Aviation Security Procedures

AVIATION SECURITY PROCEDURES
COURSE OUTLINES
Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

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TABLE OF CONTENT
COURSE START 5
INTRODUCTION - GENERAL 5
DEFINITIONS AND TERMS 5
CONTROLLING DOCUMENTS 5
THE UNITED NATIONS 7
ECOSOC 7
ICAO 7
CONVENTIONS 7
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 8
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 8
AIRPORT SECURITY 9
NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM 9
EMERGENCY PLAN 9
AIRPORT DESIGN 10
AIRSIDE - LANDSIDE 11
CRITICAL PARTS OF SECURITY RESTRICTED AREAS (CSRA) 11
BACKGROUND CHECKS 14
SPECIFIC ZONES 14
COLOR CODE 14
IDENTIFICATION CARD 14
CREW IDENTIFICATION CARD 15
AIRPORT IDENTIFICATION CARD 15
AUTHORIZATION PASS 15
TEMPORARY AUTHORIZATION 16
ESCORT 16
VEHICLE PASS 17
CRITICAL PARTS OF A SECURITY - RESTRICTED AREA 17
EMERGENCIES AT THE TERMINAL BUILDING 17
THREAT LEVELS 18
ATTACKER PROFILES 19
SUSPICIOUS ITEMS 19
SUSPICIOUS VEHICLES 20
INTERVIEW 20

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TABLE OF CONTENT
SCREENING AND SECURITY AT AIRPORTS 20
LIQUIDS AND PROHIBITED ARTICLES 24
PROHIBITED OBJECTS 25
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND SUBSTANCES 26
LIST OF PROHIBITED ARTICLES 26
DIFFERENT LEVEL OF THREATS AND ACTIONS 26
Threat levels/actions 27
THREAT LEVEL 1 - Unruly Behaviour – Verbally Threatening or Abusive; Suspicious 27
Action 27
THREAT LEVEL 2 - Physically Abusive Behavior 27
Action 28
THREAT LEVEL 3 - Life-threatening Behaviour 28
Action 28
On the ground 28
In-Flight 29
THREAT LEVEL 4 - Attempted or Actual Breach of Flight Deck 29
Action - On the ground 29
In-Flight 29
POST – INCIDENT CONCERNS FOR CREW 30
SABOTAGE (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT) 30
Internal threats 30
External threats 30
BOMB THREAT (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT) 30
ACTION BY PERSON RECEIVING A BOMB THREAT CALL 31
BOMB THREAT ON GROUND 31
BOMB THREAT IN FLIGHT - If a bomb threat is received in flight 32
DEALING WITH CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPON (CBW) 33
AEROSOL CBW WITH ACTIVATION 33
Action 34
CBW THREATS IN CABIN – WITHOUT ACTIVATION 34
Action 34

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TABLE OF CONTENT
CBW THREATS IN CARGO COMPARTMENT 34
SUSPICIOUS SUBSTANCE AND PACKAGES 35
Discovery of a suspicious spilled substance 35
Discovery of a suspicious package/envelope 35
REPORTING PROCEDURE 35
HIJACK PROCEDURES 35
HIJACKER PROFILE 35
STAGE OF HIJACK - INTIMIDATION PHASE 36
Custodial phase 36
Stockholm syndrome - London syndrome - John wayne syndrome 36
AIRCRAFT SECURITY PROCEDURES 36
AIRPLANE UNDER CREW SUPERVISION 37
TRANSIT PASSENGERS 37
SECURITY BRIEFING 37
CABIN CHECK PRIOR TO FLIGHT 37
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT ACCESS PROCEDURES 37
AIRPLANE NOT UNDER CREW SUPERVISION 38
HE LEAST-RISK LOCATION 39
SUMMARY 40
COURSE END 40

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COURSE START
LEGAL CAUTION The material contained in this training program is based on the information obtained from current national, international
and company regulations and it is to be used for training purposes only. At the time of designing this program contained then current
information. In the event of conflict between data provided herein and that in publications issued by the authority, the authority shall take
precedence.
INTRODUCTION - GENERAL
INTRODUCTION GENERAL Terrorist activity has taken yet another terrible turn, since the events of 11 September 2001. Operators,
airports, security officials, aircrews and the travelling public now share a new and unexpected threat to flight operations.
Security experts agree that there is no one key to preventing terrorist acts or even unruly passengers creating challenges aboard our
aircraft. Security must consist of many different layers or protection. Some of these layers are obvious to all of us; questioning, x-ray checks
of our baggage, and limiting liquids brought on board. Other layers of protected go undetected like intelligence of suspicious activity, lists of
names of known terror subjects or secret observation of their activities. All play a part in increasing the safety margin for our operations.
The single best source to detect and stop terrorism and unruly passengers is you. Each of you possess a God given ability to be able to
observe your surrounding and notice when something or someone does not seem to “fit”. No machine can be developed to sense what you
can. It is vitally important that if you find yourself in a situation in which something or someone does not seem to fit that you communicate
that to the appropriate authorities so others can evaluate the situation and take action if needed.
This program is intended to discuss some of the security threats to your operation and how each of you can fulfil your responsibilities to
combat these threats. This program is taken from many different sources and is not intended to override ICAO/FAA regulations or your own
companies’ security operating manual. It is intended for training purposes only. This course does not cover procedures that are considered
“sensitive to security operations” by specific operators for obvious reasons. Refer to your own security operations procedure manual for
those specific procedures. This program will first discuss some definitions and terms you need to know about security activity. We will then
discuss the different types and levels of threats that you can face in your operations. Next we will discuss ground security operations to
include security of the aircraft and then cover in-flight security procedures and actions.
DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

DEFINITIONS & TERMS To see the explanation, please download “SECURITY DOC.1” Document from the Course Document Files
section.
CONTROLLING DOCUMENTS
CONTROLLING DOCUMENTS Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) on Security were adopted by the ICAO on 22 March 1974
and designated as ICAO Annex 17 – Security. This Annex sets out the basis for the ICAO civil aviation security programme and seeks to
safeguard civil aviation and its facilities against acts of unlawful interference. The ICAO Council

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adopted Amendment 10, to Annex 17 on 7 December 2001 in order to address challenges posed to civil aviation by the events of 11
September 2001. It became applicable on 1 July 2002. The amendment includes various definitions and new provisions in relation to the
applicability of this Annex to domestic operations; international cooperation relating to threat information; national quality control; access
control; measures related to passengers and their cabin and hold baggage; in-flight security personnel and protection of the cockpit; code-
sharing/collaborative arrangements; human factors; and management of response to acts of unlawful interference.
The Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc. 8973 - Restricted) contains guidance
material on the interpretation and implementation of the SARPs found in Annex 17
Threats to the aviation industry are constantly evolving and do not only come from terror organizations and similar groups. Fanatics,
activists and protesters all pose a potential threat to aviation security.
Aviation security procedures are designed to protect civil aviation staff and property, as well as customers and the general public, from
unlawful acts. This course is designed to deliver adequate knowledge in order to help suppress active criminal aggression in the event of
sabotage, hijacking, seizing of hostages or similar incidents and also to help counter such acts.
Each state will have its own provisions with regard to aviation security and the overall aim of these provisions is to prevent unlawful
interference with civil aviation. Citizens are required to have a basic knowledge of these rules, and in most countries contravention of these
provisions can lead to imprisonment.
EASA -OPS European aviation safety agency operations contain provisions setting out security procedures for airlines.EASA -OPS
conforms to the laws and regulations produced by ICAO ANNEX 17 "unlawful interference". National authorities have drawn up their own
security regulations on the basis of ANNEX 17 and EASA -OPS, in conjunction with the EC regulations end ECAC recommendations. This
training course is based on ICAO ANNEX 17, EASA -OPS and national security laws.
Security threats to aircraft and airports have been present since the 1930s, occurring with increasing frequency during 1960s and 1970s.
Airline operators were initially reluctant to cause inconvenience to passengers or violate their privacy by searching their hand luggage.
Even though equipment for screening hand luggage was developed as early as 1963, the aviation industry was not ready to deploy the
technology until around 1973, when the first passenger checks were introduced.
There are two key theories as to the best way to protect an aircraft from criminal threats. The first one advocates that threats can be
countered by having passengers pass through various security checks. While the second one prefers the use of armed inflight security
officers on board aircraft. Both methods are in use today.
The overall objective of Aviation Security operations is to protect: * crew * passengers * ground staff * the public *

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property. In the event of actual criminal aggression, the foremost goal is to minimize * personal injury. * damage to property * disruption to
air traffic. All by means of well-set plans of action.
Individual states prepare their own laws and procedures to maintain a high level of security for air traffic under normal circumstances and in
the event of a potential threat, each state must be able to respond rapidly.
THE UNITED NATIONS

THE UNITED NATIONS The United Nations is the main organization under which the other organizations organize their regulations. The
UN consists of six organizations, with economic and social council ECOSOC the body responsible for economic and social affairs within the
UN. Within the ECOSOC there are a number of regional economic commissions.
ECOSOC
ECOSOC The special UN organization under ECOSOC entitled the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) handles special
requirements that apply to civil aviation. This organization was founded in 1944 in Chicago and was listed as a special body under the UN
in 1947 as an association of national aviation authorities from around the world. ICAO''s head office is in Montreal in Canada. It has
regional offices around the world and the European office is based in Paris. In 1969, ICAO set up a permanent committee to deal with
security issues, namely the Unlawful Interference Committee (UIC)
ICAO
ICAO Today more than 191 nations have joined ICAO, an organization that promotes the following: * international cooperation within civil
aviation * standardized action of the provisions regulating civil aviation international * high levels of air safety, and * research and
development within air traffic management.
ICAO''s first meeting was held in Chicago and the agreements concluded there accordingly entitled the Chicago Convention. This
Convention provides the basis for all of ICAO''s operations and consists of 96 articles regulating the rights and duties of its member states.
There are several appendices or annexes added to this and currently 19 annexes contain standards recommendations and general
guidelines on various issues. Annex 17 on unlawful interference, addresses criminal acts committed against civil aviation and provides the
basis of each state''s air traffic security regulations. These have different names in different countries and have been written as a result of
those countries'' ratification of varying conventions.
CONVENTIONS
CONVENTIONS The most important conventions regulating security are as follows: * the Chicago convention (1944). * The convention on
offences and certain other acts committed onboard aircraft, Tokyo (1963). * The convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the
safety of civil aviation, Montreal (1971). This convention deals with criminal acts of sabotage. * The convention for the suppression of
unlawful seizure of aircraft, Hague (1973). This convention addresses the issue of hijacking and resulted in harsher penalties for hijackers.
* The protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence that airport serving international civil aviation, supplementary to the
convention for the suppression of unlawful

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acts against the safety of civil aviation, Montreal (1988). This convention addresses acts of sabotage at airports. * The convention on the
marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of detection, Montreal (1990).
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS Other organizations that collaborate closely with ICAO on issues of security are the following: The international
criminal police organization, (INTERPOL) The universal postal union, (UPU) The international air transport association, (IATA) Airports
council international, (ACI) And the international federation of airline pilots associations, (IFALPA)
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
LOCAL AUTHORITIES Safety standards in civil aviation authorities should be at least equal to those of other well developed civil aviation
nations. National authorities are responsible for: * drawing up a program * setting up an organization * Allocating resources and *
establishing procedures that meet at least the minimum requirements of the international norms as set down in IACO Annex 17. They
should follow the recommendations issued by ICAO and the European aviation authorities. National aviation objectives shall be the same
as those required by international air traffic regulators.
Governments must support their civil aviation authorities. These authorities are responsible for developing national safety operations and
the government must ensure that these developments are implemented, upheld and the recommendations followed.
If there is more than one entity involved in civil aviation security in a state, that state shall designate a single authority to be responsible for
the coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the common basic standards.
The role of the local civil aviation authority is the following: To formulate and institute the national security program. To carry out admission
checks. To maintain negotiations and collaboration with the responsible international authorities and other organizations.
The civil aviation authorities in each state issue their own national security program, which is developed in conjunction with the directions
as set out in the ICAO. Regulations must include the rules which air traffic is required to follow. Each state''s regulations apply to their own
aircraft on international flights unless a foreign state''s air space imposes strict rules of its own. These rules must of course be followed.
Civil aviation authorities are responsible for a national security program to suppress unlawful acts committed against the safety of civil
aviation. National police boards are responsible for continuously monitoring and updating the threat assessment to civil aviation in each
individual state.
The civil aviation authorities and police departments assess threats or risks at local levels. Decisions for more stringent measures are taken
by aviation authorities after consulting national police ports. Aviation authorities must inform all operators concerned on current and
potential threats and risk assessments.

