pakistan has been under attack for
the last decade or so from a unique form of militancy.3 Islamic militants
have attacked Sufi pir shrines, which they consider un-Islamic. Since 2005,
militants have targeted more than 25 shrines across the country, including
the most famous and venerated shrines of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib (1009–
72/77) of Lahore, Baba Farid (1173–1265) in Pakpattan and Abdullah
Shah Ghazi (720–73) in Karachi.4 These attacks have uncovered the
religious leanings of the militants and further highlighted shrine-based
practices as a hurdle to the growth of a militant mode of Islam.5 Even the
state, which controls almost all of these significant shrines, has found it
necessary to highlight shrines and Sufism as a peaceful remnant of Islam.6
However, such a state position ignores the complex but overlapping
relations throughout history between Sufism7 and shrine-based
practices,8 on the one hand, and the colonial/post-colonial state, on
the other. Shrines were the sacred territorialised site for Sufism and
provided embodied spiritual space for Sufistic practices. Sufism has a
long history and, during the colonial period, branched off into multiple
reformist tendencies in response to colonial and religious encounters.
The reformist Sufistic tendencies played an important role not only in
reshaping popular Muslim religion but also in redefining the otherwise
customary pluralistic shrine-based practices.
There was a complex relationship between the state and shrines as
well. Before 1959, shrines were not under state control and there was no
2 SUFI SHRINES AND THE PAKISTANI STATE
state department for auqaf responsible for managing shrines. Even

during the colonial period, the state did not try to control shrines
directly through its bureaucracy. In order to make the ‘backward’
Pakistan modern,9 the state took over the customary sites of shrines and
associated Sufistic practices as soon as Ayub Khan’s rule started in 1959.
After taking over the shrines, the state not only controlled their
functions, it also started managing religious ceremonies through its
officials.10 This state activity encoded a new sort of relationship between
religious and political authorities at the site of the shrine.11
It is necessary to trace the politico-religious formulation of the state
that introduces a new form of relationship between shrines and the post-
colonial state. This book shows how the state of Pakistan engaged – be
it ideologically, legally, politically or administratively – with the site
of the shrine. Such an engagement with shrines by the state was
carried out in a projective framework associated with various historical
developments. These developments unfolded during the colonial period
and culminated gradually in a larger framework in the post-colonial
context. Therefore, the colonial/post-colonial amounts to a historically
continuous structure.
There are innumerable Muslim shrines in Pakistan; in particular,
the provinces of Punjab, Khyber Pakhtun Khwa (KPK) and Sindh
are famous for shrines attracting a large number of devotees.12 The
provincial Auqaf Departments13 also extract a large income from these
shrines. The shrines are dispersed in both rural and urban centres of the
provinces. Karachi, the capital city of Sindh, among many others, has a
large shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi (d. 773 AD ), along with the shrines
of Laal Shahbaz Qalandar (d. 1275) in Sehwand and Shah Abdul Latif
Bhittai (d. 1752) in another small town of Sindh. Peshawar, the capital
city of KPK, has the shrine of Mazar Ashab Baba. Punjab is no exception
and shrines are found everywhere in the thriving cities and the rural
areas. Lahore, the capital of Punjab is famous as ‘Data ke Nagri’, or the
abode of Data Ganj Bakhsh Ali Hajvery and his is the most famous
shrine not only of the Punjab but also of the whole country.
Contrary to those scholars who consider shrines a part of rural life,
there are ample reasons to study shrines in the urban setting. It is in the
urban area that the modernising spirit of the state reaches at length and,
paradoxically, where it gives space to traditional/customary localised
religious sites to let them grow exponentially.14 However, the focus of
INTRODUCTION 3
the Pakistani state has remained discreet and discontinuous for the
different cities: due to a variety of reasons the most famous shrine of
Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi remained neglected right up until
2005,15 and same is the case with another famous shrine of Mangu Pir;
only one shrine has been taken over by KPK Auqaf in Peshaswar,16
even the most famous shrine of Rehman Baba is not controlled by this
department and there has not been a single shrine taken over by
Balochistan Auqaf until 2017.
On the other hand, having a long cultural and mystical tradition,
Lahore, along with many of its adjacent cities (the area is popularly
termed Central Punjab and is the fastest growing urban region after
Karachi), is famous for bustling pre-colonial shrines such as that of Data
Ganj Bakhsh (1009–72/77), Bibian Pak Daman, Madhu Laal Hussain
(1538– 99), Mian Mir (1550– 1635), Shah Jamal (1588– 1671), Baba
Farid (1173– 1265) in Pakpattan, Bullai Shah (1680– 1757) in Kasur
and Shah Daula (1581–1675) of Gujrat. There are also famous shrines
of the colonial or post-colonial period, such as that of Mian Sher
Muhammad Sharaqpuri (1865–1928), Jamat Ali Shah Saani and Jamat
Ali Shah Ameer e Millat (1834–1951) in the semi-urban areas of
Narowal, and Sufi Barkat Ali’s (1911– 97) shrine in Faisalabad. All these
shrines were taken over by the Auqaf Department at the earliest
opportunity, for both ideological and monetary reasons; the urban areas
of the Central Punjab have been the focus of most of the developmental
works at shrines and have been the most profitable sector of the Punjab
Auqaf Department.17
The bustling region of the Central Punjab therefore demands to be
looked at closely, to measure the character of the state’s policies and their
implementation towards shrines.18 The demand intensifies further with
the fact that it is largely in and around this region that the communal or
Islamic ideological foundations for Pakistan, which have tended to be
either antithetical or reformative towards shrine-based practices, were
laid, with efforts made for their implementation. The most significant
ideologues, such as Allama Iqbal and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, religious
political parties such as Ahrar and Jamat Islami, Sufi pirs such as Jamat
Ali Shah Amir e Millat and Mian Muhammad Sharaqpuri, religious
seminaries such as a Deobandi Jamia Ashrafia and a Brelwi Jamia
Naeemia, played a significant role in reshaping the religion of the newly
built state.
Notwithstanding the religious position of the scriptural urban

Islamic thought19 that declares shrines as idolatrously innovative and
religiously deviant,20 a large number of people in Pakistan associate with
Muslim Sufi saints21 and consider them ‘sacred’.22 In popular belief,
these Sufi saints buried at the sites of shrines still possess the power to
help their devotees.23 Interestingly enough, shrines are also considered
to be a popular expression of religiosity,24 embedded in the spirit and
practice of Islamic Sufism and pluralistic mystic practices around the
tombs of Sufi saints. Islamic Sufism has a long tradition that stretches as
far back as the early years of the emergence of Islam. The tradition of
Sufism has a well-articulated form, including its own metaphysics
and organisational structure divided into orders (silsilai) and sub-orders.
The tradition carries a continuous development, but also continues
to manifest in new and multiple organisational forms.25 The State of
Pakistan treated this strong spiritual tradition of Islamic Sufism as a
singular phenomenon26 in order to re-imagine the site of the shrine,
refusing to give importance to customary local traditions.27
When the post-colonial state appropriated the site of the shrine, it
articulated it as deviant, embedded in an ‘un-Islamic’ or pluralistic
ethos. It was certain ideological developments during the late colonial
period that facilitated the taking over of shrines by the post-colonial
state. Since the 1930s the major ideological development within the
reformist rural-Sufi tradition and urban religious scholarship has
converged on a singular conception of Islam, in order to redefine Muslim
identity. We can term it a reterritorialisation process that deterritor-
ialised or disconnected its ties by the customary practices and connected
identity with non-pluralistic Islamic teachings and symbolic ethos.28
The reterritorialisation process highlighted the unique features of
Sufistic ideas, centred on Muslim identity attached to the objectification
of early religious history and prophet Muhammad while denigrating all
those practices embedded within pluralistic customary traditions. The
reforming process even started imagining the site of the shrine through
the gaze of the mosque, the puritan Muslim symbol.
The beginning of the 1940s witnessed a new phase of the
reterritorialisation process, when the politics of the Muslim League
employed the ideology of Islam for safeguarding the rights of Muslim
minority and for creating a separate homeland for Indian Muslims in
India.29 The politics of the League were aimed at creating a uniform
INTRODUCTION 5
Muslim identity, a universal and non-sectarian version of Islam, a

Singular Islam, fit for the needs of the modern society and state.30 The
Muslim League was able to make Muslims completely distinct from
Hindu identity and open up the way for a separate state for the Muslim
minority. In 1947, having gained sovereign control over a piece of land,
Pakistan, the politics of the Muslim League renewed the process of
reterritorialisation, a double-reterritorialisation unfurling perpetually
because of a complete break from the previous soil of (British) India.
Now in control of a land, the Muslim identity had to redefine itself in
order to maintain the majoritarian rule.31 The process of this redefinition
(a double-reterritorialisation) took place on multiple levels and the
delinked identity opened up a new horizon for a re-emphasised linkage
with religion on a newly acquired land – a land purified of all other
religious groups.32
The process of a double-reterritorialising process initiated a consistent
engagement of the state with varied Islamic ideologies, leading to a new
form of politics by opening up the possibility of adopting a Singular Islam
as the state’s religion.33 The new form of politics of Islam34 began a process
of ‘disputative negotiation’ amongst contrasting revivalist religious
articulations, ‘sectional interests’ and ‘politico-religious worldviews’, to
prepare the post-colonial elite to enforce/project their own version of
an Islamic state.35 This interplay of interests and politico-discursive
engagements not only kept the question of the role and character of a
Singular Islam alive but also kept the grounds for the deep-seated urge to
search for an identity, in the form of double-reterritorialisation, intact in
post-colonial Pakistan. However, the struggle for such political goals
contrasted with the inherited colonial state structures, as the latter would
not accommodate the former to its organisational makeup. Leonard
Binder concludes, in a detailed analysis of religion and politics between
1949 and 1956, that, other than giving emphasis to zakat and waqf
(endowment) matters and making it mandatory that the head of the state
be a Muslim, the whole process of Islamisation ended up as suggestive
clauses within the constitution of 1956.36 The State of Pakistan did not
move away from its emphasis on making its identity Islamic but still
could not institutionalise substantial elements of any form of revivalist,
traditionalist or fundamentalist Islam.37
However, the colonial/post-colonial political elite refused to associate
itself with the soil-based identities of the acquired land and insisted
on maintaining its identification with ummah or universal common

religious group. In this way, the double-reterritorialising stood upon
deterritorialising the pluralistic traces embedded within soil and
customs.38 For the post-colonial state, the process of double-
reterritorialisation was also linked with a process of excluding deviant
and un-Islamic remnants completely from the context of Singular
Muslim identity. One of the results of the re-identifying process was the
Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949. The
Objectives Resolution divided the citizens into Muslim and non-
Muslim, while at the same time making it mandatory for Pakistan to
identify as an Islamic state. At another level, the process resulted in
establishing both non-state and, a little later, state institutionalisation
of the Anti-Ahmadiyya movement. More significantly, the process of
double-reterritorialisation redefined and institutionalised the concept of
shrines and Sufism by excluding deviant mystic and spiritual practices
and identifying these sites with an Islamic concept of waqf.39
Soon after assuming power, the Chief Martial Law Administrator,
General Ayub Khan (1958– 69), took over shrines through a hastily
adopted ordinance in early 1959.40 The West Pakistan Waqf Properties
Ordinance (1959) was to ‘consolidate and amend the law relating to the
management of Waqf properties in the province of West Pakistan’.41
The apparently secular and modern rule of Ayub Khan42 promulgated
the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance in order to implement the
Islamic ideology of Pakistan. Javed Iqbal, the major thinker behind the
Ordinance and the son of Allama Iqbal, provided a justification for such
an Ordinance through his unique interpretation of the (later) ideas of
Allama Iqbal in a book published in the same year.43 He meticulously
re-invoked the ideology of a Singular Islam, earlier employed by the
Muslim League in the 1940s, and criticised at length the pluralistic
traditions in Sufistic ideas. Ayub Khan, by providing a foreword to the
book, also explained his own version of Islam and supported the efforts
for taking over shrines from the control of traditional and customary
caretakers through the promulgation of a legal ordinance.
The universal legalisation regarding taking over the shrines that
started in 1959 reduced the pluralistic traditions at Muslim shrines and
turned them into a space representing a Singular Islam. The legalisation
process began not only through ordinances but also through the judicial
process. This process assumed two contradictory positions regarding
INTRODUCTION 7
shrines: on the one hand, shrines were considered Islamic waqf property,
the property permanently dedicated for the religious and common
welfare; on the other hand, shrines were seen as spaces that deviated from
the right path envisioned by the propagators of Islam, the Sufi saints.
The legalisation process authorised the state to correct their deviant path
by introducing Islamic reforms. The judicial process further reduced
the ambiguities and contradictions regarding the nationalisation of
shrines through its unique interpretation of many important concepts
such as shrine, religion and waqf: thus paving the way for the ‘justified’
prevalence of state control.
Along with religious identity, the monetary reason was also
significant for prompting the post-colonial state to take over shrines.
The state started its operations through a legal ordinance, terming these
sites ‘waqf property’.44 The ordinance reduced their sacred position to a
religious monetary entity already developed, in another sense, through
colonial legal-judicial processes. Although the colonial legal-judicial
processes had homogenised the religious tradition, they did not try to
demystify the sacred nature of these sites altogether. The post-colonial
state moved further than the colonial rulers in the sense that it colonised
the hitherto local sacred sites exhaustively through its unique politico-
religious ideology. The selectivity with which the state took over
waqf properties, with an emphasis on the monetary aspect, reflected its
projective directions. The state introduced different developmental
projects in order to change the character of the shrines. At the same time,
it started supporting its preferred ideological sites, like mosques, from
the money collected from the shrines.
As it took over significant shrines, the state not only employed the
inherited structure of the colonial state along with its universalising
religious ideology, but it also interfered in the organisational structure of
the shrines. State managers replaced the traditional caretakers, such as
the sajjada nashins or mujawarans, in many present-day shrines. These
traditional caretakers of shrines increasingly found their positions
deprived of appropriating the monetary gains coming out of shrines.
Ensuring the distancing of the traditional caretakers from the shrine, the
state managers also started interfering with the customary religious
practices. Gradually, the managing of religious activities would
overshadow all other administrative aspects of the Auqaf Department.
With the growth of the Religious Affairs section within the Auqaf
Department, many other activities traditionally considered to be a

dominant part of a shrine, such as langar-khana (a space within a shrine
where visitors are served free food) and customary supportive social
activities, lost their importance.
Focusing on the relationship between the post-colonial state and Sufi
saint shrines, this book lies in the domain of political history. However,
taking an interdisciplinary approach, I have consulted anthropological,
sociological, religious, legal and judicial studies. The work intends to
throw light on the structure of the colonial and post-colonial state, in
order to understand the historical transition of controls on localised
religious practices, along with explicating the religio-political history of
the late colonial period, making sense of the heated communal tensions
of 1940s British India.
There are many important texts available45 that explore the
relationship between shrine-based practices and the colonial/post-
colonial state. The works of Sarah Ansari and David Gilmartin examine
the relationship between Sufi pirs and the colonial state. Ansari
highlights the role of the influential sajjada nashins or the pirs of Sindh as
collaborators with colonial rule. Gilmartin remains focused on Punjab
and elaborates in detail the relationship between politics and localised
religious leadership. Other than these authors, the works of Nile
Green and Arjun Appadurai are also important to understand the
relationship between a sacred site and the colonial state.46 The works of
Gregory Kozlowski, Nicholas Dirk and Erik Stokes are important
for understanding the colonial judicial process and colonial legal
development.47 This book depends heavily on Kozlowski’s under-
standing of colonial auqaf, early colonial judicial processes and the
emergence of Singular Muslim or Shariat law. However, it moves further,
to link itself with the development in the post-colonial period.
In order to understand and analyse the political-communal situation
of twentieth-century Punjab, within which communal segregation and
communally segregated sites of devotion had taken place, the book finds
the works of Ayesha Jalal, Younis Samad, David Gilmartin, Ian Talbot,
Gail Minault, K.B. Saeed and Faisal Devji48 important. Jalal provides an
incisive analysis of the decades of the 1920s and 1930s to highlight the
communal politics in Punjab. The political analyses of Samad and
Gilmartin show that in the context of tension between centrifugal and
centripetal political forces, a brief moment of consensual singular
INTRODUCTION 9
Muslim identity in opposition to Hindu identity appeared during the

1940s in India. However, amidst the continuity of centrifugal and
centripetal political tension in the post-colonial state, this brief period of
singular identity began to disappear. The possibility of the continuity of
a unique Muslim identity, even in the post-colonial state, as a self-
imposed project of the state, seems missing in Younis’ analysis.
For the post-colonial period, and in particular, the politics of Islam,49
the works of Leonard Binder, Aziz Ahmad, Vali Nasr, Ali Usman Qasmi
and Tanzil ur Rehman are significant.50 Binder, Ahmed, and Rehman are
important in highlighting the politics of Islamisation during the first
two decades of the post-colonial state of Pakistan. Binder and Rehman
focus on this politics with an emphasis on the tension between religious
and modernist groups. Qasmi, however, considers the politics of Islam
to be a continuous process without any break. For him, the concept is
important because it denotes the:
disputative negotiation of contrasting religious traditions,

sectional interests and ideological worldview of key actors, and
the imperatives of populist decision-making. It is the interplay of
such variables and their relative strengths and weakness during
different sets of socio-political, economic and, even, geostrategic
compulsions that have determined the course of Islam’s role in the
state of Pakistan.51
Following Qasmi’s analysis, this book tries to understand the Islamic

character of the state as always in the making amidst the tension of
multiple religious groups and the state’s lack of interest in absorbing
anything other than what is unavoidable. The works of Jamal Malik,
Katherine Ewing and Linus Strothmann examine the relationship of
the post-colonial state and the changes that have taken place in the
shrine-based life-form because of the state’s pervasive ideological
implementation. Strothmann shows the way in which the shrine of Data
Ganj Bakhsh in Lahore has changed since it has been controlled by the
Auqaf Department. He provides valuable details of the organisational
structure of the Auqaf Department at the shrine. Apart from his
anthropological insights, his findings rely on the works of Jamal Malik
and Katherine Ewing, who showed the impact, in her opinion, of the
policies of the colonial and post-colonial state on traditional religious
spaces. For Malik, the post-colonial state, a secular project, integrated

the autochthonous religious-cultural spaces into its own framework to
enjoy monetary gains, and developed these spaces within colonial-
bureaucratised control.52 The work of Jamal Malik, though depending
on a modernist reading of religion and culture, is an interesting
reflection on the extension of the colonial state into the post-colonial
situation. He shows how the state remained successful in absorbing
‘Islamic’ institutions while, however, reducing the number of devotees
visiting shrines. He shows that the state policies remained selective; they
dissolved the traditional organisational structures without completely
absorbing them. Malik thinks that the post-colonial state ‘enriches itself,
pushes through its ideology and legitimizes it religiously’.53
While Malik and Strothmann employ most of their historical
explanatory categories unreflectively, Ewing goes back to colonial times
to bring out the already concealed character of a Sufi saint and a mystic.
She maintains that the idea of a saint has been redefined in the post-
colonial world and that the process started during the colonial period.54
She shows the way colonial policies intervened in the local spiritual
structure and threw a whole group of faqir, mazjub or malang out of
fashion. Her insights bring to the fore a certain lack or split in the local
spiritual identity that she finds further problematised in the post-
colonial world. She also shows the changes in the ideas of significant
scholars, such as Allama Iqbal, that give space to a critical engagement
with the Sufis and later on, pave the way for ideological justification for
state control of shrines. She embarks, too, on the reasons, emphases and
shifts of different governments regarding Sufis and mysticism.
The work of Malik and Ewing opened up the possibility of
understanding the relationship between traditional religion and the
state from another perspective. With a focus on shrines, this book
develops and elaborates this perspective to understand localised religious
life. Unlike Malik, the book understands Islam as a non-homogenous
idea, emerging out of shrine-based life-forms, and unleashed for
contestation amongst multiple Muslim groups. In order to understand
concepts such as shrines and waqf, this book traces their pluralistic ethos
in the context of colonial-post-colonial political practices. Meanwhile,
Ewing’s work leaves open the space to apply her insights regarding
colonial insertions in religious life to the way Muslim groups reacted
and developed in the given rational order. As she focuses more on the
INTRODUCTION 11
character of the post-colonial subject, this book takes her reflective

insights into the workings of colonial-post-colonial state structures that
shape legally the core concepts of religion, waqf and shrine. It shows the
way the post-colonial state stretches its control by prevailing its
ideological apparatus on the ‘income generating’ shrines. Further, it
shows the manner in which the otherwise ‘modern’ post-colonial
state, which took over shrines because of their deviant and archaic
character, ends up as a ‘reformist’ agency determined to increase the
size of shrines along with visits to them, by considering them a part of
‘Islamic heritage’.
In order to understand the politics of different Muslim groups who
owned and developed a reterritorialised identity, this work brings
forward the nineteenth century Muslim reformism that emerged out of
customary shrine-based life. The reformism was fuelled with a new
rationality that had a distaste for the customary life, especially the
life-forms embedded in pluralistic practices. As the newly emerging
middle class led the reformism, the contesting politics gradually turned
towards an over-lapping consensus. The developing of the overlapping
communal consensus was similar to what Devji understands as reliving
the early Enlightenment period, which was at the same time a
‘distancing from the late Enlightenment’s ideal of one race-one soil of a
nation-state’55 in the larger colonial Indian politics. Distancing itself
from Devji, this book understands a new overlapping consensus around
Muslim identity as Singular Islam, a unique phenomenon that emerges,
however, as dominating pluralistic localised religious positions. It is one
of the reasons, therefore, that the Muslim League found it easier to
mobilise the otherwise segregated British Indian Muslims. While going
along with Jalal to understand the birth of Pakistan as an unprepared
and unexpected moment, the work shows that the consensual ideology,
already related to the deterritorialised identity, was there in the idea of
Pakistan. Therefore, by moving away from writers such as Samad,56 who
shows that the universal Muslim identity lost its hold after the birth of
Pakistan, the book puts forward the idea that a renewed, double-
reterritorialised identity has a place in the post-colonial state structure.
The post-colonial condition of the Pakistani state was unique, as
Hamza Alvi shows:57 it was a harbinger of colonial modernity, but as a
‘periphery’, within the compulsions of the world economy; Alvi
identifies classes developed uniquely, though under the logic of peripheral
capitalism, in the post-colonial world. His analysis of the post-colonial

state moves him away from conventional Marxist analysis and highlights
the structure of the post-colonial state as a kind of autonomous organism
with a mediatory role for the propertied classes. The organism of the
state, during the explicit domination of military-bureaucratic oligarchy,
remained focused on developing a peculiar authoritarian order, showing
the continuity of colonial authority.
Following writers such as Alvi and Malik, whose historical analysis
establishes the continuity of colonial rule by carrying forward the past in
the structure of the post-colonial state, this book focuses on the religious
streams within the ‘secular’ state of Pakistan. The mediating ground of
the post-colonial state gradually finds itself supporting religious
ideologies for balancing inter-class tensions. This mediational role, it
emerges, could be coercive and appropriative, as in the case of shrines,
where the state takes them under control in order to negate the prevalent
immoral practices. It is interesting to see that the post-colonial
state throws the entrepreneurs of the cultural sites of shrines, that is,
mutwallis or sajjada nashins, out of its customary productive functions.
The economy in the post-colonial state is not only the opening up
of possibilities for already established economic groups; rather, the
gradual infusion of religious streams also directs the mode of investment
that necessitates the use of force. Instead of becoming their voice, the
post-colonial state launches its inherent religio-political agenda on
the sites of shrines and lets the supported ideologies prevail upon the
sites. The post-colonial state develops and propagates its symbolic
religious ideology from the income of shrines while at the same time it
manipulates, controls and manages them through gradually evolving
bureaucratic institutions.
The promulgation of the ordinance of 1959 remains the historical
moment that is a point of departure in different directions, back into
both colonial and post colonial history. The Waqf Ordinance of 1959 in a
sense made a break in the history of shrines, mosques and waqf. The
moment brought out the merging of many different streams into one
whole. The Waqf Ordinance was not only a legal act, it was also an
amalgamation of a historically developed legal position with a religious
conception for imagining shrines and other sacred spaces of Muslims.
The ordinance also advanced a political position that not only provided
justification for but also furthered a unique political agenda. All these
INTRODUCTION 13
positions, however, merged together to form an institutional setting, a

department for a post-colonial state with the authority to take over
shrines, mosques and other sacred spaces in order to implement a unique
form of religio-political ideology.
The moment, therefore, becomes unique, and translates into the
possibility of historical tracing in multiple directions. The first direction
shows the ideological formulations developed within the colonial state
and provided the Muslim community with a unique form of identity, or
a reterritorialised space, having a unique conception of shrine-based
practices. The reterritorialised space faced a renewed attempt at forming
Muslim identity in the post-colonial state and developed a rigidified
coding for shrine-based practices. It showed further the attempt of
the post-colonial state to claim legitimacy for the promulgation of the
Waqf Ordinance. The second direction is to trace legal history in a way
that highlights the development of laws related to waqf properties
and shrines in both the colonial and post-colonial period. The third
direction is to show the working of the Auqaf Department to explain the
nature of state institutions and their selective focus on shrines. While
accepting that the post-colonial state has been secular in many ways
and has remained engaged in a kind of politics of Islam58 without
institutionalising religion, the post-colonial state lost its secular
character through appropriating and institutionalising unique religious
ideologies. It seems to have its own distinctive character, with a
blending of secular and religious streams.
The book is divided into five chapters: the first chapter shows the
working of the colonial state and its relationship with practices around
shrines in Punjab. It highlights the interference of the colonial state in
many aspects of social life, whilst arguing that the state largely ignored
urban shrine-based practices. It concludes that the colonial policies and
the social context made customary shrine-based practices alien even to
the traditional followers. The second chapter identifies the common
ground in the singular religious identity that began to emerge from the
work of different streams of Muslim groups after the 1920s, including
a unique disposition towards the spiritual world. Singular Islam
developed its identity by transcending the soil, finding its position by
dominating the voices attached to the soil or customs. A process of
double-reterritorialisation took place when this singular identity found
itself with a separate land to administer. The process generated puritan
politico-religious streams and the total exclusion of pluralistic shrine-

based practices.
The third chapter traces the legal development and judicial process
that defined and justified the waqf laws. In the colonial period legal acts,
such as the Mussalman Waqf Act (MWA) of 1923 and the Female
Dancing Act of 1943, were passed. However, the MWA of 1923 seemed
to be a legislative effort distanced from the community’s struggle.
A change can be seen by analysing the structure and context of two other
acts, the Female Dancing Act of 1943 (FDA) and the Auqaf Board Act
(ABA) of 1952. Standing upon the reterritorialised identity, both of the
acts highlight the urge of the colonial and post-colonial elite to identify
the site of the shrine only in the reformative mood. With little
differences in their emphasis, these legalising efforts show the urge of the
members of the legislative council to have moral control over the site of
the shrine. The chapter shows the way in which moral control changes
into total control of the shrines, by promulgating and extending the
waqf laws after 1959. The chapter further brings forward the judicial
interpretive activity that provides justification to the apparently non-
convincing legislations.
The fourth chapter explores the working of the Auqaf Department
since 1959, with the department responsible for introducing reforms on
local sites of devotion. The chapter starts its discussion with the Ayub
period and discusses the emphases of different governments as they have
steered the department’s direction. The chapter ends with the rule of Zia
ul-Haq and his religious policies for extending shrines. The fifth chapter
moves further and explores the working of the state and the Auqaf
Department within the changed political situation. The chapter
highlights that the changed political situation is simply a continuity of
existing ideological policies. It further discusses the department’s
budgets and accounts, to show the nature of income and expenditures.
The accounts show that the direction of the department is towards
making huge spending on secular and religious administrative heads,
while there has been only scarce spending on social welfare.
CHAPTER 1
THE COLONIAL STATE AND

SHRINES
This chapter explores the workings of the colonial state and its
relationship with the practices around shrines in the urban areas of
Punjab. It accepts the position of writers such as David Gilmartin and
Sarah Ansari, who maintain that the colonial administration established
its rule through objective rule-following bureaucratisation on the one
hand,1 and, on the other hand, by stretching co-opting policies such as
patronising the influential sajjada nashin (the spiritual inheritor and
caretaker of shrines).2 However, the focus here remains on the urban
areas of Punjab, where colonial authorities scarcely extended their
policy of co-opting the sajjada nashins of such areas. The colonial state
operated in urban areas through its reformative tendencies, and it also
made changes, directly or indirectly, at the socio-religious level. The
implementation of these policies produced a unique conception of
religious-spiritual understanding and the practices around shrines. The
colonial gaze kept the emerging religious and intellectual elites at a
distance from shrines, especially from pluralistic shrine-based practices:
thus, the shrines were cut off from larger religious-spiritual life. Not
only religious revivalists but also Sufi reformers felt the need to purify
religious practices from archaic and non-religious impurities. Amidst
such transforming socio-religious conditions, as this chapter highlights,
some of the pluralistic forms of shrine-based practices decreased, while
some others, having an affinity with the reterritorialised identity,3
continued to develop in their own ways.
Shrines, British rule and Central Punjab

When the British army marched into the Punjab in 1849 and wrested
power from the Sikh rulers,4 they found shrines and connected Sufi-pir
practices all around. The Punjab appeared to be a place where three
dominant religions, although there were many others,5 coexisted with
each other, apparently with minimum antipathy,6 and shared world
views that respected an ascetic and altruistic living. The religious life of
Muslims and non-Muslims revolved around shrines, and Punjab was
‘dotted with shrines, tombs of the sainted dead . . . and to the shrines of the
saints, thousands upon thousands of devotees resort in the hopes of gaining
something on the sacred soil’.7 To the pragmatic and protestant mind of
the contemporary British authority, anxious to take up its ‘White man’s
burden’, to enact a universal civilising mission through rules and laws and
increased bureaucratisation,8 these Sufistic shrine-based practices were
religious expressions of primitive indigenous people.9 The British
authorities decided to stay away from local religious groups.10 This
decision was not only a continuation of their previous policy – staying
aloof from local religious communities and not interfering with local
religions11 – but it was also a pragmatic administrative decision. However,
this policy of non-interference could not last long, and administrative
compulsions made them incorporate into their administrative system not
only the religious elites but also the shrine-based Sufistic ethos.12
In most of the areas of Punjab, religion meant little more than ‘going
to feasts without fasts’ and was intricately attached to the need for a
spiritual intermediary.13 Often, for a Muslim, it was enough to know
and read Kalma: there is no god but God and Muhammad was his
prophet. For the colonial administrators, Punjab appeared as a land
where ‘political power was almost exclusively the prerogative of those
who owned land, and society was organised around social groups whose
cohesion was based on kinship and their control of land – the tribe, the
village community, and the family’.14 The rural population, divided
along castes, had their own ways of constituting lives and customary
laws.15 Major Aubrey O’Brien imagined the system of religious belief in
this way: it was as if the Deity, like a sovereign
was a busy person, and that his hall of audience is of limited

capacity, only a certain proportion of mankind can hope to attain
THE COLONIAL STATE AND SHRINES 17
to the presence of God; but when individuals have got there, they
may have opportunities of representing the wishes and desires of
other members of the human race. Thus, all human beings require
an intervener between them and God.16
The need for an intervener was intricately attached to the shrine-based

Sufistic life world.
For the early colonial administrators, all the ‘religious nations’
populating Punjab could be considered one big nation, divided into
small nations. ‘They live side by side as peaceful cultivators, in happy
indifference to the petty jealousies which superior knowledge stirs up
in the hearts of their Hindu and Mussalman brethren in the towns.’17
However, the colonial authority imagined that because of prevailing
superior religious knowledge, especially in towns, Muslims were
disposed towards a puritan movement. Reference can be found to two
such movements in the reports of the colonial administrators in the
second half of the nineteenth century. One is the Faraizi movement and
the other, Wahabbism.18 The Faraizi Tehreek had a comparatively
insignificant impact on Punjab: however, Wahabbism or its variant
Ahl-e-Hadith had an impact and a good number of sympathisers in the
towns of Central Punjab. As a report by the Deputy Commissioner
of Amritsar shows, ‘Wahabis are notoriously numerous, and
increasingly so in Amritsar city, and I should estimate their numbers
at present at between six and seven thousand. They themselves claim to
be even still more numerous.’19 The puritan movement was also
prevalent in the other areas of Punjab as there were a considerable
number of Wahabis in the cities of Delhi, Ambala, Jehlam and
Hoshiarpur. With their critical emphasis upon the ‘saints, angels and
spirits’, as the census report of 1881 mentions further, the movement
was antithetical to shrine-based practices. The colonial authorities
found it ‘unsuited to the Musalmans of these parts, who have the
greatest belief in saints and shrines, and in the efficacy of pilgrimage to
groves and high places’.20
The need to collect data about oriental cultures grew stronger as the
administrative focus turned towards formulating and promulgating
customary laws and rural management. ‘Orientalist empiricism’ attained
its intellectual apogee in the 1870s and 1880s with a series of settlement
reports, the codification of customary law and census reports by such
scholar-administrators as S.S. Thorburn (1844–1924), Sir Charles Louis

Tupper (1848– 1910) and Sir Denzil Charles Jelf Ibbetson (1848–
1908).21 The rural population was seen as divided into castes and the
urban into biraderies (patrilineage/caste-communes), whilst both could
be divided into religious categories. However, the division was quite
neat, and enumeration into religious categories of Hindu, Muslim and
Sikh was to be completed for administrative purposes despite all odds.
‘Every native who was unable to define his creed’, stated Denzil Ibbetson,
who supervised the 1881 enumeration in the Punjab, ‘or described it by
any name other than that of some recognized religion, was held to be
classed as a Hindu’.22 Interestingly, as Talbot mentions, whilst the
British in India essentialised religion for enumeration purposes, it was
omitted as a category in the census they conducted back at home. And
further, he adds, whether or not the Indian census was as much a political
exercise as a scientific survey, its consequences for self-identity and its
politicisation were immense.23
Along with segregating religious communities, the British
authorities also considered Punjab as mainly an agrarian society with
no strong urban centres.24 Meanwhile, the authorities found
themselves compelled to develop a political relationship with the
large shrines and influential Muslim sajjada nashins in the ‘rural’ areas
of Southern and Western Punjab,25 yet it was not the case in the areas
that comprised the Central Punjab. Engagement with the sajjada
nashins was very rare, as there were no large Muslim shrines in the
area.26 As Central Punjab had been dominated politically by Sikhs,27
the initial Oriental writings highlighted only Sikh shrines. In 1858,
while describing the conditions and biography of the chiefs of Central
Punjab, Lepel Griffin discusses, under the category of shrines, only
‘Sikh shrines’, stretching out across the whole of Central Punjab.
Reading Griffin, it appears that Central Punjab did not have large or
elite Muslim shrines, although there were a few popular Sikh shrines
commemorating shared religious experiences. For example, Mozang’s
Sikh shrine was famous for being a meeting point of Guru Arjun with
Mian Mir and Chhajju Bhagat in Lahore.28 Griffin writes,
. . . in the Punjab are numerous shrines consecrated to the memory

of the Sikh Gurus. These are known by the name of Gurdwara,
Darbar Sahib or Derah, and generally, have been built at places
associated in some way with the Guru, and commemorating some

incident in his life. At all these shrines, the several Granths or Sikh
Scriptures are daily read aloud by the priests or Granthis, and
many of them support a large number of attendants, musicians,
and worshippers.29
Most of these shrines were controlled by Udasis, Sodhis, Bedis or other

Sikh or Hindu families, many of whom ‘possess(ed) great wealth and
large estates’.
The colonial rulers, in the absence of significant shrines and
influential sajjada nashins, kept up a mixed relationship with Muslim
shrines. A large number of shrines were ignored and the authorities did
not confiscate the property at some others,30 such as the shrine of Data
Ganj Bakhsh Sahib (Data Sahib), Lahore, popular among Rajput
tribesmen of Lahore – the shrine was awarded maafi (endowment) for
the land customarily dedicated to its name. However, with some
others, such as the shrine of Shah Daula, popular among the Gujjar
tribe in Gujrat, suspicious relations emerged because of their quaint
practices. For the colonial authorities, the shrine of Shah Daula became
significant because it gave shelter to and used Chuhas (rat children or
children with microcephaly) for deviant purposes.31 Authorities
virtually ignored the activities of Pirzadgan, the sajjada nashin of the
shrine, and highlighted the alms-collecting activities of Chuhas by the
beggars of the shrine.32 The authorities did not hesitate to take over
the land attached to shrines whenever they could; for example, they
took over the land attached to the shrines of Mian Mir, Anarkali, Mir
Qasim and Shah Chiragh, in order to set up cantonment and
administrative facilities there.33
As Central Punjab was comprised of urban areas such as Lahore,34 the
area became the zone of remapping and remodelling for projected
developmental activities.35 The new ‘civil’ centre began developing
outside the old city area. From the official secretariat to Government
House, and from the cantonment area to the railway station, most of the
new buildings and constructions were erected on land already attached to
shrines.36 The urban revamping developed a new mode of thinking and
cultural perception arising out of new colonial constructions,
transportation systems, educational systems and increased economic
opportunities. The development corresponded with the belief of the
British governance that attachment to ‘immemorial habits’ was the

reason that Indians were stuck in the quagmire of primitiveness.
Education would create new ‘dispositions’ and ‘knowledge’ necessary for
Indians to improve their material conditions, not least by cultivating a
taste for the products of British industry.37 This mingling of secular self-
interest and religious fervour provided a lasting motivation for liberal
reform in India, where ‘the passionate conviction that the ideals of
altruism and the strongest claims of self-interest coincided’.38
Languages and Sufi-spiritual writings

Persian and Punjabi were the dominant languages (the former as the
official and the latter as the language of the people)39 when the British
began ruling Punjab. However, the British authorities soon found it
more rational to introduce English as a primary language, with Urdu as a
secondary official language. Following the efforts that had already been
made in North India for promoting the learning of Urdu,40 the Punjab
administration welcomed reports maintaining that locals understood
Urdu quite well. Even in areas ‘where people don’t speak Urdu, they
however do understand it’.41 Due to this administrative understanding,
Urdu was introduced in the province as a second official language.
Although the administration found it convenient to promote Urdu
through its own efforts, they remained keen to disentangle this new
language from non-purposive usage already prevalent in the history of
the Urdu literary tradition. The promotion of Urdu therefore soon
turned into an effort to promote a purposive usage of the language. The
Anjuman e Punjab or Punjab Association was
an association that included British officials (including the

Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab from 1865–1870, Sir Donald
Mcleod) as well by many important members of the Punjabi elite
drawn from the three major religious communities of the Punjab –
Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh. With this diverse membership, the
Anjuman became a centre for debates about educational and social
reform at the time.42
Along with the efforts to promote Urdu in a purposive mode, we find

texts discussing the localised sacred spaces of shrine life in Urdu during
that period: together with such works as Tehqiqat e Chishti by Maulvi

Noor Ahmed Chishti (1864), Mukhzan e Punjab by Mufti Ghulam
Sarwar (1873) and Hazrat Ali Bin Usman Hujviri Al-Maruf Hazrat
Data Ganj Bakhsh: Savanih Hayat (1914) by Mohammad Afaq. The
organisation Anjuman Khaddam al Sufiya (1901), founded by the efforts
of Jamat Ali Shah (Ameer e Millat),43 began publishing a magazine,
Risalay al Anwar Al Sufiya, in 1904, for promoting the cause of
Tasawwuf or Tariqat. The main purposes of the Anjuman, other than
promoting the cause of Tariqat and Tasawwuf, were to develop unity
among the orders of Tasawwuf, the rejection of accusations against Islam
and Tasawwuf and the rejection of false religion.44 The magazine Anwar
al Sufiya was intended to fulfil the objectives of the organisation and for a
long time was sold at a very economical price. Jamat Ali Shah and the
Anjuman not only remained active for this journal, the former also
supported some other journals on Tasawwuf, almost all of them
published in Urdu, like Al-Irfan, Al-Faqih, Al-Jihad, al-Muballagh and
al-Lama from Kasur and As Sufiyya from Sialkot.45
The old tradition of scholarly writing in the Persian language for
higher state officials gradually started dying out and gave way to
writing in Urdu or English. Maulvi Noor Ahmed Chishti, before
producing his work in Urdu, had written some of his earlier works in
Persian. The same was the case with Mufti Ghulam Sarwar, who also
assisted Chishti in his research work. Although both of them belonged
to families deeply immersed in Sufistic orders, their interest in Urdu
writing emerged because of their close links with state officials. Some
of the initial British administrators became students of Chishti in
order to learn Urdu. Leaving aside his earlier interest in Persian, it was
the increasing interest of the administrators that made Chishti write in
Urdu. Almost in the same vein, and working closely with Chishti,
Mufti Ghulam Sarwar, wrote a history of Punjab, Mukhzan e Punjab,
in Urdu. However, he wrote Tazkira (a biographical history of the four
Sufi orders, in four volumes)46 in Persian: this might be considered one
of the last texts coming out in the Persian language in Punjab. Later
on, texts continued to appear either in Urdu or English; for example,
Muhammad Fauq (1887 – 1945) wrote in Urdu, and John A. Subhan
(1899 – 1977) wrote the biographical histories of Sufis and Sufi orders
in the English language. Interestingly, Subhan’s book was an attempt
to understand the shrines and saints of Islam, and his project was to
inform British scholars about the spiritual and shrine-based practices

of Islam.47
The prevalence of Urdu made Punjabi a subversive language that
carried with it the Sufistic tradition of local spiritual characters and poetic
wisdom. Though for Mir, the tradition of writing in the Punjabi language
did not die out and showed resilience, she accepts that it gradually lost
prominence.48 Mian Muhammad Bakhsh, a famous Punjabi poet writing
at almost the same time as Chishti and Sarwar, did not shy away from
expressing his mystical experiences in the Punjabi language; however, he
complained of being ignored in the changed colonial times. The poetry of
Khawaja Ghulam Fareed Mitthan Koti and Pir Mehr Ali Shah of Golra
Sharif was also still popular.49 The changed colonial times, however,
produced a schism between narration and poetry on the one hand, and
purposive urban Urdu poetry and altruistic rural Punjabi folk-poetry on
the other. The most famous poet of early twentieth-century Lahore,
Allama Iqbal, despite Punjabi being his mother tongue, did not write in
the Punjabi language nor did he engage with the altruistic rural Punjabi
folk-poetry tradition.50 Further, in 1938, when Subhan wrote his history
of shrines and Sufi orders, he did not forget to discuss the Punjabi poetic
tradition. At the end of his book he discussed two famous musical songs,
Dholla and Heer, sung by faqirs (mendicants) on the roads of the cities in
Punjab. It seems that the traditional character of spiritual folk wisdom, so
intricately linked with the shrine culture, began to be alienated from the
sensibility of the urban Muslim population.
The shrines and Sufis associated with the tradition of Punjabi poetry
and stories started losing their popularity in the first half of the
twentieth century. On the other hand, shrines such as Data Ganj Bakhsh,
which easily became associated with the new dominant languages, Urdu
and English, increased in popularity.51 Muhammad Fauq’s biography of
the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh in Urdu and the translation of Kashf ul
Mahjub52 by Reynold A. Nicholson into the first official language of
English, initiated a new form of writing in remembering this Sufi saint,
with the emphasis on his Islamic teachings and lamenting the conditions
of the shrine. A Kashmiri journalist and close associate of Allama Iqbal,
Muhammad Fauq intended to highlight the greatness of the Sufi saint
because of his services for the Muslim community in proselytising Islam.
This way of seeing a Sufi saint was, in a sense, a new effort to situate him
within the contemporary situation.53
Local historical imagination: remembering and forgetting

pluralistic shrine-based life forms
Along with the changes in society and the re-hierarchisation of
languages, the historical texts of that period indicated a new way to
understand and remember local socio-spiritual traditions. In order to
highlight the trend, this following section will take three texts, Tehqiqat
e Chishti (1864), Lahore: Its History, Architectural Remains and Antiquities
(1892) and Asar al Sanadid (1848 and 1854)54 of the later half of the
nineteenth century. Maulvi Noor Ahmed Chishti and Syed Latif, the
authors of first two texts, carried out their research in Lahore. However,
it was Sir Syed Ahmed Khan who wrote Asar al Sanadid from Delhi. What
Maulvi Noor Ahmed Chishti did in Tehqiqat e Chishti in Lahore, Sir Syed
Ahmed Khan had already done in Asar al Sanadid in Delhi, the dying
centre of Muslim rule in India. Both writers wrote, almost at the same
time, the history of their respective cities, with overlapping intentions.
These texts describe the conditions of their respective areas, and through
remembering their cities, led to a shift in their imagination.
Although different in their emphasis, style and even content,55 these
texts initiated a new way of writing history: a way of writing not found
in the Persian and Urdu traditions of history writing.56 Leaving aside a
few biographical attempts, the tradition of writing the history of
one’s own city with the emphasis on buildings, sites and important
personalities did not exist. Asar Al Sanadid as well as Tehqiqat e Chishti
and Lahore: History, Architectural Remains, and Antiquities emerged out of
new needs and expectations. Since they were making great changes in
the urban setting, the colonial administration developed a need for
developing a sense of the urban area.
Studying the city would reveal the intangible qualities of the

present – its centres of excellence and disrepute, its promises and
pitfalls, and the shape of society’s relationship to both its future
and past. This was a new mode of imagining the city in Indian
literature, one that grew out of the practices of urban restructuring
that accompanied British rule.57
The new mode, however, brings into relief the tension between the
contemporary spiritual world and the emerging new world.
There were huge differences between the two editions of the texts of
Asar al Sanadid (The Remnant Signs of Ancient Heroes), the first written in
1847 and the next in 1854.58 The first edition of Asar al Sanadid (AS 1)
remained a joyful remembering of the remnants of an earlier life world.
Sir Syed still considered his city, Delhi, to be the best in the world,
although shorn of many of its jewels. However, after giving details of the
buildings of his city, people and their manners, he also gave details of
117 biographies of those he held ‘in the highest regard and whom he had
either personally met or seen’. It is interesting to note the categories
within which he places his favourite personalities:
The nine categories, and the number of people mentioned in each,

are as follows: (1) twenty-one Sufi masters (masha’ikh); (2) nine
‘men of ecstasy’ (majazib); (3) twelve physicians (hukama);
(4) twenty-nine religious scholars (‘ulama); (5) five reciters and
preservers of the Qur’an (qura aur haffaz); (6) seventeen poets
(‘nightingales’, bulbul-nawayan); (7) eleven calligraphers (khush-
nawisan); (8) four artists (musawwiran); and (9) nine musicians
(arbab-i-musiqi).59
The world of Sir Syed seems to be filled with poets and musicians; at the
same time, he is not shy of mentioning Majzub. Interestingly, the text
discusses ‘Sufis’ and ‘Majzub’ before ‘Ulama’, with the description of
significant Sufis of his own time.60
However, the later edition of Asar al Sanadid (AS 2) shows a
different emphasis, style and epistemological direction to AS 1.
Written in 1854, under the guiding influence of British officials in
Delhi and with more willingness to participate in the literary circles of
the British Royal Asiatic Society, the AS 2 turned out to be a different
book, rather than a new edition of an old book.61 Syed Ahmed Khan’s
acknowledgement of British scholars and his urge to find readership
within the British scholarship led him to write the book in both Urdu
and English. His emphasis on writing history, as he explains in the
preface, makes him consciously engage in the chronological narration
and exclusion of any moment of ‘participant observer’. The joy with
which he wrote his first book gave place to the distanced position of a
writer interested only in explaining facts. The playfulness of both the
writer and the characters of the text within AS 1 had given way to
writing about an alien land through primary sources.62 The details

regarding Sufis and Majzub, however, found their place, even in AS 2,
although with little mention of locals. It seems that Sir Syed had
willingly accepted the epistemological order of British scholarship and
had distanced himself from his old city.
Setting out upon almost the same task as that of Sir Syed – writing
better history63 – Chishti wrote his history of Lahore as a ‘Command
Performance’.64 Chishti, as he mentions in his preface to Tehqiqat e
Chishti (1864), started his venture under the command of William
Coldstream, Assistant Commissioner Lahore. He described the history of
the rulers, tombs, Sufi saints, gardens and buildings of Lahore. However,
two thirds of his text concerned the study of shrines, Sufi saints and
practices in shrines. Although he extracted his primary data from many
original texts, he made use of interviews and participant observation in
abundance.65 It seems he could not follow the strict standard of objective
and chronological historical writing.66 The British administration also
criticised him for giving unnecessarily detailed information regarding
‘descriptions of very unimportant places, such as tombs of persons long
forgotten by most people and insignificant little takias (stands or
platforms occupied by a holy person)’.67
Syed Muhammad Latif, the author of Lahore: History, Architectural
Remains, and Antiquities, was an extra-judicial Assistant Commissioner of
Gurdaspur when he wrote his work. He also gave special attention to the
fact that his writing might find a favourable response from his British
employer, and in this he succeeded. Far more exquisitely than the
previous writers, he gave special attention to the changes and the healthy
imprint of the colonial administrative order.68 In his work he contended
that, apart from precipitating economic activities and prosperity,
colonial rule had contributed to peace and harmony by promoting social
coexistence. However, his special focus on the benefits of the British
administrative order69 did not completely prevent him from writing
history from the local perspective. He maintained that Punjab had
always acted as a bulwark against invading armies, contrary to the
popular narrative of its non-defiance.70 He was able to show the
importance of the sacred teachings of Guru Nanak and other Gurus
along with the Sufi saints.71 Contrary to histories such as Khazinat ul
Asfiyah and Sakinat ul Aulya,72 he was determined to give a less
exaggerated view of the saints and Sufis. For this he tried to go as close as
possible to the common-sense life hidden in tazkiras (memoirs) or

malfuzat (biographies) and ethnographic reporting of the shrines.
Comparing Tehqiqat e Chishti and Lahore: Its History, Architectural
Remains and Antiquities reveals interesting commonalities as well as
important differences. Both local texts, in their historical imagination,
saw their city being ruled by different religious dynasties and, at the
same time, animated with the mystical spirit of all three religions,
although largely with the Muslims then, later, Sikhs and Hindus. The
two texts did not try to exaggerate the differences among religious
positions and even mentioned conflicts in a non-violent tone.73 They
trace the architectural remains with reference to the permanence that
is embedded in the spiritual ambiance. Despite the changed emphasis,
the texts did not try to minimise the role of shrines in remembering
Lahore.
However, their differences are significant enough to reveal a few
important developments and emphases. The Tehqiqat e Chishti developed
its narrative not only from tazkiras but also from interviews and from the
prevailing oral stories. The emphasis remained on unearthing the
dominant spirit of Lahore. In his love for Lahore, Chishti does not
hesitate to praise a sajjada nashin (custodian of the shrine) of the shrine of
Madhu Laal Hussain for saving Lahore from the wrath of Ahmed Shah
Abdali.74 The text not only provided historical accounts of the shrines,
its treatment of shrine life was also animated. Although it did not like
some of the shrine-based activities, such as tactics for earning money at
the shrine of Bibi Pak Daman and Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib, it considered
the majawars or sajjada nashins of these shrines to be among the
noblility.75 Chishti takes pains to highlight the activities of the saints
and spiritual life of the then differentiated mystical forms such as sant,
sadhu, faqir, majawar, mutwalli, sajjada nashin and pir. Even karamat
(miracles) found a living place in and around shrine-based practices.
For Latif, social sensibility started taking a new turn in the 1890s.
He still showed an interest in Sufistic views, yet attraction for the shrine-
based life had already been lost. Throughout his narrative sajjada nashin,
mutwalli or faqir are absent; he mentions them perhaps two or three
times in his work. In order to write good history, he did not follow
Chishti’s methodology but focused more closely upon the original and
contemporary tazkiras and malfuzat. By giving importance to origins,
his methodological shift leads to a better history but at the cost of his
own life world. Although he narrated the story of shrines to his own
times, he remained content to provide a biographical narrative of the
saint of the tombs and did not try to give a glimpse of shrine-based
practices.76 His treatment of the shrines depicted them as having
historical importance due to their architectural remains. Further, unlike
Chishti, who provided lengthy detail, his accounts of Sikh shrines
remained brief, although he did not hold back from giving reverence to
Guru Nanak and other Sikh gurus. His treatment of saints exemplified
the methodology of a distanced researcher who stays aloof from
prioritising the data. As Chishti gives priority to the historical lineage,
Latif gives importance to the geographical situation of his city. His
narrative of shrines started with the description of the shrine of Madhu
Laal/Shah Hussain, suggesting it to be the most important shrine.77
Negating shrine-based practices: Muslim revivalist

movements and spiritual space
The shift in historical imagination also correlated with the larger
ideologies giving birth to Muslim revivalism at that time. Two such
movements are Aligarh educational reformism and Deoband religious
revivalism; these movements remained very important in developing
and defining the context of shrine-based practices within the larger
Muslim life-world in British India. It took these movements some time
to influence Punjab; however, they spread quite widely in different
directions in the first half of the twentieth century. Whilst the colonial
state seemed to be aligning with and supporting the reformist ideas of
Sir Syed, the urban areas of the Punjab had already experienced the
communal reformist movements.78 Arya Samaj, a Hindu reformist
movement, was an irritant for Sikhs, while Singh Sabha was taking its
own route towards engendering Sikh identity. The Wahhabis, within
Muslims, were experiencing a decrease in their popularity similar to that
of the militant Sikh Namdhari movement. Largely, the Muslim elite was
following the direction of the colonial order and resettling in the major
urban centres of Punjab. In order to develop closer relations with urban
Muslims, the colonial authorities handed over the control of their
important sacred sites, such as Badshahi Mosque in Lahore, to local
Muslims.79 In that context, the appearance of Sir Syed’s reformist
movement did not come out alien to the educated local elites; however, it
took this movement some time to prevail within the larger Muslim
public sphere.
The early reception of this movement in urban Punjab was not
enthusiastic, and in some senses, was rather discouraging. Despite the
warm hospitality given by some of the local Muslim elites to Sir Syed,
the founder of the Aligarh movement, during his visit to Lahore in the
second last decade of the nineteenth century, Sir Syed found more Hindu
groups disposed towards his mission than the Muslims. He faced a
cautious local audience, fearful of losing their customary family
traditions if they pursued modern (British) education. When he had to
give a lecture on his religious views, he spoke in an exclusive closed-door
session, fearing that his modern religious interpretation might create
uproar amongst the public.80 The movement provided a new dream,
imbued with the forsaking of customary traditions. However, for the
local audience, it was impossible to buy into a dream that would displace
their traditions.81 A response from a local writer, Mufti Ghulam Sarwar,
who refused to write Islamic history in the way Sir Syed supported,
might be helpful in understanding the movement. For Sarwar, Sufistic
traditions were the real traditions and Muslim identity could not be
imagined without a link to the father figures (buzarg).82 For Sarwar,
emphasising religious identity might generate the contesting of
historical writings, to which he was averse.83
Sarwar’s criticism may appear a little conservative; however, it made
sense in the context. His criticism was not of Sir Syed, whom he held in
high esteem; rather it emerged out of a fear of producing contesting
religious identities at the cost of homeland-based rootedness. His
fears, ignited by the projected understanding of Sir Syed’s message,
showed many signs of being gripped by a new mode of instrumental
rationality.84 Even such a liberal position as Sir Syed’s had to put
forward a programme in the context of competing for universal
religious identities.85 Here lay Sarwar’s dilemma: he earned his living
from official sources but remained unable to celebrate the colonial re-
imagination of his city.86 He refused to re-identify with the idealist
and universal identity.
At the same time, the religiously centred Deoband movement
emerged with a clear agenda of reforming religious culture embedded
within deviant cultural practices and rebuilding identity on scriptural
authorities. In 1866 Rashid Ahmed Gangohi and Qasim Nanotvi laid
the foundation of Dar Ul Alum in the small town of Deoband, in order

to revive Islam through the teachings of Shah Wali Ullah, an eighteenth-
century Delhi-based Muslim scholar. The movement, though started as
an educational activity, soon brought out its sectarian, social reformative
and revivalist political agenda through putting forward its own version
of Islam. It had a broader mission of establishing an Islamic state in the
region. Under British rule, however, and because of financial constraints,
the movement turned towards the ‘condemnation of the values and
practices of mainstream Muslim society’87 in order to reduce innovations
in religion. Later on, it engendered active politics along with reforming
cultural values, without losing its sectarian roots.
Both the Aligarh and Deoband movements emerged in opposition to
British administrative revamping in urban areas: at the same time they
aimed to relocate Muslim identity. While the Aligarh movement
distanced itself from traditions and customs, with an emphasis on
modern education, the Deoband seminary went back to basic scriptures
of religion as the most authentic way to achieve true Muslim identity.
In order to ‘challenge’ customary values and British administrative
changes, both movements tried to push the ‘irrational’ remnants of
shrine-based practices into a deliberate oblivion. The Deobandi leaders
had their roots in Sufi orders and they retained their connection with the
revivalist aspects of that tradition.88 However, their acquired rational
articulation and organisational subjectivity gradually allowed them
conceal this rootedness and helped them to criticise the archaic practices
at all shrines.89 In a certain sense the same was the case with the
movements that followed the lead of the Aligarh movement.90 Although
the Aligarh movement was aimed more at developing colonial educated
elites or a colonial urban sector,91 a large number of scholars who
emerged under the influence of this movement kept their interest in
Sufistic tradition, even if it meant criticising that tradition.92
Both the Aligarh and Deoband movements followed their own
critical and reformist paths. However Jamat Ahmadiyya, or Qadianis,
developed a strange mixture of both.93 It is hard to place this movement
within a certain category: as a reformist Sufistic order or as a revivalist
proselytising movement. It can be seen as a Sufistic order because of its
emphasis on the mystical side of human existence, the centrality of the
leader as a mujaddid (revivalist), second Messiah or Mehdi, the possibility
of prophesies and its owning of practices such as ba’ait.94 Even the
position that made this movement controversial for a large number of

