CARE Ethiopia – After Action Review

2009 Food Security and AWD Crisis

Workshop Report

Addis Ababa - Queen of Sheba Hotel – March 29-30 2010

Photo: Women Focus Group - East Hararghe Zone, Oromiya Region – 22 March 2010

Table of Contents:

Acknowledgement
1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction
3. Timeline
4. Rapid Assessment against the Humanitarian Accountability Framework (HAF)
5. “What did we do well that would like to repeat next time?”
6. “What could we do better next time?”
7. Action Planning and Recommendations for the Future
8. Conclusion

Annexes:
Annex 1: Abbreviations
Annex 2: Agenda
Annex 3: List of Participants
Annex 4: Timeline
Annex 5: Workshop Evaluation
Annex 6: Humanitarian Accountability Framework Rapid Assessment
 2

Acknowledgement:

The facilitator wishes to express his gratitude to CARE Ethiopia and especially the
Emergency Unit and PDQS staff for their support during this exercise. Draft versions of
this report have been shared with key staff at both CI and CO level to ensure that the
topics discussed are fairly represented in this document. The author took the liberty to
add clarifications for points that would otherwise be difficult to understand for an outside
audience. Action dates have been adjusted in consideration of the time that has elapsed
between the workshop and report completion. (Photo Credits: Daniel Seller)

1. Executive Summary:

The 29-30 March 2010 After Action Review was an opportunity to reflect on the 2009
type 2 Food Security/Acute Watery Diarrhea emergency within the context of a chronic
emergency country. It was also combined with a verification of the Rapid Assessment
findings against the latest version of CARE’s Humanitarian Accountability Framework,
which significantly added value to the discussion. In summary, the following was
observed:

• One of the key challenges identified was that many of the findings resembled those
of 2008 AAR. It is therefore not surprising that one of the participants asked in the
beginning: “Why are we doing the same thing year after year?” Part of the
explanation might be found in the turnover and shifts between units within a large
organization like CARE Ethiopia. As a consequence, the team committed to finding
ways to better integrate lessons learned from the past into current programming and
preserving institutional memory.
• Was it justified to declare a type 2 emergency in accordance with the CARE
classification in light of the chronic nature of the emergency and the millions of
people in permanent need of assistance? This question was answered affirmatively
as the CO faced a combination of the effects of a chronic emergency situation in the
nutrition with a spike due to poor rains in the current and previous years, as well as
high food prices worldwide. At the same time an AWD crisis added to an already bad
situation. This being said, the question of the appropriateness existing threshold for
highly populated chronic emergency countries was not resolved.
• Overall, the crisis in itself and declaring a type 2 heightened activity within the
emergency unit but meant business as usual for most parts of the organization which
created tension between the CEEU and program support and frustration on all sides.
• An increase in support was noted from CI-CEG and the membership once a type 2
was declared. However, media work was almost impossible within the political
context of Ethiopia. Attention faded, especially after a hot emergency like Haiti
occurred in January 2010.
• The AAR noted room for improvement for emergency response, in particular in the
interplay between the CEEU and program support. Procurement and HR systems
need to be reviewed in terms of adaptations for shifting to emergency mode and
expansion in parallel with the emergency program. However, also the CEEU was
asked to questions its mode of operation that at times contributed to delays.
• A key finding was the DRAT (Ethiopian ERT) should have started earlier than March
2010 as it plays a major role in coordinating activities in house.
• Timeliness of response: Here the findings were inconsistent. The rapid assessment
against the HAF pointed towards a timely response in some areas, especially in the
 3

view of CARE staff and some of the beneficiaries and partners. At the same time,
donors and some staff members thought that CARE could have responded quicker.
• Outside factors also contributed to delays, like slow approval processes by some of
the donors and Government not signing project agreements for months at a time, as
well as slow arrival of emergency stocks in country.
• In terms of linking relief, recovery, and development, there is a need to take better
advantage of the multi-sectoral nature of CARE’s program in Ethiopia and integrate
short-term emergency programs with longer-term recovery, livelihood, and
development programs.
• Already the 2008 AAR noted the need to consistently implement and mainstream
disaster risk reduction (DRR). It was stressed that DRR cannot be the responsibility
of the emergency unit alone but has to be a priority of the entire country program.
• A revision of the 2007 EPP is required and implementation of the activities identified
during the AAR, including an adaptation of systems and policies to emergency
operations where it hasn’t happened, yet. This will require CI and Lead Member
support.
• HAF Rapid Assessment: The overall rating for the eight benchmarks was a 2
(“benchmark mostly met”). Areas for improvement identified included involvement of
communities at the stage of project design, creating a formal complaint mechanism,
and project information to be provided in a transparent and easy to understand
manner to communities (e.g., language barriers). International partners also
mentioned that CARE seems to be focused on donor and government requirements,
less on the people that are being served. Lead member and CI CEG help will be
requested to establish a complaint system.
• The HAF also pointed to frustration regarding equity among temporary staff that has
been hired on short-term contracts for emergency projects. It is difficult to see how to
alter this in light of funding realities and existing labor laws, however, the CO
committed to reviewing the current system and informing all staff about the outcome.
• Despite using the standard targeting tools and criteria, exclusion and inclusion error
of beneficiaries were noted and disagreements with GOE representatives over
beneficiary numbers. Therefore, these errors have to be documented and the
findings used for advocacy in the appropriate forums.
• The HAF review recommendations included the strengthening the early warning
information and data base system, as well as supporting the establishment of early
warning systems on community level.
• CO staff encouraged AAR type of activities as part of the mid-term evaluations (i.e.,
when there is still time to adjust program activities while programs are ongoing) and
engaging in cross learning with other partners in Ethiopia and other CARE Country
Offices.
• Participants expressed the sentiment that the exercise helped them to understand
the HAF, but the challenge remains how to incorporate the HAF principles into the
daily work. Again, CEG and Lead Member support will be appreciated.
• Overall, the CO appreciated the support from CI-CEG and from the Senior Nutrition
Advisor. CI-CEG was encouraged to dedicate a focal point for all communications
between the CO, the membership, and CEG and ensure consistent support by the
Regional Emergency Coordinator.
• The membership lauded the quality of the analysis and timeliness of the information
provided and the strong emergency response strategy, which assisted members in
raising funds for the CO. Some members would have liked to see more consistent
engagement with specific donors (i.e., ECHO). In the discussion it was mentioned
 4

that a stronger CO engagement with donors also depends on the support given by
the membership.
• The CO would also appreciate more consistent contact with CI members in relation
to knowing the status of project proposals.
• Consistently, partners in the international community stressed the prominent and
outstanding leadership role CARE Ethiopia is playing within the humanitarian
community.

2. Introduction:

CARE's policy requires conducting an After Action Review (AAR) after a large-scale
Type 2 emergency (CARE International categorization) within 3-4 months of the start of
the crisis. According to the CARE Emergency Toolkit, purpose of an AAR is to capture
and learn from lessons, so that improvements can be made in CARE's operational
procedures, structures and policy (CET, Chapter 18, Monitoring and Evaluation).

Building on the advantage of hindsight, the AAR provides an opportunity for the CO and
the membership to reflect on its experience, on what worked well, what needs to be
improved, and consequently the actions that need to be taken to be (a) better prepared
for and (b) respond better to future emergencies.

This particular AAR offered the opportunity of reviewing an emergency classified as

Type 2 within the context of a chronic emergency country. Furthermore, it presented
itself as an opportunity to validate the findings of the rapid assessment against the latest
version of Humanitarian Accountability Framework (HAF) 1 that had been taking place
the same month (See Annex 2 for the workshop agenda).

Participants represented all units of CARE Ethiopia involved with emergency response,
as well as CIUK, CARE US, CARE Norge, and CI-CEG. CARE US took the role of
representing the view of the membership that couldn’t attend the AAR. In total, 35
colleagues participated (See Annex 3 for list of participants). The following expectations
were voiced at the beginning of the workshop:

Tab 1: Participants expectations for the workshop

• Learn and share various lessons between country office and field offices
• Discuss a mechanism for a better beneficiary involvement and accountability
• Key actions that need to be taken by individual staff members
• How CI and CARE systems can better support chronic emergencies
• Get a clear view of humanitarian action in CARE
• More proactive and accountable emergency actions
• Improved food commodity
• Better CARE coordination
• An overall accountability within CARE
• Improve humanitarian response
• Respond to emergencies in a timely manner
• Share experience

1
CARE's emergency response is guided by the HAF. This framework defines the organization’s
accountability to key stakeholders, particularly communities and individuals directly affected by disasters. It
outlines benchmarks that must be met for a quality response (See CET Chapter 6, Quality and
Accountability, for more details).
 5

• Better emergency response quality

• Better emergency management

Background of the 2009 Food Shortage/AWD Emergency: 2

Due to fewer than usual and erratic Belg rains 2009 (Short rainy season from February
to May), agricultural production was very poor in most Belg dependent parts of the
country. June through September 2009 main seasonal rains (Meher/Kiremt) in crop
dependent areas started late and were erratic in both distribution and quantity,
particularly in the Eastern parts of the country. This affected adversely seasonal
agricultural activities and caused drought conditions resulting in lower production. This in
turn depleted the limited available resources including pasture and water for pastoralist
communities. All of the above resulted in higher than usual food shortages.

It should also be recalled that Ethiopia and the region at large felt the effects of the
global food crisis, leading to a sharp increase in the prices of cereals and other food
commodities, which eroded the purchasing capacity of particularly poor households
(both urban and rural). The high market prices of staple foods coupled with limited
supplies of food and a shortage of emergency resources contributed to the further
deterioration of the food security situation. The supply of food crops in markets
significantly declined regionally. As in most years of drought, the situation intensified
even further during the hunger season June through October 3 . All of this coincided with
poor Belg agricultural production the previous year. Therefore, the 2009 crisis affected a
population of a chronic crisis country that was already weakened by previous years
shortages 4 .

The Humanitarian Requirements Document launched by the Government of Ethiopia’s

Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS) in February 2010
called for emergency food aid support for 5.2 million people out of a total population of
approximately 80 million. This figure is in addition to 7.8 million people already receiving
5
food and cash from the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) . Therefore, at least 13
million people are in need of in-kind and cash assistance to meet their nutrition needs.

In addition to the rampant food insecurity, a new emergency situation evolved in

September 2009: The Government of Ethiopia (GOE) and its partners had to respond to
a widespread epidemic of Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD) 6 in different affected areas of
the country. AWD was already reported earlier in 2009, however, the increment in

2
This section draws on CARE Ethiopia Food Security Emergency. Revised Strategy Paper. 2 October 2009
3
Historically, the scarcity of resources increases the risk of resource-based conflict as populations from both
inside and outside of Ethiopia migrate in search of water and pasture for livestock, thus increasing the
potential for spread of disease in both humans and livestock.
4
In general, malnutrition is the largest cause of death in the country for children under the age of five (57%
of child mortality is attributed to malnutrition).
5
The Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia has put in place a safety net program that not only
protects resource poor households, but does so in ways that prevent asset depletion at the household level
and create assets at the community level. The PSNP, which began operations in January 2005, is designed
to provide transfers to the chronically food insecure population in food insecure Woredas
6
In Ethiopia, Acute Watery Diarrhea is used as an umbrella term that includes all cases of watery diarrhea,
Typhoid and Giardia. Although AWD is common in Ethiopia at certain times of year due to poor hygiene and
sanitation practices and unsafe water sources, the situation in 2009 was far worse than in past years and
was expected to become even more severe.
 6

severity was largely due to (1) the contamination of water at identified religious holy
water sites, which are visited and consumed in the thousands during the Ethiopian
holiday and pilgrimage seasons and (2) migration of daily laborers from highland parts of
the country to cotton farming lowland areas. This resulted in the spreading of AWD
contamination as people infected returned to their homes and passed on these diseases
to other people in their communities. 7

The regions of the country that were most affected by drought, food insecurity and AWD
outbreaks were Oromiya, Afar, SNNPR, Somali, Amhara and Tigray. The crisis was not
concentrated in one specific area but widespread with levels of severity and
humanitarian needs varying throughout the country. Of the most affected regions, CARE
has a strong operational presence in Oromiya, Afar, and Amhara. Almost all of the
districts in which CARE is working are classified as priority 1or 2 hotspots by the GOE.

The crisis also had a regional perspective, as Somalia and Kenya were affected, as well.
Net-exporters in the region like Uganda and Tanzania have had reduced harvests.
Furthermore, the El Nino effect made it likely that there will be floods affecting Ethiopia in
the years to come.

For all the above reasons, the 2009 crisis represented a spike in the “normal” chronic
emergency conditions due to a combination of increased vulnerability after droughts in
previous years, poor rains, subsequently poor harvests and the AWD outbreak.

3. Timeline:

Alix Carter from the CEEU presented the timeline to remind participants of key events
that took place starting June/July 2009 (See Annex 4 for timeline). Participants added
key events organized by the categories CARE Ethiopia, external actors/partners in
Ethiopia and international actors.

The Country Office (CO) circulated an Emergency Alert for the Food Crisis on 19 August
2009 and for the AWD on 10 September. An informal Crisis Coordination Group phone
conference (“pre-CCG”) was held on 13 August. The formal CCG on 15 September
classified the combination of the slow onset food insecurity and the more rapid AWD as
a Type 2 emergency.

Comments and Observations:

• Emergency Type 2: The question was raised whether any changes were observed
after the emergency was declared a type 2. On the country level, opinions varied
from “no difference” to “an increase in communication and support from the CO to
the FOs and affected communities”.

• Senior leadership at the CO had the impression that declaring the emergency a type
2 increased the attention and subsequently the support form CI and the membership.
Regular sitreps made a difference and also lead to more inquiries by the
membership. Efforts were observed in fundraising with institutional donors, finding
external WASH capacities via CEG, and discussions happened with CARE US Food
Security Specialist.

7
CARE Ethiopia Emergency Alert. 10 September 2010
 7

• Very early on in the workshop the question of criteria for determining an emergency
type was discussed. One of the thresholds for a Type 2 classification for
emergencies is more than 100,000 people affected and 30,000 severe. However,
countries of the size of Ethiopia with a population of more than 80 million people, in
chronic emergency conditions, and with more than 7 million people in permanent
need of assistance, raise the question about the validity of a criteria of more than
100,000 people affected or whether the threshold needs to be raised for countries
like Ethiopia 8 . Participants were reminded though that number of people affected
was not the only criteria, and other factors like the local capacity to respond and
whether a spike has been observed is also taken into consideration.

