Guest Column | Col Mandeep Singh (retd)

It’s All in the Network

Technological advancements have changed face of warfare
through battlefield networks but have also introduced
vulnerabilities
The single most important activity in war is
command and control. It cannot by itself drive home an attack
against the enemy or thwart one that is launched against its
own troops. It does not destroy any target, provide supplies
or carry out a medical evacuation. Yet without command and
control none of these or any other military activity will be pos-
sible. Without command and control armies will be reduced
to mobs carrying out random acts of violence. It is only with
command and control that commanders can optimise their
resources so that a military force performs its task in an or-
ganised manner towards a stated goal.
Command and control is something that commanders do.
It includes, but is not limited to, gathering and analysing in-
formation, making decisions, organising resources, planning,
communicating instructions, coordinating, monitoring re-
sults and supervising execution. With time and technologi-
cal advances, the instruments of exercising command and
control have evolved and expanded to encompass commu-
nications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and recon-
naissance. Within this, battlefield networks are used to detect
what is happening on the ground, process that data into ac-
tionable information, decide on a course of action, commu-
nicate decisions among forces, act on those decisions and
assess the effectiveness of the actions taken.
It is important to understand that this process is sequential
and not conforming to it can lead to lapses and errors with
deadly results. A decision should be taken only after the in-
formation has been processed. Similarly, action should not
precede the decision.
connecting platforms and systems across domains by seam-
lessly passing surveillance, targeting, damage assessment, and
other information from one platform to another to improve
the accuracy, range, persistence, and speed of effects. As the
network integrates more platforms, sensors, communication
paths and other nodes, the efficiency increases in a nonlinear
manner so that the battlefield network is transformed from a
force multiplier into a force exponent. The ultimate objective
is to see farther with greater clarity and to act faster with more
precision than one’s adversary while denying the other side
the ability to do the same.
Five Elements
The battle network is made up of five functional elements each
with a combination of personnel, platforms, processes and
technology to carry out a given task. Some of the platforms
and payloads can be part of multiple functional elements si-
multaneously. These elements are:
Sensor element: The first element comprises the sensors,
both active and passive, to collect data. This data is used to
detect and geolocate forces, identify and classify them as
friendly or hostile. The sensors are also used to assess the ef-
fectiveness of actions taken, that is battle damage assessment.
Communications element: It provides the data links that
pass information among systems and operators. The infor-
mation transmitted can include voice, video, one-way data
broadcasts or two-way data links.
Processing element: This is one of the most critical com-
ponents of a battle network. It is used to analyse, aggregate
and synthesise data from a variety of sensor sources to in-
form decisions. A key discriminator in the processing ele-
ment is where the processing occurs: on-board the sensor,
in the cloud or at the tactical edge. The platforms that carry
some sensors may also have sufficient size, weight and power
(SWAP) to carry the computational components needed to
process the data they produce before transmitting it. Cloud-
based processing offers the advantage of essentially unlimit-
ed processing and data storage capacity without the SWAP
limitations of many platforms. Sensors can transmit raw or
partially processed information to data centres on the ground
for final processing and analysis.
Decision element: This is the most important part of the
battle network because it is where information is translated
into action. Where the decision is taken, how it is made, and
who is involved depends on what types of actions are being
considered. For the foreseeable future, major decisions such
as the use of lethal force, will likely involve a human-in-the-
loop at some level. Human-in-the-loop decision-making can
still involve many forms of computer-assisted or artificial
intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) augmented pro-
cesses to better inform decisions and accelerate the process,
e.g. all engagements beyond visual range already use comput-
er-assisted decision-making.
Effects element: The fifth and final element of a battle net-
work is where information is turned into effects in the bat-
tlespace. These effects include both kinetic fires, which phys-
ically damage or destroy adversary forces, and non-kinetic
fires, such as electronic warfare, directed energy weapons or
cyberattacks.
To function effectively, these elements should have interop-
erability between all sub-systems, immunity to disruption
with very high redundancy. Only then will the commanders
be able to rapidly understand the battlespace, direct their
forces faster than the enemy and deliver synchronised com-
bat effects across all domains to achieve the desired end state.
