Memory" Revisited 2021

Journal of Indian Philosophy (2021) 49:699–724
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09481-2(0123456789().,-volV)(0123456789().,-volV)
“Memory” Revisited: What Sāmavedic Technical Literature

Tells Us About Sm.rti’s Early Meaning
Guy St. Amant1
Accepted: 19 July 2021 / Published online: 25 August 2021

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021
Abstract In this paper, I build on recent scholarship concerning the early semantic
history of the word “smr.ti,” which has been shown to denote “tradition” in the early
dharmasūtra material. I seek to add nuance to this work by examining the meaning
of smr. ti in the early Sāmavedic technical literature. This corpus helps elucidate one
of the processes whereby smr.ti came to refer to something textual. This paper
argues that smr.ti’s earliest textualized referent may have been fixed or semi-fixed
individual statements rather than definite texts.
Keywords Smr.ti · Veda · Scripture · Hinduism · Tradition · Memory
Abbreviations
ĀpDhS Āpastambadharmasūtra
ĀpŚS Āpastambaśrautasūtra
BDhS Baudhāyanadharmasūtra
DŚS Drāhyāyaṇaśrautasūtra
GDhS Gautamadharmasūtra
LŚS Lāṭyāyanaśrautasūtra
Mı̄Sū Mīmāṃsāsūtra
NidS Nidānasūtra
RPrŚ Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya
Rvidh Ṛgvidhāna
SVB Sāmavidhānabrāhmaṇa
& Guy St. Amant

gs2837@columbia.edu
1
Department of Religion, Columbia University, 80 Claremont Avenue, New York, NY 10027,
USA
123
700 G. St. Amant
Introduction
The work of Wezler (2004) and Brick (2006) has clarified the early semantic history
of the word smr.ti (lit. “memory”). Smr.ti first appears as a technical term in the sūtra
literature, where, Wezler and Brick argue, it denotes something like traditionally
handed down beliefs and practices.1 Their conclusions are based on a close
examination of the use of smr. ti in the early dharmasūtras. This body of texts is
particularly important for the problem of smr. ti’s early meaning because it is the first
place where smr.ti is categorized as an authoritative source of knowledge about
dharma (dharmapramāṇa), and it provides enough data to allow us to see how the
conceptualization of that category changed over time.2
Olivelle’s (1999, pp. xxv–xxxiv) reevaluation of the extant dharmasūtras has
strengthened our ability to chart diachronic change across this corpus. It is, of
course, true that the absolute dates of these texts remain somewhat speculative, but
Olivelle’s assessment leaves little doubt insofar as their relative chronology is
concerned. And what their relative chronology reveals is a clear development in the
epistemology of dharma and a progression of smr. ti’s position within that
epistemology.3 The Āpastambadharmasūtra (ĀpDhS), which appears to be the
oldest dharmasūtra, is unique in delimiting its subject matter to “dharmas derived
from agreed-upon normative practice” (Olivelle, 2018, p. 51). These dharmas, the
ĀpDhS tells us, can be known, first of all, from the consensus (samaya) of experts in
dharma. They can also be known from the Veda, though, as Lubin (2016, p. 685)
notes, this second source is “mentioned seemingly as an afterthought.” Smr.ti is not
found in the ĀpDhS’s opening discussion of the epistemology of dharma, and, when
it does appear in that text, it seems to refer back to the idea of a traditionally agreed-
upon practice.
The Gautamadharmasūtra (GDhS) promotes smr.ti to the position of a
dharmapramāṇa, where it has, together with śīla (“habitual behaviors”), supplanted
expert consensus. Both are here unambiguously subordinated to the Veda. The
GDhS first states that the Veda is the preeminent source of knowledge about
dharma. It then declares that only the smr.ti and śīla of those who know the Veda
may serve as secondary sources.4 Brick (2006, p. 290) in particular has argued that
the GDhS uses smr. ti in the sense of an untextualized tradition, and its categorization
1
See Klaus (1992) for an in-depth consideration of the original signification of the root smṛ and its
derivatives in the Vedic corpus.
2
Scharfe (2002, p. 16) demonstrates that Taittirīyāraṇyaka 1.2.1—which is often cited as the earliest
passage that uses smr
. ti in the sense of “tradition” or “traditional texts derived from the Veda”—does not
use the word in either of these senses. See also Brick (2006, p. 288).
3
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for an especially clear presentation of the importance of
the chronological progression of the dharmasūtras for the evaluation of the changing meaning of smr. ti in
that corpus.
4
GDhS 1.1 literally states that “the Veda is the root of dharma” (vedo dharmamūlam), but Wezler (2004,
pp. 637–638) has convincingly argued that this metaphor should be understood to mean that the Veda is
“the cause of the knowledge of dharma.”
123
“Memory” Revisited: What Sāmavedic Technical Literature Tells Us About 701
together with śīla seems to bear out his argument.5 Smr.ti’s sphere of reference
would change, however, with the two more recent dharmasūtras, where it appears
principally to signify some sort of dharmaśāstric textual material.6
Although this account of smr.ti’s semantic history seems to be correct, there is, as
I see it, still an area where further research may be profitably directed. I want to
examine how and in what contexts smr.ti first came to refer to textualized material.
As we have seen, scholarly accounts have tended to concentrate exclusively on
dharmaśāstric developments, but there are a number of early instances of smr. ti that
appear in other types of sūtra texts that date from a period comparable to that of the
early dharmasūtras. Around half of these are found in the Sāmavedic technical
literature.7 There, smr. ti appears in a range of contexts that allows for several
plausible interpretations. I will argue that, when taken as an ensemble, these
instances support, though perhaps not definitively, Wezler’s (2004, p. 642)
conjecture that smr.ti may have first referred to what he calls “individual elements
of tradition”—that is, discrete statements that had assumed a fixed (or semi-fixed)
form but were not conceptualized as comprising part of a definite text.8 In the
conclusion, I will briefly consider what this means for the broader problem of
explaining smr.ti’s semantic development during the early period of its use.
Consensus and Sm.rti
Before exploring the early Sāmavedic technical literature, I want to examine the
meaning of smr.ti in a passage from the ĀpDhS. This passage comprises our earliest
piece of evidence from the dharmasūtra corpus, and its manner of usage will serve
as a useful point of comparison when considering examples from the Sāmavedic
sūtras. Smr. ti appears in an ĀpDhS passage that deals with the ritual purity of
children:
5
Olivelle (2018, p. 53) makes the interesting suggestion that Gautama uses smr . ti to mean “orally
articulated recollections.” This meaning is consonant with what we see in some of the early Sāmavedic
material. Unfortunately, he does not discuss this instance or his interpretation in detail.
6
The Baudhāyanadharmasūtra (BDhS) includes “smārta” in its list of dharmapramāṇas. Brick (2006,
p. 295) argues that this word means “the dharma connected with smr . ti” and should be taken as pointing to
something textualized, though he (2006, p. 291) also notes that the BDhS (1.2.8) may elsewhere use smr . ti
in the sense of an untextualized tradition.
7
Brick (2006, p. 289, n. 11) has identified most of the relevant instances of smr . ti in the early sūtra
literature. I would only add that it also appears in the Drāhyāyaṇaśrautasūtra, which is a more recent and
expanded version of the Lāṭyāyanaśrautasūtra. Outside of the dharmasūtras and the Sāmavedic technical
literature, smr. ti occurs in Hiraṇyakeśi-Satyāṣād.haśrautasūtra 3.1.2, p. 1:268; Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya (RPrŚ)
11.63; and Vārāhagṛhyasūtra 6.32. The first of these states that “domestic rituals are gotten through the
memory of Vedic words” (vaidikānāṃ śabdānāṃ smr . tigrahaṇāni laukikāni) and provides one of our early
attestations of what would become the classical theory of smr . ti. The second appears in a chapter of the
RPrŚ that, given its composition in the classical vaṃśastha meter and supplementary character, is
probably a later addition to the text (Shastri, 1959, pp. 62, 76). The last example is discussed in some
detail by Brick (2006, p. 296).
8
The interpretation for smr. ti I propose here was prompted by the insightful comments of the anonymous
reviewer of this article, who pointed out the possibility that the Nidānasūtra (NidS) might use smr
. ti, when
compounded with ācārya, to refer to statements attributed to venerable seers.
123
702 G. St. Amant
ĀpDhS 2.15.19-25: ānnaprāśanād garbhā nāprayatā bhavanti | ā parisaṃvat-

sarād ity eke | yāvatā vā diśo na prajānīyuḥ | opanayanād ity aparam | atra hy
adhikāraḥ śāstrair bhavati | sā niṣṭhā | smr.tiś ca.