Muslims, that is, the question of revelation and its appropriation by the
movement’s leader, fall easily within the Sufistic tradition. Meanwhile,
the rationalistic approaches of both the Aligarh and Deoband
movements tackled the question of revelation through textual
interpretation and by employing modern rationality. However, the
leader of the Ahmadiyya movement, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–
1908), remained critical of these rationalistic modes of thought.95
From the very beginning the movement did not shy away from
criticising both modernists and orthodox because of its wish to be
considered the only true interpreter of Islam.96 It criticised modern
rationalists for ‘throwing doubt on Quran’ and repudiated ‘the abolition
of Purdah, and staunchly defended the Islamic law of divorce and
polygamy’.97 On the other hand, it criticised the ‘orthodox’ or Ahl e
Sunnat Mulla and superstitions attached to shrine-based practices. The
movement, with its claims of mahdiat, miracles and buruzi (shadow)
prophethood, had to embed itself within the Sufistic tradition; however,
the emphasis on the universal appeal of the Qur’an and on the
significance of understanding text created a schism between scripture-
based Islam and mystical revivalism. The result was not unexpected and
the movement faced severe criticism from the very orthodoxy it intended
to reform.
Islamised Sufistic spirits and shrine-based practices

Despite all the criticisms and changes in society, shrine-based practices
grew during the colonial period. At the very beginning of colonial rule,
Sufistic practices in shrines were already held firmly within an elaborate
doctrinaire condition associated with a saint cult and becoming
routinised and popularised.98 Not only did the practices attached with
shrine-based Sufistic cultures such as Melad, Khatam Sharif and the Urs
of Ghauspak become prevalent in society at large, the struggle of
individualised Sufistic souls to chart their own ways had not died out
completely.99 The reformist and revivalist movements during British
rule emerged partially from the old streams; these streams not only
emerged out of but also remained closely attached to shrines. Meanwhile
some new streams, such as Ahmed Riza Khan’s Brelwism and the
activism of the Bugwi family in Punjab, emerged out of scholarly
activities. However, these positions promulgated conservative traditions

of Islamic thought, and remained distant from shrine-based practices,
linking themselves more with mosques and madrasas (seminaries). These
positions grew in the fashion of other larger religious movements such as
Deoband, in order to participate in a sectarian/communal contesting
ambiance.
The development around shrine-based practices can be seen to have
taken shape in four directions during the colonial period: Chishti
revivalism,100 Naqshbandi revivalism, emotional revivalism and urban
Shari-Sufism.101 Largely, revivalism around shrine-based practices was
the scholarly articulation of Sunni orthodoxy, closely linked to localised
shrines. Amongst Naqshbandi and Chishti pirs, a revivalist movement
brought forward the decreased emphasis on localised spiritual practices
and the increased importance of scripture-centred universal Islam.
In fact, most of these pirs proclaimed ba’ait (allegiance) in all of the four
salasil (orders)102 of Sufism. According to Arthur F. Buehler, this
revivalism may be understood as giving prominence to mediating-Sufis
instead of the directing-Sufis who became popular at the end of the
second half of the nineteenth century.103 More than that, the mediating-
Sufis became closer to pedagogic-Sufis and became scholars, embedded
within orthodox Sunnism, already closely attached to shrine-based
practices. Already from the 1920s onwards, Brelwis predominantly
connected with the Qadri Order, started showing its influence in urban
centres.104 This version of Islam, however, largely remained non-
political in urban areas, yet influenced politics in quite a different way:
the incidence of Ghazi Ilm-Ud-Din Shaheed in 1929 cannot be separated
from the influence of the preaching of orthodox Sunni Sufis.105
The other two forms of revivalism around shrines were connected
to developments around customary shrine-based practices; the first,
emotional revivalism, was a kind of re-affiliation with traditional
devotional practices connected to shrines. The ceremonies attached with
this type of shrine-based practice, such as the ecstatic movements of haal
(ecstatic condition) and chilla makoos (inverted exercises for mystical
advancements), came closest to what most of the revivalist and reformist
movements criticised as deviant. The second form of revivalism, urban
Shari-Sufism, was linked with the changes that had started taking place
at the site of shrines in order to absorb and adapt to the changed social
environment. Among the emergent urban Muslim elite, a new sort of
affiliation with shrines such as Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib of Lahore started
developing. The shrine began to lose its customary shrine-based
practices, while the religiously mediating character of the dead saint
became the predominant reason for the affiliation.
Chishti and Naqshbandi revivalist movements in Punjab and
Khaibar Pakhtun Khwa (KPK) struggled to revive the lost spirit of
Islam and unleashed the orthodox potential of the time. Focusing closely
on Muslim identity to try to penetrate deeper into the remote areas of
Punjab, both the movements created an impulse for ethical revivalism.
Chishti revivalism impressed a large number of Sufis and triggered the
development of important monasteries such as that of Sial Sharif
(Shahpur), Taunsa Sharif (Taunsa) and Golra Sharif (Rawalpindi).
However, this movement could not penetrate Central Punjab. There
were only a few Sufi Chishti personalities of significance in Central
Punjab in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One of them
was Maulana Ghulam Qadir Bhairwi (d. 1908), who also taught Arabic
at Oriental College, Lahore, and later settled as a caretaker at Baigam
Shahi mosque in the Walled City. He kept his emphasis on Hanafi
Shariat and held such a strict attitude towards non-Hanafis that he often
fought with them. Once he even slapped an Ahl-e-Hadith on someone
who did not put his hands where he thought they should have been
during the prayer. On his grave is written: ‘As per Anjuman e Hanafia
and on the order of Shara Sharif, it is declared that no Wahhabi, Rafzi,
Naturi or Mirzai should come within the mosque and they should not do
anything against Hanafia religion.’106
Where the Chishti revivalist spirit could not penetrate, Naqshbandi
revivalism filled the vacuum. Emerging out of rural or semi-urban areas
of Punjab, the Naqshbandi revivalist spirit soon succeeded in developing
khankahs around the major urban centres of Central Punjab, especially
that of Lahore. From Pir Syedaan, a famous village near Narowal where a
Sherazi Sufi family founded a settlement in the sixteenth century, two
very influential personalities emerged, with their khankahs having the
same name of Pir Syed Jamat Ali Shah Ameer e Millat and Pir Syed
Jamat Ali Shah Lasani. Both took their ba’ait (allegiance) from a
Naqshbandi Sufi of a remote area of KPK and enhanced orthodox
religious revivalism. Both were influenced by the Naqshbandi order;
however, they took different paths to develop their Sufistic inclinations.
Pir Syed Jamat Ali Shah Lasani followed traditional Sufistic ways and
spent most of his time in rural areas. He seldom performed the role of a
pedagogue and rarely participated in the colonial urban sphere.107 He
also showed less inclination for participating in the formation of a new
exclusive religious identity and remained quite open to other religious
approaches. Pir Syed Jamat Ali Shah (Ameer e Millat), on the other
hand, opted for urban centres and fully participated in the colonial
public sphere. He not only founded new madrasas (religious schools) and
religious associations,108 he also developed new mosques. He was quite
exclusivist in his approach and liked to see Muslim identity in its purity.
In the early twentieth century another Naqshbandi khankah
developed in the suburban area of Lahore and soon turned into a
famous shrine, after the demise of the Master Sufi saint. Mian Sher
Muhammad Sharakpuri (d. 1928) founded his khankah in Sharaqpur and
soon attracted a large following. Besides his spiritual karamat, he became
famous for his emphasis on Shariat and for following the Prophet’s way
of life. His stress on the love of the Prophet was exceptional and he
seemed to be happy acting as the mediator between the Prophet and His
followers. He was a cousin of Sir Muhammad Shafi, the president of the
Punjab Muslim League. He also gained popularity when Allama Iqbal
went to meet him. Although he respected Iqbal for his poetry and
scholarship, that did not stop him from criticising him for not following
Shariati ways and ‘point[ing] out that his (Iqbal’s) not having a beard is
not a right thing for a true Muslim’.109 Mian Sher Muhammad was quite
vocal in his stance that Shariat was an essential element for creating
Muslim identity. He was adamant that if one is Muslim then one needs
to look so in full attire.110 He often compared Muslims with other
religious communities, such as Sikhs, whom he praised for not
abandoning their practice of having long hair and beards. However, at
the same time, he also wanted to convert them. ‘Once he was on a railway
station and he saw a very beautiful Sikh lad. The saint kept on looking at
him for long and later on said “ah, what a beautiful boy. It’s good if he
were a Muslim”.’111
Urban shrines and Shari revivalism

The urban centres were influenced by the Naqshbandi revivalist spirit,
yet a large number of shrines either carried forward the spirit of
emotional and traditional-mediational belonging or moved towards
urban Shari mediational practices. Tehqiqat e Chishti (TC) describes many
Sufistic cults like Naushahi, Rasul Shahi, Madari and Jalali, along with
Majzub and Faqir, as belonging to the shrine-based traditions. The
Naushahi Sufi cult, a Qadri sub-order, originated in the teachings of
Sheikh Haji Muhammad Nausha Ganj (d. 1692 AD ) in a small village
near the bank of Chinab in Gujranwala district. Spearheading the
emotional revivalism of that time,112 this sub-order prevailed through a
lot of small groups and shrines in nineteenth-century113 urban centres of
Punjab. The Naushahi Sufi cult was associated in its emotional overtones
with the Malamati or Qalandri disposition, very similar to the frenzied
activities displayed at Mela Chiragha (Festival of Lights) at Madhu Lal
Hussain’s shrine or Kadam Mela (Foot Festival) at Sakhi Sarwar’s abode
in Anarkali, Lahore. Even Subhan, writing in 1938, though terming
these sub-orders and shrines as be-Shari (without Shariat),114 showed
them as widely prevalent practices.
The practices at the shrine of Madhu Laal Hussain and that of many of
its affiliated shrines were quite prevalent in Lahore. There were
numerous faqirs, majzubs and even sajjada nashins attached with those
shrines and takias (a dwelling of a faqir) in Lahore, most of which
remained engaged in pluralistic religious practices. The sajjada nashin of
the shrine, even in the time of TC, drank and accepted liquor as nazrana
(offerings) and put a red turban on the urs days.115 Two great fairs of
Lahore, called Basant and Chiraghan, were held annually at that shrine.
Lahore was emptied of people during Mela Chiragha and Shalamar Bagh
and all the areas adjacent to the shrine of Lal Hussain were so crowded it
was difficult to walk on that day. The shrine of Lal Hussain kept its
pluralistic tradition alive due to the famous biographical narrative of the
love of Lal Hussain (the Muslim Saint) for Madhu Lal (the Hindu boy)
and the supporting political conditions. Even for Latif, the shrine of
Madhu Lal stands as one of the most important shrines of Lahore despite
being connected closely with Sikh rulers:
The people still retain a recollection of the festivities and gaities

that took place at this spot during the time of Ranjit Singh in
honor of the Basant, which simply means spring, when the
luxurious Maharaja, all his chiefs and troops and everybody else
was dressed in yellow attire. The Maharaja when paying his respect
to the shrine made an offer of Rs 1100 and a pair of shawls of
yellow color.116
Irrespective of their religion people would participate in the mela

(festivity) and celebrate with liquor and other drugs. Chishti observed in
the late nineteenth century that the Muslim elite avoided visiting Lal
Hussain’s shrine at urs or on mela days.117 While, Subhan, writing in
1938, bracketed this shrine under be-Shari shrines.
As pluralistic practices continued at some shrines, at some others the
environment gradually became favourable for singular Islamised voices.
More than anywhere else, it was the shrine of Makhdoom Ali Hajvery,
popularly known as Data Darbar of Lahore, that started attracting a large
number of increasingly urbanised Muslim elites, along with the
revivalist Sufis, during the last decades of the nineteenth century.
Although it did not own as large an area of land as the shrine of Baba
Farid at Pakpattan and did not relate to a Sufi order, the shrine was still
able to attract a large number of followers from all Sufi orders in the
nineteenth century. Many significant Sufis, especially the revivalist
Naqshbandi Sufis, had already made it the centre for seeking spiritual
blessings.118 The oral account of the shrine’s attachment with the first
Chishti Sufi saint, Muin ud Din Ajmeri, and the continuous practice of
Gyarwi Shareef, for at least the previous 200 years, made the shrine
popular among the followers of the Chishti and Qadri orders.119 The
historical perception of the Sufi saint, as the first Sufi who propagated
Islam in this area, further strengthened his appeal. Religious gifts, such
as a handwritten Qur’an presented by the previous rulers, added to its
spiritual attraction for the new urban elites in general, and revivalist
Sufis in particular.120
Until 1930, the mujawars of the shrine declared that in matters of
alienation of ancestral property it followed Mohammedan or Personal
Law121 instead of customary traditions.122 The mujawar of the shrine,
however, belonged to the Rajput agricultural tribe and had elaborate
customs of distributing income earned from the shrine among multiple
inheritors. They preferred to be considered within the Islamic ambiance
by owning Sheikh as their family name.123 Earlier in the mid-nineteenth
century, Maulvi Noor Ahmed Chishti considered the mujawar of the
shrine among the religious elites of the city.124
In the wake of Nicholson’s translations and Fauq’s biographical
description of the Sufi and his shrine, the shrine of Data Darbar attracted
international focus. Two British brothers embraced Islam after reading
Nicholson’s translation of Kashf al Mahjoob in 1936. Both came to India
and became attached to the Sufis’ teachings, to the point that they never
returned to their homeland. One of them died quite young, after staying
eight years, and was buried at the shrine of Data Darbar of Makhdoom
Ali Hajvery. The other brother, with the Muslim name of Shaheed Ullah,
died in 1978. He also published a translation of Kashf al Mahjoob.
Shaheed Ullah writes in the preface that only a few had read Kashf al
Mahjoob and the real reason for the popularity of the shrine was its
spiritual power. He contends that the appealing factor for the religious
elites, however, is the Islamic or Shariati character of the teachings of the
Sufi. Shaheed Ullah contested Nicholson’s translation and refused to
accept that the teachings of Makhdoom Ali Hajvery in any sense
conflicted with the Shariati position. Shaheed Ullah maintained that
Nicholson understood Hajvery’s position as ruling out the need of
outward prayers once the real meanings of each prayer are revealed. For
Shaheed Ullah, Nicholson could not see that the Sufi only emphasised
the need to understand the real meaning before offering the outward
prayers.125
Amid the many stories of receiving respect from almost every Muslim
or Sikh ruler, the shrine, however, remained in a poor position, even as
late as the second decade of the twentieth century, when Fauq was
writing a tazkara of the saint and the shrine. He regretted that, despite
its being the most sacred shrine, the shrine keepers had not had the
proper response from the public. He requested that people pay more
attention to the shrine and give more money to rebuild it.126 However,
it was another ten years before anything concrete took place. A local
Muslim building contractor and devotee of the shrine provided funds for
reconstructing the already existing small mosque. This mosque at the
shrine was built in the early part of the nineteenth century, along with
the renovations at the tomb.127 The new mosque was built again in
1924128 and at the same place. It was a Hindu judge who made efforts to
provide electricity to the shrine. The construction of the new mosque,
however, helped to attract a large number of Muslim elites to pay a visit
and offer nazranai (monetary rewards) to the saint’s shrine.
Conclusion
Largely because of the colonial administrative policies social and cultural
changes created deep fissures in the spiritual life world intricately
embedded around shrine-based practices of Punjab. Although the

colonial policy of co-opting elite sajjada nashins continued in rural areas,
urban shrines received very little direct attention. However, colonial
policies spread out projective rationality and made locals grow within
their defined developmental framework. Religious-communal rational
voices, emerging out of urban areas, moved away from their customary
origins. They created a universal idealistic understanding, with little
space for pluralistic shrine-based religious life forms. Pluralistic
shrine-based practices found themselves caught within increasingly
defined religious boundaries, owned and appropriated by modern
Muslim articulations. The change in socio-linguistic mapping, and
the re-imagining of the past through standard historical writings,
provided a new space for the prevalence of modern movements,
standing upon the lack of awareness of their own customary rootedness.
These changes began to put emphasis on origin instead of customs, and
Sufi saints instead of shrines. The change was oblivious to overlapping
pluralistic spaces and not only increased the tension among communal
religious identities but also threw customary pluralistic shrine-based
practices into disrepute.
The spirit of development and the prevalence of colonial modern
rationality also started transforming shrine-based practices and life.
In order to pursue Muslim identity most of the sajjada nashins had to
follow the universal imagination. In that way, they found themselves
aligned with the already prevailing spirit of Brelwism that developed
as contesting articulations for the conservative religious tradition of
Ahl e Sunnat. Although inverted – that is, largely non-political – these
contesting articulations helped to define the Muslim communal identity
against other religious communal groups. However, even within the
changed environment, most shrines continued to develop in different
ways. The shrines of the saints that inclined towards Shari-Sufism
received more development than those embedded within pluralistic
shrine-based practices. For example, the shrine of Data Darbar in Lahore,
while continuing to attract non-Muslim devotees, started to gain a
central position, among many other reasons because of its Sufi saint’s
disposition towards Shari-Islam.
CHAPTER 2
DOUBLE-
RETERRITORIALISATION:
DRIFTING TOWARDS THE
NATIONALISATION OF SHRINES
This chapter explores the religio-political streams that made possible

the promulgation of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance of
1959 and enabled the nationalisation of the shrines. By examining the
activities and engagement of the post-colonial state with religious
activities, it suggests that the State of Pakistan supported and
institutionalised a unique conception of Islam, not only in the political
but also in the cultural sphere. Largely, the state appropriated the unique
themes of Islamic principles, such as the primacy of the Prophet
Muhammad and abhorrence of shrine-based practices, emerging out of a
consensual understanding of the various religious/communal groups.
The consensual basis was built on a unique sense of identification,
a process that had its roots in colonial communal politics.
The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first, the development
of religio-politics within the later colonial period is traced by discussing
the development of the conception of shrines and mystical practices,
embedded within the formulation of Muslim religio-politics since the
1920s in the Punjab. The formulation engendered a unique Muslim
identity, a kind of reterritorialised Muslim identity, unlinked from non-
Muslim communities, pluralistic shrine-based positions and the land
itself. The proponents of this identity included personalities such as
DOUBLE-RETERRITORIALISATION 39
Allama Iqbal, Zafar Ali Khan; religious-political groups such as

Ahrar and the Deoband religious-political party; and puritan Sufi pirs –
a loose group of reformist/revivalist Sufis and sajjada nashins of Ahl
e Sunnat. These proponents located the territoriality of this Muslim
identity through the mosque and through a concept of the finality of
prophethood. By contrasting a sole voice in the assembly of colonial
Punjab for pluralistic shrine-based practices against the Muslim
members of the Unionist party, this section argues that the Singular
Muslim identity was trans-political and not confined to the Muslim
League. The section concludes that this reterritorialised identity
provided a non-territorial ground for Jinnah’s Muslim League politics
for a separate homeland in India.
The second section argues that the newly established State of
Pakistan, while appropriating soil-based territory, was determined to
build its soil-less identity on a universal Muslim ummah (nation), as
popularised by the All India Muslim League during the politics of the
1940s. The contradiction between having a soil and non-soil based
ideological identity necessitated a process of re-identification, or in other
words, it initiated a process of double-reterritorialisation. This process
involved exclusion on multiple levels: at the political level, the process
excluded all religious ‘others’ as minorities; at a puritan religious level,
the process resulted in making Ahmadis non-Muslim; and on a spiritual
level, the process negated pluralistic mystical practices and devised
techniques to take over and control shrines. The religious morality of
new urban elites also supported the efforts of the state to extend its
control over shrines: modern religious scholars, while re-appropriating
the ideas of Allama Iqbal, remained disposed towards excluding
completely pluralistic mystic forms and supported the state to develop
by appropriating shrine-based practices.
Communal politics and emergence of reterritorialised

Muslim identity
The second decade of the twentieth century opened up the horizon for
nationalistic themes and an effort towards a harmonious political
coexistence.1 At the same time, the conditions for constant communal
strife were also created, especially in colonial Punjab. This communal
discord soon closed down the possibility of nationally harmonious
themes and consolidated communal voices. The otherwise differentiated

positions of orthodox Sunni streams2 found their integrating moment
in simmering communal conflicts. The efforts of revivalist Hindu
movements such as Shuddhi and Sangathan led Muslim maulvis to react
strongly, mostly on symbolic differences, such as the mode of tabligh
(preaching) and tanzeem (organisation). Incidents like the ‘trumped-up’
conversion of Muslim Malkana Rajput increased the anxieties and fears
of many Muslim maulvis in Punjab.3 The communal conflicts generated
an interplay of ‘obscene and abusive language . . . to denigrate the social
customs and religious beliefs’4 of other communities. The claims began
to emerge in abundance, to convert each other into one’s own religious
fold. Along with the puritan Sufistic figure of Jamat Ali Shah, who
vowed to convert ‘thirty-two crore Hindus to Islam’, even the soft
Sufistic figure of Khwaja Hasan Nizami, from Delhi, invited Gandhi to
embrace Islam.5 Against the backdrop of the increased religio-political
tension, the voices of Shah and Nizami represented the pressure felt
among Muslims of different persuasions.
To promote and contest communal issues, modern forms of
publication, association and advertisement came into play.6 Ahl e
Sunnat Associations emerged, such as Anjuman Hizb ul Ahnaf-e-
Hind, which was established in the 1910s in Lahore. The association
actively participated in communal conflicts and tried to advance
symbolic issues as forcefully as possible. The organisation, however,
started in a humble way; it was linked with a large unorganised, semi-
urban, shrine-based following. Maulvi Deedar Ali, the Khateeb and
Imam of Masjid Wazir Khan was the first president of Anjuman Hizb
ul Ahnaf e Hind. Jamat Ali Shah assisted in rebuilding a mosque and a
madrasa in Lohari Gate, Lahore, to where the association shifted
and centred its activities. The organisation, while becoming a central
point in Punjab for orthodox Sunni voices, took an active part in
various communal conflicts during the 1920s in Lahore, such as
Khatam e Nabuwwat – the incident of a Hindu girl being teased
(1923) – or the issue of Ghazi Ilm ud Din Shaheed, in which a young
man killed a publisher who published a book against the Prophet
Muhammad, and the Child Marriage Restraint Act (the Sarda Act)
(1929), passed by the British government increasing the age at which
women could get married. Newspapers such as Inqilab and Zamindar
and Deoband organisations such as Jamiat Ulema I-Hind showed their
anger towards the act, by calling it ‘a flagrant interference within the

Muhammadan Religion’.7
The interesting thing about the workings of the Anjuman and
scholarly Sunni orthodoxy was that most of their leaders, though
justifying shrine traditions, tried to move away from customary
pluralistic shrine-based practices. Embedded in traditionalist religious
scholarship, most of them were never hesitant to label other groups such
as Naturi (the followers of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan), Deobandi, Ahl e
Hadeeth, Qadiani, Wahhabi, Shia, etc., kafir (infidel). In the early 1920s,
a few Sunni ulema, such as Maulvi Deedar Ali, Imam of Masjid Wazir
Khan, termed even Allama Iqbal and Zafar Ali Khan kafir on different
grounds; the former for his anti-Sufistic positions and the latter for his
engagement with the Khilafat movement.
However, Sunni orthodoxy aligned itself with communal issues in
order clearly to distinguish the Muslim identity from other religious
groups.8 Contemporarily with the Gurdwara Reform movement and the
Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925, the Sunni or Ahl e Sunnat position turned
towards a kind of reterritorialisation process for re-establishing the
contours of Muslim identity. Instead of owning shrines as Sikhs did for
their identity, the position linked itself largely with the mosque. Along
with mosques, the Sunni ulema also focused on a particular way of
offering prayer, beards, food, dress and other customs derived from
sunnah (tradition of Muslim Prophet) as an integral part of the Muslim
identity.9 They stressed the establishment of mosques and madrasa,
engaged in organised activities around the concept of shariat-based
Tasawwuf, emphasised preaching through visiting different places,
focused on converting other religious communities and were disposed
towards clearing Muslim sacred sites of the remnants of a pluralistic
ethos, which they interpreted as un-Islamic practices.
The focus of Sunni orthodoxy, or Ahl e Sunnat, was also on
emphasising the distinct and clear difference between Muslims and other
religious communities. Once, in Faisalabad in the 1920s, Jamat Ali Shah
resisted those who insisted on mentioning the name of Guru Har
Gobind, a Sikh guru, along with Allah, on the wall of the local mosque.
He ensured forcefully that it would not take place, and only the name of
Muhammad would appear along with Allah on the face of the mosque.10
He ensured that the purity of Muslim identity would not be polluted by
pluralistic overlapping religious streams. Along with Jamat Ali Shah,
other Sufistic figures such as the Bugwis, a family of Sunni scholars from
the city of Bhera, Punjab, who became famous in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, and Mian Sher Muhammad Sharakpuri (d. 1926),
advanced a similar concept of Muslim and Islamic identity. The concept
of an Islamic identity became more popular when the disciples arriving
from Brelwi schools secured the position of an imam in the mosques
attached with shrines, opening up or being attached to the madaris
(religious schools) and religious practices in Central Punjab.11
Ahrar, Iqbal and anti-Ahmadiyya politics: consolidating

Muslim identity through exclusion
With the rise of communal conflict in Punjab, the old nationalists in the
cadre of Khilafists, formed their own political group, Ahrar, after
throwing the Nehru Report into the River Ravi. With the emergence of
Ahrar some very interesting changes took place, including the awareness
of the force of religious ideas for public mobilisation, the usage of
common idioms, sometimes quite vulgar ones, during political speeches
and clarity of Muslim identity when considering ‘Ahmedis’, a politically
non-Muslim entity. The politics of Ahrar took the Deobandi theological
debates onto the streets and encountered theological opponents
politically. From theologically-linked socialistic stress and emphasis
on the rights of small peasants and depressed classes, to anti-British
efforts, standing up for the rights of the Muslims of Kashmir and at the
same time vocal against traditional customs and the shrine-based
practices, Ahrar remained active and antagonistic on all sides. Ahrar’s
politics jolted the land-based elites in Punjab, at least for some years, and
its politics also resulted in the development of a platform for the later
Muslim League politics, after the promulgation of the 1935 constitution
and the communal franchising.
The politics of Ahrar revolved around two main positions: being anti-
British and being anti-Qadiani or anti-mystical. To liberate oppressed
Muslims, they developed a strategy to capture the Kashmir cause and
negate the most deviant of mystical expressions of Mirza Ghulam
Ahmed Qadiani (1835– 1908) and his sect, Ahmadism or Qadianism.
Incidentally, the Kashmir Committee that was formed earlier in 1930 in
Lahore was headed by Ahmadi leader, Mirza Bashir ud Din Mahmud
(1889– 1965). Along with many other prominent local Muslim leaders,
the famous poet, politician and religious scholar of Lahore Allama Iqbal
(1877– 1938) was also part of the committee.12 Ahrar negotiated with
Iqbal and waged a ‘war’ against Ahmadis, along with developing a fully-
fledged political campaign against the Kashmir government.13 Iqbal
promised to rethink his position. After a few months, he resigned from
the presidency of the Kashmir Committee and started distancing himself
from the Ahmadi or Qadiani positions. He published essays and articles
declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims after 1934, almost at the same
time as Unionists were supporting Sir Zafar Ullah Khan14 for the
Muslim seat of the Central Legislative Assembly against Allama Iqbal.
Initially challenging the Qadiani presence within Kashmir’s politics,
Ahrar considered the penetration of Qadianis as not only dangerous but
also ominous.15 Ahrar kept their religio-political voice against Ahmadis
strong and took the conflict to such a high pitch that national politics
also became engaged within this conflict.
At the height of the Qadiani controversy in 1934 Jawaharlal Nehru,
the leader of the Indian National Congress, wrote three articles from the
perspective of a liberal Indian, in support of Qadianis and criticising
Muslims for their exclusionist orthodox position. Iqbal counter-argued
that, even, from the Western Muslim scholarly position, Qadianis were
not part of a larger Muslim community.16 Iqbal founded his counter-
argument on historical and political grounds and declared that a sect
arising from the bosom of Islam, which claims a new prophethood

for its basis, and declares all Muslims who did not recognise the
truth of its alleged revelation as Kafirs, must therefore be regarded
by every Muslim as a serious danger to the solidarity of Islam.17
Although he was equating ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’, for Iqbal, the danger
that views such as Qadianism posed to the political existence of Muslim
society within British India, where politics were based on religio-
communal lines, was a grave threat to the collective political power of
Muslims in India. Almost aligning his views with Ahrar’s standpoint,
saving mullah-ridden and Orthodox Muslims from the liberal criticism
of both Orientalists and non-Muslim politicians like Jawaharlal Nehru
and becoming a precursor of the later politics, Iqbal seems to be opening
up the possibilities of a new form of political development around the
identity of the ‘Unitary Muslim’ and ‘Singular Islam’.
Elsewhere, in a postscript to his essay ‘Qadianis and Orthodox

Muslims’, Iqbal clarified his position further by applying his argument
to the complete exclusion of Qadianis from the larger Muslim polity in
India. He even suggested that the colonial Indian government use force
to suppress Qadianis. To him, the policy of non-interference was a bad
one, and as long as the British-Indian government carried on using this
policy, every religious community would have the right to resort to
safeguarding their interests, using suitable means.18 In his enthusiasm,
Iqbal appreciated the Orthodox Hindus’ demand for protection against
religious reformers in the new constitution.19 He further maintained
that the demand ought to have been first made by Muslims, who, unlike
Hindus, had entirely eliminated the idea of race from their social
structure.20 Iqbal advised the British government to declare Qadianis a
separate community within British India.21
Allama Iqbal’s articulation of the Singular Muslim

identity and Sufism
Before distancing himself from Qadianis, Allama Iqbal had already
developed a concept of a unique identity for Indian Muslims.22 His
conception was a sort of deterritorialisation: an unlinking from customs
and soil identity and providing an idealist unity for the Muslims of
India. His conception of Muslim identity was ideal as well as simple.23
He not only ignored the relationship with the soil but also ignored
internal religious differences. As Iqbal unlinked Muslim identity from
territory, he criticised those cultural and religious streams locating
identity in the customary manners and habits. His effort was to
deterritorialise in a way that, without introducing a lot of changes in the
traditional Muslim religious articulations, one could find a singular
moment to reterritorialise.24 For him, the singular moment was the
personality of the Prophet Muhammad with which every Muslim had to
link themselves. His intention, though, was to find an identity that
would transcend colonial-sovereignty and that at the same time could
open up dream imageries for possible territorialising through trans-
geographical boundaries.
Iqbal’s criticism of Ahmadis not only highlights his political
understanding but also his Sufistic approach. Earlier in his works, he
followed a Sufistic line, such as studying the works of Maulana Rumi
(d. 1273) and Naqshbandi saint Mujaddad Alif Saani (d. 1624) in order
to develop his thought.25 However, in his later writings, especially after
the 1930s, Iqbal became critical of a certain form of tasawwuf, that may
be termed as wahdat ul wajud (unity of being), along with a prevailing
form of shrine-based culture and sajjada nashins attached to such
places.26 In his poem ‘Punjab kai Pirzado Sai’ (To the Sons of the Pirs of
Punjab), Iqbal emphasised that sajjada nashins in Punjab were not Sufi
faqir because of their close relationships with the colonial state. This
relationship made sajjada nashins compromise the responsibility of
mystical pursuits in favour of worldly powers. Similarly, in another
poem, ‘Punjabi Musalman’ (A Muslim from Punjab), he presented a
Punjabi Muslim with the natural orientation of becoming the murid of
a pir, but is not aware of his concrete situation.27 Through his spiritual
meeting with Mujaddad Alif Sani, Iqbal idealised a Sufi figure as the
one who has the ‘passion for Rightfulness (Kalmai Haq)’. As Iqbal was
unable to find it within the sajjada nashins of Punjab, the spiritual
voice of Mujaddad Alif Sani condemned the death of the Sufistic spirit
in the land of Punjab. Iqbal’s position shows his dislike of the sajjada
nashins of Punjab but also his admiration for the spirit of Mujaddad
Alif Sani who, as he says in his poem, did not surrender before Jahangir,
the Mughal king.
Iqbal’s critique of shrine-based practices, however, was selective.
He disapproved of what was taking place in Punjab28 but he eulogised
medieval Sufis (such as Nizam Ud Din Aulya, Khwaja Muin Ud Din of
Ajmer Sharif and Syed Ali Hajvery Data Ganj Bakhsh) and regularly
visited their shrines.29 In addition to such visits, he also composed
verses in praise of these Sufi saints and shrines.30 Some of Iqbal’s
biographers suggest that he remained in search of a Pir e Kamil
(the perfect pir). Even in his criticism of Qadianis, he seems to be
perplexed by the question of the ‘spiritual elevation’ of the movement’s
founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Qadian. Iqbal thinks the founder’s
psychological level during his spiritual experience was good enough,
but the possibility of having such an experience was not questioned.
As long as the experience did not violate the supreme principle of the
finality of the prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH), such spiritual
elevation remains the most significant aspect of the Sufistic world.
He provided the spiritual teaching of Mujaddad Alif Saani as a model
for the same account.31
The prevalence of reterritoriality

The religio-politics around a Singular Muslim identity prevailed further
and started shaping the perception of Muslim elites during the 1930s
and 1940s. The debates of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, after the
elections of 1937, especially the discussion on the Music in Muslim
Shrines Act, 1942, reflect the changing attitude of Muslim elites
regarding Islam and shrines. The members of the legislative assembly
viewed the local site of the shrine in the image of a mosque. The mosque
seems to have become the standard image for the territoriality of the
religion of Islam. The discussion makes it clear that all those religious
sites that customarily allowed pluralistic practices should be
transformed into Islamic sites. It seems that the concept of territoriality
that had already been attached to the mosque pushed all other religious
sites to approach the greater morality of the site of an Islamic mosque
more closely. A discussion on placing a restriction on the singing and
dancing of females at the site of the shrine took place, and began to focus
around a sole voice supporting the pluralistic practices at the site of
shrines. The sole voice, however, soon found itself in unfavourable
conditions and opted for silence.
The Music in Muslim Shrines Act, 1942, which, among other things,
prohibited the singing and dancing of women and girls in shrines, was
moved to introduce social reform within society in general32 and Muslim
society in particular.33 However, for this purpose, the act chose the site of
the shrine, where it was found that the ‘immoral practices’ of dancing and
the singing of female singers often took place.34 Although the act was not
intended to take control of the site of the shrine, the effort can be seen as
linked with similar earlier attempts in 1924 and 1937 of the Unionist
government.35 However, that effort seems to have been more to remove
the pressure on government to curb archaic and ‘non-religious’ practices in
Muslim society in order to realign the policies of the Punjab government
with the already introduced Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application
Act (1937). The Muslim Personal Law (1937) had already created pressure
on the Punjab government to reform family, inheritance, customs and
marriage affairs, along with waqf, according to the rules of the Muslim
community.36 The pressure found its release through the introduction of
bills such as the Muslim Musawat Bill, 1939, the Anti-Dowry Bill, 1942
and the Music in Muslim Shrines Act, 1942, promulgated to prevent
female singing and dancing at shrine sites, while avoiding promulgating

Muslim personal law (1937).37
The members from the ruling benches38 saw this bill largely as an
implementation of Shariat and Islamic principles in order to purify
religious practices. Their emphasis remained on its being the right of the
state to act as a purifier, to correct degraded and immoral practices.
Singing and dancing were considered to be immoral acts that should not
have been allowed to take place at the shrines of Sufi saints who remained
active during their lifetime to preach Islam. Interestingly, the mela and
festivities at urs were denied their cultural and traditional existence.
Instead, the activities, such as the mela and urs of the Sufi saint, were seen
as immoral remnants of old puritan practices. As Raja Ghazanfar Ali
Khan maintained, at
the various shrines of Muslim saints, for instance, Dargah Data

Ganj Bakhsh, Dargah Ajmer Sharif and Dargah Kaliar Sharif
where on the occasion of urs sermons were preached openly and
religious speeches were made in public gathering with a view to
improving the morals of the people. But later on the celebration of
these anniversaries went on demoralising gradually and now they
have degenerated into ‘melas’ which are lacking all those good
things of good olden days.39
Amidst the Punjab government’s desire to introduce social reforms on

Muslim religious sites and of the revivalist consciousness of the ruling
benches to introduce Shariat, there was the lone voice of a member, Pir
Akbar Ali, from Fazilka, who opposed the bill on quite the opposite
grounds. Pir Akbar Ali considered it to be an interference in religious
matters. Though he could not differentiate between the puritan religious
stream and those who took cultural practices as significant, yet he
insisted that one stream of ideas dominating another might generate
strange results. He questioned what would happen if another
government came to power and placed a restriction on Azan. He held
that mutwallis controlled the shrines and should handle this matter
too (interestingly, at least until that time there is no evidence of any
objection to mutwallis as the legitimate caretakers of the shrines). ‘It is
up to the mutwalli of that shrine to permit or prohibit her from doing so,
but you want to take upon yourself the duties of a mutwalli and want to
prohibit such singing.’40 For Pir Akbar Ali, this bill ‘attempt[ed] to
apply a corrective to the morals of the people by compulsion which in
itself is an effort of very doubtful value’.41
To the surprise of many ruling members, Pir Akbar Ali quoted a
Hadith: ‘He who does not recite the Qur’an with ghana (in melodious
voice) is not from among us’, in order to put forward his case, which
asked: ‘if a female singer were to recite the Holy Quran with ghana
would you permit her to do so?’42 He also stated that ‘even a prostitute
can have an idea of salvation and may go to the places where she finds her
peace’.43 For many members, it was unimaginable to perceive that even a
prostitute could have a religious idea of salvation and could go to the
shrine to find her peace. Putting forward the question of ghana, coupled
with permission for the prostitute to go to the shrine, invited strong
opposition. For many members, it was as immoral to think that way as to
permit female singers to sing at shrines. However, when one member
claimed that Pir Akbar Ali was saying that ‘to sing hymns of Holy
Qur’an, God forbid me is zina (adultery)’, and even after repeating that
Pir Akbar Ali was saying ghana not zina (adultery), the member could
not understand the meaning of ghana, as he again understood this word
as ‘gunah (sin)’. For Pir Akbar Ali it was enough to stop putting his
argument forward, as he comprehended the religious understanding of
the members who were so ready to give fatwas against immoral practices
and to implement Shariat at the site of shrines. However, they did not
understand the meaning of an Arabic word. The bill prohibiting female
singers from singing and dancing at the site of the shrine, however, was
established in 1942 and it paved the way for the implementation of the
high-morality reformation agenda of the colonial urban elite embedded
in the Singular Muslim identity.
Prevalence of Singular Muslim politics and

Jinnah’s Muslim League
As Unionists worked to make laws in order to gain moral control of
sacred sites, another political force, the Muslim League, started gaining
popularity after 1940 with the intention of achieving direct control of
‘what is precious in Islam’.44 It was Muhammad Ali Jinnah who gave a
new life to the Muslim League and made it a considerable force, despite
not winning convincingly in the elections of 1937. After failing to make
a coalition with the Congress, he and his party issued a white paper
against Congress and maintained that Congress did not take decisions
favouring the Muslims of India. As World War II began, his party took
another step that became a breakthrough in colonial politics, by
claiming a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. Jinnah presented
his case for two-nations-in-India in Lahore in 1940;45 it was the most
forceful articulation of the politics of a Singular Muslim and
reterritorialised identity.46
Jinnah positioned his arguments around the impossibility of living in
a united Indian federation where the Hindu majority could interfere in
the affairs of a permanent Muslim minority. His ideas reflected the
contours of a prevailing colonial Singular Muslim identity, and
dissenting voices such as that of Pir Akbar Ali’s seemed to be fading
away. Jinnah proclaimed himself to be a Muslim,47 and asked Gandhi
and Congress not to deny their Hindu identity.48 He presented a case for
a distinct Muslim nation, different from a Hindu nation not only
because of religion but also because of law and culture. He showed
resolve in not accepting a democratic programme as envisaged by the
Government of India Act of 1935. Internationalising the situation in
India, Jinnah looked for the political division of something like ‘Muslim
India’ and ‘Hindu India’ within the regional unity of India.
Jinnah based his arguments on the antagonism – which, he
suggested, could even turn into a civil war – between Muslim and
Hindu communities for the ownership of the various cultural and sacred
sites. Jinnah mentioned the incident of Mosque Manzilgah as evidence
for the possible civil war while citing the example of Gandhi who had in
this incident even supported the violent means for the minority Hindu
community.49 Jinnah’s idea of making Muslim India was a possible
mediation between the already-contesting Muslim and Hindu
communities and, in the absence of any central or provincial authority
for deciding waqf or communal sacred endowments, a solution for
attaining mutual peace.
Jinnah’s Muslim League was able to attract various Muslim leaders
and associations already engaged in the communal contestations of
sacred sites, which merged with the League after 1940.50 One of them
was Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, a graduate from Aligarh University,
a working journalist and owner of the newspaper Zamindar, from
Lahore. He was elected to the Central Legislative Assembly and his
newly-formed party, Majlis-i-Ittihad-Millat,51 won two seats in

Lahore, Punjab in 1937. For most of his early life, Maulana Zafar Ali
Khan was a zealous nationalist Congressite, working for the freedom of
larger India. However, at the same time, he was the leading ideologue
for the Muslim community, using print media as his tool. His
newspaper Zamindar gained popularity among the emerging urban
Muslim middle class who could read Urdu, and became an important
source for increasing nationalist political consciousness, at least until
1930.
His political change came along with the Ahrars’ entrance into
Punjab politics and he was not shy in promoting religious issues in his
politics. However, instead of maintaining a dislike for Ahmadis and
orthodox Sufi shrines, he settled for communal contestation of cultural
sites by shaking hands with Jamat Ali Shah, the reformist and puritan
Sufi.52 It was the crisis of Masjid Shahid Ganj in Lahore that gave his
politics a decisive turn, when the Muslim and Sikh communities
contested the ownership of a local sacred site in Lahore. As the Ahrar
did not press the issue, for fear of losing Sikh voters,53 there was an
opportunity to form a political-religious group, Majlis-i-Ittihad-Millat,
in order to mobilise Muslims to push to take back the mosque from the
Sikh community. The crisis did not end successfully for the Majlis-i-
Ittihad-Millat, as the courts decided in favour of the Sikh community.
However, Khan gained considerable popularity in the process, availing
him of three seats in the legislative assembly.
When Maulana Zafar Ali Khan decided to merge his party with the
Muslim League in 1940 his politics had already become indistinguish-
able from that of the Muslim League. His Majlis-i-Ittihad-Millat already
promoted the cause of Singular Indian Islam, in readiness to contest
other religious groups for hegemony on cultural sites. With other Sufi-
Sunni orthodoxy he had already successfully supported the Muslim
community of Sukkur in taking back the Mazilgah mosque in 1937–9,
against the efforts of the Hindu community, in order to ‘fulfil religious
obligation and duty’.54 The crisis not only became an opportunity for
the Muslim League to overthrow Allah Bakhsh Soomro’s government in
Sindh, it also became a convincing point for Muhammad Ali Jinnah on
which to internationalise the Hindu–Muslim crises and move away
from any constitutional effort resulting in the permanent majority of a
communal group in 1940.55
Gilmartin shows that, at least in Punjab, such clashes and

contestations had already made the Unionist government seriously
consider setting up the Waqf Board in order to have an institution for
managing such conflicts. Rather, the efforts to establish the Muslim
Auqaf Bill, resembling the Sikh Gurdwara Act began in 1924. Another
serious effort was made in the aftermath of the Shaheed Ganj incident.
The Sikh Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee56 played a very active role
in the crisis and promoted the Sikh cause. The Unionist government
therefore wanted to introduce Muslim Auqaf in order to reduce
conflicts emerging among different religious communities. The bill
was developed by an MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly), who
was a disciple of a famous Sufi saint and scholar, Jamat Ali Shah of
Alipur Sayyedan, Sialkot. However, it attracted severe criticism from
within the Unionist party, especially from the pir members of Southern
Punjab, who considered it more of an effort to control their activities
than to make peace with other communal groups.
Along with the Majlis-i-Ittihad-Millat party, the Muslim League
found the support of the reformist/revivalist pirs, sajjada nashins and
Ahl e Sunnat, who were engaged in similar contestations and promoted
reterritorialised identity. The association Jamat Ahl e Sunnat’s57
religious ideal of a distinct Muslim identity was closer to the political
ideal of Jinnah’s Muslim League. The workers of the organisation, such as
Abdu Sattar Niazi, who was president of the Muslim Student Federation
and, after 1947, became a prominent figure of JUP (Jamiat Ulema e
Pakistan, a political organisation of the Brelwi school of thought),58
worked hard in the hope of building a new state based on the concept of
Singular Islam. These efforts found it very convenient to use Allama
Iqbal’s poetry of religious revivalism in rural areas, aligning it with the
tradition of those reformist Sufi personalities who struggled to make
Islam prevail in the region, in order to stir up hope for its dominance.59
As the struggle over the elections intensified, some other influential
pirs and sajjada nashins who had previously been supporting the politics
and policies of the Unionist Party, and providing support to the ruling
system devised by the British authorities, also started shifting to the
cause of the Muslim League.60 A large number of Sufi pirs began to
favour the struggle for Pakistan, thus taking the cause of a Muslim
independent state to their villages.61 In 1946, the League itself made an
organisation of mahsaikh and ulema as the Mashaikh Committee, in
which reformist figures such as Jamat Ali Shah and the Pir of Manki
Sharif were prominent. However, interestingly, some famous politicians
like Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot, Sirdar Shaukat Hayat

Khan, Malik Feroz Khan Noon and Nawab Muhammad Hayat
Qureshi, who were not much known for their religiosity till then,
were also included in this Committee with assigned religious
designations.62
The appointment of politicians within the Mashaikh Committee

combined ‘important political leaders of the province with religious
leaders of recognised status and [held] them out as spokesmen of religion
so that if occasion arose they could sway the masses more easily’.63
The policy of the Muslim League – to have a close relationship with
the pirs and the sajjada nashins – was a continuation of the Unionist
Party’s strategy. But the Muslim League completely appropriated the
religious space of reformist popular devotion, a step ahead of the
Unionists, who only developed a working relationship with those pirs
and mashaikhs who were embedded in customary traditions.64 Gilmartin
shows the anxiety of many Unionist candidates during the 1945–6
elections about the political preaching of reformist Sufis, such as
M. Hussain Shah, the son of Jamat Ali Shah, who assured the rural
community that voting for any non-Muslim League candidate would
lead to infidelity (kufr).65 In the same vein, Jamat Ali Shah termed
Jinnah as wali (friend of God), thus aligning him with the long tradition
of Sufi saints, and saved him from the destructive criticism of religious
leaders from Ahrar and Jamiat Ulema I Hind.66 It seems that the ability
of the Muslim League to reframe urban religious ideology within the
Sufistic Muslim identity consolidated the position of the Muslim League
and provided the very political weight needed to win the separatist
centripetal politics.
The Muslim League won Muslim seats in the 1945 –6 elections67
with the support of colonial urban middle-class reformist Sufis, and by
aligning with a reterritorialised identity. It is significant that Jinnah
accepted the cabinet mission plan ‘for a three-tier federal constitutional
arrangement covering the whole of India’ after refusing the mission’s
offer of a ‘sovereign Pakistan carved out of the Muslim Majority
provinces in the north-west and the Muslim-majority districts of
partitioned Punjab and Bengal’.68 On the other hand, the mobilised

Muslim League supporters and second and third tier leaders had already
developed a distinct idea of a separate and sovereign state embedded in
Islamic ideology.69 However, it is clear that both sides held to their own
modes of identities: Jinnah did not want to leave the reterritorialised
identity and the lower tiers had developed another wish, that of a
separate Islamic state, a kind of double-reterritorialised identity. The
creation of Pakistan, as a partitioned and sovereign state completely
independent of the rest of India, emerged, catching Jinnah unprepared
for the popular mindset.70
The Muslim League stood for a modern religious ideology,
proclaiming that it would transform otherwise backward life by
opening up developmental possibilities, especially, and only, for Singular
Islam in India. This religious ideology promised the development of
Muslims of India by engendering rational-scriptural formations and
giving priority to all sort of articulations linked with the conception of a
Singular Muslim identity. Through this process the singular identity
turned into a kind of ultra flexible idea that could connect with any
articulation claiming to have a Muslim identity amongst other religious
identities. Therefore it was possible for Jinnah to hold together the
reformist Sufistic strands and Deoband scholars at the same time.
However, this flexible idea had a very clear bias against pluralistic spaces
and shrine-based practices devoid of modern rationality and part of rural
and non-Islamic life.71 The success of the creation of Pakistan, despite
the loss of millions of lives, provided new strength to the political and
moral position of the urban elite to celebrate their mode of rationality
through purifying the archaic sites and practices.
Double-reterritorialising: a renewed search for

identity on a new land
Soon after independence from British rule, a search to redefine identity
re-emerged in the colonial sector.72 Earlier, during British rule, the
mainstream of religious ideologies developed overlapping consensuses
and formed the space for reterritorialising a singular identity. This
reterritorialised space was acquired among multiple religious commu-
nities. Deterritorialising from the customary traditions and soil had
already provided a sense of detachment in the spaces built on overlapping
multi-religious memories. Unitary Muslimness, without the need to

belong to the land,73 however, became enigmatic in the post-colonial
world. Muslim political elites could not hide the inherent contradiction of
its ideology. On one hand, the elites found themselves in a situation where
they were the overwhelming political majority and the rulers and
inheritors of the colonial ruling structure. On the other hand, they were
part of a liberated religious community, bound to restructure its life
according to the acclaimed religious principles. An urge to resolve this
contradiction led to another process of identity forming – a kind of
double-reterritorialising and deterritorialising process that completely
unlinked belonging from the ‘others’.74
The process of redefining as double-reterritorialising took place at
multiple levels with the common theme of re-reterritorialising and
de-deterritorialising. The process of a double or re-reterritorialising
process initiated a kind of consistent engagement with Islamic
principles and opened up the possibility of implementing Shariat
during the process of relocating in the new geographical boundaries.75
The process provided grounds for multiple negotiated perspectives to
play on the common ground of locating Muslim identity while
refusing to be rooted in the soil. The process engendered a new kind of
politics of Islam.76 This politics remained grounded in the search for a
new identity in the post-colonial state, while retaining the identity
largely shaped from the 1920s onwards. However, this politics was not
such a smooth process and contrasted severely with inherited colonial
state structures. It opened up the process of ‘disputative negotiation’
among contrasting revivalist religious articulations, ‘sectional interests’
and ‘politico-religious worldviews’.77 These interplays of interests and
politico-discursive engagements not only kept the question of the role of
Islam alive but also maintained the deep-seated urge to search for
identity, in the form of double-reterritorialisation, intact in the post-
colonial state of Pakistan.
For the post-colonial state, the process of double-reterritorialisation
soon turned into a process of excluding ‘others’ completely from the idea
of a Singular Muslim identity. As the political elite refused to relate
to the soil of the acquired land and insisted on maintaining its
identification with ummah or universal common religious group, the
double-reterritorialising rested on deterritorialising the pluralistic traces
embedded within soil and customs.78 Within the circles of the political
elite, the effort of the re-identifying process concluded in the creation of

the Objectives Resolution in 1949. At another level, the process resulted
in establishing non-state and, a little later, state institutionalisation of
the Anti-Ahmadiyya Movement. However, more than any other level,
the process of double-reterritorialisation redefined the concept of shrines
and Sufism through excluding deviant mystic and spiritual practices and
identifying these sites with Shariat-centred Islamised practices.79
Objectives resolutions: the politics of double-reterritorialisation