• Long delays: The timeline exercise demonstrated sometimes long delays between
applications for emergency projects and the time that elapsed until they are actually
approved by some of the donors (e.g., CIDA), and Government approvals (in one
case six months). However, delays were also caused by long internal procedures
and difficulties during implementation of project activities (e.g., construction of water
systems due to difficulties with the communities and local contractors). Furthermore,
some of the external support was delayed, like the PUR donation that took nine
months to arrive in Ethiopia, too late for the 2009 AWD emergency and with limited
shelf life left once it arrived.

• Participants were also asked whether they could recount a specific personal story
that touched them during the emergency response (During AARs in other countries,
this question often triggers very personal accounts of events). However, no response
was given which might have happened for several reasons like time it needs for
people to open up in a larger group, or be seen as an indication that in a chronic
crisis country this particular emergency represented “business as usual”. Naturally,
the emergency unit had to step up its activities significantly (proposal writing,
coordination with other actors, sitreps, etc..), but overall it doesn’t appear that the
very nature of the COs engagement in the emergency changed as compared to
examples from other countries that are confronted with clear-cut rapid onset
emergencies.

• This exercise led directly into the presentation by the Humanitarian Support
Coordinator of the CARE Ethiopia Emergency Response Strategy of 2 October 2009
and the major achievements, which concluded the following:

o The emergency response target of 490,000 people was surpassed, but

emergency needs are still high in regards to food security and nutrition
o CARE focused its response in areas of Afar Zone 3, East Hararghe, West
Hararghe, and Borana Zones. However, no emergency response took place in
urban areas
o A slow start-up and implementation difficulties of projects in certain target areas
due to various constraints
o Of the USD 18,8 Million that had been mentioned as the fund raising target for
2009/2010, approx. USD 7,5 Million materialized (CARE Ethiopia Sitrep no. 10,

8 “(…), in a country with at least 7M chronically food insecure people, it’s surely rather arbitrary to label any
number above that 7M (…) as constituting “an emergency”. And yet that is exactly what triggered the “level
2 emergency” (…). ACD Garth Van’t Hul. Email to the AAR facilitator. 19 March 2010
 8

28 April 2010). Approx. USD 2,8 Million came form CIDA, OFDA, and the HRF,
while the rest represents the Joint Emergency Operation Plan (JEOP) funds and
commodities where CARE is an implementing partner of CRS..

Challenges identified:

• A theme that was repeated is the difference between numbers of beneficiaries as

defined by the GOE and the at times contradicting evidence from the FOs.

• An important remark was the observation by one participant that it appears that we
keep repeating the same type of activities year after year. It was therefore time to
learn from exercises such as an AAR for the future, find ways to preserve/document
institutional memory, and implement the lessons learned. Staff turnover is an
additional challenge in this respect (e.g., only five of the AAR participants were
present in the 2008 AAR).

• Along the same line, the question of how to protect livelihoods during an emergency
response was raised. It appears that we hardly focus on this aspect of emergency
work, which in the long run should help avoiding creating dependencies, although
donors at least express interest in supporting such activities. It was also noted that
CARE needs to work on improving the linkage of emergency programs with longer
term interventions as at the moment there is only a weak relationship. This brings
DRR and climate change adaptation to play as the means necessary to make the
link.

• Another frequently repeated theme was the need for CARE Ethiopia to find a way to
bridge the inherent contradictions of running an emergency unit, which by definition
requires rapid responses, with the longer term programs and the chronic nature of
the emergencies in Ethiopia, such as climate, environment, culture and even the aid
architecture and donor funding preferences. The discussion showed that there is no
short and simple answer to these issues.

• The question was raised whether CARE Ethiopia has strong and appropriate
emergency specific policies and strategies in place. There was a recognition that
CARE as an organization has strong emergency policies, but faces difficulties in
adapting them or be sufficiently flexible to country specific circumstances. One
suggestion was therefore rather than creating more policies to find ways to adapt
existing emergency policies and procedures very hands-on as part of the Emergency
Preparedness Plan exercise.

• The restrictive civil society law that came into affect in 2009 did not directly affect the
emergency program but impacted some of our other activities in the FOs, e.g. when
lower-level officials’ interpretation of this law led to a delay in the proposal approval
process.

• Last but not least, as a particular challenge the lack of community ownership of most
nutrition projects was mentioned.
 9

4. Rapid Assessment against the Humanitarian Accountability Framework (HAF)

Mohammed Khaled, CI Regional Emergency Coordinator for East and Central Africa,
introduced the HAF and its linkages to AARs. The HAF review informed and enriched
the discussion, while the workshop was an opportunity to received feedback and validate
the findings from stakeholder interviews, as well as the Country Office (CO)/Field Office
(FO) self-assessment (See Annex 6 for details) 9 .

Daniel Alemu of PDQS presented the self-assessment findings of the CARE Ethiopia
HAF capacity assessment, based on 11 responses (See Annex 6 for details). The overall
average rating for the eight benchmarks was a 2 (“benchmark mostly met”).

Methodological Observations:

• The exercise presented itself as an opportunity to actually talk directly to

beneficiaries – something which senior staff often have little time to do. This should
be regarded as a value added for of the HAF review for both expat and national staff.

• Secondly, separating men and women groups was important, as community

members were more likely to answer openly. The presence of local government
representatives, especially among men, might have impacted the reliability of
information given. However, as the people present were genuine representatives of
their communities, excluding them would neither have been appropriate nor practical.

Comments and Observations:

• While the facilitator mentioned that an across the board “2” rating might have been a
bit too generous, most participants felt comfortable with the rating, the exception
being Benchmark 5 (“Systems for stakeholder feedback and complaints”). This
finding was later also confirmed by the interviews with communities which showed
that the area needing most improvement was involvement of communities at the
stage of project design and gathering feedback.

• In relation to Benchmark 3 (“Design and internal monitoring processes”), it was

mentioned in the self-assessment that CARE had assessed program support
effectiveness and efficiency, but this did not happen consistently.

• Recently, emergency procurement policies and systems have been established but
there are still challenges to implementing the policy and timeliness. The tendency of
blaming each other for system shortcomings (e.g., Emergency Unit versus Program
Support, in particular procurement) was mentioned as being not very helpful for
finding constructive solutions. Beside internal factors, also donor regulations and the
lack of reliable vendors were mentioned as reasons for a lack of timeliness.

• Specifically in relation to Benchmark 5 (“Systems for stakeholder feedback and

complaints”), it was mentioned that formal complaint and whistleblower mechanisms
are in place and leadership is committed to those mechanisms. However, staff have

9
Time did not allow presenting the CI-CEG Performance Metrics; however, the AAR findings will
eventually assist in compiling the scoring of CARE’s response to this emergency.
 10

not internalized those systems or are not familiar with them. One of the results is that
when complaints reach senior leadership/management level, there is a better chance
that they are investigated and action taken. The challenges of conducting quality and
timely investigations in response to substantive complaints or accusations include
time constraints and lack of expertise. Labor laws that in general favor employees
were also mentioned as a factor affecting investigations.

• On Benchmark 8 (“Staff capacity and human resources management during

emergencies”) one finding was the challenge to hold temporary staff members
accountable. HR mentioned that this might be due to the reality of the large number
of temporary staff members that need to be supervised and monitored and the fact
that in many nutritional projects, temporary staff lack project specific job description,
making it more difficult to hold them accountable.

• A key sentiment raised by the participants that the exercise helped them to
understand the HAF, but the challenge remains how to incorporate the HAF
principles into the daily work, especially considering challenges such as capacity and
government restrictions (e.g., when it comes to beneficiary selection).

• Taking the HAF principles seriously will also require finding an appropriate way to
feedback to the communities and partners that volunteered their time to be
interviewed, especially in questions that could not be answered on the spot.

• During the discussion the question how we can make “shift power to beneficiaries” a
reality. CARE faces numerous challenges like, e.g., including external factors, such
as: Donor preferences for simple nutrition projects, delay of project agreements,
various government barriers etc. The CD noted that CARE needs to find a
mechanism to create a relationship with the beneficiaries and find a way to hear the
voices of the communities more consistently 10 .

• It is understood that that the HAF represents the standard we aspire to attain even if
the reality on the ground prevents us from reaching all the HAF benchmarks at all
times.

5. “What did we do well that would like to repeat next time?”

Woldu Terefe (Emergency Unit and Rural Livelihoods Unit DM&E Advisor) and Daniel
Alemu (Learning and Knowledge Management Advisor/PDQS) presenting the HAF rapid
assessment findings (See Annex 6).

• External stakeholders (partners, other INGOs, communities) clearly knew about

CARE’s work and interventions in Ethiopia, and the staff working in the field.
• At times, CARE’s emergency response was faster than by other NGOs, especially in
AWD. This gives CARE’s effort more credibility.
• Transparent information sharing was noted between CARE and stakeholders. More
participation was also observed during the planning phase involving partners.

10
CARE Ethiopia’s CIUK PPA and CARE Canada CIDA Partnership Branch project and activities have
enabled the CO to pilot various downward or “forward” accountability mechanisms, that could be relevant
and learnings applied to our emergency interventions and community linkages.
 11

• Based on the limited sample that was interviewed, the relationship with the
communities appears to be one of mutual respect.
• Compared to other organizations, there is good participation and consultation of
stakeholders (community, community volunteers, Kebele administrations, and
Woredas 11 ) during implementation phase. One example given was the good
community participation such as involving clan leaders, community elders, and
community task force members in beneficiary targeting.
• Even though there have been some problems related to targeting of beneficiaries
due to political influence, in general nutrition projects targeting was found to be bias
free as it was based on standard nutrition indicators.
• Members of the international community interviewed (donors, INGOs, UN) stressed
the prominent and outstanding role CARE Ethiopia is playing within the humanitarian
community. For example, the HINGO group and monthly meetings that are now
chaired by CARE were for a long time absent.
• International stakeholder also appreciated the value driven approach of CARE in its
operations.

Group Exercise:

As a next step, the participants were split into three pre-assigned groups, ensuring as
much as possible an equal representation. The groups focused on the following:

(1) Leadership and Decision Making,

(2) Emergency Response and Quality (e.g., targeting, coverage i.e. beneficiaries and
types of interventions, participation, complaints systems, monitoring); and
(3) Program Support (HR, admin and logistics, safety and security).

All three groups were asked to consider both internal and external coordination issues in
their discussion. The groups were also asked to discuss how to replicate positive
examples. However, due to a lack of time, that part of the exercise was only completed
by one group.

Group 1: Leadership and Decision Making

What worked well? Cause why it worked well

1. Supportive policy environment
2. Joint responsibility in place for drought
response and DRAT meetings
3. Discussions between emergency unit
and program support for timely, effective
and efficient emergency responses
4. Updating policies and guidelines to
reflect global and local context
• Previous emergency experience
• Government requirements such as standard
response protocols
• Donor policies and compliance
• Support from HQ and the RMU
• Acknowledging problems/challenges and
seeking solutions together
• Ensuring accountability and fulfill compliance
requirements

11 Kebele is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia. Woredas are districts that consist of several
Kebeles. Zones consist of several Woredas. Regional States are made up of a number of Zones.
 12

What worked well? Cause why it worked well

5. Gender and diversity were addressed • GED guidelines
very well
6. Shared decision making at FOs and CO • Good governance
level
7. CARE strategic plans • Accountability

Comments and Observations:

• It was noted that contingency planning was not mentioned during the presentation.
Some donors allowed the including emergency contingency funds in their proposals
to be used for unforeseen circumstances (e.g., HRF). However, the lack of sufficient
standby emergency funding within CARE was mentioned as a shortcoming. Such
funds could have helped during the first phases of the emergency response
(Remark: The newly established CI ERF was activated).

• Other participants mentioned the following as areas that were positive examples:
o High transparency on senior management level
o Strong accountability
o Mobilizing and securing of financial resources
o Decision making as a shared responsibility at the FO level

• In terms of project identification and design, the following seems to have worked
well:
o Rapid assessments were organized at the Country Office level
o Field Offices coordination on the local level and providing inputs to concept
papers
o Informal discussions with donor representatives.
o Discussions with OCHA/HRF and preparing submissions after a consensus had
been reached

• Gender was always considered as a cross cutting theme in the emergency response
activities. In the case of the HRF proposal for Borana, this was tried for the first time
in conjunction with PDQS.

Group 2: Emergency Response and Quality

What worked well? Cause why it worked well How to replicate

1. Capacity Building for • Gaps were monitored, • Analyze and document gaps
staff (SPHERE), identified, and CARE tried its • Share experience and cross
communities, and GOE best to address those learning
partners (e.g., nutrition,
WASH, AWD)
2. Timely and efficient • Good cumulative set of • Use experience in WH and
transfer of resources to experiences in the team EH to open same type of
beneficiaries • Logistics (Warehouses etc.) distribution sites in Amhara
3. Active participation in • Good technical expertise • Experience sharing and
Task Forces and • Good liaison skills guidance from CO
coordination at both CO • Stronger harmonization of
and FO level -> Good systems
contribution to GOE • Sharing of minutes from
response meetings

What worked well?
4. Planning for Emergency
5. Targeting of
beneficiaries
6. Early response on the
ground compared to
partners
7. Good credibility
8. Multi-sectoral
intervention (nutrition, food
security, WASH)
9. Decentralization of
management –
empowerment of staff at
all levels
13
Cause why it worked well How to replicate
• Timely and comprehensive • Continue making it a priority
situation reporting and always look at ways to
(FSLU/SITREPS) and improve our information
system of reporting collection
• Staff dedicated to purpose
• Good networking
• Knowing who is doing what • Meeting lists
in other agencies to avoid • Good handover when staff
duplications and gaps go on leave or to the field
• CARE participated in GOE
led targeting
• CARE active in coordination
mechanisms and culture of
making sure meetings are
attended
• Good previous emergency • Observation: When DRAT
experience was activated response
• Organizational presence, improved
infrastructure, and capacity
established in operational
areas
• Early warning data
• Multi-donor support • Sharing experience in
• Community trust clusters
• Ability to mobilize resources • Feeding back to communities
• Long-term presence and
experience
• Robust internal control
systems
• Compared to partners, better
response to community
complaints
• Strong leadership
• CI mechanisms to raise
funds
• Strong technical expertise
• Recruitment of external staff
when we needed to (WASH
specialist and WASH
advisor)
• Revised FO structure: • Look at FO level for good
creation of an Field Office examples of best practices
Leadership Team (FOLT) –
this allowed for increased
decision making and
leadership of staff at FO level
• Relationship between CO-FO
and lines of communication
are much clearer: Information
sharing, communication,
team work, coordination,
problem solving – all
improved
 14

Comments and Recommendations:

• CI-CEG REC Mohamed Khaled acknowledged the strong engagement of the CO in

the crisis, as demonstrated on the CCG calls.
• In terms of quality, the question of appropriate targeting was raised.
• It appears that at least the areas of response were well coordinated between the
different organizations active on the ground.