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Local police authorities are responsible for screening persons, items and vehicles. It is possible to have additional companies approved by
the aviation safety authorities in order to assign responsibility for screening . Local police authorities are also empowered to implement
heightened security measures at airports within their police district, in the event that an acute threat situation arises, as well as to take
operative command in the event of actual criminal activity.
AIRPORT SECURITY
AIRPORT SECURITY Different types of civil aviation operations are exposed to different levels of threat and risks. In order to set common
basic standards for aviation security, authorities must consider: the size of the aircraft the nature of the operation the frequency of
operations at airports. States are allowed to apply more stringent measures on the basis of a risk assessment.
An airport must be regulated where commercial airlines operate commercial air traffic using aircraft with a takeoff mass of ten tons or more
and have * more than eight scheduled departures in a 24 hour period * Two or more scheduled departures at the same time * exceptions
may be made for charter flights for private use with a takeoff mass up to 45.500 kg.
The appropriate authority may allow special security procedures or exemptions for the protection and security of assigned areas at airports
on days on which there are not more than eight planned departing flights, provided that only one aircraft is to be loaded, unloaded, boarded
or disembarked at any one time, either within the critical part of the security-restricted area or at an airport that falls outside the scope of
this requirement.
NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM

NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM As a part of the national security program there must also be a security program that deals with the
needs of international as well as domestic air traffic.
The purpose of airport security programs is to develop and implement documentation and monitor the allocation of responsibility under
which the organization must implement processes, routines and plans designed to provide the best possible protection for civil aviation.
This program should include plans for procedures to be followed in the event of a crime or threat of danger in order to save human life and
minimize injury or damage.
The security program shall be devised in such a way as to prevent unnecessary disruptions, interference and delays to air traffic. Those
sections of the security program that deal with preventive security procedures and plans for steps to be taken in the event of a threatening
situation or other special circumstances shall only be disclosed to the staff concerned and not be made public knowledge.
The program and instructions shall be kept protected in such a way as to make it inaccessible to unauthorized persons and shall be
classified in accordance with the official secrets act.
EMERGENCY PLAN

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EMERGENCY PLAN Each airport must have an emergency plan in case of emergency. An Emergency Plan should contain the following: *
the type of emergency, whether designed for aircraft or ground installations (e.g. aircraft incidents, bomb threats etc.) * the categories of
staff to be involved and allocation of their responsibility * the names and telephone numbers of the staff involved along with maps/plans of
the airport and its surroundings * the setting up and manning of an Emergency Service response team by competent personnel, and *
arrangements for media and public relations management with TV and/or video monitoring
An emergency is a serious incident demanding an immediate response from groups within several organizations in the air and on the
ground. An emergency is declared in the following cases: * when serious damage can arise * upon hi-jacking * sabotage, bomb threat or
terrorism * kidnapping or other similar threat
AIRPORT DESIGN
AIRPORT DESIGN When designing airports, passenger terminals, freight terminals and other buildings offering direct access to the airfield
at airports, the following minimum requirements must be taken into consideration: * security measures must be taken to protect
passengers, their baggage, freight, courier and express parcels, post, catering deliveries and the airlines'' depots and warehouses * limits
must be set up between the airport’s landside and airside, i.e., public and nonpublic areas * safeguarding and control of access to the
airside, restricted areas and other vulnerable areas
There must be no mixing at all of passengers who have been cleared by security and those who have not. Should any opportunity for
physical contact between the two arise, those passengers and their luggage must undergo secondary screening before boarding an
aircraft. Authorities may employ other measures, on the condition that they have conducted a risk appraisal.
Adequate procedures must be in place to stop passengers who are transferring or passengers in transit from getting access to, or carrying
prohibited items aboard.
All other aircraft, whether operating for commercial purposes or not, and that a have a maximum take off mass of ten tons or have an
approved cabin configuration of less than twenty seats may not access the immediate vicinity of aircraft used for commercial air transport if
they have not been cleared by security. This is to avoid breach of the security measures taken for these airplanes and their luggage and
cargo for transport on board.
To separate these passengers, the procedures below must be followed: * At larger airports physical arrangements and/or security
measures must be employed to stop passengers for departure and passenger arrivals merging with passengers who have cleared security.
* If possible, passengers for departure and passengers arriving who have not been screened should pass through a separate flight
terminal. * When passengers are admitted to, or leave the tarmac they shall also be kept separate from passengers who have already been
screened or are be transported in a special bus or other vehicle or be kept under constant supervision.
Should no separate terminal be available, passengers who have not been screened should either: a) pass through a

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separate area of the terminal building than screened passengers, or be escorted or transported by bus or other vehicle to and from the
aircraft; or b) undergo a security check before being allowed access to any restricted area if this is unavoidable, or c) undergo other
security measures producing the same effect, as the local situation requires.
When designing and constructing new airport facilities or altering existing ones the following areas shall be established. a) airside; b)
landside; c) security restricted areas (SRA); and d) critical parts of security restricted areas (CSRA).
AIRSIDE - LANDSIDE
AIRSIDE The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof, access to which is restricted. LANDSIDE
Those parts of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof that are not airside Security restricted area (SRA) means that
area of as site where in addition to access being restricted other aviation security standards are applied to persons other than passengers.
In addition, items carried shall be screened on a continuous and random basis upon entering security restricted areas in order to prevent
prohibited articles from being introduced into these areas.
CRITICAL PARTS OF SECURITY RESTRICTED AREAS (CSRA)

CRITICAL PARTS OF SECURITY RESTRICTED AREAS (CSRA) * Shall be established at airports where more than 40 persons hold
airport identification cards giving access to security restricted areas. * The CSRA of an airport is the part of the Security restricted area
(SRA) that must be kept 100% secure at all times. * All persons without exception, together with items carried, shall be screened upon
entering critical parts of security restricted areas in order to prevent prohibited articles from being introduced into these parts.
Boundaries between landside, airside, security restricted areas, critical parts and, where applicable, demarcated areas shall be clearly
identifiable. The boundary between landside and airside shall be a physical obstruction that is clearly visible and which denies a person
unauthorized access.
Security restricted areas (SRA) and Critical parts of security restricted areas (CSRA) shall include at least the following: a) a part of an
airport to which screened, departing passengers have access; and b) a part of an airport through which screened departing hold-baggage
may pass or in which it may be held, unless it concerns secured baggage; and Security restricted areas (SRA) can also include c) a part of
an airport designated for the parking of aircraft to be boarded or loaded.
A security search of the parts that could have been contaminated shall be carried out immediately beforehand to reasonably ensure that it
does not contain prohibited articles. This precaution shall be considered to be met for aircraft that are subject to an aircraft security search.
Whenever unauthorized persons, in the case of a SRA, or unscreened persons, in the case of a CSRA, gain access to the area, a security
search of the parts that could have been contaminated shall be conducted as soon as possible to reasonably ensure it has not been
contaminated. This shall be considered to be met for aircraft that are subject to an

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aircraft security search in a SRA or in a CSRA.
Access to airside shall be restricted in order to prevent unauthorized persons and vehicles from entering these areas. Unauthorized
persons may not be admitted to installations outside airside on the landside which are important for the functioning of the airport.
Access to security restricted areas shall be controlled to ensure that no unauthorized persons or vehicles enter these areas. Persons and
vehicles may be granted access to security restricted areas only if they fulfill required security conditions.
Persons, including flight crew members, must successfully complete a background check before they are issued with either a crew
identification card or airport identification card allowing unescorted access to security restricted areas.
Vehicles entering a security restricted area are to be thoroughly searched for prohibited articles. Special screening procedures or
exemptions may also be introduced for persons other than passengers at the discretion of the relevant authority.
With the exception of passengers, previously screened personnel who temporarily leave secure areas may be exempted from re-screening
on their return at the discretion of the authority.
Every time a staff member passes through a screening control point into or out of the restricted zone, the screening delay contributes to a
reduction in the person''s efficiency. As a result, personnel should make every effort to minimize trips requiring them to leave the critical
areas once they have passed the daily screening. It is also worth considering whether tools of trade might not be left securely in the
restricted zone rather than being taken home at the end of the shift.
Standard screening procedures apply to every individual who enters the security restricted, including both passengers and airport staff.
Persons arriving from countries which do not follow the above rules are to be considered unscreened and treated as such.
Access to the security restricted areas is permitted only through controlled access points, where screening is in effect. Any attempt to enter
the security restricted areas via any other access point is deemed a criminal offense and must be treated as such.
Access to airside, including security restricted areas may only be granted to persons and vehicles with a legitimate reason to be there. In
order to access airside a person shall visibly display an authorization pass and a vehicle shall display a vehicle pass. Persons who are
airside shall, when challenged, present their authorization papers. There must also be a system in place for the constant monitoring of
persons and vehicles accessing aircraft.
In order to be granted access to security restricted areas a person shall present one of the following authorizations: a) a valid boarding card
or equivalent; or b) a valid crew identification card; or c) a valid airport identification card; or d) a