Children cannot become impure until undergoing the ritual of annaprāśana.
Some maintain that they cannot until they are a year old or for as long as they
cannot distinguish between the directions. The preferable position9 is that
[they cannot] until undergoing initiation; for it is at this time that they come
under the purview of rules.10 That is the niṣṭhā, and it is the smr. ti.11
In order to work out a precise understanding of smr. ti in this passage, we must
differentiate its meaning from that of niṣṭhā. One possibility is provided by Olivelle
(1999, p. 59), who translates the final sentence as: “This last view is the
authoritative one (niṣṭhā), and it is the traditional teaching (smr.ti).” His rendering
predates, however, the work of Wezler and Brick, both of whom have argued that
smr.ti should here be understood to signify something like “tradition” in a general,
non-textualized sense. Their proposed meaning fits well in the context, but, from a
syntactic standpoint, it appears that smr. ti points to a specific traditional practice
rather than “tradition” in general. In any event, adopting the interpretation proposed
by Wezler and Brick introduces a degree of redundancy into the passage, provided,
of course, niṣṭhā really means something like “authoritative view.” Bühler (1898,
p. 140) has, however, translated niṣṭhā differently; he understands it to refer back to
initiation because, in his view, it is the boundary (niṣṭhā) that separates the stage of
life when one is qualified to perform ritual action from the stage when one is not.12
In choosing between these two interpretations, we might wish to turn to other
instances of niṣṭhā in the ĀpDhS. The word appears on two other occasions, each of
which offers conflicting evidence. In one instance, niṣṭhā means something along
the lines of “the firm conviction,” whereas the other points quite clearly to the “the
conclusion” of the study of dharma.13 If we accept Bühler’s translation, smr.ti may
9
Bühler (1898, p. 139), Olivelle (1999, p. 59), and Brick (2006, p. 292) all translate aparam as “the
superior position,” which accounts for the distinction between eke and aparam. One might also consider
translating aparam as “another position,” especially because the parallel sūtra in the Hiraṇyakeśidhar-
masūtra 27.3.57, 10:173 reads eke in the place of aparam.
10
Bühler (1898, p. 139) understands adhikāra to signify the right to perform sacrificial rituals, whereas
Olivelle (1999, p. 59) and Brick (2006, p. 292) take it to mean that the child comes under the purview of a
certain set of rules.
11
My translation largely follows the earlier translations of Bühler (1898, p. 139), Olivelle (1999, p. 59),
and Brick (2006, p. 292). There are several salient points where Bühler’s translation disagrees with those
of Olivelle and Brick.
12
Here Bühler no doubt follows the commentator Haradatta: upanayanam api parāmṛśatas tacchabdasya
niṣṭhāśabdasāmānādhikaraṇyāt strīliṅgatā | sā niṣṭhā tad upanayanam avasānam anadhikārasyeti. “Even
though the word ‘that’ (i.e., sā) refers to [the neuter] word ‘initiation,’ it is qualified by the feminine
gender because of its co-referentiality with the [feminine] word ‘limit.’ That is the limit [i.e.,] that
initiation is the termination of the absence of qualification [for the performance of sacrificial action].”
13
For the first, see ĀpDhS 2.23.10: traividyavṛddhānāṃ tu vedāḥ pramāṇam iti niṣṭhā tatra yāni śrūyante
vrīhiyavapaśvājyapayaḥkapālapatnīsaṃbandhāny uccair nīcaiḥ kāryam iti tair viruddha ācāro ’pramā-
ṇam iti manyante. “It is the firm view of the most eminent scholars of the triple Veda, however, that the
Vedas are the ultimate authority. The rites using rice, barley, animals, ghee, milk, and potsherds and
involving the participation of the wife that are prescribed in the Vedas must be performed with the loud
123
be easily taken to denote a traditional practice that is considered standard. The very
fact that it is cited as a meaningful, if secondary, determinant suggests that it carries
some sort of normative authority. Yet it may also be useful to consider the usage of
niṣṭhā in the GDhS as well; there it clearly means a conclusion reached after the
consideration of several conflicting viewpoints, albeit within the specific context of
legal disputation.14
A sense similar to the one found in the GDhS seems to be most appropriate given
the context—the ĀpDhS uses the word “niṣṭhā” after examining various contra-
dictory opinions. Adopting this interpretation reintroduces the problem of
differentiating niṣṭhā from smr.ti. My hypothesis is that niṣṭhā represents the
conclusion of an argumentative process based on reasoning. In this particular case, it
signals the judgement that follows from the immediately preceding argument: only
after undergoing initiation does an individual come under the purview of the rules
governing purity, so, logically speaking, the problem of impurity can only arise after
initiation. Smr.ti, then, might be contrasted with this type of logical reasoning
inasmuch as it points to a particular custom that embodies an agreement that exists
in practice.15 The matter is complicated by the presentation of several conflicting
views, all of which were presumably traditional among different groups of people.
We can only speculate as to why just one of these qualifies as smr.ti. Was it a
question of the number of people who accepted it? Or a matter of being accepted by
the right people? Given that the ĀpDhS ascribes our knowledge of dharma to the
consensus of disciplinary experts, it seems likely that the latter of these two types of
qualification was considered to be more important. If my hypothesis is correct, then
smr.ti’s meaning would roughly correspond with that of sāmayācārika in ĀpDhS
1.7.31, which signifies a particular behavioral norm that is accepted as conventional
—presumably by the knowers of dharma.16
Sm.rti Beyond Dharmaśāstra?
The particular meaning of smr. ti found in the ĀpDhS persists, at least insofar as we
can tell, into the GDhS. Things change, however, with the BDhS. Brick (2006,
Footnote 13 continued
and soft recitation of ritual formulas, they hold, and any practice opposed to those rites is devoid of
authority.” This translation is Olivelle’s (1999, p. 67). For the second, see ĀpDhS 2.29.11: sā niṣṭhā yā
vidyā strīṣu śūdreṣu ca | ātharvaṇasya vedasya śeṣa ity upadiśanti. “The knowledge found among women
and Śūdras forms the conclusion, and they point out that it is a subsidiary component of the Atharva
Veda.” This is also Olivelle’s translation (1999, p. 72).
14
GDhS 11.25: vipratipattau traividyavṛddhebhyaḥ pratyavahṛtya niṣṭhāṃ gamayet. “Given conflicting
[evidence, the king] should confer with those learned in the three Vedas and deliver his judgement
(niṣṭhā).” My translation follows Olivelle’s (1999, p. 97) with some modifications to the wording.
15
Wezler (2004, p. 631) suggests that samaya in the phrase dharmajñasamaya might mean something
like “agreement that exists or appears in practice.” Perhaps smr
. ti points to something similar, at least
insofar as this text is concerned.
16
ĀpDhS 1.7.31: samāvṛttasyāpy etad eva sāmayācārikam eteṣu. “Even after he has returned home, the
accepted practice is that he should behave towards these individuals exactly the same way as he behaved
when he was a student.” This translation is Olivelle’s (1999, p. 16).
123
704 G. St. Amant
pp. 291, 295) informs us that, in one instance, the BDhS uses smr. ti in a meaning that
seems to correspond with the one found in the earlier dharmasūtras. In its opening
section, however, the BDhS gives smārta—that which is “related to smr. ti”—as a
source of knowledge about dharma, and it distinguishes this source from śiṣṭāgama.
Brick (2006, p. 295) argues that the latter of these two terms denotes something like
“the practice of cultured people,” which means, in his view, that the former likely
points to dharma that is connected with some sort of traditional text.
Brick (2006, pp. 296–298) provides a number of historically subsequent usages
that track the semantic shift in smr.ti’s meaning, noting that the Mānavad-
harmaśāstra equates the word smr. ti with dharmaśāstra. He suggests that three
developments account for this change (Brick, 2006, pp. 298–301). First,
dharmaśāstra “is essentially the codification of Brahmanical tradition,” (Brick,
2006, p. 298) so the shift simply reflects an expected dissolution of the boundary
between customary practices and their textualized representation (Brick, 2006,
p. 301). Second, Brick draws our attention to “the changing self-representation” of
dharmaśāstric texts—the sūtras “present themselves as scholarly works,” while the
Mānavadharmaśāstra and subsequent texts “claim to be of divine provenance”
(Brick, 2006, pp. 298–299). He also argues that “the semantic development of smr. ti
ties in with the increasing use of verse material within the dharmaśāstra tradition”
(Brick, 2006, p. 299). These verses, in Brick’s view, express traditional beliefs but
are not smr.ti; yet the citation of an ever-greater number, he argues, prompted a
transformation in smr.ti’s meaning.