Group 3: Program Support

The group approached the exercise by listing the basic functions of the various program
support units and prioritizing those functions.

What worked Causes why it worked well

well?
HR • Emergency Staff Roster - available at FOs
• Good and timely response to emergency staff needs
• Although they were initially not available for all emergency staff,
eventually clear JDs were drafted
• HR provided good orientation to staff although the focus appeared to be
on development as compared to shorter-term field based emergency
staff
• Timely recruitment
Commodity • Timely reporting and communications on commodity allocations
• Establishment of onsite warehouses
• On the spot CO/FO training of field staff in commodity management
• Sharing of staff on CO and FO level
Transport • Quick checklist on rental cars used by CARE staff
• Prioritization in allocation of vehicle for emergency CO response
• Proactive and negotiated access to vehicles for phased out projects
Procurement • Creation of emergency procurement procedures and emergency
purchases
• Clear procedures that minimize risks of corruption (sealed bid, 3 staff to
witness)
Finance and • Facilitated quick payments, even for larger amounts (2-3 days versus 2-
Internal Audit 3 weeks under normal circumstances)
Gov’t and other • Support towards quick approval of emergency proposals
Agencies Liaison
IT • Gave good support at HQ level and FO level
• Provided user friendly software

Comments and Recommendations:

• In order to be able to replicate, systems and procedures need to be well documented

and clearly communicated to FOs for further dissemination.

• In the Humanitarian Support Coordinator’s (HSC) view, the performance of some

program support departments improved, but worsened in other cases. As a positive
example, it was mentioned that a procurement policy was put in place that included
specific emergency protocols (e.g., to save time, direct approvals from CD for
emergency purchases).
 15

CARE Membership Views:

Among the Membership, there was agreement of what went well in CARE Ethiopia’s
emergency response:

• Strong analysis of the situation early on followed by a strong strategy which assisted
members in raising funds for the CO
• Early, regular, and detailed communication by the CO with CI members -- prompt
and informative
• Strong emergency sitreps both in terms of quality and detail of information was
identified as very useful. Members and donors that received the sitreps appreciated
them as a source of information.
• Concept notes received by members were of high quality and well written which
facilitated the members dialogue with donors
• Prompt and comprehensive responses to donor questions in the proposal/fund
raising process
• A less explicit feedback was that most of the members said that they didn’t have to
provide much support which indicates the strength of the CO in regards to managing
emergency response; this is noteworthy given the size of the operation.

Comments and Recommendations:

• Alerting the membership to an impeding crisis as early as June 2009 was

appreciated
• Including international standards in sitreps would be useful, as well as disaggregated
data (e.g., break down by gender). In the future, CO should focus on measuring the
response against standards/benchmarks such as SPHERE and HAF, etc.
• CI members were able to feed into/promote media interest due to the awareness
raised by the CO; the fact that this was the 25th anniversary of aid in Ethiopia also
increased the interest in the country/region.

Feedback for CI:

• Leading on from the initial action in June taken by the CD, from the CO perspective,
CI-CEG’s follow-up by setting up the CCG, help with the protocols and leverage
funding was much appreciated.
• In general, communication between CO and CI members was excellent.
• The support from CARE USA on food security (Miles Murray) and CEG on HR was
particularly strong (for example, for the hiring of a WASH expert).
• The commitment of the CI members who attended the AAR workshop was noted.

6. “What could we do better next time?”

Daniel Alemu, LKM PDQS, presented a summary of the HAF rapid review findings of
areas where CARE could have done better in regards to the 2009 emergency response
(i.e. weaknesses). In summary:
 16

• CARE addresses the needs in its areas of intervention, however, emergency

projects, in particular WASH, lack sustainable linkages to longer-term rehabilitation
and development projects and don’t provide long-term solutions.
• There are long delays in some project agreement processes due to time lags
between donor an government approval. One donor also mentioned delays in CARE
responding to queries. 
• We seem to fail in accessing people in the most remote areas (e.g. CTC ), or in the
words of one beneficiary in Afar: “I have walked since yesterday to reach here. I
have questions for you. But you have to come to my village to understand. But you
won’t be able to reach. So I am not asking the question.”
• CARE’s implementation was rated by one donor as “acceptable, but doesn’t stand
out as a partner compared to others”.
• Other organizations are better in impact reporting, or at least try to measure impact
while CARE during its response was focusing more on output indicators.
• Other INGOs respond quicker, especially the ones with an emergency focus.
• CARE’s cost structure and finance/accounting systems don’t seem to fit a quick
emergency response.
• CARE’s rules and regulations allow less flexibility as compared to other INGOs. At
the same time these rules don’t appear to give CARE a higher degree of
accountability.
• CARE lacks unrestricted funds and therefore maybe more risk averse than other
partners.
• Communities and local partners mentioned the lack of community consultation during
project design (e.g. construction activities).
• Some women indicated fearing to complain about women’s exclusion and of other
beneficiaries that should have been included.
• In one area, the local GOE representatives complained that CARE is not willing to
accept government nutrition screening data
• Limited joint monitoring and meetings with Woreda partners were mentioned. This is
a Catch 22: Partners would like to participate, but are overstretched and don’t have
the logistics to join. Some partners claimed that CARE keeps cancelling meetings.
• International partners also mentioned that CARE seems to focus on donor and
government requirements, less on the people that are being served
• Communities and local partners mentioned that project information is not
transparently and clearly provided to the community (e.g., language barriers)
• There is no formal response to community complaints and there is no CARE staff
regularly assigned to handle complaints.  

Comments and Recommendations:

• The women focus group discussions were more vocal.

 17

• There was an underlying tension in some of the groups due to the presence of
government counterparts and the perceived lack of safe space to speak up among
the men.

• As there was no formal complaint system in place, communities mostly voiced their
concerns through the government representatives who then passed the information
on to CARE. Although people mentioned that they saw the local authorities as their
representatives, it still invites the risk of complaints being censored.

• There was inconsistent awareness among CARE staff that the lack of a formal
complaint mechanism was an issue. The community facilitators played an informal
role of passing on beneficiary concerns to the FOs.

• Regarding the lack of a formal complaint mechanism, the issue here is to create an
environment where people feel free to complain. At least people know they can
complain, but it is disconnected from an actual complaint mechanism. Such a
mechanism would make it easier for people to raise their voices and be part of
empowerment. Other NGOs and even the GOE do not have formal complaint
mechanisms, but this should not be seen as an excuse. The lead member can
provide help and advice sought from CI in establishing complaint mechanisms. 
 
• The HAF review also demonstrated the high and at times unrealistic expectations of
government and communities towards CARE, i.e., being able to address all the
needs; CARE should find ways for communities to complain about the services
CARE provides and to respond/feedback in a timely fashion.

• In the discussion, the point was also raised that at times donors expect CARE to
bring about long lasting change but the funding they provide is often for short-term
projects.

• In general, workshop participants expressed their appreciation for the HAF

framework. The opinion was voiced that the framework might be replicated and
adapted to CARE’s long-term development programs. The facilitator mentioned that
it is an ongoing discussion on CI level, i.e., dropping the “H” and focus on an
organization wide Accountability Framework.

• During the HAF review, government representatives raised the issue that at times
CARE would not agree with the official beneficiary numbers and targeting approach.
Beneficiary numbers are politically sensitive in the Ethiopian context (i.e. figures on
total number of people in need across the country). Therefore, CARE has to be
vigilant and diligent in documenting the evidence in order to be able influence the
higher-level policy discussions (i.e. multi agency seasonal assessment figures) and if
necessary to challenge the GOE in an appropriate manner on beneficiary numbers.
Action can also be taken through various forums (e.g., the office of the UN
 18

Humanitarian Coordinator), but CARE has to have the data and evidence ready to
document the points raised.

• In the past, CARE has been able to affect change on several occasions, especially
on the local level. In one case in Borana, CARE was able to document that Kebele
elders were targeting their family members; this was brought to the attention of
higher GOE level and the lists were changed accordingly. This shows that with hard
data we do have leverage, but this is more difficult on the national level as these
numbers are a lot more politically sensitive.

Group Exercise:

The group work on areas where CARE could do better in the future started with
examples given by senior staff on issues where they could bring about change. The CD
and the HSC mentioned the triggering of the Disaster Response Action Team (DRAT) –
the Ethiopian version of the Emergency Response Teams -- in early March; this was
very useful, but it should have been done much earlier; it could have made a difference
to implementation, meeting deadlines, and avoiding bottlenecks. It would have ensured
earlier coordination between JEOP, PSNP, the Commodities Unit, and the FOs on the
ground. FO staff mentioned targeting of beneficiaries and contents of food rations as
potential areas for improvement as they were not always correct.

Below is the summary of the group discussions, as well as the comments from the
participants.

Group 1: Leadership and Decision Making

Key Point Causes How to improve in the future

1. Lack of dissemination of
decisions, concerns, and
information between CO
program team and FOLT, as
well as FOLT and field team
2. Downward accountability is
not included in project design
and implementation
• Little time available for • Updating staff on every
communication discussion and decision
• Lack of means of made at CO and FO level
communication • Conducting a FO staff
• Lack of logistics meeting every 15 days at
• Barriers for Woreda level.
communication such as
long distances between
CO and FOs and poor
internet connections
• Poor quality of cell phone
network
• Disconnect between • Better orientation of
emergency and regular emergency staff
M&E systems, such as • Use high level meetings
Community Score Cards, on DRR and P-shift to
Community Review and integrate accountability
Reflection Processes, (PDQS and
 19

Key Point Causes How to improve in the future

3. Failure to use the existing
system/mechanisms
(Emergency Procurement,
DRAT)
4. Expansion in operations
without change in program
support
Social Audits, and Panel
Monitoring 12
• Lack of understanding
• Lack of coordination
• Time constraints and
pressures on the team
• Lack of thought and
coordination
• Pressure to appear cost
effective in our response
• Donor/GoE constraint
PMT/Emergency)
• Integration and working on
synergies between
projects
• Work on internal and
external accountability
• Use down time for specific
training/orientation
• Advance planning
• Integrate standard
systems into the EPP
• Mentoring from senior
staff to more junior staff
• Guidelines on rapid staff
expansion should be part
of the EPP
• Involve DRAT in proposal
design

Comments and Recommendations from other Groups:

• Ad. 1. Lack of dissemination of decisions, concerns, and information between CO

program team and FOLT, as well as FOLT and field team: Meetings with focal point
like lead Community Facilitators should take place every 15 days or shorter for
information sharing purposes (part of the regular unit meetings). Frequency should
be decided at FO level. Up and down information sharing should be reviewed (CO-
FO-Units and back).

• Ad. 2. Downward accountability is not included in project design and

implementation: More use and inclusion of local partners could bring improvements.
Even though there is already a good start with local taskforces, we need to
strengthen it further (may be though periodic review meetings and connection to
other unit’s systems). Accountability needs to be addressed internally and externally.

• Ad. 3. Failure to use the existing system/mechanisms (Emergency Procurement,

DRAT): The usage of the term “failure“ triggered a discussion whether it is not more
a procedural issue and not true on all levels. Emergency purchases have also
disadvantages, like higher prices. Overall, purchases could be improved with better
coordination of procurement within CARE.

• Ad. 4. Expansion in operations without change in program support: Other groups

commented that this is part of the contingency planning and EPP processes.
Furthermore, it would make sense to involve the DRAT more, e.g., by having the
DRAT review project proposals.

12
Social Audit is a community resource monitoring mechanism; Panel Monitoring is a participatory
monitoring mechanism with a group made up of project staff, government partners, and some community
members. The panel oversees activities at the field level, identify constraints, strengths, weaknesses etc.
and recommends appropriate action.
 20

• Other comments included the following:

o Sharing of experiences with other COs (e.g., TDY).
o Periodic project review meetings with the GOE.
o System for information and lessons learned sharing on a continuous basis
(internal and external)
o Gather Human Interest stories to make the emergency work more tangible for the
senior leadership and outside audiences.
o Assign a dedicated CI person as focal point for all communications between CO,
EHAU, CEG, CI Members.
o Consistent contact to and support by the CI-CEG Regional Emergency
Coordinator

Group 2: Emergency Response and Quality

Key Point Causes How to improve in the future

1. Beneficiary targeting:
Exclusion and inclusion
errors in JEOP
2. Weak integration
between emergency
project and other
development projects
3. Community role in
planning (weak
participatory approach at
all levels: Community,
Woreda, zone, region)
4. Rolling out of EPRP (so
far it hasn’t happened
continuously and the
current version needs
revision)
5. In all emergency
projects there is no formal
community complaint
mechanism
6. Construction activities
not completed within
project period
• Logistic, staffing, limited
role of CARE in terms of,
e.g., advocacy
• Poor communication,
attitude of staff, PAR
system requirements, and
therefore focus of staff on
their own projects.
• Pressure from donor
• Project design timeline
from projects
• Last prepared in 2007
• Less attention because of
rush implementation of
projects
• Lack of time
• HSC and staff turnover
• Complaint mechanism
system is not in place
• Contracting
mechanisms/procedures
are long
• Limited experience within
CARE
• Apply Woreda and Kebele
level taskforce for monitoring;
enhance CARE’s role
• Continue Emergency Unit
meetings and circulate minutes
• PMT function stronger
replicated at the FO level
• Have projects ready on shelf at
FO level
• Enhance communication at
CO, FO, government office
and community level
• EPP or EPRP (Emergency
Preparedness/Response Plan)
• Request support from CI
• Pay attention to EPRP (as a
priority and plan accordingly)
• Delegate responsibility to
stakeholders at CO and FO
level
• Include in project documents
• Design complaint tracking
checklist for every project
(incorporate locally available
system)
• Include in JD for front line staff
(Community Facilitators and
Lead Community Facilitators,
Project Officers)
• Strengthen joint monitoring
specific to community
• Revising vendor contract
• Realistic time frame for large
infrastructure projects
• Involving community in
construction activity as a
committee
 21

Key Point Causes How to improve in the future

7. Limited experience on • Use feedback for new
applying lesson learnt from emergency projects
previous emergency
project
8. Causes for malnutrition • Limited planning • Interventions based on the
are not considered in specific causes of malnutrition
interventions

Comments and Recommendations from other Groups:

• Ad. 1. Beneficiary targeting 13 : Exclusion and inclusion errors in JEOP -- deliberate

vs. unintentional targeting errors are the cause of exclusion/inclusion in targeting.
The deliberate errors refer to accountability, which CARE can address. CARE also
needs to focus on how to address unintentional errors.

• Evidence needs to be collected during targeting to be able to challenge the GOE

numbers at the local level. At higher levels, there is inherent exclusion because of
the way the aid architecture is structured in Ethiopia (negotiation of overall
beneficiary figures at regional and federal levels) which is most likely beyond
CARE’s ability to prevent.