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valid national, appropriate authority identification card; or e) a valid compliance authority identification card recognized by the appropriate
national authority.
The boarding card or equivalent shall be checked before a person is granted access to security restricted areas in order to reasonably
ensure that it is valid. The different identification cards shall also be checked before a person is granted access to security restricted areas
to reasonably ensure that they are valid.
In order to access security restricted areas, a vehicle shall display a valid pass. This vehicle pass shall be checked each time a vehicle
requires access to security restricted areas to ensure that it is valid.
In order to prevent unauthorized access to security restricted areas access points shall be controlled by a) an electronic system which limits
access, or b) authorized personnel implementing access control.
Surveillance or patrols shall be undertaken in order to monitor: a) the boundaries between landside, airside, security restricted areas,
critical parts and, where applicable, demarcated areas. b) areas of, and in proximity of, the terminal that are accessible to the public,
including parking areas and roadways. c) the display and validity of personsal identification cards in security restricted areas other than
those areas where passengers are present. d) the display and validity of vehicle passes when airside; and e) hold baggage, cargo and
mail, in-flight supplies and air carrier mail and materials in critical security areas waiting to be loaded.
The frequency and means of conducting surveillance and patrols shall be based on a risk assessment undertaken by the appropriate
authority, taking into account: a) the size of the airport, including the number and nature of the operations; and b) the layout of the airport, in
particular the relationship between different areas and ability to segregate these areas; and c) the possibilities and limitations of
surveillance and patrols.
Surveillance and patrols shall not follow an easily predictable pattern and random spot checks of personnel identification cards must be
carried out. Measures shall be in place to initially deter persons from breaching security checkpoints but, should a breach occur, will enable
the breach to be promptly rectified and repercussions resolved.
The following areas must also be protected by fences, guards and patrols: * technical and maintenance areas * power installations *
transformer stations * navigation equipment * air-traffic control towers * all buildings used by flight control along with fuel depots and
communication installations In addition, special precautionary measures must be taken to protect high risk installations such as: * fuel
depots * communication installations from sabotage attempts. Admission to these areas must be closely controlled through the use of
identity documents, uniform patches and vehicle passes.
All terminal areas open to the public at Regulated Airports must be supervised closely and continually, by patrolmen and with the aid of
surveillance cameras.
Methods must be established to restrict and control access to public areas in the vicinity of moving aircraft. These areas include: * spectator
points * airport hotels * parking lots * approach roads * car hire points * taxi ranks * service vehicle

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stands
It must also be possible to close such areas to public access at short notice in the event of a threat. These areas must also be regularly
patrolled as long as they are open to the public.
* Ramps and other service vehicle stands must be adequately illuminated and vulnerable infrastructure points at the airport must also be
well illuminated. * Areas outside the barrier, including those close to runways and taxiways, must be continually and adequately monitored
by patrols, CCTV or other surveillance methods.
BACKGROUND CHECKS
BACKGROUND CHECKS All personnel to be admitted to authorization and higher security zones must be subject to a background check
that covers at least the last five years. This check must be repeated at regular intervals of no longer than five years. Among the categories
of persons required to undergo background checks and security controls are: * persons who have the right to enter a security restricted
area * crew members of aircraft
Among other things a security check must establish: * personal knowledge of the person being checked, and an identity control *
information that comes to light through testimonials, certificates and references * and information that has come to light when checking
index registers and conducting a personal-history background check.
It is the duty of employers to ensure that full background security checks are carried out on all relevant personnel. An application to
examine the registers must be sent to the Civil Aviation Authority which has sole power to decide whether or not the request shall be
permitted. The Civil Aviation Authority must consider any information it receives from the police.
SPECIFIC ZONES
SPECIFIC ZONES Some airports assign specific colors to designate particular areas, making it easy for personnel to see who is authorized
to enter the various security restricted areas. Identity passes may also display specific corresponding colors denoting the zones to which
they have access.
COLOR CODE
COLOR CODE Typical airport pass color coding is as follows: •Red - All areas. •Yellow - Landside - non Security Restricted Area (SRA) -
not allowed in SRA. •Green - Internal airside. •Blue - External airside plus internal access. •Purple - Diplomatic passes. •White - Temporary
pass. Bearers must be escorted at all times while in Security Restricted Area (SRA).
Airports also maintain zone numbering systems. These zones are as follows: 1. Internal areas except 2 & 3. 2. Baggage reclaim halls. 3.
Baggage makeup areas. 4. Ramp. 5. Aircraft and their footprints. 6. All other external areas of the Security Restricted Area (SRA). 7. All
areas.
IDENTIFICATION CARD

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IDENTIFICATION CARD All personnel needing access to security restricted areas (SRAs) for their work, or those who frequently visit an
airport must carry these cards. A crew or airport identification card is a personal document and must be supplied with the name and
photograph of the holder, who must wear the badge at all times when on duty in such a way that it is clearly visible.
Under no circumstances may an airport identification card be lent or loaned to anyone else. Identification cards must clearly identify the
employer and nature of the holder''s duties. Law and order enforcement officers and security services are authorized to enter all zones.
CREW IDENTIFICATION CARD

CREW IDENTIFICATION CARD The identification card of a crew member employed by an air carrier, or an airport worker identification
card may only be issued to a person who has an operational need and has successfully completed a background check.
Crew and airport identification cards shall only be valid for a period not in excess of five years. The identification card of any person who
fails a background check shall be immediately withdrawn.
Identification cards shall be visibly worn at all times whenever the holder is in a security restricted area. Any person not displaying their
identity card in security restricted areas shall be challenged and be reported if necessary.
The identification card shall be returned immediately to the issuing entity: a) upon request of the issuing entity; or b) upon termination of
employment; or c) upon change of employer; or d) upon change of the need for access to areas for which authorization has been given; or
e) upon expiry of the card; or f) upon withdrawal of the card.
The issuer shall be notified immediately of the loss, theft or failure to return an identification card. An electronic card shall be immediately
disabled following return, expiry, withdrawal or loss, theft or failure to return.
A crew identification card of a crew member employed by an air carrier shall display: a) the name and photograph of the holder, and b) the
name of the air carrier, and c) the word ''crew'' in English, and d) the expiry date
AIRPORT IDENTIFICATION CARD

AIRPORT IDENTIFICATION CARD An airport identification card shall display: a) the name and photograph of the holder; and b) the name
of the employer of the holder, unless electronically programmed; and c) the name of either the issuing entity or the airport; and d) the areas
for which the holder is authorized access; and e) the expiry date, unless electronically programmed. The names and areas of access may
be replaced by an equivalent identification.
In order to prevent the misuse of airport identification cards, a system shall be in place to reasonably ensure that unauthorized attempted
use of cards is detected in a timely manner.
AUTHORIZATION PASS

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AUTHORIZATION PASS Authorization passes providing right of access to restricted zones are issued at the sole discretion of employers.
Employers are responsible for checking personnel before issuing a pass authorizing access to restricted areas on the airside.
Authorization passes must always be visibly displayed as long as the holder remains in a Security Restricted Area (SRA). Several types of
Security Restricted Area (SRA) pass exist - Full Pass, Temporary Pass and various designs of passes for Control Authorities.
Pass holders may only enter restricted zones while on duty. When passing through a gate or door, to or from a restricted zone, employees
must ensure that the gate or door closes immediately after them.
No person must be allowed to ''piggy-back'', that is to say, enter behind them. Never prop open doors or gates at anytime. Report any
defective door, gate or lock without delay.
If an authorization pass cannot be produced, the surveillance center or the police must be contacted at once. It is extremely important to
always report any suspicion of offense. Upon offenses against security regulations, the airport has discretion whether or not to withdraw
authorization documents.
TEMPORARY AUTHORIZATION
TEMPORARY AUTHORIZATION Visitors to a Regulated Airport authorization zone must be issued with, and wear, a temporary
authorization badge. To receive this badge: * visitors must make an application to specially authorized personnel * even in possession of an
authorization badge, visitors will not be admitted without Security''s prior approval. * Visitors must be accompanied by a person with an
authorization badge * Visitors that have to enter a transit area must also undergo a security check.
Should you observe unaccompanied persons wearing a temporary pass anywhere within a restricted zone, challenge them or report them
to Security immediately.
Crew members, other than those holding a valid airport identification card, shall be escorted at all times when in security restricted areas
other than: a) areas where passengers may be present; and b) areas in the immediate proximity of the aircraft on which they have arrived
or will depart; and c) areas designated for crews.
ESCORT
ESCORT An escort shall: a) hold a valid identification card b) be authorized to escort in security restricted areas c) have the escorted
person or persons in direct line of sight at all times; and d) reasonably ensure that no security breach is committed by the person or
persons being escorted.
Vehicles that pass from the landside to the airside must display a vehicle-specific pass. this must be clearly visible in the vehicle from the
outside. Other vehicles requiring access to the airside must be inspected before being allowed in, and a temporary pass granted.
Emergency vehicles may be exempted from these requirements.

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VEHICLE PASS
VEHICLE PASS Vehicles that remain permanently on the airside must display a vehicle-specific pass. The pass must show the
authorization zones to which the vehicle is permitted. Vehicles and deliveries to the airside or other authorization zones must be subject to
random checks. Vehicles used on the airside must remain on the airside as far as is practicable.
A vehicle pass may only be issued where an operational need has been established. A vehicle pass shall be specific to the vehicle and
display: a) the areas for which it Is authorized access; and b) the expiry date.
The vehicle pass shall be displayed in a visible place whenever the vehicle is airside. The vehicle pass shall be returned immediately to the
issuing entity: a) upon request of the issuing entity; or b) when the vehicle no longer requires access to airside; or c) upon expiry of the
pass.
The issuer shall be notified immediately upon the loss, theft or failure to return a vehicle pass. An electronic vehicle pass shall be
immediately disabled following its return, expiry or notification of loss, theft or failure to return.
A system shall be in place to reasonably ensure that the attempted use of vehicle passes that have been lost, stolen or not returned is
detected in good time. Upon detection, appropriate action shall be taken. If YOU see a vehicle inside the Restricted Zone not displaying a
valid pass, challenge the driver and/or the passenger(s) or report the vehicle to security immediately.
CRITICAL PARTS OF A SECURITY - RESTRICTED AREA

CRITICAL PARTS OF A SECURITY RESTRICTED AREA All vehicles accessing critical parts of a security restricted area shall be fully
examined before being allowed to enter. They shall also be protected from interference immediately after examination until entering critical
parts. The driver and any other occupants of the vehicle shall not be in the vehicle when the examination takes place and must take their
personal belongings with them to be screened separately. There shall be a defined methodology in place to ensure adequate random
selection of all areas and vehicles to be examined.
An adequate search shall consist of a thorough manual check of the areas, including contents, to reasonably ensure they do not contain
prohibited articles. The following methods may only be used as a supplementary means of full examination and do not constitute an
examination on their own: (a) explosive detection dogs; and (b) explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment.
The authority may at its discretion, allow vehicles to be exempted from examination, or to be subjected to special examination procedures,
provided that they are escorted within restricted areas by authorized personnel.
EMERGENCIES AT THE TERMINAL BUILDING

EMERGENCIES AT THE TERMINAL BUILDING Emergency evacuations are usually initiated by an alarm. Depending on what has
triggered the alarm, evacuations of the terminal buildings are divided into two categories: 1. Emergency Evacuation 2. Controlled
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Emergency evacuations are called when there is immediate danger to human life, or when a security incident calls for a full evacuation to
take place in less than 20 minutes. A controlled evacuation is called when there is no immediate danger to human life. In the case of a
controlled evacuation, the alarm system should not be activated and there should be at least 20 minutes in which to perform the
evacuation.
Some important things to know about evacuations: All personnel who work with members of the public must assist in an evacuation of the
building affected. With the exception of staff with special duties to perform during an evacuation, e.g., security and traffic information staff.
If possible, the public must be evacuated in the direction of the landside. During evacuation, two persons should assist at each exit. The
person at the inside emergency exit must ensure, as long as there is no immediate danger to their life, that all persons in the immediate
surroundings leave the building through the emergency exit. The second person leads the way, opening all the emergency doors that have
to be passed through in order to arrive at ground level where s/he indicates which direction to take to reach the public assembly point. *
Immediately after they have carried out their duties, airport staff must make their way to the staff assembly point
In the event that you come across an accident, you must call an ambulance or emergency services immediately. You must also
immediately call the Airport Security Center Be sure not to distract staff who are busy at the scene of an accident, even if you are
authorized to be there. Be sure to respect cordoned-off areas.
Due to the fact that an airline operator represents a large company or an entire nation, the civil aviation industry presents an attractive
target for terror organizations and criminals. After an attack, an incident may receive global media coverage. Consequently, the terror
organization receives a lot of publicity to justify its attack
It has become apparent that terror organizations are highly skilled at organizing themselves and their attacks. A terror attack may be
planned over the course of several years. A perpetrator might very well apply for a job at the airport and work there for several years before
being be used to implement the terror attack. Possible targets within aviation: A) The Airport: Concourse, check-in areas, search areas,
metro stations etc. 2) Aircraft: hijacking, sabotage. As an employee you need to be perceptive and attentive everywhere and anywhere at
the airport.
THREAT LEVELS
THREAT LEVELS Five levels of threat have been identified These are designed to give a broad indication of the likelihood of a terrorist
attack They are based on the assessment of a range of factors including current intelligence, recent events and what is known about
terrorist intentions and capabilities This information may well be incomplete and decisions about the appropriate security response are
made with this in mind
Threat assessments are also produced as needed, for individuals and events. The five threat levels are as follows * Low * Moderate *
Substantial * Severe * Critical * Low an attack is unlikely * Moderate an attack is possible, but not likely * Substantial an attack is a strong
possibility * Severe an attack is highly likely * Critical an attack is expected imminently.