Current Networks
The current battlefield networks in service range from the
India’s project Shakti to Russian battle network. Some of
these are:
India: Shakti, a fully digitised, integrated and networked
Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS)
was the first among the various Combat Command Control
and Information (C3I) systems fielded in the Army. It is a net-
work of military-grade tactical computers automating and
providing decision support for all operational aspects of ar-
tillery functions from the corps down to the battery level. The
system is also designed to seamlessly integrate with overall
Battlefield essential
Shakti Artillery Combat
Command and Control System
(ACCCS) at Army Day Parade

Battlefield Networks
Primarily, a battlefield network is a combination of target
acquisition sensors, target localisation sensors, command
and control (C2) elements, weapons, weapon platforms, and
electronic communications linking them together. Battle net-
works are also referred to as the ‘sensor-to-shooter kill chain,’
or just the ‘kill chain.’
This system, or the network, is not a new phenomenon
though the components of the same have changed over time.
While scouts and couriers were used earlier, satellites, drones
and aircraft do the task of reconnaissance now. Similarly,
semaphore flags, telegraph and field telephones have large-
ly been replaced by more modern communication systems.
The new systems have given the capabilities to look and strike
deeper but this capability, coupled with speed and ubiquity of
communications, means that there is an exponential increase
in the amount of information being generated by sensors that
needs to be processed in time before arriving at a decision.
This puts a lot of pressure both on the network and the com-
mander, and poses some major challenges.

Better Options
The objective of a battlefield network is to enable better op-
tions for commanders, speed up the decision making process
and optimise effects in the battlespace. This is achieved by

12 FORCE | July 2023 FORCE | July 2023 13

Guest Column | Col Mandeep Singh (retd)
C3I grid. The other systems are the air defence control and re-
porting system, battlefield surveillance system and battlefield
management system.
Russia: Since initiating the reform of the Russian Armed
Forces in 2008, Moscow has developed a limited network-cen-
tric warfare capability that was tried out first in Syria. It plac-
es emphasis on force enablers and force multipliers like the
electronic warfare (EW) capacity and a unified reconnais-
sance and intelligence capability. Russia had created a unified
command-and-control (C2) structure as part of the National
Defence Management Center (Natsionalnomu Tsentru Upra-
vleniya Oboronoy—NTsUO) in Moscow that lies at the heart
of Russia’s network-centric capability.
The NTsUO acts as an information hub, facilitating all mil-
itary operations in real time, managing all military subunits
in the Russian Armed Forces, including the nuclear triad. It
unites the various automated C2 systems functioning across
the Armed Forces. Consequently, the NTsUO includes three
command-and-control centres uniting the various automat-
ed C2 systems: the Strategic Nuclear Forces Command and
Control Centre, the Battle Management Centre and a Centre
for Management of Day-to-Day Activities. Despite the im-
pressive structure, the Russian network has serious limita-
tions especially in the use of military communications and
reconnaissance satellites as has been experienced in the Rus-
so-Ukraine conflict.
China: China perceives modern military conflict as a con-
frontation between opposing operational systems that is
waged not only in the traditional physical domains of land,
sea and air but also in outer space and the nonphysical cog-
nitive, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains. To execute
tech risk Networking is
essential for operational
efficiency
14 FORCE | July 2023
such a concept, the Chinese have been developing an integrat-
ed ‘system confrontation’ approach to operations since 2005
that is akin to but broader than US network-centric warfare.
The PLA’s aim for creating an informatised force is to build
a system of systems that can coordinate activities across the
military and inside and between military theatres, arms, and
services. The central warfighting system in this concept is
the operational system, a linkage of organisations, function-
al processes and networks enabling integrated joint service
warfighting across all domains. The operational system is
made up of five component systems: the command system,
firepower strike system, information confrontation system,
reconnaissance-intelligence system, and support system.
Within this, the Network Systems Department of PLA Stra-
tegic Support Forces (SSF) is a theatre command-level orga-
nization responsible for information warfare with a mission
set that includes cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance,
electronic warfare, and psychological warfare.
China is now moving towards ‘intelligentised’ approach
to warfare away from its ‘informationised’ approach to war-
fare by harnessing emerging technologies such as artificial
intelligence, cloud computing, big-data analytics, quantum
information and unmanned systems that will enable her to
carry out faster processing and the fusing of information for
quicker decision-making and command-and-control efforts
to support future combat operations.