• Ad. 2. Weak integration between emergency project and other development

projects: There are mechanisms of emergency coordination with other units in the
FOs already, but still needs to be improved on; the issue is that Project Managers
usually have the information but have trouble in cascading it upwards and
downwards.

• As there is one central manager of emergency projects at the FO level (EPMs), the
level of integration and coordination is fairly high. However, there appears to be
room for improving the coordination between the emergency unit and other
units/projects at the CO level.

• The Personnel Activity Report (PAR) was cause for concern in regard to finding
appropriate ways of charging time to coordination between units. Senior
Management and HR were asked for guidance on this for cases when activities are
not directly related to the projects staff members are assigned to (there was
disagreement on this matter how much of a problem this actually is).

• There is the need to develop a mindset that coordination benefits people’s individual
projects regardless of the PAR percentage charging. Coordination can be justified

13
“Targeting” in this context is meant by the process of defining, identifying and reaching the intended
beneficiaries of a program. Common problems for JEOP and other food aid programs include: Errors of
exclusion (intended target group members are excluded from the benefits) or errors of inclusion (non-
targeted people are included); dilution of transfers (too little aid, and/or too many recipients); diversion or
leakage (transfer resources are put into the system but do not reach the intended beneficiaries at the other
end); conflicting ideas of who the target groups are (or should be); bias or corruption; misinterpretation of
targeting criteria or directives; and weak accountability and appeal systems
 22

as contributing to the value and efficiency of one’s project. There needs to be a shift
in mentality that integration does in fact benefit one’s own individual projects.

• Limited funding available for recovery projects.

• Ad. 3. Community role in planning (weak participatory approach at all levels;

community, Woreda, zone, region): CARE must ensure that communities receive
proper explanations when shelf-projects are being developed to avoid false
expectations (make sure they understand we are only developing proposals and
they may not become funded).

• There is a need for baseline information on the communities CARE serves that is
updated regularly. This might actually be even more beneficial than having shelf
proposals as “shelf baseline data” could be drawn from during project development.
The Program Quality and Assistance Tool (PQAT) and Underlying Causes of
Poverty (UCP) tool could be used for this purpose.

• FO DM&E should be involved and support getting community feedback for planning
proposals and send data to CO emergency staff.

• Ad. 5. In all emergency projects there is no formal community complaint mechanism:

Induction of new staff should include training/orientation on complaint mechanisms
to address this weakness in downward accountability.

• Ad. 6. Construction activities not completed within project periods: There needs to
be diligent monitoring of construction activities at the FO level and earliest reporting
of problems. There have been a few good examples with construction, however,
problems have been caused by: Lack of accountability from the contractors’ side;
lengthy/bureaucratic procedures within CARE; inexperienced project managers in
the field; price rises for imported items; delays in production of required items due to
electricity cuts; and lack of close monitoring by country and field offices.

• Ad. 7. Limited experience on applying lesson learnt from previous emergency

project: Lack of experience sharing b/w CO and FOs. CARE should make sure to
actively draw on lessons from past projects and evaluations/lessons learned reports

Group 3: Program Support

Key Point Causes

1. HR • Staff turnover and continuity of contracts
• Delay of staff recruitment
• Delays in salary payment for short-term contract staff
• Lack of roster for emergency staff at CO level
2. Procurement • Delay in commodity purchase and transportation
• Purchase of commodity with three months shelf-life for a 18 months
project
• Lack of expiry date for commodity purchases
• Poor quality
• Delay in delivery of rental cars
• Delay in paying rental contracts
3. Finance • Delay in processing vendor payments that cost us our trustworthiness
 23

Key Point Causes

in the eyes of the vendor
• Delay in contract staff salary payment
• Payment for loading and unloading
• Lack of trust for contract staff on project advance
4. Gov’t & other • Delay in project agreement signing especially with government offices
agencies liaison on regional level (lack of prioritization on the side of the regional Gov’t.)
5. IT • Communication problem between CO and FOs (E.g. East Hararghe,
Borana, Awash)
6. Commodity • Lack of consistency in reporting
• Lack of standardized warehouses and sometimes lack of warehouses
all together

Comments and recommendations from other groups:

• Ad. 1. HR: Admin and HR were asked to review the current contract modalities for
emergency projects. Staff is hired on temporary contracts in line with the project
duration. These colleagues have to be let go when projects end which means that
CARE looses permanently institutional memory and expertise. However, in light of
the CARE business model (i.e., based on donor funded projects of limited duration)
and the labor laws, this will be difficult to change. This not withstanding, the equity
and fairness of the current contracting system should be reviewed.

• Although HR was criticized during the workshop for slow hiring processes during the
emergency response, delays had also been caused by program. Thus, the inter-play
between units should be reviewed.

• Ad. 2. Procurement: Emergency programs usually don’t purchase food but deal with
donated items which limits flexibility in terms of appropriateness of the relief goods
available. Procurement staff clarified though that a 3-year shelf life is standard for
most food items such as CSB, Famix, and sometimes even Plumpy’nut (ready to
use therapeutic food). Many of the challenges procurement is facing might be
possible to resolve by proper planning of purchase requests and sharing of
information between units.

• Ad. 3 Finance: Finance staff clarified that “lack of trust in project staff” is not the
issue. It’s a system requirement to mitigate risk when it comes to handling of cash.
Therefore, the issue is to review and improve the current system so that contract
staff can handle project advances.

• Payment of temporary staff has not been always expedited in a timely fashion. Once
PARs have been submitted, payment should be triggered without delays. Finance
should be asked to look into the matter. FOLT should be involved in resolving this
issue and follow up on its implementation.

• Ad. 4. Gov’t & other agencies liaison: To reduce delay in projects, CARE should
negotiate and consult with the government about the project design ahead of time
before finalizing the project proposal. This might not exclude the possibility of
delays, but at least reduce the risk of regional Government officials withholding their
signature and showing this way their displeasure for not having been sufficiently
 24

included in the design process (which has caused delays of up to six months in the
past).

• Ad. 5 IT: Communication problems are due to the limited frequency band provided
by the GOE. As for Internet connection in some operational areas, CARE had to rely
until recently on slow dial-up connections. Even the expensive VSAT option in
Borana has not yielded satisfactory results unless the GOE allows upgrading the
system to broadband. For the time being, the mobile Internet connections (CDMA,
EVDO) using the cell phone network appear to be the best compromise.

CARE Membership Views:

• In terms of technical support for a sector, donors’ engagement and maintaining

relationship with donors could be improved (e.g., ECHO). There should be an
ongoing dialogue and continuous interaction between donors and CARE Ethiopia.

• The recovery elements of the emergency strategy could be strengthened

Comments:

• In the discussion it was mentioned that a stronger CO engagement with donors also
depends on the support given by the membership. The CO would like to see a
mechanism to have more consistent contact with CI members in order to know the
status of project proposals.

• The CO stated that some of the attention from CI and the membership dropped when
larger emergencies happened, e.g., the CI CEG Head of Emergency Operations was
lost as a main point of contact when Haiti happened. Although it was clarified that is
should anyway be the REC who is the first point of contact, it was noted that for the
future there needs to be clear communication who has been delegated as focal point
in an emergency on both CI and LM level, especially if staff are deployed. It was
recognized that CEG has very few staff to cover the entire CARE world.

• A proper orientation of new hired staff at CO level is necessary to familiarize them

with CI structures, and roles of various entities and positions.

• Overall, good and consistent communication with the membership and CI-CEG is
important. As an example it was noted that when Sitreps suddenly stopped arriving
as they were by mistake by the CEEU sent to a wrong email address, this did not
trigger questions by CI. Last but not least, the use of the emergency roster was
encouraged.

• In relation to media work, CARE ETH had the support from a former CIUK media
staff, Amber Meikle. However, in-country media coverage beyond reporting on the
basics of emergency response was limited (for example, OCHA weekly updates that
often get published in local newspapers). This is due to Government sensitivities
about its image related to humanitarian crises, and concerns about jeopardizing
CARE’s emergency response. Being a lead member in various coordination forums
(HINGO, EHCT) provided an opportunity for behind the scene advocacy.
 25

7. Action Planning and Recommendations for the Future

The following is a summary of recommendations from the rapid assessment against the
HAF:

• Encourage the participation of communities, in particular women

• Engage stronger in partner capacity building
• Strive for timely response to complaints and timely emergency response
• Focus on holistic programming and the relief-recovery-development continuum
• Strengthen the awareness raising components of WASH programs
• Review equity issues between regular and temporary staff
• Lobbying for donor flexibility for emergency projects
• Strengthening the early warning information and data base system
• Support early warning systems on a community level
• Ensure transparency in reporting
• Encourage AAR type of activities as part of the Mid-term evaluations (i.e., when
there is time to adjust program activities)
• Engage in cross learning with other HAF partners
• Ensure CARE representation in coordination mechanism on regional and federal
level
• Advocate the harmonization of targeting guidelines (especially between the
Government and CARE in nutrition projects)

Comments:

• The presentation of the HAF review findings triggered a discussion about gender and
gender mainstreaming. During the review exercise, women were especially
encouraged to share their views. The topic was not raised from the GOE partners’
side although women affairs representatives were present. The question of cultural
change in general and FGM (changes taking place, but very slow) was raised in one
meeting with government partners. Gender mainstreaming is a deliberate part of
CARE’s work in emergencies (e.g., HRF nutrition project in Borana), but it is clearly a
work in progress.

• CARE might be loosing some capacity with the move of the Gender focal person, but
the commitment continues. It was recommended to take advantage of the new
Gender emergency position in Geneva that started in March.

Lessons Learned from AAR 2008:

Before moving to action planning based on the recommendations, Alix Carter presented
on the key strengths, weaknesses, and recommendations (i.e. lessons learned) which
were identified in the November 2008 AAR. No questions were raised although it was
noticeable that many of the findings of 2008 re-emerged, e.g.,

• Lack of connection between CARE’s emergency response with development work

and the need to consistently implement and mainstream disaster risk reduction
(DRR).
• Difficulties with communication among different offices due to the poor
communications infrastructure in Ethiopia.
 26

• Lack of effective mechanisms to ensure downward accountability, particularly in the

context of emergency response. Therefore, the need was identified to create an
effective beneficiary feedback system that provides CARE feedback on its and other
stakeholder performance.
• CARE Ethiopia must work to build complaint systems and involve communities as
much as possible.
• Review and update the country office EPP.
• Improve coordination among various units during budget preparation and project
implementation.

Group 1: Leadership and Decision Making – Action Plan

Recommendations Completion Dates Responsible Resources

Person Required
1. Better up and downward
dissemination of
information, participation
and input in decision
making
• Both up and downward • Ongoing process • EPM and LCF/PO • Good information
information sharing • Recommendation: flow between
• Conduct regular meetings conducted meetings DRAT-HSC-
both with FO staff and every 1-2 weeks CEEU- EPM- FO
Community Facilitators depending on the team and CFs
context (E.g. WH
weekly, Borana
fortnightly)
2. Downward
accountability to be
included in design and
implementation (on all
levels).
• Institute HAF and integrate • FY 11, 1st quarter • Jason, Asmare • Jason and
with existing accountability (PDQS), CEEU, Asmare to meet;
mechanisms PMT • Include financial
resources for this
into emergency
proposal (i.e.
staffing)
3. Existing system not fully
utilized
• Identify gaps in staff’s • Jason, EPM
knowledge and assign
mentors
• Focus on systems when
effecting EPP
4. Expansion of emergency
program support
• Proportional expansion of • Immediate (for the • EPP team (for the • To be discussed
program support as 1st two 1st two during EPP
emergency expands recommendations) recommendations) Workshop 31
• Staff expansion plan as March 2010
part of EPP
• Inform DRAT on proposal • Jason (for the 3rd
 27

Recommendations Completion Dates Responsible Resources

Person Required
design • Ongoing (for the 3rd recommendation)
recommendation)
5. For CI: More consistent
linkages and technical
support
• Assign remote CI technical • From now on and • CI sector specialist
support person ongoing (for the 1st one)
• Backstopping arrangement • CEG HEO (for the
for CEG Head of 2nd one)
Emergency Operations
(HEO)

Group 2: Emergency Response and Quality – Action Plan

Recommendations Completion date Responsible Resource

person required
1. Humanitarian • Learning and
accountability Knowledge
Management
Advisor – LKM
PDQS (overall
responsibility)
• Roll out HAF to FOs • 4th quarter of FY • DME (Woldu)
10- 1st quarter of
FY 11
• Include in orientation for • Ongoing and part of • PMs and HR
new staff orientation manual
(Q4)
• Arrange across sharing of • 1st quarter of FY 11 • HSC to task DME • EHAU (Miles
experience between CO Murray)
and CARE Zimbabwe
about complaint
mechanism
• Develop and pilot • 2nd quarter of FY11 • HSC/DME/LKM/ • USD 5,000
complaint system at CO PM/PDQS
2. Linking relief,
emergency and
development
• Adopt/establish PMT like • 1st quarter of FY11 • FOPOM • Technical
meetings at the FO level assistance from
• Selection of impact group • 1st -3rd quarter of • EPO, Livelihood PMT at CO
specific hazard FY11 advisor and • UDS 6,000,
vulnerability assessments PDQS • Support from
(refers to P-Shift) REC M.Khaled
• Review of vendor • 1st Quarter FY11 • Procurement
selection and contract Manager and CO
process for construction, legal advisor
e.g., for WASH Projects (through the
Admin. Director)
• Include topic in EPP, • Ongoing • PMT + include in
mitigation, prevention and ToR
preparedness activities
 28

Comments:

• In the discussion it was noted that the group focused on mitigation and DRR
measures. It was stressed that DRR cannot be the responsibility of the emergency
unit alone but has to be a priority of the entire country program. The issue should be
taken up as part of the EPP.

• The question of beneficiary targeting still needs to be addressed.

• The issue of review of vendor selection and contract process for construction came
up as a couple of WASH projects had serious problems in this regard. The question
is therefore whether under the circumstances CARE should get at all involved in
construction work.