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Since the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 and more recent attempts such as the Shoe Bomber, security has been heightened at all airports,
including the requirement for passengers to remove their shoes at security and have them X-rayed.
Furthermore new demands require that laptops be screened separately from other hand luggage and attempts by terrorists to carry
explosives in liquid form have affected how much liquid passengers may carry on board.
ATTACKER PROFILES
ATTACKER PROFILES The police have drawn up six known attacker profiles using actual incidents that have targeted airlines. 1. The
mentally deranged who targets the civil aviation industry mostly to protest or to gain attention. 2.The criminal who is frequently an offender
on the run from justice. 3.The fugitive who is fleeing from a dictatorship where departures to democratic nations are closely scrutinized and
the fugitive demands transportation to a democratic state.
4.The politically motivated terrorist who belongs to a political or religious group. The aim of these attacks is to attract attention to an issue
and/or the liberation of imprisoned comrades. The object may also be retaliation. In the 1960s and 70s such attacks were mostly hijackings.
However in recent years the focus has shifted and the attacks are more often about air traffic sabotage. 5.Protesters, animal rights activists
and environmental protesters, as these groups have been known to break into airports and disrupt air traffic by blocking runways or
damaging aircraft to gain media attention for their cause. 6.Employees. Employees who’ve been involved in industrial disputes, for
instance, or dismissed from their jobs can sometimes be motivated by revenge and pose a threat to the aviation industry.
It is important that staff at airports understand that their knowledge of the airport and possible ability to access Security Restricted Areas
(SRA) is of value to individuals or organizations who pose a potential threat to civil aviation.
* Details of security procedures and measures are not to be discussed away from the workplace or without good cause. * Be wary of
people who ask questions about security measures at the airport. * Immediately alert security to anyone attempting to persuade you to take
an item through security whether or not it appears harmless. * Report to security or the police any potential reconnaissance activity e.g.
people taking photos of the search area.
SUSPICIOUS ITEMS
SUSPICIOUS ITEMS * All members of staff need to be on the look-out at all times for unattended items. * This applies to unattended items
anywhere in the airport, not just within the Security Restricted Area (SRA). * It is essential that YOU do not ignore it * Ask people nearby if
they own it. * If non one claims ownership, keep the public away from the area and don’t allow them to interfere with it.
Should you discover an abandoned bag, box or package on the airport premises, you must on no account touch it or interact with it. For
example, if you discover a unattended bag in the lavatories, DO NOT remove it. It may contain a bomb that will explode when moved. You
must immediately contact the Airport Security Center or the police, who will take care of the matter.

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Suspicious items are things that appear out of place. They may be unattended - they may be not. Suspicious items can be found anywhere
in the airport, not just within the Restricted Zone. It is very important that YOU do not ignore them. Do not touch a suspicious item. Contact
the airport security center or the police who will take care of the matter Keep people away from the area and do not allow them to touch or
interfere with it.
SUSPICIOUS VEHICLES
SUSPICIOUS VEHICLES Staff must always be vigilant when vehicles are around and immediately report any suspicious vehicle in or
around the security restricted area (SRA). Any suspicious vehicle around the perimeter of the security restricted area (SRA) or elsewhere
around the airport should not be ignored and should be reported immediately to security staff or to the police.
All vehicles inside the restricted zone should clearly display a valid vehicle pass . Should you see a vehicle without a pass on display,
challenge the driver and immediately report the vehicle.
It is very important that staff report incidents, unusual or out-of-routine events. This can help prevent crime and help improve ineffective
routines.
The media is often interested in airlines and airports. But an employee must never make any public statements or ''off the record''
comments regarding an emergency, an accident, or their employer to the media. Instead direct all media requests to the relevant
management parties
INTERVIEW
INTERVIEW For employees with permission to be interviewed, the following may be helpful: * Be prepared for uncomfortable questions *
Be honest. * Answer all questions according to the policy of the airline operator * Give short and concise answers. * Decide on the
message you want to send out and be on the offensive in order to succeed. * Be constructive. * Never reveal the names of customers or
crew members
SCREENING AND SECURITY AT AIRPORTS

SCREENING AND SECURITY AT AIRPORTS Airports must employ fully trained security staff to ensure timely inspection of passengers
and their luggage to the stringent requirements. Security checks to be carried out before a flight are to be designed so as to cause minimal
delay to flights providing the efficiency of these checks is not affected.
The security officers are employed to carry out a range of essential functions such as control of access points to restricted zones, manual
searching of passengers and staff, baggage screening and screening of personal effects by conventional X-ray and automated explosive
detection systems, searching and checking of aircraft, control of access to aircraft, searching and or protection of restricted zones, checking
of vehicles and supplies.
Security control officers and security guards must wear identity badges displaying the text Airport Security and must be clearly visible at all
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cabin baggage and checked in luggage at airports operated by state authorities. At airports controlled by local authorities or under private
ownership, the police authorities are responsible for security checks on passengers and hand luggage.
It is important that new technologies aid the monitoring and surveillance efforts to ensure that no dangerous items that can be used for
criminal activity is allowed onto the aircraft. Upon deployment of new technologies, it is important to introduce adequate training to make
measures effective.
In a study conducted by 32 airports in the USA during the year 2001, in which a training exercise saw specially selected people conceal
weapons on their persons. Twenty five per cent were cleared by security and allowed onto the aircraft. Special attention must be also be
paid to electrical and battery powered items carried in hand luggage or on checked in luggage, as it it possible to conceal an explosive
charge.
Equipment used for screening luggage, for instance X-ray equipment, and metal and explosive charge detectors must be maintained and
checked in accordance with regulations and must be approved for use by the relevant authorities.
At regulated airport security checks must be carried out on all staff, flight crew and passengers. Transfer passengers must also be included
if they have not been cleared by security earlier, and have had their hand luggage, all checked in luggage, and transfer luggage checked in
order to uncover suspect prohibited articles such as explosive charges or other dangerous items.
Flight crews'' checked in luggage must also be cleared by security. Even personnel who are full pass holders have the same chance of
being randomly selected for a physical search when entering the security restricted area SRA. Screening applies to everybody. Before
screening, passengers must remove coats and jackets and remove portable computers and other large electrical items from cabin baggage
to be screened separately.
* Passengers must be security screened using the following methods: a) manual security inspection, or b) metal detector portal monitor
through which they pass. c) When using a portal monitor, spot checks of screened passengers must still be conducted on a random basis. *
Manual inspections must be carried out on all passengers who activate the alarm, in addition to the on-going spot checks of those who do
not, and 1. passengers who activate the alarm must pass through the metal detector portal again or 2. undergo a new manual inspection
using a hand-held detector.
Where the screener cannot determine whether or not the passenger is carrying prohibited articles the passenger shall be denied access to
security restricted areas until screened to security''s satisfaction.
The arch way metal detector (AMD), also known as the walk through metal detector, is a standalone structure resembling a wide door
frame. When an AMD detects a questionable item or material it emits an alarm signal and lights up. But a full metal detection screening
program is difficult to implement using only AMD''s. So hand held metal detectors HHMDs are also normally required to be used on
passengers triggering the alarm when walking through the AMD.
When a manual search is performed it shall be carried out so as to reasonably ensure that the person is not carrying

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prohibited articles. When a Walk-Through Metal Detector (WTMD) sounds an alarm, the cause of the alarm shall be resolved.
Hand held metal detection equipment (HHMD) may only be used as a supplementary means of screening. It shall not replace the manual
search. Where a live animal is permitted to be carried into the cabin of an aircraft it will also be screened either as a passenger or as cabin
baggage.
A security check shall also be carried out for freight, courier packages, post and goods to be transported by air. These security inspections
are to ensure that no prohibited items are conveyed to the airside and restricted areas.
If this is not practicable, persons and items must undergo appropriate random checks using a frequency based on risk appraisal, and
carried out by the competent authorities in each member state. These random checks must also include all objects that are carried on
board aircraft by all service providers such as cleaning crews, deliveries of tax-free goods and all other parties who have access to the
aircraft.
All baggage - be it cabin, hand, or cargo compartment baggage - and all cargo, supplies and goods have to be screened before being
allowed into the Security Restricted Area (SRA). The screening of hand baggage takes place at the same time as the person carrying it is
being screened. All hand baggage is subject to the same random chance of being selected for a physical search as it is being taken into
the Security Restricted Area (SRA).
Baggage for the hold must be screened separately prior to being loaded onto an aircraft. Cargo and goods, including everything sold at the
airport in the Security Restricted Area (SRA) can be screened away from the airport and delivered securely. Otherwise all goods must be
screened on arrival at the airport prior to being allowed into the Security Restricted Area (SRA).
All items of baggage, including all cargo, supplies or goods that have not been screened or searched have to be reported. There are
exceptions to the rule that all luggage must undergo security checks, these include Diplomatic Bags and other items. The appropriate
authorities must identify categories of persons to whom special security clearance procedures apply and who are exempted from them.
Diplomats and other persons who have immunity, and their personal luggage, with the exception of Diplomatic Bags, are required to be
cleared by security. Diplomatic couriers and their personal luggage are not exempted from these requirements.
Should an airline operator request special security treatment for passengers or luggage, the local security department at the airport must be
informed. An airline operator may accept a diplomatic consignment, providing the person who delivers the item has been officially assigned.
* Luggage is screened using various techniques such as X-ray or ‘sniffers’ (equipment designed to detect the presence of particles in
explosive charges). * Manual security inspections may also be made. * When hand luggage and checked-in luggage is inspected using
conventional X-ray machines, at least 10 per cent must be thoroughly checked through by