I want to complicate Brick’s explanatory framework through an examination of
the word smr. ti in the early Sāmavedic technical literature. This material, much of
which likely predates the BDhS at the very least, suggests that smr.ti had already
begun to refer to textualized material outside of the dharmaśāstric tradition. The
semantic developments seen in the Sāmavedic technical literature appear to confirm
Wezler’s (2004, p. 642) intuition that smr. ti may first have come to refer to
individual utterances and only later to definite texts, though Wezler was thinking of
dharmaśāstric and not Sāmavedic material. If my hypothesis about smr.ti’s
development in the Sāmavedic context is correct, it may be worth considering,
along with Wezler, whether some sort of individual phrase served as the first
textualized referent of smr.ti in the dharmaśāstric corpus as well. A plausible
candidate is found in the floating verse maxims cited with increasing frequency by
the authors of the dharmasūtras.17
Perhaps the two earliest instances of smr.ti in the Sāmavedic technical literature
appear in the Lāṭyāyanaśrautasūtra (LŚS), a ritual text that Parpola (1968b, p. 1:28)
tentatively dates to 400-300 BCE. Parallel instances are found in the Drāhyāya-
ṇaśrautasūtra (DŚS), which is a more recent and expanded version of the LŚS
(Bronkhorst, 2007, p. 330). The LŚS principally deals with the performance of
Sāmans at the soma sacrifices. In this text, the word “smr.ti” appears twice and, in
both cases, is used in connection with ūha, a term that describes the modification of
17
This suggestion was made by the anonymous reviewer of this article. Brick (2006, pp. 299–300)
discusses the connection between the increasing use of these verses and the textualization of smr
. ti in some
detail, though he does not suggest that smr
. ti ever referred to them individually or collectively. See also
Olivelle (1999, pp. xxviii–xxx) for a discussion of the citation of verses in the dharmasūtras.
123
ritual material for specific sacrificial applications. Scholarly accounts tend only to
emphasize the type of ūha that involves changing the words of Vedic mantras. For
example, the mantra “agnaye tvā juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi” which is dedicated to Agni,
must be changed into “sūryāya tvā juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi” when it is used to make an
offering to Sūrya.18 But ūha also encompasses other types of transformations,
including the arrangement of sāmans for use in the Soma sacrifices.
Before examining the relationship between smr. ti and ūha in the LŚS, it will be
useful to review the makeup of the Sāmaveda.19 It contains two collections (the
Pūrva- and Uttarārcika) of verses (ṛks) that have been taken from the Rgveda. The
˙
verses themselves are not sāmans; they are the bases (yonis) to which the melodies
of the various sāmans are set. Several songbooks are attached to these verse-
collections. Two of these, which are collectively called the Prakṛtigāna, contain
what we might for convenience call “models” of the actual sāmans. These models
consist of a single ṛk that has been set to a tune and modified in various ways.20 For
example, some of the vowels are elongated, and various syllables are added (Caland
1931, p. ix). Model sāmans are sometimes used individually, and, in such cases,
they are simply taken from the Prakṛtigāna. But, at the Soma sacrifices, sāmans are
organized into extended liturgies composed of variously arranged chant complexes
that set groups of two or three ṛks to melodies from the Prakṛtigāna. These
complexes eventually came to be transmitted within two songbooks called the
Ūhagāna and Ūharahasyagāna.
The prototypical instance of adaptation (ūha) involves, at least in theory, taking a
sāman from the Prakṛtigāna and extending the same tune over two additional ṛks.21
This was a complex process, and, from an early date, adapted sāmans appear to have
been transmitted in a fixed form.22 Whether these adaptations had by the time of the
LŚS been collected into anything like the received ūha songbooks is at present
difficult to say. It is clear, however, that the LŚS’s two instances of smr.ti appear to
have some sort of connection with Samavedic ūha. Both appear in a single passage,
which begins as follows:
LŚS 6.1.4-6: triṣu vā tṛceṣv ekarcavat tṛce darśanāt | sāmnā ca stom-
asaṃkhyānāt | tisṛṣv ācāryāḥ smṛteḥ.23
18
Bronkhorst (2007, p. 189) draws our attention to these particular examples, which he has taken from
Bhatṛhari’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya.
19
For a more extensive overview of the Sāmavedic literature, see Howard (1977, pp. 8–9) and Parpola
(1968b, pp. 1:67–76).
20
There are, as we will see, several sāmans that are exceptionally composed over several ṛks in the
Prakṛtigāna.
21
The Uttarārcika contains most of the sets of two or three ṛks over which the extensions are supposed to
be performed; see Howard (1977, p. 8–9).
22
See Parpola (1968b, pp. 1:75–76), though note that he is in disagreement with Caland (1931, pp. xi–
xiii) about the date of the two ūha songbooks.
23
For the parallel sūtras, see Drāhyāyaṇaśrautasūtra (DŚS) 16.1.5-7. Note that Dhanvin, the
commentator of the DŚS, reads DŚS 16.1.7 as: tisṛṣv ācāryāḥ smṛter yathānyāni sāmāni. This reflects
a combination of LŚS 6.1.6 and LŚS 6.1.7, the latter of which likewise reads yathānyāni sāmāni “Just as
in the case of other sāmans.” See also Ranade (1998).
123
706 G. St. Amant
The Santani sāman [should be sung] over three sets of three ṛk-verses just as
sāmans composed over a single verse [are repeated over three verses in actual
performance]; for we see that [the Santani is composed] over a set of three
verses [in the Prakṛtigāna itself].24 Moreover, [performing the Santani over
three sets of three ṛk-verses is appropriate] because the number of verses
necessary to complete the liturgy should be calculated on the basis of the
number of sāmans [and not, as the opponent has argued in a previous section,
the number of ṛk-verses]. [No, that is not right, because,] on the basis of smr. ti,
the teachers hold [that the Santani should be performed] over three ṛk-verses.
The opponent begins with the observation that in the Prakṛtigāna almost all model
sāmans consist of a melody composed over a single verse. When these models are
transformed for use in a Soma liturgy, they are usually extended over two more
verses, making three in total. The Santani is exceptional because its model in the
Prakṛtigāna is composed over three verses rather than one.25 As a result, the
opponent concludes by analogy that the Santani should be tripled, which would
mean repeating it over two additional verse-triplets.26 The LŚS ultimately rejects
this view, telling us that the teachers hold that in actual sacrificial performance the
Santani should be sung over three ṛk-verses. They maintain this position on the basis
of smr. ti. The two commentators take slightly different views on the precise meaning
of this word. Agnisvāmin, who is no doubt older, seems to understand smr.ti as
referring to a transmitted collection of Sāmavedic ūha identical or similar to the
Ūhagāna. Dhanvin, who comments on the parallel sūtras in the Drāhyāyaṇaśr-
autasūtra, prefers to read smr.ti as signifying “the memory of the ūha-makers,”27 by
which he means that the teachers are supposed to have created the modified sāmans
based on their memory of indications found in the Prakṛtigāna.28
24
Caland (1931, p. 323) notes that the Calcutta edition of the Sāmaveda mistakenly sets this sāman over
a single ṛk and that the correct reading can be found in the Grantha edition, where the Santani is chanted
over three stotrīyās.
25
Technically speaking, it is composed over three stotrīyās; the latter two being made by the division of
a single verse from the Pūrvārcika (Caland 1931, p. 323).
26
Agnisvāmin on LŚS 6.1.4: yathāmnāya ekarce dṛṣṭāni prayoge tṛce kriyante evam idam api santani
tṛce dṛṣṭaṃ prayoge triṣu tṛceṣu kriyate. “Just as [sāmans] set over a single ṛk in the Prakṛtigāna (āmnāya,
lit. traditional text) should be performed over three verses during their use [in the Soma sacrifices], so too
the Santani, which is set over three verses [in the Prakṛtigāna], should be performed over three verse-
triplets.” Similarly, see Dhanvin on DŚS 16.1.5: yathaikasyām ṛci dṛṣṭaṃ rathantaram uttarayor apy ṛcor
eva gīyate | sādṛśyasya saṃpatyartham evaṃ tṛce dṛṣṭaṃ santany uttarayor api tṛcayor eva geyam. “Just
as the Rathantara, which is set over a single verse [in the Prakṛtigāna], is sung over two further verses, the
Santani, which is set over three verses, should be sung over two further verse-triplets in order to bring
about a similarity [with the Rathantara in terms of the transformation it undergoes for use in the Soma
sacrifices].”