Group 3: Program Support – Action Plan

Recommendations Completion date Person Resource

responsible required
1. HR:
• Area Admin Heads should • Ongoing • AAH, EPM, PM,
communicate the CO a and HR
week ahead for the
renewal of expiring
contracts.
• Develop a roster for • End of July and • HR • Support from
emergency staff at all ongoing CEEU and AAH
levels
• Review contracting of • First Quarter FY11 • HR • Support from
regular vs. temporary staff. CD, ACD, AD
Circulate clarification on
the status of both types of
employment, in particular
regarding salary payments,
project advances and staff
entitlements (suggestion:
as part of an updated FAQ
document)
2. Transportation and
Procurement:
• Review of bottlenecks in • Ongoing • PMT • CEEU
procurement. Priorities
should be given for
emergency purchases
• One person should be • First Quarter FY11 • AD
assigned to handle
emergency purchases and
be held responsible
• Emergency unit should • Ongoing • CEEU
submit their plan ahead of
time
• Shortening bid closing date • First Quarter FY11 • DRAT/ PMT
for emergency food
transportation
 29

Recommendations Completion date Person Resource

responsible required
3. Finance:
• Effecting vendor payments • Ongoing • Area Finance • PMT, CEEU,
within 5 days after Head and PO, and EPM
receiving payment order Finance
from procurement Controller

Comments:

• Regarding recommendations on transportation and procurement, this is already an

ongoing process. Representatives of the emergency unit raised concerns that some
purchases took up to three months to be completed. Program Support clarified that
some causes for the delay are to be found within the unit, but not all. It needed time
to identify the source of the delays. Furthermore, some of the factors causing delays
are to be found in the interplay of different units and need to be reviewed from this
perspective. Bottlenecks need to be identified on an ongoing basis and resolved in
consultation between emergency, procurement, commodities, finance, and admin.

• It should also not be forgotten that transport costs are rising in Ethiopia and
availability of sufficient numbers of reliable transporters/trucks is a longstanding
constraint for all and has even been raised at EHCT level, in particular: (1)
Availability of trucking capacity in the country in general; (2) the GOE’s prioritization
at different times of the year, putting fertilizers and agriculture production inputs
ahead of emergency related commodities, as one example; and (3) competition
across NGOs and humanitarian actors overall for the same limited resource pool,
that weakens the hand of the purchaser (e.g., CARE).

• In regard to the emergency roster, the CO is committed to developing the new

emergency system. This will not only include core emergency positions but also
support staff such as drivers, storekeepers, etc. The system will also include FO
personnel. CARE ETH will have to define its requirements for the roster, what it
should be used for and be realistic what it can deliver. As it will be online in will be
easy to share among units.

• The group’s presentation covered most points except IT and commodity related
issue. However, according to the field staff most of the commodity issues can be
managed at FO level and as long as the necessary budgets can be made available.

8. Conclusion

In the closing remarks, the HSC stressed the comparative advantage that CARE is
running both development and emergency programs. Having a large structure causes
challenges but it also means that CARE has the potential to make real changes in the
communities served by the organization.

Regarding the AAR, the timeline exercise helped to visualize the past eight months
achievements; the workshop in general to identify the organization’s strengths, as well
as to reach a consensus on areas that need improvement.
 30

The rapid HAF assessment leading up to the AAR presented itself as an opportunity to
talk to the beneficiaries on the ground. The HSC recommended that all of CARE staff
should do this more, despite our many other obligations in our daily work lives.

Most of the expectations mentioned at the beginning of day one were addressed to at
least some degree. However, not all questions raised could be fully clarified and
discussed in detail within a large group and the limited time available. Therefore, some
of the questions were deferred to the EPP workshop the following day or will need to be
addressed in the near future.

As a lot of the issues in the 2008 AAR reemerged, it will require commitment by the
entire organization and individuals that action is taken to address these issues.

The workshop concluded with an evaluation of the two-day exercise (see Annex 5).

Tab 2: Participants Evaluation of AAR – Summary:

Moderately Not useful at

Very useful Useful useful all
How useful did you find the AAR
workshop overall?
(26 respondents) 65,4% 30,8% 3,8% 0,0%
How effectively did the workshop
meet the objectives of the AAR?
(26 respondents) 30,8% 69,2% 0,0% 0,0%
Excellent Good Fair Poor
How would you rate the
facilitation of the AAR
workshop? (22 respondents) 63,6% 36,4% 0,0% 0,0%
How do you rate the meeting
facilities? (22 respondents) 27,3% 54,6% 18,2% 0,0%

The evaluation illustrated that a majority of participants were satisfied or very satisfied
with the exercise. Some participants felt that workshop relied too heavily on
presentations. This point was considered during the preparations for the exercise;
however, the daily workload of staff would have made it difficult for many to review the
many materials that fed into the workshop. One comment that was repeatedly mentioned
was that participants would have liked to have more time for the action planning and
discussions. Overall, the comments showed that the purpose of the workshop was met
and participants left with the impression of having learned about CARE’s strength and
weaknesses in its emergency response.
 31

Photo: AAR Workshop Participants – Addis Ababa – 29/30 March 2010

 32

Annex 1: Abbreviations

ACD: Assistant Country Director

AD: Administration Director
AWD: Acute Watery Diarrhea
CCG: Crisis Coordination Group
CD: Country Director
CEEU: CARE Ethiopia Emergency Unit
CET: CARE Emergency Toolkit
CI: CARE International
CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency
CI-ERF: CARE International – Emergency Response Fund
CO: Country Office
CSB: Corn Soya Blend
CSC: Community Score Card
CTC: Community Based Therapeutic Care
DMFSS: Disaster Management and Food Security Sector (GOE)
DRAT: Disaster Response Action Team
DRR: Disaster Risk Reduction
EDRP: East Hararghe Drought Rehabilitation Project
ECHO: European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office
ECHT Ethiopian Country Humanitarian Team
EH: East Hararghe
EHNRI: Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute
ENCU: Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit for Ethiopia
EPM: Emergency Program Manager
EPO: Emergency Program Officer
FAO: Food and Agricultural Organization
FO: Field Office
FOLT: Field Office Leadership Team
GAM: Global Acute Malnutrition
GOE: Government of Ethiopia
HAF: Humanitarian Accountability Framework
HQ: Headquarters
HRF: Humanitarian Response Fund
HSC: Humanitarian Support Coordinator
INGO: International Non Governmental Organization
JEOP: Joint Emergency Operation Plan (NGO consortium)
LKMA: Learning and Knowledge Management Advisor (PDQS)
M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
NCE: No-Cost-Extension
OTP: Outpatient Therapeutic Program
OTP/SC: Outpatient Therapeutic Program/Stabilization Centre
P&G: Procter and Gamble
PAR: Personnel Activity Report
PDQS: Program Development and Quality Support
PMT: Program Management Team
PSI: Population Services International (Partner NGO)
PSNP: Productive Safety Net Program
RMU: Regional Management Unit
SAM: Severe Acute Malnutrition
 33

SNNPR: Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region

TSF: Targeted Supplementary Food
TSFP: Targeted Supplementary Feeding Program
UN-OCHA: United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNICEF: United Nations Children Fund
WASH: Water, Sanitation & Hygiene
WFP: World Food Program
WH: West Hararghe
WHO: World Health Organization
 34

ANNEX 2: AAR Agenda

Day 1 – 29 March 2010

08:00 Security brief for CI Guests at the CARE Office

08:30 Arrival of Participants at Queen of Sheba

08:45 – 09:30 Welcome and Opening

09:30 – 10:30 Exercise 1: Timeline – “What happened?”

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee break

10:45 – 12:30 Rapid Review against the Humanitarian Accountability Framework

– Self-Assessment Findings and Verification

12:30 – 13:45 Lunch Break

13:45 – 15:30 Exercise 2: “What did we do well that would like to repeat next
time?”
Rapid Review Findings
Group Work
• Group 1: Leadership and Decision Making (including
coordination)
• Group 2: Emergency Response and Quality (e.g., targeting,
coverage i.e. beneficiaries and types of interventions,
community participation, complaints systems, monitoring,
coordination, etc.)
• Group 3: Program Support (HR, admin and logistics,
coordination, safety and security, etc)
Group Work Presentations

15:30 – 15:45 Coffee break

15:45 – 17:30 Exercise 2 continued: Group Work Presentations and Views from
the CARE Membership

17:30 Feedback on Day 1 – Facilitator and three volunteers

 35

Day 2 – 30 March 2010

09:00 – 09:15 Summary of Day 1 and Gallery Walk

09:15 – 10:30 Exercise 3: “What could we do better?”

Rapid Review Findings
Group Work (same groups as Day 1)
Group Work Presentations

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 – 12:30 Exercise 3 continued: Group work presentations and Views from
the CARE Membership

12:30 – 13:45 Lunch Break

13:45 – 15:30 Exercise 4 - Action Planning Built on Recommendations

Review of previous After Action Review – “Lessons learned or
‘unlearned’”?
Rapid Review Findings
Group Work

15:30 – 15:45 Coffee break

15:45 – 17:00 Exercise 4 continued: Group Work Presentations

17:00 – 17:30 Workshop Evaluation and Closing Remarks

 36

ANNEX 3: AAR List of Participants

CARE Ethiopia:
Name Location Position
1 Abby Maxman AA Country Director
2 Alix Carter AA Emergency Program Officer
3 Amanuel Tefasse AA Emergency WASH Advisor
4 Amber Meikle AA Communications and Hum. Policy Advisor
5 Asmare Ayele AA PDQS Coordinator
6 Benti Erena AA Commodities Manager
7 Berhanu Moreda AA Administration Director
8 Charles Hopkins AA Pastoralist Program Coordinator
9 Dagnew Menan AA Emergency Preparedness and Livelihood Advisor
10 Daniel Alemu AA PDQS LKM Advisor
11 Daniel Seller AA Facilitator and Senior Emergency Advisor
12 Elelta Ghebru AA Emergency Unit Intern
13 Jason Andean AA Humanitarian Support Coordinator
14 Jundi Ahmed AA Emergency Nutrition Advisor
15 Mandefro Mekete AA Emergency Program Manager
16 Shewaye Yalew AA HR Manager
17 Tewodros Zeray AA Head of Procurement
18 Woldu Tefera AA DM&E Advisor
19 Yewoinshet Adane AA Emergency Nutrition Advisor
20 Bizualem Semagn WH FO Commodities Supervisor Emergency
21 Engida Asha WH FO Emergency Project Manager
22 Melaku Girma WH FO Food Monitor
23 Hossaena H. Mariam EH FO FO POM
24 Solomon Zembelachew EH FO Commodity Supervisor
25 Wubshet Gewane EH FO Emergency Project Manager
26 Yonatan Urgessa EH FO Area Admin Head
27 Alfenur Abu Awash FO FO POM
28 Teshale Tekola Awash FO Emergency Project Manager
29 Aklilu Asefa Borena FO JEOP Project Officer
30 Aman Buli Borena FO Emergency Project Manager
31 Roba Halake Borena FO JEOP Project Officer

CARE International:

Name Location Position

1 Miles Murray CARE USA CARE US Senior Advisor for Emergency
London Programming - Nutrition
2 Mohamed Khaled Nairobi CI-CEG Regional Emergency Coordinator for
Eastern Africa
3 Marko Lesukat Nairobi CIUK Regional Coordinator
Regional Resilience Enhancement Against
Drought (RREAD)
4 Salem Hailemichael Oslo CARE Norge - Program Officer
 ANNEX 4: Disaster Timeline for Ethiopia Food Insecurity and AWD Emergency 2009-2010
Actors Pre-August August September October November December January February March
2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010

CARE June 2009: August 15: Early Sept.: Oct. 2: Nov. 2: Dec 3: Jan 10: Feb 8: HRF
Ethiopia CD informs Project start- Rapid Emergency Awash FO WASH needs Afar radio More approves 6
CI about the up of HRF Nutrition strategy reports 26 assessment broadcasting revisions and month
potential of a funded Assessment Paper for new completed in focusing on resubmission Borana
deteriorating emergency conducted in food suspected Afar Region AWD of Borana Nutrition
food security nutrition Afar Region security/AWD AWD cases Zone 3 prevention Nutrition Response for
situation. intervention finds a GAM released and one through the and control Proposal to CARE (start
in West and rate of 21.8% death in AWD for 8 weeks HRF April 1)
CO responds East and SAM rate Oct. 5: CARE target response (20 min/
to AWD Hararghe of 1.6% WASH areas project week) No new March 1:
outbreak in targeting (critical) Specialist cases of Senior
Afar 8,800 arrives in CO Nov. 16: Mid Dec: Jan 15: AWD Emergency
operational beneficiaries Sept. 10: WASH Borana 6 suspected reported in Advisor
areas as per to respond to CO sends Oct. 17-18: Advisor nutrition AWD cases any of CARE Arrives in
GoE request increasing Emergency Borana FO recruited proposal in Awash operational country to
needs on the Alert to CI for staff conduct (national) to submitted to Fentale areas support with
CO submits ground Type 1 a rapid support with UN OCHA Woreda AAR, HAF
WASH Emergency - livelihood emergency HRF due to reported by Jan 25-Feb and EPP
proposal to Aug. 13: Pre AWD assessment WASH and lack of FO. No new 18: CARE exercises, as
P&G CCG to epidemic in target AWD response cases emergency well as other
review the areas to programs from CIDA reported from program support
June-July situation CARE assess other CARE staffs from tasks.
2009: (CEG/CO/ partners with overall East Awash FO FOs the CO and
CARE RMU) IRC in a situation and Hararghe reports 9 new FOs CO prepares
participates in AWD impact of Drought cases of CIDA rejects participate in for HAF, AAR
multi-agency Aug. 19: emergency Hayaga Rehabilitation AWD in Borana a series of and EPP
Belg CO sends response seasonal project Gewane Nutrition Hygiene exercises
assessment Emergency project (Afar rains (EDRP) Woreda with proposal due Promotion
led by GoE Alert to CI for and West becomes 2 confirmed to lack of and SPHERE March 3:
Type 2 Slow Hararghe Oct 19-23: active deaths. No funding - trainings DRAT
Onset Regions) CO conducts new cases resubmission funded by activated and
Emergency- AWD assess- Mid/Late reported from of proposal to UNICEF meetings are
Drought & Sept. 15: ment in Afar Nov: other CARE HRF. held on a
Food CCG with FO staff Awash FO FOs HRF weekly basis.
Insecurity classifies the and WASH opens CTC CARE approves
combined specialist sites in Afar CO conducts receives NCE NCE for EH March 10:
food security/ Region under rapid nutrition for HRF and WH (until Joint
AWD crisis assessment WASH April 30) Gov’t/CARE
 38

ANNEX 4: Disaster Timeline for Ethiopia Food Insecurity and AWD Emergency 2009-2010
Actors Pre-August August September October November December January February March
2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010