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hand. * This does not apply if more sophisticated X-ray equipment is used. * Luggage that has been cleared elsewhere prior to arrival at the
airport itself must be kept in locked storage or under supervision the whole time. If this is done no extra inspection is necessary before it is
stowed on board.
Cabin baggage shall be screened by: a) a hand search, or b) x-ray equipment, or c) explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment.
Where the screener cannot determine whether or not the cabin baggage contains any prohibited articles, it shall be rejected or rescreened.
A hand search of cabin baggage shall consist of a manual check of the baggage and its contents.
Where x-ray or explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment is used, each image shall be viewed by the screener. All alarms shall be
resolved to the satisfaction of the screener.
Where X-ray or EDS equipment is used, any item which impairs the analysis of the cabin baggage shall be taken out of the baggage. The
bag shall then be screened again and the item shall be screened separately.
Any bag that is found to contain a large electrical item shall be screened again and the electrical item screened separately. Explosive
detection dogs and explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment may only be used as a supplementary means of screening.
* All carriers must ensure that passengers who check in luggage for stowage in the hold are traveling on the same flight as their luggage. *
ID check or other reliable method, a) when luggage for stowage in the hold is handed over to the carrier, and b) upon boarding.
The following steps must be taken to safeguard checked-in luggage: * it must be kept at the airport’s baggage sorting area or other secure
storage area with admission to authorized staff only * all unauthorized persons entering a storage area for checked-in luggage must be
announced, identified and escorted from the area. * Original luggage and luggage for transfer may not be left unsupervised on the ramp or
by the aircraft before being stowed on board except within CSRA, where the checked in or transfer luggage does not need to be supervised
on the ramp. * Admission to Lost Property Offices at terminals shall be restricted with a view to preventing unauthorised access to luggage
and other items.
Before luggage is approved for transport, airline operators must ensure the following: * each article of luggage is clearly marked so that it
can be identified as belonging to the passenger who checked it in. * each passenger is checked in and on the flight that is carrying his/her
luggage * luggage is kept at a restricted area of the airport with admittance to authorized personnel only * all luggage accepted and stored
by airline operators for carriage in an aircraft hold must be clearly identified as accompanied or unaccompanied luggage.
Accompanied luggage is accepted for transport by air and has been checked in by a passenger who is traveling on board. This is distinct
from unaccompanied luggage, which has been checked in by a passenger who is not on board the aircraft.

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Luggage accepted as checked-in luggage is safeguarded from unauthorized handling from the moment it is checked in until it is placed on
board an aircraft. This also applies to luggage in transit. Aviation safety authorities may, at their sole discretion, take decisions on
exceptions to the requirement of a renewed security check of luggage in transit.
Airline operators may not accept luggage for transport unless it has been cleared by security. Notices with passive to passengers informing
them about items not permitted on board aircraft are clearly displayed close to check in desks. Prohibited items must be taken from
passengers.
Items that are found when searching a passenger or his/her hand luggage and which may not be taken into the cabin but may be carried as
checked-in luggage shall be securely transported by the airline operator. This luggage must be kept inaccessible during flight.
* Airline operators must not carry the luggage of any passenger who does not board the aircraft. * All unaccompanied baggage, both at
origin and transfer, must be screened. * The above does not apply to unaccompanied baggage that has been previously screened and
where it can be established that the separation is the result of circumstances beyond the passenger’s control, and that the luggage has
been kept in the care of the airline all the time. * a luggage declaration or similar document must be produced which shows that
unaccompanied baggage for stowage in the hold has been identified and checked by security.
Should a passenger be absent at boarding, his/her checked-in luggage and cabin baggage must be unloaded before the plane departs.
Should a passenger declare that s/he has not been in control of, or is unsure about the contents of their luggage, it must be thoroughly
inspected. Lost luggage or luggage that has become separated from passengers in transit shall be stored in such a way as to prevent
unauthorized access to it.
LIQUIDS AND PROHIBITED ARTICLES

LIQUIDS AND PROHIBITED ARTICLES During the summer of 2006 an act of terrorism was uncovered in which several persons planned
to carry liquid explosive on board an aircraft. As a result of this, new rules concerning liquids in carry on baggage came into force. The
definition of liquids include gels, creams, mixtures of liquids and solids and the contents of pressurized containers. For instance, tooth
paste, hair gel all forms of drinks, soups, perfumes, aerosols and other items with similar consistency.
Before screening, LAGs (liquids, aerosols and gels shall be removed from cabin baggage and shall be screened separately, unless the
equipment used for the screening or cabin baggage is also capable of screening multiple closed LAG containers Inside baggage. LAGs
shall be screened by: a. X-ray equipment, b. explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment, c. explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment,
d. chemical reaction test strips, or e. bottled liquid scanners. Tasting or testing on the skin may be used as a supplementary means of
screening.
Passengers, crew and airport staff may not carry liquids in their carry on baggage unless these are in containers no larger than one
hundred millimeters in volume, and sealed in a transparent plastic bag. The plastic bag must be able to hold its

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contents without a problem and must be completely sealed it must also be possible to open and re seal the bag.
Exceptions to this rule are permitted if the liquid: * is to be used during the journey and is necessary for medical purposes, or is part of a
special diet or baby food. Any liquid purchased at the airport''s airside must be packed in such a way as to make it clearly visible that the
product was bought at the airport the same day and that the container has not been tampered with.
-was purchased from within the authorized zone, in a store regulated by the official security routines as provided by the security
arrangements at the airport, or -was purchased at another airport in the European union, providing the liquid is packed so as to make it
clearly visible that the container has not been tampered with and that it was bought on the airside of the airport in question the same day, or
-was purchased on board an EU-based carrier, providing the liquid is packed in such a way as to make it clearly visible that the container
has not been tampered with and that it was bought on board the aircraft the same day.
PROHIBITED OBJECTS
PROHIBITED OBJECTS The following articles are prohibited from restricted zones and on board aircraft without prior permission: Any
firearm or item having the appearance of a firearm regardless of whether or not it is capable of being discharged.
Any explosive, or any article manufactured or adapted so as to have the appearance of an explosive, whether or not it is capable of
producing practical effect by explosion, or any article marked or labeled so as to indicate that it is, or contains explosive
Any article designed or adapted for causing injury to or incapacitating a person or for destroying or damaging property, or intended by the
person having it for such use, whether by him/her or by anyone else
The directives below refer to all kinds of weapons and objects that are covered by the restrictions, but when assessing whether or not an
object may be used as a weapon, we must apply a certain degree of common sense. One example of an acceptable exception is a
carpenter who needs to use tools when working in a security restricted area.
PROHIBITED OBJECTS
PROHIBITED OBJECTS: * Firearms: all weapons from which a shot may be fired by way of an explosion, compressed air or gas, including
starter guns and flares. All individual parts of a firearm are also classed as prohibited objects. * Knives and cutting instruments: * sabres *
swords * box-cutter knives * hunting knives * souvenir knives * martial arts equipment * professional tools * other knives with a blade that is
at least six centimeters long * objects that are prohibited according to local legislation * Cudgels, truncheons, baseball bats or the like.
Explosives/ammunition/flammable liquids/corrosive substances: all explosive or flammable substances that alone or in combination with
other objects may cause an explosion or a fire. This includes explosive materials, fireworks, petrol, other

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flammable liquids, ammunition and the like, or any combination of these. It also includes all corrosive or toxic substances including gases,
irrespective of how they are stored, i.e. whether or not they are compressed.
* Items that incapacitate: * all forms of tear gases * and similar chemicals * gases that are stored in pistols * tins * other containers *
equipment that may affect capacity or performance, such as electrical stun-guns.
PROHIBITED OBJECTS
PROHIBITED OBJECTS * Other objects: items such as icepicks and axes, razors, golf clubs and scissors can be used as weapons. *
Objects of any kind that could be used to imitate a real weapon. This may include, but is not limited to, objects that look like explosive
devices, or other objects that may give the impression of being a weapon or a dangerous object.
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND SUBSTANCES

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND SUBSTANCES: Possible chemical/biological attacks include the use of chemical or biological
substances to commit unlawful acts. Such chemical and biological substances that are restricted must include, but are not limited to, the
following: * mustard gas * v.x. * chlorine * sarin * cyanide * anthrax bacteria * botulism bacteria * smallpox viruses * tularaemia bacteria
Objects and containers that show signs of containing chemical or biological substances or suspicion of such contents must be: * reported to
the airport authorities * the police * the military * any other competent authority without delay * be kept isolated from the terminal areas that
are open to the public.
The following items may not be stowed in the hold * Explosives, including detonators, blasting caps (pipes), grenades, mines and explosive
devices. * Gases including propane and butane. * Flammable liquids, including gasoline and methanol. * Flammable solids and reactive
substances including magnesium, firelighters, fireworks and sparklers. * Oxidizers and organic peroxides, including bleach and repair kits
for car bodywork. * Toxic or infectious substances, including rat poison and infected blood. -Radioactive material, including medicinal and
commercial isotopes. -Corrosive substances, including mercury and car batteries, and * Components for vehicle fuel systems that have
contained fuel. * NB. Injection needles intended for medical purposes are permitted for carriage both in the cabin and in the hold. Any
prohibited items discovered by security officers during screening of a person and their cabin or hand baggage will be removed.
Certain items, such as tools, are allowed into the Security Restricted Area (SRA) at the sole discretion of the airport manager, provided
there is a satisfactory reason. All such items must be supervised whilst in the Security Restricted Area (SRA).
LIST OF PROHIBITED ARTICLES

LIST OF PROHIBITED ARTICLES
DIFFERENT LEVEL OF THREATS AND ACTIONS

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DIFFERENT LEVEL OF THREATS & ACTIONS Crew familiarity with basic threat levels leads to successful handling of occurrences of
unlawful interference. It is essential that a relationship of realistic trust and credibility and cooperation between all the parties involved as
layers of protection. The crews must know that the Commander will be advised as necessary of intelligence that directly affects their flights.
The Commander must of course communicate to the rest of the crew all know threats to the flight and set a tone of trust, confidence and
cooperation among the crew. This cooperation is a key element during the determination of the seriousness of many developing incidents.
What starts out as a minor disruption can quickly turn into a major event.
Communication and teamwork are key to safely addressing any situation. All personnel should constantly be vigilant for any indications of
suspicious activity or disruptive behaviour.
Threat levels/actions
THREAT LEVELS/ACTIONS: Threat Levels have been developed to help define and communicate the level of threat between crew
members and ground personnel. * Threat Level 1: Disruptive behaviours (Generally verbal); * Threat Level 2: Physically abusive
behaviours; * Threat Level 3: Life-threatening behaviours; * Threat Level 4: Attempted breach or actual breach of the flight crew
compartment.
THREAT LEVEL 1 - Unruly Behaviour – Verbally Threatening or Abusive; Suspicious