The creation of Pakistan brought out the need to make the nascent state
Islamic, albeit in an unusual way. The ‘great leader’ (Quaid e Azam)
of the newly independent nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, remained
throughout his life more disposed towards liberal ways, and in his
speeches and acts seldom tried to present views suggesting theocracy for
developing the idea of Pakistan. However, especially after the 1940s, his
close connection with religious figures and his political articulations
about making Muslim identity distinct enough as a nation to claim a
separate homeland, made it hard for some to find his direction clear.80
A large number of intellectual and political elites of the nascent
state pushed forward a religious, if not theological, agenda for the
new state, as they also found it quite sensible when dealing with
the political situation of the nascent country. The ideological basis of
the Muslim League compelled it to include revivalist ulema, which
was already disposed towards law making instead of engaging in
theory,81 in the constituent assembly to form an Islamic constitution.82
The presentation of the Objectives Resolution, after the death of
Jinnah,83 ensured that any future constitution would have to deal with
the question of Islamic principles.
The Objectives Resolution triggered the political exclusion of non-
Muslims and also showed the near impossibility of forming a theological
state, because of the differences among the political elites regarding the
idea of Islam.84 However, it also made clear that neither would the State
of Pakistan avoid a certain form of Islam. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime
Minister of Pakistan and part of the modernist political elite, whilst
accepting the resolution, showed his unique sense of a forward-looking
Islamic society, free from sectarian dissension, along with a clear distaste
for theocracy.85 His idea of Islam in the affairs of the state was to
introduce spiritual and ethical elements into otherwise indifferent
political affairs, not only locally but also in an international context that
had been divided between capitalism and socialism.86 He refuted clearly
as mischievous propaganda the assertion that ulema made the position of
the head of the state available only to a Muslim.87
On the other hand, for Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, a Deoband scholar
and member of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan,88 the best
models of democracy lay in the early history of Sunni past. He accepted
the idea of democracy, but by qualifying that the best democracy was the
first Islamic State of Muslim Khalifa, because it took ‘a lead in all other
democracies of the World’, and that it was ‘the first political institution
in the world which abolished imperialism, enunciated the principle of
referendum and installed a caliph elected by the people in place of the
king’.89 He referred to Jinnah’s letter to Gandhi in 1944 and Jinnah’s
speech in 1945 to maintain that the Muslim League’s struggle was a
struggle for a separate Islamic state.90
Interestingly, Sir Zafar Ullah Khan, who was severely criticised by
Ahrar and other religious groups from the 1930s because of his Qadiani
persuasion,91 accepted the resolution with the hope of drafting a
constitution based on individualistic principles. His speech, in defence
of the resolution, highlighted his conception of an Islamic state and
society as having the highest standards of morality, freedom and equality.
Whereas Liaquat Ali Khan elaborated the general feature of Islamic
ideology in a rather loose totalitarian way, Zafar Ullah Khan stressed the
idea of personal freedom and the ideal principles of Islam. Highlighting
the Islamic economic system, he showed that Islam would give personal
economic freedom and engender ‘co-partnership and profit sharing,
rather than upon the lending of money on interest’.92 He was among
those in the Constituent Assembly who strongly stressed the moral
purity of Islamic society and rationally articulated the ban on the use of
gambling and intoxicants.93 Going against the minority members, Zafar
Ullah Khan emphasised that the sphere of politics and religion could not
be considered separate and that ‘the Resolution does go further and
require that the Constitution to be framed should be such by virtue of
which the Muslims shall be enabled so to order their lives’.94 Standing
with the varied and disparate ideas of Islam, the majority of Muslim
members voted in favour, while non-Muslim members unanimously
voted against the resolution, stressing the ‘principles of democracy,
freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam’.95
In 1950 the government established a Talimat e Islami Board to

collect and draft suggestions for including Islamic principles in the
new constitution. An eminent religious scholar, Allama Syed Sulaiman
Nadvi, who belonged to Deoband and Nadwa seminaries, became its
president, after Dr Hamid Ullah’s short stay as the board’s head.96
After one year of consultation, the board proposed 22 points for the
constitution. The crux of the proposal was to make Pakistan an Islamic
state based on ideology instead of locality, geography or ethnic
identity. Different schools of thought agreed to respect the freedom
and rights of other sects to propagate their own version of Islam. The
proposals considered Muslim Personal Law or Shariat Law (1937),
which was re-enacted by the Provincial Assembly of Punjab in 1948, as
a legislative arbitrator among multiple interpretations. The proposals
maintained that ‘matters coming under the purview of personal law
shall be administered in accordance with their respective codes of
jurisprudence ( fiqh)’.97 The proposals also provided a solution for
conflicting matters as ‘it will be desirable to make provision for the
administration of such matters by judges belonging to their respective
schools of thought’.98 The proposals, however, were not incorporated
into the first constitution of Pakistan in 1956, which otherwise
claimed to be an Islamic constitution.
Preparing for the double-deterritorialisation of

pluralistic spaces: moral control and auqaf
Excluding non-Muslims completely from the idea of Muslim politics
also entailed the process of redefining pluralistic traces and practices at
popular sacred sites. After promulgating the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat) Application Act in 1948, and after the elections, the Punjab
Legislative Assembly’s foremost task was to extend Islamisation to give
control over Muslim shrines. The Auqaf Bill of 1951–2, however, came
as a surprise to many of the members of the assembly, as there was no
mention of such a bill during the elections that had taken place only a
few months before.99 However, the ruling benches claimed that the idea
of the bill was not new and earlier, in 1924 and 1937, similar efforts had
already been made.100 The ruling benches maintained that earlier efforts
to introduce such a bill had failed because of the fear of having non-
religious figures as members of the Muslim Auqaf Board. However, in
the same way that, after partition, such fears had been shown to be
groundless, this bill, which called for supervision of the shrines and their
properties, remained in place.101
The ruling benches, though, maintained that there was clear evidence
of the misappropriation of waqf property. However, they made it clear
that the intention was to make the working of waqf transparent. The bill
was not introduced to take complete control of waqf properties from the
traditional caretakers, rather it restrained itself to the purpose of
overseeing and registering waqf property. The ruling benches made it
evident that, as the Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925 had had very good
results for the Sikh community, the Auqaf Bill had to be introduced in
order to eradicate social ills and redirect the flow of wealth otherwise
being wasted by mutwallis. In this sense, the bill was presented as
redressing a missed opportunity in history to bring shrines and other
sacred sites under community control.
Although many of the opposition members severely criticised the bill
in some instances, the whole debate remained a discursive activity
wrapped within the discourse of Shariat, during which both opposition
and Treasury benches did their best to present their point of view
according to religious texts. Voices like that of Pir Akbar Ali, as they
appeared during the debates of 1942, about restricting the dancing of
women in shrines, were not heard at all during these discussions.
It seemed that, even to speak in favour of the mutwallis appeared taboo,
because of the almost unanimous acceptance of mutwallis as ‘cheaters,
usurpers, and fraudulent’ and ‘those who have been consuming the Waqf
property without any right and legality’.102 This criticism also remained
based on the implementation of Shariat; differences arose regarding the
right or wrong way of achieving it. The criticism maintained that the
newly developed state intended to take a mediatory position between
devotees and shrines while considering Islamic Shariat as its ideal and
equating the Waqf Board with Islamic Shariat.103
One of the major efforts of the bill remained that of defining the
difference between public and private waqf property. Acknowledging
the efforts of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in creating the Waqf Validating
Act 1913 in order to legalise private waqf property, the Auqaf Bill was to
define public waqf. As there was no longer colonial rule in the newly
liberated Islamic state, the benefits of waqf had to reach the public.
Opposition benches tried their best to convince Treasury benches to
restrict the understanding of ‘public’ to ‘common people’. However, the
Treasury benches defied all their efforts and found ways to create the
possibility of taking waqf property under the direct control of the state.
In this way, the Treasury benches equated public and state, in the
absence of private waqf, and justified taking control of the use of the
income. As in the case of waqf where a clear beneficiary was not present
and family was not there, ‘only the state is to decide what should be
religious, charitable and beneficial for the public’.104
The state benches made it clear that the bill was for the greater
benefit of the public. The Treasury benches ensured that the waqf funds
could not be used for any purpose other than that defined by waqf.
Funds reserved (waqf) for a mosque could not be used on the mosque
other than for that purpose, not even on another mosque.105 The
opposition suggested to the Treasury benches the use of the word ‘poor’
instead of ‘public’, as Shariat ordered Muslims to give waqf income to the
poor or to faqir. The opposition cited religious texts in order to validate
its position. The Treasury benches were not slow to reply by alluding to
such religious texts as Fatawa-e-Alamgiri etc., to put forward the claim
that waqf was for God and for the welfare of its common people; hence
the word ‘public’ could be used instead of ‘poor’.106 The Treasury
benches maintained that waqf, once made, became the property of God.
The profit from the waqf property could only be used for the welfare of
the common people. Such a property could not be inherited or gifted and
could not be sold. From there, it was not difficult to deduce that the state
worked for God and therefore it was the duty of the state to take control
of properties attached to the waqf and let the public, in general, take
benefit from them. The opposition benches tried to reduce the chances of
the state taking over waqf property; however, the Treasury benches
convinced the opposition by condemning them as lawyers for mutwallis.
For the opposition, this appeared to be a form of abuse, and an opposition
member clarified that he was not a lawyer for mutwallis, instead he was
only trying to work for Islamic Shariat in the Islamic Republic.107
The bill created a changed mood and a drift in the perception
amongst colonial-urban elites regarding the site of shrines. Instead of
taking shrines, or takia or astana, as customary sacred sites, the
provincial assemblies’ debates remained focused on private or public
waqf property. Members from both opposition and Treasury showed
their unwillingness to take the side of the mutwallis or sajjada nashins
and demonstrated a kind of a universal necessity to take action against
the immoral activities of mutwallis. The opposition made it clear that the
effort of the state was to appropriate the vulnerable property attached to
the sacred spaces and the state intended to take that position.
Post-colonial politics, shrine-based practices and high morality

The post-colonial state kept revivalist or puritan Muslim scholars only at a
dialogical distance in the politics of Islam,108 and showed a profound wish
to reshape laws that followed the religious interpretation of modern
religious scholars,109 while institutionalising some of the ritualistic
religious practices of its old allies, that is, of reformist Ahl e Sunnat Sufis.
The post-colonial state began celebrating Eid Milad Un Nabi (the birth of
the Prophet (PBUH))110 unofficially almost from the very start.111
However, the Punjab government seemed to take the lead and officially
organised a large function in January 1950 when for the first time the
Governor of Punjab, in the absence of the Provincial Assembly,112 had
organised a programme in Shahi Qila (Fort), Lahore. Around 250,000
people gathered on that occasion.113 The day was celebrated through
reading Naat and the eulogising (salam) of the Prophet Muhammad.
While ensuring the day was officially celebrated, the state used its
departments to decorate important buildings with lights and facilitate
processions and other similar activities.114 It also supported the procession
of Eid Milad Un Nabi in Lahore. The procession became a customary
practice during the 1950s that used to end at Dalgiran Mosque, near
Lahore railway station.115 However, in 1959, the procession appeared to
end at the shrine of Data Sahib.116
On the other hand, the expectations of modern elites and the press in
general were heightened regarding the ethics of possible religious
expressions. During the period between 1950 and 1958 many instances of
immoral or criminal acts at the site of a shrine or about shrine-based
practices in general, and failed expectations of the Auqaf Board were
reported.117 It is difficult to find a difference drawn between eccentric
practices and criminality attached to pirs and pir parasti (devotion for the
pir) in the newspaper reports and editorials published after the creation of
Pakistan.118 An editorial report published in a newspaper in 1955
reported that the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) in Daska had caught a
group of fraudulent men, disguised in the form of pirs, who were active in
looting sadaloh (simpleton) rural women; the newspaper opines that this is
not the first example of its kind; similar news was reported in newspapers
almost daily after the creation of Pakistan.119 The editorial further opined
that to be a pir seemed to be the easiest way to earn money, because of the
superstitious beliefs of the rural people.120 On another occasion, a letter to
the editor described how sorcerers in the guise of pirs came to the villages
and, by performing karamats (miracles), stayed in villagers’ houses for
many days. Further, these pirs made the women and girls of the villages
dance to the melody of the dhol for many days. The letter suggests that
these are not only immoral practices but also against Islamic Shariat and
must be stopped.121 However, occasionally one also finds a suggestion
from a newspaper that differentiated between criminals and the beliefs of
the people, and suggested that police should do their task properly and
politicians must participate actively in reforming activities in rural and
backward areas to avoid such incidences.122
The reports did not save even the most venerated of the shrines; that
is, the shrine of Data Sahib of Lahore. Amongst all the shrines, it was this
shrine that was considered to be the one urban elites most preferred to
visit. Even earlier than the official holiday given by the state on this day,
most of the local markets and offices seemed to be closing down for a day
on the urs of Data Sahib. However, an incident regarding the abduction
of two women, only a few days after the urs in September 1958, by some
of the mujawarins or mutwallis of the shrine of Data Darbar, Lahore,
shook the followers. The incident took place when two women from
Wazirabad came to pray at Data Darbar and a few mujawarins lured them
in, apparently in order to show them sacred ziaratai (sacred belongings).
Allegedly, the mujawarins abducted them and held them captive for two
days. Later on, when one of the women succeeded in escaping from the
cell where she had been kept, she approached the police and reported the
incident. After searching for three or four days, police were able to arrest
the runaway mujawarin.123 The incident took place only a few weeks
before the imposition of the martial law of Ayub Khan in October 1958,
and for some, became the immediate reasons for taking over shrines,
especially that of Data Darbar Lahore.124
Islamic ideology and the ground for the

Auqaf Ordinance 1959
By the time Ayub Khan came to power modern Muslim thinking had
moved away from sectarian to translocal political Islam in its search for
the conception of an Islamic state. The modern thought had stemmed

from Iqbal’s ideas, which prevailed in the post-colonial state as
universal political terms. Interestingly, at the same time, Iqbal
maintained affectionate relations with as fundamentalist a figure as
that of Maulana Abul Maududi and controversial Ahl e Quran scholars,
such as Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz. It was Iqbal who nominated Maulana
Maududi for the headship of the Islamic school, Dar ul Islam, opened
at Pathankot and later on transferred to Mansura, Lahore.125 Ghulam
Ahmed Pervaiz also enjoyed Iqbal’s company126 and actually also
worked alongside Maududi. Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz was part of
Jamat e Islami until at least 1944. However, afterwards both of these
religious scholars went their separate ways, and after another few years
both were almost at daggers drawn with each other: Maududi became
the champion of fundamentalist ideological teachings of Islam and
Pervaiz became the head figure of modern Islam, after the creation of
Pakistan.
Both personalities, however, adopted the modern spirit of their time,
which reflected more than anything in their respective conceptions of
the modern Islamic state. Both of them employed economic systems –
‘socialism’ and ‘capitalism without interest’ – as the ground on which
their respective conceptions of state grew. Maulana Maududi, who
also became a leader of Jamat e Islami in 1942, one of the most
influential religious political parties in post-colonial Punjab, Pakistan,
put forward his conception of an Islamic state as an all-pervasive
ideology without any need for geography. For him, instead of having
Pakistan for the Muslims of India, the whole of India should have been
Islamised, and once it had happened, the whole of India would have
become Pakistan. Further, for Maududi, a localised view of ideology
was untenable.
On the one hand we have to imbibe exactly the Quranic Spirit and
identify our outlook with the Islamic tenets while on the other, we
have to access thoroughly the developments in the field of
knowledge and changes in conditions of life that have been
brought during the last eight hundred years; and third, we have to
arrange these ideas and laws of life on genuine Islamic lines so that
Islam should once again become a dynamic force; the leader of the
world rather than its followers.127
However, for Pervaiz, the idea of a separate state, interpreting Iqbal

through the development of events in the 1940s, was not only necessary
at the time but also essential for the ideals of Islam to materialise.128 It
was only within an Islamic state, that is, a-Din, that a complete ethical-
religious code for all aspects of the nation state could be realised.129
Interestingly, for him, the state shouldered all the responsibility for the
growth and development of its citizens. Indeed, further, he considered
that this responsibility resembled that of a socialist state, where
ownership of most of the business enterprises belong to the state. His
socialist bearing led him to consider Islamic teachings an all-pervasive
political ideology, like a Leninist communist ideology, requiring a state
to show its truth, triggering the development of its citizens.130 His
emphasis on development made him abhor all those modes of thoughts
and practice that stood in its way. He not only reduced the evidential
position of Hadith for interpreting Qur’anic text, he emphasised the
interpretation of the Qur’an through modern knowledge systems and
broader history. However, he believed that whenever the human mind
reached true understanding or ideology, that understanding would be
the reflection of the Qur’an. His onslaught on superstitions was quite
comprehensive, and he even reinterpreted such concepts as jinn and ghaib
(unknown), etc., in his own unique way, and, like Feuerbach and Sir
Syed, considered these phenomena as a human projection.131
Maududi and Pervaiz fought bitterly with each other for the
dominance of their religious articulations and conceptions, never
refraining from terming each other kafir or traitor, a new and increasingly
popular form of religious-political abuse in Pakistan. However, both
remained almost unanimous in their conception and criticism of
shrine-based practices and their efforts to negotiate Islam within
translocal or transnational discursive environments.132 With great
emphasis on differentiating din (a term used in Islam for denoting
its ability to provide guidance in all fields of life) from religion,
Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz made religion a subjective experience with no
objective validity for verifying the truth of human actions. In this way,
he declined to accept any role of traditional-deviant spiritual practices in
the development of the modern person.133 For him, Sufistic ethos was
one such remnant of the country’s cultural tradition. It was essential to
liberate oneself from the shackles of this tradition in order to grow
stronger. Maulana Maududi held almost similar views regarding shrines
and the pir-murid relationship as those of the Deobandi school of

thought. His disposition towards owning the revivalist worldview of
Islam made him abhor local customs and traditions.134 In his worldview,
there was no place for shrine-based culture, ascetic life or sacredness
attached to a dead saint.135
Unlike Maududi and Pervaiz, who retained an idealist position, Javed
Iqbal’s religious interpretation was more pragmatic within the new
political reality of Pakistan. After the imposition of Ayub Khan’s martial
law, he published a book titled The Ideology of Pakistan and its
Implementation. The book is an attempt to relocate Islamic ideology
within the confines of the new post-colonial geographical boundaries.
It did not dwell upon the contradictions of transregional Muslim
identity and regionally confined Islamic ideology, but developed its
contention ignoring these contradictions and simplifying the matter
with an urge to implementing Islamic ideology in Pakistan. The book
sought answers to the questions posed by President and Field Marshal
General Ayub Khan.136 In order to retain nationalism without territory,
Khan felt Islamic ideology was necessary for the ‘conditions of life in
Pakistan’.137 However, though acknowledging the need to implement
the ideology of Islam, he seemed confused, and questioned the author
to provide concise answers for the implementing of Islamic ideology.
Ayub Khan’s questions sought answers for strategies embedded within
the ideology for an Islamic society that gave no place to national
territorialism. He seemed to be quite disturbed that in the conditions of
life in Pakistan it was very hard to transcend localities. He added his
apprehension regarding conditions of life in Pakistan as ‘a collection of
many races with different history’ and his urge was to define an ideology
that could weld these discrete identities together. However, while
reflecting on his global fears, he insisted that such an ideology must also
combat the offensives of communism and Hinduism.138
Javed Iqbal came up with an answer that claimed to be embedded
within the understanding of Islam and at the same time had the form of a
‘modern’ religious ideology that could easily be appropriated by the
martial law government. His position equated Islamic ideology with
Pakistani ideology and then linked it with the state in a manner in
which Islam became an organ within the larger machinery of the state.
However, Islam could not be understood other than as an animated force,
and there would be no place for those, the thesis maintained, who
enervated this organ – that is, both mulla and pir. He delineated the
duty of the state as providing a guarantee of fundamental rights.
In reciprocity, the state demands total submission and loyalty from its
citizens. The thesis further explains the nature of fundamental rights and
links it with Thomas Jefferson’s theory of fundamental rights.139 He
further put forward the characteristic of an ideal citizen and equated this
idea with the Islamic ideal of being a Momin,140 who can find the
realisation of themselves within the post-colonial State of Pakistan. His
position seemed to be making an effort to sketch an ideology that could
create modern enlightenment and democratic culture with some sort of
merging with an Islamic conception.
His position criticised the Munir Commission Report, which had
shown the impossibility of defining Islam and a Muslim because of
sectarian differences of religious leaders in Pakistan.141 He made a
serious effort to clear mullahs from the allegations in the report by
claiming that only if Justice Munir deduced common elements from
his findings could a definition of ‘Muslim’ be inferred.142 He opted for
a simple position in his definition of Islam and satisfied his readers
with the definition of a Muslim as one who believes that ‘[t]here is no
God but God and Muhammad is the Prophet of God’.143 However,
he made sure to complement his position with an emphasis on a
Muslim’s need to grow further, saying that ‘unless and until actions
and behavior of a person conform to his inner belief and conviction
(iman) he lacks the necessary qualifications for being regarded as a
Muslim in the full and the strict sense of the term’.144 For him, a
Muslim had to develop to become an ideal Muslim, that is, Momin,
through absorbing characteristics of love, freedom, disinterestedness
( faqr), courage, creative ability and historical context.
For Javed Iqbal, though the character of a Muslim had previously
been moulded by the institution of mysticism and forward-looking
theologians, in the post-colonial society both could only be seen as dead
forces. For him, leaving the early phase of Islam, the Muslim mystic
renounced the world of matter by considering it to be profane, and
became completely introverted. ‘If the idea of God is reduced to merely
an Omnipotent Will which inculcates fatalism and encourages
renunciation’145 the Muslim cannot develop into a forward-looking,
courageous and powerful person. Similarly, if religious scholars relished
closing down the doors of Ijtihad and ‘slavishly surrendering their ego
to the dictates of the past authority . . . and thus ma[king] the entire
religious thought in Islam practically stationary’, the religion could not
engender the ideal and perfect human being. For the development of a
Muslim, Javed Iqbal finds both customary mysticism or spiritualism and
conservative religious scholarship to be unhealthy, unable to sit within
the modern environment.
However, for conservative religious scholars or mullahs, Javed Iqbal
presents a training programme for them to improve themselves. The
suggestions were given to grant special powers of the qazi to mullahs.
In this fashion, the book elaborated the position of the mullah within
society. It further maintained that in each mosque the office of imam
should be established and these imams must be ‘graduates of Theology
from our state recognised universities’. The book suggested that the
imam must be given the training to be transformed into a social worker.
The book maintains that:
In their spare time, they should teach children and adults in the
villages, assist in building clean and hygienic houses, wells, roads,
etc. They should work in the fields and assist in the programmes of
medical relief or other development programs.146
It charts a detailed programme for improving the condition of the

mullah and giving him back his rightful, though lost, status in society.
On the other hand, for sajjada nashins, khadmins, gaddi nashins or
mujawars, there is no suggestion of such a training programme. Instead,
for all connected with the monasteries, there are two options: ‘either be
reformed’ as suggested by Allama Iqbal or be ‘removed from their self-
created spiritual positions’.147 The suggestion by Allama Iqbal, to be
reformed, as reinterpreted by Javed Iqbal, is to acquire again the highest
position from which mysticism has fallen. ‘Islam has had too much of
renunciation’,148 and Iqbal maintains that the mysticism enwrapped
within renunciation
gradually and invisibly unnerved the will of Islam and softened it

to the extent of seeking relief from the religious discipline of the
law of Islam. The nineteenth-century Muslim reformers rose in
revolt against this mysticism and called Muslims to the broad
daylight of the modern world.149
In the modern world there is no place for ‘medieval mysticism’.

Therefore there is no place in modern Pakistan for localised practices,
until and unless these practices embrace the puritan spirit of the
nineteenth-century mystic revolutionaries or religious revivalists, and
abandon renunciation. Thus, Javed Iqbal provided ideological
justification for taking over the control of shrines and shrine-based
practices and transforming them into a new regimented form.
Conclusion
In the context of the re-identifying process in colonial India, a
reterritorialised identity, as an idea of Singular Islam amongst a colonial
Muslim elite, prevailed in the first few decades of the twentieth
century. The development of a Singular Muslim identity emerged as an
overlapping consensual process; a handy ideology not only for competing
with others, especially Hindus, but also for dominating the customary
voices situated at the pluralistic sites of shrines. The ideology provided
the platform for the politics of Muslim groups, especially the Muslim
League, which steered through colonial politics aimed at creating a new
Muslim state in India. However, the development opened up the
possibility of another reterritorialisation process, a kind of double-
reterritorialisation. The Muslim League and the colonial urban sector
refused to locate themselves within the newly acquired land. Instead, the
elite opted to re-own the ideology that already remained supportive
for gaining new land and that already defined itself, amongst other
contesting religious communities, by excluding other communities. The
new situation opened up another kind of linking and unlinking process.
For example, at the political level, the process ended up in defining, in
the Objectives Resolutions, a clear demarcation of the difference between
Muslims and non-Muslims, while outlining foundational principles for
any future constitution. On a religious puritan level, the process led to
an Anti-Ahmadiyya Movement to purify Muslim identity; the process
also extended to the spiritual practices and the elites of the post-colonial
state, in order to implement Islamisation, making efforts to begin the
exclusion of deviant pluralistic practices from shrines.
The process to Islamise sacred spaces, through waqf laws, started with
creating a supervising and surveying board. However, dissatisfaction
soon surfaced because of the perceived immoral practices of pirs
constantly reported in newspapers. Whilst the post-colonial state kept

puritan-revivalist religious groups at a dialogical level, it also started
institutionalising some religious forms, closely associated with the
consensual symbolic structure of the Singular Muslim identity. The
post-colonial state found it convenient to institutionalise the forms of
religion that did not threaten the structure and working of the inherited
state. The political instability of the post-colonial state pushed it to
develop more clearly and visibly the relationship with unique religious
forms. The inability of the initial period of the post-colonial state to
achieve political stability contributed to autocratic governments taking
over the reins of Pakistan. In order to implement an Islamic ideology in
Pakistan, Javed Iqbal, while re-appropriating the thoughts of Allama
Iqbal, guided the autocratic government of Ayub Khan to completely
take over sacred sites from traditional caretakers. He provided a double-
edged programme for Islamisation that on the one hand would start a
process of implementing true reformative Islam, whilst on the other
hand gave complete control of traditional spiritual sites to the autocratic
state. This Islamisation was to initiate reforms in the Islamic mode of
teaching, for the development of the caretaker of the mosque and at the
site of a mosque. However, for shrines and shrine-based practices, there
was no option but to leave their traditional positions and let Islamised
spirituality, as conceived by Iqbal and the other thinkers, prevail.
CHAPTER 3
LEGALITY, JUDICIAL PROCESSES

AND WAQF: A TRANSITION
FROM MORAL TO TOTAL
CONTROL OF SHRINES
The Waqf Ordinance of 1959 provided the post-colonial state, for the
very first time, with legal justification and a framework to take direct
control of shrines. The moment put unprecedented emphasis on direct
and total control of shrines and remained an essential element for all the
later similar legal acts. However, the ordinance, though unprecedented,
was one in a continuous line of legal acts aimed at taking care of shrines
and waqf, with an evident difference of emphasis. This chapter tries to
unearth that difference through analysing the structure of legal acts and
their link with the ground of identity. The chapter shows that earlier
legislative initiatives, emerging amidst the process of reterritorialising
identity, were directed more towards moral control than claiming total
control of shrines. These legislative activities, such as the bill for the
creation of the Auqaf Board in 1952 and the prohibition on female
singers in 1943, gave the framework for policing, moral control and
surveying the local sacred sites. However, since 1959 there has been a
clear continuity of emphasis on direct control of the sacred sites. This
continuity of emphasis became possible because double-reterritorialised
identity started imagining the localised spaces of devotion as deviant.
The chapter is divided into three sections analysing legislative
activities, laws and judicial processes. In the first section, the chapter
discusses the legal acts, such as the Mussalman Waqf Act of 1923
(MWA-1923), the Music in Muslim Shrines Act, 1942, which
prohibited the singing and dancing of women and girls in shrines
(Female Singers’ Prohibition Act (FSP-1943)) and Auqaf Board Act of
1952 (ABA-1952). The MWA-1923 was a centralised legislative effort,1
embedded in the tension between the prevalence of private property
and endowed or waqf property.2 A change can be seen by analysing the
structure and context of two other Acts, the Music in Muslim Shrines Act,
1942 and the Auqaf Board Act of 1952. Standing on reterritorialised
identity, both acts highlight the urge of the colonial and post-colonial
elite to identify the site of shrine only in the reformative mood. With a
little difference of emphasis, the former legislative effort shows the urge
of the members of the legislative council to have moral control of the site
of the shrine. However, the latter legislative activity presented itself to
have a better control of the income and the site of the shrine; the
discussions in the Punjab legislative assembly during endorsing the bill
expressed the readiness of the members to take shrines under state’s
direct control in 1952 – 3.
The second section traces the legal activities with and after the Waqf
Ordinance of 1959. The ordinance, instead of leaving control of the local
space of a shrine to local communities, takes complete control of those
spaces through the lego-religious concept of waqf property. The section
shows that this conceptualisation enables the state to take control of all
those sacred sites that are profitable, especially shrines. This section
examines the changes in the ordinance by later governments and shows
that, though there are differences and similarities among many revisions,
such as the Federal Waqf Properties Act, 1976 and Waqf Properties
Ordinance, 1979, no change moved away decisively from the spirit of
the Ordinance of 1959. Further, in order to support state policies, the
unique judicial interpretation paved the way by unearthing the legal
confusions and contradictions inherent in the legal ordinances. The third
section, therefore, examines the way the judicial process resolves the
tensions emerging out of controlling techniques and vagueness of
concepts used for taking control of shrines. The section shows that the
post-colonial judiciary reinterprets the religious concepts like Shariat,
shrine, waqf, private property, etc., to relocate their meaning within
the changed politico-legal context. The section shows that through
re-interpretative activity, the judiciary not only brings out its unique
LEGALITY, JUDICIAL PROCESSES AND WAQF 71
religious interpretations but also provides legitimacy to the working of

the post-colonial state.
Muslim waqf acts, communal identity and moral control

The promulgation of the Mussalman Waqf Act of 1923 was a universal
legal moment for enumerating and registering the Muslim Auqaf
(endowments) in British India. The need arose because of the already
promulgated Mussalman Waqf Validating Act of 1913 that made it
possible for a Muslim elite to declare the property in perpetuity for its
children as a family waqf (endowment).3 The Waqf Validating Act of
1913 was the partial invocation of the traditional Muslim concept of waqf
that makes a certain property permanently dedicated for the family, public
and even religious purposes at the same time; a customary practice in pre-
colonial Muslim India.4 As the British rule began introducing permanent
settlement and laws connected with land ownership in north and east
India, the numbers of waqf property increased exponentially; waqf
appeared as a solution to keep large immovable property permanently
intact, along with keeping the status of the family high, and in some cases
saving tax.5 However, the permanent dedication of waqf property collided
with the new environment and concluded by preventing the application of
waqf for family (private waqf), although it was carried on as religious and
charitable (public) waqf by British judicial authorities in the late
nineteenth century. The restrictions on dedicating property as family waqf
generated a struggle within the Muslim elite to regain permission; the
result was the promulgation of the Waqf Validating Act in 1913.
The Muslim elite won legislative rights for family (private) waqf
while unsettling the status of religious and charitable (public) waqf at
the same time.6 Family waqf for the Muslim elite found its special place
in the Mussalman Waqf Act of 1923:
Wakf means the permanent dedication by a person professing the

Mussalman faith of any property for any purpose recognised by the
Mussalman Law as religious, pious or charitable, but does not
include any Wakf, such as is described in section 3 of the
Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913, under which any benefit
is for the time being claimable for himself by the person by whom
the Wakf was created or by any of his family or descendants.7
By making purposes of dedication compatible with the Mussalman Law,

the Waqf Act provided a different space for public waqf – a specific
religious (public) space. The act made a clear distinction between two
types of waqf and, after giving legal acknowledgement to the family
space, made the rest of the ‘unregistered’ and ‘undefined’ public waqf
accountable.8
The Waqf Acts and the colonial judicial discussions did not make
clear the conditions for qualifying a property or a sacred site as waqf. The
British judicial decisions provided some clarity by maintaining that a
religious and charitable (public endowments) site should be understood
as waqf. The decisions also always required the condition of the presence
of a clear written deed for legally endorsing any property as waqf.
However, the British administrative decisions to interfere at some of the
sacred sites created confusion on the limits of considering the sacred
sites and the property attached to them as waqf.9 Further, the legal
permissibility of family waqf created the need for registering public waqf
in the whole of India, largely to satisfy British administration but
also partially to reform them.10 The confusion prevailed, however, and
when the Mussalman Waqf Act of 1923 was promulgated it did not
clarify the definition of public waqf, but showed its intent to ‘manage’
waqf property properly so that the property that was ‘being wasted or
misappropriated’11 could be saved.
The act differentiates between the benefits coming out of the
working of waqf and benefits taken by the mutwalli (caretaker) in their
position of being the caretaker of the shrine or mosque.12 The division
remained important for saving mutwallis from acquiring a benefit for
the personal use, but at the same time, this definition bracketed
mutwallis within a category of beneficiary. The division did not make
the local community or the followers of the sacred site beneficiaries.13
The act binds each mutwalli to furnish before the court the monetary
details of the previous five years and of the property attached to the
sacred site. The mutwalli was to submit not only the gross annual
income from the waqf property attached with the sacred site and ‘a
description of the wakf property sufficient for the identification
thereof’,14 but also the income record of the previous five years. The act
also made it compulsory for the mutwalli to furnish before the court the
amount of the ‘Government revenue and cesses, and of all rents annually
payable in respect of the Waqf Property’.15
The act reduced the justification of those shrines, being already run
through the force of custom, where a mutwalli was appointed through
progeny. It made this position redundant by matching it with the
emphasis on the waqf created through family or descendants of the
family for personal benefits. Though the act permitted personal benefits
for the mutwallis, at the same time it highlighted their fluid and almost
redundant existence. Further, as most of the shrines of the Muslim Sufi
saints grew without any declared form of trust or any defined origin, the
existence of a caretaker at any such shrine started losing its meaning. The
act abstracted the position of mutwalli and made it accountable not only
to the community but also to the state. It triggered the disenchantment
process with the customary pluralistic spaces and provided the
justification for the already-existing criticism by religious revivalists
and reformists of shrine-based practices.
During the rule of the Unionists in Punjab, another act prohibiting
the singing by females at shrines, with the clear intent of reformation,
was promulgated in 1943. The act came after the promulgation of the
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (Shariat Act),
which had already created a desire in the Muslim community for
them to devise their own rules to take control of their auqaf. The impact
of the Shariat Act paved the way for the Muslim members of the
Unionist Party to devise a strategy, if not for controlling and surveying
Muslim waqf, at least for demonstrating the implementation of
reformative principles. FSP-1943 believed shrines to be potential sites
for implementing reformative principle; it was an attempt to replicate
the moral standards of a mosque at shrines. Before mentioning the main
clause, the act gives a definition of a Muslim shrine as ‘a shrine of a
recognised Muslim saint and shall include the premises of the
shrine and the premises owned by and attached to the shrine’.16 It is
interesting that a Muslim shrine is understood as being of ‘a recognised
Muslim saint’. It seems the act differentiates between recognised and
non-recognised Muslim saints. In another sense, the act singled out
shrines of Muslim saints from the multiple unrecognised shrines of
saints, not popular as Muslim in the sense understood by the colonial
urban elite; an effort to distinguish recognised Muslim saints from the
pluralistic customary sacred spaces.
However, the main clause of the act, that provides details for the
punishment for singing or dancing at Muslim shrines says:
If any woman or girl sings to the accompaniment of a musical

instrument or dances with or without a musical instrument in a
Muslim Shrine, she shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and
shall be liable on conviction to be punished with fine not
exceeding five hundred rupees or with imprisonment of either
description for a term not exceeding six months or with both such
fine and imprisonment.17
From a gender perspective the punishment can be considered as an

attempt to control a woman’s body and agency in the space of shrines, as
Purewal and Kalra show.18 Important though the gender perspective is, it
misses the point that this clause represents continuity in controlling the
space of shrines – a site in need of reform. The shrines themselves turned
into a female space and thus complemented the generalised control on
woman’s bodies and agency; the domination of patriarchal Muslim elite
morality upon the immoral, deviant and archaic sites of shrine.
Punjab Auqaf Act and the Auqaf Board of 1952:

a re-emphasised moral control on shrines
Although the constitutional development started quite early, almost
with the creation of the new state of Pakistan,19 the process had also to
face hurdles due to the conflicting political directions. The Dominion or
State of Pakistan, as it emerged out of the struggle of minority Muslims
in colonial India, was soon caught up in the ideological debates around
the politics of Islam. As most of the religious political parties found
renewed life in the new context, standing on the already reterritorialised
Muslim identity that was also instrumental in acquiring new land,
they started a full-throttled struggle to make the new constitution of
Pakistan completely Islamic. The state found itself caught up in a kind
of tension between reterritorialisation and the double reterritorialisation
identity-making process. The state itself developed a kind of double-
territorialised identity through the Objectives Resolution to devise a
fundamental principle for any future constitution, while excluding all
other religious communities as minorities.
The post-colonial state showed its willingness to include religious
symbolism within its legal framework, as the details of the politics
of Islam remained outside the state institutions. Although the
re-promulgation of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act

of 1937 in 1948 was considered an unconvincing effort for extending
Sharia-based Islamisation,20 for the ruling benches the act was a step
towards extending Sharia in the largest province of West Pakistan. The
act states that:
Notwithstanding any rule of custom or usage, in all question

regarding succession (whether testate or intestate), special
property of females, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, adoption,
guardianship, minority, legitimacy or bastardy, family relations,
wills, legacies, gifts, religious usages or institutions including
Waqfs, trusts and trust property, the rule of decision shall be the
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) in cases where the parties are
Muslims.
The act paved the way for taking care of waqf properties and brought
them under the Muslim Personal Law, that is, Shariat.
Pursuing his legal duty, the Governor General ordered the Governor
of Punjab to enact the Punjab Muslim Auqaf Survey (Amendment) Act
in 1950 as the Punjab Act XXXVI,21 after the Punjab Assembly had
already been dissolved.22 The purpose of the act was to make a survey of
waqf properties in the province.23 Through this act, the state bound the
mutwalli (caretaker) to register its waqf through nazim or nazim e aala to
be appointed in his area.24 The Act provides the authority for nazim
to enter upon any property which he believes to be a Waqf Property;

to call for and inspect documents relating to the said property; to
call for and inspect accounts of income from the said property, and
its expenditure; and, summon and record the statement of any
person in possession of any such property in any capacity or
believed to be in possession of information relating to it.25
However, as the new Punjab Assembly started its business in 1951,26 the
bill had to receive legislative permission, and for this a revised Muslim
Auqaf Bill was presented in the Assembly. The Minister of Education,
the Honourable Abdul Hameed Khan Dasti, presented the bill in the
Punjab Assembly.27 Interestingly, the bill presented was a mixture of
the Punjab Muslim Auqaf Bill of 1923 and the unsuccessfully presented
bill of Mian Maqbool Ahmed, a minister in the Unionist government

in 1937. While presenting the bill in the Assembly he did not forget to
mention the background and the previous efforts to present this ‘much
needed bill’. His justification was that it should have been approved
and enforced since 1924. For the minister, it had been Muslims’
deepest wish to introduce such a bill that could make the waqf
properties attached to the sacred sites accountable.28 The minister
maintained that the condition of auqaf at a certain moment in time
shows the manners and culture of a nation and reflects its effectiveness.
Auqaf also shows the inner spiritual condition of a nation, he opined.
And as far as the Haquq ul Ibad, or rights for the people, are concerned,
the waqf laws demonstrate how fairly the nation uses the waqf
properties. He believed that auqaf is based on two types of principles
found within Shariat and religion, accordingly: one type of principle
links all types of waqf with God and in this way takes it away from
private ownership and places it in the hands of God;29 the second type
of principle is that the benefit of any such property must be for the
general public. He was of the opinion that his views were undeniably
religious, though a little later he mentioned that he had already
received dozens of letters against the bill.
Not finding the religious position sufficient, the minister mixed his
ideas with political wisdom by saying that his government felt this
burden and decided to make income out of the properties of auqaf.
Afterwards, he defined his version of history by locating origins of all
auqaf as initiated by the saints (buzarg) for righteousness. These auqaf
were the sources from which people of a nation gained spiritual and
physical nourishment. He went on to insist that all these waqf and the
attached properties, originated by saints for righteous purposes, were
being used for bad purposes. To prove his case, he provided examples of
the shrines of Hazrat Shah Abul Muali, Bibi Pak Daman and Miani
Sahib. He said that the properties attached with these shrines had been
sold in the recent past and the nation still had tears in its eyes from the
pain these incidences inflicted. Therefore, he introduced the bill to stop
these ‘innovations’ and to provide benefits to the common public out of
the income of these auqaf.30
Despite heated debate on the bill and opposition’s severe criticism
of the intentions of the ruling party,31 parliament finally approved the
Auqaf Board Bill and the Auqaf Act, 1952.32 The Auqaf Board was to
work as an overseer and an auditor of the monetary benefits coming out

of waqf properties. The board was to ‘maintain a complete and authentic
record of rights, containing full information relating to the origin,
income, object and beneficiaries of every Waqf’. The board was also to
work closely with mutwallis (the traditional caretakers) of the waqf,
meeting them whenever necessary and giving them ‘directions for the
proper administration of Waqf and to institute inquiries when necessary,
relating to the administration of any Waqf’.33 The board was to ensure
that mutwallis must specify the object to which the income from the
created waqf should be applied. The board was also to work out whether
the income was being used to the best benefit of the Muslim community
and not against the tenets of Islam. It was also to see better use of surplus
income and should invest that income, in the beneficial sector.
Though the board was to supervise the working of waqf, the
provisions of the rules did not allow direct control of any waqf or the
replacing of already working mutwalli. The act says that:
the general supervision of every Waqf shall vest in the Board which
shall do all things considered by it to be necessary, control and
administration of such Waqf and for the application of the funds to
purposes for which it exists.
However, control here does not mean direct control of the shrine or any
other sacred place, until and unless some such situation arose. The act
maintained that ‘such supervision shall not authorize the removal of a
duly appointed Mutwalli except under the other provisions of this
Act’.34 The possibility of changing the mutwalli or taking a waqf
property into direct control, therefore, was concealed but not intended.
The act operated through subtle but tactical differences between waqf
and waqf property. Although it defined mutwalli and waqf, however, the
earlier Muslim Auqaf Act of 1923 did not specify waqf property. This act
not only links waqf with the tenets of Islam or Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat Law) but also clearly defines the concept of waqf property and
thereby gives this concept a separate and distinct enumerable value. The
act understands a waqf property as:
all property or interest of whatever nature in property, lawfully

dedicated, granted or used so as to constitute a Waqf, and includes
the property or interest acquired with the sale proceeds or in

exchange of or from the income arising out of the property or
interest so dedicated, granted or used.35
The act also clearly defines the meaning of ‘family’ and thereby
provides a limitation on the use of private waqf as well as taking away
the legitimation of public waqf started without any specified origin.
The act limits the benefits of private waqf or the Waqf Validating Act
1913 by clearly defining the progeny of ‘great grandparents’ or
‘descendants of the children’.36 This defining of family also had an
indirect impact on the legitimacy of the shrines like Bibi Pak Daman
or Data Sahib, Lahore, that did not have a specified origin for tracing
the start of the auqaf, and the mutwallis or mujawars of these waqf
claimed their ownership or legitimacy to run these auqaf from the
customary continuity of the progeny. The act defines public waqf as
that which starts as private waqf ‘but the ultimate benefit whereof has
become available for the public in general . . . by the reason of the death
of the Waqif (Waqf maker) . . . or . . . the extinction of the line of his
family or descendants, or otherwise’.37 Public waqf without any
specified origin seems to be losing its legitimacy.
Controlling shrines through Auqaf Ordinances:

post-colonial coloniality or double re-territorialisation
With the introduction of One Unit by Major General Iskandar Mirza,
the provinces of West Pakistan were merged with each other to have a
single West Pakistan legislative assembly. The political upheavals,
however, paved the way for Iskandar Mirza to step down and hand over
the supreme powers of the country to the Chief Martial Law
Administrator, General Ayub Khan. Putting the Constitution of 1956
to one side, Ayub Khan started his own programme of reforming
Pakistan society. He redirected the movement of the post-colonial state
towards developmental concerns, in a sense moving away ‘from the
question from why Pakistan was created to where Pakistan was
heading’.38 On the one hand he introduced such drastic changes as that
of land reforms for introducing economic reforms and on the other hand
he allowed making such activities as family laws to ‘establish greater
consistency between the legally permissible and morally acceptable in
matters affecting Muslim marriage, divorce, the age of consent and

inheritance’.39 On the more religious side, he kept away from the impact
of revivalist mullahs, at least for the few initial years, moved closer to the
modern religious intelligentsia and favoured the introduction of many
religious-social reforms. Following the re-appropriation of Iqbal, by
both Javed Iqbal and the modernist scholars, and moving on the ground
of double re-territorialisation, he took sacred sites into direct state
control as waqf properties.
On 17 April 1959, the martial law government of Ayub Khan
promulgated an ordinance, the West Pakistan Waqf Properties
Ordinance (WPWPO),40 ‘in pursuance of the Presidential Proclamation
of the 7th day of October 1958 and in the exercise of all the powers
enabling him in this behalf’.41 The martial law authorities were not
bound by previous legal developments in the legislative history of
Punjab. Though the ordinance was to ‘consolidate and amend the laws
relating to the management of Waqf properties in the Province of West
Pakistan’,42 this ordinance superseded all the laws regarding waqf made
after and before the independence of Pakistan and was directly linked
with the Religious Endowment Act of 1863.43 The ordinance made it
clear that government could repeal all the previous legal enactments
made so far. However, the ordinance pronounced that
everything done, action taken, obligation, liability, penalty or

punishment incurred, inquiry or proceedings commenced . . . rule
made and order issued under any of the provisions of the . . .
enactments’ shall remain continued ‘if not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Ordinance’.44
The ordinance made its intent quite clear that it was an operational
device to nationalise waqf properties and that any obstacles to it would
not be tolerated.
Moving away from the Punjab Muslim Auqaf Survey Act, 1950, the
West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance (WPWPO) 1959 ordinance
made waqf property a central concept for defining and remembering
sacred spaces. In this way, the ordinance not only made waqf property
equivalent to waqf but also reduced the designation of sacred sites as
waqf property. The ordinance defined waqf property as ‘of any kind
permanently dedicated to by a person professing Islam for any purpose
recognised by Islam as religious pious or charitable’, whereas earlier the

Punjab Muslim Auqaf Survey Act, 1950 and the Auqaf Board Act, 1952
had kept the distinction between waqf and waqf property. The acts of
1950 and 1952 gave almost the same definition of waqf that the
ordinance gave to waqf property, with the difference that the acts of 1950
and 1952 were cautious about using the words ‘religion’ or ‘Islam’ and
instead used Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) to define waqf dedicated by a
Muslim. The acts of 1950 and 1952 also did not say ‘person professing
Islam’ but, rather, restrained themselves from using the word Muslim
and linked it with the recognition of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) as
religious, pious or charitable. The intelligentsia behind the creation of
the ordinance, having already owned double-reterritorialised identity,
had taken Islam as the singular defining concept and, therefore, made the
word ‘Muslim’ synonymous with ‘Islam’ in their minds.45
In its intention to take over control of waqf sites, the ordinance
defined waqf property at considerable length, and also included
charitable purposes within the definition of property. Directly invoking
the Charitable Endowment Act, 1863 enabled the ordinance to ignore
the difference between the charitable and religious. The ordinance
defined waqf property in detail and included almost all the possible
means for religious auqaf to earn income within the definition of waqf
property. It considered all those properties ‘used from time immemorial
for any purpose recognised by “Islam” as religious, pious or charitable’,
even where no evidence of dedication is found, ‘property allotted in
exchange of property left in India’, ‘property of any kind acquired
through the sale proceeds of income arising out of Waqf Property’, ‘the
income from boxes placed at a shrine and offerings and offerings or
subscriptions for charitable purposes’, and all those charitable purposes
as ‘relief of the poor, education, worship, medical relief, maintenance of
shrines or the advancement of any other object of charitable, religious or
pious nature’. The ordinance left no space within the rules to allow the
donated income to go to the traditional caretaker or mutwalli and closed
down all avenues for the mutwalli to collect money.
The ordinance initiated an office of administrator, later on terming
this office Chief Administrator of Auqaf,46 and authorised the office not
only with the authority of sole corporation but also Chief Mutwalli,
merging both colonial and traditional responsibilities in the OFFICE
appointed by the government. The administrator was to take control of
the waqf properties and take their control under his own office. The office
of administrator was to prepare and maintain accounts for the record of
all properties and income arising from waqf properties. The ordinance
created an Auqaf fund for keeping ‘all money received or realized by the
Administrator in respect of properties under his control and manage-
ment’. However, it not only made the administrator responsible for
creating a record of the monetary transactions but also for providing
authority to sell waqf property, if the administrator thought it
appropriate. In contradiction to many previous Muslim Auqaf Acts and
with a majority of Muslim opinion against the selling of waqf property,
the ordinance gave the right to sell waqf properties to the office of the
Chief Administrator. Although the ordinance gave authority to the
courts to listen to decisions against the acts of Chief Administrator, it
made sure that ‘no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall be
instituted against any person for anything which is in good faith done or
intended to be done under this ordinance’.47
The ordinance authorised the direct control of properties attached to
waqf, but remained vague regarding the administration and manage-
ment of the religious activities in the waqf spaces. Customarily, at the
sacred spaces of shrines mutwallis or mujawars perform the religious
practices, i.e. bathing the grave of the saint or dua (prayer) ceremonies,
thereby spreading the blessings from the saint to the pilgrim. The
ordinance, however, by initiating new offices of administrators under
the direct control of the government. authorised the administrators
to ‘take over, and assume the administration, control, management
and maintenance’ of a waqf property whenever they found it feasible, only
issuing a notification for their act.48 Through this act, the administrator
would have the authority to prepare schemes for the maintenance and
administration of waqf properties. The administrator ‘shall give effect
to such wishes of the person dedicating as can be ascertained, and to
which effect can be reasonably given’. However, for all those waqf
properties where it was not clear that any ‘dedication’ had been made
and/or was not available at all, the administrator would be free to take
action on his own.
Throughout Ayub Khan’s rule, the basic structure and spirit of the
West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959, remained unchanged;
rather, its intent to take over waqf properties was strengthened through
the legislative and Chief Administrator’s enactments, issued regularly
through amendments. In the first of this long line of amendments, and

only two days before taking over the first ever waqf property of the shrine
of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib in Lahore, an amendment issued by the
Governor of West Pakistan repealed the Punjab Muslim Auqaf Act,
1951 (Punjab Act XXXVI of 1952).49 In April, after taking over a
dozen shrines, the WPWPO (Amendment), 1960, was enforced by the
Governor of West Pakistan. This ordinance (amendment) further
increased the authority of the Chief Administrator Auqaf, providing him
with more control on rental or leasing issues involved in taking over
waqf property and giving him powers to enforce his acts through strict
penal actions. The Chief Administrator also provided authority to take
mutwallis under his direct control and to extract information from any
person regarding waqf property. In the following year, September 1961,
another WPWPO (Amendment), 1961, came into force, which further
increased the authority of the Office of Administrator. Now waqf
included also the property permanently dedicated for the purposes of a
mosque, Takia, Khankah, Dargah or other shrines. Article 225 of the
constitution of 1962 gave permanent effect to the WPWPO, 1961,
within the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1962).50
After the separation of East Pakistan in December 1971 and the
dissolution of one unit of West Pakistan into provinces, the WPWPO,
1961, came under the provincial matter and became Punjab West
Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance. Even with this devolution, the
Waqf Ordinances faced no more significant changes51 until the last years
of the Bhutto government. The initial few years of that government
emphasised socialistic reforms and a popular engagement with Sufi
shrines;52 however, the last few years saw a swing towards increased
Islamising effort, as it helped the government to engage with opposition
gathering around the slogan of ‘Nizam e Mustafa’ (the system of the
Prophet PBUH).53 In 1975– 6 the Bhutto government started to feel
the need to revisit WPWPO, 1961.54 To fulfil this purpose, a new
revised bill regarding auqaf was devised by the Ministry of Religion and
presented to the Senate for its approval.
The Auqaf Federal Act Bill, for centralising the management of
waqf properties, was presented in the Senate by the Minister of
Religious and Minorities Affairs, Maulana Kausar Niazi, in 1976. The
bill was presented with the main objective of promoting Islamic values
through better organisation of properties attached to shrines and
mosques. The minister maintained that through this bill, government

would appoint a chief administrator in each province under the Central
Administrator General, Auqaf Department. The minister claimed that
because the provinces had their own auqaf policies, they did not have
good coordination among themselves. He claimed that even opposition
had demanded better control of auqaf matters and therefore he hoped
that the opposition would support the bill. The minister claimed further
that through this bill the government would be able to take complete
control from all the illegal occupants of the properties attached to shrines.
He maintained further that this bill was completely Islamic and was put
forward to completely reform the shrines and mosques through taking
over their control.55
The bill introduced a hierarchy of administrators and at the same
time increased their authority, while giving further clarity to the rules
for keeping accounts of the waqf property. It created a post of
Administrator General under the federal government and linked it with
an administrator in each province. The bill gave the Administrator
General responsibility for a federal auqaf fund, liable to be audited
yearly, for monetary transactions. It also increased the authority of the
administrator to plan and seek the development of projects on shrines
and waqf property costing more than 5,000 rupees.56 The bill kept the
previous authority of the administrator to sell waqf property but defined
more clearly the reasons for selling: to secure maximum economic
benefits, to serve the best public interest, to effect the wishes of the
person dedicating the property, to enable the property to be used for the
purpose recognised by Islam as religious, pious or charitable, to provide
maintenance to the unemployed, to provide education, medical aid,
housing, public facilities and services such as roads, sewerage, gas and
electric power and, finally, to prevent danger to life.57
At the end of the published bill, the Minister of Religious Affairs,
under the signatory of member-in-charge, clearly defined the objectives
of and reasons for the bill. The statement says:
In pursuance of the Principles of State Policy laid down in the

Constitution it is imperative that steps be taken to enable the
Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with
the fundamental principles of Islam, to provide them facilities to
understand the meaning of life as laid down in the Holy Quran
and Sunnah to promote unity in the observance of Islamic moral

standards and to secure proper organisation of Auqaf and mosques.
In order to achieve the above objectives and to ensure uniformity
and coordination throughout the country, it has been found
expedient to provide for the proper management and administration
of Auqaf under Federal control.58
The emphasis on Islam and morality seem to be a clear shift from the
underlying policies of Ayub Khan, who introduced the Waqf Property
Ordinance in order to introduce social reforms at the sacred religious
sites. However, it seems that the Bhutto government’s Minister of
Religion was quite anxious to convince people that the new Auqaf Bill
would introduce changes in the environment for ordering their lives
according to the Islamic principles for Pakistani Muslims.
The 1976 Act not only increased the state’s centralised authority, it
also authorised the auqaf administrators to take control of even religious
activities at shrines. However, although previously every attempt to
control the shrines had shown its intention to control the means of
income of the waqf property as thoroughly as possible, it had never
demonstrated the intention to control the religious activities through
state bureaucracy as clearly as was shown here. The act clearly states that ‘
[c]ontrol and management shall include control over the performance
and management of religious and spiritual, cultural and other services
and ceremonies (Rasoomat) at or in a Waqf Property’.59 In this sense, the
act reduced the existing vagueness in the WPWPO of 1960. Rather,
moving ahead, the Act extended its authority to
prescribing the syllabus and curricula for the proper education and
training of Imams and Khatibs and of the other employees of the
Auqaf institutions in Pakistan; and prescribing and regulating the
standards syllabi and curricula of institutions providing Islamic
religious education.60
The act extended its control from waqf seminaries to general religious
education in all those educational institutes providing religious
education, whether waqf or not.
However, after another year of the enforcement of the Auqaf Federal
Act, 1976, the Bhutto government was overthrown by the army Chief of
Staff, General Zia ul Haq and the post-colonial state faced its third
period of martial law. The martial law authorities came forward to free
public life from the tensions created by the democratic regime. The
regime claimed it would ease political tension and introduce elections
within 90 days. However, as the days passed the martial law authorities
increased their grip on the state structure and unleashed their own
reformist agenda. Their political strategy was to defer the election and
deny the rights of political parties to form party-based government. The
regime focused on two aspects: to introduce some form of civilian
government in the provinces;61 and to introduce Islamic reforms. For the
first focus, the regime announced the creation of civilian government in
the provinces. For the second, multiple Islamic rules were introduced.
As auqaf was quite important even for this regime, the authorities
introduced a new ordinance, the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance,
1979, and merged both of their focuses within the newly enforced
ordinance.
Although the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979, included
almost all the previous developments that had been included in previous
auqaf laws, it also introduced changes in major directions. The ordinance
changed the federal character of the 1976 Federal Act and, in alignment
with its policy to introduce civilian governments within provinces,
decentralised the Auqaf Act. The ordinance reads: ‘[the] Government
shall appoint a Chief Administrator of Auqaf for the Province of the
Punjab and may by order, vest in him, the Waqf properties situated in
the Province including all rights, assets, debts, liabilities and obligations
relating thereto’.62 In this way, it reintroduced colonial divisions of
subjects, as through the dyarchy of 1924 and later on through the
constitution of 1935. However, despite its making auqaf a provincial
matter, the ordinance kept the Auqaf Federal Control Act, 1976 in force,
unless it was inconsistent with the provisions of the newly enforced
Ordinance of 1979.
The ordinance could not continue to be an exception to the increasing
Islamisation and subsequent policies. As the earlier ordinances made it
incumbent on the head of the auqaf department to be Muslim, even
the Auqaf Bill of 1951– 2 made it necessary for the president and
the members of the Auqaf Board to be Muslims, the ordinance of
1979, with the amendment of 1984, even made it necessary for the
deputy administrators to be Muslim, along with the Muslim Chief
Administrator. The ordinance maintains: ‘provided that no person be

appointed as Deputy Administrator unless he is a Muslim’.63 Going
even further, the ordinance barred the appointment of a non-Muslim as
an officer, stating that ‘no person shall be appointed as an Officer unless
he is a Muslim’.64 The ordinance (amendment, 1984) also links selling
of waqf properties with the ‘main purpose’, as it is according to the
Islamic teaching, for which the waqif (waqf maker) dedicated the waqf.
As the rules for waqf properties since 1959 provided authority at the
discretion of Chief Administrator Auqaf to sell waqf property for reasons
he considered befitting, the Ordinance (Amendment, 1984), 1979,
introduced a ‘religious’ obligation to follow the intent of the waqif.65
Even where the Chief Administrator considered it necessary to sell waqf
property, the ordinance binds the authority as ‘subject to the provisions
of subsection (2) of section 15 where it should be satisfied that
circumstances exist which make it necessary to sell or otherwise dispose
of any Waqf Property in order’.66 And even where the auqaf authority
finds it necessary to sell out waqf property the authorities should see first
that the ‘sale-proceeds shall first be applied for satisfying the main
purpose of the Waqf’.67
The Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance (PWPO), 1979, has acquired
a permanent legal position since its enforcement and no government
since has felt the need to make any significant change to it. The death of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had already deflated the socialist philosophy of
nationalisation of business corporations. Zia ul Haq himself started
dismantling the national-socialist acts of the Bhutto government. The
privatisation policies were resumed forcefully under ensuing govern-
ments. Although Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and
leader of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), continued a few socialist ideas,
she put forward the idea of public/private partnerships and showed a
positive leaning towards privatisation, while the other ruling political
group, led by the Muslim League and headed by Nawaz Sharif, never
hesitated to support increased privatisation. However, the intention of
these governments could not change the nationalisation assumptions of
waqf properties.
During the post-Zia period, especially in the Musharraf government,
the emphasis was on reforming institutions and creating better
administration. Instead of changing the fundamental principles of the
Waqf Ordinance, the state focused on improving the functioning of the
department. To pursue this policy, detailed rules were devised for

managing shrines, mosques and waqf property.68 The rules dealt mainly
with the appointment of managers, a scheme for the management of
waqf property, the appointment of a Religious Purposes Committee and
the leasing of waqf properties. Instead of taking waqf properties as a
singular concept, these rules clearly define distinct management for the
shrines and mosques. The rules lay down that, in the case of the mosque,
the manager of a waqf is responsible for ensuring that ‘religious services
and other functions performed therein are continued’.69 The rules also
make it binding that in the case of the shrine ‘the conduct and regulation
of the established rites and ceremonies [should be performed] in
accordance with the tenets of the saint or sect concerned’.70 The rules,
while keeping mutwallis out of shrines, make the auqaf manager, a
representative of the national bank and district khateeb, responsible for
keeping the keys of the locked income boxes placed at shrines.71
The Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002,
categorise shrines and mosques in terms of their income and define
rules for appointing a Religious Purposes Committee to manage their
affairs. The 2002 rules place shrines into three categories: seven to ten
members, where the shrine has an annual income of 10 lac rupees72 or
above; five to seven members, where the shrine has an annual income of
5 to 10 lac rupees; and five members, where the shrine has an annual
income of less than 5 lac rupees.73 However, for mosques there are only
two income divisions, corresponding to the two lower-income brackets
of shrines. The 2002 rules maintain that:
where the Waqf Property is a mosque, the Religious Purposes

Committee shall consist of: five to seven members, where the
mosque has an annual income more than one lac rupees; and five
members where the mosque has an annual income less than one lac
rupees.74
The rules suggested that shrines have such a clear income advantage that
there was no need to introduce a higher income bracket for managing the
mosques.
The emphasis of the Musharraf period on developmental concerns also
correlates with a slightly different but related legislative process that
gives a new meaning to waqf property. The legal acts from 1959 to 1979
provided a colonial re-appropriation of a Muslim law of waqf; however,

in the first decade of the new millennium, waqf property was also
understood as heritage. The Auqaf Department had already been
working in collaboration with the archaeology department. At different
times the state also portrayed shrines as religious sites for visitation.
During the Musharraf period, a renewed interest in cultural heritage and
tourism emerged because of United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation (UNESCO) initiatives with the Government of Pakistan to
attract investment for conserving old sites in the country. The State of
Pakistan capitalised on this opportunity and extended its operations to
cultural heritage sites. Two pilot projects were initiated: one in Lahore
and the other in Peshawar. The Lahore project was named the Tajdeed e
Lahore (Reviving Lahore) Program by the government. A board was
instituted to oversee the programme through an ordinance in 2002,
though the work on the project was initiated as early as 2000, with the
reconstruction of the shrine of Shah Chiragh. The purpose of the board
was to relocate the cultural heritage sites, make plans to improve those
sites, protect them from damage and control unnecessary advertising
material posted on any such site.
The ordinance, however, was repealed by another legal enforcement of
the Punjab Heritage Act of 2005, which the Punjab Assembly approved
on 13 January 2005 and the Governor assented to on 19 January 2005.75
The scope of the initial programme, which was meant to revive the
heritage sites of Lahore only under this act, now extended to the whole of
Punjab. The act’s purposes were almost the same as those of the earlier
Tajdeed e Lahore Program: ‘to conserve, maintain, rehabilitate and
develop the Punjab Heritage and make provisions for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto’. The act was to make efforts to locate and
conserve the sites of cultural heritage in the whole of the Punjab.
As there had been many other departments doing similar work, the act
creating a board comprising secretaries or controllers of different state
departments.76
The 2005 Act opened up the possibility of considering waqf, so far
understood only as religious sacred sites, as cultural heritage. Instead of
considering shrines as embedded within customary traditions, all the
previous legal efforts, from 1959 to 1984, had conceived of these sites as
religious spaces. The legal efforts were concerned with controlling and
managing these sites in order to provide a better environment for

religious practices. However, the legal efforts did not differentiate
between mosque- and shrine-based practices. In order to control and
manage all the sites, the legal efforts broke the link between the site of a
shrine and the customary traditions within which the shrine-based ethos
had been embedded. In order to regenerate the cultural heritage in
Punjab the 2005 Act redirected the thinking of the governing elite
consider some of the shrines, if not all, as part of their cultural heritage,
an Islamic heritage.77
Defining auqaf laws through judicial decisions

The auqaf laws provided the structure or frames within which the post-
colonial state defined not only waqf and waqf properties but also waqf
property as a religious site and its relation with the public. The judicial
process also links shrines with universal Islamic theology and the history
of Muslims in India in order to give them Islamised identity. The
activity, which remained largely redefining and re-interpreting the
hidden and vague meanings of Waqf Acts, also provided viable answers
to the complex question of waqf property and its justified usage by the
state. Although district courts sometimes gave decisions in favour of
customary mujawarins (traditional caretakers of the shrines), the judicial
process seldom moved against the policies and legislative processes of the
government and worked as an interpreter of decisions already taken.
The judicial process started as soon as the aggrieved parties, mostly
customary mutwallis or sajjada nashins of different shrines from which the
post-colonial state had taken control, began approaching courts to seek
justice. In response to cases filed by the mutwallis, the courts started giving
their rulings, after defining in detail not only the position of the appellants
but also defining such concepts as religion, public, nation state, sajjada
nashin and shrines. The following section will try to establish the judicial
definitions through the decisions of some significant rulings of the
Supreme Court, as those of Pir Rashid ud Daula, pirzadgan of Shah Daula
shrine, and Haji Ghulam Rasul, representing the mujawarin of Data Ganj
Bakhsh Sahib, Lahore, against the auqaf administrator.
Although the sajjada nashins of the shrine of Shah Daula were not the
first to go to the courts, the detailed decision on the case between Pir
Rashid ud Daula versus the Chief Administrator of Auqaf provided
answers to many of the conceptual confusions regarding the Waqf

Properties Ordinance of 1959. Before coming to the Supreme Court, the
appellants, in this case, pirzadgans of the shrine of Shah Daula had
already won their case at the district court. In another case, that of Sain
Karam Ilahi v. Auqaf, the same district court had already held that the
Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959, could not be considered valid as
the governor did not have the powers to promulgate such laws. However,
the Auqaf Administrator refused to accept the decision and the then
Martial Law Administrator, Zone B, issued Martial Law Order No. 82:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any order,

injunction or judgment of any Court, the West Pakistan Waqf
Properties Ordinance, 1959, will stand valid in all respects and
will not be called in question on any ground or in any manner, in
any court, including the High Court and Supreme Court.78
The District Judge, in the presence of the martial law order, considered
that it was not within the power of the court to decide on the ordinance,
but still pronounced that the shrine of Shah Daula could not be
considered as a waqf property. However, the Office of Auqaf went to the
High Court and received a favourable decision. The High Court not only
considered the ordinance as not ultra vires but also maintained that a
shrine, even that of Shah Daula of Gujrat, and the income thereof should
be considered as waqf property. The appellants, therefore, had to resort to
the Supreme Court, where a bench comprising Chief Justice Hamood ur
Rehman, Justice Muhammad Yaqub Ali, Justice M.R. Khan and Justice
Waheed ud Din Ahmad heard the case and issued a detailed decision.79
When the appellants approached the courts, they tried to challenge
the concept of religion and tried to uncover its different meanings in
order to show that the concept could be changed with relation to the
sites; that is, religion does not have an equally unequivocal meaning for
the site of mosque and the site of shrine. As the definition of waqf
property, the Auqaf Ordinance of 1959 considers all those dedicated
properties as waqf that are religiously dedicated.80 Without naming
them, the ordinance considered all the shrines as waqf property and made
them susceptible to be taken over by the post-colonial state. However,
there were problems tackling this question. For the courts, there was no
single definitive text to be followed, nor any single constitution upon
which a decision could be based. The courts avoided aligning themselves

with the constitution of 1962 but considered the Waqf Properties
Ordinance, 1959, should be read with the already abrogated Constitution
of 1956.81 During the judicial process, the courts not only took colonial
cases as a precedent but also took laws like the Punjab Muslim Shariat Bill
(1948) as a framework within which to consider their decision. However,
whenever the argument suited their purpose they made references to the
texts of the constitution. For example, in order to equate waqf with a
religious position, the court cited the clauses of the 1956 Constitution
where waqf and mosque are placed together.82
During the discussion for the case Pir Rashid ud Daula v. The Chief
Administrator of Auqaf, the appellants or pirzadgans made the point that
shrines are not religious institutions at all. They referred to Wilayat
Shah v. Sardara and others,83 in which the single judge of the Lahore
High Court gave a ruling that a khankah was essentially private
property and should not be considered a religious institution. In his
decision, the learned judge, Cornelius J., considered khankah as though
evolving out of a small tomb or pucca grave, and developing into a
larger devotional site. It should be considered a private institution in
the sense of an
institution which is managed by members of the family of the

founder so that the right of managing the property, the right of
receiving offerings, the right of initiating and instructing disciples,
the right of holding an urs, etc. devolve upon particular persons.84
The judge therefore seems to have given more weight and importance to
the possession of and running the business, instead of the acquisition of
the property as a necessary condition for considering it private property.
However, the Bench of the Supreme Court in the 1960s diverged
from the earlier ruling and, to justify the ordinance, explained the
difference between khankah and dargah. As its textual authority for the
matter, the court took the writings of Syed Amir Ali as the standard text
and based its decision on the reading of the text. In this way, the court
was able not only to differentiate between khankah and dargah but also to
bracket khankah as ‘public and quasi-public waqfs’,85 ignoring the
historical understanding of the concept ‘public’, where it seems to mean
‘open for all people’. The court referred to Amir Ali’s historical
narration, already cited in an earlier case,86 as the only true narration.