United States: The battlefield networks include the Ad-
vanced Battle Management System (ABMS) of the United
States Air Force, which started out as a replacement for the
E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
aircraft and has evolved into a secure, military digital network
environment. The US also has the Terrestrial Layer System,
which is intended to network a range of sensors—including
intelligence agency sensors—to enable precision kinetic, elec-
tronic and cyberattacks. One system that it started operation-
alising is the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS). It
was initially planned to be used against regional ballistic mis-
sile threats but has now a wider role of integrating a broader
array of sensors and shooters to counter cruise missiles and
unmanned aircraft threat as well.
Severe Limitations
Most of the current battlefield networks have severe opera-
tional limitations. Designed for military operations of yore,
they are not optimised for speed, complexity and lethality
of future conflicts. The networks have limitation in terms
of range and complexity of sensors as the decades-old plat-
forms cannot adequately leverage new technology even cur-
rently available.
Lack of interoperability between various systems is a ma-
jor limitation as services specific networks rarely have the
ability to communicate with each other. Another limitation
of the current battlefield networks is that it either does not
have the supporting structures to enable future C2 or they
require maturation.
Next Gen Networks
The battlefield networks that can meet the needs of the fu-
ture force have been enabled largely by technological ad- A2/AD environment
vances that have taken place in recent decades. It is a point The battlefield network should be able to securely and reli-
of interest that these advancements have been driven in part ably connect sensors to shooters and support command and
by commercial developments: lighter, cheaper and higher control in a lethal, electronic warfare-rich environment. The
fidelity sensors; increases in data throughput capacity and battlefield network itself will be a prime target for the enemy
coverage from cellular, fibre, and satellite communications hence it should not only have immunity against soft kill but
networks; massive cloud computing and data storage cen- also the required redundancy against hard kill weapons as
tres; and big data analytics, machine learning (ML), and ar- well. Also, the network should have the requisite technical
tificial intelligence (AI) systems. maturity and affordability to be able to function in the future
The application of these commercial technologies to mili- operating environment.
tary battle networks has manifested itself in whole or in part However, the biggest challenge is the military’s continued
in many different concepts, initiatives, strategies and buzz- focus on platforms and not the network. Most of the focus re-
words over the years. This long line of thinking includes the mains on acquiring newer platforms that are visible and offer
Revolution in Military Affairs and what the Soviet’s termed better optics than a network subsystem mounted on a truck.
the Long-Range Reconnaissance-Strike Complex in the 1980s
and 1990s; the Transformation Initiative, Network-Centric Recent Developments
Warfare, and the Third Offset Strategy of the 2010s (to name Russia has had the opportunity to battle test its networks,
a few examples). Realising the importance of harnessing the first in Syria and more recently during the ongoing conflict
civil technological advancements, China has formalised the with Ukraine. There are reports that Russia has refined its
process with its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strelets-M Integrated Command and Communication System
Strategy to ensure more effective flow of dual-use technolog- (ICCS) and the Andromeda-D battlefield management sys-
ical innovation into the defence sector. One key area where tems. These networking systems allow drone operators and
such a technology is proposed to be used is the development other soldiers to input enemy positions and targets on a digital
of the battlefield network. map, facilitating fighter aircraft, kamikaze drones, or artillery
with guided shells to engage the targets with minimal delay.
Gathering Information Due to these improvements, Russia has been able to short-
Starting from the first stage, gathering of information and ac- en the sensor-to-shooter kill chain and is largely succeeding
cess to data so collected is the first criticality. The information in detecting Ukrainian attempts to its defensive lines well in
should not be corrupted and the network should have the ca- time and frustrating the attempts to a great extent through
pability to speedily process the intelligence data collected to the use of affordable and yet effective fire strikes using drones
translate it into actionable information. and guided artillery shells. Some of battlefield networks being
As the battlefield network will incorporate both new and developed and fielded by other countries are discussed below.
legacy systems, it should ensure interoperability not only India: The Indian army is working on a number of key proj-
between the sub-systems but also between the networks of ects to enhance battlefield situational awareness within the
different services. For instance, the air force network should framework of network-centric warfare. These projects include
be able to communicate and exchange information with the Project Sanjay, the new battlefield surveillance system that
army’s networks, especially of the air defence. aims to provide an integrated surveillance picture to com-
FORCE | July 2023 15
Guest Column | Col Mandeep Singh (retd)
manders and staff at all levels by integrating a large number
of sensors and creating number of surveillance centres for the
field formations. The project has already undergone field trials.