THREAT LEVEL 1 UNRULY BEHAVIOUR –SUSPICIOUS OR VERBAL THREAT: Level 1 Threats are usually attributed to an unruly
passenger(s). The behaviour may be disorderly due to alcohol, drugs, mental or medical problem etc. or abusive language used by
passenger that has lost his/her temper either in the boarding area or once on board the aircraft. Additionally, any acts, body language or
words that confirm any suspicious or threatening behaviour. A Level 1 threat can occur either on the ground or while airborne. This is the
most common threat faced by airline personnel.
Action
ACTION: The cabin crew will inform the Commander and follow procedure provided to handle common disruptive behavior (conflict
management skills). Inform the Commander as soon as possible if the conflict cannot be diffused and recommend that the passenger be
removed from the flight. The cabin crew should consider warning the unruly passenger of the possible results of their illegal activity.
The flight crew will immediately ensure that the flight deck is properly secured and all admission to flight deck will be suspended until it is
confirmed that the situation is completely resolved. The flight crew should advise ATC, ground personnel and security if need to resolve the
situation. The Commander should make an appropriate PA. If the aircraft has already taxied, the Commander should consider stopping the
aircraft or returning to the gate to have the person and their baggage removed before continuing the flight. In-flight the flight crew should
keep the Operation Control Center advised of their situation and request security personnel meet the aircraft upon landing if necessary.
Diversion will usually not be required unless the situation elevates.
THREAT LEVEL 2 - Physically Abusive Behavior

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THREAT LEVEL 2 PHYSICALLY ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR The type of behavior involves physical abuse from the assailant for example,
grabbing, pushing, slapping, kicking another passenger or crew or deliberate damage to property. This type of threat can easily elevate
from a verbal exchange into a physical assault and then into a life-threatening situation quickly and should be handled with great care. Use
on conflict management skills are extremely important at this level.
Action
ACTION: The cabin crew will inform the Commander and follow procedure as trained to handle combative passengers. The cabin crew
should use separation techniques and self-defense responses as necessary. Call for assistance from other crewmembers and passengers
as needed to restrain the assailant. Then check for personnel requiring medical assistance.
The flight crew will immediately ensure that the flight deck is properly secured and all admission to flight deck will be suspended until it is
confirmed that the situation is completely resolved. The flight crew should inform ATC, Operation Control Center, ground personnel or
security personnel as needed. They should make a PA announcement as necessary. If the aircraft has taxied, stop the aircraft or return to
the gate and have the passenger removed along with their baggage. If in-flight, the crew should consider a divert to the nearest suitable
airport and get help from outside resources.
THREAT LEVEL 3 - Life-threatening Behaviour

THREAT LEVEL 3 LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOUR If the crew determines that the life of one or more members of the crew or
passengers is in danger, a Level 3 Threat should be communicated. Generally, this level of threat is generally determined by the presence
of a weapon or dangerous device. If possible, cabin crew should make all possible effort to safely confirm the presence of some kind of
weapon or device. Examples of weapons/devices include guns, explosives, knifes, chemical, gasses, flammable liquids, wires or cords
(normally used for choking), stun- guns etc.; even duct tape or bare hands and serving knives can be used as weapons for choking or
stabbing. The crew should consider the behaviour of the assailant to determine if they feel the situation is life-threatening. The action of the
assailant can be a premeditated plan to act solely or as a part of another larger plan to take control of the aircraft; or simply a mental,
medical, alcohol or drug induced actions of one of the passengers.
Action
ACTION: This type of threat should be handled with great care but direct action must be taken immediately.
On the ground
ON THE GROUND: The cabin crew will inform the Commander and follow procedure as trained to handle life-threatening situations. The
cabin crewmembers should do the following: Use separation techniques or self-defense responses as necessary to avoid any assailants;
attempt to restrain any assailants per proper company procedures; attempt to escape and get all the passengers out of the aircraft.
If the flight crew has already evacuated the aircraft, the cabin crew should: try to communicate with ground personnel or the company; use
hostage survival techniques to cause delays; evacuate all passengers and crew; follow the directions of

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authorities on the ground; and then check to see if anyone needs medical attention.
The flight crew will immediately establish communication with the cabin crew and ground personnel; evacuate or escape from the aircraft;
and ensure that all relevant system are shutdown or disconnected prior to leaving.
In-Flight
IN-FLIGHT: In-flight, the cabin crew should also notify the Commander of the nature of the threat, number of assailants, their location,
description of weapons if applicable. Discontinue cabin service to monitor the situation in the cabin. If an explosive device or suspicious
device is found, coordinate with the Commander to move the device to the Least Risk Bomb Location.
In-flight, the flight crew will confirm the flight deck is properly secured and all admission to flight deck will be suspended until it is confirmed
that the situation is completely resolved. The flight crew will inform ATC and Operation Control Center of their situation with details on the
nature of the threat, information on any assailants onboard the aircraft. The Commander should declare an emergency to ATC, squawk
7700, and request diversion to the nearest suitable airport and request armed intervention from law enforcement personnel on the ground.
The flight crew should expect interception by military aircraft and monitor 121.5 and follow appropriate intercept procedures
THREAT LEVEL 4 - Attempted or Actual Breach of Flight Deck

THREAT LEVEL 4 ATTEMPTED OR ACTUAL BREACH OF FLIGHT DECK Threat Level 4 is an attempt or actual breach of the flight deck.
This is can be the most serious threat to the safety of the aircraft, crew and passengers. This threat can either be a plot to take control of
the aircraft or just another level threat that escalates to a Level 4. Several attempted and actual cockpit breaches have occurred by people
with mental or medical problems. In each case these people were restrained by a combination of flight, cabin crew and passenger
assistance. The flight deck lockdown policy is the primary defense for the cockpit. However, hijackers could use physical force and violence
in the cabin in order to attempt to gain access to the flight deck. This cannot be allowed to succeed. Any attempt to enter the flight deck is
very serious and should be considered as a method of gaining control of the aircraft and use it as a weapon of mass destruction.
Action - On the ground

ACTIONS: ON THE GROUND: The cabin crew should notify the Commander immediately, attempt to escape or evacuate the aircraft, or if
escape is not possible, they should use all available recourses to eliminate the threat and restrain any assailants.
The flight crew should communicate with ground personnel to get security intervention. If possible, evacuate or escape the aircraft and
shutdown all relevant systems to disable the aircraft. If escape is not possible, the flight crew should use all available resources to mitigate
the threat.
In-Flight
IN-FLIGHT: Cabin crews should immediately contact the Commander and use all available resources to eliminate the

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threat. Cabin crew should communicate by all available means with other crewmembers and passengers to get help to restrain all
assailants.
Flight crews should immediately ensure that the flight deck is properly secured and declare an emergency with ATC, set the transponder to
7500 and land the nearest suitable airport. Flight crew should use an emergency or rapid descend to minimize the time of exposure to the
threat in flight. The hijackers should never be given access to the flight deck, no matter what violence or threats are made against
personnel in the cabin.
A hijacker would most probably attempt to immobilize a pilot by attacking him/her on the head, neck and throat from the blind side. If the
assailant has gained access to the flight deck, one of the flight crew should take all necessary measures to prevent the assailant from
taking control of, or causing the flight crew to loose control of, the aircraft. This is to be carried out while the pilot flying maintains control of
the aircraft. Pilots should discuss how they would handle any intruder once they have breached the flight deck.
POST – INCIDENT CONCERNS FOR CREW

POST – INCIDENT CONCERNS FOR CREW Cooperate with the authorities. If in a foreign country, contact the airline representative,
follow company procedures. Do not discuss the situation with the media or other witness. All crewmembers that have been involved or
witnessed the incident involving passenger disturbance (Level 1-4) must forward a written statement to the authorities and company as
required. Collect all necessary information from the witnesses including contact information. Treat all security information confidentially and
provide information only to those who operationally require it. Expect that the whole crew might have to remain at the airport until all
required coordination has been completed with the authorities and the airline.
SABOTAGE (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT)

SABOTAGE (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT) Sabotage can be committed by personnel inside or outside of the company for a
number of reasons.
Internal threats
INTERNAL THREATS Internal threats may come from employees that have a grievance against the company or supervisory personnel.
They may attempt to get revenge by damaging aircraft systems or taking other actions, which might damage the aircraft or support
equipment/systems to get back at the company. It is important that all personnel be vigilant for this type of illegal activity and report it
immediately.
External threats
EXTERNAL THREATS External threats may come from many different sources. As discussed earlier, there are many different layers of
protection to stop illegal activity from damaging airports, aircraft, operating systems, ground equipment, fuel storage etc. Each of us must
remain vigilant to identify suspicious activity immediately.
BOMB THREAT (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT)

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BOMB THREAT (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT) Over 99% of bomb threat calls against civil aviation targets are hoaxes, perpetrated
by people who wish to cause a nuisance and/or disruption to normal activity at airports or air carrier operations. In some cases passengers
running late for flights have actually called in bomb threat to delay takeoff so they can make their flight. The level of disruption caused will
vary according to the severity of the threat and the scale of reaction to it. Disruption may cause significant delay to services and
inconvenience and probably discomfort and unease to airport, air carrier and customers. The costs of such disruption can be significant.
Bomb threats are normally anonymous telephone calls, which may provide information indicating the intention to commit an act of terrorism
or sabotage against an air carrier, aircraft or airport installation. Written warnings are rare but should be assessed using the same
techniques as applied to a telephoned warning.
Telephoned bomb warnings may be received by airports or air carriers either directly from the people using the warnings or from
intermediaries, for example, press agencies or the media. Because it is practically impossible to determine if a really dangerous situation
exists or if it is only an empty threat, EVERY BOMB THREAT MUST BE TAKEN SEROUSLY.
ACTION BY PERSON RECEIVING A BOMB THREAT CALL

ACTION BY PERSON RECEIVING A BOMB THREAT CALL The recipient of a bomb warning should attempt to obtain as much
information as possible in order to facilitate assessment of the threat and identification of the person issuing it. Keep in mind that even
minimum information might be useful for further analysis of the situation and the threat.
When answering a bomb threat call: First, listen without interrupting the caller and without giving usable information. Then, employ all
possible tactics to prolong the conversation notably by asking questions if possible, such as; * What sort of device is it? * Where is the
device located? * When will it detonate? * What type of explosive is being used? * Where are you calling from? * What is your name and
telephone number? * Why do you expect me to believe you? * What do you hope to accomplish by doing this? * Are you aware that there
are many innocent people involved? * What do you hope to gain?
Try to learn the Flight Number, airport, time. Record or write down the exact words the caller uses during the conversation or immediately
afterwards. Make notes of any accent or peculiarities of speech, together with other obvious factors such as sex, approximate age of the
caller. Make notes of characteristics of the voice, and attitude and accuracy of the language of the caller and note also background noise.
Notify the proper authorities as soon as possible! As a minimum contact: * Airport/airline security, * Operational Control Centres *
Airport/airline management, * Flight/Ground Operations Managers and * Flight/Ground Safety Officials.
BOMB THREAT ON GROUND

BOMB THREAT ON GROUND When a bomb threat or warning is associated with an aircraft that is on the ground: Before boarding: Have
the passengers leave the gate area to a safe location (generally outside the terminal) with their cabin baggage. Leave the airplane.