27
Agnisvāmin on LŚS 6.1.6: evaṃ hi ācāryaiḥ gītaṃ smr . tir ūhagītiḥ. “The ‘memory’ (smr. ti) that ‘it was
sung in this way by the teachers,’ i.e., the Ūhagīti. See also Dhanvin on DŚS 16.1.7: saiva kuta iti cet
vasiṣṭhāder ūhakārasya smṛter iti brūmaḥ. “Why is [the sāman thought to be completed over each ṛk in
the Prakṛtigāna]? We say it is on the basis of the memory of the ūha-makers such as Vasiṣtha.”
28
˙
Dhanvin on DŚS 16.1.7: smṛter eva kiṃ mūlam iti cet pratyabhijñeti brūmaḥ | chāndasapāṭhe yathā
prathamāyām ṛci santanino gānaṃ tathaivottarayor api pratyabhijānīmaḥ | prastāvas tu kevalaṃ na
dṛśyate. “Now what is the root of that memory? We say it is recognition. Just as we recognize the tune of
the Santani over the first ṛk in the Prakṛtigāna (chāndasapāṭha, lit. reading derived from the Pūrvārcika),
123
Dhanvin’s interpretation of the term smr.ti betrays, I think, the influence of

Mı̄māṃsā and may be set aside as a likely anachronism. Agnisvāmin’s is more
plausible, and he is right to understand smr.ti as connected with the transmitted form
of the adapted sāmans. At the same time, the precise nature of this connection is
unclear. On the one hand, when we look in the Ūhagāna we find that the Santani is
performed over three verses.29 On the other, it seems uncertain whether the ūha
songbooks had been compiled into a definite form by the time of the LŚS. Even if
they had, there is little to prove that smr. ti here refers to them rather than the
transmitted form of individual modified sāmans or, even more broadly, the
traditional consensus of the expert tradition tasked with their performance.
In order to assess the likelihood that smr.ti here denotes Sāmavedic ūha rather
than tradition in a general sense, it will be necessary to consider whether the
modified sāmans had assumed a transmitted form by the time of the LŚS’s
composition. There is some circumstantial evidence to support the conclusion that
they had. The LŚS clearly postdates another Sāmavedic text called the Ārṣeyakalpa,
which is a sort of index that lists out the names of the sāmans, including the
modified ones (ūha), in the order of their performance during the various Soma
sacrifices.30 The relative chronology of these two texts is clear because the LŚS
quotes the Ārṣeyakalpa on numerous occasions, including in its broader discussion
of the Santani.31 The Ārṣeyakalpa itself appears to presuppose the existence of
individual instances of ūha in some sort of fixed form—it refers to the modified
sāmans by the same names that we find in the ūha songbooks, and the sheer
complexity of the liturgical arrangements it prescribes makes the possibility of
modification during performance unlikely. Whether it presupposes the ūha
songbooks as definite texts, however, is a more difficult question. The order of
the two songbooks corresponds with the sequence of modified sāmans prescribed by
the Ārṣeyakalpa, though this latter text includes other information as well. Caland
(1931, p. xii) takes the position that the Ārṣeyakalpa is of an earlier date because it
sometimes provides explanations that would be irrelevant if it were simply
following the sequence of the two ūha songbooks. Parpola (1968b, p. 1:76)
disagrees, arguing that, logically speaking, an indexical work likely postdates the
material it indexes. Unfortunately, the second instance of smr. ti in the LŚS does little
we recognize it over the second two as well. Only the introductory portion (prastāva) is absent.” See also
16.1.14: chāndasapāṭhe prastāvādarśanam eva smṛter mūlam. “The basis of the memory is the absence of
the introductory portions in the Prakṛtigāna.”
29
Ūhagāna Daśarātraparva 5.10, p. 100–101; 7.1, p. 139; Saṃvatsaraparva 3.13, p. 250–251, Ahı̄naparva
2.7, p. 420–421; 2.10, p. 422; Satraparva 1.6, p. 478; 4.4, p. 514–515; and 4.7, p. 515–516. Here I refer to
the Ūhagāna of the Kauthuma śākhā because the LŚS is connected with this śākhā.
30
Weber (1886, p. 27) provides a list of all the sūtras where the LŚS cites the Ārṣeyakalpa; some appear
under the abbreviated name Kalpa.
31
LŚS 6.1.10: ekarceṣu coddhṛtaṃ kalpe. “In the [Ārṣeya]kalpa, [the Santani] is extracted [for
application] to sāmans composed over a single ṛk.” This argument refers to Ārṣeyakalpa (Caland, 1908,
p. 142–143) 10.2, 5th day: bārhadgirasyarkṣu santani. “The Santani [is performed to the] verses of the
Bārhadgiri sāman;” 7th day: kāṇvasyarkṣu santani. “The Santani [is performed to the] verses of the Kānva
sāman.” Both the Bārhadgiri and Kānva sāmans are set to a single ṛk in the Prakṛtigāna. See ˙
Āraṇyakagāna 3.1.16 and Grāmegeyagāna ˙ 7.1.28.
123
708 G. St. Amant
to clear up this confusion. It too suggests a connection with ūha but similarly fails to
clarify the precise nature of that connection:
LŚS 6.1.12-13: tāsu sarvāsu prastāvāḥ syur nyāyapragāthadharmābhyām |
nottarayor ācāryāḥ smṛteḥ.32
[If the Santani is completed within a single verse, then] all of the verses should
have prastāvas — because there is a principle [that states all sāmans should
include the five requisite parts] and because pragāthas have the property [of
requiring a type of repetition in actual performance].33 On the basis of smr. ti,
the teachers [hold that prastāvas] should not be [added] to the second and third
verses.
In theory, all sāmans are meant to have five parts (bhakti), among which the
prastāva is a short introduction sung by a priest called the Prastotṛ. The issue here
arises from the fact that the model for the Santani is composed over three verses, but
only the first includes a prastāva. The objector argues that a prastāva should be
added to the second and third verses because, among other things, there is a
principle that states sāmans should be sung with all five bhaktis.34 The LŚS records
that the teachers reject the addition of prastāvas on the basis of smr.ti, which the
commentators again tie to the ūha songbooks. This connection is perhaps most
clearly articulated by Agnisvāmin, who informs us that: “The teachers do not accept
prastāvas for the latter two verses. Why? Because of smr.ti—that is, because the
Santani is so remembered in the Ūhagīti (i.e., the Ūhagāna).”35 If Parpola is right
about the date of the ūha songbooks, then Agnisvāmin’s interpretation is certainly
plausible. Yet it seems equally plausible to interpret smr.ti here as pointing to the
customary way of performing the Santani rather than to its appearance in a
particular text. In the absence of more conclusive evidence, it would be best to leave
open the possibility that the LŚS uses smr.ti in a way that is at least consonant with
the meaning found in the ĀpDhS. It may refer, that is, to something like the
traditional way of performing the Santani sāman.
32
See also DŚS 16.1.13-14.
33
See Dhanvin on DŚS 16.1.13: pūrṇaṃ hi sāma geyam iti nyāyāt. “Because of the principle that a
sāman is to be sung in a complete form.”
34
Dhanvin on DŚS 16.1.13: yadi pratyṛcaṃ sāmasamāptiḥ tarhi pratyṛcaṃ pāñcabhaktikam eva gāyen
nottarayoḥ prastāvalopaḥ kāryaḥ. “If the sāman is completed with every ṛk-verse, then each of those
verses should be sung with all five bhaktis. The prastāvas should not be elided for the latter two verses.”
The fact that the prastāvas must be added comes out more clearly in Agnisvāmin’s commentary on LŚS
6.1.12: ya uttare stotrīye luptaprastāva āmnāyete tayor api prastāvaḥ kartavyaḥ. “One must perform a
prastāva even for the two subsequent stotrīya-verses that are transmitted without them.”
35
Agnisvāmin on LŚS 6.1.13: uttarayoḥ stotrīyayor ācāryāḥ prastāvaṃ necchanti | kasmāt | smṛteḥ |
evaṃ hi smaryate santany ūhagītau. See also Dhanvin on DŚS 16.1.14: ūhakārasmṛter nottarayoḥ
prastāvaḥ. “On the basis of the memory of the ūha-makers, there is no prastāva for the latter two verses.”
According to Parpola (1968b, p. 1:66), the Anustotrasūtra, which examines the form sāmans actually take
in ritual performance, also connects the word smr. ti with ūha.