The narration runs:
A Darwesh or a person who, by leading a pious life, has won the

esteem and veneration of the neighborhood, or a sufi of a particular
sanctity has settled down in some locality. So long as he has not
attained sufficient eminence, it is designated as Astana. His pious
life and religious ministrations attract public notice, disciples
gather round him, and a place is constructed for their lodgment.
And the humble Takia grows into a khankah. After the death of
the holy personage the spot where he is buried becomes a shrine
and an object of pilgrimage not only for his disciples but for
people of distant parts, both Muhammadans and Hindus, and is
designated either as Dargah or Astana or Rouza.
In this sense, the court understood shrines as the continuity of khankah

and equated dargah, astana or rouza with different forms of a single
shrine similarly displaying single shrine-based practices.
The court concluded further that not only should all the different
mystical forms be considered as shrine-based practices but also all of the
different forms are religious in nature. The court’s interpretation of Amir
Ali’s text could not locate it in its historico-cultural situation and placed
history in a kind of eternal presence. The text presented the linear
growth of shrine-based practices as half Sufistic and half pluralistic. The
text ignored the possibility of the cotemporal existence of many of
the shrine-based forms as it ignored the impossibility of having khankah,
astana and darbar at the same time. Following the text, therefore, the
court could not see that there may be differences within dargah, astana,
rouza and darbar. Ignoring the difference among different forms and
abstracting the narration from the concrete historical situation brings
out another dimension: it ignores the role of living forms and living
figures on these sites – in short, customary practices. The reading of the
text, in the way the court constructed the narration, seems to assume
further that there is no need to accept the presence of living dervesh or
Sufi. The text only highlighted the existence of one living spiritual
being, and even that spiritual being appears in the earlier part of the text
in the khankah when common people started visiting the place –
whatever comes later appeared only as remembering focused around the
dead saint. The text refused, further, the possibility of sajjada nashin, the
spiritual inheritor of the dead-saint, as a dervesh Sufi saint.
Ignoring the historical situatedness, the court was also unable to
perceive the form of non-puritan religion. The court could not see that
the religion in the above story was presented in the non-communal and
non-Shariat form, within non-Singular Islamic space and having
multiple religious communities living side by side. Space and the site
where both Muhammadans and Hindus visited as devotees could not be
considered religious in the post-colonial state standing upon the Singular
Muslim identity. Amir Ali’s text presumed the spaces of overlapping
devotions as a historical and existential fact. However, within the post-
colonial state, such sites can only be considered as deviant sites and the
practices at them as deviant forms.87 In the presence of the process of
Islamisation, the sense of religion could not be understood as the site
where both Hindus and Muslims could participate together. However, the
court ignored the distinction and considered these sites as religious
because devotees used to come for praying fatiha, ‘participate in Urs,
ceremonies of the saint, celebrate the birthday of the Holy prophet
(PBUH), perform other rites and ceremonies, have recitations from the
holy Quran’.88 Also because ‘a Khankah is a place where religious devotees
are lodged and fed during the period they are congregated there for
religious instructions’.89 The court also observed that because Shah Daula
was himself very benevolent and many Muslim texts mention him as a
saint, his shrine could be understood as a religious shrine.
The court, while following Amir Ali, not only considered all forms of
shrine-based spaces as religious but also envisioned these spaces in the
imagery of a mosque. For the court, Amir Ali includes khankah ‘as well
as Rouzahs and Dargahs in the same category of subjects of Waqf as
Mosques and Imambaras’.90 The court then provided the reason for Amir
Ali to consider khankahs, dargahs, etc., as waqf and under the same
category along with mosques.91 For the court, it was because in these
spaces ‘the rich and the poor, the rich and the indigent, are equally
entitled to participate’.92 Therefore the court maintained that:
if such an institution is intended to be visited by any member of

the public, who feels attracted towards joining in the instructions
or devotional exercises, or to perform pilgrimage to such a place,
then the institution would become a public Waqf, in the same way
as a mosque would become a public Waqf, if once it is established

that prayers are habitually offered therein by the public with Azan
and Ikamat.93
From there, it was not difficult for the court to see the shrine of Shah
Daula in the light of an already developed textual interpretation and to
maintain that the shrine is a religious institution and, therefore, waqf
property. Even going beyond that, it maintained that the shrine of Shah
Daula and the similar shrines can be
valid objects of Waqf even according to the Shariat Law and the
manner of their user . . . in the present case, from time immemorial
would seem to indicate that they were treated as religious
institutions to which the members of the public at large, rich or
poor, affluent or indigent, had equal access without any restriction
whatsoever, in the same manner, they would have access to any
other place of public worship or pilgrimage.94
Interestingly, taking support from Shariat law, in its decision the court
held offerings as waqf property. Accepting that there have been many
cases in the previous judicial decisions confirming rights of sajjada
nashins on the offerings (nazranai) at the shrine, the court still found a
text negating all precedents. The court even refused to accept the fatawas
of the 55 ulemas from Ahl e Sunnat wal Jamaat submitted by the
appellants, to show that ‘all nazar and niaz (offerings) which is daily
offered at Dargah, is to be divided between the descendants of the saint
enshrined there and the khadim (servitors) of the shrine’. The court
accepted the authority of the text of Tayyib Ji,95 a judge and a lawyer
during the colonial period, and appropriated the basic principle that ‘the
offering is made to the holy saint buried at the shrine’ [emphasis mine].
The court took the word of Tayyab Ji as resonating with the clauses of
the Auqaf Ordinance:
Nazrana or offerings given at a shrine or dargah either in a Ghalla

(offering box) or otherwise, may become consecrated to God, or
impressed with a trust, in which case they must be used for
religious or pious purposes. The reason given in support of this
view is that the offerings are often made in the belief that there is
religious [emphasis mine] merit in making them and that they are
generally invited by representations (expressed or implied) that
they will be utilised for religious or charitable purposes.96
The court therefore accepted even the offering of cash as waqf property
and denied the right of sajjada nashins over the monetary nazranas
(offerings) and ghalla (cash box), and maintained that if the sajjada
nashin had been appropriating the cash and offerings, this could only be
considered as mischief.97 The court provided justification for the
Administrator Auqaf Department to take over all the offered income
because offerings would be given to the buried saint.
If a Waqf could under the Shariat Law be made of property of this

nature . . . then we can see no valid objection to the Legislature
impressing them with such a character and depriving those who
were hithertofore appropriating them as their personal income or
property . . . particularly, where the intention of the donor was not
clear although basically [emphasis mine] the offerings were made
for a religious or charitable purpose.98
While making its decision against sajjada nahsins the court displayed a
different attitude towards khadims (servitors) of the shrines and
permitted them to carry on earning income at the site of the shrine.
Considering them as those who work at the shrines and take their reward
against their work, the court thought that taking away their reward was
not justified. It seems that it placed the post-colonial state in a
mediatory position, the position customarily enjoyed by sajjada nashins
at the site of the shrine. The invisible nature of the work values of the
gradually expanding market economy gave enough reasons for the courts
to think in favour of those who worked – that is khadim – against those
who did not work – sajjada nahsins. It seems the court opened up the
possibility for a new world, within which the post-colonial state would
be taking the position of those who did not work.
Difference between possessory rights and private ownership

In another case, the Supreme Court further defined the concept of
khadims in order to bring forward the right of the traditional caretaker
for possessing waqf property. After the shrine was taken over by the
Auqaf Administrator, and after moving through the lower courts, the
traditional caretakers of the shrine of Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib
went to the Supreme Court, where the case was heard by the same judges
who had heard the previous case of Pir Rashid ud Daula v. Auqaf. The
court accepted the case for the hearing because the khadim or mujawarin
filed the case as customarily possessing property at the shrine of Data
Ganj Bakhsh Sahib, instead of the sajjada nashin. However, as the
previous ruling has already decided that the Waqf Ordinance could
not be challenged, the appellants emphasised the regaining of their
dispossessed property, without going into the fight for control of the
shrine. The discussion during the case continued defining the concept of
possessory rights and their relation to private property, along with the
nature of mujawars and/or khadims of the shrine. The court made a
difference between acquired property as a basic element of the concept of
private property and gifted property, not necessarily private property and
therefore susceptible to public control.
The court, though, did not lend its support to accepting mujawars as
sajjada nashins, as the appellants tried to present them, yet considered it
better to see them as equivalent to align its position with the previous
decision. The court supported the position of the respondent council and
considered that it was not possible for the mujawar, as servitor, to own
property of the shrine. For this, the court followed the decision of
J. Tayyab Ji in the case of Mahommad Oosman and others v. Razaq Saleem
Ahmed Vanjara and others.99 The court maintained that Tayyab Ji had
given his decision, after a detailed examination of the Qur’an and texts of
Muslim jurisprudence, and found that only sajjada nashins could claim
an intermediary position between a devotee and God. The serving
positions, such as mujawar and khadim, are servants and cannot claim to
have the intermediary position along with a share in the offerings and
property. However, the court found it prudent not to expand on this
position, as even Tayyab Ji maintained that in cases where the time
period is very long, the position of the mujawar might be considered
differently. The court, therefore, maintained that for present purposes
mujawars could be considered equivalent to sajjada nashins, as they
performed similar functions for a similar length of time.100
The court maintained that because of the evidence of using the
property for many decades, it accepted their rights to possess property as
acquired but not as an owner. The court accepted the plea of mujawarins
to acknowledge their possession, at best, as joint ownership. In tracing

the record of revenue, the court maintained that the records for the years
of 1856 and 1868 showed that the land taken over by the Auqaf
Administrator was in control of the ‘Mujawaran of Hazrat Data Ganj
Bakhsh Sahib’ as ‘Maqbooza Malikan (owners as in possession)’.
However, it did not see this evidence as establishing the property as
being owned by mujawarans and, therefore, it should not be treated as
waqf. The court further maintained that the property of ‘Maqboozan
Malikan’ had been divided into three patties (lines); namely Patti
Khairdin, Patti Alauddin and Patti Qutub Din.101 The court accepted
the position that the revenue record showed that the property had also
been divided respectively among all of these patties. It also accepted the
fact that individual mujawars had also sold, mortgaged or leased out the
property in the past. However, the court was surprised that, given all
these facts, it could be proved that the property under the discussion was
the property of mujawarins and not a possessory right; that is, how could
mujawarins prove that it was not because of their role as caretakers that
they had acquired the possession of their lands?
In order to refute the position of mujawarin, the judges highlighted
the basic characteristic of private property, that is, the ownership of the
property can only be claimed if the property becomes a self-acquired
property. The judges maintained that they could not find any entry in
any of the revenue records that showed that the heirs of any of the
mujawarin ‘were brought on to the record as the owners’.102 They
maintained further that the ‘owner’s column has all along shown that
only a floating body of the persons, known as the Mujawaran of the
shrine of Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib, were owners of these lands’.103
The court acknowledged that there were many altered entries suggesting
gifts to the shrines; however, the judges could not find any entry
regarding the personal ownership of the land. The court highlighted that
during the land settlement of 1892, three of the mujawar, acting as
general attorneys of the mujawarins:
made a declaration that all the lands recorded in the three patties
were not lands owned by the respective patties in possession thereof
but that, in fact, all the lands were owned by the shrine of Data
Ganj Bakhsh Sahib and, therefore, all these lands should be
recorded in the ownership of the shrine.104
Once the judges of the Supreme Court reached the position that the
lands under the possession of the mujawarins could not be considered
their private property and must be considered the property of shrine, it
was not difficult to deduce further that all such property must also be
considered waqf property. As a final move the court reminded the
mujawarins that as they had already declared that they were the
possessors of the property during the colonial period it was not possible
to move away from this position in post-colonial times. The court stated
that since the mujawarins
with full knowledge of the facts requested the revenue authorities

to correct the records by entering therein the true position and
have since allowed that position to remain unchanged for nearly 80
years they are now debarred from setting up a different case and
should, at any rate, not be believed when they say that this is not
the true position.105
From that point onwards the court decided quite clearly that the
properties in question were waqf properties and ‘since the shrines in this
case, was a public institution, its properties also were public Waqf’.106
Public as common people and/or community, or public as a state

Since Supreme Court judges defined the concept of waqf property in the
light of private property, at the same time they equated ‘public’ with the
state. Equating ‘public’ with the state is not uncommon and has been
used in many rulings and seldom criticised. The post-colonial state
appears, at least during its first few decades, as the public embodied,
unable to see any local community playing any role within larger
Muslim life. The state stretched universal Muslim ideology to such a
point that no difference of locality is recognised. This difference never
appeared during the judicial decisions and the debates on the Auqaf
Board nor during the legislative processes on waqf properties. If it
appears anywhere, or if any criticism appears in some form, it remains
in such a weak position that instead of deconstructing the assumed
symmetry, it helps instantly to strengthen the assumptions.
It is interesting that the nation state emerged on the concept
of religious ideology, and the universal commonality of religious
dispositions understood ‘public’ as necessarily linked with the state.
If, as the ruling of the Supreme Court suggests, a waqf is valid ‘public
waqf’ then it can be taken over by the state. The decision suggests that
‘public’ was understood as ‘open to the public’ or ‘accessible for the use of
the public’ but necessarily controlled by the state. This is contrary to
previous rulings of colonial courts where judges, while defining Shariat
and creating a difference between public and private waqf, did not relate
to the ‘public’ as a connected necessity through which the state had the
power to control such public waqf. The colonial judges restrained
themselves only to defining ‘public’ and ‘private’ in order to simplify
matters and in order to save the gradual prevalence of the ‘private
ownership’ of the property, while at the same time giving privilege to
the local customs. However, the later judiciary of Pakistan not only had
Shariat available as a codified law, without being troubled by a difference
of interpretation but also, interestingly, the text of Syed Amir Ali,
defining most Muhammadan laws as Shariat laws. The judges therefore
found it convenient to take decisions by employing and connecting these
apparently distinct concepts, thus validating state control over waqf
property and also expressing the ‘socialistic reformist’ streak embedded
within the eclectic ideas of the modern intellectual elite.
Rasoomat (customary ceremonies), state and

traditional caretakers
For many years, the confusion over the possibility of holding rasoomats
(customary practices) at the site of a shrine remained unclear between the
Auqaf Department and mujawarins or mutwallis. However, the confusion
continued only for mujawarins and judiciary, while the bureaucracy of the
Auqaf Department was quite clear on the issue. Even given the fear of
going against judicial decisions, the Auqaf Administrator, with the
support of larger state machinery, never gave up control, at least over
the most significant shrine, that of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib. Even during
the period when the judiciary gave decisions in favour of its mutwallis or
mujawarins, he continued to make things difficult for them. The confusion
was highlighted when, after winning through all the lower courts,
mujawarins also won a favourable decision from the Supreme Court to
retain their rights to perform religious practices at the shrine. The Supreme
Court gave a decision in favour of the mujawarins of the shrine of Data Ganj
Bakhsh Sahib in 1971, granting the following reliefs to the mujawarins:
(i) That the Mujawarin acquired the right by immemorial user of

performing the ‘Rasoomat’ and other religious ceremonies connected
with the shrine provided that performance of such functions does not
amount to misuse of the Waqf Properties.
(ii) That under the Waqf Properties Ordinance the Chief Administrator
of Auqaf had no right to deprive them of this privilege of performing
such Rasoomat and other religious ceremonies although he had the
discretion to contribute or not to contribute towards the expenses
thereof and the right to recover the same.
(iii) That the taking over of the amount of Rs 12,561.50 in cash found in
a Potla or bag was illegal, as it was a part of pre-Notification offerings
which have already been appropriated by the Mujawarin. This
amount should be returned to the Mujawarin.
(iv) That if the ornaments are in the shape of utensils such as Atar Daan
(scent bottle), Gulab Posh (rose cover), etc., or articles such as Gilafs,
Pabor Yosh Canopies, etc., they should be treated as Waqf Properties
belonging to the shrine and not as the personal properties of the
Mujawarin but if there be any item of purely personal use presented
to the shrine by way of offerings then they should be returned to the
Mujawarin.107
However, the Chief Administrator Auqaf refused to accept the decision

of the Supreme Court. As soon as the mujawarins requested him to
comply with the Supreme Court orders, the Governor of West Pakistan
issued an ordinance making amendments to the West Pakistan Waqf
Properties, 1961.108 Through Ordinance XVI of 1971, section 6 of the
West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961, was substituted,
increasing the powers of the Chief Administrator. The new Ordinance
states:
Section 6 (1) ‘Notwithstanding anything to the Contrary

contained in section 22 of the Religious Endowments Act,
1863, or any other law for the time being in force, or in any
custom or usage, or in any decree, judgment or order of any Court
or other authority, or in any proceeding pending before any Court
or other authority, the chief Administrator may, by notification,
take over and assume the administration, control, management
and maintenance of a Waqf Property.
(2) No person shall perform services or ceremonies (Rasoomat)

referred to in subsection (1) except with the prior permission of the
Chief Administrator and in accordance with such directions as
may be given by him.’109
The amendments to the Waqf Properties Ordinance of 1961 authorised

the Chief Administrator Auqaf to refuse to comply with the direction of
the Supreme Court orders allowing mujawarins to perform religious
rasoomat within the shrine. The mujawarins again went to the High
Court, requesting the court to give direction to the Chief Administrator
Auqaf to perform the legal obligations in compliance with the orders of
the Supreme Court.110 The single judge of the Lahore High Court
instructed the Chief Administrator to comply with the Supreme Court
orders and take a favourable decision with regard to the mujawarins.
However, the Chief Administrator Auqaf, instead of following the High
Court decision given on 24 May 1974, challenged the decision in Letters
Patent Appeal before a Division Bench of High Court on 5 July 1974.
The Division Bench accepted the filing of the case by the Chief
Administrator Auqaf and set aside the judgment of the single judge of
the Lahore High Court.111 The mujawarins, however, again filed the case
in the Supreme Court. The case remained in the court for 16 years, at
which time the Supreme Court decided against the mujawarin of Data
Ganj Bakhsh Sahib and made it clear that the permission of the Chief
Administrator was necessary for the performance of any religious
ceremony.112
Conclusion
Until Ayub Khan’s ordinance regarding taking over complete control of
shrines, the post-colonial state, although it extended its control, kept its
lego-religious thinking grounded in reterritorialised identity. The
earlier emphases to exclude deviant customary practices could not
produce the desired results because of the incapacity of the post-colonial
state and gave way to complete control through the autocratic rule of
Ayub Khan. The underpinning of all legal activities since 1959
remained embedded within the emphasis on the continuity of the
reterritorialisation, a kind of double-reterritorialisation. The opening up
of the possibility of controlling the traditionally deviant sites through
universal laws, initiated and enforced through Ayub Khan’s reformist

agenda, never allowed the local traditional caretakers to control the
sacred sites. The Bhutto government only tried to keep the universal
impact of these laws through introducing centralised activities, upon
which, interestingly, stood the Ordinance of 1979.
It is interesting that no democratic government ever felt the need to
change the universal legalisation process, nor did the fact that such
legalisation was initiated under martial law regimes embarrass these
governments. The process of double-reterritorialisation or extending
Islamic territoriality for the local sacred sites was prevalent that each
government felt it incumbent on them to carry on with the fundamental
principles of legalities. The colonial period, despite opening up the
universal legalising process and providing grounds for imagining
reterritorialised identity, left the sites of worship to the local
communities. However, within the post-colonial State of Pakistan,
there is no local community within the ambit of Islamised Muslims that
can be legally considered free to control ways of religious worshipping
on its own. The legalisation process connected localities and the local
sites of worship with the universal religious ideologue. The localised
religious practices could not secure a place within this universalising
locality except to appear as ‘deviant’. The legalised framework left a
place, however, only for those sacred sites unable to grow economically.
It is interesting that the legalisation within the post-Ayub period kept
its thinking on shrines linked closely with the profitability of the sacred
space – the legalisation ensures that only those shrines that would not
become a financial burden on the government itself can come under the
control of the Auqaf Department.
The legislation-cum-legalisation process, though universal, how-
ever, remained flaw-ridden; its ambiguities and vagueness requiring
judicial interpretive activities for clarification before the implemen-
tation. Unlike the colonial judicial process, which created rules for
reducing the multiplicity of life forms, the post-colonial judicial
process, especially after the Ordinance of 1959, opened up a process of
clarification of flaws and vagueness of the already-defined legal rules.
The post-colonial judicial process redefined concepts of shrines, waqf
and public and private property. Where the process could not define
clearly it gives, in a concealed way, domination of one form over the
other, as the judicial process made religion synonymous with Islam and
enforced it even on pluralistic historical manifestations. The changed

circumstances within which the post-colonial judiciary found itself put
them on the path of owning and manifesting double-reterritorialised
identity in their decisions. The post-colonial judicial process,
following the spirit of the colonial judiciary, pushed forward a similar
agenda of devising a universal legalisation process in order to extend
and control the locality.
CHAPTER 4
THE POST-COLONIAL STATE,

SHRINES AND THE AUQAF
DEPARTMENT
This chapter examines the development and working of the Auqaf

Department in relation to the politico-religious policies of the post-
colonial state, starting from the rule of General Ayub Khan to General
Musharraf. The chapter shows that the policies and emphases of each
government had their unique character; some continuity could also be
witnessed after the Auqaf Department started its work. Following
Jamal Malik’s position, the chapter demonstrates that the colonial
urban sector, through the department, extended its control on shrines.
However, it is also to understand that the gradual extending of
the colonial sector was also the accomplishment of the revivalist
religious strands, which remained concealed beneath the policies of
the Auqaf Department. The chapter will show that the Auqaf
Department gradually shifted its policies from an emphasis on the
reformist position to religious prevalence, and later on, to an emphasis
on performance; hence absorbing both reformist and revivalist
religious positions. The policies created the possibility of dominating
customary shrine life more completely through the revivalist agenda
that had been in place from its colonial origin. Interestingly, the
revivalist religious focus also became the reason to enlarge the sites
of shrines.
THE POST-COLONIAL STATE, SHRINES 105
The Auqaf Department and the rule of Ayub Khan:

initiating control for reforms
Auqaf as a separate state department came into being after the
promulgation of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance
(WPWPO), 1959, and from then on acted on shrines to have them
transformed as sites with modern facilities.1 The Auqaf Department was
set up in order to take control of the waqf properties attached to shrines
and translate the income deriving from these properties into welfare
for the common people (the public). The socialist nationalisation of
shrines – taking them over in order to distribute their surplus income to
the people – correlated with the government’s other policies of social
reform.2 Almost at the same time, the government had introduced its
intention to undertake a survey and redistribute large land holdings in
the country. Ayub Khan considered that large landholding hampered
‘the free exercise of political rights and stifle the growth of political
institutions’.3 He intended that land reforms should entail the
emergence of a strong middle class that could engender leadership that
would in turn reform rural life.4
However, the taking over of shrines and waqf properties that went
along with these intentions was also linked with the ideological strands
of high morality and ‘revivalist’ religious practices. The intelligentsia
behind the operations and launching of the Auqaf Department even
intended to transform the shrine practices through creating a
propaganda campaign that would expose the fraudulent character of
mutwallis or sajjada nashins of shrines. The intention was to show the
common people that, because of their naivety, they lost their precious
belongings by giving them to shrines.5 Along with initiating the
operations of the Auqaf Administrator, the government also created a
commission to eradicate social evils. The committee, headed by Maulvi
Ghulam Muhayyuddin, while giving many other reasons, also
considered the worshipping of graves and tombs a major social evil
and recommended taking the necessary steps to eradicate worshipping at
the graves. The recommendation of the committee, coupled with the
policies of the Auqaf Department already carried out, provided the
government with the justification not only to carry forward the process
of taking over shrines but also enhanced the criticism against mujawars
and mutwallis (the caretakers of shrines). In order to pursue this
intention, the department, as well as taking over the shrine, also began a
propaganda campaign that spread such messages as ‘do not to give
nazranas (offerings) to the mujawar’ and ‘shrine-going is a remnant of a
simple and archaic rural life’.6
Following the policy of taking over shrines, the Auqaf Department
started its operations with meagre resources but at a fast pace.
It started working as A.H. Qureshi, a Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP)
officer in the Government of Pakistan, who held the title of an
officer of the Administrator of Waqfs and Secretary to the Government
of West Pakistan, became the first administrator of the department.
The administrator issued the first notification to repeal the previous
act of 1952 and enforce the ordinance of 1959 on 9 January 1960.7
The administrator’s first head office was in Karachi. During his visits, he
held the status of commissioner and was therefore able to accept the help
of the staff of the Commissioner’s Office and officers of the Revenue
Department, such as the Tehsildar (Tehsil Administrator), the Naib
Tehsildar (Deputy Tehsil Administrator), etc. Because of the authority
of the Revenue Department, the Auqaf Administrator gained access to
the revenue record that provided the department with the ability to
undertake quick surveys to take control of the shrines. Except for a few
major shrines, the Tehsildar or Naib Tehsildar acted on the orders of the
Auqaf Administrator to take control of shrines and property attached
therewith.
Although the Auqaf Department started operation almost nine
months after the promulgation of the WPWPO, 1959, the department
was quick to take control of some significant shrines in Lahore in the
following few months. Starting in March with taking over the shrine of
Hazrat Ali Hajvery Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib,8 Lahore, the department
was able to take over more than 30 waqf properties by October.9 At the
same time it was in a position to take over another dozen waqf
properties, within which a large amount of land attached with Bibian
Pak Daman, Lahore was also included.10 Other than Data Ganj Bakhsh
Sahib, the department was able to take over around 10 shrines, including
the shrines of Mian Mir, Shah Jamal, Madhu Lal Hussain and Shah
Kamal in Lahore, a shrine of Bullai Shah in Kasur, two shrines
including Mian Muhammad Sharaqpuri in Sheikhupura, one shrine
of Pak Shah Rehman in Gujranwala and the shrine of Imam Ali ul Haq
in Sialkot, up to the end of 1960. The department also took over
around eight waqf properties of Takia (the temporary abode of a saint

and a form of the shrine), and 34 mosques, in Lahore, in the same
period.11
The shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib did not possess the largest
attached property but its popularity and centrality, along with its
ability to earn a considerable amount of cash income, drew the Auqaf
Department’s attention initially. The shrine had a history of almost
900 years; however, its centrality emerged in correlation with the
prevalence of Muslim revivalist movements in late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century Punjab. Many decades before the division
of British India, the shrine had already attracted a lot of attention
as well as the focus of local European scholars. Its popularity became
the reason for the construction of a new mosque in 1924. However,
its popularity and the pilgrims grew at such a fast pace that from
thousands of pilgrims in 1850 the estimated number grew to more
than 250,000 pilgrims in the 1950s on urs days. The large increase in
pilgrims also entailed large donations. The increase in popularity
place considerable stress on the caretakers of the shrine to manage and
control the site better. However, the slowness and inability of the
mujawars to extend the site of the shrine not only earned them a bad
name but also provided justification for the Auqaf Department to take
it over.
As soon as the department took over the shrine, the administrator
appointed a committee to manage and maintain the waqf properties.
Comprising three administrative staff, the committee was headed by
Deputy Commissioner Lahore (member and chairman), with the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Lahore, as a member and a Pakistan Civil
Service (PCS) city magistrate as Secretary of the Committee.12 After a
few weeks, the administrator replaced the magistrate with another,
Abdul Waheed and also gave him the authority of ‘Manager of the said
Darbar (shrine) in addition to his own duties as Magistrate, First
Class Lahore, with effect from the 15th of February, 1960’.13 However,
after another two weeks, the Administrator once again modified the
managing committee of the Darbar of Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib,
Lahore. This time the administrator enlarged the committee from four
to seven members and included four significant devoted elites. The new
members of the committee were: Amir Ud Din, from Barood Khana;
Sheikh Muhammad Din, the proprietor of National Fans, Lahore; Haji
Muhammad Amin, Proprietor Ahmed Bakhsh and Bros., Brandreth

Road, Lahore; and Dr Abdul Waheed, Ferozsons, Lahore.14
The inclusion of members from non-administrative bureaucratic
positions not only changed the composition of the managing committee
but also reforged the link between religiously and emotionally motivated
believers with the Darbar (shrine). The proprietor of the National
Fans Company, Haji Sheikh Muhammad Din, only after a few months
becoming a member of the managing committee, announced the building
of a new mosque for Data Darbar. He claimed he would bear all the expenses
of the mosque himself.15 Sheikh Muhammad Din announced that the new
mosque would resemble the mosque of Madina and it would be named after
the name of Prophet Muhammad. He also claimed that the map of the
mosque was under preparation and its construction would cost around
400,000 rupees. However, the construction of the mosque was only a part of
reconstructuring the whole shrine, at a total cost of 1,200,000 rupees.16
The changes and development at the shrine became more visible on
the first urs of Data Sahib after it had been taken over, on 13 October
1960, which had been delayed for a few weeks because of the spread of an
epidemic of cholera in the city.17 The preparation for the urs started
quite early and the new managing committee expected to have as many
numbers of devotees as before the take-over. An editorial in a newspaper
not only thought that the number of devotees would be as large as it had
been but also considered the new development in a positive manner and
appreciated the working of the new Managing Committee. The editorial
complained that before, the mosque of Data Darbar had not even had a
loudspeaker and proper lighting system. However, the editorial praised
the activities of the new managing committee for not only providing
basic infrastructural facilities but also introducing many other things,
like a separate entrance facility for women, a better and organised traffic
system and a clean environment. For the first time, the tomb and the
buildings around were lit throughout the night. The unusual and
pleasant difference, according to the report, was the absence of mujawars
and the beggars who used to snatch even the clothes of the pilgrims. The
report maintained that even the dark roads behind the Darbar, which
were otherwise rife with criminals, were populated by groups of rural
pilgrims and devotees.
Though the urs of the Data Sahib turned out in a way as expected by
the managing committee and seemed to generate a large income, it did
not prevent the elite devotees from pouring large sums of money into
welfare activities.18 At the end of the first year some of the facilities had
already been provided in both the shrine and the mosque, such as
constructing separate gates for male and female, purchasing a
loudspeaker for the mosque, facilities for cleanliness, providing fans,
etc., by Sheikh Muhammad Din and Syed Maratb Ali, another Lahore’s
elite. Bearing most of the expenses of these purchases between them,
Sheikh Muhammad Din gave Rs 20,000 and Syed Maratb Ali Rs
50,000. Out of this money, the new managing committee announced
pensions for the orphans and widows of the previous mujawar of the
shrine. Also, the committee set up a free dispensary that was to become
the first step towards a fully-fledged hospital, nearby Data Sahib
Shrine.19 Another devotee and a member of the managing committee,
Dr Abdul Waheed, the proprietor of Ferozsons, donated Rs 10,000 per
month for the next ten years to support the dispensary. Another famous
shoe company, Bata, gave a donation of Rs 30,00020 and the Chief
Electric Company provided a free electric facility on urs day.
The committee not only took care of the infrastructural facilities at
the shrine but also performed the religious ceremonies, including the
ceremony of Dastar Bandi (putting a turban on the heads of the
significant devotees).21 Traditionally, it was mujawars who performed
these ceremonies, along with other related activities like saying prayers.
However, on this urs, the ceremony of Dastar Bandi was inaugurated by
putting a dastar (turban) on the head of the Administrator Auqaf, A.H.
Qureshi, who was also supervising the whole ceremony. Later on, some
200 notables were given dastars. Both naat (the eulogy of the Prophet
Muhammad) and qawwali (a style of Muslim devotional music now
associated particularly with Sufis) were performed in the urs and devotees
had taken more interest in qawwali than any other activity.22 Religious
scholars were invited and provided a platform for making speeches on
the personality of the saint and his understanding of Islam. For the first
time, the shrine was decorated with lights in a way that is usually
associated with the day of Eid Milad Un Nabi (the celebration of the
birthday of the Prophet Muhammad). This year the shrine had already
become the final point for the processions of Eid Milad Un Nabi.23
The interest that the Auqaf Department showed in organising,
managing and controlling the shrine and religious practices of Data
Sahib was extended to other shrines, but with less enthusiasm. In the
same year, the Auqaf Department had already taken over other
significant shrines, such as those of Mian Mir and Bullai Shah in Lahore
and Kasur. However, these shrines did not have similar support and
passion for reconstructing and developing facilities, despite having the
presence of similar elite devotees. The focus of the Auqaf Department
seemed to be on appropriating the income and the property attached
to the shrines instead of initiating development projects. The Auqaf
Administrator, after taking them and their attached waqf property,
appointed a magistrate or Tehsildar (Tehsil Administrator) as their
manager.24 The administrator, however, felt no need to appoint the any
senior state official as head of the managing committee, as was the case of
Data Darbar Sahib.
The Auqaf Department took over the shrine of Mian Mir on 9 July
1960, only six months after initiating its activities.25 The department
took control of the shrine from the then sajjada nashin, Noor ul
Hussain Shah. The Managing Committee was formed after a few weeks
of departmental control and Chaudhry Eid Muhammad Malik, the
proprietor of the Ratan Cinema, was nominated as its president. As the
urs was in October, the managing committee started preparing for
the occasion and the president took on the burden of arranging all the
electric and lighting facilities. After the announcement of the date by
the Auqaf Administrator, the managing committee, with the help of
the manager of the shrine, organised the first urs, from 17 – 20 October.
The Auqaf Department took possession of a total of 74 kanals of land,
on which, later on, 314 shops were constructed around the shrine.
Along with this land, around 425 kanals and seven marlas of
agricultural land were also taken over by the department. After another
six years, the Auqaf Department extended its control on the landed
property attached with the shrine again and annexed another four
kanals of land, taking control of around another 139 acres of
agricultural land attached to the Mian Mir shrine in Gujranwala
District.26 Property in the Anarkali market of Lahore of around two
kanals was also annexed. However, the Auqaf Department sold out all
the previously acquired waqf property in the 1980s.27
At almost the same time, on 6 October 1960, the Tehsildar (Tehsil
Administrator) of Kasur District took control of the shrine of Baba
Bullai Shah, on the orders of the Auqaf Administrator. Bullai Shah was
considered to be a famous Punjabi Sufi poet and the fame of his shrine
and the property attached to it attracted the Auqaf Department to take

this shrine over. The Tehsildar of Tehsil Kasur, Akbar Kazmi, entered
the premises of (Dargah) shrine on the orders of the Auqaf Administrator
on 5 October and took the income box (sandukchi) into his possession.
The Tehsildar recovered eight rupees and one paisa from the box, an
amount that a newspaper claimed had been collected within a few hours,
and later on sealed the box. The Tehsildar told the mujawar of the
Dargah to pay rent for the houses attached to the shrines or vacate them.
He also told the tenants to pay the rents of the shops attached to the
shrine or face consequences.28
In the first ten years, the Auqaf Department kept its focus on taking
over and controlling the significant shrines as much as possible. Even
during the first two or three years, the department had already taken over
a number of significant shrines. However, some other significant shrines,
like Bibian Pak Daman, Lahore and Waris Shah (a Punjabi poet famous
for writing the Hir tale), Sheikhupura, remained out of its control for the
early years of its first decade. In total, the Auqaf Department was able to
take control of 52 shrines in the Lahore and Gujranwala zones in its first
decade of operation. The department took control of 36 shrines in the
five sectors of Lahore, while from the other sectors of Lahore, as from
Sheikhupura, it took control of four shrines, and from Kasur it took
control of a shrine of Baba Bullai Shah. From Gujranwala, the
department took control of seven shrines, along with three shrines from
Gujrat and two from Sialkot. It seems the Auqaf Department kept its
emphasis on taking control of shrines from large cities or the area around
them.29
Even in that early period, an ideological tilt was discernible in the
working of the Auqaf Department, as the taking over of the shrines of
Bibian Pak Daman and Waris Shah suggests. The department started
receiving complaints against the mujawars of Bibian Pak Daman as early
as the first few months of the 1960s. The complaints claimed that eight
mujawars of the shrine were in the process of selling land of the graveyard
attached to the shrine and had already sold a large piece of land.30
Although the department began an inquiry and undertook a survey of
the land, it took many years to take control of the shrine. The Auqaf
Administrator, Masood Khaddarposh, who was famous for his leftist
and Punjabi leanings, took control of the shrine from mujawars in
September 1967. The Auqaf Department not only took over the shrine
and 24 kanals of land attached therewith but also 62 kanals of the land of
the graveyard attached to the shrine.31 However, the department had to
withdraw its control of almost all the land attached to the shrine after a
few years because of the court decision. The court decided in favour of
the mujawar, who filed a case against the Auqaf Department on the basis
that the land acquired by the department, except that of the shrine, was
registered in the name of the mujawar. As the revenue record was in his
favour, the Auqaf Department withdrew its control of the land32 and had
to be content with just the shrine and three shops.33
The Auqaf Department took control of the waqf properties not only
from the ‘possession’ of mujawars or mutwallis but also from the Islamic
associations like that of Anjuman e Islamia. The Anjuman was the oldest
association of its kind in Lahore. It came into existence in 1869, mainly
to control the affairs of Badshahi mosque.34 However, the association
gradually gained control of around 13 important mosques in Lahore,
including Badshahi Mosque, Sunahri (Golden) Mosque35 and Shah
Chiragh Mosque.36 The mosque of Shah Chiragh was interesting in the
manner that – although part of the shrine of Shah Chiragh, constructed
by Aurangzeb Alamgir37 – it came into the hands of Muslims after the
incident at Shaheed Ganj Mosque, to appease them.38 Until the
nineteenth century, the shrine of Shah Chiragh was quite famous and
still attracted a good number of devotees on urs days.39 The British
government occupied some part of this waqf land and erected a large
building for the office and the residence of the Principal Assistant to the
Deputy Commissioner. A little later, the Accountant General’s office
occupied the building and, along with it, some land was taken over by
the High Court, in the second to the last decade of the nineteenth
century.40 With the increase of commercial and social life on Mall Road,
the site of the shrine of Shah Chiragh became a central place.
The Shah Chiragh Mosque not only began attracting a large number
of worshippers for Juma prayers but also became a significant place for
the preaching of Islam. In 1960, the mosque already had three different
departments for the dissemination of religious teachings. The
departments included the Tameer e Millat Library (Developing Nation
Library), the Islamic Centre and the Idara Islah e Nafs (Institute of Self-
Reform). There was a hall for the Tameer e Millat Library, called a dar ul
mutala (study room). A variety of preaching activities used to take place
through the Islamic Centre, such as lectures on Islam, especially in the
month of Ramzan (the Muslim month of fasting). At the Idara Islah e

Nafs, lectures on Rumi or on the hidden meanings of remembering God
took place. However, the activities were largely run by the department
of Islamiat at the Punjab University, and Professor Alaud Din Siddiqui
and Professor Yousaf Saleem Chishti were active in running these
undertakings. As the mosque and the activities around it were quite
popular, the shrine-based practices at the shrine of Shah Chiragh were
insignificant until the 1960s.
Acting on the instructions of the Chief Administrator of Auqaf, the
Auqaf Department started surveying the waqf properties under the
control of Anjuman e Islamia. The Anjuman had a total of 13 mosques
and large waqf properties attached therewith under its control. The
department took control of the Shah Chiragh building, mosque and
shrine in October 1960. The control, however, remained loose until
1973, when the whole Auqaf Department took over the buildings of
the shrine of Shah Chiragh. Interestingly enough, the take-over of Shah
Chiragh was appreciated by the locals, as a letter published in the
editorial pages of a newspaper suggests. The letter congratulated the
Auqaf Department on taking over the Shah Chiragh Mosque and hoped
that it meant an end to the continuous embezzlement of the mosque
funds. The letter complained that, though the Anjuman managed to
collect around Rs 1,000 as rent money from the tenants of the
building, yet the khateeb (speaker at the mosque) and muazzan
(the person who calls to prayer) of the mosque did not receive even the
equivalent amount given to the janitor of the Lahore Municipal
Committee. The letter further maintained that the recent reconstruc-
tion of the mosque had only taken place because of collected funds
received many years before.
In the last two years of the first decade of controlling shrines and waqf
properties, the Auqaf Department systematised the rules and regulations
for the imam (who leads prayer in a mosque) and khateeb positions within
the overall scheme. The focus on imam and khateeb positions correlated
with other similar activities, such as a re-emphasis on providing modern
Islamic education. Although the Auqaf Department had nationalised
more than 200 madrasas (religious seminaries)41 along with the
nationalisation of the Islamic University of Bahawalpur (Jamia
Bahawalpur) in the early years of the 1960s,42 a re-emphasis appeared
even in the last two years of Ayub Khan’s rule on controlling religious
educational activities.43 Similarly, the department took over mosques

with shrines both attached and non-attached in the early years of its first
decade, although it did not focus on religious employees. The hopes
among employees attached to the mosques of benefiting from a better
pay scale and stable position within the nationalised mosques were high.
However, for the first few years of its working, the department showed
less interest in improving the condition of religious employees and even
failed to pay the salaries of many imams and khateebs for many months.44
The department could not make the time to take decisions on the pay
structure for imam and khateeb positions and so kept them on a waged
basis. As the emphasis on Islamic teaching prevailed, the Auqaf
Department made an effort to systematise the pay structure of these
positions, and enforced the rules in 1968.45
Although the Auqaf Department made efforts to introduce changes at
the site of the shrine in order to modernise the facilities during Ayub’s
rule, these efforts remained selective and unsustainable. The focus on
the shrine of Data Sahib, and to a lesser extent on some other shrines of
Lahore, remained considerable; however, the department soon lost interest
in the latter case. For example, at the shrine of Imam Ali al Haq in Sialkot,
taken over in 1960, after introducing some initial developments46 the
department failed to make satisfactory improvements. The facilities
at the mosque, such as urinals, a water tank, waterspouts, etc., though
installed, often failed to work properly. Cleanliness standards were also
neglected. The department also opened up a dispensary in the late 1960s
but without a qualified doctor in attendance.47 The salaried imam and
khateeb often asked for funds in Juma prayers, though there was no record
keeping.48
Yahya Khan: modernising Islamic traditions

As the rule of Ayub Khan ended on 25 March 1969 and gave way to the
then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army Yahya Khan, the
emphasis on religious development did not change significantly. From
the very start Yahya Khan’s regime faced a leftist political surge, largely
shrouded within Islamic symbolism. To counter the leftist surge, the
regime carried on using Islamic modernism. ‘The generals believed that
Islam was the only ideology that could confront the Left and provide a
basis for keeping Pakistan together.’49 Interestingly, the military
establishment showed its wish to modernise orthodox maulvi through

training processes. With the emergence of the Ulema Academy, this
wish was made reality as it furthered the state’s interest that Islamic
thought should prevail as a central unifying ideological thread to bind
together political groups already identifying themselves through
provincialism, socialism and ethnicity.50
As Yahya Khan dissolved the One Unit scheme in 1970, the
provinces of West Pakistan found a legislative rebirth, enabling them to
enact and enforce rules regarding provincial subjects. The Auqaf
Department, which until then had acted as the West Pakistan Auqaf
Department, was dissolved into four different Auqaf Departments of
West Pakistan. Hamid Mukhtar became the first Chief of Punjab
Auqaf.51 The department, however, carried on taking over operations
and controlling activities through ordinances. It took over around 12
shrines in the Lahore and Gujranwala zones in three years during Yahya
Khan’s regime. Out of these shrines, six were taken over in 1969, the
remainder in the next two years.
The regime gave more emphasis to modernising religious teachings
and introducing developmental projects at the site of the shrine.
Furthering religious teaching reforms, the Punjab Auqaf Department
inaugurated an Ulema Academy with the intention of teaching the
understanding of ulema and khateeb according to the fast-paced modern
world. The governor of Punjab, Lieutenant-General Attiq ur Rehman,
inaugurated the academy in Hazuri Bagh, Lahore, and stressed the
necessity to adapt traditional religious views to modern scientific
advances. The governor maintained that it was the responsibility of the
ulema of the country to upgrade their knowledge in order to reintegrate
the force of iman (faith) against the disenchantment engendered by
modern knowledge systems. The governor feared that modern education
was taking the youth of Pakistan away from God and religion; it was,
therefore, incumbent upon religious ulema to learn new disciplines in
order to save youth from un-Islamic ideas. The speeches of Chief
Administrator Auqaf, Punjab, Hamid Mukhtar, and the Principal of
Ulema Academy, Dr Rashid Ahmed, an Al Azhar and Cambridge
graduate, reassured the governor regarding the efforts made by the
Auqaf Department for improving the understanding of Islam according
to the contemporary requirements for both ulema and the syllabi of
religious schools.52 They maintained that the academy would connect
religious scholars with the world of knowledge and, for this purpose, the
academy had already established a library of 4,000 books. Further, to
link religious scholars with literary activities, he said, the academy had
also begun publishing a quarterly magazine Din o Danish [Religion and
Intellect].53
To further the developmental works, the department emphasised the
extending of the network of dispensaries at shrines already taken over.
The dispensary at Data Darbar could not be extended into a larger
health complex as had been envisaged almost ten years earlier, and the
proclaimed objectives of establishing modern facilities were not
provided either at this dispensary or anywhere else. However, things
began to change when Dr Colonel Ibad ullah Sheikh (1967– 72), the first
non-civilian doctor, became medical superintendent of the dispensary.
Until the start of Yahya Khan’s rule, the colonel could do nothing. With
the change in government, a re-emphasis on extending developmental
activities became feasible. Within three years the Auqaf Department not
only extended the dispensary of Data Sahib into an eye hospital54 but
also extended the network of dispensaries in eight important shrines of
Lahore and another six outside Lahore.
Dispensaries Established during (1969–72)

Dispensaries in Lahore (headed by medical officer/dispenser)
1. Data Shifakhana at Darbar Hazrat Madhu Lal Hussain Sahib.