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During boarding: Stop the boarding process, disembark passengers with all cabin baggage via stairs or jet bridges. Then, evacuate them to
a safe location and isolate the airplane. Leave the airplane.
During taxi: Taxi to a designated parking position if such a position is available or taxi to a remote and isolated location, which is apart from
buildings or other airplane movement areas. Then, disembark the passengers via stairs. Escape slides should only be used in extreme
conditions and have the passengers moved to a safe location. Leave the airplane. Then, isolate the airplane until proper security personnel
arrive.
After the aircraft is isolated, the airport and security authorities will take over the situation. The Fire brigade and emergency services should
be ready to service the airplane as it stops. The airport and the security authority will cordon off and guard the airplane. Hold baggage,
cargo, catering and supplies will be unloaded. Whole airplane will be searched. Once the airplane has been considered sterile, it could be
towed to a normal parking position.
The passengers and crew should be transported to and gathered to a secure room. The passengers, crew and their cabin baggage should
be screened before re-boarding. Hold baggage should be screened and then reloaded subject to identification during re-boarding of the
passengers. The cargo may be screened before reloading or, if not possible, held over at least 24 hours.
BOMB THREAT IN FLIGHT - If a bomb threat is received in flight

BOMB THREAT IN FLIGHT IF A BOMB THREAT IS RECEIVED IN FLIGHT: Operation Control Center and the Commander must evaluate
the threat and take action accordingly. An in-flight bomb search takes about 60-90 minutes to accomplish. If a diversion airport is available,
the crew should consider landing as soon as practicable to have the aircraft and personnel searched rather than continue flight. If a
diversion airport is not readily available, the crew should consider using the In-Flight Bomb Search Procedure, which includes searching the
cabin of the aircraft and all cabin baggage/wardrobe.
Cabin and Flight Crew should apply Bomb Warning procedure printed in their QRH or In-flight manuals.
If a device is found in-flight that is suspicious or has been identified as a bomb comply with the following: CONTNUE WTH THE NEXT 8
SLDES.
If the aircraft can land with 20-30 minutes it is recommended that the device remain where it was found and passengers/crew be moved
away from the device.
If landing cannot be made within about 30 minutes then it is strongly recommended to relocate the bomb/suspicious device to the Least
Risk Bomb Location. Remember greatest danger occurs when the explosion occurs directly adjacent to a critical structural part of the
airframe or in the vicinity of fuel tanks, fuel lines, control runs, hydraulic and electronic compartments and components.
The cabin crew should build a pallet for the device at the Least Risk Bomb Location to direct any possible blast out the door rather into
more critical portions of the aircraft. Follow the procedure published in In-Flight Manual Emergency

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Procedures Section. Commander gives the last decision whether it is necessary to move the bomb to LRBL or not.
Disconnecting or cutting electrical circuits in the suspect item should not be attempted. Also, a suspicious package or article should not be
jettisoned from the airplane.
A descent should be made to 10,000 feet, if fuel and terrain allow, to reduce differential pressure to a minimum without changing cabin
pressure. This is to minimize the chance of an explosive decompression and avoid triggering a possible pressure initiated device. If
possible, a landing site should be selected with a pressure altitude “lower” than the present cabin altitude. Whenever possible, especially
on short haul flights, the scheduled airport should be approached; otherwise the principle of “nearest suitable airport” applies according to
commander’s decision.
Tests have shown that an in-flight explosion need not necessarily cause an airplane to crash. Several aircraft that have sustained an in-
flight explosion and have survived the explosion to land safely. However, it may cause serious injury particularly to those persons in the
close proximity to the point of detonation.
After landing, passengers should depart the aircraft via stairs. If the Pilot in Command finds that disembarkation via stairs is not possible
because, for example, stairs are not available within an acceptable period of time, a “Controlled Disembarkation via Slides” should take
place.
In case a bomb has been found and treated according to the bomb handling procedure, a “Controlled Disembarkation via Escape Slides”
should take place principally. REMEMBER AN UNSUCCESSFUL BOMB SEARCH DOES NOT NDCATE END OF DANGER!
DEALING WITH CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPON (CBW)

DEALING WITH CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPON (CBW) Chemical/Bilogical Weapons should be handled with the same care and
dillagence as the the bomb/suspicous device procedures above.
AEROSOL CBW WITH ACTIVATION

AEROSOL CBW WITH ACTIVATION A primary method of releaseing chemical and biologic agents inside the aircraft is aerosol dispersion.
The action of leaking, exploding, or manually pouring the substance into the cabin interior will move the agent through simple airborne
transmission onto the skin or into the eyes, lungs and nasal passages. It will be the goal of crew members to contain the weapon’s aeresol
potential before it spreads through the cabin atmosphere or, if unable, to minimize its effect on passengers and crew.
With the exception of slow-acting biological agents, such as anthrax, airborne exposure to toxic agents may rapidly generate sudden
passenger sickness in an epidemic outbreak.. Generally, many biological agents will generate symptoms less rapidly then will chemical
agents, many of which cause immediate symptoms. Depending on the agent, passenger and cabin crew may exhibit choking, discoloration
and fainting, blistering or convulsions that are beyond the means of of crew members to effectively deal with while airborne.

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Action
ACTION: Flight crew members must don mask and goggles before any other action. Turn on the passenger oxygen switch. Secure the
cabin door and deny any entry from the cabin. Next, decrease cabin pressure by raising the the cabin altitude as quickly as possible, to
evacuate and dilute the aeresol chemical agent. Recurcilation fans should be turned off and the coldest possible temperature should be
selected to aid in minimizing agent aeresol dispersion. Cabin crew and passengers should go on oxygen. A rapid descent and an
immediate landing is paramount to ensure flight crew are physically able to land the aircraft and gain time-critical medical treatment for
exposed individuals.
CBW THREATS IN CABIN – WITHOUT ACTIVATION

CBW THREATS IN CABIN – WITHOUT ACTIVATION If a CBW is reported to be on aircraft but without apparent activation due to lack of
physical symtoms or exposure-it should be noted that exposure to biological agents will not likely result in an immediate presence of
symptoms; nor will the dispersal of a biological or chemical agent necessarily be immediately detectable.
Action
ACTION: The crew must take immediate steps to deal with the situation and attempt to minimize aeresol dispersion immediately. Flight and
cabin crew have different duties that should be started simultaneously.
Flight crew should immediately don masks, goggles, select 100% oxygen, minimize skin coverage with shirt sleeves down or uniform
jackets worn. Some CBW agents are odourless and will not be sensed until it is too late, so this step should not be delayed. Although an
emergency declaration and turn towards an alternate aerodrome is appropriate, an immediate change in cabin pressure should not be
initiated until the unactivated device is secured to the maximum extent possible. Immediately reducing cabin temperature to the lowest
practical setting and turning off recirculation fans will decrease most aeresol dispersion characteristics.
Once the suspected Chemical/Biological container is covered and sealed from the cabin atmosphere, a gradual descent of the aircraft can
be initiated using a descent that minimizes the rate of cabin change. The slower the descent and increase in cabin pressure, the lower the
risk of agent dispersal during the final phase of flight
CBW THREATS IN CARGO COMPARTMENT

CBW THREATS IN CARGO COMPARTMENT A reported CBW threat in cargo compartment should be dealt with much as one would deal
with a cargo fire: isolate the cargo bay by removing all sources of ventilation and turn off recirculation fans. In-flight activation of a CBW
may be sensed by smoke detectors in the cargo hold. Normal fire fighting techniques will provide optimal protection. During descent, a
positive outflow of pressure from the airconditioning packs will decrease the risk of chemical agents migrating from the cargo bays and into
the cabin. Setting the landing elevation lower than the actual destination will keep the cabin relatively over-pressurized throughout the
landing phase. Manually keeping outflow valves from fully opening upon landing could keep the cabin over-presurized and protected from
cargo area contamination until ready for emergency evacuation through upwind exits.

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SUSPICIOUS SUBSTANCE AND PACKAGES

SUSPICIOUS SUBSTANCE & PACKAGES Identification: A suspicious package may have oily stains, discoloration or odour. A suspicious
substance may be a white, tan or beige colored powder and have the consistency and texture of talcum powder.
Discovery of a suspicious spilled substance

DISCOVERY OF A SUSPICIOUS SPILLED SUBSTANCE: Important; do not try to clean up the substance. Advice the Pilot in Command.
Turn ventilation down to minimum. Breathe oxygen and have the passengers breathe oxygen. If contact has been made with the
substance, immediately wash hands and forearms repeatedly. Don protective equipment; gloves and mask. Cover the substance
immediately with anything suitable at hand, then create as many barrier layers as possible between the agent and the cabin atmosphere by
covering the item with multiple layers of plastic trash bags, dry blankets, more plastic, wet blankets, then more dry blankets to minimize
leakage and spreading. Isolate the area. Do not allow anyone to approach the substance in a radius of 3 meters. Have any inidividuals
exposed to the substance wash their hands and forearms. Change clothing that may have been contaminated and place it in a sealed bag.
Discovery of a suspicious package/envelope

DISCOVERY OF A SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE/ENVELOPE: Important; do not shake or empty contents of envelope and package. Advice
the Pilot in Command. Crew to consider going on oxygen. Don protective equipment; gloves and mask. Cover all exposed skin. Isolate the
area. Do not move the item. Cover the substance as mentioned in the above paragraph. Consider passengers to go on oxygen.
REPORTING PROCEDURE
REPORTING PROCEDURE The Commander must be notified by cabin crewmembers of any possible CBW threat. The will assure that an
accurate report of the incident is made and reported to proper authorities. Refer to your company’s procedure manual for the correct
reporting procedure for your company.
HIJACK PROCEDURES
HIJACK PROCEDURES It is a very important to distinguish between an “attempted hijacking’’ and a “confirmed hijacking’’. An “attempted
hijacking’’ means some illegal action is taking place but the flight crew still in control of the aircraft. A “Confirmed Hijacking’’ means, that
one or more assailants are in control of the aircraft. It is absolutely essential that the flight crew clarifies this distinction with air traffic control
or ground personnel, due to the potential difference in response and resultant risk variables to all on board the aircraft. An aircraft that has
clearly diverted from its planned route of flight, is proceeding toward a major population center and whether or not it is in communication
with ground entities may well be treated as a hijacking with intended use as a weapon of mass destruction. If communication is possible, it
is paramount that the crew communicates the actual status of control of the aircraft.
HIJACKER PROFILE
HIJACKER PROFILE The profile of a hijacker can be classified into broad categories based on their objectives: Asylum

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Seekers: are looking to escape a country or groups to reach safety or a better life style. Criminals: are trying to avoid arrest or detention for
illegal acts Political motivated: persons trying to make a “statement” about some apparent wrong or injustice as they see the situation.
Terrorists: politically or religiously motivated individuals or groups attempting to make a “statement” through the use of illegal acts or
inflicting mass casualties.
Various motivations can drive this psychological phenomena. These characteristics are common to all extremist groups regardless of their
target. The goals, methods, demands, messages and statements of terrorists are clearly communicated to potential terrorists, who are
often inspired by the associated notoriety and publicity to emulate the behavior. Crewmembers need to be aware that terrorists will
manipulate their victims, the public, the authorities and the press. Trained terrorists are very knowledgeable in these areas. They will use, if
possible, unwitting crewmembers ‘’mouthpieces’’ of their cause or situation. Terrorist’s action is normally aimed far more at the outside
audience than at their victims. Mentally disturbed persons suffering from anyone of many emotional or medical imbalances, which cause
erratic behaviour.
STAGE OF HIJACK - INTIMIDATION PHASE