123
The Nidānasūtra and Textualization
More evidence for the early meaning of smr.ti in the context of the Sāmavedic
technical literature is found in the Nidānasūtra (NidS). The dating of this work
remains uncertain. Renou (1939, pp. 152–153), who bases his conclusion on the
text’s use of extremely concise nominal phrases, believes that it was produced
during the late sūtra period, while Parpola (1968b, pp. 1:63–64) argues that the
particular style upon which Renou based his opinion appears only in NidS 1.1-1.7
and a handful of subsequent sections. Parpola takes all of these to be later
interpolations and dates the rest of the text to a period preceding that of the LŚS.36
The NidS may use smr.ti in a way that supports Wezler’s (2004, p. 642) suspicion
that the textualization of “tradition” might have started with individual statements,
though here, of course, we are not dealing with the dharmaśāstric tradition but an
expert tradition related to Sāmavedic liturgies. This conclusion follows from an
examination of the phrase ācāryasmr.ti, which the NidS appears to use with
reference to the transmitted form of individual utterances attributed to venerable
teachers.37 Here too smr.ti is found in a section that deals with the nature of ūha. The
NidS’s second chapter opens with the following question: “Were the modified
Sāmans (ūhāḥ) created by the seers (ṛṣikṛtāḥ), or were they not created by the
seers?”38 An opponent first argues that ūha was not created by the seers. Once the
pūrvapakṣa position has concluded, the NidS then sets out its own position, which
runs as follows:39
ṛṣikṛta ity aparam40 | katham evaṃ41 bahv anārṣaṃ yajñe kriyeta | athāpi
bṛhad uttarayor nābhipaśyāmīti bharadvājaḥ | tapo ’tapyata rathantaram
uttarayor iti vasiṣṭhaḥ | vidyamānasyaivohasyābhivādo bhavati | athāpy ete
vāsịsṭhaṃ bhāradvājam ity ācakṣate | athāpy ācāryasmṛtīnāṃ vaktā tam
atiśaṅkamānaḥ sarvatraivāśaṅketa.42
The preferable view is that [the modified sāmans] were created by the seers;
for how could a great deal [of material] not coming from the seers be created
for sacrificial performance? Moreover, Bharadvāja [has said] “I do not see the
Bṛhad sāman over the latter two [verses].” Vasiṣtha [has said] “He practiced
˙
austerities [and saw] the Rathantara sāman over the latter two [verses].”43
36
Parpola (1968b, pp. 1:133–136) provides a detailed comparison of parallel passages from the two texts
and argues that the LŚS must have reformulated part of the NidS.
37
This interpretation was first pointed out to me by the anonymous reviewer of this article.
38
NidS 2.1, p. 22: ṛṣikṛtāḥ svid ūhā3 anṛṣikṛtā iti.
39
The pūrvapakṣa is cited in full in the appendix.
40
This opening statement responds to the adversary’s initial position, which reads: anṛṣikṛtā iti vai khalv
āhuḥ. “Indeed, they say that the modified sāmans (ūhāḥ) were not created by the seers.” The editor
suggests emending ṛṣikṛta ity aparam to ṛṣikṛtā ity aparam. My translation follows his suggestion.
41
I prefer to read eva along with the related manuscripts collectively labeled “C” by the editor of the
critical edition. My translation follows this reading.
42
NidS 2.1, p. 22–23.
43
The phrase attributed to Vasiṣtha appears to be a modified and abbreviated form of a common
˙ Jaiminīyabrāhmaṇa. See, for example, Jaiminīyabrāhmaṇa 1.217:
formulation found especially in the
123
710 G. St. Amant
[This is] an abhivāda of existing ūha. Now, they call these two the “Vāsiṣtha
˙
sāman” and the “Bhāradvāja sāman.”44 Were the speakers of the ācāryasmr.tis
to doubt that [abhivāda], they would come to doubt everything.
This passage presents us with several interpretive problems. The first concerns the
statements attributed to Bharadvāja and Vasiṣtha. Are they to be read together as
˙
explaining the origin of the Bṛhadrathantara sāman, which appears in the
Ūharahasyagāna and is jointly attributed to these two figures?45 Or are they
separate statements, the first of which supports a pūrvapakṣa position that denies
ūha was created by the seers?46 Both interpretations run into difficulties. The first is
problematic because the passage subsequently makes separate reference to the
sāmans seen by Bharadvāja and Vasiṣtha, though at least one manuscript preserves a
˙
different reading that points to a single modified sāman attributed to both seers.47
The latter interpretation is also unlikely because the NidS presents its arguments in
accordance with a fixed structure. As Bhatnagar (1971, p. 68), the editor of the
critical edition, notes, the NidS begins its argumentative sections by stating two
opposing viewpoints. It then presents the entire pūrvapakṣa position without the
interposition of any counterarguments: “It appears that the views of the adversary
are final and nothing is to be gainsaid. But it is not so” (Bhatnagar 1971, p. 68).
Only after concluding the pūrvapakṣa does the NidS procced to set out its own view,
which it generally marks with the phrase aparam. It then refutes the adversarial
arguments. As a result, we would expect Bharadvāja’s statement, which appears
after the beginning of the NidS’s own arguments, to support the view that ūha was
created by the seers.
Fortunately, the meaning of the rest of the passage does not depend on the precise
relationship between the statements attributed to the two seers. What matters more
is the meaning of abhivāda, which is usually translated as something like “respectful
salutation.” Here, however, it appears to refer back to the statements attributed to
Bharadvāja and Vasiṣtha, or, perhaps more specifically, to the references those
˙
śrutakakṣaḥ kākṣīvataḥ paśukāmaḥ tapo ’tapyata | sa etat sāmāpaśyat. “Desiring livestock, Śrutakakṣa,
the son of Kakṣı̄vat, practiced austerities. He saw this sāman.” See Caland (1919, p. 84) for a German
translation.
44
See Aṣṭādhyāyī 4.2.7: dṛṣṭaṃ sāma. “[The affix aṆ is applied after the name of an individual by whom
a sāman has been seen in the sense of] a sāman seen [by him].” See also Jaiminīyabrāhmaṇa 3.26: yad u
vasiṣṭho ’paśyat tasmād vāsiṣṭham ity ākhyāyate. “Vasiṣtha saw it, therefore it is called the Vāsiṣtha
sāman.” The anonymous reviewer of this article pointed ˙ out that a number of Vedic texts connect ˙
Vasiṣtha with the Rathantara sāman and Bharadvāja with the Bṛhat sāman. See, for example, Ṛgveda
˙
10.181.1-2 and Aitareyabrāhmaṇa 1.21, p. 16.
45
Ūharahasyagāna Kṣudraparvan 1.7, p. 703–704. See also Puṣpasūtra 2.29.4. But note that, according
to Caland, the Bṛhadrathantara sāman is “Die rathantara-Singweise auf den stotrīyās des Bṛhat.” See
Kṣudrasūtra 2.5 n. 6 (Caland 1908, p. 182).
46
This reading was suggested by the anonymous reviewer of this article.
47
Several manuscripts collectively labeled as “C” read vāsiṣṭhabharadvājam, and instead of the dual ete,
they read anenaiva. If we were to accept this set of readings, perhaps the meaning would be something
like “Because of this very [reference], they call it the sāman seen by Vasiṣtha and Bharadvāja.” It is also
˙ the editor states this is his
worth noting that the reading ete is only found in one manuscript (B), albeit
most reliable one. The others read anye or the more problematic enye.
123
statements make to ūha.48 We might therefore translate the whole sentence as: “This
is a reference to ūha that already exists.”
The last sentence also presents two difficulties. Both the precise meaning of
ācāryasmṛtīnām and the antecedent of tam are unclear. I suspect that tam refers back
to abhivāda—the most plausible singular masculine noun that appears in the context
—though one might argue that tam could refer to ūha.49 This second option would,
however, be less relevant for the broader argument, which seems to be specifically
concerned with the references made to ūha within statements like the one attributed
to Vasiṣtha and with the names given to specific instances of ūha by the tradition. If
˙
my interpretation is correct, then one might suppose that ācāryasmṛtīnām denotes
the body of received material where such references are found—perhaps collections
of the same sort of statement that are in this passage attributed to Bharadvāja and
Vasiṣtha.50 Ācāryasmr.ti might refer either to these statements individually or to
˙
collections of them taken as a unit. Whatever the case may be, a textualized
meaning of ācāryasmr.ti seems all but certain; otherwise, there would be no way to
account for the “speaker” (vaktā) of the teachers’ smr.tis.51 The plural number,
moreover, makes it unlikely that ācāryasmṛtīnām refers to the two ūha songbooks,
either separately or as a collection.