2. Data Shifakhana at Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman.
3. Data Shifakhana at Darbar Hazrat Miran Hussain Zinjani Sahib.
4. Data Shifakhana at Darbar Hazrat Takia Lehri Shah, Ichhra.
5. Data Shifakhana at Darbar Hazrat Shah Abdul Maali.
6. Data Shifakhana at Masjid Wazir Khan.
7. Data Shifakhana at Shahdara Town (Takia Kakay Zais).
8. Data Shifakhana at Shah Kamal Colony (Auqaf).
Dispensaries outside Lahore (headed by medical officer/dispenser)
1. Darbar Hazrat Baba Farid-ud-Din, Pakpattan, headed by a medical

officer.
2. Darbar Hazrat Bahaud-din Zikria, Multan, headed by a medical

officer.
3. Darbar Hazrat Kh. Ghulam Farid, Kot Mithan, headed by a dispenser.
4. Darbar Hazrat Ali-ul-Haque, Sialkot, headed by a dispenser.
5. Mauza Bahanwala, Liaqatpur, headed by a dispenser.
6. Model Mosque, Company Bagh, Sargodha, headed by a dispenser.
The dispensaries proved to be a minor step in giving medical relief;

instead of giving a semblance of modern facilities, they were transformed
into a sacred site within the larger complex of the shrine. The
dispensaries were established largely to provide health services for
devotees coming to the shrine of the saint. Many of the visitors started
taking medicine from the dispensary as extended healing symbols
(barakat) of the saint. For the Auqaf Department, however, this meant
fewer serious visitors to the dispensaries and therefore less significance
for a medical relief centre. The reduced importance of a dispensary for
health purposes, coupled with the chronic lethargic malfunctioning of
the government institutions, fell quite short of expected results. The
dispensaries were reduced to providing only a few sulpha medicines, at
the most, and even those medicines often remained unavailable.55
The Bhutto government and the working of the

Auqaf Department
After the fall of Dhaka in 1971, the military handed over rule to a
civilian, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in the capacity of Civil Martial Law
Administrator. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the leader of the Pakistan Peoples
Party, which had emerged as the largest political party in West Pakistan
after the elections of 1970. Within a truncated Pakistan, he distilled
hopes through his slogan of ‘Roti, Kapra aur Makan’ [bread, clothing and
housing], wrapped up in the larger concept of Islamic socialism.56
Bhutto found popular support through claims of taking wealth from the
elites and redistributing it within the plebeian or common masses.57 His
left-of-centre leaning provided him with a great deal of support from
popular and socialistic groups. For the initial few years of his rule, his
policies remained aligned with the intention of popular support that led
him to nationalise the large industries and agricultural lands while
providing a renewed basis for regional religious identity.58 His party in
the Punjab government, as in Sindh,59 pursued the common will of his

spirit and, while rediscovering Punjabi identity through Punjabi cultural
memories, started strengthening the pluralistic religious ethos.
The Bhutto government showed a general inclination to consider a
Sufi figure as deeply embedded within socialist ideas. During the initial
few years, the efforts to promote a shrine of a Sufi saint that remained
attached to pluralistic tradition and Punjabi Sufi poetry remained clear.
Inaugurating the urs of Madhu Lal Hussain in Lahore, the Minister for
Auqaf, Information and Broadcasting proclaimed that in future this
would be the biggest urs in the country. He said that this urs remained
attached to mela (fair), a tradition that should be revived. He said,
further, that in the past this urs and mela had been the second largest in
the country, after the urs of Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh. However, he
hoped that in future the urs and mela of Madhu Lal Hussain would
surpass any other shrine-based activity, as it would be celebrated on a
Pakistan-wide level.60 The Bhutto government not only demonstrated
its priorities regarding certain Sufi figures, it also recast the images of
Sufi saints, in general, in a socialist and egalitarian spirit. Even Data
Ganj Bakhsh was considered a preacher of egalitarianism and seen as
providing an image of a classless society ‘based on the concept of
Musawat e Muhammadi which Allama Iqbal and Quaid e Azam later
termed as “Islamic Socialism”’.61
Along with envisaging Sufi saints as socialist and egalitarian
figures, the early Bhutto rule also considered shrines as cultural
reminiscences of poetic and spiritual expressions. Hanif Ramay became
a voice for promoting this idea when he was given a central place in
the Punjab government.62 Thanks to his efforts, the Punjab Auqaf
Department began to give importance to the shrines of Punjabi Sufi
poets. As early as in 1971 he was maintaining during his speeches that
Sufi shrines should be understood as cultural artifacts and seen as sites
of potential rebirth of hidden cultural voices. For Ramay, who was
inherently an artist more than a politician, the sites of shrine should
also be built in a way that would show and reanimate the literary
remnants of Pakistan’s culture. To achieve this, Ramay had a plan to
develop theatres at the sites of shrines, at least on such sites as those of
Bullai Shah63 and Waris Shah.64 For Ramay, theatre would revive the
poetical expressions of the Sufi poets and reconnect audiences with
their life-world.
To implement his ideas, Ramay planned a committee composed of

Munnu Bhai, a famous leftist journalist and a playwright, Shafqat
Tanveer Mirza, a leftist scholar, B.A. Qureshi, then Chief Secretary of
Punjab and famous for having a deep literary aesthetic, and Baba Sadiq,
a former bank manager and a devotee of Baba Waris Shah, to
reconstruct the site of the shrine of Waris Shah. The committee also
included some members of Lahore Arts Council. Ramay was himself a
member, but it was Qureshi who headed the committee. In an
interview, Sadiq mentioned that the condition of the shrine at that
time was ‘pathetic’. Even on urs days, barely 200 people visited the
shrine of this great personality. As the shrine was not attached to a large
waqf property, the focus of the Auqaf Department, which had already
taken over the control of this shrine many years before, was also
minimal and the shrine was in poor condition.65 The committee
started its work in 1974 – 5 and finalised a plan for redesigning and
reconstructing the shrine of Baba Waris Shah in a few months. The first
phase of the project took three more years, and the shrine of Baba Waris
Shah achieved a new face in 1978. The second phase was delayed
because of the change of government and the expenditure of a large part
of the funds allocated to the shrine on a nearby road.
With the help of the Lahore Arts Council, however, the reconstructed
shrine began to attract a large number of devotees and pilgrims on
urs days. Gradually, the Lahore Arts Council introduced international
Punjabi poetry and a Hir reading competition on urs days. However, as the
Lahore Arts Council supported the building and running of this shrine,
they later took almost 75 per cent of the income of the shrine. In the same
ratio, the Lahore Arts Council became responsible for meeting the
incurred expenses on maintaining and controlling the shrine of Waris
Shah. The figures showed the growth in the cash box income at the shrine.
They show that, along with the persona of Waris Shah as a poet, his appeal
as a Sufi figure also grew gradually and began to attract a large number of
devotees and donors. The record shows that the cash boxes at the shrine of
Waris Shah in 1996–7 collected Rs 272,000 against expenses of
Rs 35,100. However, the total amount collected from the shrine was
Rs 1,088,000, out of which the Lahore Arts Council took Rs 816,000.
In comparison, in 2006–7, the Auqaf Department collected around
Rs 2,129,600, out of which 25 per cent – Rs 532,400 – was taken by the
Auqaf Department, with the rest going to the council.
Along with working on the shrine of Waris Shah, the Bhutto

government carried on giving occasional donations to the shrines
and tried to make plans to improve the sites of shrines without
implementing any significant plan. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave a donation
of golden gates to the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib, Lahore, and
started the precedent of visiting popular shrines. The Auqaf Department
also launched a clean water facility at the Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib
mosque, shrine and at the hospital.66 The Bhutto government also
started planning to redesign and extend the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh
Sahib, the most popular with devotees. Almost 900,000 people visited
the shrine in 1974 during the three days of urs. Interestingly, the days
for urs had already increased from two to three due to the increase of
people at the shrine. The government therefore started planning to
extend the site of the shrine. Such plans already existed but had not yet
been realised. The government also started planning to reconstruct the
shrine of Bullai Shah, to turn it into an amphitheatre where plays on the
themes of the message of Bullai Shah could be staged. However, nothing
concrete took place.
Though none of its plans were implemented, the government was at
least able to give the Auqaf Department a proper space for its
administrative working, organising its material in offices and giving
staff a suitable place to work. The Auqaf Department, while taking
over another seven kanals of land attached to the shrine of Shah
Chiragh, moved into the building of the Shah Chiragh complex and,
after some adjustments and renovations, made their head office there in
1973. Up to that time, however, the department had already structured
its working in a systematic way and already appeared as a separate and
distinct department. The department came under a provincial ministry
attached to the Jail Khana Jaat, yet it had already acquired the structure
of a separate department. The working of the Auqaf Department was
already divided into sub-departments, zones and sectors. There were
five zones in total, within which the department had organised its
operations, and these continued until 1994, when the organisational
structure was revised.
Consolidating itself through having a proper head office, the Punjab
Auqaf Department continued taking over shrines throughout the
Bhutto period and throughout the 1970s. The department took control
of around 59 shrines in that decade. However, six of these shrines had
already been taken over by the department during the Yahya regime.
From 1972 until 1977, the last year of the Bhutto government, the
Auqaf Department took over a total of 51 shrines. During this period,
the department focused more on taking over and controlling shrines
from the area outside of Lahore. Out of these 51 shrines, the Auqaf
Department took control of 29 shrines in Gujranwala Zone, including
five from Sialkot, 13 from Gujrat and 11 from Gujranwala Zone. From
Lahore Zone, the department took over around 20 shrines, including
three from Kasur, four from Sheikhupura, and the rest of the 15 from the
environs of Lahore. These shrines included such significant shrines as
that of Baba Ghulam Haider Sain, Badami Bagh in Lahore, the shrine of
H. Kamal Chishti, Kasur and the shrine of Nausha Ganj Pak,
Wazirabad. The shrine of Kamal Chishti is the oldest shrine in Kasur,
and the shrine of Nausha Ganj Pak is the father figure of a sub-Sufi sect,
Naushahi of the Qadri order. However, the shrine of Baba Haider Sain
was important largely because of its ability to attract travellers who
wanted to ensure a safe journey by donating money before starting their
journey from the nearby largest bus station in Lahore.
Largely, as the Bhutto government brought in folk shrines under
bureaucratic controls and helped to disenchant the ‘traditional’ Sufistic
practices, a renewed but critical interest in them started to appear.67
Severe criticism emerged in the last years of the government about the
inability of the Auqaf Department to take care of the shrines. Among
many of the reports, some hit at the very heart of the whole control and
management of the affairs of the Auqaf Department. These reports
showed the extremely poor condition of even the shrine of Data Ganj
Bakhsh Sahib, so far the central site at which bureaucratic controls had
implemented a modern reformation agenda. One such report described
in detail the condition of and around the shrine of Data Sahib. The report
questioned the need for security persons or police standing at the door of
the shrine to safeguard the golden door donated by the prime minister,68
complaining that because of the police at the door, devotees found it
difficult to go freely into the shrine. The report maintained that around
the shrine the streets were polluted and the water from gutters pooled on
the already damaged roads. Addicts and criminals were quite common
around the shrine, along with suspected foreign nationals without a
passport or national identity card. The area around the shrine had sheds
for cows and buffaloes and often they moved along the roads while
splashing their excretions around. The area had a bad sewerage system
and often the polluted water coming from the gutters entered the
houses. Even after complaining many times, the area’s residents’
complaints went unheeded by the authorities.69
In the last two years of the Bhutto government, contrary to its earlier
leftist leaning, a clear shift and re-emphasis on Islamisation became
obvious. The government was eager to demonstrate activities for
increasing Islamisation, amidst demands that even the activities on 1
May, Labour Day, should be organised in an Islamic way.70 The early
leftist approach towards Sufistic expressions as cultural embodiments
changed towards a version that highlighted Sufi figures as those who
promoted efforts to preach and propagate Islam in the region. Even
while visiting the shrine of Madhu Lal on its urs day, a provincial
minister stressed the relationship between a Sufi and the preaching of
Islam.71 The speaker of the Punjab Assembly seemed quite eager to
inaugurate the procession of Bari Gyarwi Sharif in 1976, which had been
started by Malik Ata Ullah Qadri, a local religious scholar, only a few
years before in Lahore. While all ghair Shari (non-Shari) actions were
banned in the procession, a large group of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
stalwarts, including the Provincial Minister for Parliament affairs, the
President of Lahore and many other important members of the PPP
government and party, walked alongside the procession that was to end
at the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib.72 For the first time the Bhutto
government not only took direct control of the Badshahi mosque
through the Auqaf Department but also started building the Faisal
Mosque in Islamabad. The idea of the Shah Faisal Mosque was initiated
as early as in 1966; however, due to the delays in designing, finalised in
1969, delays in funding and the murder of Shah Faisal of Saudi Arabia,73
ensured that the work did not begin until 1976.74 Until June 1976 the
work on the mosque was often delayed due to contracting issues.75
On the other hand, the Ministry of Religious Affairs made serious
efforts to project the image of the state as Islamic. Kausar Niazi, the
Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, wrote many articles highlighting
the mosque as the central symbolic element of Islam.76 Further, in
order to show its seriousness regarding Islamisation, the government
created a central/federal auqaf body and placed all provincial Auqaf
Departments under its control through a bill passed through the senate.
The minister intended to move further towards what was considered
proper Islamisation by controlling waqf property in a more effective way

through national-level policy. The government, however, did not allow
the Auqaf Bill to go to the Islamic Ideological Council (IIC) as it
included permission for the Auqaf Administrator to sell waqf property.
An opposition senator who suggested sending the Auqaf Bill to the IIC
thought the clause giving authority to the Auqaf Administrator to sell
waqf property was un-Islamic. The government opposed the suggestion
on the grounds that it was a proponent of the Islamic cause; therefore
nothing against Islam could possibly be included in the bill.77
In addition to the centralisation of auqaf in Islamabad, the
government also showed its seriousness about Islamisation to improve
the condition of aima (plural of imam) and khutaba (plural of khateeb)
through improving their pay scales. The government improved the
salary packages and announced the minimum pay scale for muazzans
(prayer callers) as PS-4 and for imam/khateeb as PS-9. The Provincial
Minister for Auqaf, Rana Iqbal Ahmed Khan, also announced the
increase of monetary assistance by the state for non-auqaf religious
seminaries and the assistance increased from Rs 100,000 per annum to
Rs 300,000 per annum. In addition, the Federal Minister, Maulana
Kausar Niazi, was also concerned about the condition of shrines and
intended to change the non-Islamic perception of shrines and the
practices at them. In order to show his sincerity, in 1976 the minister
ordered the Auqaf Department to give attention to the shrine of Ghazi
Alam Ud Din Shahid of Lahore. Ghazi Alam Ud Din was executed by
the British colonial authorities for murdering a Hindu publisher who
had allegedly published a blasphemous book. The minister ordered the
immediate reconstruction of the shrine of ‘the lover of Prophet (PBUH)’,
and reiterated that ‘it is our religious responsibility to take care all those
figures who gave their lives for Islam, and no self-conscious nation
remained oblivious for this task’.78
Zia ul-Haq’s regime and auqaf

When General Zia ul-Haq toppled the government of Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto in 1977, the martial law regime showed that it intended to
retain the already existing legal framework, at least for the first two
years. It maintained the centralised Ministry of Religious Affairs, under
which the Auqaf Department had started working after the passing of
the federal Auqaf Bill. The military regime changed the Minister of
Religious Affairs but did not change Auqaf Administrators in the
provinces.79 Muhammad Ashraf, who was in charge of the Auqaf
Department Punjab after being appointed only a month before the
military coup, that is, in June 1977, remained in his post for another two
years, when Aftab Ahmed Khan was again appointed Chief Administrator
Auqaf of Punjab.80 However, the Auqaf Department could not give its
attention to the shrines during those years and was occupied with
arranging reports on religious schools. The focus on shrines was revived
after the promulgation of the Auqaf Waqf Properties Ordinance (AWPO)
of 1979, which relinked auqaf policies with colonial legacy and
decentralised the structure of the Auqaf Department.
As the emphasis of the Zia regime remained on promoting Islam to
justify the extension of its military rule, it ensured the propagation of
the uniform teaching and truths of Islam. To achieve this, although
initiated as early as 1979, after concerted efforts had been made to
enumerate and support religious schools,81 the most visible effort took
place in 1984 when the regime made it mandatory for all auqaf mosques
to recite Juma Khutba as provided by the state officials.82 Along with
that, the mushirs (consultants) and administrator of auqaf kept their focus
on explaining the necessity for Islamic teachings and practices at shrines
and their madrasas attached. Their portrayal of Sufis as preachers and
propagators of Islam became the established truth. Later, in 1993–4,
when Hanif Ramay returned from exile and became the speaker of the
Punjab Assembly in the Benazir government, he was unable to return to
his original leftist position. With a little sarcasm, he understood Sufis as
preachers of Islam, though he labelled all contemporary ulema as those
‘who make people kaafir’.83
The policy of Islamisation propagated through auqaf made it
essential to preach the teachings of Islam through different techniques at
the site of the shrine. The Auqaf Department remained active in
organising a competition for reciting the Qur’an, naat and religious
debates at different urs events, especially on the urs of Data Ganj Bakhsh
Sahib and at educational institutions, like schools. The state officials also
carried on the previous state’s policies to support and strengthen the
religious position of Ahl e Sunnat by promoting processions on
important occasions like Eid Milad un Nabi, Giyarwi Sharif and Akhri
Chahar Shamba (the last Wednesday of the month of Safar, and
considered as the day the Prophet Muhammad felt well enough to walk
after serious illness).84 The shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib had a
central place in all these processions, as almost all such processions in
which local and provincial officials participated ended there.85
The Auqaf Department restarted operations to take control of
shrines after the promulgation of the Waqf Properties Ordinance,
1979. In the whole of the 1980s the department had taken over a total
of 52 shrines, almost equivalent to the number achieved during the
1960s. The department took control of 26 shrines from the five sectors
of Lahore District. From Kasur District, it took over four more shrines,
while from Sheikhupura District the department was able to take over
five more shrines. From the three sectors of Gujranwala, that is
Gujranwala, Gujrat, and Sialkot, the department was able to take over
six, seven and four shrines respectively. Out of these total 52 shrines,
however, only two shrines were taken over in 1989, after the end of Zia
ul-Haq’s rule. Thus, during his entire rule, the Auqaf Department took
over a total of 52 shrines, and in the last nine years took over 50
shrines. It shows that during Zia ul-Haq’s rule, the maximum number
of shrines were taken over by the Auqaf Department. Control of some
significant shrines was taken during this decade, including the shrine
of Shah Inayat Qadri, Lahore, teacher and pir of famous Sufi poet Baba
Bullai Shah, the shrine of H. Ghoray Shah, Lahore and the shrine of
H. Jamat Ali Shah, Narowal.
The emphasis of the Zia regime, however, was on the shrine of Data
Ganj Bakhsh Sahib and, therefore, the shrine was expanded and gained a
renewed Islamised outlook during the period. Though the idea to extend
the space of the shrine had been under consideration by almost all of the
previous governments since Ayub Khan,86 it was Zia ul-Haq’s personal
interest that made the renovation of the shrine possible. Even before the
promulgation of the 1979 Waqf Properties Ordinance, and only one year
after taking over the reins of the state, in 1978, Zia ul-Haq had placed
the foundation stone for the construction of a mosque and the extension
of the shrine.87 To hasten the process of designing and constructing the
mosque and the shrine, he formed a committee, which presented final
designs in 1979. After being selected and approved by Zia ul-Haq, and
boasting minarets resembling Turkey’s Bayazid Mosque, the model of
the mosque and shrine was placed for public viewing on the urs of Data
Sahib on 7– 10 January 1980.88 The mosque was to be built on 14 kanals
and with the capacity for 2,000 namazis (worshippers) to pray at the
same time. In that way the mosque would be the third largest mosque
in the country after the Badshahi and Faisal mosques. The Auqaf
Department was to bear all the expenses of the construction of the new
mosque and shrine. However, to achieve a quick start, Zia ul-Haq gave a
special loan of Rs 5,000,000 to the Auqaf Department.
The construction of the new mosque and shrine with the special loan
from Zia ul-Haq also showed another side of the Islamising effort during
his era: appropriating sacred sites and placing them into the market
economy to earn profits. The state’s wish to reconstruct shrines and keep
them in good condition started to become clear. This urge demonstrates
more than what Jamal Malik terms an ‘integrationist process’ of the
state. Malik supports his point of view by citing the publication of a
booklet from the Pakistan tourism authority listing ‘137 shrines, 79 out
of which are elaborately described’. He infers that the ‘condition for
listing the shrines in the booklet is [that] they would be in a reasonable
condition and accessible to foreign tourists’. He further maintains that
this ‘presupposes an effective administration, which in turn means that
those shrines must be well integrated’.89 However, for most of the
shrines, the presupposition of being in reasonable condition was only
illusory. At best the urge of the state to reconstruct the dilapidated
shrines through the very income these shrines had been earning because
of devotees can be seen. Other than the ‘integrationist approach’, the
loan from Zia ul-Haq and the state’s desire for the shrines to be in good
condition showed its willingness to participate in the controlled market
economy to earn profits. However, the state department was not
prepared to initiate this process effectively. The Auqaf Department was
severely criticised throughout the 1980s for the selective, non-effective
and lethargic approach of the state towards shrines.
With the growing centrality and stature of the shrine of Data Ganj
Bakhsh Sahib, the Auqaf Department came under criticism for remaining
to ignore other shrines. The Musheer (Adviser) Auqaf, however, claimed
to have initiated the reconstruction and revamping of shrines in Punjab as
early as 1980, but until 1985 the situation was negligible. As the shrine of
Data Sahib became more impressive, the other shrines remained in a
dilapidated condition. The criticism maintained that many other shrines
collected at least as much money and their condition could be improved
by investing what they collected. Critics maintained that the Auqaf
Department did not invest the money collected through donations at the
shrines and its staff were involved in corruption.90 Even as famous a shrine
as that of Baba Fareed, Pakpattan, remained in a poor condition, with
fallen hujras (rooms for worship). In a report published in 1985 the local
population maintained that the department had collected around Rs
3,300,000 a year but no reconstruction work had taken place. Another
report, in the same year, on the famous shrine of Bullai Shah, Kasur,
criticised the Auqaf Department severely for ignoring the condition of the
shrine. The report maintained that with the collection of hundreds of
thousands of rupees each year, although the department had developed its
offices and its employees residences nothing had been spent to improve the
shrine and its environment. According to the report, almost 1 million
people came to visit this shrine on urs days alone, but found no facilities.
The report appealed to the authorities to improve the environment of the
shrine, along with making the Auqaf Department accountable.91
The initiation of the construction of the mosque and the shrine
of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib and the military regime’s emphasis on
Islamisation also led to increased tensions between Ahl e Sunnat and
Deobandi Muslim sects around shrines. Ahl e Sunnat, or the orthodox
section of Muslims, favoured tackling shrines with a soft reforming
emphasis at the site of shrines in order to link them more closely with
Islamic rituals.92 Deobandi, on the other hand, though it did not object
to tombs being built, did not approve of grand structures and cults at
and around shrines. One such conflict emerged when a new centre for
publication, Markaz e Tahqeeq e Auliya (Centre for Research on Saints),
was created by the Auqaf Department. Jamal Malik explains that conflict
erupted because of a book previously published by Gauraya, then in
charge of Ulema Academy. For Malik the conflict highlighted the
traditional tension between sects and the personal manipulation used to
preserve the positions of the authorities.93 The conflict shows that the
Ahl e Sunnat orthodoxy, so far relegated to the back benches, had found
the courage and enough support to fight against the dominant revivalist
positions that had been directing the literary activities of and within the
Auqaf Department. At the time, when millions of rupees were being
spent on the shrine and the mosque of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib, the Ahl e
Sunnat orthodoxy found a suitable environment to show some strength.
When the civilian government gained power in the provinces and
centre in the non-party elections of 1985, while Zia ul-Haq remained as
president, the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib was already in the
middle of its construction. The newly elected Chief Minister Nawaz
Sharif made his first public move after becoming Chief Minister (CM) of
Punjab to visit the shrine. He visited the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh
Sahib along with the shrine of Allama Iqbal and Minar-e-Pakistan,
the symbol of independence, in Lahore. His visit was in line with the
previous rulers, both military and civilian, who had been ready to
appropriate the localised sacred sites in order to share the common
national identity. The CM not only visited the shrine but also inaugurated
the urs of Data Sahib every year of his time as CM of Punjab. Meanwhile,
however, the activities at the shrine were gradually organised through
subcommittees and associations. The urs had now translated into a quasi-
state controlled religious and educational site where more emphasis was
given to speeches and conferences. The emphasis most of the time, during
and after urs days, remained on condemning Ghair Shari (non-Shariat)
activities that prevailed at the shrine, not only by Deoband scholars but
also by Ahl e Sunnat scholars.94
Conclusion
All the four governments – of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Bhutto and Zia
– placed more emphasis on infusing their own mode of religious
ideologies than developmental tasks at the site of shrines. Each
government tried to create its own defining frame embedded in its own
brand of Islam in order to control the site of the shrine. With the brief
exception of the early Bhutto period, the religious ideology kept any
pluralistic imagery of the site of the shrine at bay. Each government
emphasised taking over shrines with a view to redefining them; however,
the development remained selective. In the case of both right and left
wing political rulers, the focus of development could not extend beyond
selected shrines.
The martial law regimes showed a sense of continuity and
overlapping dispositions despite being directed towards varied religious
interests. All three regimes retained the colonial policy of keeping auqaf
as a provincial matter, as opposed to a brief period of the Bhutto regime
that made an effort for centralisation. Martial law regimes remained
more focused on introducing their policies. With its more modern
understanding of Islam, Ayub Khan’s regime focused on introducing
updated facilities at the site of the shrine. Yahya Khan’s regime

emphasised not only developmental activities but also the introduction
of educational activities. The emphasis of the regime was to change the
mode of religious thinking through its emphasis on Ulema Academy
and to merge religious tradition with the modern world. On the other
hand, the Zia ul-Haq government reintroduced the concerns of both the
previous martial law regimes, but through its own version of Islamic
understanding. With the focus on developing a huge mosque at the site
of the shrine, Zia’s martial law government also emphasised madrasas
(religious seminaries). The focus on madrasas, however, entails the effort
of relinking these seminaries with their traditional sources of learning.
The martial law government also ensured funding for the upkeep of
madrasas. However, the government pressed for shrines to be placed
within controlled capitalistic economics under which they might attract
large income.
CHAPTER 5
DEVELOPING AND REDEFINING

SHRINES IN THE POST-ZIA
PERIOD
This chapter discusses the working of the Auqaf Department during the
democratic decade, that is of the 1990s, and the Musharraf period.
Without changing the framework of waqf ordinance, both these periods
focused on the institutional working of the Auqaf Department.
Underlying religious and economic concerns, complementing each other
in a balanced way, characterised the institutional progress of the
department during this period. During the democratic decade, both the
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League, having
alternate periods in power, reflected their own politico-religious
leanings, though they never challenged the existing framework for
managing shrines. However, with the beginning of the Musharraf
period, efforts were made to project the sites of shrines as Islamic
cultural heritage. Starting with the United Nations’ project,
government efforts were further focused on engaging and convincing
international monetary agencies of its ability to develop and run such
projects. The chapter highlights how this development translated into
the revamping and reconstruction of shrines. The chapter also describes
the economics of the Auqaf Department and analyses its income and
expenditure ratio during that period. The chapter matches the income-
generating zones of the department against the mode of expenditures in
order to show the administrative expenditures institutionalised
spending on Islamised activities, at the expense of shrines.
DEVELOPING AND REDEFINING SHRINES 131
The democratic decade, Auqaf Department and shrines

The emphasis on the development and the centrality of the shrine of
Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib was the major concern during Zia ul-Haq’s
period in power. The shrine was transformed into a grand complex with
the second largest mosque in Lahore. Such an out-of-proportion focus
on the shrine at the cost of others produced discontent and criticism
against the working of the state and the department. In order to allay
this discontent, in the last year of his rule Zia ul-Haq expressed a wish to
build as large a complex as that of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib, Lahore at the
site of Baba Fareed, Pakpattan. His wish, however, was out of step with
the developmental restrictions of the Auqaf Department. He died in a
plane crash in 1988,1 and the transition period that ended with elections
for a new government meant that new developmental activities in the
department came to a halt.
The elections of 1988 brought a new power structure in Pakistan
with sharp political conflict that was also manifested in the
administrative structure in the rift between the centre and the province
of the Punjab. The election gave a simple majority to the government of
Benazir Bhutto in the centre, with the opposition, headed by Nawaz
Sharif, gaining a majority in Punjab and being able to form a
government in the province.2 The rift between province and centre
became one of the major reasons for the fall of the government of Benazir
Bhutto in 1990, giving way to the rule of Nawaz Sharif.3 The whole
democratic decade later witnessed political tensions and the change of
the elected governments of the PPP of Benazir Bhutto and the Muslim
League of Nawaz Sharif, one after another. Both the political parties
came to power twice in the 1990s, after being toppled by non-
democratic forces.
Politically antagonistic to each other, both of the political groups had
different religious leanings. Both of these parties had a different political
lineage and links with political traditions. Benazir Bhutto claimed to
have the ideational inheritance of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples
Party.4 She represented a ‘novelty of being an urbane, eloquent, and
liberal woman, grown in the unlikely soil of the decadent East and
polished in the West’.5 Public hopes were high that she would revive the
popular spirit associated with her father. On the other hand, Nawaz
Sharif acknowledged his roots in the religio-political policies of
Zia ul-Haq. He did not hesitate to rally his party around an assembly of
revivalist Islamic political forces. His party assured the Pakistan military
that Islamic concerns would be well taken care of and presented itself as a
vehicle for Islamisation in liaison with the military.6
These two political parties demonstrated a variety of concerns
regarding shrines and saints during the decade. The Muslim League
seemed to be following the footsteps of Zia ul-Haq. Their main focus
was on the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib and they seldom developed
other shrines. Nawaz Sharif kept up his practice of visiting the shrine
after he was elected, as he had in 1985 when he was elected and became
Chief Minister (CM) of Punjab for the first time.7 He further supported
the work at the shrine of Data Sahib and ensured the allocation of funds
for the purpose. He inaugurated the first phase of the Data Sahib
complex in 1989. Only a few days after the inauguration ceremony, he
also ordered the start of the second phase of the complex.8
Following the policies of Zia ul-Haq, Nawaz Sharif showed an
interest in the shrine of Baba Fareed of Pakpattan.9 Visiting the shrine of
1991, he ordered work on the shrine to restart to realise the promise of
his political mentor Zia ul-Haq.10 However, the work could not move
ahead as a conflict emerged on the question of destroying the old mosque
and hujras (small rooms) at the shrine. The Archaeology Department of
Pakistan advised that the old constructions at the shrine were many
centuries old and should be preserved. The project designers could not
understand these views and firmly maintained the position that a new
complex was needed similar to that of the shrine of Data Sahib. The
conflict continued until 1999, the last months of Nawaz Sharif’s second
tenure, when the government decided to dismantle the old constructions
and erect a new one in its place.11
The Benazir PPP, following the policy of participating in popular
practices, did not align itself with either the shrine of Data Sahib of
Lahore or that of Baba Fareed of Pakpattan. The Benazir government not
only facilitated the construction of the shrine of Baba Fareed12 but also
showed reverence for the shrine of Data Sahib of Lahore. During
its briefly held period of power in collaboration with the Pakistan
Muslim League (J) from 1993 to 199513 in Punjab, the PPP ensured
participation and celebration during urs days with as much enthusiasm
as that of the other political parties. The emphasis on practices, however,
was the pivotal point that differentiated the religio-political leaning.
The PPP’s Governor Punjab proactively participated in popularising the

rituals such as drinking and donating milk during urs. The politics of
participation demonstrated an effort to mix with the rural population
and lower-middle class.
An underlying tension between the two political parties and their
religious disposition also resulted into a conflict during the 950th urs of
Data Sahib. The conflict emerged on the issue of holding Sama in the
vicinity of the shrine. The basement at the shrine was under construction
and there was no room available to hold Sama. The Provincial Minister
for Auqaf, Shah Nawaz Cheema, claimed that the function of Sama
should take place on the roof of the basement under construction in front
of the tomb. However, the bureaucracy of the Auqaf Department refused
to follow the minister’s order and threw debris on the roof. The head of
the Mahfil Sama Committee then asked permission to organise Sama in a
nearby school from the Secretary for Education who, however, refused.
The minister threatened to bulldoze the school if the secretary did not
provide permission to hold Sama. Albeit without formal approval, the
committee organised Sama in the school by force.14
The PPP government showed its interest in shrines other than that of
Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib. On the 370th urs of Mian Mir, famous
personalities of the PPP government such as Mohammad Hanif Ramay,
Speaker Punjab Assembly, Chaudhry Shah Nawaz Cheema, Provincial
Minister of Auqaf, Senator Sheikh Rafiq, Jahangir Badar, Aitazaz Ahsan
and Mian Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo, then the Chief Minister of Punjab,
participated in the urs activities.15 Highlighting a shrine other than that
of Data Sahib, Benazir Bhutto turned the government’s focus to the
shrine of Bibian Pak Daman, a shrine of sacred women in Lahore. She not
only visited the shrine on 2 May 1994 but she also ordered the expansion
of the structure of the shrine.16 With little leftist leanings, and as a
woman herself, her interest in the shrine of Bibian Pak Daman seems
quite natural. However, the alignment of the shrine with the Shia
community provided another aspect of the interest in the shrine.
The shrine of Bibian Pak Daman, although taken over by the Auqaf
Department as a Brelwi or Sunni shrine, had already acquired an
overwhelming Shia image in the 1960s. The conflict between sects
erupted as early as in 1971, only a few years after it had been taken over
by the Auqaf Department. After revamping the site of the shrine, the
management committee wrote names of panj tan paks (five sacred bodies/
personalities) and of 12 Shia imams inside the tomb. However, Sunni

devotees also wrote the names of four khalifa rashidins (first four pious
khalifas of the Muslim state in Madina) on the face of the shrine.
To resolve the conflict, the Chief Administrator Auqaf had to intervene
and make rules for both Shia and Sunni devotees. The devised rules failed
to pacify the devotees and it took two more arbitrative sessions to resolve
the issue. The final decision specified the sections within which both
Shia and Sunni devotees could hold their respective meetings. The Auqaf
Administrator decided the matter while considering the tradition of the
sect of mujawars of the shrine, who happened to have been Sunni for the
previous 150 years. It is interesting that the Auqaf Administration used
this position of ‘custom’ and ‘history’ as the ground of decision, instead
of taking into consideration the views and affiliations of the saint himself
that were the grounds for constructing the whole portrayal of waqf
properties and of taking the control of shrines away from mujawars and
sajjada nashins. The mujawars, who themselves were Sunni, never
hesitated to own the Shia history of the shrine.17
General Musharraf and the working of the Auqaf

Department
In October 1999, General Musharraf and his aides overthrew the
government of Nawaz Sharif and began the process of guiding the state
into the fast-changing twenty-first century.18 After the attacks on the
Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2011 (9/11) the situation
changed considerably and, while the incident allowed foreign troops to
use Pakistan’s resources, at the same time it opened up opportunities to
reform Pakistan’s institutions and rebuild its cultural environment.19
The conflicting demands and opportunities provided legitimacy to the
ideological justification of the idea of Moderate Enlightenment, a
strange mixture of two apparently different streams of thought in the
context of the history of Pakistan. The emphasis on unfolding this idea
remains on promoting and unearthing the hidden potential of Sufistic
teachings and presenting them to the world as the other side of a
militant Pakistan. Within heightened terrorism and militancy, the other
side helped to show the peaceful image of Pakistan to the international
community. The emphasis on Sufistic messages unearthed the
importance of such poets as Bullai Shah and Waris Shah and their
shrines, and later on even that of Madhu Laal, along with other Sufi
shrines like Nausha Ganj and Shah Chiragh. Interestingly, many delayed
auqaf projects were resumed.
The Musharraf period also coincided with the activities initiated by
the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) for improving
the cultural heritage and tourism programme in Pakistan. Though the
programme had started as early as in 1972,20 it was reinforced by the
Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Ordinance, 1985.21 It was only
given attention and had life breathed into it in the late 1990s. The report
‘Cultural Tourism in Lahore and Peshawar’ was ‘the result of an initiative
by the Government of Pakistan, UNDP and United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)’.22 The project’s final
form included strategic and legal details, developmental recommen-
dations and funding plans in a report published in 2000 by UNESCO.
The report focused on the cities of Lahore and Peshawar, with the emphasis
on conservation and promoting and maintaining the cultural heritage sites
of the cities. The report also linked the cultural heritage project with
suggestions on how to acquire funding to improve cultural heritage
sites and placed emphasis on improving performance and executing
developmental projects. The report suggested that improving cultural
tourism would alleviate poverty and increase employment opportunities,
and provided a detailed programme to run the project.
In order to execute the UNDP programme to conserve, develop and
market cultural heritage tourism, the Governor of Punjab launched the
‘Tajdeed e Lahore Programme’ (Revive Lahore Programme), under the
supervision of a board in 2002, through an ordinance.23 The legal position
of the ordinance, however, was covered through a broad based act, the
Punjab Heritage Foundation Act, 2005.24 The act brought together
many different departments of the Government of Punjab, including
Archaeology, PHA (Pakistan Horticultural Authority) and the Auqaf
Department. The act established a Board of Governors and a fund for its
operations and projects that would be carried out through the creation of
committees of specialists again from different departments of Punjab
government. As the framework was enlarged through legal enactment, the
work of Tajdeed e Lahore was merged with the Fund for Punjab Heritage
in the form of a special committee.25 Other than the historical sites in
Lahore, like Fort, Shalamar Bagh and Toulington Market, the Heritage
Fund also gave weight to the development of the sites of shrines.
As the emphasis on heritage and cultural tourism grew, the shrines

started to receive funding for their reconstruction through programmes
like Tajdeed e Lahore Programme. The first of such funding was for the
shrine of Shah Chiragh and its adjacent building and mosque. The shrine
was renovated by a team headed by an architect from the Auqaf
Department after the Archaeology Department refused to comply with
the orders of the Governor of Punjab to complete the project in a few
weeks.26 The project, though not a very large one as its total cost was
only Rs 70 million, became significant enough to attract even the
President of Pakistan, General Musharraf, to visit Lahore to inaugurate it
on 28 October 2000. It is interesting that the project coincided with the
efforts of the government at that time to win the confidence of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) through demonstrating that
internal development programmes were being undertaken. The IMF
became disillusioned with the economic policies of democratic
governments of the 1990s and lost trust in the ability of the State of
Pakistan either to keep its promises or to restructure the economy.27
During the pivotal time, the Auqaf Fund and the emphasis on
improving cultural heritage programmes provided opportunities to
improve Pakistan’s credibility during 2000 and 2001, and paved the way
for Pakistan to gain the promise of IMF funding that was released a year
later.28
This fortuitous development was carried on at many other shrines
that were reconstructed during the Musharraf period other than the
shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib. In 2003 the government released
funds for the reconstruction of the shrine of Bullai Shah, and the project
got under way in the same year. The federal government took a special
interest and provided the funds on the special directives of the Prime
Minister, Mir Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali, who also inaugurated the
completed mosque beside the shrine.29 The reconstruction was a two-
phase programme: in the first phase the mosque and 20 shops were
constructed; in the second, the complex at the shrine was to be
constructed. Other than the shrine of Bullai Shah, the construction work
at the complex of the shrine of Baba Fareed was also started. It began at
the end of 1999 and finished in 2003. The construction projects on
shrines like those of the shrine of Nausha Ganj Bakhsh in Gujranwala
and Waris Shah in Jandiala Sher Khan, Sheikhupura began after 2000.
At the shrine of Shah Jamal, in 2007, the Auqaf Department revamped
the shrine’s flooring and constructed shops outside the shrine.30 At the
shrine of Jamat Ali Shah Lasani in Narowal, the Auqaf Department
made small improvements, like putting in a motor for the water supply
and improved flooring. Even one of the most neglected shrines of Madhu
Laal Hussain in Lahore received attention, though it took many more
years for any significant activity to take place.31
Amidst all this work being carried on at the other shrines, the shrine
of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib was not ignored; rather, the shrine gained
more importance. The first phase of the complex of Data Ganj Bakhsh
Sahib had been completed in the late 1980s and the work on the next
phase was already under way during the 1990s, yet the second phase was
completed by the end of the 1990s. During the Musharraf period a few
activities were proposed at the newly built second section of the shrine.
The Auqaf Department opened up a centre for ‘Maarif ul Aulya’
(knowing Sufi saints), with two sections: teaching and publication. The
already operational religious school, Jamia al Hajvairy, was relaunched in
the basement of the shrine of Data Sahib. In the next few years the school
was able to enrol around 200 students, providing facilities for board and
lodging, a few spacious classrooms, a large library and administrative
rooms, with an annual budget of Rs 6 million. At the end of Musharraf’s
rule, the school was already able to start an eight-year programme of
Dars e Nizami, equivalent to an MA (Masters of Arts). The other section
of the centre took care of publishing and began publishing a quarterly
journal with the same name from 2002. A little later, the centre started
publishing a monthly newsletter, ‘Auqaf News’.
Until the completion of the second phase of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib,
the shrine had been attracting almost as many visitors weekly as it had
been on the urs days during the early years of the 1950s. The shrine not
only became a religious complex with the largest mosque, only smaller
than the Badshahi Mosque, and a centre for dozens of religious activities
but also became a large social welfare complex, with a 100-bed free
hospital and sizable food services.32 The hospital, which had started as a
small room and remained so until the 1990s, grew into a few buildings,
yet remained poor in its performance. It was many years later that it
turned into a well-organised hospital. Out of the seven different
departments of the hospital,33 only one, the paediatric ward, was built
during the Musharraf period. By the end of Musharraf’s rule, the
performance of the department had reached a satisfactory point. The
Medical Superintendent of the hospital was also in charge of nine

dispensaries in and seven dispensaries outside Lahore. MBBS (Bachelor
of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery) doctors were in charge at the
shrines of Baba Farid and of Baha uddin Zakariya Multan. At the rest of
the dispensaries senior dispensers managed the sites. On the other hand,
Langar Khana (the free food service) at the shrine grew into huge food
providing services.
With the growth of the shrine of Data Sahib, as the shrine became a
separate zone with a PCS (Pakistan Civil Service) officer in charge, its
perception within departmental-religious circles underwent a change.
The shrine now became a strong centre for state controlled Brelwi
teachings, conferences, assemblies and literary expressions. The literary
circles around the shrine now started considering the shrine as a khankah,
a space built by and for a living saint. The principal of Jamia al Hajvairy
wrote in the preface of its prospectus that the relaunching of the school
re-animated the dying tendencies that had been attached to the khankah.
He maintained that since the very beginning, the religious school had
remained a central element of the khankah. Through these khankahs,
students emerged who propagated the two-nation theory that became
the basis for the creation of Pakistan. However, after independence, the
teaching and publication practices at khankahs started deteriorating and
that had been the reason for the increased social evils, militancy and
violence in society. He appreciated the efforts of the Director General
Religious Affairs and the Secretary Auqaf in recreating the environment
of khankahs at the shrine of Data Sahib and hoped that the effort would
give rebirth to those who would serve the nation and religion in the best
possible way.34
The economics of the Auqaf Department:

income and expenditure
The Auqaf Department started with meagre resources and fewer staff
than the customary custodians had had in order to provide better
management and control of waqf property. The beginning was marked
with the hope that through state bureaucracy the waste of the income
generated through public offerings, land contracts, rents from
commercial shops and residential places and many related businesses
attached to the shrines would be stopped. There were further hopes that
state officials would stop selling the endowed property and the
traditional caretakers would no longer be able to benefit from the
capricious use of the property. The state intended to use the income
generated through the shrines for the general welfare of the people as
well as to transform the site of shrines into modern facilities. However,
with each new government, the emphasis changed. Gradually, the
department grew from its small beginnings into a large organisation
with permanent employees and large buildings. The change of
government also brought with it a change of emphasis on religious
policies. The Auqaf Department internalised religious policies into well-
defined Islamised activities through a fully-fledged directorate. The
nationalisation that had begun with taking care of waqf sites gradually
evolved into the prevailing of Islamised practices. Sustaining these
practices required a lot of income from the shrines.
The emphasis on religious prevalence did not stop the Auqaf
Department from earning money. One of the important ways to earn
money was to increase the number of sacred sites within the department’s
control. Gradually, the department took hundreds of sacred sites under
its control. For the Auqaf Department, only profit-making shrines were
worth taking over – that is, those shrines generating more money than
the expenditure they incurred.35 The overall working of the department
remained very below standard for quite a long period and the department
started re-investing on shrines quite late on after its inception, almost
with the start of the rule of the democratic period. It was within
Musharraf’s period that the development projects started and emphasis
on performance increased. This also coincided with the internal
restructuring of the department. For the first time the department tried
to organise itself through organising its data.36 However, it is
noteworthy that visits and offerings seemed to exceed the conditions set
out by the Auqaf Department. The analysis of the economy of shrines
reveals some interesting facts. This section analyses the economic
activity through the department’s budgets.
In the first decade, although the department only took over 52 shrines
it showed a better profit ratio because of less spending on administrative
expenses. Table 5.1 shows that although the income in 1966 is less than
all other amounts, because of less expenditure on administrative
structure the department could have earned 60 per cent surplus or profit
from its received incomes. The department spent only 39.04 per cent of
Table 5.1 Decade-wise income, expenditures and surplus relationship
Expenditure without Surplus Surplus and income Expenditure and Volume increase
Year Income development (in Rs) (in Rs) (SI) ratio (in Rs) income (EI) ratio in a decade
1966 3,969,925 1,550,045 2,419,880 60.96% 39.04%
1970 8,814,284 4,697,594 4,116,690 46.07% 53.02%
1976 16,378,334 12,993,226 3,385,108 20.77% 79.33% 412.56
1986 54,649,400 40,990,700 13,031,100 23.84% 76.16% 333.66
its income on maintaining its administration in 1966. The situation

changed, however, and in 1970 administrative expenses were
already higher than the previous year, with 53.02 per cent of income
being spent on them. The situation changed further with the increase
of bureaucracy and administrative structures in the next few years.
In 1976, profits fell to 20.77 per cent, the lowest ever, and at the same
time the expenditure to income ratio reached its highest. Expenditure
reached an unprecedented level of around 80 per cent of total income,
which shows that the administrative structure of the organisation had
grown a great deal. Jamal Malik and Ernest Ewing observed this fall of
real profits. Malik matched the profit to the high inflation figures and
calculated that real profits decreased. For both, the increase of
integrationist policies of the post-colonial secular administration and
the decreasing interest of people in archaic and traditional shrine-based
practices also caused a decrease in shrine-based visits. We can also
suggest that an increased administrative burden and lack of
development at the site of shrines might be another reason for the
fall in profits. However, there is a significant increase of volume of
income in the mid-1970s – more than 400 per cent of the income
generated in 1966. This also suggests that more than the decrease in
the number of visitors, there was a surge in offerings that meant,
indirectly, visits by devotees.37
In the following decades, we can see that a balance was achieved
between income, expenditure and surplus ratios, despite the increase in
the volume of the income. In each decade there is a kind of stable increase
in income: comparing 1976 to 1986, the volume of income increased by
around 333.43 per cent; from 1986 to 1996 the volume increased by
384.9 per cent; and from 1996 to 2006 the volume increased by 323.03
per cent, the lowest of the previous four decades. The increase in the
volume in income from 1986 to 1996 suggests that the reconstruction
works, especially at the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh, had increased the
number of donations. It seems that devotees themselves supported and
participated in the construction works.38 Further, Table 5.1 shows that
surplus and income (SI) ratio and expenditure and income (EI) ratios
remained almost stable during the three decades, as in 1986, 1996 and
2006 the EI ratio remained at around 76 per cent and SI at around 23 per
cent. It means that after the mid-1970s, and especially after the mid-
1980s, the department achieved economic balance. From then on, with a
few changes, expenditure grew in a similar ratio as did the volume of

income.
Major income heads and accounts of the Auqaf Department

The income of the Auqaf Department comes largely from shrines and is
divided under nine headings.39 Out of these nine, cash boxes, land contracts
and rents collected the bulk of the amount. Interestingly, however, since the
mid-1990s the contract money from shoe handling at shrines gained
significance. Shoe-contracting income increased around five times from Rs
1,643,000 in 1996 to Rs 79,00,000 in 2006 in the Lahore zone.
In Gujranwala Zone too, shoe-contracting income increased exponentially,
almost seven times, from Rs 194,000, in 1996 to Rs 1,355,000 in 2006.
In both zones the income from flower contracting also increased a good
deal. The income from flower contracting in 1996 was Rs 650,000 and
increased to Rs 2,100,000 in 2006, an increase of around 3.3 times in
Lahore zone. Although in Gujranwala Zone the income collected from
flower contracting is not significant, the again increase shows a significant
change. From an almost insignificant Rs 44,000 in 1996, income increased
to Rs 235,000 in 2006, which is an increase of more than five times. The
increase under the lease income heading from contracting land is normal
and increased by around three times from 1996 to 2006. Income from rents
of property, however, did not increase much and showed an increase of little
more than two times in Lahore Zone. The Gujranwala zone shows a large
increase in the income from leasing land; from Rs 2,817,000 in 1996
income increased to Rs 13,643,900 in 2006, almost five times more, while
the increase from income in rents shows an increase of three times, from
Rs 2,154,300 in 1996 to Rs 6,621,000 in 2006 (See Appendix).
However, the most important heading for receiving income remained
that from cash boxes that are normally placed at the shrines into which
visiting devotees put donations. Tables 2 and 3 suggest that, aside from
1986,40 the cash box category received more than 50 per cent of the total
collected income in 1996 and 2006. In 1986, however, the percentage of
cash box income remained quite low, at around 35 per cent (see
Table 5.4). The reasons included that from some zones, such as
Bahawalpur only 18.9 per cent and from Sargodha only 23.4 per cent
income was collected under that heading. However, in Central Punjab,
even in 1986, cash box income stands at around 50 per cent.41 The
situation seems have changed in 1996 when Bahawalpur Zone generated
Table 5.2 Income from major headings in 1996
Income Percentage of Amount Percentage of Times
No. (in Rs) total income (in Rs) total income increase
1 Rents (Karaya jaat) 28,178,896 13.39 87,197,000 13.26 3.09
2 Agricultural land contracts (Zar patta Arazyat) 27,529,903 13.08 86,084,000 13.09 3.12
3 Cash boxes 125,223,205 59.53 347,470,000 52.84 2.77
4 Contracts for shoe keeping (Thaika hifazat paposh) 14,003,263 6.65 41,642,000 6.33 2.97
5 Contracts for flower selling (Thaika gulfroshi) 1,249,600 0.59 3,973,000 0.60 3.17
6 Miscellaneous income 12,130,373 5.76 49,225,000 7.48 4.05
7 Darbar Hospital voucher ( parchi) fees 979,093 0.46 3,046,000 0.46 3.11
8 Recovery of advances and income from investments 2,150,000
9 Sales of Auqaf Department publications 265,000
Receipts in assets building account 17,149,000
Total 210,344,593 657,551,000
Table 5.3 Income from major headings in 1986

No. Income heads Amount (in Rs) %
1 Cash box 19,083,570.48 34.92
2 Land contract 11,716,831.36 21.44
3 Rents 18,427,777.00 33.72
around 25 per cent, D.G. Khan around 49 per cent and Faisalabad around
42 per cent of their total income in cash box.42 As the situation in Central
Punjab zones remained almost the same, the cash box income seems to
have stayed at more than 50 per cent in both 1996 and 2006 (See
Appendix). The growth of cash box income shows a relationship between
the emphasis of the developmental concern of the Auqaf Department,
growth of shrine visitors and the growth of their donations from 1986 to
1996 and from 1996 to 2006.
Zones and income-expenditure details

The Auqaf Department organised its working from the very beginning
within zones and sectors, although after undergoing restructuring, the
Table 5.4 Zone-wise income in major headings in 1986

No. Zone Major heads Percentage of zone income
1 Bahawalpur Zone Cash box 18.9
Land contract 42
Rents 27.5
2 Sargodha Zone Cash box 23.9
Leasing 26.9
Rents 43.3
3 Multan Zone Cash box 39.2
Leasing 18.8
Rents 30
4 Central Punjab Cash box 47.6
Leasing 12.6
Rents 31.8
5 Rawalpindi Cash box 45
Leasing 6.9
Rents 24
Table 5.5 Zone-wise income for 1986

No. Zones Income (in Rs) Percentage
1 Bahawalpur 9,727,593 17.79
2 Sargodha 6,743,664 12.33
3 Rawalpindi 2,076,677 4.1
4 Multan Zone 8,494,565 15.54
5 Central Punjab Zone 27,606,900 50.51
department revised the number of zones and increased its number from
five to 11 in 1993– 4. As Table 5.4 shows, in 1986 the number of zones
was five. Out of these, Faisalabad Zone emerged out of Sargodha, D.G.
Khan Zone emerged out of Bahawalpur and Pakpattan Zone emerged
out of Multan, while the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib and Badshahi
Mosque were carved out as independent zones from Central Punjab
Zone. The restructuring was undertaken largely to manage the waqf
properties better and, as Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib had already grown to
the point that it was earning more income than any other zone, its
creation into a separate zone made sense. However, the decision to make
Badshahi Mosque a separate zone in 1993– 4 makes less sense according
to the income column in Table 5.11. In 1996, instead of earning a profit
the Badshahi Mosque lost Rs 954,662. The Data Sahib Hospital was also
in loss, as it was also made a separate zone. However, as a hospital should
be considered a social welfare activity, the reason to make it a separate
zone, despite its being in deficit, seems justified. However, the decision
to turn Badshahi Mosque into a separate zone can only be considered as
one more effort to give priority to the state’s religious ideology on shrine
culture.
Among all the zones of Punjab, the emphasis on and centrality of
the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib turned it into the largest income-
earning zone for the Auqaf Department. Table 5.6 shows that the
shrine of Data Sahib earned a considerable amount from as early as
1986, totalling around 35 per cent of the total earned income of the
department, while in 1996 and 2006 the Data Sahib was able to collect
around 31 and 25 per cent respectively of the total income earned by
the department. The increase in the volume of income of the shrine
seems to be highest during 1966 and 1976, but it showed a gradual
decline of surplus income if we compare the figures of 1986, 1996 and
Table 5.6 Income of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib
Shrine 1966 (in Rs) PTIY 1976 (in Rs) PTIY 1986 (in Rs) PTIY 1996 (in Rs) PTIY 2006 (in Rs) PTIY
1 Data Sahib 1,366,235 35 5,464,940 36 19,127,290 35 65,233,790 31.01 169,130,000 25.72
Note: PTIY ¼ percentage of income to total Income that year.
2006. The decrease in surplus volume, however, reflects the increase in

the size of overall income generated by the shrine; an increase of more
than Rs 1 million to Rs 160 million shows the unfolding of the shrine’s
potential. The figures also showed that the focus of the various
governments also helped to increase the shrine’s income.
As development works were carried on at the shrine from the very
beginning up to 1996, the volume of income continued to increase
impressively. A decline in 2006 can be understood as the stabilising of
the shrine after it had reached saturation point after the development
work had finished.
However, the income from the shrine of Data Sahib retained quite a
high surplus volume, as in 1996 the shrine earned 341.05 times more
than in 1985 and in 2006 around 260 times more than the income
earned in 1996 (see Table 5.6). However, its percentage within total
income of Auqaf earnings shows a gradual decrease. We can see that from
as high as around 36 per cent it decreased to around 25 per cent of the
total income generated by the Auqaf Department in 2006. It seems that
some other shrines and other zones also started generating more income
in those years. The centrality of the shrine of Data Sahib, though still
a major contributor, shows a decrease within the overall income
situation. We can see an increase in income in Lahore, Gujranwala,
Faisalabad and Pakpattan zones. The development at some important
shrines in these zones, especially in Lahore, Gujranwala and Pakpattan,
suggests the reasons behind the improvement in income. The shrine of
Bibian Pak Daman earned Rs 2,747,200 in 1996; however, in 2006 the
income had increased by almost 440 per cent from 1996, amounting to
Rs 12,092,900. However, at the shrines of Mian Mir and Baba Bullai
Shah the volume of income increased by around 300 per cent, as in 1996
the shrines earned Rs 2,207,100 and Rs 2,079,000 and in 2006, Rs
6,466,100 and Rs 6,754,700 respectively. At both of these shrines the
development work either could not gain momentum or started quite
late. At the Mian Mir shrine, the building for the langarkhana (free food
services) and Sama (qawwali) hall was developed before 2006. However,
it remained closed for most of the time and only opened on special days;
thus, it could not attract visitors. Other development work in the form
of a hospital started in 2007 outside the area of Mian Mir but hardly
found a satisfactory pace. At the shrine of Bullai Shah, although the first
phase of mosque was completed quite early, the second phase took much
Table 5.7 Income increase in volume
Volume Volume Volume Volume
1966 1976 income 1986 income 1996 income 2006 income
Shrine (in Rs) (in Rs) increase % (in Rs) increase % (in Rs) increase % (in Rs) increase %
1 Data 1,366,235 5,464,940 400 19,127,290 350 65,233,790 341.05 169,130,000 259.26
Sahib
longer and in 2006 – 7 the development work was still under way.43
Another factor also appears to be that even though the development of a
shrine may help to increase the volume of income, the development of a
mosque at the site of a shrine does not seem to make a significant
difference.
Before the restructuring of zones, the highest income-generating
zone for the Auqaf Department was that of Central Punjab. This zone
earned more than 50 per cent of the total income generated by auqaf in
1986 (see Table 5.4). Later on, this zone was divided into the four zones
of Data Sahib, Lahore, Gujranwala and Badshahi Mosque. Taken
together, these zones still generated more than 50 per cent of the total
income. However, looked at separately, two of the zones are higher
income-generating zones. Data Sahib generated income of around 31
per cent in 1996 and around 25 per cent of the total auqaf income in
2006. Lahore Zone earned around 17 per cent in 1996 and around 18
per cent of the total income in 2006. However, Gujranwala Zone
lagged behind with, around 6 per cent in 1996 and around 7 per cent in
2006. What is significant is that both Lahore and Gujranwala zones
show a trend of increasing income. From other zones, Faisalabad shows
a significant shift from around 5 per cent in 1996 to around 9 per cent
in 2006. Pakpattan Zone also shows little increase, of around 1 per cent
in 2006, as the income stood at around 8 per cent showing a rise to
around 9 per cent in 2006. However, Multan, Sargodha, D.G. Khan
and Bahawalpur, continued to show an increase in income, although
showing a decrease with respect to the overall income from auqaf (see
Table 5.8).
Data Sahib Hospital and income-expenditure analysis

The shrine of Data Sahib, however, remained a consistently high income-
generating zone, and showed a large surplus, yet a large amount of its
income was spent on the hospital attached with the shrine. The hospital,
which began from a small dispensary and later operated as an eye ward,
grew to become a hospital with seven departments by 2000. Although
before 2000 working conditions were poor, later on it grew into a well-
organised hospital. The hospital, considered to be free, takes a nominal
amount for providing different services, such as X-ray, laboratory
facilities, eye testing, etc. and therefore also generates some income.44 This
income, however, remains a nominal contribution within the overall auqaf
Table 5.8 Zone-wise breakdown of income 1996 and 2006

Income % of Income % of
(1996) total (2006) total
No. Zone (in Rs) income (in Rs) income
1 Data Sahib 65,233,790 31.01 169,130,000 25.72
2 Lahore Zone 35,852,921 17.04 121,200,000 18.43
3 Gujranwala 13,151,217 6.25 48,750,000 7.41
4 Rawalpindi 7,655,324 3.63 25,480,000 3.87
5 Faisalabad 12,349,353 5.87 55,802,000 8.48
6 Sargodha 9,796,559 4.65 29,485,000 4.48
7 Multan 14,373,392 6.83 38,192,000 5.80
8 Pakpattan 17,784,105 8.45 61,396,000 9.33
9 Dera Ghazi Khan 8,842,785 4.20 24,767,000 3.76
10 Bahawalpur 21,111,856 10.03 49,682,000 7.55
11 Badshahi Mosque 2,164,138 1.02 7,910,000 1.20
12 Data Sahib Hospital 979,093 0.46 2,705,000 0.41
13 Head office 1,050,260
Total 210,344,593 657,551,000
income, as the income stays at around 0.4 per cent against the total
generated income, as Table 5.8 shows. The hospital appears to have been
taking up around 38.10 per cent of total income of the shrine of Data
Sahib in 1986, 35.33 per cent in 1996 and 41.85 per cent in 2006 (see
Table 5.9). If we compare the expenses of Data Sahib hospital with the
total expenditure of the Auqaf Department, we find that the expenditure
on the hospital is around 14.3 per cent in 1996 and 9.9 per cent in 2006
(see Table 5.10). The gradual increase of the expenditures at the hospital
Table 5.9 Expenditure on Data Sahib hospital in ratio with the income of
Data Sahib shrine
1986 1996 2006
1 Data Sahib Income 19,127,290 65,233,790 169,130,000
(in Rs)
2 Data Sahib Expenditures 7,288,400 23,050,400 70,797,600
Hospital (in Rs)
Percentage 38.10 35.33 41.85
Table 5.10 Expenditure on Data Sahib Hospital in ratio with the income
of Data Sahib shrine
Details Estimates (in Rs)
Income 2,705,000
Expenditure 70,797,600
Details of Income
X-ray 1,140,000
Chit fee 630,000
Laboratory charges 180,000
Admission fee 265,000
Eye testing fee 80,000
Misc. 410,000
Total income 2,705,000
Details of Expenditure
Expenditure on health 70,797,600
Total expenditure 70,797,600
Table 5.11 Badshahi Mosque

Estimates (in Rs)
Details 1996 2006

Income 2,316,000 79,100,00
Expenditure 3,292,300 6,027,000
Details of Income
Cash box 250,000 1,450,000
Shoe contract 750,000 2,650,000
Tabrrakat muqaddasa 1,298,000 2,010,000
Misc. 3,000 1,800,000
Total income 2,316,000 7,910,000
Religious Affairs including Tableegh 994,100 5,493,700
Department and mosque (Religious Affairs)
Allowances 450,400
Contingent 1,744,800 533,300 (Administration)
Talai Quran Pak 3,000
New expenditure 100,000
Total expenditure 3,292,300 6,027,000
correlated with the gradual growth of the departments in the hospital.