STAGE OF HIJACK INTIMIDATION PHASE: The hijackers use violence, aggression and intimidation to establish control over the crew,
passengers and the aircraft. They attempt to stop any action to recover control. Passengers and crew generally react in disbelief and fear
that “this is happening to them”. Since 11 September, passengers and crew are much more likely to react with aggression and violence
toward the assailants.
Custodial phase
CUSTODIAL PHASE: The hijacker attempt to de-humanize the hostages with continued violence and aggression. They attempt to use the
hostages as “bargaining chips” to communicate with outside authorities and the crew to support their cause. The passengers begin to feel
despair, boredom and a collective spirit. The hostages are susceptible to three different syndromes in this phase: * Stockholm syndrome *
London Syndrome * John Wayne Syndrome
Stockholm syndrome - London syndrome - John wayne syndrome

STOCKHOLM SYNDROME: An unconscious natural technique whereby, hostage and hostage taker establish a degree of empathy with
each other as a result of positive contact over a period of time. The hostage can develop a feeling of distrust of all authorities, emotional
feeling in support of assailants. At this point minimal use of force is needed to keep the hostages in line. LONDON SYNDROME: Is the
opposite of the Stockholm syndrome and the hostage can become a Target of the hijacker. Heated political or religious discussions can
occur that can a return of aggression and intimidation. This syndrome has been called ‘Suicide by terrorist’. JOHN WAYNE SYNDROME:
The feeling of helplessness often experienced by predominantly male hostages causes them to wish to be a hero but are actually unable to
respond. This can lead to depression or despair.
AIRCRAFT SECURITY PROCEDURES

AIRCRAFT SECURITY PROCEDURES All operators need to take proper procedures to protect aircraft, crews and passengers

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from any illegal activity. Each operator should have published procedures to secure aircraft when not in use by the flight crews and
procedures for the crews to follow at assure the aircraft is safe from the presence of explosives or other threats.
AIRPLANE UNDER CREW SUPERVISION

AIRPLANE UNDER CREW SUPERVISION A minimum of one flight crewmember and one cabin crewmember has to be on board or near
the airplane at all times. They should authorize entry of other personnel on to the airplane. All personnel boarding the aircraft should have
their identity checked. Identification by approved ID-Cards is regarded as sufficient or with working groups, the identification of the group
leader is regarded to be sufficient. Objects taken into the cockpit or cabin have to be checked by the cabin crew. Passenger belongings,
which have been security, checked do not require are-check;
TRANSIT PASSENGERS
TRANSIT PASSENGERS Transit passengers leaving the airplane have to take all their personal belongings with them, and a cabin check,
which includes galleys, lavatories, head racks and compartments with quick release latches, must be performed. Transit passengers who
remain on board must identify their personal belongings during the cabin check.
Security authorities must be informed immediately any suspicious act is identified. If any person attempts to enter the aircraft without proper
identification, refuses to produce identification when asked or there is some doubt as to the actual identification of the individual. The crew
shall support security authorities, when required.
SECURITY BRIEFING
SECURITY BRIEFING The security briefing should be seen as an opportunity to develop the security team on board the aircraft. The
Commander should set the tone for the flight by relaying any specific security information or concerns about the flight. They should review
crew communication procedures for threat levels and cockpit access procedures for the flight. The crew should also discuss any special
attention passengers such as deportation etc.
CABIN CHECK PRIOR TO FLIGHT

CABIN CHECK PRIOR TO FLIGHT Security Check must be accomplished by Cabin Crew after all ground staff (cleaning, catering, duty
free etc.) has left the aircraft. All Cabin Crewmembers are responsible checking their related area as published in company procedures
manual. Purser should start of Cabin Security Check prior to boarding to cabin crew via PA. Cabin Crew must look for anything which or out
of place. Cabin Crew must report any irregularities to Purser immediately.
Cabin Crewmembers should visually check seats cushions, the area under the seats, and the seat pockets for any unknown objects. They
should inspect the overhead lockers for any material left behind, including under blankets, pillows and crew baggage. Also emergency
equipment areas need to be inspected to look for unauthorized material.
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT ACCESS PROCEDURES

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FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT ACCESS PROCEDURES The specific coded signals established during the pre-flight briefing should be
required for entry.
The flight deck door must be kept closed and locked during flight except for essential needs.
The flight deck door must be closed and locked during boarding.
The flight deck door will be unlocked after de-boarding.
All persons must be positively identified before flight deck access is permitted.
Any person entering or leaving the flight deck must visually check the entry area outside the flight deck before the flight deck door is
opened. Verify with the cabin crew that the galley and adjacent lavatory is not passenger-occupied.
During boarding and de-boarding the flight deck door must be closed and locked. (CDLS – Cockpit Door Locking System in progress)
Until the last passenger leaving the aircraft by de-boarding, nobody is allowed to enter the flight deck except at the Commander’s request.
Where fitted, the curtain between the area in front of the flight deck door and the cabin should be closed except during takeoff and landing.
The flight deck door must stay locked during all threat levels. Information and coordination will be made only via interphone.
The curtain between the Cabin and Galley must be closed anytime the Cockpit door opened.
Entering time to cockpit shall be kept minimum.
No passenger must be able to see the Cockpit door-opening phase.
The ultimate goal is to minimize the time when the flight deck door is open.
AIRPLANE NOT UNDER CREW SUPERVISION

AIRPLANE NOT UNDER CREW SUPERVISION If Company Maintenance or its maintenance contract agents are available the
responsibility for security of the airplane is automatically transferred to that respective organization.
If company personnel are not available and the aircraft will be not be under crew supervision for more than 2 hours, the Commander will
make sure that all cabin doors are closed and that tamper evidence is applied to all aircraft doors either by himself or by the contracted
service provider.
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access to the aircraft from stairs, platforms and jet brides have been removed. All access points that can be reached from the ground must
be sealed to determine if access has been made.
Before entering an airplane that has not been under crew supervision and using the security seal procedure a check must be accomplished
for integrity (exterior safety check).
If any seal is found to be missing or damaged, the respective compartment, cockpit and cabin, which include galleys, lavatories, head
racks, and compartments with quick release latches, must be checked for foreign objects before boarding of passengers. If any foreign
object is detected, do not remove it, but inform the PIC or security authorities immediately. Follow Company or contract procedures to notify
the company and authorities. Early recognition of a threat, intervention and removal while at the gate can preclude a serious on-board
incident.
HE LEAST-RISK LOCATION
THE LEAST-RISK LOCATION All aircraft manufacturers must specify where in the aircraft an explosive charge would cause the least
damage shoot it explode. Well emergency equipment found close to this area must be removed to secure a place in the aircraft.
* In Airbus models A321 / A330/A340, this place is located in the middle of the rearmost cabin door on the right hand side * In Boeings
B767/B737, this place is situated at the rearmost galley- service door at the right, on the "escape slide bustle". When a suspicious object is
placed there, the slide must be disarmed
* Any bomb threat received direct by Air Traffic Control concerning an aircraft on the ground must be forwarded to * The carrier in question
-its representative * the appropriate police authority alerted. * If the aircraft is in the air, the National Criminal Investigation Department must
also be notified. * If a carrier considers a bomb threat to one of its aircraft in the air to be credible and requires assistance to communicate
with the plane, this help must be given.
* If a bomb threat concerns an aircraft taxiing out to start, the ATS-unit must instruct the captain to wait at an appropriate point for security
reasons. * The captain must then contact the carrier’s operative command, if it is accessible, for further instructions. * In all other cases the
ATS-unit must notify the captain using the wording: There is a bomb threat call under investigation...
* When an airplane is in the air the ATS-unit must notify the captain if a bomb threat targeting the plane has been received. * This is a
security message, are you ready to copy? The following message was received from (location) at hh:mm GMT, quote, ‘A bomb threat call
has been received at hh:mm which may relate to your flight, and which we believe to be credible’, unguote. * In addition to this, any
instructions from the carrier must be reported to the aircraft and the captain’s opinion sought.
* When an aircraft is starting or landing the ATS-unit may only notify it regarding a bomb threat when it deems the pilots no longer busy
maneuvering the plane. * When an airplane is in the final phase of landing, the captain shall not be

Ref C115
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Rev 1.0
Date 2020-03-26
informed until it has slowed to normal taxi speed.
SUMMARY
SUMMARY This program was intended to review important challenges and procedures for security procedures on the ground and while
airborne. This program does not address all possible contingencies that can occur during your operation. See your AFM and Operator’s
Security Procedural Manual for exact procedures and forms to be completed for your type aircraft or operations. You are one layer of
protection among many that makeup a very larger multi-level barrier to stop the threat of terrorism or operational disruptions. Remember if
something just doesn’t look right to you, it probably isn’t. It is always better to check out 100 false alarms than it is to let one threat get
through the system
COURSE END
End of the course

Aviation Security Procedures

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Aviation Security Procedures

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AVIATION SECURITY PROCEDURES

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

DEFINITIONS AND TERMS 5

THE UNITED NATIONS 7

NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM 9

CRITICAL PARTS OF SECURITY RESTRICTED AREAS (CSRA) 11

CREW IDENTIFICATION CARD 15

AIRPORT IDENTIFICATION CARD 15

CRITICAL PARTS OF A SECURITY - RESTRICTED AREA 17

EMERGENCIES AT THE TERMINAL BUILDING 17

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

SCREENING AND SECURITY AT AIRPORTS 20

LIQUIDS AND PROHIBITED ARTICLES 24

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND SUBSTANCES 26

LIST OF PROHIBITED ARTICLES 26

DIFFERENT LEVEL OF THREATS AND ACTIONS 26

THREAT LEVEL 1 - Unruly Behaviour – Verbally Threatening or Abusive; Suspicious 27

THREAT LEVEL 2 - Physically Abusive Behavior 27

THREAT LEVEL 3 - Life-threatening Behaviour 28

THREAT LEVEL 4 - Attempted or Actual Breach of Flight Deck 29

Action - On the ground 29

POST – INCIDENT CONCERNS FOR CREW 30

SABOTAGE (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT) 30

BOMB THREAT (CONSIDERED A LEVEL 3 THREAT) 30

ACTION BY PERSON RECEIVING A BOMB THREAT CALL 31

BOMB THREAT ON GROUND 31

BOMB THREAT IN FLIGHT - If a bomb threat is received in flight 32

DEALING WITH CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPON (CBW) 33

AEROSOL CBW WITH ACTIVATION 33

CBW THREATS IN CABIN – WITHOUT ACTIVATION 34

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CBW THREATS IN CARGO COMPARTMENT 34

SUSPICIOUS SUBSTANCE AND PACKAGES 35

Discovery of a suspicious spilled substance 35

Discovery of a suspicious package/envelope 35

STAGE OF HIJACK - INTIMIDATION PHASE 36

Stockholm syndrome - London syndrome - John wayne syndrome 36

AIRCRAFT SECURITY PROCEDURES 36

AIRPLANE UNDER CREW SUPERVISION 37

CABIN CHECK PRIOR TO FLIGHT 37

FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT ACCESS PROCEDURES 37

AIRPLANE NOT UNDER CREW SUPERVISION 38

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

THE UNITED NATIONS

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

CRITICAL PARTS OF SECURITY RESTRICTED AREAS (CSRA)

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

aircraft security search in a SRA or in a CSRA.

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

CREW IDENTIFICATION CARD

AIRPORT IDENTIFICATION CARD

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

Copyrights ? 2020 by Flyco Training Solutions

CRITICAL PARTS OF A SECURITY - RESTRICTED AREA