Borana as type 2 CIDA in Amhara intervention JEOP FY monitoring

livelihood Sept. 18: nutrition Region (2 (through 2010 started. review in Afar
project CO applies project (this Woredas) March 17)
proposal for EUR project also with partner and IRC HRF March 10:
submitted to 41,000 form operates in FHI in late subgrant Livestock JEOP starts
HRF the CI ERF WH and EH December project emergency in two
for WASH since April (through project Woredas of
JEOP 5th Specialist 2009) CIDA March 31) approved. Afar
round and WASH nutrition
distribution resources CO submits project CARE USA FSLU FSLU
started Nutrition familiarization informs the January February
CO submits Proposal in workshop CO of report report
revised Borana to with staff and approval for circulated. circulated
WASH CIDA as per gov’t. the P&G
proposal to ENCU partners in grant of USD USAID Crisis
donor P&G request Afar 101,202 for a Modifier Fund
facilitated by WASH approved
Nutrition and Nov. 14-20: CARE senior project
HRF WASH CO pastoral nutrition staff targeting The PSI
project and emer- 10,000 training
sensitization gency units people in EH repeated on
workshop and partner and safe water,
SC-UK supporting Diarrhea
conduct a over 35,000 management
joint rapid beneficiaries and water
livestock in other FOs quality
assessment
in Afar after HRF reviews
reports of a pastoral
critical threats unit proposal
to livestock for a
health livelihood
intervention
Afar FO including de-
reports 22 stocking,
new cases of animal feed
AWD in and
Amibara and veterinary
 39

ANNEX 4: Disaster Timeline for Ethiopia Food Insecurity and AWD Emergency 2009-2010
Actors Pre-August August September October November December January February March
2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010

Gewane activities in 2
Woredas with Woredas of
one Afar Region.
confirmed
death – no NCE
AWD cases approved for
reported from HRF WASH
any other intervention
CARE (through
operational March 17)
areas and IRC
subgrant
Nov 30: (through
WASH March 31)
Specialist
ends mission P&G grant
and departs via CARE US
Ethiopia approved:
USD 101,202
Participatory for a WASH
community, project
government, targeting
and CARE 10,000
monitoring of people in EH
projects and
(Panel supporting
Monitoring) over 35,000
beneficiaries
NGO in other FOs.
technical
WASH HRF reviews
meeting pastoral unit
working at proposal for a
AWD hot spot livelihood
Woreda in intervention,
Afar including de-
NGO PSI stocking,
training for animal feed
 40

ANNEX 4: Disaster Timeline for Ethiopia Food Insecurity and AWD Emergency 2009-2010
Actors Pre-August August September October November December January February March
2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010

partners and and

staff from all veterinary
FOs on safe activities in 2
water systems Woredas of
Afar Region

External June 2009: August 13: GoE requests Sept. 28-Oct. WHO reports Dec 7: Jan 11: Feb 2:
Actors – GoE calls for GoE shares USD 500,000 11: GoE led that AWD GoE releases WHO reports GoE releases
Ethiopia and NGO support draft to contain the multi agency cases are still Multi-sectoral that AWD humanitarian
International to respond to Humanitarian AWD mid-Meher present in 7 contingency cases are requirements
AWD Requirement outbreak in seasonal regions and plan (based now in document for
outbreak in s Document. Addis Ababa assessment Addis Ababa, on mid-Meher decline in Jan.-June
Afar Region Requests from continues. but rates are assessment affected 2010: Over
emergency UNICEF. declining and results) for areas 5.2 million
June-July WASH UNICEF A joint FEW/ the national Jan-June people
2009: support to commits to SNET/WFP case fatality 2010: 4.8 UNICEF estimated to
GoE leads address the USD 100,000 report finds a rate is also million people reports that require
multi agency need of for training high food sustained expected to roll-out of emergency
Belg assess- estimated 1.6 and insecurity below 1 per require OTPs food
ment million people operational situation in cent emergency programs has assistance
through-out and emer- costs. most of food increased in and over
the country to gency food SNNP, AWD assistance hotspot 67,000 AWD
assess food assistance for Examples of Northern Partners and over Woredas of treatment
security 6.2 million activities by Afar, parts of Meeting 118,000 SAM Amhara,
situation through the other orgs.: - Amhara, forum cases Oromiya, UNICEF
end of 2009 WHO Eastern established SNNP and reports that
commits USD Oromiya, and by UNICEF Late Dec: Tigray admissions to
August 27: 30,000 for Gambella for NGO and Partner SC- TFP have
WHO reports AWD Regions and UN partners UK conducts The 3rd been
that 123,000 response extremely to discuss nutrition annual decreasing in
AWD cases - UNICEF severe and survey in National partner
are expected sends 20,000 situation in coordinate Borena Zone Disaster Risk project
in coming bottles of Somali AWD on a and finds Management implementati
weeks water guard Region and weekly basis. 38% GAM Conference is on areas,
to Addis the Southern GoE not rates in adult held on except in
Ababa health Oromiya included population January 21- West
bureau. lowlands because of 22 in Addis Hararghe and
 41

ANNEX 4: Disaster Timeline for Ethiopia Food Insecurity and AWD Emergency 2009-2010
Actors Pre-August August September October November December January February March
2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010

- UNICEF ENCU the political Nov 23 – Ababa East

and Oxfam reports sensitivity Late Dec: Hararghe
establish increasing surrounding GoE led multi Zones in
sanitation TFP AWD, agency Oromiya
facilities at caseloads in requiring a Meher Region (both
churches and Oromiya, safe space assessment are CARE
holy sites in especially for partners in continues operational
Amhara West which they WHO reports areas). As of
Region to Hararghe could openly that outbreaks the end of
prepare for Zone discuss the of AWD have December
religious situation. re-emerged in 2009, TFP
celebrations EHNRI CARE in several parts admissions
(increased reports that regular of the country, have been
risk of AWD) the incidence attendance including Afar, increasing in
of new cases Oromiya and select areas
AWD cases of AWD is FEWS- SNNP regions of the
continue to declining NET/WFP (CARE is country,
be reported in across the Food Security working in namely
5 regions and country but Outlook Oct. Afar and Somali and
all 10 sub- still remains a 2009 - March Oromiya) Amhara
cities of Addis threat 2010 Regions.
Ababa indicates that
. Oct 22: Meher rains WHO reports
Sept. 28-Oct. GoE officially has been that cases of
11: GoE releases below AWD
leads multi Humanitarian average this continue to
agency mid- Requirement year in decline
Meher s Document Eastern and across the
seasonal with needs Southern country
assessment for Oct. – parts of the
throughout Dec.2009: country.
the country to 6.2 million Expected
assess food people result: delays
security estimated in in Meher
situation and need of production
risks in other emergency and
sectors food extension of
assistance; the hunger
 42

ANNEX 4: Disaster Timeline for Ethiopia Food Insecurity and AWD Emergency 2009-2010
Actors Pre-August August September October November December January February March
2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010

OCHA 78,000 season

releases children for
statement on SAM WFP reports
food crisis in treatment; that the TSF
the region and program is
132,149 facing critical
people resource
CI ERF require shortfalls
approved for support to
WASH deal with ENCU
response AWD requests
CARE and
CI-CEG WFP other
supports CO circulates a partners to
with revised intervene with
recruitment of Hotspot CTC in
a WASH Matrix to Borana Zone
specialist partners of due to rising
CARE’s rates of
CARE USA operational malnutrition
donates 1.4 areas, 14
million Woredas are Nov 23 – late
sachets of identified as Dec: GoE led
PUR to priority 1 for multi agency
support response and Meher
AWD/WASH 10 fall under seasonal
response priority 2 assessment
(supplies not throughout
to arrive in the country to
country until assess food
March 2010) security
situation and
other sectors
 43

ANNEX 5: Workshop Evaluation

1. How useful did you find the AAR workshop overall?

Table 1: Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Participants by ratings of the overall AAR

No. Percentage
Very useful 17 65.4%
Useful 8 30.8%
Moderately useful 1 3.84%
Not at all useful None None

Comments:
The AAR was very useful in identifying our strong and weak points.
To critically reflect on what worked and also brainstorm how to improve on CARE’s work
further is a valuable exercise.

2. What part of the AAR was most useful to you and why?

Discussing objectively what has worked well and less well.

Lessons learnt from different corners of FO’s, Cos and CI and others which may help to fill
our gaps in the upcoming programs (This answer was given very frequently).
The program target, design, and quality. It’s something which can be implemented.
Presentations of the rapid review findings.
Recommendations: being realistic on the action.
The exercises: culminating in the action points.
The timeline
Group work: it helped to understand the situation in all themes. Moreover, it has reflects
each individual’s perspective.
All parts of the discussion.
Learning what went well and what we’ve done better is very useful part of AAR. Because it
gives insight to build up on what went better and improve the weaknesses.
The accountability section, especially for community beneficiaries, was very useful because
we mostly give priority for donors commitment set out on proposals.
Program support issues because these are the bottleneck for rapid emergency responses.
Knowing the interventions, group discussions, plenary discussion.
HAF in emergency situations is the most useful part to discharge one’s responsibilities and
accountabilities to communities in general.
Coming together as a group to share concerns as this is a rare opportunity.
Visiting the previous action plans and recommending new ones because this certainly
guides future actions.

3. What part of the AAR was least useful and why? (Not answered by many participants)

All parts were useful (most frequent answer)

The strength was over mentioned while there are practical problems prevailing.
Some of the findings presented because most of them don’t reflect the actual fact on the
ground.
The Program Support section. Because identifying problems are not clearly identified.
 44

Action planning and recommendation: It was on rush and most of the issues raised are not
as such practical.
Timeline: could have been shared in workshop document.

4. How effectively did the workshop meet the objectives of the AAR?

Table 2: Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Participants by Effectiveness of the

Workshop’s Objectives

No. Percentage
Very Effective 8 30.8%
Effective 18 69.2%
Moderately effective None None
Not effective at all None None

Comments:
Very well organized and background preparations were obviously invested.
Effective because some of the issues were reemphasized and timeline was put for coming
actions.
The participants have got clear image about HAF accountability in emergences and where
we are as CARE Ethiopia.
Effective in the content: honest about our weaknesses but the question is will we apply
these lessons?
The mode of learning/ experience sharing in group work is appreciable.
The discussion helped us to assess the regular program intervention with the already set out
tools for emergency program.
It was to the point and effective.
It has touched the critical issues with regard to AAR.
We learnt a lot of issues and shared experiences.
Because of time constraints we couldn’t effectively brainstorm out weaknesses.
Group participation of more junior Field Staff was difficult.
Very effective since we came to learn critical areas where we are strong and where we are
weak as an organization.

5. How do you expect to use the learning gained from this AAR in your own work?

It will fill our gaps in all corners of units in the upcoming programs.
It helped us to be more capable to do our job effectively and efficiently.
By linking the lessons learnt to my work and also referring to other sources like the care tool
kit.
I’ve got a lot on Program Support i.e. on how to support the emergency unit.
Through discharging my responsibilities in facilitating emergency responses.
We are expected to use the learning and recommendations to improve the quality of
emergency response.
Through communicating /disseminating the issue to staff, support unit as well as partners
and incorporate the issue to be addressed in the routine field work at each level.
This learning will be applied in day to day project management to bring better impact on our
beneficences.
We need the lesson learnt for other development interventions. We need a report from the
workshop for future references.
 45

Helped me to better understand the complex environment under which CARE emergency
unit operates.
It’s good for continuous reviews on each project.
By using action points as guidance as a way forward.
Through sharing the lessons learnt with FO emergency staff, we can get feedback and work
on it practically.
I expect to use the gained knowledge on time.
Choosing the points where I fit in, I will build upon our best practices and improve our
weaknesses so far.
To actively refer to the lessons on a regular basis and ask one self and colleagues to rate
where we are- how we are progressing.
I expect to apply this gained knowledge down to grass root level especially to lower staff.
Applying it and holding ourselves accountable from here on.

6. How do you think CARE benefits from this AAR?

Improving internal coordination and accountability to our stakeholders

If issues are rectified and bold out at organization level then there is a possibility that they
can be lined into future actions.
CARE benefits a lot (have consensus from the AAR on what went well, what is wrong and
how do we go about it). Further, some development projects/programs may adopt this
exercise to their forward accountability tracking.
CARE staff will have clear understanding on emergency issues discussed in AAR and will
apply on day to day implementation. It will also strengthen program activities and benefit the
organization.
If the lessons are implemented as per the action plan, we will make progress on the
recurrent bottlenecks facing us for the past 2-3 years.
By critically analyzing the report that went out of this workshop and making sense of it.
Becoming more accountable to donors.
CARE Ethiopia has a very long experience in working with emergencies and also creating a
balance between long term development and emergency operations. Therefore, the wider
CI could defiantly benefit from CARE Ethiopia’s experience and hence, the CO should make
utmost effort to share these.
It would help put everybody accountable for their responsibility
It will be an effective institution in terms of implementing a quality humanitarian emergency
intervention.
Given the regular AAR, CARE will use/apply the recommendations put on the previous gaps
identified from the AAR.
The evidence based information from the review will lend itself to make appropriate decision
making process at all levels.
It would only benefit CARE, if we come up with a mechanism to remind people the
commitment made.
By documenting the lessons learnt and communicating through dissemination of the finding
to subordinates and partners.
I think CARE would benefit a lot if it tries to interpret all raised issues and recommendations
into actions in the upcoming emergency operations.

7. How would you rate the facilitation of the AAR workshop?

Table 3: Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Participants by Ratings of the Facilitation of

the AAR
 46

No. Percentage
Excellent 14 63.6%
Good 8 36.4%
Fair None None
Poor None None

Comments:
The time schedule was short
Great work: It was positive and kept momentum flowing
There was a very good facilitation and was well organized
Much appreciation for the facilitator (Daniel S.) on group works
Very flexible and participatory facilitators which considered the tempo of the group
It was good because it allowed the participants to actively engage in discussions through
small group discussions

8. How do you rate the meeting facilities?

Table 4: Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Participants by Ratings of the Meeting’s

Facilities

No. Percentage
Excellent 6 27.3%
Good 12 54.55%
Fair 4 18.15%
Poor None None

Comments:
Coffee, tea, and lunch break was really good
The seating arrangement was not comfortable to handle such a big number of participants
Refreshments could have been done better
Everything was good except the electric power going out

9. Do you have any suggestions on how these AAR exercises might be improved in the
future?

Involving some participants from our stakeholders i.e. from the government and other key
INGO’s
Not the AAR itself but tracking progress in applying lessons is crucial. As we have seen,
we’ve failed to implement lessons from 2008 AAR. Thus, we shouldn’t repeat the same
mistake
The issue of time should be considered for next time for better internalization
More time should be given to action planning as well as discussions and less presentations
Think more about group composition in the future
Involving other non-emergency unit departments
May be the facilitation could be done by the CO staff while the different advisors could play
more of a resource person’s role throughout the review exercises
The outcome needs to be shared with everyone in CARE and we need to post it in the
public folder
Look for any other facilitation other than repeated group works
 47

The pre assessment of AAR should be more scientific in collecting data (quantitative
method)
This AAR should be exercised in coordination and collaboration of all units involved in the
emergency response activities

10. Any other comments? (very few responses)

Keep on updating us on AAR, HAF and any other important issues in the humanitarian
organizations
Most Ethiopians feel to communicate in Amharic and a lot of points may have been missed.
Therefore, for the future look for any other means of initiating to speak in local language
 48

ANNEX 6:

Rapid Accountability Assessment against the

Humanitarian Accountability Framework

CARE Ethiopia – July 2010

Photo: Women Focus Group – East Hararghe Zone, Oromiya Region – 22 March 2010

Daniel Alemu – Learning And Knowledge Management Advisor

Daniel Seller – Consultant/Senior Emergency Advisor
Woldu Terefe – DM&E Advisor
 49

1. Background and Rational for the Exercise

CARE International’s Humanitarian Accountability Framework (HAF) is the guiding document to

the organization’s commitment to accountability at all stages of emergency preparedness and
response. Humanitarian accountability means that CARE strives to use its power responsibly
and shift the balance of power back towards disaster affected people.