One might alternatively argue that ācāryasmr.ti here refers to individual instances
of ūha. This interpretation is plausible, though the NidS appears subsequently to use
a different word—ācāryagītāni—in this meaning.52 Another piece of external
evidence also undermines this interpretation. The Mīmāṃsāsūtra (Mı̄Sū), which has
been tentatively dated to around 200 BCE, contains a brief section that may engage
with the problem of Sāmavedic ūha.53 Unfortunately, the sūtras in question are
themselves somewhat opaque, and Śabara (c. 5th century CE), who composed the
earliest extant commentary, provides two different interpretations. The first has
nothing to do with ūha and instead considers whether the word sāman denotes a
mantra when it is sung or the underlying tune. The second interpretation casts these
sūtras as dealing with the nature of Sāmavedic ūha, though the Mı̄Sū is supposed by
Śabara to maintain the opposite siddhānta position to that of the NidS:
48
Compare, for example, with Pañcaviṃśabrāhmaṇa (PB) 11.6.3, where abhivadati is used to mean that
the priest “addresses” the second day of the bahiṣpavamāna. See also PB 12.1.8, where tad eva tad
abhivadati seems to mean that the priest “addresses” or “refers to” the antarikṣa by chanting a sāman
composed on a ṛk (RV 9.65.16) that includes the word antarikṣa. For a translation of these two passages,
see Caland (1931, pp. 260, 272).
49
This interpretation was suggested by the anonymous reviewer of this article.
50
I am here adopting with some modification the insightful view of the anonymous reviewer of this
article.
51
Contrast with NidS 6.5, p. 138: eṣa ācāryasamayaḥ. “This is the convention of the teachers.” This
phrase refers to conventional way of performing the Mādhyandinapavamāna during the Gargatrirātra
ritual—the normal Yaudhājaya sāman is replaced the Yaudhājayekākṣarānta sāman. This reference does
not seem to involve a textualized tradition of any kind. The Ārṣeyakalpa 6.3, p. 78 does not make note of
this convention, though Caland (n. 3) mentions it in a footnote of his edition.
52
NidS 2.1, p. 23.
53
For the date of the Mı̄Sū, see, for example, McCrea (2010, p. 124 n. 2).
123
712 G. St. Amant
Mı̄Sū 9.2.1-2: sāmāni mantram eke smṛtyupadeśābhyām | tad uktadoṣam.

Some say the [modified] sāmans are mantras because of smr.ti and because of the
instruction [that they are desired to be done]. [No, that view] bespeaks its own fault.
Śabara poses the question as follows: “Does [Sāmavedic] ūha come from the seers
(ārṣa)—is it eternal (nitya)—or was it made by men?”54 He interprets sūtra 9.2.1 as
providing a pūrvapakṣa that supports the view that Sāmavedic ūha should be
categorized as mantra, and sūtra 9.2.2 as denying this position, stating that it should
not. Our principal interest is in the usage of smr. ti, which Mı̄Sū 9.2.1 adduces as one
of the pūrvapakṣin’s two reasons for accepting that the modified sāmans should be
categorized as mantra. This usage corresponds, at least functionally, to that of the
NidS, which also suggests that smr.ti somehow supports the view that Sāmavedic
ūha comes from the seers.
It is well known that Mı̄māṃsakas would later come to use smr.ti to signify
textualized “memories” that were supposed to allow one to infer the existence of
Vedic passages for which the actual wording was inaccessible. But unlike its
commentaries, the Mı̄Sū itself does not use the word smr.ti in its most important
discussion about inferring the Vedic bases thought to underpin traditional
practices.55 The word smr.ti does appear elsewhere, albeit only four times, but it
is not always obvious what exactly it means. In this particular case, Śabara tells us
that smr.ti points to the traditional teaching embodied in the phrase: “They
remember that ‘These [modified sāmans], being mantras, come from the seers, [i.
e.,] are eternal.’”56
Śabara takes smr.ti to mean a specific traditional teaching in a verbalized, though
probably only semi-fixed, form, and his interpretation seems basically compatible
with the meaning I have hypothesized for ācāryasmr.ti in the NidS; there too it
points to some form of verbal teaching.57 The example cited by Śabara is not,
however, attributed to any sort of revered figure. Śabara’s work dates, moreover,
from a much later period than the NidS, so his interpretation may be anachronistic.
But, assuming his second interpretation of Mı̄Sū 9.2.1 is broadly correct, the sūtra’s
structure makes clear that smr. ti, whatever it means, must be understood as one of
the reasons supporting the argument that Sāmavedic ūha should be categorized as
mantra; it seems therefore unlikely that smr. ti refers to ūha itself.58 Given the Mı̄Sū
54
Śābarabhāṣya on Mı̄Sū 9.2.1: kim ayam apy ārṣo nitya uta puruṣapraṇīta iti. Technically, this
statement refers to a specific instance of Sāmavedic ūha cited in Śabara’s commentary, but the point is
obviously to deal with Sāmavedic ūha more generally. I have translated the line with this larger frame of
reference in mind.
55
By this I mean Mı̄Sū 1.3, which the later tradition would come to call the “Smr
. tipāda.” But, see also
the use of smr
. ti in Mı̄Sū 7.1.10-11.
56
Śābarabhāṣya on Mı̄Sū 9.2.1: evaṃ hi smaranti | mantrabhūtāny etāny ārṣāṇi nityānīti.
57
This meaning of smr
. ti seems similar to one that Olivelle (2018, p. 59) suggests in a different context.
See note five of my paper.
58
There is a possible counterargument to this interpretation. The Mı̄Sū’s pūrvapakṣa might want to draw
attention to the existence of the ūha songbooks, which are, according to Śālikanātha, studied in the same
manner as Vedic texts. If smr . ti were to refer to these songbooks, then the adversary’s point might be to
highlight that these songbooks are studied and treated in a manner identical to other Vedic texts. See
Śālikanātha’s commentary on Bṛhatī 9.2.1-2.
123
is here participating in the same discourse as the Nidānasūtra, we might expect

smr.ti to have roughly the same meaning in both contexts.
The cumulative weight of the evidence suggests that the NidS uses ācāryasmr.ti
to refer to some sort of transmitted textual material, perhaps individual statements
attributed to teachers within the Sāmavedic liturgical tradition or groups of such
statements. These meanings are to a degree different from what we find in the LŚS,
where smr. ti is not attributed to the teachers and instead serves as an authoritative
source that informs a position they maintain. Whether this difference marks a true
semantic shift is at present impossible to say because, as we have seen, the LŚS’s
usage may be plausibly interpreted in a variety of ways. In any event, both texts use
smr.ti in connection with Sāmavedic ūha—perhaps because recitational conventions
represent a context in which “tradition” was of particular importance and began to
be codified at an early date.
The NidS contains two more instances of the word “smr.ti.” Both appear in the
same broader section as ācāryasmr.ti, though they are found in the pūrvapakṣa,
where they appear in the locative case (smṛtau) and without the qualifier ācārya-.
Unfortunately, this part of the passage presents a variety of interpretive challenges
and remains to me unclear. What can be said, however, is that a comparison of
corresponding arguments from the pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta leads to the tentative
conclusion that smṛtau is used conditionally to mean something like “provided [the
modified sāmans] were authoritatively transmitted.” I see no easy way to reconcile
this usage with that of the clearer ācāryasmṛtīnām. Perhaps smr.ti has two separate
senses in the Nidānasūtra, or, alternatively, smṛtau is a misreading for smṛte (see
Appendix).
The Sāmavidhānabrāhmana
.
Another instance of smr.ti is met with in the Sāmavidhānabrāhmaṇa (SVB). This
work is not a brāhmaṇa-text in the usual sense of the word. It deals with expiatory
rites and the use of sāmans in desire-granting rituals of a markedly different nature
from those of the Vedic sacrificial program. In terms of style, it resembles, as Jan
Gonda (1975, p. 320) tells us, most closely texts of the sūtra genre, and two studies
date it somewhat ambiguously to “the sūtra period” (Burnell, 1873, pp. viii–x;
Konow, 1893, p. 2). Sharma (1980, p. vii), who edited the critical edition, places it
in “the later sūtra period.” His dating is generally supported by the fact that the SVB
contains several terms that are unattested in all but the latest stratum of Vedic
prose.59 It is also worth noting that an entire section of the SVB (1.2.1-12) has been
incorporated into the GDhS (Bühler, 1898, p. li; Olivelle, 1999, p. 74), though what
59
For example, SVB 1.5.13 contains the term abhojya, which Olivelle (2002, p. 345) informs us appears
nowhere else in the Vedic corpus apart from the late Gopathabrāhmaṇa (1.3.19). SVB 3.5.3 contains an
etymological explanation for the term cakravartin. Kane (1946, p. 66) tells us that in the Vedic literature
this word first appears in the late Maitrāyaṇīyopaniṣad. Similarly, SVB 3.9.1 contains the word maṭha in
the sense of a “hovel,” a term that Scharfe (2002, p. 172) states first appears in the later sections of the
Mahābhārata (12.139.29) and in the Baudhāyanadharmasūtra (3.1.14).