However, the rise in expenditure in 2006 correlates with the existence of
the fully-fledged hospital with seven different departments and more than
50 MBBSs or other highly skilled employees.
Head office, administration and non-development spending

Though Data Sahib Hospital was a high consumer of the income of the
Auqaf Department, it was the head office, as a separate zone, that
remained at the top of the expenditure table. Interestingly, the Auqaf
Department divides its administration under two main headings:
administration and religious affairs. Administration is further
divided into two main headings: head office and zonal administration.
‘Head office’ is that of the Auqaf Department, Punjab, situated within
Shah Chiragh Building Lahore. We can see from Table 5.12 that the
head office consumed around 25 per cent of the total expenditure in
1996, and around 16 per cent in 2006. Head office also earns some
income for the department that remains 2.5 per cent of the incurred
expenditure. However, head office as an administrative unit comes
under a separate heading within expenditure and income tables,
other zones having their own administrative offices and thus
expenditure. Out of these, Lahore Zone has the highest administrative
expenses at Rs 13,017,600, followed by Faisalabad at Rs 7,784,100,
Gujranwala at Rs 7,624,200, Multan at Rs 7,542,000, Data Sahib at
Rs 7,310,200, Pakpattan at 6,789,100, Sargodha at Rs 5,350,200 and
Rawalpindi at Rs 5,192,600, with Badshahi Mosque coming last at
Rs 5,33,300 in 2006.
Badshahi Mosque
The most interesting zone, and one of the primary concerns of the
Religious Affairs Department of the Auqaf Department, is the site of
Badshahi Mosque. It is a historical mosque; before being taken over by
the Auqaf Department it was under the control of Anjuman Islamia,
British authorities having given it to the local Muslims through
Anjuman in the late nineteenth century. Despite severe criticism of
Anjuman, and even after taking over some other sacred sites, the
department could not take control of the mosque in the first decade of
its operations. With the Bhutto period in the offing, and with the
high tide of common Islamic ideology in the international world, the
Table 5.12 Zone-wise breakdown of expenditure of 1996 and 2006
1996 (in Rs) 2006 (in Rs)
No. Zone Expenditure Income Percentage Expenditure Income Percentage

1 Data Sahib 14,453,200 65,233,790 22.15 30,623,500 169,130,000 18.01
2 Lahore Zone 20,994,800 35,852,921 58.55 72,903,100 121,200,000 60.15
3 Gujranwala 6,266,000 13,151,217 47.64 23,509,500 48,750,000 48.22
4 Rawalpindi 6,328,800 7,655,324 82.67 20,615,600 25,480,000 80.90
5 Faisalabad 8,433,300 12,349,353 68.28 26,993,025 55,802,000 48.37
6 Sargodha 5,894,000 9,796,559 60.16 20,336,100 29,485,000 68.97
7 Multan 9,840,400 14,373,392 68.46 29,369,000 38,192,000 76.89
8 Pakpattan 8,121,900 17,784,105 45.66 28,470,500 61,396,000 46.37
9 Dera Ghazi Khan 4,381,200 8,842,785 49.54 15,271,500 24,767,000 61.66
10 Bahawalpur 10,114,680 21,111,856 47.90 30,466,000 49,682,000 61.32
11 Badshahi Mosque 3,118,800 2,164,138 144.11 6,027,000 7,910,000 76.19
12 Data Sahib Hospital 23,050,400 979,093 2354.26 70,797,600 2,705,000 2617.28
13 Head office 41,727,000 1,050,260 3973.01 11,388,7700
Development 239,215,000
Total 161,929,550 210,344,593 711,795,000 657,551,000
Auqaf Department felt encouraged to take over the mosque. However,

expenditure remained quite high at the mosque and Table 5.12 shows it
to be in loss in 1996 and barely manageable in 2006. The income from
the mosque in 1996 was Rs 2,164,138 against a high expenditure of
Rs 3,118,800, with the loss of Rs 954,662. However, in 2006 the
mosque earned Rs 7,910,000 against expenditure of Rs 6,027,000, with
the surplus income of 19 lacs. The Badshahi Mosque can be seen as an
ideal type of the extended religious ideology underlying the whole
working of the Religious Affairs Department. Even after many years, in
1996 the mosque was still incurring a loss. Despite this, the vast
administrative expenditure found them thriving on the mosque. It is
interesting that this mosque shows a pattern of increase in cash box
income because of the sacred sites of visits, a pattern one normally finds
at shrines. The collection through the cash box, however, is lower than
the standard at shrines, as the cash box collected around Rs 250,000 in
1996, while in 2006 it collected around Rs 1,450,000. Even after
another decade or so, the mosque earnings barely kept its functioning.
Comparing it with Data Sahib, the ideal type of shrine, we can instantly
see that from the very first day the shrine was able to earn sufficient
income. In fact, it is hard to find a single shrine in loss within the control
of the Auqaf Department.
Zones and expenditure

Other than Data Sahib Hospital, head office and, partly, the Badshahi
Mosque, the expenditure on all other zones remained less than the
income generated through them in both 1996 and 2006. However,
Table 5.12 shows that the expenditure incurred was on the rise.
Rawalpindi and Multan zones seem to have been leading in the
percentage of expenditure, as even in 2006 it stood at around 80 per
cent and 76 per cent respectively. However, in Lahore and Gujranwala
zones the percentage seems to have been increasing. The expenditure
at Lahore reached around 60 per cent of the total income, that is
Rs 72,903,100, out of which Rs 121,200,000 was expenditure.
Gujranwala also follows the pattern of Lahore – with the increase in
expenditure the possibility of surplus income decreases. It is
interesting, however, that Data Sahib shows a decline in expenditure,
as the expenditure-income ratio decreased from 22.15 per cent in 1996
to 18.01 per cent in 2006.
Religious Affairs: administrative appropriation of shrines

through religious disguise
Other than non-religious administration, the Auqaf Department has a
full grown Department of Religious Affairs and it is included as a
separate income heading within its budget. This heading does not earn
any income and exists as a pure liability within the Auqaf Department’s
budget. We can see some major subheadings in the Fig. A145 that show
all sorts of religious employees, mostly placed within the newly
developed, revived or old mosques attached to the shrines. It also has
employees in newly developed educational seminaries, attached or
sometimes non-attached seminaries such as Ulema Academy. We can see
from Table 5.13 that expenditure under the heading of Religious Affairs
is almost as high as the Administration Department’s expenses. In 1996,
the expenditure on Religious Affairs stood at 32.69 per cent, while in
2006 it showed a small decrease of 29.71 per cent of the total
expenditure of the year. The figures suggest that the expenditure on
Religious Affairs is almost equivalent to, if not more than, all the
income generated by the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib. It seems that
the post-colonial state not only tried to integrate shrines within its
administrative structure but also restructured them through a unique
way of expanding the Religious Affairs Department.
Religious Affairs does not only cover all the sacred sites throughout
the Punjab Auqaf Department, but is also one of the expenditure
headings that shows a constant increase in many zones. Compared with
Table 5.13 Expenses of main headings, 1996 and 2006

1996 2006 (in Rs
No. Major headings (in Rs) Percentage millions) Percentage
1 Administrative 66,042,000 32.85 180.512 25.36
expenses
2 Religious affairs 65,714,380 32.69 211.485 29.71
3 Social welfare 25,075,200 12.47 15.9444 2.24
4 Reconstruction 5,098,000 2.53
5 Development 239.25 33.61
6 Purchases 4,512,700 2.24 12.372 1.73
7 Health 24,215,800 12.04 70.620 9.9
Total 201,009,495 711.795
Table 5.14 Zone-wise breakdown of religious affairs expenditures, 1996 and 2006
Expenditures Income Percentage Expenditures Income Percentage
No. Zone 1996 (in Rs) (in Rs) of total 2006 (in Rs) (in Rs) of total
1 Data Sahib 10,096,600 65,233,790 15.47 20,388,000 169,130,000 12.05
2 Lahore Zone 15,495,600 35,852,921 43.21 58,639,000 121,200,000 48.38
3 Gujranwala 6,536,200 13,151,217 49.7 14,596,900 48,750,000 29.94
4 Rawalpindi 5,583,600 7,655,324 72.93 14,561,400 25,480,000 57.01
5 Faisalabad 2,192,000 12,349,353 17.77 18,608,925 55,802,000 33.34
6 Sargodha 6,195,480 9,796,559 63.24 14,373,900 29,485,000 48.74
7 Multan 3,574,000 14,373,392 24.86 19,563,000 38,192,000 51.22
8 Pakpattan 4,119,600 17,784,105 23.16 19,143,800 61,396,000 31.18
9 Dera Ghazi Khan 5,184,900 8,842,785 58.63 9,125,200 24,767,000 36.84
10 Bahawalpur 3,617,600 21,111,856 17.13 21,298,600 49,682,000 42.86
11 Badshahi Mosque 3,118,800 2,164,138 144.14 5,493,700 7,910,000 69.45
12 Data Sahib Hospital - -
13 Head office - -
Total 65,714,380 210,344,593 31.24 211,485,000 657,551,000 31.09
other administrative headings, expenditure by Religious Affairs seems

to be increasing without causing any concern. Interestingly, in some of
the zones the expenditure on religious affairs makes up almost 50 per
cent of their total income. We can see in Table 5.14 that in Lahore the
expenditure on religious affairs stood at 43 per cent in 1996 while in
2006 is was 48.38 per cent of its total income. In Multan it was
around 25 per cent in 1996; however in 2006 it reached 51 per cent.
In Pakpattan it was 23.16 per cent in 1996 and in 2006, 31.18 per cent.
However, in some zones the expenditure seems to be going down, as in
Rawalpindi Zone, where it was around 72 per cent in 1996 while in
2006 it decreased to 57.1 per cent. This reduction is illusory and should
not be understood as a decrease in the expenditure of the Religious
Affairs Department. Instead, it must be seen as an increase in the income
of Rawalpindi Zone. We can also see that out of the total expenditure,
expenses on religious affairs, that is, Rs 14,561,400, in Rawalpindi Zone
in 2006 was still around 70 per cent of its total expenditure, that is,
Rs 20,615,600.
The increased spending on religious affairs also hindered spending
on health, development and social welfare. There are many zones
within which no health services are provided and in others the facilities
are in a poor condition. In Faisalabad and Sargodha zones, though both
earn a reasonable amount, there are still no health services provided by
the Auqaf Department, while in Bahawalpur, Pakpattan, D.G. Khan
and Gujranwala zones a mere Rs 380,200, Rs 365,300, Rs 607,900 and
Rs 448,000 respectively is spent on health services. Similarly, we can
see that spending on social welfare stood at 12.47 per cent in 1996 and
barely 2.24 per cent in 2006. The lowest point in 2006 might be
balanced a little by around 33 per cent spending on development and
reconstruction projects at shrines. However, this is next to nothing
compared with the Administrative and Religious Affairs expenditure.
It is not only that a very large amount is spent on religious affairs,
which is exploitative in itself, but it also keeps focus away from the
very spirit of shrine culture. A visit to a shrine, even one such as Data
Sahib, the most central of all the shrines, can provide evidence that a
flood of uncouth and ill-mannered behaviour emerges when food is
distributed. There is very little effort on the part of the administration
to treat the poor and needy in a better and well-organised way.
However, on religious days we can see a clear difference, as on the days
of Ramzan, when food services take place in a well-ordered and well-

mannered way.
Social welfare and accounts

The whole debate about taking control of sacred sites has been connected
to the conception of social welfare. For many forms of shrine, social
welfare seems to be the central point around which the shrine-based life
forms move. On the basis of ethnographic work, modern scholars even
started considering faith-based organisations to be an important
component in providing social services.46 However, the emphasis of the
Auqaf Department remained on varied sides, yet increased the distance
of shrines from their traditional social welfare practices. At Data Ganj
Bakhsh Sahib, the total spending on social welfare remained at
Rs 1,115,000 and Rs 29, 25,300 in 1996 and 2006 respectively and in
Lahore Zone in the same years, the total spending on social welfare was
Rs 1,173,000 and Rs 1,246,500 (see Table 5.15). Out of total
expenditure at Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib, expenditure on social welfare
stayed at only 7.7 per cent and 9.55 per cent of the total expenditure
1996 and 2006 respectively. Similarly for Lahore Zone, the percentage
remained at only 5.5 and 1.70 per cent of the total expenditure of the
zone. The situation in Gujranwala Zone is similar, where the percentage
stayed at 9.9 and 3.58 per cent of total expenditure. It seems the pattern
for spending on social welfare decreases even at the most significant
shrines and zones of the Auqaf Department (see Table 5.15).
Conclusion
Although there was no legislative development regarding the
controlling framework in the 1990s a renewed relationship between
state and shrine was founded, on a rather institutional footing. The state,
in a sense, took ownership of shrines as sites of Islamic heritage, and
focused on the Auqaf Department’s internal restructuring. The attention
was now on improving operational and bureaucratic rules and procedures
in order to consolidate and grow the Auqaf Department as an
organisation seeking profitability. For the first time in its history, at the
end of 1990s an internal report was published in order to organise details
of property. It is strange that the condition of the department was so bad,
Table 5.15 Percentage of social welfare expenditure
Social welfare Social welfare
expenditure 1996 Total expenditure expenditure 2006 Total expenditure
No. Zone (in Rs) (in Rs) % (in Rs) (in Rs) %
1 Data Sahib 1,115,000 14,476,700 7.7 2,925,300 30,623,500 9.55
2 Lahore Zone 1,173,000 20,951,400 5.5 1,246,500 72,903,100 1.70
3 Gujranwala 625,300 6,266,000 9.9 843,600 23,509,500 3.58
and its working was in such disarray that, earlier than that report, only
fragmentary zone-related data was available. There was no master list
compiled in a tabulated form.47 In 1999 the Secretary Auqaf made one
such list that started ‘making the process of leases, rents, cash-box
collections and other modes of income, more transparent’.48 As the
department interacted with the public at high level, the ‘data would
thus contribute towards a more responsible and responsive, a more
efficient and effective and public friendly Auqaf organisation’.49 With
the start of the Musharraf period, the effort of the secretary coincided
with a general emphasis of the regime on performance and reformation.
However, the condition of the department remained unacceptable to the
Public Accounts Committee, which showed its dissatisfaction with
many financial transactions in 2005.50
The Auqaf Department’s accounts show a pattern of increases and
decreases in income, emphasising points of expenditure and ignoring
some sectors. The striking feature of the accounts is that they bring out
the significant position of the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib among
all the zones. As the income of some other zones also started to increase,
the shrine experienced a small decrease in its traditional centrality. Some
of the shrines within Lahore Zone, like Bibian Pak Daman, also showed
signs of a considerable increase in income. However, although the
increase reflected a surge in visits, the difference in earned income was
still unable to affect the centrality of the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh
Sahib. Overall, it seems that what was previously termed the zone of
Central Punjab and later divided into the five zones of Lahore,
Gujranwala, Data Sahib, Data Sahib Hospital and Badshahi mosque was
the leading income generating zone for the Auqaf Department. Though
Data Sahib Hospital was consistently in loss, the shrine’s overall income
comprised more than 50 per cent of the department’s total income.
The most interesting feature of the accounts is the heavy expenditure
incurred by the Religious Affairs section. The Religious Affairs
department pursued the process of official Islamisation at the site of
shrines, viewing them in the light of mosques to fulfil their purpose. The
huge spending on religious affairs also shows the desire for state ideology
to dominate the sites of shrines. Overall, spending on religious affairs
stood at around 30 per cent, and if it is coupled with expenditure on
administration, it amounted to more than 50 per cent of the total
expenditure of the Auqaf Department in the period under discussion.
It is quite strange that the taking over of the shrines from traditional
caretakers resulted, on the one hand, in providing jobs for thousands of
state employees, and on the other, the prevalence of the appropriated
ideology on the sites of shrines. It is not clear what justification the
Auqaf Department has for such spending of the income given by the
devotees to the Sufi saint of the shrine. The high spending on religio-
administrative affairs came at the cost of customary functions such as
social welfare and the well-being of the common people, traditionally
considered as the most significant role of shrines.
CONCLUSION
This book has examined the relationship between the post-colonial state
and shrines with its focus upon Central Punjab. The book has traced the
relationship in historical mode and tried to show the development of
the relationship both analytically and descriptively. It holds that, for the
post-colonial state, 1959 was the critical moment for the relationship. At
that time, the post-colonial state decided to take over shrines and other
sacred sites through an ordinance claiming to manage waqf properties.
The timing is important because since then the underlying principle of
the ordinance – that the post-colonial state had the right to take over
shrines to overthrow the customary caretakers and to manage their affairs
through a state department did not change with any later change of
government. Although making small changes and placing different
emphases, no government since then has changed the framework of the
Auqaf Department and its legitimacy to control and manage waqf
properties. The moment of the passing of the 1959 Ordinance, therefore,
still lives even in the second decade of twenty-first century. Understanding
it as a critical moment for the relationship between the state and shrines,
this book has tried to move back and forth from that moment in order to
highlight its character and potential.
Moving backwards, the moment of the ordinance stood on the
appropriation of a certain kind of religio-political ideology. Interest-
ingly, that ideology was not owned only by the state authorities; rather,
was accepted by a large range of religo-political streams through an
overlapping consensus. Embarking on an identity-making process, the
varied religio-political streams had to compete amidst communal
CONCLUSION 163
tensions in the third decade of twentieth-century colonial rule. All of

this ushered in a kind of reterritorialised process that was already linked
with the deterritorialising of soil-based identity. Following these
religio-political streams and bringing forward their reterritorialising
process, it appeared that these streams developed a unique perspective
regarding pluralistic shrine-based practices. The position developed a
kind of consensus against the pluralistic practices and suggested
reforming all such forms through the religio-moral principles. The
development, which was not only theological but also highly political,
merged with the spirit of the reformist colonial urban elite and started
reforming all those practices considered deviant.
The religio-political process correlated with the colonial legal
developments that engendered a segregated identity for Muslims without
letting them engage in any kind of struggle. The Religious Endowment
Act, 1920 and Muslim Waqf Act of 1923 initiated the process of the
surveying and enumeration of sacred sites, while emphasising the nature
of segregated religious Muslim waqf. The process also complemented the
reterritorialised process of identity formation for the Muslim community.
Defining Muslim waqf legally can be contrasted with the violent struggle
of the Sikh community to gain their identity through taking control of
their shrines. The Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925 segregated Sikh sacred sites
from other communities and set an example, at the same time, for other
communities to own their own shrines reciprocally. As the legislative
legalisation had defined ways for identifying Muslim sacred spaces and the
religious elite had started identifying itself with the mosque more than
shrines, the pluralistic shrine-based practices appeared deviant. The
colonial Muslim elite tried to take control of shrines because of their
potential to engender conflicts and political tensions, and at the same
time, its potential to exert moral and political influence upon the local
population. However, the elite had to remain content with initiating
moral reformative acts, such as the Music in Muslim Shrines Act of 1942,
before the creation of Pakistan.
The emergence of the post-colonial State of Pakistan marked the
beginning of a process of double-reterritorialisation, or relocating
Muslim identity on the already reterritorialised identity. The Muslim
League and the larger colonial urban sector elite, especially in Punjab,
refused to identify themselves with the newly acquired soil. Instead, the
elite opted to re-own the ideology that already remained supportive in
gaining new land and had defined itself among other contesting
religious communities by excluding them. The new situation opened up
another kind of linking and delinking process. At the political level, the
process engendered the Objectives Resolution, which demarcated the
difference between Muslims and non-Muslims clearly while laying down
foundational principles for any future constitution. On a religious-
puritan level, the process opened up the anti-Ahmadi movement to
purify Muslim identity. The process also extended to the spiritual
practices and the elite of post-colonial state, in order to implement
Islamisation, making efforts to exclude deviant practices, the remnant of
pluralistic shrine-based practices, from the sites of sacred spaces.
Before the promulgation of Ayub Khan’s ordinance for taking over
total control of shrines, the post-colonial state had already started
extending its control though keeping its lego-religious thinking
grounded in reterritorialised identity. The emphasis on excluding
deviant customary traditions continued to emerge during the whole of
the 1950s; however, it could not produce the desired results because of
the incapacity of the post-colonial state and still lingering acceptance
of the customary sacred sites. It is with the autocratic rule of Ayub
Khan that the state moved on to a complete takeover. The
underpinning of all legal activities since 1959 remained embedded
within the emphasis on the continuity of extending the reterritor-
ialisation, a kind of double-reterritorialisation of Islamisation. The
opening up of the possibility of controlling the customary deviant sites
through universal laws, initiated and enforced through Ayub Khan’s
reformist agenda, never allowed the local customary caretakers to
control the sacred sites. In the wake of realising the impact of universal
laws, the Yahya regime and Bhutto government tried to introduce the
centralised activities upon which, later on, interestingly, General Zia
ul-Haq’s decentralised Ordinance of 1979 was based. The legalisation
process connected localities and local sites of worship with the
universal religious ideologue. The universalising-locality left no place
for localised worshipping to appear as anything but a deviant form.
It is interesting that the legalisation within the post-Ayub period
regarding shrines could not help imagining the profitability of the
sacred space. Only those shrines that would not become a financial
burden on the government itself, the legalisation maintains, could
come under the control of the Auqaf Department.
CONCLUSION 165
In the 1990s, when the state had stopped revising the controlling
framework, the Auqaf Department witnessed an institutional
restructuring. It started operating on rules and structure in quite a
new way; consolidating itself as an organisation, it improved through
generating more and more internalised rules. For the first time in its
history, at the end of the 1990s an internal report was published in order
to organise details of property. It is strange that the condition of the
department was so bad and its working in such disarray, that, earlier than
that report, only fragmentary zone-related data was available, and no
master list had been compiled in a tabulated form.1 In 1999 the
Secretary Auqaf made one such list that started ‘making the process of
leases, rents, cash-box collections and other modes of income, more
transparent’.2 As the department had to interact with the public at a
greater level, the ‘data would thus contribute towards a more responsible
and responsive, a more efficient and effective and public friendly Auqaf
organization’.
However, with the beginning of the Musharraf period, efforts were
made to project the sites of shrines as Islamic cultural heritage. Starting
with the United Nations’ project, the government’s efforts were further
focused on engaging and convincing international monetary agencies
of its ability to develop and run such projects. The efforts concluded in
securing funds for revamping and reconstructing some of the significant
shrines. In addition to these developments, the Musharraf regime
focused on performance and reformation within the Auqaf Department.
The changes at the shrine supported the facilitation of visitors and thus
increased the volume of income generated through shrines and related
businesses. However, these efforts did not translate into swift
institutional procedures and proper recordkeeping. That is why the
condition of the department remained unacceptable to the Public
Accounts Committee, which showed its dissatisfaction over mal-
functioning of financial transactions in 2005.
It is quite challenging to gauge the pattern of income, expenditure
and investment from the available accounts data of the department
because of the poor recordkeeping and the malfunctioning of financial
transactions mentioned above. However, this book has made an effort to
analyse the available data as meticulously as possible in order to show the
pattern of increase and decrease in income, the points of expenditure that
had been emphasised and the sectors where investment had been
ignored; this effort provides complementary information to the

theoretical contentions already formulated regarding the relationship
between the post-colonial state and shrines. The striking feature of the
accounts is the significant position acquired by the shrine of Data Darbar
among all the zones. As the income of other zones also started to increase,
the shrine of Data Sahib maintained its traditional centrality. Overall, it
seems that the earlier zone of Central Punjab, which was divided into the
five zones of Lahore, Gujranwala, Data Darbar, Data Darbar Hospital and
Badshahi Mosque, led the income-generating zones for Auqaf Department
in the period under consideration. Though Data Darbar Hospital was
consistently in loss, and Badshahi Mosque more or less breaking even, the
overall income of the Central Punjab zone comprised more than 50 per
cent of the total income of the Auqaf Department.
The most interesting feature of the accounts is the heavy expenditure
incurred by the Religious Affairs Department. The Religious Affairs
Department pursued the process of official Islamisation at the site of
shrines, viewing them in the light of mosques to fulfil their purpose. The
huge spending on religious affairs also shows the desire for state ideology
to dominate the sites of shrines. Overall, spending on religious affairs
stood at around 30 per cent, and if it is coupled with expenditure on
administration, it amounted to more than 50 per cent of the total
expenditure of the Auqaf Department in the period under discussion.
It is quite strange that the taking over of the shrines from traditional
caretakers resulted, on the one hand, in providing jobs for thousands of
state employees, and on the other, the prevalence of the appropriated
ideology on the sites of shrines. It is not clear what justification the
Auqaf Department has for such spending of the income given by the
devotees to the Sufi saint of the shrine. The high spending on religio-
administrative affairs came at the cost of customary functions such as
social welfare and the well-being of the common people, traditionally
considered as the most significant role of shrines.
This book has shown that the post-colonial state acted as a
dominating and excluding entity. The process of dominating, however,
did not result in a complete eradication of the customary caretakers of
the shrines. There has been resistance, both passive and active, reflected
through different social behaviour. Many of the traditional caretakers
went to the courts and challenged the action of the martial law
government. Many of these traditional caretakers carried on providing
CONCLUSION 167
some marginalised functions within shrines, and some left the site of
their shrine altogether. At shrines like Data Darbar, Mian Mir and Shah
Daula, there is some sort of presence of previous traditional caretakers as
well. At the shrine of Data Darbar, mujawars continued reading daily dua
(pray) at the shrine. At the shrine of Mian Mir, the traditional caretaker
used to sit outside the mosque on every Thursday to meet the visiting
devotees. At the site of the shrine of Shah Daula, the previous caretaker
can be found either sitting on the stairs or standing nearby to provide
spiritual solace to the devotees.
It is not the case that the Auqaf Department always worked at a
distance from the traditional caretakers. At some shrines, there has been
a little less conflict than at others. This form of relationship represents
another related direction not discussed in the present research, that is,
where both Auqaf Department officials and traditional caretakers
worked together. There was also a form of relationship in which shrines
kept on resisting the control of the state and a constant tension
continued between the two entities. This book, however, is an attempt to
open up the horizon to view and study other multiple modes of
relationship. Any future study in this direction might go one step ahead
by building on the present attempt.
APPENDIX
Table A.1 Punjab Religious Affairs 1 (mosques and shrines)

No. Title No. of posts Scale
1 Executive officer 1 18
2 Khatib data Darbar 1 18
3 Khatib Badshahi Mosque 1 18
4 Research officer 1 17
5 Zonal khatib 9 17
6 Naib khatib/imam (Badshahi Mosque) 1 17
7 Rais ul Tabligh 2 17
8 District khatib 25 16
9 Research associate 1 16
10 Research fellow 2 16
11 Research assistant 2 16
12 Computer operator 1 14
13 Store keeper/senior clerk 1 14
14 Senior khatib 80 12
15 Sound system operator 1 11
16 Computer progammer 1 11
17 Junior clerk 4 11
18 Khatib/imam 118 9
19 Mudarris 1 9
20 Research assistant 2 7
21 Naib khatib/imam 228 6/7
22 Mudarris 1 6
23 Muazzan 143 5
24 Generator operator 2 5
25 Assistant sound operator 1 5
26 Electrician 11 5
27 Langer supervisor 2 5
28 Plumber 3 5
29 Tube well operator 6 5
30 Turbine operator/electrician 1 5
31 Driver 1 5
32 Generator operator/electrician 1 4
33 Muazzan/khadim 74 3
34 Muhafiz tabarrakat 3 3
35 Khadim Babsahi Masjid 9 3
36 Khadim for zonal and district khatib 33 3
37 Supervisor Data Darbar 4 3
38 Head sweeper Data Darbar 4 3
39 Supervisor data Darbar 4 3
40 Head sweeper data Darbar 2 3
41 Caretaker 266 2
42 Khadim 243 2
43 Khadim data Darbar 22 2
44 Female caretaker 4 2
45 Female khadima data Darbar 9 2
46 Langri/nanbaee 3 2
47 Security guard 5 2
48 Chowkidar 51 2
49 Mali 7 2
50 Waterman/mashki 3 2
51 Naib qasid 6 2
52 Sweeper 27 2
53 Sweeper data Darbar 20 2
54 Surplus pool 23 2
Total 1,477
Table A.2 Punjab Religious Affairs 2 (academies and religious institutes)
No. Title No. of posts Scale
1 Deputy director 1 18
2 Research officer 1 17
3 Librarian 1 17
4 Headmistress 1 17
5 Lecturer 2 17
6 Administrative officer 1 16
7 Head mudarris 1 16
8 Sadar mudarris tajweed o qirat 1 16
9 Sadar mudarris 1 16
10 Senior subject teacher 1 16
11 Senior scale stenographer 1 16
12 Accountant 2 16
13 Superintendent Dar ul Aman 1 16
14 Female teacher 1 15
15 Mudarris 3 14
16 English teacher 1 14
17 Computer operator 1 14
18 Proofreader 1 13
19 Mudarris 7 12
20 Senior khateeb 1 12
21 Headmaster 1 12
22 Supervisor tajweed o qirat 1 12
23 Assistant librarian 4 12
24 Junior clerk 7 11
25 Library clerk 3 11
26 Store keeper 1 11
27 Mudarris 19 9
28 Mudarris hifz o qirat 3 9
29 Mudarris 14 7
30 Female teacher 7 9
31 Teacher 3 9
32 Mudarris 54 6/7
33 Mudarris 1 5
34 Kitchen supervisor 1 5
35 Electrician 1 5
36 Driver 1 5
37 Library attendant 10 3
38 Daftaro 1 3
39 Naib qasid 13 2
40 Female naib qasid 3 2
41 Cook 4 2
42 Chowkidar 6 2
43 Mali 1 2
44 Water man/mashki 1 2
45 Khadim Hostel 2 2
46 Sweeper 4 2
Total 195
Table A.3 Shrines taken over in the first year of 1960 in Lahore and Gujranwala zones
Detail of attached property
Residential
Date of Taken unit with Agri. Urban No. of units
Sr. Name takeover over from: area land area on rent Remarks
1 Darabar H. Data 147-3-8 288 -
Ganj Bakhsh
2 H. Shah Jamal – Muhammad 06-10-00 - Commercial 03 -
Shafi
3 H. Shah Kamal 1960 Baba Sardar 85-15-116 - Res. & 14 þ 5 -
Shah Commercial
4 H. Shah Wali, 5 June 1960 Malik 03-05-87 - - 33 Brelwi-Katchi-
Abbott Road Muhammad abadi-99 yrs.
Din- lease (LDA)
President
anjuman
5 H. Hakim Shah 21 July 1960 Mutwalli 05-16-27 - - Katchi-abadi-
(Cooper Road) darbar 99 yrs. lease
(LDA)
6 H. Mauj Darya 25 July 1960 Mutwalli 05-11-213 - - A mosque, -
Bukhari, Darbar hujra, a
Edward Rd. graveyard,
residential
house,
workshop
and two
open plots
7 H. Shah Ali 6 September Fateh 05-09-112 - - 15 Deobandi
Rangrez (Railway 1960 Muhammad,
Headquarters) Mutwalli
darbar
8 H. Chohar 16 July 1960 Tasawwar 23-06-55 - - - Brelwi
Shah Bandagi yamin,
Mcleaod Rd. Mutwalli
9 H. Mian MIr, 14 July 1960 Nur ul - 01-00-07 - 314 Brelwi
Infantry Road Hassan Shah
10 Daras Barrai Mian 13 August Mian - 11-02-00 - 09 Brelwi
1960 Muhammad
Nazir
11 H. Madhu Lal 20 March 1960 Mubarak Ali - - - 01 Brelwi
Hussain Akbar Shah
Shaheed,
Baghbanpura
Table A.3 Continued
Detail of attached property
Residential
Date of Taken unit with Agri. Urban No. of units
Sr. Name takeover over from: area land area on rent Remarks
12 H. Shah Noori 1961 Muhammad 815-14-00 101-7-15 Agri - -
Attari Din
Kasur
1 H. Bullay Shah 26 October Ex Mutwalli 68-02-00 08-07-05 - 19 -
1960 Lal Shah
(Late)
Sheikhupura
1. H. Pir Bahar 23 April 1960 Imtiaz Ali - 01-02-16 Mela 03 Brelwi
Shah, near Shah ground-03
G. Bus Stand
2. H. Gulab Shah 30 November Mian - 00-06-00 - - -
1960 Ghulam
Muhammad
Gujranwala
1. Shah Abdul 16 November - 25-07-00 - - Brelwi
Rehman 1960
Sialkot
1. H. Imam Ali 30 April 1960 Mutwalli 54-00-00 1 thra, 11 -
ul Haq 1 room and
22 plots
Table A.4 Property details of the shrine of H. Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib taken over by Auqaf Department
Sr. Notifications Kanal Marlas Sq. ft. Shops Houses Mosque Village District
1 No. 3(1)- Dated: 76 18 205 52 34 Shish Mahal Lahore
Auqaf-60-I 11 January
1960
31 2 41 12 46 þ 12 1 Lahore Khas Do
268 15 One double Tibbi bazar Do
storeyed
2 No. 8584- Dated: 46 16 Awan Lahore
Auqaf-60-I 31 October Dhaiwala
(Amendment) 1960
18 Rasulpur Sheikhupûra
3 No. 3(1)- Dated: 18 15 “ “
Auqaf-60-I 28 November
(Amendment) 1961
12 13 “ “
Total 469 79 246 64 93 1

Within this property also included the amount of cash box ( potla or bag), that is, Rs 12,561.8.0/-
Source: APLD SC Vol. XXIII, pp. 379– 81.
Table A.5 Details of zones and sectors of Punjab Auqaf in the 1970s and
1980s
Sr. Zones Important Sectors
1 Bahawalpur Rahim Yar khan, Bahawalpur
2 Multan Multan, Muzaffar Garh, Dera Ghazi Khan
3 Sargodha Sargodha, Faisalbad, Jhang, Chiniot
4 Central Punjab Lahore, Kasur, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, Sialkot and
Okara
5 Rawalpindi Rawalpindi, Jehlum and Gujrat
Table A.6 Zones and circles under Punjab Auqaf Department after 1993
Sr. Zones Sr. Circles
1 Bahawalpur
(i) Bahawalpur
(ii) Chishtiya
(iii) Rahim Yar Khan
(iv) Uch Sharif
2 Dera Ghazi Khan
(i) Dera Ghazi Khan
(ii) Kot Mitthan
(iii) Muzaffar Garh
3 Faisalabad
(i) Faisalabad
(ii) Jhang
(iii) Shahkot
4 Gujranwala
(i) Gujranwala
(ii) Gujrat
(iii) Sialkot
5. Lahore
(i-v) Lahore (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
(vi) Kasur
(vii) Sheikhupura
6 Multan
(i-iii) Multan (I, II, III)
(iv) Jahanian/ Khanewal
7 Pakpattan Sharif
(i) Pakpattan Sharif
(ii) Burewala
(iii) Okara
(iv) Sahiwal
8 Rawalpindi
(i) Rawalpindi
(ii) Attock
(iii) Jehlum
9 Sargodha
(i) Chiniot
(ii) Khushab
(iii) Sargodha
10 Data Darbar, Lahore
11 Badshahi Mosque, Lahore
Table A.7 Income and Expenditure of Lahore Zone of 1996 and 2006
Estimates Estimates Times Percentage of total Percentage of total
Details 1996 (in Rs) 2006 (in Rs) Increase Income (1996) Income (2006)
Income 42541000 12,1200,000 2.84
Expenditure 20951400 7,29,03,100 3.47
Details of Income
Rent 12348000 2,80,00,000 2.26 29 23
Lease Money 2400000 78,10,000 3.25 5.64 8.25
Cash Boxes 24000000 6,85,40,000 2.85 56.4 56.5
Shoe keeping 1643000 79,00,000 4.8 3.86 6.5
Flower Contract 650000 2100000 3.23 1.52 1.73
Misc. 1500000 68,50,000 4.56 3.52 5.65
Total Income 42541000 12,12,00,000 2.84
Administration 3582600 13017600
i-Religious Affairs 54887200
ii-Religious Affairs 3751800
Total Expenditure on Religious Affairs 15188800 58639000 3.86
Expenditure on Social Welfare 1189000 12,46,500 1.04
New Expenditure 207000
Reconstruction 784000
Total Expenditure 20951400 72903100 3.47
Table A.8 Income and Expenditure of Gujranwala Zone of 1996 and 2006
Estimates Estimates Times Percentage of total Percentage of total
Details 1996 (in Rs) 2006 (in Rs) Increase Income (1996) Income (2006)
Income 14242300 48750000 3.42
Expenditure 6449400 23509500 3.64
Details of Income
Rent 2154300 6621000 3.07 15.12 13.58
Lease Money 2817000 13643900 4.84 19.77 27.98
Cash Boxes 7833000 22807000 2.91 54.99 46.78
Shoe keeping 194000 1355000 6.98 1.36 2.77
Flower Contract 44000 235000 5.34 0.30 0.48
Misc. 1200000 4359600 3.63 8.42 8.94
Total Income 14242300 4,87,50,000 3.42
Administration 2092000 76,24,200 3.64
i-Religious Affairs 1,40,80,500
ii-Religious Affairs 5,16,400
Total Expenditure on Religious Affairs 3757400 1,45,96,900
Expenditure on Social Welfare 322000 8,43,600
Expenditure on Health 4,44,800
New Expenditure -
Total Expenditure 6449400 2,35,09,500 3.64
Table A.9 Income and Expenditure of Bahawalpur Zone of 1996 and 2006
Estimates (in Rs) Estimates (in Rs)
Details 1996 2006
Income 22396000 49682000
Expenditure 10457280 30466000
Details of Income
Rent 477000 9793000
Lease Money 11000000 24455000
Cash Boxes 5600000 12377000
Shoe keeping 115000 246000
Flower Contract - -
Misc. 1504000 2811000
Total Income 22396000 49682000
Total Expenditure on 6174680 21298600
Religious Affairs
Expenditure on Social Welfare 694200 916800
Expenditure on Health 380200
New Expenditure 297800
Reconstruction and Development 460000
Total Expenditure 10457280 30466000
Table A.10 Income and Expenditure of D.G Khan Zone of 1996 and 2006
Details 1996 2006
Income 10244000 24767000
Expenditure 4634500 15271500
Details of Income
Rent 431000 1212000
Lease Money 2600000 6161000
Cash Boxes 5000000 11700000
Flower Contract 75000 175000
Misc. 2000000 5200000
Total Income 10244000 24767000
Religious Affairs
Expenditure on Social Welfare 186300 660000
New Expenditure 80000 -
Table A.11 Income and Expenditure of Faisalabad Zone of 1996 and 2006
Details 1996 2006
Income 13545500 55802000
Expenditure 8874000 26993025
Details of Income
Rent 3345500 9580000
Lease Money 3000000 22950000
Cash Boxes 6000000 16500000
Misc. 650000 5600000
Total Income 13545500 55802000
Religious Affairs
Expenditure on Social 703900 600000
Welfare
Expenditure on Health -
Table A.12 Income and Expenditure of Multan Zone of 1996 and 2006
Details 1996 2006
Income 16092000 38192000
Expenditure 10477300 29369000
Details of Income
Rent 2842000 9250000
Lease Money 3200000 5570000
Cash Boxes 6550000 15260000
Misc. 2000000 4050000
Total Income 16092000 38192000
Religious Affairs
Welfare
Total Expenditure 10477300
Table A.13 Income and Expenditure of Pakpattan of 1996 and 2006
Details 1996 2006
Income 20802000 61396000
Expenditure 8352700 28470500
Details of Income
Rent 2513000 6880000
Lease Money 2689000 6661000
Cash Boxes 13300000 40555000
Shoe keeping 1500000 4200000
Flower Contract
Misc. 800000 3100000
Total Income 20802000 61396000
Religious Affairs
Welfare
Total Expenditure 28470500
Table A.14 Income and Expenditure of Sargodha Zone of 1996 and 2006
Details 1996 2006
Income 10646200 29485000
Expenditure 5833200 20336100
Details of Income
Rent 5540000 14000000
Lease Money 2500000 8100000
Cash Boxes 2300000 6430000
Flower Contract - -
Misc. 300000 930000
Total Income 10646200 29485000
Religious Affairs
Welfare
Expenditure on Health - -
NOTES
Introduction
1. The current wave of terrorism, especially in Pakistan, has brought the varied
forms of practising Islam to the surface. The extremist groups follow militant
Islam, which might broadly be seen as associated with the revivalist Muslim
schools of thought such as Deoband and Ahl e Hadith. At many levels, the
state and the political elite show their dissatisfaction with the extremist
religious groups and propose their own version/s of legitimate Islam.
2. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, Western
analysts have looked at Sufism more closely as a counterweight to militant
Islam. The RAND Corporation recommended ‘encouraging Sufism, since it is
an “open”, intellectual interpretation of Islam’: Amitabh Pal, Islam Means Peace:
Understanding The Muslim Principle of Nonviolence Today (Santa Barbara, CA:
Greenwood Publications, 2011), p. 60; Ron Geaves, ‘Who defines moderate
Islam “post”-September 11?’, in Ron Geaves, Theodore Gabriel, Yvonne
Haddad and Jane Idleman Smith (eds), Islam and the West: Post 9/11 (Aldershot:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), pp. 62–75, p. 67.
3. ‘Ideology is an instance of imposing a pattern – some form of structure or
organization – on how we read (and misread) political facts, events,
occurrences, actions, on how we see images and hear voices.’ In this way,
ideology is a ‘set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual’. See
Michael Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p. 3. See also ‘Ideology’, Oxford Dictionaries. Available at http://
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ideology (accessed 27 November
2012).
4. Zia Ur Rehman, ‘Attacks on Sufi shrines signify new conflict in Pashtun
lands’, Friday Times, 23/50 (3 February 2012). Available at http://www.the
fridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue¼ 20120203&page¼3 (accessed
20 November 2017).
NOTES TO PAGES 1–2 187
5. One of the banned militant organisations, Lashkar e Tayyiba (LT) criticises

Sufism because of its ability to dampen the jihad spirit. Hassan Abbas,
Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 215.
6. Ever since Ayub Khan’s first speech at the shrine of Bhattai, Sufi pir can be
found portrayed as emblems of peace and humanity. The Musharraf
government emphasised Sufistic ideas as a pacifist version of Islam, against the
increasing militancy. More recently, government officials have denounced
attacks on shrines, emphasising that terrorist activities cannot reduce the
popularity of peace-loving devotees of Sufi shrines.
7. Sufism may be differentiated from the scholarly and judicial tradition. In this
sense, it is understood as the Islamic emotional discourse, as opposed to the ‘cold’
and ‘technical’ constructions put forward by theologians and judicial scholars
(Annemarie Schimmel, The Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 130–48, 287). However, for
Ewing, Sufism as a colonial construct becomes equivalent to religion through
colonial Oriental studies and administrative policies. Ewing considers not only
Sufism to be a colonial construct but also the term ‘Sufi pir’ (Katherine Pratt
Ewing, Arguing Sainthood: Modernity, Psychoanalysis and Islam (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 41–64). However, the term Sufism has a long
history and a long tradition, with Muslim saints identifying themselves with this
tradition. The term can be traced as far back as the writings of Ali Hajweri (CE
1009–72/77) in India. Even Carl Ernst, however, makes no distinction between a
Sufi tradition and a Muslim saint. Yet he writes: ‘There is no Sufism in general.
All that we describe as Sufism is firmly rooted in particular local contexts, often
anchored to the very tangible tombs of deceased saints, and it is deployed in
relation to lineages and personalities with a distinctively local sacrality.
Individual Sufi groups or traditions in one place may be completely oblivious of
what Sufis do or say in other regions.’ Carl W. Ernst, ‘Situating Sufism and yoga’,
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, 15/1 (2005), pp. 15–43, p. 22.
8. Geertz’s study moves away from Trimingham’s research and disassociates
Sufistic practices from the organisational aspects. This delinking brings out,
on the one hand, the possibility of seeing Sufism in multiple forms, while on
the other hand it makes shrines separate from the necessary connection with
Sufi mysticism. Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco
and Indonesia (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 18 – 9.
9. The rule of Ayub Khan, at least for its initial period, was antithetical to
superstition, irrationality and corrupt and backward traditional social practices.
Ewing writes that ‘this effort to redefine the Sufi saints and shrines . . . was one
strategy for attempting to put some positive content into the empty vessel that
was Islam as it had been articulated secular, post-colonial Western educated
political elite’. Ewing, Arguing Sainthood, p. 89.
10. It is quite common to see state officials go to Data Darbar and make chadar
charrhai (cover the tomb with chadar).
188 NOTES TO PAGES 2 –4
11. See Katherine Pratt Ewing, ‘The politics of Sufism: redefining the saints of
Pakistan’, The Journal of Asian Studies 42/2 (February 1983), pp. 251 – 68.
Available at http://jstor.org/stable/2055113 (accessed 13 May 2010).
12. Balochistan has very few shrines. The Balochistan Auqaf Department claims
that it has never taken over any shrine from where it earns an income of any
sort.
13. The Auqaf Department started working in 1959 after the promulgation of the
West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance. After three years, another East
Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance established the East Pakistan Auqaf
Department. After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the West Pakistan
Auqaf became a provincial subject, except for a brief period in 1976–9.
14. The state itself supports these customary sites, as the developmental works of
the Auqaf Department suggest.
15. Similarly, Karachi has not only the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi but also of
Mangu Pir, another famous but neglected shrine.
16. The KPK Auqaf Department controls no more than five shrines in the whole
province.
17. Punjab Auqaf Department is the largest of all the provincial departments and
controls more than 500 shrines. It had to restructure in 1993– 4 and, because
of the huge growth of the sites of and income from shrines, split the zone of
Central Punjab into five further zones of Lahore, Gujranwala, Data Darbar
Ganj Bakhsh, Badshahi Mosque and Data Darbar Hospital, Lahore.
18. The difference of identity construction in the distant shrines can be seen from
the state’s ideological implementation of those under its direct control. Uzma
Rehman’s study shows that the constructed identity at the shrines of Waris
Shah in Punjab and of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai in Sindh, both in rural areas,
relies little on categories such as Muslim, Hindu and Sikh. Instead, the
identity is linked more closely to the saints and their poetry. Uzma Rehman,
Sufi Shrines and Identity Construction in Pakistan: The Mazars of Pir Waris Shah
and Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing,
2011), p. 5. However, Strothmann shows that the identity at the shrine of
Data Ganj Bakhsh relies heavily on the difference between Hindu and Muslim.
Linus Strothmann, Managing Piety: The Shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 22.
19. Modern scholars have the tendency to locate different forms of religious type in
rural and urban regions. Both Francis and Gilmartin, while making a difference
between Sufi and Ulema, locate Ulema in urban areas and Sufi in rural regions.
Francis Robinson, Islam, South Asia and the West (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2007), pp. 59–98; David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and
the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988),
pp. 52–6.
20. Richard Kurin, ‘The structure of blessedness at a Muslim shrine in Pakistan’,
Middle Eastern Studies 19/3 (July 1983), pp. 312– 25. Available at http://www.
jstor.org/stable/4282949 (accessed 23 June 2010).
NOTES TO PAGE 4 189
21. This book will use the term Sufi-saint in order to foreground the plurality of
the spiritual life-forms. The word Sufi relates to a long tradition of Islamic
spiritual life, and is sometimes even used as synonymous with Sufism. However,
saint, though an English word, is only used here for the lack of any other word
for connoting multiple variations of similar vernacular life-phenomena. One can
find words like darvesh, baba jee, saain, faqir, etc. in local imaginings, especially
in nineteenth-century works like that of Maulvi Noor Ahmed. See Noor Ahmed
Chishti, Tehqiqat e Chishti (Lahore: Al Faisal Publishers 2006). However, for
non-pluralistic usage, Sufi saint would be used.
22. This term may be aligned with the loose usage of Muslim, Hindu or Sikh
where identities are not clearly demarcated through well-defined religious
ideology. Scholars such as Cohen, Dirk, Kozlowski, Jalal and Ewing emphasise
that colonial rule generated a competing and entrenched phenomenon of
communal identities.
23. Ewing’s field study reveals that even disliking living pir does not stop people
visiting shrines. Ewing, Arguing Sainthood, pp. 112– 6.
24. David Gilmartin, ‘Tribe, land and religion in the Punjab: Muslim politics and
the making of Pakistan’, PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
(1979).
25. The works of Trimingham and Malik bring this development to light.
J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1971); Jamil Malik, ‘Introduction’, in Jamal Malik and John Hinnells
(eds), Sufism in the West (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1 – 27.
26. ‘Muslim shrines and tombs of Sufi Saints represent Muslim Culture and
Traditions . . . These Sufi Saints still rule over the hearts of Pakistanis and
Muslims of other countries. With the passage of time the number of devotees
has increased. The visit to shrines by millions of people every year is an abiding
testimony of their absolute and undisputed sway over their followers and of
their divine blessings emanating from their hallowed graves.’ Pakistan Tourism
Development Brochure, 1985.
27. The strong version of Sufism maintains that it has not been influenced by any
mystical tradition of the sub-continent.
28. Although the concepts of reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation were
defined in the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (Anti-Œdipus,
trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (London and New York:
Continuum, 2004)), I am using them in the sense of Arjun Appadurai
(‘Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy’, Theory Culture
and Society 7/2 – 3 (1990), pp. 295– 310), who considers the process of
reterritorialisation as, ‘regaining identity in a peculiar way’, not necessarily
linked with the connection with soil: ‘soil needs to be distinguished from
territory . . . where soil is a matter of a spatialised and originary discourse of
belonging, territory is concerned with integrity, survey-ability, policing, and
subsistence’. Anne Murphy, The Materiality of the Past: History and
Representation in Sikh Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, p. 17.).
Further, the process of reterritorialisation cannot take place without

deterritorialisation, that is, the disjuncture between feelings of belonging
and place of residence. ‘It may be all but impossible to distinguish
deterritorialisation from reterritorialisation, since they are mutually enmeshed,
or like opposite faces of one and the same process.’ Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Œdipus, p. 258.
29. In the second chapter this book shows that the politics of the Muslim League
further developed the already-developing consensus of Muslim identity that
prevailed even in other Muslim political groups such as the Unionist Party of
Punjab.
30. Faisal Devji understands this as being similar to the term Zion that ‘serves to
name a political form in which nationality is defined by the rejection of an old
land for a new, thus attenuating the historical role that blood and soil play in
the language of Old World nationalism’. Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as
a Political Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), p. 3.
31. Jinnah kept the idea of Pakistan generalised and without any geographical
moorings. Pakistan, as a separate nation state, emerged in quite a surprising
way. Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global
Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 36 –8.
32. For Devji it was ‘the desire to both join and reject the world of nation states’.
Ibid., p. 11.
33. During debates on first constitution in early part of 1950s in Pakistan, Binder
writes that: ‘Most of the members from Bengal used up a large part of their
time in excusing the long delay in constitution making, in recalling the
struggle for Pakistan, in thanking God that an agreed formula had been
worked out, in hailing the millenium when all the ideals of Islam would be
realized through an Islamic constitution, and in praising the virtues of Islam.
But when all this was said only six members specifically demanded that the
Head of the State be a Muslim, only two specifically demanded that Islam be
declared the state religion, and only eight specifically demanded that Pakistan
be declared an Islamic republic.’ Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in
Pakistan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961), p. 323.
34. Ali Usman Qasmi considers the advantage of using this phrase is that we can
discuss at the same time the ‘disputative negotiation of contrasting religious
traditions, sectional interests and ideological worldview of key actors, and the
imperatives of populist decision-making. It is the interplay of such variables
and their relative strengths and weakness during different sets of socio-
political, economic and, even, geostrategic compulsions, that has determined
the course of Islam’s role in the State of Pakistan.’ Ali Usman Qasmi, ‘God’s
kingdom on earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947– 1969’, Modern Asian
Studies 44/6 (20 November 2010), pp. 1197– 253.
35. Ibid.
36. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, pp. 350– 61.
37. Ibid.
NOTES TO PAGES 6 –8 191
38. From the speeches of the objectives resolution, to both revivalists and modern
intelligentsia, and from sajjada nahsin to the modern elite, one can hear an
echo of such a process of identification. On one level, such conception even
went on to create a larger Islamised block, including all Muslim worlds, on
which Khaliq uz Zaman, the president of Muslim League, even started
working seriously. Daily Imroze, Lahore, 11 January 1950.
39. The usage of Islamic concept of waqf in the context of taking over shrines was
an unprecedented extension of how local sacred sites were perceived.
40. The Ordinance of West Pakistan Waqf Properties was promulgated by the
Governor of West Pakistan on 15 April 1959, and was published for general
information in the Gazette. Ordinance XXI of 1959. PLD Vol. XI– 1959,
p. 202.
41. Ibid.
42. Writers such as Malik and Nasr considered the policies of Ayub Khan to be an
extension of the colonial state structure through secular policies. Jamal Malik,
Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Lahore:
Vanguard Books, 1996), p. 35; Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the
Making of State Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 64.
43. Javed Iqbal, The Ideology of Pakistan and its Implementation (Lahore: Sheikh
Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1959).
44. West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance of 1959 conceives shrines as waqf
property.
45. Gilmartin, Empire and Islam; Gilmartin, ‘Tribe, land and religion in the
Punjab’; Sarah F.D. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind 1843–
1947 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Jurgen Wasim
Frembgen, Journey to God: Sufis and Dervishes in Islam, trans. Jane Ripken
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009); Pnina Werbner and Helene Basu
(eds), Embodying Charisma: Modernity, Locality and the Performance of Emotion in
Sufi Cults (London: Routledge, 1998); Christian W. Troll (ed.), Muslim Shrines
in India: Their Character, History and Significance (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1989); Ewing, ‘The politics of Sufism’; Ewing, Arguing Sainthood; Robert
Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism Unbound: Politics and Piety in Twenty-first Century
Pakistan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
46. Arjun Appadurai, Worship and Conflict under Colonial Rule: A South Indian Case
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Nile Green, The Bombay
Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840– 1915 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
47. Gregory C. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and Society in British India
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nicholas B. Dirks, ‘From
little king to landlord: property, law, and the gift under the Madras Permanent
Settlement’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 28/2 (April 1986),
pp. 307– 33; Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (London: Oxford
University Press, 1959).
48. Devji, Muslim Zion; Younas Samad, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and
Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937– 1958 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995);
K.B. Saeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857– 1948 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968; Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious
Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982).
49. Qasmi, ‘God’s kingdom on earth?’.
50. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857– 1964 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1967); Tanzil ur Rehman, Objectives Resolution and
Its Impact on Pakistan Constitution and Law (Karachi: Royal Book Company,
1996); Nasr, Islamic Leviathan.
51. Qasmi, ‘God’s kingdom on earth?’, p. 1202.
52. Jamal Malik, ‘Waqf in Pakistan: change in traditional institution’, Die Welt des
Islams 30/1– 4 (1990), pp. 63– 97.
53. Ibid.
54. Ewing, ‘The politics of Sufism’.
55. Farzana Shaikh, review of Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea,
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, n.d. Available at http://samaj.
revues.org/3846 (accessed 2 July 2017); Devji, Muslim Zion.
56. Samad, A Nation in Turmoil.
57. See Hamza Alavi, ‘Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology’, in Fred
Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds), State and Ideology in the Middle East and
Pakistan (London: Monthly Review Press, 1988), pp. 64– 111; ‘Kinship in
West Punjabi villages’, Contributions to Indian Sociology 14/1 – 27 (1972),
pp. 1 – 27; ‘Authoritarianism and legitimation of state power in Pakistan’, in
Subrata Kumar Mitra (ed.), The Post-Colonial State in Asia (Lahore: Sang-e-
Meel Publications, 1998), pp. 19–71; and ‘India: transition from feudalism to
colonial capitalism’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 10/4 (1980), pp. 359 – 99.
58. Qasmi, ‘God’s kingdom on earth?’.
Chapter 1 The Colonial State and Shrines

1. Writers such as Malik, Appadurai and Dirk bring out the uniqueness of the
colonial administration, as an extension of Weberian ideas of disenchanted,
objective, rule-bound bureaucratisation (see, e.g., Max Weber, Economy and
Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1978).
2. See David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988) and Sarah F.D. Ansari, Sufi
Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind 1843– 1947 (New York: Cambridge
3. The ‘reterritorialised identity’ will be discussed in more detail in the following
chapters. However, this phrase is meant to denote the changed Muslim
identity, emerging during the first half of twentieth-century Punjab.
NOTES TO PAGE 16 193
4. Imperial Gazetteer of India – Punjab 1908 (Vol. 2), p. 4. Also Tan Tai Yong,
The Garrison State: The Military Government and Society in Colonial Punjab,
1849– 1947 (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), p. 33.
5. ‘It is often exceedingly difficult for a native to say, or for anybody else to
discover, what his religion really is.’ Sir Denzil Charles Jelf Ibbetson, Punjab
Census, 1881.
6. It is interesting that the earlier history, which witnessed violent conflicts
between religious classes, also showed instances of the intertwining of religions
and of helping each other. For instance, Malerkotla, a Muslim majority state,
remained a sacred state throughout Sikh rule and even later on for Sikhs. Not a
single incidence of violence took place there, even when bloody violent clashes
were going on between warring communities during partition in 1947. One of
the reasons was the blessings of Sikh Guru Gobind Singh to this state, whose
Muslim Raja stood in defence of Guru’s captive sons in the eighteenth century.
See Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. 2: 1839–2004 (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 131–2. For another writer, the reason is a
constant social effort to keep alive a collective moral past, embedded in the
pluralistic ethos of the town. See Anna Bigelow, Sharing the Sacred: Practicing
Pluralism in Muslim North India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
7. Aubrey O’Brien, ‘The Mohammedan saints of the Western Punjab’, Journal of
the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 41 (1911),
pp. 509 –20, p. 519.
8. Ian Talbot, India and Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000),
p. 10.
9. Henry Maine reflected the Victorian approach to progress when he put forward
his theory of stages of development of societies through their ability to own
the form of law. Societies who did not even have a code of law written on
tablets as the Romans had remained very primitive. See Karuna Mantena, ‘Law
and “tradition”: Henry Maine and the theoretical origins of indirect rule’, in
Andrew Lewis and Michael Lobban (eds), Law and History, vol. 6: Current Legal
Issues 2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 159– 88.
10. Shah Mahmood, the caretaker of the shrine of Baha ud Din Zakrya, helped
British forces to defeat Multan in 1849– 50. The bombardment on the city
also damaged the shrine. The British authorities refused to pay any amount for
these damages, on the grounds that it was not appropriate to grant help on a
religious basis. See David Gilmartin, ‘Tribe, land and religion in the Punjab:
Muslim politics and the making of Pakistan’, PhD dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley (1979), p. 63.
11. Both Warren Hastings’ Regulations of 1772 and Victoria’s proclamation of
1858 maintained that the British rulers of India were bound to respect the
‘religious usages’ of Muslims.
12. It is interesting that for the administrative scholars of Punjab, the shrines
became important not only because of sajjada nashins and their influence, but
also the general Sufistic ethos, as one can find many commendable comments
in Ibbetson’s report of the 1881 Punjab census for maintaining peace.