Accountability is both a means for CARE to improve the relevance, quality and impact of the
organization’s work, and an end in itself, as our stakeholders – especially beneficiaries – have a
right to hold CARE to account. Implementation of the HAF requires applying a “good enough”
approach (See Chapter 6 of the CARE Emergency Toolkit for details).

Summary of HAF Objectives

• Help ensure that accountability in emergencies remains visible throughout CARE

• Help provide clarity for senior managers who need to know what CARE’s
commitments mean for them and their teams
• Help CARE staff, particularly those working with disaster-affected communities, put
accountability into practice throughout their work
• Help CARE staffs at all levels fulfil our commitments to our primary stakeholders.

In February 2010, CARE tasked a consultant to conduct with the support of the Country Office
and CEG a Rapid Accountability Assessment against the HAF benchmarks and performance
indicators. This was the first time that a full review against the revised HAF was conducted
(version February 2010). 14

The HAF findings feed into to the AAR review of the 2009 food shortage/AWD emergency and
informed and enriched the discussion. The workshop was an opportunity to solicit feedback and
validate the findings from stakeholder interviews, as well as the Country Office (CO) and Field
Office (FO) self-assessments against the HAF benchmarks. Most AAR workshop participants
regarded the HAF assessment as a useful exercise, but asked for further guidance on how to
integrate the HAF into the daily work of CARE.

2. Overview of Monitoring and Evaluation in Emergency Projects in CARE Ethiopia

Emergency projects like regular development projects in CARE Ethiopia use M&E systems for
data collection, documentation, lessons gathering and reporting as the basis for management
decision and internal and external reporting. Emergency projects have well-established log
frames, project implementation plans, M&E matrixes with standard indicators to regularly track
the project performance and achievements in line with the stated project objectives. Since July
2009, the CEEU has a dedicated staff for DM&E related activities.

At the very beginning of the project all emergency projects conduct sensitization/launching
workshop with stakeholder involvement. Likewise and dependent on the type of emergency,

14
CARE’s Humanitarian Accountability Framework. Policy statement and guidance note. Pilot Version, February
2010
 50

project close out/exit workshops are organized. Regular joint workshops and meetings are held
to enhance coordination and harmonization among all partners at Woreda and regional level
during project implementation.

Project staff is conducting regular participatory monitoring exercises with close support of the
Emergency and PDQS staff, Rural livelihoods DM&E Advisor and field based DM&E officers. To
enhance participation throughout the project panel monitoring, joint supervision and review
meetings with the participation of government partners, communities and project staff are in
place. Events and workshops are organized with stakeholders mainly with the government line
sectors, community and other agencies operating in the area to identify the strengths and
limitations for timely correction and adjustments during the project period. Both quantitative and
qualitative information is collected through household and standard nutrition surveys, focus
group discussions, and key informant interviews.

The CEEU has developed a standard menu of indicators for nutrition and WASH responses,
and is developing specific indicators for AWD against key humanitarian standards (SPHERE,
CARE’s HAF, UNICEF guidelines, FANTA, etc). This will improve the measuring of performance
on a regular bases and will be used as a quick reference tool when designing emergency
proposals.

To measure the project achievements, efficiency, and effectiveness against the baseline and to
draw lessons for future programming, emergency projects conduct final evaluations at the end
of most projects. The FO Emergency Project Managers submit monthly and quarterly reports to
the Country Office; the CO submits reports to relevant government bureaus and donors as per
agreements.

Due to the nature of the emergency projects and often short time spans given by donors to
submit proposals, it has been a challenge to effectively include communities in bottom-up
proposal developments processes. Though there is limited time to conduct a grass root
community need assessment during the proposal development period, CARE Ethiopia
emergency unit has managed to collect some basic information and identify existing problems
through the assistance of government partners. Recognizing this shortcoming the CEEU has
started developing shelf concept notes involving the beneficiaries.

Though CARE Ethiopia has been up for a good start in its emergency related M&E activities, the
CO has still a long way to go to improve its emergency DM&E system through learning from
other similar humanitarian organizations or others best practices in the CARE world.

3. Methods Used for the Assessment

Geographic focus:
• East Hararge: Grawa and Kurfe Chale Woredas
• Afar: Amibar and Gewane Woredas
• Addis Ababa

Focus Group Discussions:

• In each location 4 male and female beneficiary community groups (8 focus group
discussion in total)
• Field Office Staff and Community Facilitators (5 in total)
• Government Partners at local and regional level (5 in total)
 51

Individual Interviews:
• 3 UN and INGO Partners
• 2 Donor interviews
• Individual CO/FO staff for triangulation

Feedback on Self-Assessment Questionnaire:

• 11 Responses

Assessment Period:
• 16 – 26 March 2010 and verification during the AAR 29/30 March 2010

The Assessment team consisted of the three authors of this report and of the HSC Jason
Andean for Afar. The methodology employed had three components:

(1) CARE CO and FO staff self-assessment against the HAF benchmarks, using the tool
provided by CI -CEG (see Annex A for summary findings). Both country and field offices
staff involved in emergency operations were asked to provide the self-assessment ratings
by consulting with the peers in their respective units. The summary in annex A represents
the averages of the 11 responses.

(2) Focus Group Discussions (FGD). Semi-structured qualitative interviews (See Annex B).
After some ice-breaking questions, the logic of the AAR was followed -- what went well, what
could have worked better, and recommendations for the future, and in all cases asking in
particular about the benchmark indicators (e.g., timeliness of the response). At the FO level,
FGDs were conducted by separating the groups by community facilitators, emergency
project officers, and FO senior management. This method was employed to have the full
picture of the emergency operations at different levels.

The FGDs at the community level were separated by men and women. This helped to gain
feedback from different perspectives and create an atmosphere where individuals would feel
at liberty to speak up. This might have worked less well with male FGDs as the presence of
local government representatives might have impacted the reliability of information given.
However, as the people present were genuine representatives of their communities,
excluding them would neither have been appropriate nor practical. Only one interview
materialized on the regional government level.

(3) Key informant interviews: Adapted semi-structured interviews with individuals of the UN, the
INGO community and donors involved in the emergency response.

The exercise presented itself as an opportunity to actually talk directly to beneficiaries –

something which senior staff often have little time to do. This should be regarded as a value
added for of the HAF review for both expat and national staff.

4. Self-Assessment Findings

Benchmark 1: Leadership on Accountability

Average Score: 1,9
Summary of Comments:
• The CO is making good and effective efforts to comply with international standards, codes of
conduct, program principles, etc.
 52

• At national/IASC level and within the humanitarian community CARE has publicly committed
to advance humanitarian accountability and has acted upon it.
• Less consistent in how we engage with other humanitarian actors, regional, and zonal
actors.
• CO is investing substantially in humanitarian efforts both in financial terms and in terms of
leadership engagement.
• However, there is inconsistent awareness of HAF standards among the PMT and SLT
members.
• Lines of authority are clear and although late, the Disaster Response Action Team (DRAT)
mechanism is now functioning (equal to ERT).

Benchmark 2: Impartial assessment of needs, vulnerabilities and capacities

Average Score: 2,1
Summary of Comments:
• CARE works with the GOE and humanitarian partners in targeting and identifying the most
vulnerable and affected, e.g. children
• CARE does not always play the primary role in targeting the beneficiaries, this is rather done
by the GOE in conjunction with the communities.
• However, there is a need to improve on including local capacities (e.g., using community
based organizations).
• Data is often disaggregated by gender, but age is not a universal variable in project
interventions.
• The nutrition project has done good assessments, the WASH project assessment had
limited participation of stakeholders.
• Sectoral emergency strategy to guide interventions is under development,
• There are some good examples of seeking other key stakeholder's views in project
assessments and information gathering efforts, e.g., underlying causes of poverty.

Benchmark 3: Design and internal monitoring processes

Average Score: 1,5
Summary of Comments:
• CARE has recently trained staff in SPHERE standards
• The HAF assessment tool is not well known and utilized. However, there are other design
and monitoring tools in use.
• Though not consistent CARE has systematically assessed programme support
effectiveness/efficiency. Recently established specific policy/systems of “emergency
purchases” as part of the procurement guidelines.
• Adapted and adjusted policies to improve efficiency when requested by the Emergency Unit.
• CARE has incorporated learning's from 2006 pastoral drought response in Borana.

Benchmark 4: Participation of disaster-affected communities

Average Score: 2,2
Summary of Comments:
• CARE has made a lot of efforts to include beneficiaries during the project planning phase.
• CARE works closely with community members and representatives through its Community
Facilitators (CFs)
• CARE involves GOE and humanitarian partners in assessments, monitoring and evaluation.
However, limited involvement of stakeholders in the planning and implementation, unless
they are part of the GOE framework.
• However, communities and the poorest are less involved in assessment, planning,
implementation, and M&E.
 53

• Disaster response projects are designed to increase local capacity to respond to disasters,
e.g., WASH projects

Benchmark 5: Systems for stakeholder feedback and complaints

Average Score: 1,6
Summary of Comments:
• Some projects have systems of receiving and addressing beneficiary complaints, which
involves local leaders and government partners.
• However, even if formal complaint and whistleblower mechanisms are in place, staff did not
internalize it and not all are familiar with it.
• When complaints reach senior leadership/management level, there is a better chance that
complaints are investigated and action taken.

Benchmark 6: Information-sharing and Transparency

Average Score: 1,9
Summary of Comments:
• Project related information is provided, but not consistently. Some of the stakeholders do not
receive financial information on projects
• However, GOE Partners have key information on project resources, like SAFTY NET
program (emergency/contingency resources)
• We seem to be doing a fair job in disseminating project relevant information to the
beneficiaries/communities through publications and public announcements.
• However, often the information provided doesn't consider local languages. Therefore, the
CFs are the forefront information providers to communities in their languages
• There are challenges keeping up with the reporting to donors.

Benchmark 7: Independent reviews, external evaluations and learning

Average Score: 1,8
Summary of Comments:
• Evaluations for the most part are conducted with high standards and efforts are made to
include beneficiaries.
• Managers work to implement recommendations, but action points are not always clear.
• There are consistent budget allocations in projects and unrestricted funds for AARs, EPP
and evaluations.
• External evaluators/consultants are involved in evaluations
• There is sharing of results of evaluations with donors, government and partners. However,
communities and local partners face the language barrier.
• Every project implemented is consistently audited by GoE and respective donors, as well as
by CARE’s internal audit unit.
• However, we are inconsistent in incorporating learning's from AARs and reviews.

Benchmark 8: Staff capacity and human resources management during emergencies

Average Score: 2,1
Summary of Comments:
• On CO level, there are mechanisms in place such as JDs that outline clear accountabilities
(this is weaker on FO level)
• Staff signs additional accountability statements like (Sexual Harassment and Exploitation,
Code of Conduct, Conflict of Interest)
• Large number of temporary staff makes it more difficult to hold staff accountable
 54

• As most of emergency staff are temporary, they could not get a chance for proper CO
orientation. However, and although not adequate, most staff receive orientation at Field
Office level
• Policies exist, but staff are not adequately familiar with some of them and/or do not
consistently apply/adhere to them.
• Performance management processes are well established and staff are held accountable
• Performance management systems are in place, institutionalized and used by supervisors
and PMs

5. Findings - What went well

5.1 What is CARE known and appreciated for?

• Majority of stakeholders clearly knows CARE’s work and interventions.
• The Community is aware of emergency and regular programs.
• The stakeholders know the CARE staff assigned and work with them.
• There is good community and staff relationship and mutual respect.

Feedback from international community:

• “CARE is a responsible citizen in the humanitarian community. Top class. 9 out of 10”.
HINGO meeting was absent for a long time. Excellent work put into HRF.
• CD is very well respected in the community, as is other senior staff.
• In CARE values matter. Everybody seems to know what CARE is committed to, from the
drivers to the managers.
• Probably does a better job then others on accountability

5.2 How is CARE’s response perceived?

• Early response in AWD and nutrition.
• CARE has responded when the community was looking for support.
• Nutrition targeting was free of bias.
• CARE has served the community to the best of its capacity
• Provided local capacity building trainings (CVs, HEWs and HWs)

5.3 Participation and coordination

• Good participation during implementation
• Strongly participation of Community Volunteers, clan leaders and community on
targeting/screening
• PA officials monitor implementation process.
• Good participation of Woreda partners since project inception.
• Good Consultation with Woreda line sectors.

5.4 Transparency and Information Sharing

• Partners are usually provided with regular reports
• Information is provided through review meetings
• There is better transparency at planning
• Project start-up workshops were good at providing project information
• The local system of information exchange (e.g., Dagu in Afar) has played a great role in
project information communication
• Mass communication and mobilizations have served in reaching more people with project
information
• Contact with PA leaders has helped to reach the community with project information
 55

• CARE’s transparency is very good. Culture of letting donors and partners know what is
going on, even when there are difficulties in a project. Reporting and grant management
works.
• Seen as a good partner in the humanitarian community. Open to sharing information
(assessments, etc.)

5.5 Complaint Mechanisms

• Community complaints through CFs , PA leaders and extension agents
• CFs usually respond at the spot what they can and the rest communicate to their
supervisors
• Community and partners are comfortable at directly presenting their complaints to CARE
• Partners have used opportunities like task force meetings to present their complaints
• Traditional information mechanisms like Dagu have served for complaint presentation and
feedback

6. Findings- What could we have done better?

6.1 Emergency Response:

• Some staff do not speak local language
• Some knew about project activities but don’t know who is doing them.
• Limited scale to address all vulnerable and satisfy communities need. (E.g. Water supply,
food aid and nutrition.)
• Response in some areas is on and off and lacks sustainability
• Delayed project agreement process
• On spot screening (EOS and CBN Approach)
• Failure to access people from remote areas (e.g. CTC ).

“I have walked since yesterday to

reach here. I have questions for
you. But you have to come to my
village to understand. But you won’t
be able to reach. So I am not
asking the question.”