The other project is upgradation of the artillery combat
command and control system (ACCCS) with highly accurate
defence series maps, its integration with Project Sanjay will
complete the sensor-shooter grid. Project E-Sitrep Situation-
al Reporting Over Enterprise-Class GIS Platform (E-Sitrep)
will take care of all operational correspondences in the army.
These projects will be integrated to provide inputs to the new
situational awareness module for the army (SAMA).
SAMA is a decision support mechanism that is designed to
present a comprehensive battlefield picture to commanders
at all levels. The aim of all these projects is to enable improved
battlefield surveillance, faster decision making and appropri-
ate weapon response using automated means and technology
to meet future challenges.
United States: Taking a different route, the US is develop-
ing an overreaching system called the Joint All Domain Com-
mand and Control (JADC2). This is in consonance with the
transformation under way as the US prepares to fight near-
peer adversaries in multidomain operations.
The JADC2 aims to connect sensors from all military ser-
vices into a single network wherein a cloud-like environment
is provided for the joint force to share intelligence, surveil-
lance and reconnaissance data, transmitting across many
communications networks to enable faster decision making.
The JADC2 intends to enable commanders to make better de-
cisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing
the data using artificial intelligence algorithms to identify
targets, then recommending the optimal weapon—both ki-
netic and non-kinetic (e.g., cyber or electronic weapons)—to
engage the target.
China: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is de-
veloping its own battlefield network that is proposed to be a
multi-domain network that can support its new operational
concept called Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW) and
also have the capability to disrupt, cripple or outright destroy
an adversary’s underlying networks and infrastructure, spe-
cifically the US JADC2 initiative.
The MDPW aims to align all PLA forces, from cyber to
Graphic Imagery Thales depicts operationalisation of its Deployable Tactical Internet (DI@NE) for brigade and above; and Mobile
Tactical Internet (M@TIS) based on heterogeneous radio networks for battalion and below
16 FORCE | July 2023
space, and relies on interlinked command and control, com-
munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and re-
connaissance to quickly coordinate firepower and expose for-
eign weaknesses. It is important to note that the PLA refers to
“systems destruction warfare” as the next way to conduct war
as warfare is no longer solely focused on the destruction of
enemy forces; rather, it is aims to disrupt, cripple or outright
destroy the other’s underlying networks and infrastructure.
Threats to Networks
Intelligence gathering is a fine art. It goes beyond UAVs send-
ing back images to real and perceived targets. This aspect is
important as almost all militaries across the globe are smitten
with livestreaming i.e. live feeds being provided from the battle
zone and being used to make decisions.
The belief that the image is the reality is a dangerous one
with serious consequences as livestreaming has a very real
tendency of affecting perceptions and negatively influencing
decision-making. It has also led to an overreliance on UAVs
and livestreaming at the cost of other assets. Unless checked,
this can lead to changes in operational behaviour to satisfy
the hunger for pictures – at the cost of achieving real objec-
tives. The battlefield networks should be so designed that
undue credence is not given to imagery at the cost of other
inputs.
The efficacy of any weapon or support system is directly
dependent on the degree of integration into the battlefield
network. Care should be taken to ensure that the degree of in-
tegration is optimal for all systems and sub-systems and it is
not done in a haphazard or patchy manner thereby degrading
the potential of the weapon (or support) system.
Network Competition
With advances in communications and computer technolo-
gies, the benefits associated with networking military systems
have also increased at an affordable cost. But it has also in-
creased the competition and conflict between capable, com-
petent adversaries. As competencies increase, so do the threat
from adversary networks. From indirect artillery fire tech-
niques first developed in the late nineteenth century to the
duel between the US Air Force and the Vietnamese integrated
air defence system to the use of drones and electronic warfare
systems in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, battle network com-
petitions have always existed. In this battle of operating sys-
tems and networks, the adversary networks themselves have
become the prime target.