123
714 G. St. Amant
this means for the dating of the entire text is difficult to say.60 The word smr. ti occurs
only once in the SVB:
SVB 3.9.6 atha yāny anādiṣṭakāmakalpāni teṣām yathāśruti smr.tiliṅgaiḥ
kāmāḥ kṣurasaṃyuktāḥ.61
There are certain [sāmans] for which desire-granting ritual procedures have
not been explicitly taught [in the SVB]. The desires related to [those sāmans]
are, in conformance with explicit prescriptions, connected with specific
observances (see discussion below) by way of smr.tiliṅga.
Before examining the meaning of smr.ti here, we must consider the phrase kāmāḥ
kṣurasamyuktāḥ, which Sharma adopted in his critical edition of the text. In doing
so, he is following the reading of the commentator Bharatasvāmin as opposed to that
of Sāyana, who appears to have read something like kāmākṣarasaṃyuktāḥ instead.62
˙
Sāyana glosses this phrase as “connected with observances” (niyamasaṃyukta). The
˙
reading kāmākṣarasaṃyuktāḥ is challenging because it has no obvious antecedent.
Moreover, its connection with the interpretation Sāyana provides is far from
˙
obvious. The phrase might refer back to kalpa and mean “the procedures [for those
sāmans] are connected with specific desires and akṣaras.”63 Yet Sāyana’s gloss
˙
appears to ignore the word kāma altogether, and it gives niyama as a synonym for
akṣara. The only place I have found a similar meaning attested is in Hemacandra’s
(3.516, p. 86) Anekārthasaṃgraha, where tapas (“austerity”) is given as one
meaning of akṣara.
Whatever Sāyana’s precise reading may have been, his gloss makes sense in
˙
context because the SVB often enjoins particular observances along with the
procedures it prescribes, and yathāśruti may be taken as connected with the
assignment of a link between sāmans and particular desires.64 Bharatasvāmin’s
reading is somewhat more difficult to understand. He glosses kāmāḥ with kalpāḥ—a
60
The direction of borrowing appears clear given the GDhS makes additions to a liturgical utterance
prescribed along with a water-libation. Compare SVB 1.2.7 with GDhS 26.12. See Bühler (1898, p. li)
and Olivelle (1999, p. 74)
61
Burnell’s edition reads kāmākṣarasaṃyuktaḥ and Konow’s (1893, p. 79) translation seems loosely to
follow it (Wunschworten). Sharma’s apparatus reveals that this is the reading transmitted in Sāyana’s
commentary. Bharatasvāmin, who lived around 1300 CE, reads kāmāḥ kṣurasaṃyuktāḥ. ˙
62
Sharma seems to emend his edition of Sāyana’s commentary to read kāmāḥ kṣurasaṃyuktāḥ, though
˙ manuscripts he labels A (kāmākṣarasaṃyuktāḥ) and B
he notes in his apparatus that variants appear in the
(kāmākṣarasaṃyukto) as well as in Burnell’s edition. According to Sharma’s introduction (p. xi), A and B
are the only manuscripts he consulted that include Sāyana’s commentary. It is possible that he is here
˙
following Satyavrata Samasramin’s 1895 edition. I unfortunately do not have access to this work. Insofar
as the root text is concerned, it seems that Sharma’s better manuscripts read kāmāḥ kṣurasaṃyuktāḥ, but a
few others provide a reading closer to Sāyana’s as it appears in the manuscripts reported by Sharma.
63
˙
One might consider whether the reading akṣara transmitted in Sāyana’s commentary is meant in some
way to refer to nidhanas and not to observances. I am, however, unaware ˙ of any Sāmavedic technical
literature that uses the word akṣara this way, though it is sometimes used to specify the number of
akṣaras that appear in a nidhana.
64
Is it possible that Sāyana actually read something like kāmā akṣarasaṃyuktāḥ and the two words were
mistakenly written together?˙ This explanation would at least account for the fact that the gloss
niyamasaṃyuktāḥ seems to ignore the word kāma. Or, if the singular reading of B is correct, perhaps part
of the o-ligature was dropped by scribal error?
123
change that seems to be based on the broader import of the passage rather than the
meaning of the words—and kṣurasaṃyuktāḥ as tīkṣṇadhārāsaṃyuktāḥ (“endowed
with a sharp blade”). This is, insofar as I can tell, nothing more than a mechanical
provision of synonyms: kṣura literally means something like “razor,” and the SVB
uses it elsewhere in this sense.65 The SVB does contain another instance of the
phrase kṣurasaṃyukta, but here it clearly refers to a ritual practitioner and not to
desires or ritual procedures:
SVB 2.5.666: atha yaḥ kāmayetāvartayeyam ity ekarātraṃ kṣurasaṃyuktas
tiṣṭhet sutāso madhumattamā iti varga eteṣām ekam anekaṃ vā sarvāṇi vā
prayuñjāna ekarātreṇa kuṭumbinam āvartayati.
Now, a man who desires [thinking] “I will control [someone]” should stand
kṣurasaṃyuktaḥ for the duration of a single night. Employing one, several, or
all among the collection [of sāmans that begin] ‘sutāso madhumattamāḥ,’ he
brings a householder under his control within a single night.
Konow (1893, p. 58) has translated kṣurasaṃyukta in this context as “razor in hand”
(Rasiermesser in der Hand). This interpretation is plausible given the preceding
section, which instructs a practitioner first to create an effigy of the individual he
wants to bring under his control and second to slice parts of the effigy into a fire.67
Here, Sāyana’s reads kṣurasaṃyukta, which he glosses with “holding a razor”
˙
(kṣuraṃ dhārayan). The word kṣurasaṃyukta also appears once in the Ṛgvidhāna.
Here too the phrase qualifies a ritual practitioner:
RVidh 1.28.154cd-156: trirātropoṣitaḥ snātaḥ prayataḥ caritavrataḥ ||
prāṇāyāmaśatam kṛtvā upatiṣṭec chatakratum | ekāhaṃ kṣurasaṃyuktaḥ pādau
saṃdhāya vāgyataḥ || yo jāta iti sūktena ṛṣim gṛtsamadam smaran | śatakṛtvo
japed etad indra śreṣṭheti cāntataḥ.
A devout man, having fasted for three nights, bathed, and having observed a
vow, should worship Indra after performing one hundred breath-exercises.
Having been kṣurasaṃyukta for a day, placing his feet together, and having
restrained his speech, he should keep the seer Gṛtsamada in mind with the
hymn [beginning] “yo jātaḥ” and mutter it one hundred times with [the verse
beginning] “indra śreṣṭha-” at the end.68
In his translation of this passage, Bhat (1987, p. 311) renders kṣurasaṃyukta as
“holding a dagger” and construes ekāham with “restraining his speech.” The
corresponding usage of ekarātram in the preceding SVB passage suggests, however,
65
SVB 1.5.15, 2.5.5 (Burnell 2.5.4), 3.6.11, and 3.6.13.
66
The critical edition appears to have been misnumbered as 2.5.3 has been skipped. In Burnell’s edition
and Konow’s (1893, p. 58) translation, this passage is numbered 2.5.5.
67
SVB 2.5.5: kṛṣṇavrīhīṇāṃ nakhanirbhinnānāṃ piṣṭamayīṃ pratikṛtiṃ kṛtvā piṣṭasvedaṃ svedayitvā
sarṣapatailenābhyajya tasyāḥ kṣureṇāṅgāny avadāyāgnau juhuyāt. “Making an effigy out of ground up
black rice broken up with the fingernails, he should let the dough rise, rub it with mustard oil, and slice the
limbs with a razor offering them into the fire.” I am here following Konow’s (1893, p. 58) German
translation.
68
My translation follows Bhat’s rendering (1987, p. 311), though I have made a number of
modifications.