However, this interest collided with the developmental interest in urban areas,
which necessitated a more projective understanding through modern
economic and educational institutions.
13. Septimus Smet Thorburn, Mussalmans and Money-Lenders in Punjab (London:
William Blackwood and Sons, 1883) p. 2.
14. Gilmartin, ‘Tribe, land and religion in the Punjab’, p. iii.
15. Orientalist writers like Ibbetson and Maclagan can be discovered through such
writings as Denzil Ibbetson, Edward Mclagan and H.A. Rose, A Glossary of the
Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and North West Frontier Province, 3 vols (Lahore:
Superintendent, Government Printing Punjab, 1919).
16. O’Brien, ‘The Mohammedan saints of the Western Punjab’, p. 511.
17. William Chichele Plowden, Report on the Census of British India taken on the 17th
February 1881 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1883), p. 166.
18. Both of these movements carried with them jihadi and militant sentiments,
with an emphasis on the revival of an austere political Muslim state. However,
after action taken by the British government, both of these movements
reduced their emphasis on militancy and also lost their increasing influence.
About the Faraizi movement, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal writes that in
the census of 1881 ‘no persons are returned as Ferazis, although provision was
made in the instructions to enumerators for showing them if found. The
explanation seems to be that this name is not one which members of the sect
use when speaking of themselves, but is an entirely exotic epithet, and the
Mahammedan of Eastern Bengal would no more call himself a Ferazi than a
Puritan of the Commonwealth would have called himself a Roundhead. The
birth-place of the sect is the Furreedpore district, where its founder – an
honour which is disputed between one Hadji Sharitulla and his more famous
son Dudu Miyan – was a small landowner; thence the tenets of the sect spread
throughout the delta of the Ganges and Brahmaputra and into the
metropolitan districts of the 24-Pergunnahs and Nuddea. Like the Wahabis,
the Ferazis insist on the unity of God, and the uselessness of intercession by all
saints, angels, and spirits. Like them also they claim the right of private
interpretation of the Koran, and reject all glosses or commentaries by doctors,
however learned. They preach the heinousness of infidelity and the all-
importance of strictness in life and ritual. Practical considerations have
induced them of late to abandon the doctrine of the divinely ordained
obligation of religious war; but time was when the Ferazis of Eastern Bengal
furnished a continuous stream of money and recruits to the rebel camp on our
North-West Frontier. Personally the Ferazi is known by certain tricks of
clothing and gesture, and by the ostentatious austerity of his demeanour. They
are as a class intensely bigoted, turbulent, and litigious, and with a few
exceptions they are as ignorant and intolerant as fanatics have mostly been in
the history of the world.’ See Plowden, Report on the Census of British India,
p. 166.
19. Ibid., p. 28.

20. Ibid.
21. Talbot, India and Pakistan, p. 13.
22. Plowden, Report on the Census of British India, vol. 1, p. 19.
23. Talbot, India and Pakistan, p. 14.
24. Lahore was an exception. However, even Lahore was taken as a ‘pristine city in
some distant past’, though in its existing condition, the filthy and desolate
urban centre needs to be rebuilt like writing on a plain paper, a palimpsest. See
William J. Glover, ‘Introduction’, in Making Lahore Modern (London: University
of Minnesota Press, 2008), pp. xi–xxvii.
25. The caretakers (sajjada nashins) of the powerful shrines became important for
the authorities; thus a British official noted: ‘The Sajjada Nashin’s mere
presence in our court convinced the people that the most influential man of
their own faith is on the side of the order.’ Subsequently, the then Lieutenant
Governor suggested evading the religious policy of non-interference in the
interests of political expediency. The Lieutenant Governor while citing the
situation in Multan, put forward his general political strategy as ‘in no
division are there so few chiefs as in that of Mooltan. There is scarcely an
individual of territorial influence between the Government officials and a
population almost exclusively pastoral and agricultural, and as shown by
recent experience very liable to be moved to insurrection by sudden and
inadequate causes.’ He maintained further that it was in the interest of
the British authorities to support the local influential men irrespective of
their religious background. As for the British authorities, the foremost
and the most influential person in Multan was Shah Mahmood, sajjada nashin
of the shrine of Baha ud Din Zakrya (1170 – 1262) and Shah Rukn e Alam in
Multan. The authorities ensured that Shah Mahmood joined the court of the
Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. Gilmartin discusses this situation in
‘Tribe, land and religion in the Punjab’, p. 63. See also Copy of Letter from
Secretary, Board of Administration, Punjab to Secretary, Government of India,
Foreign Department, 13 September 1860, Punjab Board of Revenue, File
131/1575.
26. Jamat Ali Shah, a pir and sajjada nashin of a shrine at Ali pur Syyeda, Narowal,
a district near Lahore, was probably one of those influential elite who had a sort
of collaborative relationship with the colonial authorities.
27. Six out of 104 local chiefs were Muslims, and even among them most were Shias.
28. Chishti mentions the same site as ‘Chhati Badhshahi’ of Sikhs. For him the site
became famous as the temporary dwelling of Guru Har Gobind Singh when he
came back to Lahore after staying for some time in the Darbar (court) of
Jahangir. Noor Ahmed Chishti, Tehqiqat e Chishti [1864] (Lahore: Al-Faisal
Publishers, 2006), pp. 137– 8.
29. Lepel H. Griffin, The Punjab Chiefs [1865], 3 vols (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1993), vol. 1, p. 607.
30. By and large the colonial authorities left the traditional maafian and/or waqf
property in the control of traditional claimants in order to maintain a balance
between directly and indirectly administered land. ‘The maafi or rent-free
holdings are numerous in this district. The great majority are held on life
tenures, and will probably lapse before another settlement is undertaken; but
there are large number of such holdings that are dependent on the preservation
and continuance, for their purposes, of various religious buildings or hospices.
The total number of rent-free holders (or mafidars) is 2,226 holding 25,521
acres, representing a rent-roll of Rs. 19,211. The number of rent-free holdings
for life is 1451 with an acreage of 19782, representing an annual revenue of
Rs. 13,838. This dependent on the existence of buildings, temples, &c., are
164, of 1464 acres amounting in value to Rs. 1,256; and those held in
perpetuity area 263 in number, of 2649 acres, value Rs. 3002; while those held
at the pleasure of Government are 362 in number of 1607 acres of land of an
annual value of Rs. 1100.’ See, Leslie S. Saunders, Report on the Revised Land
Revenue Settlement of the Lahore District, in the Lahore Division of the Punjab,
1865– 69 (Lahore: Central Jail Press, 1873), p. 36.
31. The unique characteristic of the shrine of Shah Daula intrigued the authorities
to the point that a special report was written by Lepel Griffin, for giving
shelter to Chuha or a small child born with small head and long ears. ‘It is said
that the first child of any woman who asked him to pray for a child for her is
born an idiot with a small head and long ears. Such children are offered to the
shrine by the parents. They can eat and lie down but are absolute idiots. The
custom of offering these children still prevails; they are called Shah Daula’s
rats, and one or two are presented every year.’ ‘Shah Daula Chuhas’, No. 1382,
Lahore, 19 April 1879, Home Department File, Proceedings of the
Government of the Punjab (Lahore: Punjab Government Press: 1879), p. 186.
32. The report maintained further that ‘[t]he faqirs of the shrine trade on them,
taking them to different towns and collecting alms by exhibiting them. The
ignorant people of the country consider them supernatural beings.’ Ibid. (italics mine).
33. H.R. Goulding, Old Lahore: Reminiscences of a Resident (Lahore: Civil and
Military Gazette Press, 1924), p. 1.
34. The term Central Punjab became popular with the British administration.
The area comprises Lahore and Amritsar division, as the map of early
twentieth-century Punjab shows. See Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849–1947
(New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988).
35. For the British authorities, Lahore became the most important city in Punjab,
where they headquartered their activities and kept it as their provincial capital.
36. As mentioned earlier, at the land attached with Shah Chiragh and Mian Mir
(1550 – 1635), the colonial administrators created residences and cantonments.
Further, the Lahore secretariat and government houses were situated at the
shrines of Anarkali and of Qasim Khan.
37. Glover, Making Lahore Modern, p. xxii.
38. Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (London: Oxford University
Press, 1959), p. 46.
39. There were multiple different dialects and in some cases languages other than
Punjabi, such as Multani, Riasti, Derawali, Kohistani, Potohari, Jangli, etc.
However, in Central Punjab, Punjabi largely remained the dominant language.
40. Francis Robinson’s study shows the way that, after 1800, ulema emphasised
Urdu even as a scholarly language. Francis Robinson, Islam, South Asia and the
West (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 59 – 98.
41. Tahir Kamran, ‘Urdu migrant literati and Lahore’s culture’, Journal of Punjab
Studies 19/2 (2012), pp. 173– 94, p. 192.
42. Jeffrey M. Diamond, ‘Narratives of reform and displacement in colonial
Lahore: the intikaal of Muhammad Hussain Azad’, Journal of Punjab Studies
16/2 (2009), pp. 155– 72, p. 161.
43. For many years, the head office of Anjuman Khaddam al Sufia remained in
Lahore. See the biography of Sayyid Jamat Ali Shah by Sayyid Akhtar Hussain
and Muhammad Tahir Faruqi, Sirat e Amir e Millat (Karachi: Wahid Press,
1974), p. 350.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 360. Publishing journals on the issue of Tasawwaf was in line with the
similar contemporary activities started around the figure of Khwaja Hasan
Nizami (1876– 1955) in Delhi. He not only published a similar journal
himself, but also supported many such activities. Rafiuddin Hashmi (ed.),
Khatut e Iqbal (Lahore: Maqtaba e Khyaban e Adab, 1976).
46. Mahmood Alam Hashmi, ‘Mufti Ghulam Sarwar Lahori: a biographical
sketch’, in Ghulam Sarwar Lahori, Khazinat ul Asfia: Qadria, vol. 1 (Lahore:
Maktaba i Nabwiya, 1986), pp. 1 – 18.
47. See Preface in John A. Subhan, Sufism its Saints and Shrines (Lucknow: Lucknow
Publishers, 1926).
48. Farina Mir, The Social Space of Language: Vernacular Culture in British Colonial
Punjab (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010).
49. He was famous for his lectures on Ibn e Arabi. His Manqabat (a poetic eulogy
for Murshid or the Sufi Master) ‘Kithai Mahar Ali Kithai Tairi Sana’ (Who am
I (Mahar Ali) to praise you) was also very popular.
50. Iqbal’s position was critical of the pirs of Punjab. His poems, ‘Punjabi
Musalman’ and ‘Punjab ke Perzado Sai’, were critical of customary shrine-
based practices.
51. Even in the later nineteenth century, Maulvi Noor Ahmed Chishti had already
described the elites of the city as going to the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh,
instead of the fair of Madhu Lal Hussain, although at the same time he did not
seem reluctant to tell his readers that during the fair of Madhu Lal Hussain,
the streets of Lahore were emptied and many more also came from outside
Lahore to participate in the fair. The religious composition, however, remained
mixed and it shows that, as social changes made their impact, the shrine of
Madhu Lal Hussain must have been losing its attraction, especially for elite
Muslims.
52. Kashf ul Mahjub is a famous text, the only extant work of Hazrat Ali Hajveri
(Data Ganj Bakhsh) written in his own lifetime. Of the many editions, see, for
example, ‘Ali ibn ‘Usman (Hazrat Ali Hajveri/Data Ganj Bakhsh), Kashf ul
Mahjub, trans. Reynold A. Nicholson (Leiden: Brill, 1911). Available at https://
archive.org/details/kashfalmahjub00usmauoft (accessed 20 August 2011).
53. For Orientalists the interest in Indian Sufis correlated with the question of the
high level of Muslim conversion. Those who were unable to find an answer for
such conversion through forcible means turned towards local saints as the
significant factor behind it.
54. For C.M. Naim, the two editions of Asar al Sanadid must be seen as the
publication of two different books with the same name. The first edition was
published in 1847, the other in 1854. C.M. Naim, ‘Syed Ahmad and his two
books called “Asar-al-Sanadid”’, Modern Asian Asian Studies 45/3 (2010), pp. 1–40.
55. Chishti, Tehqiqat e Chishti and Muhammad Latif, Lahore: Its History, Architectural
Remains and Antiquities, with an Account of its Modern Institutions, Inhabitants, their
Trade, Customs, & c. [1892] (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1994) are
concerned with the history of Lahore while Syed Ahmad’s Asar-al-Sanadid (1847
and 1854) sets out to explore the history of Dehli.
56. Irfan Habib, ‘Sar Sayyad Ahmad Khan aur Tarikh-Nawisi’, Fikr-o-Agahi
(Delhi), Aligarh Number (2000), p. 123.
57. Glover, Making Lahore Modern, p. 185.
58. Scholars like C.M. Naim, Irfan Habeeb, Shahms ur Rehman Faruqi and
Christian W. Troll have similar views about Asar al Sanadid.
59. Naim, ‘Syed Ahmad’, pp. 6 – 7.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Arshad Ali, Asaral-Sanadid: Tahqiqi wa Tanqidi Mutala’a (Jehlum, Pakistan:
Awaz-i-Alamgir Educational Publishers, 1998). Ali thinks that the two
editions should be regarded as separate books. He also points out that while
earlier books about important places – he calls them asariyat (antiquarian) –
contain some mention of the local people, it is not the case with books on
religious sites.
63. As Ashish Nandy puts it: ‘History, as a discipline and form of consciousness,
came handy in this exercise. It flattened the pasts of all societies, so that they
began to look like so many edited versions of European paganism and/or
feudalism. The triumph of the idea of history in the southern world – over
other forms of construction or invocation of the past – was ultimately a
European triumph. This conquest was not merely over the selves of other
societies, but often over Europe’s own earlier selves that had stealthily survived
into the present, either in Europe or in analogous or parallel forms within
other cultures. Europe truly became Europe as we know it today only after it
foregrounded the experiences of Colonialism and a crypto-Hegelian idea of
history within its self-definition. It also then ensured that these became parts
of the self-definitions of all defeated civilizations.’ Ashis Nandy, An Ambiguous
Journey to the City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 2.
64. Naim used the phrase ‘command performance’ to differentiate AS 1 from AS 2.
Naim, ‘Syed Ahmad’, p. 37.
65. ‘Chishti often prefaced a description with the clause “it is said that” or “I have
heard it told”, substantiating his British reviewer’s suspicion that he compiled
many entries by interviewing local residents or the caretakers of shrines.’
Glover, Making Lahore Modern, p. 190.
66. There is much in Tehqiqat e Chishti that suggests Chishti wrote it with an
awareness of the kind of criticism Sayyid Khan’s earlier work had received.
There is also much in it that retains some of the earlier work’s ‘haphazard’
features, that sense of not being able to see the wood for the trees.
67. Government of Punjab, ‘Report on Vernacular Books Registered in the Punjab
during the year 1867,’Home Department Proceedings (General), no. 131
(September 1870), n.p., from Glover, Making Lahore Modern, p. 189.
68. ‘What a marvellous change has the comparatively short period brought about!
. . . An age of violence and rapine has given place to one of peace and harmony.’
Latif, Lahore, Preface VIII.
69. Overall, Latif did not criticise other religious communities; very rarely, he
criticised when he had to compare the previous rule of Ranjit Singh with the
British authorities, and here one can feel the origin of a new form of
‘communal conflict’: ‘Ranjeet Singh . . . converted all mosques and places of
Muhammadan worship in the Sikh capital into powder-magazines, or
workshops for the manufacture of fire-arms and ammunitions. The British
Government have most generously and justly restored all such places to their
Muhammadan subjects, and thus won their heart-felt gratitude.’ Ibid., p. xi.
70. ‘It [Punjab] is aptly termed the steel-head of the spear of this great empire, the
guard room of India on the north . . . It is pre-eminently the soldier’s land, the
sword in hands of India.’ Ibid., p. ii.
71. About Nanak, Latif wrote: ‘When the reflecting mind of the pious Nanak
conceived the amelioration condition and the combination of conflicting
creeds . . .’, he termed Ranjeet Singh ‘the lion of the Punjab’. Ibid.
72. Khazinat ul Asfiya was written in late nineteenth century by Ghulam Sarwar.
Sakinat ul Aulya was written by Dara Shikoh in the seventeenth century.
73. For Chishti there are very few conflicts between Muslims and Sikhs. This
history even contradicts other narratives, such as the killing of Guru Arjun
Singh at the hands of Jahangir. Instead, this history describes a Hindu
governor of Lahore who intended to marry his daughter to the son of the Guru
but could not get the Guru’s agreement. As a result, he inflicted pain and
agony upon the Guru, and ultimately the Guru died. Chishti, Tehqiqat e
Chishti, pp. 130– 8.
74. Ibid., p. 887.
75. Ibid., pp. 170– 1, which explains in detail the shajra (list of pedigree) of
majawar of Data Ganj Bakhsh.
76. Partly because he made a conscious effort to write proper history, without
interviews and ‘participatory observation’.
77. Or it may be because he was not sure of his priority and so resisted having a
priority, treating the matter only topographically.
78. The Aligarh Movement was officially supported by the colonial authorities and
also received with the personal approval of many Muslim officials, who
considered that it offered the potential for the increase of Muslim empowerment.
S.M. Ikram, Indian Muslims and Partitions of India (Delhi: Atlantic Publishers,
1992), p. 206.
79. The control of the mosque was given by the colonial authorities to Anjuman e
Islamiya, formed solely for this purpose in 1887.
80. Ali Syed Iqbal, Syed Ahmad Khan ka safarnama-e-Punjab (Aligarh: Aligarh
Institute Gazette Press, 1884), pp. 88 – 9.
81. Until at least 1905 a magazine opposing the ideas of Sir Syed and his
movement was published regularly. Arthur F. Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet:
The Indian Naqshbandiyya and the Rise of the Mediating Sufi Shaykh (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1998), p. 197.
82. Hashmi, ‘Mufti Ghulam Sarwar Lahori, p. 17.
83. Ibid.
84. That tradition was already in tatters; however, its love affair with the city never
lessened. A poetic genre, ‘Shahr e Ashoob’, became popular in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, displaying the sense of alienation and self-
estrangement in a world in which old city centres were eroding. There is a verse
by Zauq (d. 1854), ‘In dino garchai Dakkan mai hai bari qadr e Sukhan – Kaun
Jai Zauq par Dilli ke Galliyan Chor kar’ (There is a great value in Dakkan for the
verses, however who would leave the streets of Delhi). The love for the city is
characteristic of his identity and love for his homeland.
85. During his visit to Punjab, especially Lahore, the local Hindus asked Sir Syed
to initiate a similar project for Hindu students as well. Sir Syed replied that he
would be quite happy to do this. He was not happy to be taken as a Muslim
representative. It was only because of financial constraints and specialised focus
that he started his programme for Muslim students. See Iqbal, Syed Ahmad
Khan, p. 102.
86. Glover showed that the colonial authorities did not like the early efforts of local
historians to bring out the history of their respective cities. However, as soon as
the writings started celebrating the constructions and reforms developed by the
colonial authorities, they were taken as accepted academic works. Glover,
‘Thinking with the city: urban writing in colonial Lahore’, ch. 6 in his Making
Lahore Modern, pp. 185–202.
87. Muhammad Moj, The Deoband Madrassah Movement: Countercultural Trends and
Tendencies (London: Anthem Press, 2015), p. 196.
NOTES TO PAGE 29 201
88. At least until the generation of Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, Maulana
Saulaiman Nadvi and Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni, the tradition of piri-
muridi was in vogue. Each of them was initiated into a certain spiritual order;
Maulana Ahsan Madni was initiated into the Chishti-Sabri order by Rasheed
Ahmed Gangohi; Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi was initiated by Imdad ullah
Muhajir Makki into the Naqshbandi order; and Maulana Saulaiman Nadvi by
Maulan Hussain Ahmed Madni into the Chishti-Sabri order. For a discussion
of the similar position, see Brannon Ingram, ‘Sufis, scholars and scapegoats:
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905) and the Deobandi critique of Sufism’,
The Muslim World 99/3 (2009), pp. 478– 501.
89. Even many of the scholars who emerged out of the seminary kept the piri-
muridi tradition alive and propagated their own version of the tradition.
Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi made a name for himself giving life to his own
style of the piri-muridi relationship.
90. The Aligarh movement impressed a large number of the intelligentsia,
ranging from poets to journalists, and reformists to businessmen. Allama
Iqbal, one of the most important scholars of the first four decades of the
twentieth century, considered the death of Sufism through shrine-based
cultural practices, though he himself remained immersed in Sufistic ethos
throughout his life. Unlike Syed Ahmad, he puts the ‘Ulama before the Sufis,
and subsequently also includes four non-Muslim men of learning – something
that Syed Ahmad does not do’. See Naim, ‘Syed Ahmad’, p. 1.
91. Khilafat Movement in the 1920s is understood to have emerged directly out of
the Aligarh Movement. As the graduates of Aligarh University, Ali Brothers,
Shaukat Ali Jauhar and Muhammad Ali Jauhar, along with their classmate,
Zafar Ali Khan, the editor of Zamindar, remained the main proponents of the
movement. Regarding the movement itself, Gail Minault writes: ‘This was the
age of the emergence of the professional politician in India, part journalist,
part orator, part holy man.’ Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious
Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982), p. 3.
92. Zafar Ali Khan, Allama Iqbal and Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz are examples of
scholars who kept constant engagement with Sufistic practices, though they
maintained a critical attitude.
93. The movement was started in 1901 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who had been
preaching his thoughts for the previous 20 years. ‘He belonged to a respectable
Mughal family, which traces its migration into India from the time of Babur,
in the sixteenth century. He received a good education in Muslim language
and sciences, and sometime, before the year 1880, he evidently came to the
conclusion that he was called to undertake a special divine mission. However,
it was not until 1889 that he announced that he had been the recipient of a
divine revelation, which made it lawful for him formally to initiate followers or
disciples.’ Murray T. Titus, The Religious Quest of India: Indian Islam: A Religious
History of Islam in India (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 217–8.
94. Hervey D. Griswold, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad: The Mehdi Messiah of Qadian
(Lodiana, IN: American Tract Society, 1902), p. 12.
95. ‘If the ignorant Muhammadans are to be blamed for an excessive reverence for
tombs and miracles of saints, the advanced Muhammadans have a blind
admiration for everything Western.’ Howard A. Walter, The Ahmadiyya
Movement (London: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 67.
96. ‘The Mirza Sahib claims . . . that he is divinely appointed Umpire (Al-Hakam)
to arbitrate among the warring sects and jangling creeds, and the divinity sent
Mahdi to wage, with the weapons of second reasoning and clear
demonstration, a spiritual Jihad against all enemies of the truth as Aryas,
Christians and Mullah-guided Muhammadans, and especially to destroy from
off the earth the mischievous doctrine of the Gross.’ Ibid., p. 14.
97. Titus, The Religious Quest of India, p. 223.
98. J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1971), p. 173.
99. These movements did not try to deny their connection with the religious/
Sufistic tradition.
100. From late eighteenth century, the internal development of Tasawwuf was
showing signs of change. Within the order of Chishtis, a revivalist movement
emerged through the teachings of Shah Kalim Ullah of Dehli (1650– 1729).
This movement remained orthodox, though, helping direct Tasawwuf towards
recreating Muslim identity and ethical revivalism. Figures like Khwaja
Suleman of Taunsa (1770 – 1850), Khwaja Shamsud Din Sialwi (1799 – 1883)
and Syed Mahr Ali Shah of Golra Sharif (1856– 1937) owned and pursued this
movement. For details see, Gilmartin, Empire and Islam.
101. Emotional revivalism emerged through the teachings of Mohammad Nausha
and were popularised in Lahore through the Faqir family. The emergence of
Naqshbandi and Qadri revivals gradually produced urban Shari-based Sufistic
practices within or around the urban areas.
102. Pir Jamat Ali Shah, one of the famous Sufi-pir personalities of first half of the
twentieth century, though famous as a Naqshbandi saint, also proclaimed to
have ba’ait in all of the four salasil (orders), that is, Naqshbandi, Chishti, Qadri
and Suharwardi.
103. For Buehler, the Naqshbandi Sufistic tradition took three forms: teaching
Shaykh, directing Shaykh and mediating Shaykh. By mediational Shaykh he
means ‘a perspective which posits Shaykhs, both living and deceased who
mediate between individual Muslims and God (via Muhammad), the existence
of a spiritual hierarchy which is a function of how one is connected to
Muhammad, and a variegated religious topography of tomb-shrines which are
potent places to contact God.’ See, Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, pp. 168– 9.
104. In Lahore, the Masjid Wazir Khan mosque became a centre for the prevalence
of Sunni orthodoxy or Brelwism.
105. A young man named Ilm-ud-din killed a publisher and allegedly the writer of
a book, Rangila Rasul, in Lahore in 1929. Some prominent Muslims such as
Allama Iqbal and Sir Muhammad Shafi were united with the conservative
religious sections to describe the book as an act of blasphemy. The killing of
the alleged writer was celebrated and the young man, who was later sentenced
to death, was given the title of ghazi (holy warrior). Ayesha Jalal, Self and
Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850 (London:
Routledge Publications, 2000), pp. 295– 6.
106. Mahmood Ahmed Saqi, Qutub e Lahore (Lahore: Idara Ahl e Sunnat Wa Jamaat,
1990).
107. Buehler may place Pir Syed Jamat Ali Shah Lasani between the ‘directing’ and
‘mediational’ Naqshbandi Sufi space. However, he considers Pir Syed Jamat
Ali Shah Ameer e Millat as a mediating Sufi.
108. He was the founding figure of Anjuma al Khaddamia Soophia and Anjuma e
Naumania, Lahore. He also laid the foundation of madrasas in Ali Pir Syyedan
in Lahore. See Syed Akhtar Hussain Shah and Muhammad Tahir Farooqi, Amir
e Millat (Karachi: Wahid Press, 2009), pp. 350– 64.
109. Muhammad Nazeer Ranjha, Tareekh wa Tazkara Khankah Naqshbandia
Mujaddadia Sharakpur Sharif (Islamabad: Purab Academy, 2007), pp. 98 – 9.
Pir Mian Mohammad Sher Rabbani, though, did not remain vocal in political
matters, as he died nine years before the birth of Pakistan. However, during his
meetings with Sir Mohammad Shafi (who was also his cousin) and Iqbal, he
emphasised Muslim identity. In both those meetings, he criticised them for
not having beards. His son, the Sajjada Nashin of the Khankah Naqshbandia
Mujaddadia, Mian Mohammad Sher Rabbani, however, took an active part in
politics. He successfully arranged the first public meeting of the Muslim
League in his town and advised Muslims to take the side of Jinnah in
opposition to the Unionist Party.
110. Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet, p. 186.
111. Ibid.
112. ‘When subject to religious frenzy they hang themselves on trees head
downwards and sway their bodies violently backward and forwards shouting
Illa llah till they faint from exhaustion. They explain this custom with a story
about Pak Rehman ascending to heaven, and on being recalled by Naushah,
thinking it respectful to his tutor to descend with his head foremost.’ Denzil,
Mclagan and Rose, A Glossary, vol. 3, p. 199.
113. In Lahore, near Masti Gate, a Naushahi shrine of Fazal Shah (d. 1854 AD ) was
famous. In Gujranwala the shrine of Pak Rahman (d. 1740) attracted hundreds
of thousands of visitors at urs. Chishti, Tehqiqat e Chishti, pp. 476– 8.
114. John A. Subhan differentiated between Shari and Be-Shari Sufi saints while
narrating the history of Sufis, especially discussing the Lal Shahbazi and Rasul
Shahi sections of Suhrawardi order. Subhan, Sufism its Saints and Shrines,
pp. 236 –53.
115. Chishti, Tehqiqat e Chishti, p. 325.
116. Latif, Lahore, p. 146.
117. Noor Ahmed Chishti, Yadgar-e-Chishti [1859] (Lahore: Nigarashat Publishers,

2007), pp. 130– 2.
118. The biographical sources of these Sufis suggest that they had already made the
shrine a leading spiritual centre. Although he did not much like travelling,
Mian Muhammad Sharaqpuri often found time to visit the shrine. There is a
similar position in Jamat Ali Shah Lasani.
119. Denzil, Mclagan and Rose included the shrine of Data Darbar, during the first
decade of twentieth century, within the Chishti order because of the close
association between Khwaja Muin ud Din Chishti, the father figure of the
Chishti Sufi order and the shrine.
120. Chishti mentions around seven Qur’ans gifted to the shrine during the previous
300 years or so, including gifts from Ranjeet Singh, the ruler of Punjab in the
early nineteenth century, and Sheikh Ghulam Muhayyud Din, the Subaidar of
Kashmir in the eighteenth century. Chishti, Tehqiqat e Chishti, p. 821.
121. At the same time, however, there were other shrines, such as the shrine of
Hazrat Khwaja Khawind Mahmud of Lahore, that preferred customary ways
for the succession of the office of Mutwalli or Sajjada Nashin. ‘The succession
to the office of mutwalli or sujjada-nashin of the mausoleum known as the
shrine of Hazrat Khwaja Khawind Mahmud of Lahore, is governed by customs
and not by Muhammadan Law, and by that custom the existing sujjada-nashin
nominates his successor in his life-time, and, on his death, the murids and
worshippers of the shrine and other mutaqds (believers) assemble and formally
recognise the new mutwalli and duly install him into the office in accordance
with the wishes of the last sujjada-nashin . . .’. William H. Rattigan, A Digest
of Civil Law for the Punjab Chiefly based on the Customary Law (Lahore:
University Book Agency, 1881). Available at http://punjabrevenue.nic.in/fm
anu.htm (accessed 12 Nov 2012).
122. ‘In matters of alienation of ancestral property, Majawars of the shrine of Data
Gunj Bukhsh at Lahore, who described themselves as Rajput Sheikhs, but
whose principal source of livelihood was earnings from service at the shrine,
and who had nothing to do with plough or with village communities, are
governed by the Mohammedan Law and not by custom. In this case the parties
were no doubt Rajputs, which is one of dominant agricultural tribes in the
villages of Lahore district, but it was not established that the Majawars had
anything in common with Mohammedan Rajputs living in rural areas and
following agricultural pursuits . . . .’. Ibid. Available at http://punjabrevenue.
nic.in/cust9.htm (accessed 14 Nov 2012).
123. Neither Maulvi Noor Ahmed Chishti nor any other writer of the nineteenth
century mentioned the linking of their name with any family name other than
Sheikh. Chishti, Tehqiqat e Chishti, pp. 170– 2.
124. Ibid.
125. Sayyid Ali Hajveri, Sharah Kashf ul Mahjoob, trans. Wahid Bakhsh Siyal
(Lahore: Al-Faisal Publishers, 2009), p. 27 and pp. 33 – 5.
NOTES TO PAGES 36 – 42 205
126. Mohammad Din Fauq, Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh (Lahore: Gauhar
Publications, 2008), pp. 136– 7.
127. Latif mentions the date 1861 for renovations at the shrine. See Latif, Lahore,
p. 181, and Fauq, Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh, p. 140.
128. Ghafir Shahzad, Data Darbar Complex: Tameer sai Takmeel Tak (Lahore: Book
Home, 2004), p. 27.
Chapter 2 Double-Reterritorialisation: Drifting towards

the Nationalisation of Shrines
1. The second decade saw the emergence of Hindu-Muslim unity through the
Khilafat Movement of Muslims and Mahatma Gandhi’s Swadeshi Movement.
The collaboration of Muslim groups with Hindu Congress leaders was founded
in anti-colonialism.
2. To describe it as a single stream is quite difficult, at least during the early
part of twentieth century. However, it started merging with the Brelwi
movement, emerging out of the teachings of Ahmed Riza Brelwi (d. 1926),
who became famous during the early years of the twentieth century. In its
general emphasis it relates to the many similar variants and emphases that
emerged within orthodox Islam or Jamat Ahl e Sunnat during the first half of
the twentieth century in Punjab, including many sajjada nashins and Islamised
pirs. However, Sunni orthodoxy gained wider popularity as Brelwi Islam in
Pakistan.
3. Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam
since 1850 (London: Routledge Publications, 2000), p. 251.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 259.
6. Francis Robinson, ‘Technology and religious change: Islam and the impact of
print’, Modern Asian Studies 27/1 (February 1993), pp. 229 – 52. Available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/312883 (accessed 13 May 2010).
7. Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, p. 312.
8. Jafar Baloch, Iqbal aur Zafar Ali Khan (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan,
1995), pp. 35 – 6.
9. Mohammad Sadiq Kasuri, Tareekh e Mashaikh Qadria Rizwia (Lahore: Zavia
Publishers, 2004), p. 327.
10. Syed Akhtar Hussain Shah and Muhammad Tahir Farooqi, Amir e Millat
(Karachi: Wahid Press, 2009), pp. 450– 1.
11. The mosque of Data Darbar was reconstructed around 1923 –4. Syedana Shah
Abul Barkat Syed Ahmed Lahori (1901– 78), a disciple and khalifa (a spiritual
disciple) of Imam Ahmed Riza Khan, arrived there as a khateeb and imam
masjid around 1923. After a few years, he also joined the madrasa of Masjid
Wazir Khan but soon had to leave it because of the conflict between him and
the caretaker of the mosque, Mirza Zafar Ali Judge, over the mode of teaching.
Kasuri, Tareekh e Mashaikh Qadria Rizwia, p. 314.
206 NOTES TO PAGES 43 – 44
12. Allama Iqbal was part of the Kashmir cause from as early as 1909, when he
became a general secretary of the already existing Kashmir Anjuman, renamed
the Muslim Conference. This was formed to show solidarity with Kashmiris,
and Muhammad Fauq, the famous Kashmiri historian, was also part of that
committee. See, Rattan Lal Hanglo, ‘Mohammad-ud-din Fauq: remembering
the first journalist of Kashmir’, Kashmir Dispatch, 5 July 2012. Available at
http://www.kashmirdispatch.com/others/05078557-mohammad-ud-din-
fauq-remembering-the-first-journalist-of-kashmir.htm (accessed accessed 13 May
2010). See also Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, p. 352.
13. Janbaz Mirza, Karwan e Ahrar, vol. 1 (Lahore: Idara Maktaba Tabsara, 1975),
p. 347.
14. Sir Zafar Ullah Khan also became president of All India Muslim League in
1931. Ahrar protested against the decision. Ibid., p. 238.
15. In a speech by Sheikh Abdullah published in 1933 in Inqilab, he said, ‘I don’t
have the right to stop them because of their religious views. Because this is the
age of Ahmadism’. Ibid. (italics mine).
16. Allama Iqbal’s response was published by many organisations. It may be found in
‘Shamloo’ (Latif Ahmad Sherwani) (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore:
Al-manar Academy, 1944), pp. 93–111. and Abdur Rahman Tariq (ed.), Speeches
and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali, 1973), pp. 109–39.
17. ‘Shamloo’, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, p. 94.
18. Ibid.
19. Iqbal wrote these essays in 1934 when the new constitution of 1935 was about
to be put into operation. The constitution had already accepted the issue of a
separate electorate and hoped to incorporate the Communal Award, already in
operation since 1932.
20. ‘Shamloo’, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, p. 59.
21. His theorising, however, seems to provide sufficient justification for many later
events in the post-colonial state. His recommendations to the British state
were taken over by the post-colonial state, which termed this community non-
Muslim in 1974. It is interesting that the publisher of the essay, in the
rejoinder, considers it necessary to publish the decision of the Legislative
Assembly of Pakistan, in 1974, terming Qadianis non-Muslims, while
republishing these writings of Iqbal. Muhammad Iqbal, Islam and Ahmadism
(Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Ashraf Printing Press, 1980), pp. 67 – 8.
22. Allama Iqbal’s articulated ideas appeared most clearly in his lectures delivered
in the late 1920s, published later as The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in
Islam. In order to set out the identity of Muslim culture, Iqbal emphasised the
concept of the ‘finality of the institution of prophethood’. Allama Muhammad
Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Sheikh
Muhammad Ashraf, 2007), p. 129.
23. David Gilmartin, ‘The Shahid Ganj Mosque incident: a prelude to Pakistan’,
in Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus (eds), Islam, Politics, and Social
Movement (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 146 – 68.
24. Iqbal’s speeches and statements gave space to the colonial urban Muslim elite
in the company of the traditional religious groups. On the one hand, his
suggestions made Islam a necessity of the modern age, with the underlying urge
to consider ritualistic practices less important than the need for unity. On the
other hand, the essays put forward a generalised but concrete definition of Islam
in India. ‘I suggest the formation of an assembly of ulema which must include
Muslim lawyers who have received education in modern jurisprudence. The idea
is to protect, expand and if necessary, to reinterpret the law of Islam in the light
of modern conditions, while keeping close to the spirit embodied in its
fundamental principles.’ Allama Iqbal, ‘Presidential Address Delivered at the
annual session of the All India Muslim Conference at Lahore on the 21st March
1932’, p. 61, in ‘Shamloo’, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, pp. 37–61.
25. In Allama Iqbal’s philosophical writings in prose, published as The
Reconstruction of Religious Thought In Islam, he clearly positioned his Sufistic
thoughts and his sympathies with a specific spiritual tradition, especially those
of Mujaddad Alif Sani.
26. Allama Iqbal severely criticised the form of Tasawwuf that dwells on and
promotes the idea of Wahdat al Wajud (Unity of Being). For him, this form, as
an Ajami (Persian) idea, creeps into the otherwise Arabic Islamic teachings.
His efforts to disentangle Ajami influences on the original Arabic teachings in
order to revive and liberate the true spirit of Islamic teachings continued. See
Ijaz ul Haq Qaddusi, Iqbal Kai Mahboob Soofia (Iqbal Academy Pakistan:
Lahore, 1976), Preface, and Abul Lais Siddiqi, Iqbal Aur maslak e Tasawwaf
(Iqbal Academy Pakistan: Lahore, 1977).
27. His poems were published in a collection titled Zarb e Kaleem in 1936 (various
editions, e.g., Zarb-e-Kaleem: Armagan-e-Hijaz (Lahore: Al Faisal, 1997)).
28. In a letter to Akbar Ala Abadi, Iqbal says: ‘Yaha Lahore mai zaruriat e Islami
sai aik mutnaffas bhe agah nahi . . . sufiia ke dukanai hai magar waha seerat e
Islami ke mata nahi bikti.’ [Here in Lahore, not a single person is acquainted
with the necessities of Islam. There are shops of Sufis but no one sells there the
mannerism of Islamic life.] Qaddusi, Iqbal Kai Mahboob Soofia.
29. See ibid. for verses written in his praise, pp. 52, 119, 242– 5.
30. Allama Iqbal seemed to communicate with Sufis more intimately than can be
inferred from many of his published works. Once, when his brother was
suffering with a severe problem, Allama Iqbal sent a written poem to the
shrine of Nizam ud Din Aulya. See ibid., p. 245.
31. Not only does his poem, ‘Punjab kai Pirzado Sai’, but also his essays, compiled
in The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, display his interest in
Mujaddad Alif Sani and in an essay ‘Culture’ he discusses Sani as the spiritual
figure who can be considered as the model for spiritual experiences.
32. The Unionists continued to make efforts to take control of shrines and waqf,
yet the pressure to curb archaic practices in Muslim society in general, and
within Muslim shrines, increased with the prevalence of state policies
introducing Muslim Personal Law or Shariat Bill (1937) and the gradually
208 NOTES TO PAGES 46 – 48
prevailing ideology of the Muslim League. The pressure found its release
through the introduction of bills such as the Muslim Musawat Bill, 1939, the
Anti Dowry Bill, 1942 and the Music in Muslim Shrines Act, 1942.
33. ‘The Bill does not seek to interfere with religion at all. It is merely a Social
Reform measure.’ Malik Khizar Hyat Tiwana, the Minister for Public Works,
concluded at the end of debate on the bill. Punjab Legislative Assembly (PLA)
Debates, Vol. XIV, 1940 (Lahore: Superintendent Government Printing
Punjab, 1942), p. 789.
34. Ibid.
35. The Unionist government made two significant efforts to control shrines
earlier, in 1924 and 1937. David Gilmartin, ‘Tribe, land and religion in the
Punjab: Muslim politics and the making of Pakistan’, PhD dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley (1979), p. 230.
36. The Muslim Personal Law (MPL) was also a transition from the emphasis on
customary traditions to communal laws during colonial period. The law was
promulgated through the centre and created a pressure on provinces, making
them transform their laws accordingly. However Shariat law could not become
provincial law until quite late, in 1948.
37. The Unionist government seemed to be avoiding implementing this law in the
province, most probably because of the fear of introducing Muslim inheritance
laws. See discussion of the members, such as Malik Feroz Khan Noon and
Begum Shahnawaz, in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. PLA Debates, Vol. XIV,
p. 789. Also for the avoidance of introducing MPL, see ibid., p. 789.
38. Some of the significant members who participated in the discussions were
Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Syed Mohy-ud Din Lal Badshah, Raja
Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Mian Abdul Rab, Sheikh Faiz Muhammad and Pir Akbar
Ali. Ibid., pp. 782– 9.
39. Ibid., p. 786.
40. Ibid., p. 784. It is also interesting that the reply from a member of the ruling
bench did not say that he was in favour of taking the role of the mutwalli;
instead he said that people on the day of urs do not remain in control of a
mutwalli. Ibid., p. 787.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Until 1940, through the Jamat Ahl e Sunnat, Allama Iqbal and Maulana Zafar
Ali Khan had already shown the way to save what was precious in Islam in
urban areas. They rallied against such bills as the Sarda Bill, which made the
minimum age of marriage 14 for a girl and 18 for a boy, in order to save
Shariat. Almost at the same time these organisations made their case against
the Hindu writer, whose book vilified the prophet and created the grounds for
the blasphemy crisis, concluding in the execution of Alam Din as a martyr
(shaheed). The same organisations protested against Masjid Shahid Ganj, a case
of shared ownership of an endowment or waqf.
45. ‘This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard
to minorities, by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between Muslim
India and Hindu India, which will far more adequately and effectively
safeguard the rights and interests of Muslim and various other minorities.’
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, address at Lahore Session of Muslim
League, March 1940 (Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publishing,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan,
Islamabad, 1983), pp. 5– 23.
46. It is the reason that Jinnah was able to situate his idea of the Muslim nation in
India on constitutional grounds instead of ‘. . . being tied to a language of
historical and territorial integrity.’ Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a
Political Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), p. 105.
47. ‘Why does not Mr Gandhi honestly now acknowledge that the Congress is a
Hindu Congress, that he does not represent anybody except the solid body of
Hindu people? Why should not Mr Gandhi be proud to say, “I am a Hindu.
Congress has solid Hindu backing?” I am not ashamed of saying that I am a
Mussalman.’ Ibid.
48. ‘Why not come as a Hindu leader proudly representing your people, and let
me meet you proudly representing the Mussalmans? [“Hear, hear” and
applause] This is all that I have to say so far as the Congress is concerned.’ Ibid.
49. Ibid. For the details of Manzilgah incident see, http://gulhayat.com/
MasjidManzilgahpFull.asp (accessed 20 July 2016).
50. Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for
Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 260 – 87.
51. Younas Samad, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan,
1937– 1958 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 43. A little later,
even Shias and Ahl e Hadith, two other Muslim sects, showed their political
unity, though for opposite reasons. In 1934, the Shia Conference decided and
appealed to all Shias to vote only for those candidates standing upon joint
electorate. In 1934, Ahl e Hadith League appealed the Governor General to
reserve special seats for them. Mirza, Karwan e Ahrar, pp. 466 – 7.
52. David Gilmartin, ‘Religious leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the
Punjab’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 13/3 (1979), pp. 485 – 517,
pp. 501–3. Available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/312311?seq¼1#page_scan_
tab_contents (accessed 13 May 2010).
53. Denying the criticism, Janbaz Mirza claims that Ahrar did take part in
agitation in line with its past actions against provocations. Within four
years of its creation, Ahrar was already engaged with multiple mosque-
related issues. From ‘throwing the meat of pig’ in the state of Junaid Rohtak
to the Babri mosque agitation, and from Shahjahan Mosque, Alor to
Kapurthalla sit-in, the politics of Ahrar never lost an opportunity to
represent the territorially-sacred site of Muslim identity. Mirza, Karwan e
Ahrar, pp. 286, pp. 436 – 7.
54. Munir Inquiry Commission Report or Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted
under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances (hereafter
Munir Commission Report) (Lahore: Superintendent Government Printing
Punjab, 1954).
55. ‘We have had ample experience of the working of the provincial constitutions
during the last two and a half years, and any repetition of such a government
must lead to civil war and the raising of private armies, as recommended by
Mr Gandhi to the Hindus of Sukkur when he said that they must defend
themselves violently or non-violently, blow for blow, and if they could not
they must emigrate. Jinnah, ‘Address’, pp. 5– 23.
56. On 20 November 1920, at a meeting held at Akal Takht, Amratsar, a
Committee, Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (Central Gurdwara
Management Committee, SGPC) was formed to manage all Sikh shrines.
Sunder Singh Majithia, Harbans Singh Attari and Bhai Jodh Singh were
elected president, vice-president and secretary respectively. Mohinder Singh,
The Akali Struggle: A Retrospect, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and
Distributors, 1988), p. 20.
57. Ibid., p. 15.
58. Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi was member of Punjab Muslim Students Federation
that accepted the idea of Paksitan as early as in 1939. Samad, A Nation in
Turmoil, p. 64.
59. Gilmartin highlights the text of Niazi and Shafi: ‘The flag of Islam . . . which
Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh planted in Lahore in the eleventh century, with
which Khwaja Muin ud din Chishti encompassed the corners of India, and
which Khwaja Bakhtiyar Kaki, Baba Farid Shakkarganj, Hazrat Nizamuddin
Auliya, and Khwaja Nasiruddin Mahmud Chiragh e Delhi had in their own
times raised high, has by the misfortune of India for the last two hundred and
fifty years awaited a standard bearer.’ David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam:
Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1988), p. 210.
60. Ibid., pp. 505– 8.
61. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849 – 1947 (New Delhi: Manohar
62. Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot was described as Pir Mamdot Sharif,
Sirdar Shaukat Hayat Khan as Sajjada Nashin of Wah Sharif, Malik Feroz
Khan Noon of Darbar Sargodha Sharif and Nawab Muhammad Hayat Qureshi
as Sajjada Nashin of Sargodha Sharif and finally, the Secretary of this
committee, Ibrahim Ali Chishti, was designated Fazil-i-Hind Sajjada Nashin
of Paisa Akhbar Sharif. Munir Commission Report, p. 254.
63. Ibid.
64. For Unionists it was enough to have a close relationship with pirs and sajjada
nashins of rural areas. They intended to have their cooperation, and if it was not
forthcoming, they had to be satisfied to see them indifferent to the politics.
Gilmartin, ‘Tribe, land and religion in the Punjab’, pp. 169–70.
65. Ibid., p. 218.