The laned MDPW of China is a prime example of battle-
field networks being developed to counter and degrade the
adversaries’ network(s). This is an important aspect to bear
in mind as the battlefield networks will not only need to com-
pete against a hostile network but will be expected to still be
able to function effectively.
Artificial Intelligence
While battlefield networks, particularly the air defence net-
works, already making use of artificial intelligence (AI) and
Machine Learning
(ML) to a limited ex-
tent, the use of AI/
ML in battlefield net-
works will increase
significantly in the
years to come. AI/ML
applications across
the systems will al-
low for integration
of larger number of
sensors using robust
communication paths
to synthesise and pro-
cess data into action-
able information at
machine speed. This
in effect will create
improved capabilities
in information detec-
tion, identification
and synthesis across
multiple domains.
The capability of AI to processes vast amounts of informa-
tion faster and more accurately is just one of the advantag-
es of using AI in battlefield networks. It can ingest, process
and synthesise vastly more information at superhuman speed
while also predicting the outcomes of a potential course of
action and evaluate environmental or adversarial variables
that would be beyond human capacity to assess. Through its
prediction capabilities, AI can identify and continue tracking
a high-value target even when the target disappears from the
line of sight. It can proactively mobilise kill platforms and car-
ry out dynamic re-tasking of platforms.
AI has the ability to find connections between disparate
pieces of information and by collating data across domains
and services into a single place, it makes information more
discoverable for swifter and sharper decisions. It has an add-
ed advantage that it can see ahead of the battlespace, giving
commanders a cursory understanding of the environment
beyond current capabilities and the ability to respond proac-
tively rather than reactively.
Limitations Exposed
The technological advances and new-gen battlefield networks
being tested across the globe seem to offer new capabilities
to militaries but it is important to note that not all capabili-
ties publicised or assessed translate into actual performance
in battle.
This is best illustrated by looking at some prominent net-
work failures in recent times, from the shooting down of an
Indian Air Force helicopter by friendly fire in 2019 to the fail-
ure of the Russian C2 system in the initial phase of the conflict
with Ukraine. Though Russia had invested heavily in upgrad-
ing its C2 capabilities and had even tested its networks in Syr-
ia, the Russian military was plagued by poor intelligence and
reconnaissance capabilities in the early months.
For example, during the counteroffensive in Kharkiv, the
Russian military often lost track of Ukrainian brigade elements,
leading to the successful Ukrainian rout of Russian forces in
the region. Moreover, each Combined Arms Army operated
independently through its axes of advance, with little over-
all coordination. Russia faced major communications issues
with even the Strelets reconnaissance, command-and-con-
trol, and communi-
cations system being
targeted and disrupt-
ed early in the inva-
sion. The loss of over
200 command posts
and communication
stations only added
to the chaos and con-
fusion.
Technological
Dangers
It is often said that
the nature of warfare
has changed and re-
cent technological
advancements have
made the present day
and future wars much
different from the
conflicts of the past.
Most of the scholars use the phrase “paradigm shift in the na-
ture and spectrum of war” while discussing these changes and
tend to focus on technology leading these changes as modern
armies look deeper, process almost unlimited amount of data
and strike farther than ever before. But these changes are not
without their dangers, namely the overreliance on technology
on the one hand and the failure to fully exploit the latest capa-
bilities on the other.
An overreaching battlefield network that links all enti-
ties, provides limitless real-time information and images of
far and beyond with multiple options being generated by AI
driven sub-systems and weapon systems taking on real (and
perceived) hostiles, like the Skynet of Terminator series may
be desirable and attainable, but unless it is managed and
controlled with the required human intervention, it may well
become the nemesis. The battlefield networks thus need to
be designed and developed with due care so that they are the
solution rather than a part of the problem.
It also needs to be remembered that technology alone will
never be able to solve all the problems of command and con-
trol as an advancement is often accompanied with unexpect-
ed complications and side effects or by the inevitable rise
of effective countermeasures. It is true for all technological
advances. And it is true for battlefield networks. The need is
thus to be ready for the changes and advancements by being
ahead of the curve for only those who harness and exploit
these changes will survive in the future battlespace.;
FORCE | July 2023 17