Quote from woman during FGD in

Afar Region
 56

International Partners:
• Implementation: 5 out of 10. “Kind of acceptable, but doesn’t stand out as a partner”.
• Others respond quicker, especially the ones with an emergency focus. Understood that
there is a link between emergency and development. But it is a barrier to a flexible
response.
• CARE’s cost structure is expensive. Finance and accounting system doesn’t seem to fit a
quick emergency response.
• Lack of unrestricted funds and might therefore be more risk averse than other partners.
• CARE Rules and Regulations allow for less flexibility as compared to others. At the same
time it doesn’t seem to give CARE a higher degree of accountability, despite the rules.
• Lack of flexibility to respond to human sufferings out side operational areas
• CARE is working to address the needs in its areas though the interventions didn’t provide
long term solutions: “Areas which are affected by one hazard this year, next year they will
have the same issues in the same areas”.
• Others are better on impact reporting, or at least try to measure impact

6.2 Participation and coordination

Communities and local partners:
• No clear community consultation during project design (e.g. construction activities.)
• Sometimes fear to complain about women’s exclusion and exclusion of right beneficiaries.--
“Kanfudhate fudhate kankenes Rabbidha jenne dhisna” (Local expression, literally
translates as “Those who got have already taken and it is God who provides”, i.e.,
expression of fatalism)
• Community role in the project is not explicitly shared.
• Limited joint monitoring and meetings with Woreda partners. Catch 22: Partners would like
to participate, but are overstretched and don’t have the logistics to join. At the same time
they claim CARE keeps cancelling meetings.

International partners:
• CARE seems to focus on donor and government requirements, less on the people that are
being served.

6.3 Transparency and Information Sharing

Communities and local partners:
• The project information is not transparently and clearly provided to the community
• There is no formal way of providing project information to the community
• Mass communication and mobilizations are the only known formal mechanisms of project
information sharing
• CARE is not willing to accept government screening data

6.4 Complaint Mechanisms

• There is no formal response to their complaints through CARE people
• The responses provided are not direct and to the satisfaction of the beneficiaries. Usually
complaints lack positive response
• There is no CARE staff regularly assigned to handle complaints. Sometimes we are forced
to go to FO for complaints
• In some of the communities, they are afraid to complain about the targeting, i.e., the
inclusion of not right beneficiaries, especially women.
 57

7. Way Forward - Actions/Improvement suggestions:

7.1 Improvement points on Working with Beneficiary community and local partners:
• There is a need to provide more focus on local community participation (during contract
agreements, design, M&E)
• More focus to be given to women participation was found important
• Partners and communities would like to see emergency programs to be more holistic in
terms of components and scale (Water, Supplementary Feeding, providing medicines and
drugs).
• Timely response to complaints of the community and partners requests was found important
and there is a need for arranging formal complaint mechanisms in place.
• Awareness raising should be strengthened so that sanitary practice improvement through
awareness raising within the community was seen vital. It is found to work on awareness
raising prior to emergency and just appearing to respond to emergency onset like AWD
response.

7.2 Improvement points in improving internal Management and operational efficiency

• Providing Emergency specific Job descriptions for Community Facilitators, consistent
orientations for all staff on CARE and international standards was found important.
• The difference in benefits between regular and temporary staff has created some
frustrations and balancing benefits was seen as one area of improvement.
• Shifting project intervention from short term emergency to longer term development
intervention was seen important to have long lasting impact.
• Focus be given on recovery programs than emergency and scaling up of the projects than
terminating was seen as important.
• Strengthening CSSGs (Community Self-Help and Saving Groups) as a recovery and
response to shocks was cited as one of the options for effective project implementation
• The need for flexibility by donors, CARE was seen vital in-terms of timing, budgets
earmarked, and budget shifting from one activity to the other within the project objectives.
• On time response (avoiding late onset of projects and responses)
• Linking emergency projects with development projects.
• Strengthening the early warning information and data base system.
• Improving transparency in terms of reporting and exchange of information.
• Conducting such AAR before the end of projects preferably at mid-term.

7.3 Improvement points on working with partners (Improving partnership) ,Regional

government and international partners:
• Engaging in cross-learning with organizations outside CARE which are involved in
emergency project implementation.
• Enhancing partners capacity (training, materials and coordination)
• Partners and communities would like to see emergency programs to be more holistic in
terms of components and scale (Water, Supplementary Feeding, Drugs)
• Timely response to complaints of the community and partner requests and making complaint
mechanisms responsive to PA level complaints
• Regional Government would like to see CARE supporting participatory early warning on a
community level.
• Reporting goes usually to the federal government, not to the regional office. In general,
there appears to be a lack of information exchange between the various levels of
government so that hierarchical information flow system that addresses the needs of all
stakeholders is important.
 58

• Representation at regional (specifically Afar region) and federal level is ad hoc. Regular
representation is recommended, especially in the WASH cluster and Emergency Task force
meetings, as partners expect more from CARE considering its experience and being a
strong WASH partner.
• It is thought that CARE has the capacity at least is in a better position than other similar
organizations in emergency.(technical, financial and strong relationship with stakeholders).
Scaling up WASH interventions in operational areas both in emergency response and long-
term project intervention was found important.
 59

Annex A: Self-Assessment Summary Table – HAF Benchmarks

HAF Benchmark CO Score

The Scale Legend:

0 – Benchmark not met
1 – Benchmark partially met
2 – Benchmark mostly met
3 – Benchmark fully met

Benchmark 1: Leadership on accountability

1. Country Office has made a public commitment to comply with specific standards,
principles and codes of conduct. 2,3

2. Senior Management Team members know the standards CARE is committed

to. They include them in policies and allocate enough staff and funds to quality and 2,2
accountability to be able to comply with the HAF.
3. Heads of CARE functional units (program, HR, finance, etc.) have laid down
their own responsibilities for implementing the HAF. They monitor their compliance 1,8
and improve systems and procedures if needed.

4. Country Office has mechanism to deploy adequate resources quickly in

emergencies. This includes clearly defined decision-making mechanisms for rapid 2,1
responses, with clear lines of authority and accountability.
5. Performance assessments for senior managers include what they have done
to raise awareness and oversee implementation of the HAF. 1,3

Sub total 9,7

Average score 1,9
Benchmark 2: Impartial assessment of needs, vulnerabilities and capacities
1. CARE bases its targeting criteria on systematic assessments of priorities. It
carries out these assessments with the disaster-affected population. 2,3

2. The assessments consider local capacities and institutions, coping

mechanisms, risk reduction, and responses by other agencies. 2,3

3. Whenever feasible, data is disaggregated by sex and age to ensure that

women, girls, boys and men are targeted appropriately. 1,9

4. CARE uses capacity assessments to work out the needs of the CO and
possible partners. It tries to meet these needs locally before using resources from 2
outside the country.
5. CARE shares and validates its assessment findings with other stakeholders. It
consults with other relevant agencies when determining its response. 2,3

6. CARE has an appropriate emergency strategy to guide its response. This

strategy is informed by assessments and is periodically updated, and the strategy 1,8
reflects the specific needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups.
Sub total 12,6
Average score 2,1
 60

Benchmark 3: Design and internal monitoring processes

1. Staff systematically use CARE's HAF, lessons from previous programmes, and
relevant technical and quality standards (e.g. Sphere) to shape planning, design 1,8
and monitoring.
2. CARE has mechanisms to review and report on its processes, outcomes and
inputs. This is in addition to tracking inputs and outputs. 1,9

3. Disaster-affected people (including women and men, boys and girls, and
people from vulnerable and marginalised groups) participate in planning, design and 1,1
monitoring. CARE actively seeks their feedback on impacts.

4. CARE uses monitoring results to make prompt changes where needed. It

share these results with stakeholders. 1,3

5. Risk management is incorporated into recovery planning. 1,6

Sub total 7,7
Average score 1,5
Benchmark 4: Participation of disaster-affected communities
1. CARE seeks out and works with representatives of the poorest and most
vulnerable people. 2,5

2. CARE involves beneficiaries (or their representatives) in assessments,

implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This includes deciding on project 2
activities
3. CARE tells beneficiaries and local communities about the findings of
assessment, monitoring and evaluation. 1,3

4. CARE involves local government and partners in assessments,

implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 2,7

5.CARE builds its disaster response on local capacities. It designs emergency

projects to increase local capacity to respond to disasters. 2,4

Sub total 10,9

Average score 2,2
Benchmark 5: Systems for stakeholder feedback and complaints
1. CARE involves stakeholders – especially beneficiaries – in planning,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of CARE programs. 1,9

2. CARE and its partners have formal mechanisms to gather and monitor
feedback from beneficiaries and other key stakeholders. (Methods include
1,8
disaggregated data, stakeholder maps, systematic stakeholder surveys, and focus
group discussions).
3. CARE has a formal mechanism to take and response to complaints from
beneficiaries and other stakeholders. This mechanism is safe, non-threatening way,
and accessible to all (women and men, boys and girls, and people from vulnerable 1,4
groups).

4. CARE managers oversee the complaints and community feedback system. They
make sure CARE responds to the feedback and complaints, makes improvements
1,3
and tells the affected communities about any changes (or why change is not
possible).
Sub total 6,4
Average score 1,6
 61

Benchmark 6: Information-sharing and Transparency

1. CARE communicates key information to all stakeholder groups, including:
• Its structure, staff roles and responsibilities and contact details

• Its humanitarian programme, commitments to standards, assessment

findings, project plans (including deliverables), specific activities and key financial
information
• Its processes for selecting beneficiaries (including targeting criteria and
entitlements) and making key decisions 1,8
• Opportunities for stakeholders to participate and give feedback on its
programme (including how beneficiaries and local communities can become
involved, and how the formal feedback and complaints mechanism works)

• CARE's performance such as progress reports, monitoring information,

and findings of reviews and evaluations, including an explanation of gaps in
meeting minimum standards.
2. CARE provides all information in a way that is accessible to beneficiaries, local
communities and authorities and does not discriminate against vulnerable groups or 1,7
cause harm.
3. The information CARE makes public gives a balanced view of the disaster. It
highlights the capacities and plans of survivors, not just their vulnerabilities and fears. 2,1

Sub total 5,6

Average score 1,9
Benchmark 7: Independent reviews, external evaluations and learning

1. CARE collects information for evaluation impartially according to the

recognised international standards. The disaster affected populations participates in 1,9
collecting the information.
2. Country Office earmarks budget for and organise AARs and independent real
time reviews and/or evaluations. 2,3
3. CARE senior managers act (based on clear action plans) on recommendations
from AARs, reviews, and evaluations. 1,8

4. CARE makes the results of evaluation and learning activities public in suitable
formats to demonstrate our accountability commitments and to promote learning by 1,4
stakeholders, including disaster affected communities.

Sub total 7,4

Average score 1,8
Benchmark 8: Staff capacity and human resources management during
emergencies

1. The job descriptions or terms of reference of staff working in humanitarian

operations clearly define their accountability responsibilities. 2,5
2. CARE documents its staff recruitment and employment policies and practices.
2,5
Its staff are familiar with these.
3. CARE briefs all staff before they go into an emergency. This includes
orientation on humanitarian accountability and compliance. 1,8

4. CARE clearly defines specific competencies and behaviour it expects of staff. 2,6
 62

5. Staff regularly receive orientation/training on the HAF. This includes relevant

principles, standards and compliance systems. 1

6. Staff and partners understand and practice the non-discrimination principle of

the RCRC Code of Conduct, and associated principles of impartiality and neutrality in 1,9
all humanitarian operations.
7. Managers are held accountable for supporting staff and regularly reviewing
2,5
their performance.
Sub total 14,8
Average score 2,1

Total Score 75,1

Percentage (100 x Total aggregated score/117) 64%
 63

Annex B: Semi-structure questionnaire – Outline HAF Rapid Accountability Assessment

1. Country Office Addis Ababa and Field Offices Afar and East Harargeh:

Self Assessment Tool – HAF Benchmarks

2. Community Facilitators Afar and East Harargeh:

Questionnaire will not be shared ahead of visit, and following simplified outline used:

(a) What do you appreciate about CARE’s work in emergencies in Ethiopia?

Areas potentially to be covered: recruitment, orientation and training, timeliness of response and
reporting, appropriateness of response in terms of commodities provided, scale and geographic
focus, accountability to standards (if you are aware of any), quality of project design, monitoring
and implementation, participation, transparency, staff capacity leadership, feedback to
communities and government entities, communities perception of CARE’s response,
coordination in the field.
(b) Where do you see room for improvement?
(c) What recommendations would you have for CARE for the future?

3. Communities Afar and East Harargeh (broken down by men and women):

Opening questions:
• What is CARE doing in your village?

(a) What do you like about CARE’s work in your village?

• Did CARE respond quickly?
• Did CARE provide the right commodities, and enough?
• Did CARE target the right people? Those who needed it most? Pastoralist girls in Afar and
chronically insecure rural women in East Hararghe reached?  
(b) In what way have communities been involved in the project design, implementation, and
monitoring? (i.e., participation)
• How were the beneficiaries selected and what are they are entitled to?
(c) Feedback Mechanism and transparency:
• How were you informed about the project?
• If you have a concern with the project where do you go?
• How comfortable do you feel discussing your issues with CARE staff?
• How has CARE been at responding to any concerns or complaints that you have made?
• How could information about the project be made more accessible?
(d) Where do you see room for improvement and what recommendations would you have for
CARE for the future?

4. Donors:

(a) What do you appreciate about CARE’s work in emergencies in Ethiopia?

Areas potentially to be covered: timeliness of response and reporting, accountability to
standard, quality of project design, monitoring and implementation, participation, transparency,
staff capacity in terms of grants management, reporting
 64

(b) Where do you see room for improvement?

(c) What recommendations would you have for CARE for the future?

5. Government Partners:

(a) What do you appreciate about CARE’s work in emergencies in Ethiopia?

Areas potentially to be covered: timeliness of response and reporting, appropriateness of
response in terms of scale and geographic focus, accountability to standards, quality of project
design, monitoring and implementation, participation, transparency, staff capacity, feedback to
communities and government entities, coordination with government, spirit of partnership)?
(b) Where do you see room for improvement?
(c) What recommendations would you have for CARE for the future?

6. UN and INGO Partners:

(a) What do you appreciate about CARE’s work in emergencies in Ethiopia

Areas potentially to be covered: timeliness of response and reporting, appropriateness of
response in terms of scale and geographic focus, accountability to standards, quality of project
design, monitoring and implementation, participation, transparency, staff capacity, feedback to
communities and government entities, coordination, quality of partnership?
(b) Where do you see room for improvement?
(c) What recommendations would you have for CARE for the future?

Photo: Male community members - Afar Region – 19 March 2010