66. Ibid., p. 216.
67. The Muslim League won 460 of the 533 Muslim seats in the central and
provincial assembly elections. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p. 172.
68. Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 16.
69. Venkit Dhulipala has shown in detail that the way, especially leaders from UP,
had developed the idea of Pakistan as a new state of Medina where Islamic
practices would find unhindered life. Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam,
and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India (Delhi: Cambridge
70. Ayesha Jalal maintains further that ‘Jinnah and the Muslim League made a
strong, but ineffectual, protests that there could be no political India bereft of
territories inhabited by Muslim majorities’. Jalal, Democracy and Authoritar-
ianism in South Asia, p. 16.
71. It is interesting that the religio-moral principles of the colonial urban elite
remained against the pluralistic shrine-based practices and the alignment of
Sufi pir with Muslim League politics, though their revivalist spirit
strengthened yet also reduced the justification for their traditional existence.
72. Jamal Malik has employed the concept ‘sector’ for showing paradigm shifts in
Indian society after colonisation. He analyses this sector in two forms, the
colonial agricultural sector and colonial urban sector in order to highlight the
section of society aligning with the colonial developmental paradigm. Jamal
Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan
(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996), pp. 17 – 9.
73. For Appadurai, the concept of reterritorialisation means regaining identity in a
peculiar way, not necessarily linked to with the connection with the soil: ‘soil
needs to be distinguished from territory . . . where soil is a matter of a
spatialized and originary discourse of belonging, territory is concerned with
integrity, surveyability, policing, and subsistence’. Further, for him:
‘Deterritorialization expresses the disjuncture between feelings of belonging
and place of residence.’ Arjun Appadurai, ‘Disjuncture and difference in the
global cultural economy’, Theory Culture and Society 7/2– 3 (1990), pp. 295–
310. However, the process of deterritorialisation necessarily gives birth to the
process of reterritorialisation.
74. The Muslim political rulers found themselves in a majority and, having a
singular identity and a land to rule, they devised a technique to reduce all
other communities to the status of minorities. The religious elite found itself
in the position of majority rule, reterritorialising itself through excluding
Ahmadis. In the new land, all of the political, intellectual and religious elite
excluded traditional pluralistic mystical practices.
75. During debates around the first constitution in the early part of 1950s in
Pakistan, Binder writes that: ‘Most of the members from Bengal used up a
large part of their time in excusing the long delay in constitution making, in
recalling the struggle for Pakistan, in thanking God that an agreed formula
had been worked out, in hailing the millennium when all the ideals of Islam
would be realized through an Islamic constitution, and in praising the virtues
of Islam. But when all this was said only six members specifically demanded
that the Head of the State be a Muslim, only two specifically demanded that
Islam be declared the state religion, and only eight specifically demanded that
Pakistan be declared an Islamic republic.’ Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics
in Pakistan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961), p. 323.
76. Ali Usman Qasmi argues that the advantage of using this phrase is that at the
very same time we can discuss the ‘disputative negotiation of contrasting
religious traditions, sectional interests and ideological worldview of key
actors, and the imperatives of populist decision-making. It is the interplay of
such variables and their relative strengths and weakness during different sets of
socio-political, economic and, even, geostrategic compulsions, that has
determined the course of Islam’s role in the State of Pakistan.’ Ali Usman
Qasmi, ‘God’s kingdom on earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947– 1969’,
Modern Asian Studies 44/6 (November 2010), pp. 1197– 253.
77. Ibid.
78. From the speeches of the Objectives Resolution one can see in both revivalists
and modern intelligentsia, from sajjada nashins to modern elites, such a process
of identification. Such a conception went on to create a larger Islamised block
that included all Muslim worlds, on which Khaliq uz Zaman, the president of
Muslim League, began serious work. Daily Imroze, Lahore, 11 January 1950.
79. Ayub Khan, ‘Foreword’, in Javed Iqbal, The Ideology of Pakistan and its
Implementation (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1959), pp. xi –xii.
80. While putting forward his views in favour of the Objectives Resolution of
1949, Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Uthmani presented the conversation between
Jinnah and Gandhi that emphasised the separate and distinct identity of the
Muslim nation. Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 61.
81. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, pp. 11 –3.
82. Ibid., pp. 29 – 31.
83. For some, Jinnah himself accepted the formation of a new state as somewhere
between a theological and a secular state. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernity in
Sub-continent: from 1857 to 1964 (Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 340.
84. The dominant political elite, led by Liaquat Ali Khan, showed a clear distaste
for theocracy and a very clear sense of Islam as pro-democratic religion. Liaquat
Ali Khan distanced himself from ritualistic Islam and made it clear that ‘Islam
is not merely a relationship between the individual and his God, which should
not, in any way affect the working of the State’. M. Rafique Afzal, Speeches and
Statements of Quaid e Millat Liaquat Ali Khan (1941 – 51) (Lahore: Research
Society of Pakistan, University of the Panjab, 1967), p. 232.
85. The state would not curb the ‘freedom of any section of the Muslims . . . No
sect . . . will be permitted to dictate to the others’. Ibid., p. 233 ‘I have said
enough to show that we want to build up a truly liberal Government where the
greatest amount of freedom will be given to all its members.’ Ibid., p. 234.
86. Ibid., pp. 232– 3.
87. Ibid., pp. 239– 40.
88. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, p. 29.
89. Tanzil ur Rehman, Objectives Resolution and Its Impact on Pakistan Constitution
and Law (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1996), p. 14.
90. Ibid., p. 16.
91. Mirza, Karwan e Ahrar, p. 239.
92. Rehman, Objectives, p. 20.
93. Ibid.
94. This point is also highlighted by Rehman, ibid., p. 19.
95. The third clause of the Objectives Resolution. Golam W. Choudhury, Documents
and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan (Dacca: Green Book House, 1967).
96. Ibid., p. 39.
97. Ibid., p. 200.
98. Ibid., pp. 200– 1.
99. PLA Debates (Lahore: Superintendent Government Printing Punjab, 1955),
p. 282.
100. Ibid., p. 282. David Gilmartin has already shown that Unionists had made an
effort to control the activities of shrines in order to reduce communal conflicts.
David Gilmartin, ‘Tribe, land and religion in the Punjab: Muslim politics and
the making of Pakistan,’ pp. 231– 236.
101. PLA Debates, 1955.
102. Ibid., p. 339.
103. Ibid., p. 288.
104. Ibid., p. 297.
105. Ibid., p. 286.
106. Ibid., p. 337.
107. Ibid., p. 340.
108. The post-colonial state not only ignored the collective suggestions of ulema for
the constitution but also took a secular position during the 1953 Khatam e
Nabuwwat Movement. Religious scholars such as Maulana Maududi and Abd
us Sattar Niazi had to face strict sentences. However, the politics around the
first constitution during 1955–6 restored the importance of religious figures
such as Maududi. Governor General Sikandar Mirza ensured the support of
Maulana to stamp the constitution as Islamic. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr,
Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996), p. 44.
109. S.A. Rehman, the serving judge for the Supreme Court of West Pakistan in
1958, stated ‘that the field of fresh legislation is wide open and that the
classical jurisprudential compendiums need to be updated, albeit in line with
the “permanent values” specified by the Quran, so as to make them compatible
with the challenges and demands of the modern world’. With the fierce
214 NOTES TO PAGE 60
response of Maududi, Rehman’s position seemed to be the prevailing voice of

the state machinery, ready to reinterpret religious teachings according to the
changed situation. Maududi retorted with the argument that ‘the Prophet
was not simply a priest who dictated certain permanent values but was
mandated with the certain task of setting up an Islamic order, based wholly
on Divine principles. The laws introduced for this purpose, and the mode of
their practice, interpretation and implementation has come down to the
Muslims in the form of Hadith and the Sunnat.’ Qasmi, ‘God’s kingdom on
earth?’, p. 1219.
110. There is a severe conflict about celebrating Eid Milad un Nabi between
Deobandi revivalists and Brelwi scholars. Deobandi revivalists do not consider
it religiously right to celebrate the birth of the Prophet and consider it a biddat
(innovation). However, Brelwi scholars favour this celebration and are against
all those opposing it. Sajid Khan Naqshbandi, Roidad e Manazra Kohat:
Mrawwaja Jashan e Eid Milad un Nabi (Kohat: Anjuman Dawa Ahl as-Sunnah,
2011).
111. Even earlier, just after independence, state authorities started participating in
activities for Eid Milad Un Nabi. However, in Punjab the celebrations were
officially organised for the first time in 1950. Daily Imroz, 27 December 1949.
112. The Punjab Provincial Assembly was dissolved in January 1949 by Liaquat Ali
Khan, after the uncontrolled dispute between the premiership of Iftikhar
Mandot and Mian Mumtaz Doltana. Tahir Kamran, ‘Early phase of electoral
politics in Pakistan: 1950s’, South Asian Studies 24/2 (July – December 2009),
pp. 257 –82, pp. 261–2.
113. The Punjab government advertised the programme for celebrating Eid Milad
Un Nabi in newspapers. One of these advertisements that was published in the
Daily Imroz on 1 January 1950 says that police, scouts, paasban and national
volunteers would give a salute (salami) to the Honourable Malik Muhammad
Anwar and later, on meeting him, would begin under the presidency of His
Excellency Governor Bahadur. Abul Hafeez Jalandhry and Saqib Zahrwi
would present Naat and Salam, and Mr Dinsha, C.E. Gibbon, Reverend Najm
ud Din, Vir Sanan Sahni, Allama Ala ud Din Siddiqui, the Honourable Malik
Muhammad Anwar and His Excellency Sardar Abd ur Rab Nishtar would
make speeches. It is interesting that some of the speakers seem to be either
Christians or Hindus. Daily Imroz, 1 January 1950.
114. The post-colonial state, especially after Major General Sikandar Mirza came to
power, started promoting such activities further. One can find a visible
difference between news reports published under his rule. The newspapers
started giving the activities a very prominent place and the role of state in
providing support for organising these activities became quite visible. This
continued after Ayub Khan came to power and took over shrines.
115. Daily Nawai Waqt, 18 October 1956, Lahore.
116. In 1960 the state encouraged the route of the procession of Eid Milad Un Nabi
to end at the shrine of Data Sahib for the first time, connecting the tradition of
celebrating Eid Milad Un Nabi with the shrine of Data Sahib, a tradition
which continued from then on. Daily Nawai Waqt, 16 September 1959.
117. One can find such reports in Urdu daily newspapers, for example, in Imroz and
Nawai Waqt. However, more often, it was Nawai Waqt that carried such
reports and editorial responses on them.
118. For example, in a report published in the Daily Imroz, police from the Criminal
Investigations Department arrested a religious pir for proclaiming to be Imam
Mahdi in Karachi. Daily Imroz, 9 November 1950, Lahore.
119. Daily Nawai Waqt, August 1 1955, Lahore.
120. Ibid.
121. ‘Shaubda Baz Darwesh’ (sorcerer Darwesh), Letter to the Editor, Daily Nawai
Waqt, 26 October 1955, Lahore.
122. Daily Nawai Waqt, Lahore, 1 August 1955.
123. Daily Nawai Wakt, Lahore, 24 September 1958.
124. This also became a moral justification for taking over shrines in order to reform
them.
125. Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, pp. 36 –7.
126. Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz was part of the scholarly activity, Tolu e Islam,
organised around Allama Iqbal in 1930, and one of the key figures of Ahl e
Quran. See Ali Usman Qasmi, Questioning the Authority of the Past: The Ahl al
Qur’an Movements in Punjab (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011).
127. Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, p. 51.
128. Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, Islami Muashrat (Lahore: Idara Tulu e Islam, 1979),
pp. 180 –6.
129. Ibid., pp. 13 – 4.
130. For his detailed ideas regarding the nature of an economic system in an Islamic
state, see Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, Nizam e Rabubiat (Lahore: Tulu e Islam,
1954).
131. One can find such interpretations in many of his texts. For example see,
Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, Iblees wa Adam [Devil and Adam] (Lahore: Idara e
Tulu e Islam, 1983 [1945]).
132. For Pervaiz the socio-religious teachings of Islam emphasise system building
and a socialist economic system. For the Jamat-e-Islami the observation of the
Justice Munir Committee Report can be noted: ‘It (Jamat-e-Islami) aims at the
establishment of the sovereignty of Allah throughout the world which, in
other words, means the establishment of a religio-political system which the
Jama’at calls Islam.’ Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab
Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Munir
Commission Report), Printed by the Superintendent, Government Printing
Punjab, 1954, p. 243.
133. For an understanding of the ideas of Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, see his books
Iblees wa Aadam and Insan nai kya socha.
134. Maulana Maududi remained determined to revive the true essence of Islamic
civilisation. Thus he rejected all other elements of civilisation and tried to
connect cultural practices with the scriptural principles to become the

foundation of Islamic civilisation. Abul Ala Maududi, Islami Tahzeeb aur us kai
Asul e Mubaadi (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1986), pp. 7 – 12.
135. Ibid., p. 36.
136. Ayub Khan’s own ideological position and the questions regarding Islam can
be found in the Foreword of Iqbal, The Ideology of Pakistan and its
Implementation.
137. Ibid., p. xi.
138. Ibid., p. xii.
139. Thomas Jefferson said: ‘We must hold these truths to be self-evident that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain
inalienable rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that
whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government
laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to affect their safety and happiness.’
Ibid., p. 43.
140. ‘The ideal citizen of Pakistan, however, is the Momin, i.e. any person who
truly, sincerely, honestly and steadfastly believes in the God of Islam and
everything which He enjoins.’ Ibid., p. 86.
141. Against the backdrop of the Anti-Ahmadiyya, violence erupted in 1953. The
Governor of Punjab promulgated an ordinance, later called the Punjab
Disturbances (Public Inquiry) Act, 1953, directing the setting up of a court
to hold a public inquiry into the disturbances. Justice M. Munir and Justice
M.R. Kayani were the members of the Court of Inquiry and submitted their
report on 10 April 1954 to the Home Secretary Government of Punjab. Later
on, the report – popularly known as the Munir Commission Report –
concluded that the violence took place because law and order had been
subordinate to political ends. The report also showed the impossibility of
having a singular definition of Islam because of sectarian differences. Munir
Commission Report.
142. Javed Iqbal ignored the point that the Munir Commission Report was not a
theological exercise but an investigative report. Iqbal, The Ideology of Pakistan
and its Implementation.
143. Ibid., p. 100.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid., p. 89.
146. Ibid., p. 27.
147. Ibid., p. 29.
148. Ibid., p. 13.
149. Ibid., p. 29.
Chapter 3 Legality, Judicial Processes and Waqf:

A Transition from Moral to Total Control of Shrines
1. See Gregory C. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and Society in British India
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 106– 7.
2. For details, see Umber Bin Ibad, ‘Waqf or law for Muslim endowments:
constructing religious singularity for appropriating shrines’, Pakistan Journal
of Islamic Research 12 (June 2013), pp. 15 – 35.
3. The colonial judicial process prevented the application of waqf for the Muslim
elite in the late nineteenth century, and they could not continue dedicating
property through waqf law.
4. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and Society in British India, pp. 20 – 1.
5. Ibid., pp. 33 – 6.
6. Ibid., p. 174.
7. Ibid., clause b.
8. See Ibad, ‘Waqf or law for Muslim endowments’.
9. British authorities did not in general interfere in the affairs of the sacred
sites. There were cases when the shrines and Imambarahs were termed as
waqf, but in the presence of clear deed, most of them were created in the
nineteenth century. Kozlowski shows that the British administration
interfered in at least two important sacred sites: Imambarah of Hooghli and
Darbar of Mian Sahib. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and Society in British
India, p. 174.
10. The reasons were many, but as Kozlowski shows, the Muslim elite wanted to
change the direction of income from public waqf towards modern institutions
such as education and health facilities. Ibid., p. 177.
11. Introduction, ‘The Mussalman Waqf Act, 1923’, Muslim Laws (New Delhi:
Universal Law Publishing, 2011), p. 25.
12. Ibid., clause (a): ‘“Benefit” does not include any benefit which a mutwalli is
entitled to claim solely by reason of his being such mutwalli.’
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid. section 3, clause (a).
15. Ibid., section 3, clause (d).
16. Abdul Wahid Chaudhry, Manual of Auqaf Laws (Lahore: National Law Book
House, 2012), p. 204.
17. Purewal and Singh understood this bill as giving control in a generalised way
over women’s bodies. This chapter, however, looks at this position as moral
control over the generalised conception of shrines itself. Navtej Purewal and
Virinder S. Kalra, ‘Women’s “popular” practices as critique: Vernacular
religion in Indian and Pakistani Punjab’, Women’s Studies International Forum 33
(2010), pp. 383– 9, p. 388.
18. Ibid.
19. The independence of the new state itself resulted through an act, the Indian
Independent Act 1947. See Indian Independent Act 1947, Original Statute
from the UK Statute Law Database, Office of Public Sector Information,

National Archives, Richmond, Surrey (retrieved 6 April 2013).
20. In 1948 the Punjab Assembly passed a bill into law as the Punjab Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat Act) 1948, with the enthusiastic support of the
members. For most of the members, passing the act represented a convincing
step in favour of Islamisation. However, as the object of the act was not to
override statute but abrogate customs wherever there is a clash between a
custom and Muslim Personal Law, the act was to remain a symbolic exercise
only to be used for reforming personal and familial matters along with
customary practices.
21. All-Pakistan Legal Decisions (PLD), Vol. III, 1951, p. 12.
22. The Punjab Assembly was dissolved in January 1949 and new elections took
place in March 1951. Ibid.
23. Punjab Gazette, Legislative Department, Notification No. 639– Leg, 5 April
1951, p. 231.
24. Ibid., p. 13.
25. Ibid., p. 15. The act also provided powers of civil court to the nazim under the
Code of a Civil Procedure, 1908.
26. Tahir Kamran, ‘Early phase of electoral politics in Pakistan: 1950s’, South
Asian Studies 24/2 (July– December 2009), pp. 257– 82, p. 257.
27. Punjab Legislative Assembly (PLA) debates from 16 December 1951 to
15 January 1952 (Lahore: Superintendent Government Printing Punjab, 1955),
p. 276.
28. Ibid., pp. 276– 9.
29. It is quite interesting that the honourable minister did not hesitate to act like a
religious figure or mufti to award fatwa. He even maintained at the end of his
speech that almost all of the members of that parliament were religious, pious
and spiritually enlightened persons. Ibid., p. 279.
30. Ibid., p. 62.
31. Ibid., p. 477.
32. Ibid. The speaker of the Punjab Assembly, Dr Khalifa Shuja ud Din,
announced the submission of nomination papers for qualifying for the
membership of the Auqaf Board. The Board was to be comprised of 12
members of the Provincial Assembly through voting, out of which at least two
had to be Shias. However, few members of parliament showed interest in
joining the Auqaf Board and only 11 members asked to join. As Khalifa Shuja
ud Din was the speaker of the assembly, he himself became a member and the
condition of 12 members was fulfilled. Therefore, ‘the election of the Muslim
Members of the Punjab Muslim Auqaf Board fixed for Wednesday the 17th
December, 1952, at 9 o’clock at the Assembly Chamber, Charing Cross,
Lahore, under the Muslim Auqaf Rules, 1952’ did not take place. The elected
candidates were: Dr Khalifa Shuja ud Din, Maulana Ahmed Ali, Mufti
Muhammad Hassan, Maulana Ghulam Murshid, Maulana Syed Nazir Ahmed
Kher Ullah Puri, Maulana Syed Mirak Shah, Khawaja Khan Muhammad,
Maulvi Muhammad Ilyas, Syed Manzoor Ahmed, Chaudhary Abdul Karim,

Mian Noor Ahmed Lalika and Sheikh Noor Muhammad.
33. Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary), 4 February 1952, p. 65.
34. Ibid., pp. 64 – 5.
35. Ibid., p. 63.
36. Ibid., p. 62.
37. Ibid., p. 63.
38. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 61.
39. Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan (London: Hurst and Co., 2009), p. 90.
40. This ordinance of 1959 was repealed by Ordinance X of 1960, West Pakistan
Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1960. However, with the amendment of few
terms, the whole ordinance remained in almost the same condition. PLD,
Vol. XII, 1960, Ordinance X of 1960, West Pakistan Waqf Properties
Ordinance, 1960, p. 116.
41. PLD, Vol. XI, 1959, Ordinance XXI of 1959, West Pakistan Waqf Properties
Ordinance, 1959, p. 202.
42. Ibid., p. 202.
43. For Talbot there is a general tendency in Ayub Khan’s paternalistic disposition,
which was closely linked with the handbook of Punjab School of Administration,
to re-introduce nineteenth-century ideas of tutelage. Ian Talbot, Pakistan:
A Modern History (London: Hurst and Co., 1998), p. 153.
44. Ibid., p. 205.
45. This position also coincides with writers like Mohammad Waseem, who think
that the Islamisation of Ayub Khan marked a break with the earlier religio-
political position, especially that of Jinnah. Whereas for Jinnah, it is very
difficult to find reference to Islam in abstraction from the communitarian
politics of India, within which Muslims as a community found their identity
together so as to achieve their rights within colonial India.
46. An amendment in 1960 replaced the term of Administrator with Chief
Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan. PLD, Vol. XII, 1960, Ordinance X
of 1960, West Pakistan Waqf Properties (Amendment) Ordinance, 1960,
p. 116.
47. PLD, Vol. XI, 1959, p. 204 (italics original).
48. Ibid., p. 203.
49. Notification, No. 1 (1), Auqaf, 60, Extra Ordinary issue, The Gazette of West
Pakistan, 9 January 1960, Office of the Administrator of Waqfs and Secretary
to Government of West Pakistan.
50. Punjab Laws Online, ‘The Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961’, last
modified July 201. Available at http://ns-1.pap.gov.pk/laws/797.html
(accessed 10 March 2013).
51. Meanwhile, the governments kept introducing ordinances for making rules and
regulations regarding management and control of waqf properties and the Auqaf
Department, such as the West Pakistan Auqaf Department (Delegation of
Powers) Rules (Amendments), in 1969. Chaudhry, Manual of Auqaf Laws,

pp. 187–90.
52. Bhutto’s pro-Sufi pir policies correlated with his extended reforms in rural
sectors and nationalisation of large industries. Talbot, Pakistan, p. 230.
53. Two religious parties, Jamat e Islami and Jamiat Ulema i Islam Pakistan (JUI
(P)) spearheaded an alliance, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), that
adopted as its slogan ‘Nizam e Mustafa’ [Social Order of the Prophet]. Later
on, the PNA movement became famous with this name. Gilles Kepel, Jihad:
The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B.Tauris, 2002), p. 100.
54. Daily Nawai Waqt, 28 June 1976, Lahore.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p. 679.
57. Ibid.
58. Senate Bill No. 2 of 1976, The Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary), Part III,
Islamabad, 28 June 1976.
59. Ibid., p. 677.
60. Ibid., p. 681.
61. Daily Nawai Waqt,, Rawalpindi, 22 October 1979.
62. The Governor of the Punjab promulgated this ordinance on 11 April 1979 and
published it in the Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary). The Punjab Waqf
Properties Ordinance, 1979, Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary), 14 April 1979,
pp. 521-A – K.
63. Ibid., section 4 (amended).
64. Ibid., section 5 (amended).
65. Ibid., subsection (2) of section 15. ‘In the settlement of a scheme the Chief
Administrator shall give effect to such wishes of the person dedicating as can
be ascertained, and to which effect can be reasonably given.’
66. Ibid., section 16 (amendment).
67. Ibid.
68. On 13 June 2002, through a notification, the Governor of the Punjab issued
rules for managing and administering waqf properties as the Punjab Waqf
Properties (PWP) (Administration) Rules, 2002, and at the same time
repealed the earlier WPWPO (Administration) of 1960.
69. Notification No. US (G) 3- 82/A/93, section 4, subsection 2, Secretary to
Government of the Punjab, Religious Affairs and Auqaf Department, 13 June
2002.
70. Ibid., section 4, subsection 3(i).
71. Ibid., section 4, subsection 3(ii).
72. A lac (lakh) is equivalent to 100,000 rupees (e.g. 10 lac ¼1 million rupees).
73. Notification No. US (G) 3-82/A/93, section 6, subsection 1(i), (ii), (iii).
74. Ibid., section 6, subsection 2.
75. Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary), 25 January 2005, pp. 2559– 63.
76. Along with the secretary of the Religious Affairs and Auqaf Department, the
secretaries of Local Government, Culture and Youth Affairs and the Finance
Department, Director General, Archaeology, Punjab and Director Lahore

Museum were also made members of the board. The board was to be headed by
a chief minister (CM), three members from treasury benches and one from the
opposition. Ibid.
77. Almost at the same time, the Punjab government also continued extending
the religious affairs of Auqaf Department through such acts as the creation of
the Qur’an Board. The cultural emphasis could only bring in investments to
abolishing the sites of shrines. However, the government initiated the creation
of the Qur’an Board not through an Act but through notification by the
chief minister. The purpose of establishing the Qur’an Board was to ensure
the standard printing, save the sacred pages of the Qur’an and to distribute the
Qur’an to needy persons and institutions. The board, headed by CM
Punjab and with both Deobandi and Brelwi as its members, would
have its administrative office within the Head Office of Auqaf Department.
It was also to manage pages of the Qur’an by ensuring that boxes were
provided for saving old and martyred pages of Qur’an. The board was also to
work for the establishment of a Qur’an Museum and a Library. Notification,
No. SO (IBM)4-67-A-2003, published in the Report on Punjab Quran Board,
July 2005.
78. The Martial Law order was issued on 16 February 1961. PLD, SC 1971,
Vol. XXIII, p. 410.
79. PLD, Vol. XXIII, 1971 Supreme Court, p. 376.
80. See section 2 from (a) to (c), West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959,
Appendix.
81. The court maintained that the Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959, was not
affected by the provisions of Articles 102 and 110 of Constitution (1956),
SC 1971, p. 405.
82. The court gave reference from the constitution of 1956 that shows that the
constitution was permitted to make laws about the provincial legislatures
through items, 65 and 69 of the Provincial List in the Fifth Schedule, as:
Clause 65: Charities and Charitable institutions; Charitable and Religious
Endowments, and Clause 69: Waqfs and Mosques.
83. PLD, 1949, Lahore 1949.
84. PLD, Vol. XXIII, 422 SC.
85. The title of Chapter 10 in Vol. 1, Ameer Ali, Principles of Mahommedan Law
(Calcutta: Thacker, Spink, 1912).
86. Khwaja Md. Hamid v. Mian Mahmud and Others, AIR 1922 PC 384 ¼ 50 IA 92.
87. This is reminiscent of the discussion during Music in Muslim Shrines Act,
1942 and the Auqaf Board Bill, 1952. During the discussion members of
parliament remained eager to show that the sites of shrines remained sites for a
prevailing Islamic ethos, and all the rest were deviant forms.
88. SC 1971, p. 423.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. The court’s understanding of shrines in the image of mosques not only found
support from the reading the text of Ameer Ali, but also the Muslim Personal
Law or Shariat Bill 1948, and the Constitution of 1956 gave impetus to
understanding shrines in the same way. Muslim Personal Law or the Shariat
Bill though enacted earlier in 1937 was re-enacted in 1948 by the Punjab
Assembly. The Shariat Bill, 1948, makes waqfs to be dealt with under Muslim
personal laws. The constitution of 1956, through items 65 and 69 of the
Provincial List in the fifth schedule, placed waqfs and mosques together.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid., p. 424.
95. Faiz Badruddin Tyabji and Muhsin Tayyibji, Muslim Law; The Personal Law of
Muslims in India and Pakistan, 4th edn (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi, 1968),
p. 541.
96. PLD, SC 1971, p. 427.
97. Ibid., pp. 426– 7.
98. Ibid., p. 429.
99. LR 1938 Bom. 184.
100. PLD, SC, Vol. XXIII, p. 385.
101. PLD, SC, 1971, Vol. XXIII, p. 388.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., p. 391.
106. Ibid.
107. The decision came on 24 June 1971. PLD, 1971, SC 376.
108. Ghulam Rasul v. Government of the Punjab, SCMR 2003, p. 1821.
109. Ibid., p. 1826.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid., pp. 1815– 29.
112. ‘The appellants (Mujawarin, the care takers of the shrines) had to move the
Chief Administrator under section 6(2) for the purpose of such rights and
unless such permission is granted, they could not perform any religious
ceremony.’ Ibid., p. 1829.
Chapter 4 The Post-Colonial State, Shrines

and the Auqaf Department
1. Javed Iqbal, The Ideology of Pakistan and its Implementation (Lahore: Sheikh
Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1959), pp. 28 – 9.
2. In Political Order in Changing Societies Samuel Huntington maintains that:
‘More than any other political leader in a modernising country after the World
War II, Ayub came close to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus, or Great
Legislator on the Platonic or Rousseauian model.’ Samuel P. Huntington,
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press,
1968), pp. 250–1. For Talbot, Ayub was not only an ‘innovator’, but also
paternalistic in the tradition of the Raj’s non-regulation provinces. Ian Talbot,
Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst and Co., 1998), p. 153.
3. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol. I (Karachi: Pakistan
Publications, 1967), pp. 48 – 9.
4. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967), p. 88.
5. ‘Mohakma Auqaf ke Nai Scheme’, editorial, Daily Nawai Waqt, 8 December
1960, Lahore.
6. ‘Auqaf department appealed the public to avoid giving Nazranas to the
previous Mutwalli of the shrine of Hazrat Mauj Darya Bukhari’. Ibid.,
26 October 1960.
7. Notification No. 1(1), Auqaf 60, Lahore, 9 Saturday 1960, published in
The Gazette of West Pakistan, p. 9.
8. Notification No. 3(1), Auqaf-60, Lahore, 11 January 1960, published ibid.,
pp. 37 – 8.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Notification No. 3(1), Auqaf-60, Lahore, 11 January 1960, published in
The Gazette of West Pakistan, p. 38.
13. Notification No. 3(1), Auqaf-60, Lahore, 13 February 1960, published ibid.,
p. 64.
14. Notification No. 3(1), Auqaf-60, Lahore, 24 February 1960, published ibid.
15. The idea of reconstructing or enlarging the mosque was not new, as it
had already been brought up in the previous decade or so but had not been
realised.
16. Daily Nawai Waqt, 16 December 1960, Lahore.
17. Urs was to take place in the middle of August 1960. Ibid., 3 October 1960.
18. Reports on urs maintained quite positively that the crowd at urs did not lessen
after the shrine was taken over by the Auqaf Department.
19. The Governor of West Pakistan, Malik Amir Muhammad Khan inaugurated
the newly built dispensary on 17 February 1961.
20. Editorial, Daily Nawai Waqt, 15 October 1960, Lahore.
21. One of the important religious ceremonies, that is, to recite Khatam Sharif,
had already taken place on 15 August 1960, on the date of urs. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. The first of its kind procession of Eid Milad Un Nabi began in the city around
1933. However, the procession started from the Mochi gate and ended at
Dalgirah Chowk in the city of Lahore.
24. It is interesting that most of the properties traditionally attached to the shrine
were already occupied by the colonial cantonment when the colonial armies
entered Lahore and situated one of their main garrisons in the village already
attached to the shrine. Even after independence, the cantonment continued in

the same place.
25. No. 3(14), Auqaf 60-I, A.H. Qureshi, CSP Notifications, Office of the Chief
Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan, Lahore, 12 March 1968.
26. No. VI(36), Auqaf 68, Notifications, Office of the Chief Administrator of
Auqaf, West Pakistan, Lahore, 12 March 1968.
27. On this issue, Nighat Sheikh, a member of the Provincial Assembly, also
moved a motion that was accepted in the Punjab Assembly and an inquiry was
ordered into the matter. Daily Lohkot, 26 March 2012.
28. It is interesting that the Dargah of Baba Bullai Shah was developed initially by
a prostitute devotee who donated the land for the shrine. Later on, non-
Muslims also donated (waqf) a large amount of land to the shrine, as the record
of revenue department showed.
29. Also, as 1969 was under the rule of Yahya Khan, the Auqaf Department took
control of five shrines out of these total 52 shrines. During Ayub Khan’s
period, the department was able to take control of 47 shrines. M. Athar Tahir,
Internal Report of Auqaf Department, 1999.
31. Notification No. 1 (71) A/63, published in The Gazette of West Pakistan.
32. Ghafir Shahzad, Punjab Mai Khankahi Culture (Lahore: Fiction House, 2007),
p. 146.
33. M. Athar Tahir, Internal Report of Auqaf Department, 1999, p. 150.
34. S.M. Ikram, Indian Muslims and Partitions of India (Delhi: Atlantic Publishers,
1992), p. 203.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Mufti Ghulam Sarwar Quraishi, Tareekh-e Makhzan Punjab (Lahore: Dost
Associates, 1996), p. 523.
38. Janbaz Mirza, Karwan e Ahrar, vol. 2 (Lahore: Idara Maktaba Tabsara, 1977),
pp. 234 –5.
39. The shrine continued to attract many devotees until Anjuman took over the
mosque and shrine. Aman ullah Khan Arman Sarhadi, Urs aur Mailai (Lahore,
Kitab Manzil, 1958), p.76. However, after the Auqaf Department took over
the shrine, the number of devotees reduced considerably.
40. ‘The only building on the plain now occupied by the High Court was
the shrine of Shah Chiragh, in which the Accountant General’s office was
housed for many long years, until its removal to its present quarters.
It appears, however, from some very old records that, before its occupation
by the Accountant General’s office, this shrine was the residence of
the ‘Principal Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner.’ Colonel H.R.
Goulding, Old Lahore: Reminiscences of a Resident (Lahore: Sang e mil
Publications, 1998).
41. Around 247 religious schools were nationalised up to 1962. See Jamal Malik,
‘Waqf in Pakistan: change in traditional institution’, Die Welt des Islams 30/1–4
(1990), pp. 63–97, p. 85. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1571046

(accessed 13 October 2008).
42. In 1963, Jamia Abbasiya or Jamia Bahawalpur (Islamic University of
Bahawalpur) was taken over by the Auqaf Administrator in order to harmonise
traditional and modern education. See ibid., pp. 84– 6.
43. Ibid., p. 86.
45. The West Pakistan Auqaf Department (Khateebs and Imams) Service Rules,
1968.
46. Some significant developments were: taking over control from previous
mujawars; placing salaried imam and khateeb in the mosque attached to the
shrine; opening a library in an already-existing hall, etc. A. Latif, ‘Sialkot
Shrine’, letter to the editor, Pakistan Times, 7 October 1970.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Vali Nasr thinks that the Yahya Khan regime turned to Islam in order to face ‘a
strong leftist challenge to state authority in both wings of Pakistan’ . . . The
generals believed that Islam was the only ideology that could confront the Left
and provide a basis for keeping Pakistan together.’ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr,
Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001), p. 74.
50. Ibid.
51. Pakistan Times, 20 October 1970.
52. Pakistan Times, 19 October 1970.
53. Ibid.
54. In 1970, the building of eye wards, a kitchen block and an administration
block was inaugurated by the administrator. The building was built with a
grant of around Rs 600,000 from the Matruka Waqf Imlak Board, Govt. of
Pakistan.
55. A. Latif, ‘Sialkot Shrine’.
56. Ibid.
57. Nasr, Islamic Leviathan, pp. 75– 6.
58. Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A New History (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2012), pp. 96–7.
59. Nasr, Islamic Leviathan, pp. 75– 6.
60. ‘Kindly hearts with divine splendour: Madho Lal’s urs begins’, Pakistan Times,
31 March 1974.
61. Katherine Pratt Ewing, Arguing Sainthood: Modernity, Psychoanalysis and Islam
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 72.
62. Hanif Ramay was elected as a member of the Provincial Assembly on a PPP
ticket in 1970. He was Punjab Finance Minister from 1972– 3, Punjab
governor from February 1973 to March 1974 and was appointed Chief
Minister of Punjab from 15 March 1974 to 15 July 1975.
63. Ramay had intended to develop the amphitheatre at the shrine of Baba Bullai
Shah. A plan was devised but was never realised.
64. The debate to give primacy to the Punjabi language found its cultural-
religious expression during the early years of Bhutto rule. With Hanif
Ramay as Chief Minister of Punjab, a re-emphasis on Punjabi poets and their
poetry as a cultural Sufi expression began to become visible. The poetry and
shrines of Waris Shah, at Jandiala Sherkhan in Sheikhupura, Madhu Lal of
Lahore and Bullai Shah, of Kasur, acquired a prominent place, if not in the
projected operations of the Auqaf Department, at least in the dreams of the
new left democrats. The renewed emphasis, however, was a continuity of
interest in the Punjabi language. One of the famous bureaucrats of the Ayub
period was Masood Khaddarposh, who was quite committed to this
linguistic-socialistic trend. Interestingly, during his period as Chief
Administrator Auqaf, the most important shrine of Punjabi poetry, Waris
Shah, which had still not been taken over, most probably because of its
economic nonviability, was nationalised in 1968.
65. Interview with Baba Sadiq, 2010.
66. The project, to make arrangements for supplying 50,000 gallons of water
through a tube well, was inaugurated by Aftab Ahmed Khan, Secretary Auqaf,
in 1976. However, the project was not completed until 1979.
67. Ewing’s ethnographic work suggests the prevalence of similar conditions.
Ewing, Arguing Sainthood, pp. 156– 7.
68. ‘Darbar Data Ganj Bakhsh ke Galio mai: Basti Basti Nagar Nagar’, Daily
Nawai Waqt, 13 April 1976, Lahore.
69. Ibid.
70. ‘Yaum e May kai Jaloos mai Islami Nazryat Kai Mutabiq Naarai Lagai Jai’,
ibid., 25 April 1976.
71. ‘Sufiai Karam nai Islam ke Ishaat mai Numaya Kirdar ada Kya hai’, ibid.,
14 April 1976.
72. ‘Bari Gyarhwi Shareef ka Jaloos Aaj Dehli Gate sai niklai ga’, ibid., 11 April
1976.
73. The mosque was to be inaugurated in 1975; however, it was delayed when
Shah Faisal was murdered in March 1975.
74. Daily Nawai Waqt, 12 June 1976, Lahore.
75. J. Gordon Melton and Martin Baumann (eds), Religions of the World:
A Comprehensive Encyclopedia of Beliefs and Practices, 2nd edn (Santa Barbara, CA:
ABC-CLIO, 2010), p. 2596.
76. Maulana Kausar Niazi, who was also the Federal Minister for Religious
Affairs, was quite prolific and often wrote articles for newspapers. One such
article is ‘Hamara Nizam e Masjid (Our system of mosque)’, published in
Daily Nawai Waqt, 24 May 1976, Lahore.
77. Ibid., 5 July 1976.
78. Ibid., 27 June 1976, Islamabad.
79. On the order of Zia ul-Haq, the president of Pakistan, a report on the National
Committee for Religious Schools, Pakistan was compiled in 1979. The report
was organised by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Report of National
Committee for religious schools of Pakistan, published by Idara Tahqiqat e

Islami, Islamabad, 1979.
80. Aftab Ahmed Khan had already served as Chief Administrator Auqaf from
10 March 1975 to 9 September 1976.
81. The purpose of the National Committee not only entailed the enumeration
process but also to work out ‘the financial requirements of all Deeni
Madrassahs in order to assist them within the country’s overall available
resources’. Ibid., p. 116.
82. Daily Jang, 17 January 1984.
83. Ibid., 28 July 1994.
84. In Ahl e Sunnat tradition this day is very significant as it is the day on which
people are likely to have illness visited on them divinely. It is therefore
recommended that the day should be remembered with religious devotion.
85. The procession of Akhri Chahar Shamba on 4 January 1980 started from
Masjid Wazir Khan and finished at the shrine of Data Darbar. The newspaper
also reports that this was the first occasion this day had been remembered by
organising a procession on this grand level. Earlier in the history of Pakistan,
one does not find the tradition of making procession to remember and
celebrate the day. Daily Nawai Waqt, 4 January 1980, Lahore.
86. Even during the Bhutto period, an idea to expand the shrine of Data sahib was
already being reconsidered. However, after many serious attempts the project
did not materialise. See Ghafir Shahzad, Data Darbar Complex: Taamir sai
Taamir tak (Lahore: Idrak Publications, 2004), pp. 33 – 42.
87. Daily Nawai Waqt, 19 February 1980, Lahore.
88. Ibid., 7 January 1980, Lahore.
89. Malik, ‘Waqf in Pakistan’, p. 80.
90. A number of such reports can be found in newspapers of the 1980s.
91. Kasur, Daily Nawai Waqt, 17 March 1985, Lahore.
92. For example, Maulana Tahir ul Qadri, was quite active in making the site of
shrine free of Ghair Shari practices. Nawai Waqt, 4 November, 1984.
93. Malik, ‘Waqf in Pakistan’, pp. 88 – 9.
94. Statements of Tahir ul Qadri, an Ahl e Sunnat orthodox scholar are significant
in this regard. For a similar position see, Daily Nawai Waqt, 4 November
1984, Lahore.
Chapter 5 Developing and Redefining Shrines

in the Post-Zia Period
1. Hasan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s
War on Terror (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 136.
2. Ibid., p. 137.
3. Nawaz Sharif, heading IJI (Islami Jamhuri Ittehad) was elected Prime Minister
of Pakistan in 1990. Ibid.
4. Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst and Co., 1998), p. 293.
5. Ibid., p. 136.
6. Vali Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 153.
7. Nawaz Sharif took the oath to become the first Chief Minister of Punjab on
8 April 1985. Daily Nawai Waqt, 8 April 1985. On the very next day, Nawaz
Sharif visited the shrine of Data Sahib in a large procession. Daily Nawai Waqt,
9 April 1985.
8. Ghafir Shahzad, Punjab Mai Khankahi Culture (Lahore: Fiction House, 2007),
p. 150.
9. During his visit in 1988 Zia ul-Haq expressed the wish to reconstruct the
shrine of Baba Fareed in almost the same fashion as that of Data Sahib. Ibid.,
p. 189.
10. Ibid., p. 190.
11. Ibid., pp. 190– 6.
12. Ibid., p. 150.
13. S.L. Kaushik and Rama Patnayak (eds), Modern Governments and Political
Systems, vol. 3: Government and Politics in South Asia (New Delhi: Mittal
Publications, 1995), p. 144.
14. Daily Urdu Jang, 3 July 1994.
15. Daily Urdu Jang, 16 August 1994.
16. Shahzad, Punjab Mai Khankahi Culture, p. 156.
17. There has been active conflict over the origin of the shrine. The Sunni version
presents a narrative in which the noble daughters of a Sunni saint committed
suicide in the fourteenth century. However, the Shia version believes in the
history of Noor Ahmed Chishti, who gave historical details of the way the
daughters of Hazrat Ali came to Lahore after the incident of Karbala. Maulana
Noor Ahmed Chishti, Tehqiqat e Chishti [1864] (Lahore: Al-Faisal Publishers,
2006), pp. 159– 162.
18. Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan (London: Hurst and Co., 2009),
p. 139.
19. Robert Looney, ‘The Musharraf paradox: the failure of an economic success
story’, The Open Area Studies Journal 1 (2008), pp. 1 – 15, p. 3.
20. The Government of Pakistan ratified UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention
in 1972.
21. This ordinance was promulgated by the Governor of the Punjab on
25 February 1985 and published in the Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary),
27 February 1985.
22. UNESCO and UNDP, Cultural tourism in Lahore and Peshawar (Islamabad:
UNESCO Office, 2004), p. 16. Available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/
0013/001357/135776eo.pdf (accessed 13 May 2010).
23. The ordinance for the Tajdeed e Lahore Board was published in the Punjab
Gazette (Extraordinary), 3 October 2002, pp. 2997– 3005.
24. The Punjab Heritage Foundation Act, 2005. This act was passed by the
Punjab Assembly on 13 January 2005; assented to by the Governor of the
Punjab on 19 January 2005; and published in the Punjab Gazette

(Extraordinary), 25 January 2005, pp. 2559– 63.
25. Clause 9 of the act runs: ‘There shall be a separate Committee with functions as
may be specified by the Board for preservation of cultural heritage within the
revenue limits of Lahore District. (2) Such Committee may include persons
nominated by the Board, provided that the Board may, from time to time,
change the composition of the Committee.’
26. Ghafir Shahzad, ‘Lahore Shah Chiragh complex’, 28 March 2008. Available at
http://www.urbanpk.com/forums/index.php/topic/11950-lahore-shah-charag-
complex/ (accessed 13 May 2010).
27. Looney, ‘The Musharraf paradox’, p. 3.
28. Ibid.
29. Associated Press of Pakistan, 3 June 2004, Lahore.
30. The work at the shrine of Shah Jamal finished around 2009. Interview with
Deputy Director Projects Auqaf.
31. The work at the mosque of the shrine started in 2010 and on the buildings
such as hotels, toilets, etc. started as late as 2012. Ibid.
32. Linus Strothmann, ‘Giving comfort, dispelling fear: social welfare at the shrine
Of Data Ganj Bukhsh in Lahore, Pakistan’, Erdkunde 67/1 (2013), pp. 49 – 61.
33. At the end of the Musharraf period, the Data Sahib Hospital had seven
different departments: 1) gynaecological/obstetrics; 2) eye; 3) medical;
4) dental; 5) paediatric; 6) X-ray and ultrasonographic; and 7) pathology. M.S.
Hospital, ‘Performance report of Data Sahib Hospital and allied dispensaries’,
Internal Report, 2010.
34. Prospectus Jamia Hajveria Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh, published by the
department of Religious Affairs and Auqaf, 2005.
35. Interview from zonal administrator, Auqaf Department, Lahore, October 2011.
36. The first internal report for recording all the land and its details was only
prepared in 1999.
37. After Malik’s analyses, which matches income with inflation and calculates the
real profit position, it becomes easy to infer the visitation pattern. However,
this chapter contends that it is possible for real profits to fall but visitation
rates stay the same or even grow further. It is possible for more people to offer
donations but, because of inflation, the value of their income is reduced. There
is no direct relationship between the offering and decrease and increase of real
profits.
38. During an interview with a Deputy Director of Projects Directorate of Auqaf
Department, a similar perception was shared by the official, who remained
engaged in construction matters and who also observed the change in the
psyche of devotees.
39. See Table 2.
40. Malik concluded that the trend for fewer visits to the shrine is the reason for
the decreasing collection. Jamal Malik, ‘Waqf in Pakistan: change in
traditional institution’, Die Welt des Islams 30/1– 4 (1990), pp. 63 – 97.
41. Development at the shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib was already underway.
‘The shrine donations suggest a rise whenever construction starts taking place.’
Interview with a Deputy Director of Projects Directorate of Auqaf
Department, Lahore, October, 2011.
42. After 1993– 4 the restructuring of the zones created new zones. For
comparison, see Appendix.
43. The shrine of Bullai Shah, it seems, is also still able to attract many devotees
who remain able to distance themselves from the religious ideology of the
state. It appears that ideology is easily aligned at the shrine of Data Ganj
Bakhsh Sahib in Lahore.
44. See Table 10.
45. See Fig. A1 in Appendix.
46. Strothman, ‘Giving comfort, dispelling fear’.
47. M. Athar Tahir, Waqf Properties, Auqaf Department Internal Report, 1999.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Report of Public Accounts Committee II (Punjab Government: Secretariat of
the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab Lahore, 2007).
Conclusion
1. M. Athar Tahir, ‘Waqf properties’, Auqaf Department Internal Report, 1999.
2. Ibid.
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Shahzad-ul-Hasan Gilani Chan Pir, sajjada nashin, Mian Mir shrine, Lahore, March
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(1941–51) (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Panjab, 1967).
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Bukhari, Khurshid Hussain, Hazrat Shaikh Tahir Bandagi Lahori (RA) (Sheikhupura:
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Chishti, Maulana Noor Ahmad, Tehqiqat e Chishti [1864] (Lahore: Al-Faisal
Publishers, 2006).
———, Yaadgar-e-Chisthi [1859] (Lahore: Nigarashat Publishers, 2007).
Fauq, Mohammad Din, Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh (Lahore: Gauhar Publications,
2008).
Goulding, H.R., Old Lahore: Reminiscences of a Resident (Lahore: Civil and Military
Gazette Press, 1924), republished Lahore: Sang e mil Publications, 1998.
Griffin, Lepel H., The Punjab Chiefs [1865], 3 vols (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel
Griswold, Hervey D., Mirza Ghulam Ahmad: The Mehdi Messiah of Qadian (Lodiana,
IN: American Tract Society, 1902).
———, Sharah Kashf ul Mahjoob, trans. Wahid Bakhsh Siyal (Lahore: Al-Faisal
Publishers, 2009).
Hajveri, Sayyid Ali, Sharah Kashf ul Mahjoob, trans. Fazaluddin Gohar (Lahore:
Zia-ul-Quran Publications, 2010).
Hashmi, Mahmood Alam, ‘Mufti Ghulam Sarwar Lahori: a biographical sketch’, in
Mufti Ghulam Sarwar Lahori, Khazinat ul Asfia: Qadria, vol. 1 (Lahore: Maktaba
i Nabwiya, 1986), pp. 1– 18.
Hashmi, Rafi ud Din (ed.), Khatut e Iqbal (Lahore: Maqtaba e Khyaban e Adab,
1976).
Iqbal, Javed, The Ideology of Pakistan and its Implementation (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam
Ali and Sons, 1959).
Iqbal, Muhammad, Zarb-e-Kaleem: Armagan-e-Hijaz (Lahore: Al Faisal, 1997).
———, Islam and Ahmadism (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Ashraf Printing Press,
1980).
Ishaq, Badr-ud-Din, Sair-ul-Aulia, trans Mohammad Mueen-ud-Din (Lahore: You
Publishers, 2007).
Jinnah, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali, address at Lahore Session of Muslim League,
March 1940 (Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publishing, Ministry of
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Khan, Ayub, ‘Foreword’, in Javed Iqbal, The Ideology of Pakistan and its Implementation
(Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1959), pp. ix – xiii.
Khan, Syed Ahmad, Asar al Sanadid (1847 and 1854).
Khusrau, Ameer, Afzal-ul-Fawaid, trans. Mohammad Latif Malik (Lahore:
Nigarshat Publishers, 2008).
Kipling, John Lockwood and Thomas Henry Thornton, Lahore [1876] (Lahore:
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Latif, Muhammad, Lahore: Its History, Architectural Remains and Antiquities, with an
Account of its Modern Institutions, Inhabitants, their Trade, Customs, & c. [1892]
(Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1994).
Maqbul, Chaudhary Noor Ahmad Naqshbandi Mujaddadi, Khazina-e-Karam
(Lahore: Maktaba Hazrat Karmanwala, 1997).
Maududi, Abul Ala, Islami Tahzeeb aur us kai Asul e Mubaadi (Lahore: Islamic
Mirza, Janbaz, Karwan e Ahrar (Lahore: Idara Maktaba Tabsara, 1975).
Moj, Muhammad, The Deoband Madrassah Movement: Countercultural Trends and
Tendencies (London: Anthem Press, 2015) ‘The Mussalman Waqf Act, 1923’,
Muslim Laws (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 2011).
Naqshbandi, Sajid Khan, Roidad e Manazra Kohat: Mrawwaja Jashan e Eid Milad un
Nabi (Kohat: Anjuman Dawa Ahl e Sunnat, 2011).
Nizami, Khaleeq Ahmed, Tareekh e Mashaikh e Chisht (Islamabad: Dar ul
Musannafin, 1982).
O’Brien, Aubrey, ‘The Mohammedan saints of the Western Punjab’, Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 41 (1911), pp. 509–20.
Qaddusi, Ijaz ul Haq, Iqbal Kai Mahboob Soofia (Iqbal Academy Pakistan: Lahore,
1976).
Qasuri, Mohammad Sadiq, Tareekh e Mashaikh Qadria Rizwia (Lahore: Zavia
Publishers, 2004).
Quraishi, Mufti Ghulam Sarwar, Tareekh-e Makhzan Punjab (Lahore: Dost Associates,
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2008).
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INDEX
Abdali, Ahmed Shah, 26 Baba, Rehman, 3

Ahl e Sunna, 30, 37, 39, 40, Baba, Mazar Ashab, 2
41, 51, 60, 94, 124, 127, Badshahi Mosque, 27, 112, 137, 145,
128, 203, 205, 208, 149–54, 156, 160, 166
214, 227 Baba Farid, 1, 3, 35, 116, 117, 138,
Akhri Chahar Shamba (the last Bakhsh, Mian Muhammad, 22
Wednesday of the Arabic month Bhagat, Chhajju, 18
of Safar), 124, 227 Bhittai, Shah Abdul Latif, 2
Ahl-e-Hadith, 17, 32 Bhutto, Benazir, 86, 131, 133
Ahrar, 3, 39, 42, 43, 50, 52, 56 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 86, 117, 120,
Ali, Sufi Barkat, 3 123, 131
Anarkali, 19, 34, 110 Bibi Pak Daman, 26, 76, 78, 116
Anjuman e Punjab or Punjab Binder, Leonard, 5, 9
Association, 20 Biraderies, 18
Anti-Ahmadiyya, 6, 29, 30, 42, Brelwi, 3, 30, 31, 37, 42, 51,
55, 67 133, 138
Asar al Sanadid, 23, 24 British Royal Asiatic Society, 24
Arjun, Guru, 18
Auqaf Administrator, 84, 89, 90, 96, Capitalism, 12, 56, 62
97, 99, 105, 110, 111, 123, 124, census reports, 17
134, 225 Central Punjab, 18, 19, 32, 42, 142,
Auqaf Department, xi, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 13, 144, 145, 149, 160, 162, 166
14, 51, 57, 58, 60, 61, 69, 70, 71, Charitable Endowment Act 1863, 80
73 – 87 Chiragh, Shah, 19, 88, 112, 113, 120,
Auqaf Board Act (ABA) of 1952, 135, 136, 152
14, 70, 80 Civil Service of Pakistan, 106
Auqaf Ordinance, 61, 78, 90, 94 Chishti, 21 –3, 25– 7, 31 – 3, 35,
Autochthonous religious-cultural 113, 121
spaces, 10 Customary law, 16, 17
Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib, 1, 19, 26, 32, India, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 18, 20, 23, 27, 35,
82, 89, 96, 97, 99, 101, 106, 107, 39, 43, 44, 49, 50, 52, 53, 62, 67,
120– 2, 124– 8, 131–3, 136, 137, 71, 72, 74, 80, 89, 107
145, 146, 155, 158, 160
Daula, Shah, 3, 29, 89, 90, 93, 94, 167 Jamia al Hajvairy, 137, 138
Delhi, 23, 24, 29, 40 Jamia Ashrafia, 3
Deoband, 3, 27, 29, 30, 31, 39 – 42, 53, Jamia Naeemia, 3
56, 57, 64, 127, 128 Ji, Tayyab, 94, 96
Dholla, 22
Double-reterritorialisation, 5, 6, 13, 39, Kamal, Shah, 106, 116,
54, 55, 74, 101, 102, 163, 164 Karachi, 1 – 3, 106, 188, 191, 192, 197,
203, 205, 209, 212, 213, 215,
Faqirs (mendicants), 22, 34 223, 235, 237– 41
Faisalabad, 3, 144, 145, 147, 149, 150, Kashf ul Mahjub, 22
152, 153, 156, 157 Khan, Maulana Zafar Ali, 3, 49, 50
Faqir, 10, 22, 26, 34, 45, 59 Khateeb, 40, 87, 113, 114, 115, 123,
Faraizi movement, 17 205, 225
Fareed, Khawaja Ghulam Mitthan
Koti, 22 Lahore Arts Council, 119
Fauq, 21, 22, 35, 36
Female Dancing Act of 1943, 14 Mahfil Sama Committee, 133
Malang, 10
Ghazi, Abdullah Shah, 1 – 3 Mangu Pir, 3
Government of Pakistan, 88, 106, 135, Markaz e Tahqeeq e Auliya, 127
209, 228, 234 Marxist analysis, 12
Giyarwi Sharif, 124 Majzub, 10
Gujrat, 3, 19, 90, 111, 121, 125 Mir, Mian, 3, 18, 19, 106, 110, 133,
147, 167, 196, 233
Haq, Zia ul, 14, 123, 125, 126, 127, Muslim Auqaf Act of 1923, 77, 81, 82
129, 131, 132, 164 Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
Heer, 22 Application Act 1937, 46, 47, 57,
Haq, Imam Ali ul, 106 73, 75, 77, 80, 207, 208, 218, 222
Hussain, Madhu Laal Hussain, 3, 26, Mutwallis or Sajjada Nashins, 12, 47,
34, 137 58, 59, 60, 61, 72, 73, 77 78, 81
82, 87, 89, 99, 105, 112
Ideological apparatus, 11 Mussalman Waqf Act (MWA) of
Iqbal, Allama, 3, 6, 10, 22, 33, 1923, 14
39, 41, 43, 44, 51, 66, 68, Mukhzan e Punjab, 21
118, 128 Malfuzat (biographies), 26
Iqbal, Javed, 6, 64 – 8, 79 Mujawarans, 7, 97
Islamic heritage, 11, 89, 158
Islamic socialism, 117, 118 Naqshbandi, 31 – 33, 35, 45
Islamic Ideological Council, 123 Narowal, 3, 32, 125, 137
Islamic ideologies, 1, 5 Nazrana, 34, 36, 94, 95, 106, 223
INDEX 245
Objectives Resolution, 6, 55, 67, 164 Shah, Jamal, 3, 106, 136

Orientalist empiricism, 17 Shah, Bullai, 3, 106, 110, 111, 118,
120, 125, 127, 134, 136, 147
Pakistan Peoples Party, 117, 130, 131 Shah, Jamat Ali Amir e Millat, 3, 21,
Rehman, Pak Shah, 106 32, 33, 40, 41, 50 – 2, 125
Pak, Nausha Ganj, 121 Shah, Jamat Ali Saani, 3, 32, 137
Panj Tan Pak (five sacred bodies/ Shah, Pir Mehr Ali, 22
persons), 136 Shah, Waris, 111, 118, 119, 120, 134,
Peshawar, 2, 88, 135, 228, 233 136, 188, 226, 233, 241, 242
Pirzadgan, 19, 89, 90, 91 Shahid, Ghazi Alam Ud Din, 123
Pluralistic traditions, 6 Sharaqpuri, Mian Sher Muhammad, 3
Post-colonial state, 54, 60, 62, 64, Shariat Law, 8, 57, 77, 94, 95,
65, 67 – 71, 74, 78, 85, 89, 90, 99, 208
93, 95, 98, 101– 04, 141, 155, Sharif, Nawaz, 86, 128, 131, 132, 134,
162– 4, 166 227, 228
Punjab Assembly, 75, 88, 122, 124, Shia, 41, 133, 134, 195, 209, 218, 228
133, 218, 222, 224, 228 Singular Islam, 5, 6, 11, 13, 35, 43, 51,
Punjab Heritage Foundation Act 2005, 53, 67, 93
135, 228 Sufism, 4, 6, 31, 37, 44, 55
Punjab Muslim Auqaf Survey Sunni, 31, 40 –2, 50, 56, 133, 134,
(Amendment) Act in 1950, 202, 205, 228
75, 79, 80
Punjab Special Premises (Preservation) Tajdeed e Lahore, 88, 135, 136, 228
Ordinance 1985, 135 Tehqiqat e Chishti, 21, 23, 25, 26, 33
Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) The Archaeology Department of
Rules 2002, 85, 86, 87, 219, 220 Pakistan, 132
Qadri, 31, 34, 35, 121, 122, 125, 197, Ulema Academy, xi, 115, 127,
202, 205, 227, 234, 235 129, 155
Qalandar, Laal Shahbaz, 2 Unionists, 43, 48, 52, 73, 207,
Qasur, 3, 21 210, 213
Reterritorialisation, 4–6, 13, 38, 39, 41, Wahabbism, 17

54, 55, 67, 74, 101, 102, 163, 164 Waqf Property, 7, 58, 59, 70, 71, 72,
Religious Endowment Act of 1863, 75, 77, 79, 80 – 4, 86 – 90, 94, 95,
79, 163 98, 99, 100, 110, 119, 123, 138,
Religious Purposes Committee, 87 191, 196
West Pakistan Waqf Properties
Sarwar, 21, 22, 28, 34 Ordinance (1959), 6, 38, 79, 81,
Sehwand, 2 82, 90, 100, 105

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Umber Bin Ibad is Associate Professor in the History Department at

Forman Christian College University, Lahore, and was previously an

UMBER BIN IBAD

Copyright q 2019 Umber Bin Ibad

References to websites were correct at the time of writing.

ISBN: 978 1 78831 181 6

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available

Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India

Table 5.1 Decade-wise income, expenditures and surplus

Table 5.15 Percentage of social welfare expenditure 159

This book became possible because of the support of many individuals

moral assistance. Further, the professional efforts of Sophie Rudland,

In the context of politico-religious extremism and the prevalence of

state department for auqaf responsible for managing shrines. Even

Notwithstanding the religious position of the scriptural urban

Muslim identity, a universal and non-sectarian version of Islam, a

on maintaining its identification with ummah or universal common

Department, many other activities traditionally considered to be a

Muslim identity in opposition to Hindu identity appeared during the

disputative negotiation of contrasting religious traditions,

Following Qasmi’s analysis, this book tries to understand the Islamic

spaces. For Malik, the post-colonial state, a secular project, integrated

character of the post-colonial subject, this book takes her reflective

capitalism, in the post-colonial world. His analysis of the post-colonial

positions, however, merged together to form an institutional setting, a

politico-religious streams and the total exclusion of pluralistic shrine-

THE COLONIAL STATE AND

Shrines, British rule and Central Punjab

was a busy person, and that his hall of audience is of limited

The need for an intervener was intricately attached to the shrine-based

scholar-administrators as S.S. Thorburn (1844–1924), Sir Charles Louis

. . . in the Punjab are numerous shrines consecrated to the memory

associated in some way with the Guru, and commemorating some

Most of these shrines were controlled by Udasis, Sodhis, Bedis or other

British governance that attachment to ‘immemorial habits’ was the

Languages and Sufi-spiritual writings

an association that included British officials (including the

Along with the efforts to promote Urdu in a purposive mode, we find

that period: together with such works as Tehqiqat e Chishti by Maulvi

inform British scholars about the spiritual and shrine-based practices

Local historical imagination: remembering and forgetting

Studying the city would reveal the intangible qualities of the

The nine categories, and the number of people mentioned in each,

writing about an alien land through primary sources.62 The details

possible to the common-sense life hidden in tazkiras (memoirs) or

Negating shrine-based practices: Muslim revivalist

the foundation of Dar Ul Alum in the small town of Deoband, in order

position that made this movement controversial for a large number of

Islamised Sufistic spirits and shrine-based practices

activities. However, these positions promulgated conservative traditions

Urban shrines and Shari revivalism

The people still retain a recollection of the festivities and gaities

Irrespective of their religion people would participate in the mela

embedded around shrine-based practices of Punjab. Although the

This chapter explores the religio-political streams that made possible

Allama Iqbal, Zafar Ali Khan; religious-political groups such as

Communal politics and emergence of reterritorialised

themes and consolidated communal voices. The otherwise differentiated

anger towards the act, by calling it ‘a flagrant interference within the

Ahrar, Iqbal and anti-Ahmadiyya politics: consolidating

arising from the bosom of Islam, which claims a new prophethood

Elsewhere, in a postscript to his essay ‘Qadianis and Orthodox

Allama Iqbal’s articulation of the Singular Muslim