123
716 G. St. Amant
that ekāham may construe with kṣurasaṃyukta. But these two instances of
kṣurasaṃyukta are of limited help because both describe a practitioner. While a
person can obviously hold a razor, I see no way to qualify kāmāḥ or kalpāḥ in such a
way. This leaves us with two options: either we accept Sāyana’s interpretation, at
˙
least in its general sense, or we assume another meaning for kṣura through
metaphorical extension. The latter of these brings us to what amounts to the same
outcome; contextually kṣura must point to some sort of procedure, and, given the
image of a razor, we should perhaps assume it is one that is difficult to undertake.69
Another reason to think we are dealing with something like niyama is that the SVB
often assigns specific observances that are meant to accompany the chanting of a
sāman in pursuit of some particular result. Take, for example, the following:
SVB 3.9.1: caturo māsān payobhakṣo gā anu gatvāraṇye śucau deśe maṭhaṃ
kṛtvā tatra praviśet | kamaṇḍalum udakopasparśanārtham ādāya trīnt
saptarātrān anudaka upavasan ṛcaṃ sāma yajāmaha ity etayoḥ pūrvaṃ sadā
sahasrakṛtva āvartayan yadi devatāḥ paśayati siddhaṃ tad iti.
Consuming only milk, [the practitioner] should, having followed the cows for
a period of four months, construct a hovel in a pure place in the forest and take
up residence there. Having taken up a water jar in order to rinse his mouth, he
should abstain from water for twenty-one nights and repeat the first of the two
[sāmans set to the verse that begins] “ṛcaṃ sāma yajāmahe” a thousand times
a day. If he sees deities, [the ritual] has been successful.70
It appears likely, then, that whichever reading we accept, we are dealing with the
problem of how to assign observances to desires for which the SVB has not taught
specific ritual procedures.71 This tentative conclusion brings us to smr.tiliṅgaiḥ, which
ought to provide the means whereby specific ritual procedures may be connected
with the appropriate desires. Liṅga’s appearance together with smr. ti is, however,
perplexing—were smr.ti here to mean simply “tradition,” what, then, would liṅga
mean? Unfortunately, the term appears nowhere else in the SVB, and mechanically
translating the phrase as “by the indications of tradition” seems unhelpful.72 What
69
Could the image point to something like Kaṭhopaniṣad 3.13-14: yacched vāṅmanasī prājñas tad
yacchej jñāna ātmani | jñānam ātmani mahati niyacchet tad yacchec chānta ātmani || uttiṣṭhata jāgrata
prāpya varān nibodhata | kṣurasya dhārā niśitā duratyayā durgaṃ pathas tat kavayo vadanti. “A wise
man should curb his speech and mind, control them within the intelligent self; He should control
intelligence within the immense self, and the latter, within the tranquil self. Arise! Awake! Pay attention,
when you’ve attained your wishes! A razor’s sharp edge (kṣurasya dhārā) is hard to cross—that, poets
say, is the difficulty of the path.” This translation is Olivelle’s (1998, p. 391) with my addition in
parentheses.
70
See Konow (1893, pp. 78–79) for a German translation that agrees in sense with mine.
71
An analogous concern with the assignment of observances can be felt in 2.1.1-2: athātaḥ kāmyānām |
anādeśe trirātram upavāsaḥ puṣyeṇārambhaḥ. “Now, on to [the ritual procedures performed] for
particular objects. In the absence of a specific instruction, one should perform a fast for three days and
begin in the month of Pauṣa.”
72
For example, Konow’s (1893, p. 79) “den Andeutungen der Smr . ti.” Liṅga does, albeit seldomly, appear
in the meaning of “character” in some early texts, for example Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 4.4.6. But this
meaning would here make liṅga redundant; the word smr . ti would suffice on its own.
123
would those indications actually be, and what purpose would they serve in
qualifying the tradition itself?
It seems to me that liṅga is best understood as serving a function that corresponds
with the one it plays in hermeneutical contexts, where its prototypical purpose is to
determine how to apply a mantra to a ritual action when no explicit prescription is
available. For example, when the name of a deity appears in a mantra, the name
serves as an indication (liṅga) that the mantra may be used in the worship of that
deity—it has the capacity to suggest a particular ritual application. This usage of
liṅga is often associated with Mı̄māṃsā, but it was well established by the time of
the Āpastambaśrautasūtra (ĀpŚS), which, provided the rough dating usually
suggested for this text is correct, is either older than or from a period similar to the
SVB.73
The context of the SVB passage suggests a similar function for liṅga: here too it
appears to provide a means to apply ritual details in situations that lack an explicit
prescription. One might still argue that smr.ti and liṅga should be taken separately—
by smr. ti and by liṅgas—perhaps with the latter term referring to the indicative
marks found in the various sāmans. But this meaning seems unlikely; the character
of sāmans makes the use of their content for such a purpose difficult. Even if we
focus on the underlying ṛk-verses, the SVB does not seem usually to connect their
meaning with the purposes to which they are assigned, and there is nothing in the
verses to indicate information about observances of any kind.74
Provided my interpretation of smr. tiliṅgaiḥ is correct, we would expect smr.ti to
denote something that includes both information about specific religious obser-
vances and contains some kind of indication that could be used to apply those
observances to particular desire-granting rituals that make use of sāmans. For these
reasons, I think smr.ti probably refers to something textualized, perhaps phrases or
groups of phrases that assumed a fixed or semi-fixed form that were not—or not yet
—incorporated, either literally or conceptually, into definite texts. It would be
reasonable to ask what this sort of phrase might look like. For this we may turn
again to the NidS, which contains an interesting passage in its discussion of the
Mahānāmni verses:
NidS 4.3, p. 66: tāsāṃ khalu trīn saṃvatsarān brahmacaryaṃ caret |
kṛṣṇavastraḥ kṛṣṇabhakṣa ācāryādhīnas tapasvī tiṣṭhed divāsīta naktam | … |
evaṃ khalu carataḥ kāmavarṣī parjanyo bhavati.
[The reciter] must for [the Mahānāmnı̄ verses] practice brahmacarya for three
years. During the day, he should wear dark clothes, eat dark food, serve his
73
For the phrase yathāliṅgam, which means “[apply the mantra] in accordance with its indicatory mark,”
see, for example, ĀpŚS 1.5.5, 3.20.2, 4.1.8, and 4.10.1. The ĀpŚS uses liṅga without yathā in 19.18.4 and
19.18.8.
74
The SVB sometimes prescribes particular endings (nidhanas) that relate to the function of the ritual.
Were liṅga to be taken separately from smr. ti as referring to indications found in the underlying verses of
the sāmans or to their Prakṛtigāna forms, these nidhana would be of no relevance as they are specifically
enjoined by the SVB and not part of the underlying sāman. There is some further discussion of the issue
of the relationship between the words underlying particular sāmans and their function in the SVB in
Konow (1893, pp. 22–23).
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718 G. St. Amant
preceptor, and stand while practicing penance; at night, he should sit … The
clouds surely rain according to the wishes of one who performs these things.
These look very much like the sorts of observances found in the SVB. There is
evidence, moreover, that statements about similar types of observances were
preserved as the words of venerable teachers within the Sāmavedic tradition. The
NidS also contains a statement attributed to Gautama that concerns the practice of
brahmacarya as it relates to the performance of the Purı̄ṣa sections on the fifth day
of the Soma sacrifice.75 Although these statements are themselves preserved within
a definite text, the attribution of the quotation to Gautama allows us to conjecture
that the NidS is, at least in part, drawing on some sort of textualized or semi-
textualized source material. And if the SVB does in fact use smr.ti with reference to
these sorts of materials, then liṅga might refer to the mention of specific results in
connection with particular observances—for example, the power over rain that
appears in the abovementioned NidS passage. This example, as well as the
statement attributed to Gautama, are connected with the solemn sacrificial program.
It seems plausible that the SVB intends to argue for the secondary application of the
traditional teachings that deal with these sorts of observances, which were perhaps
originally codified within expert traditions concerned with the solemn sacrifices, to
personal rites.
It is important to note that the meaning I have proposed for smr.ti is conjectural,
though I think, especially given the evidence of the NidS, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that we are dealing with something verbal. In the absence of other
evidence, smr. ti’s most likely referent seems to be some sort of fixed or semi-fixed
statement attributed, at least sometimes, to authority figures within specific expert
traditions or to the larger discursive units within which those sorts of statements
might have been embedded. But do we have evidence to suggest that such
statements were in fact transmitted outside of (or conceptualized as separate from)
definite texts? Our ability to examine this problem is hampered by the fact that the
material that has come down to us is obviously preserved within larger textual units;
this perhaps explains why Wezler (2004, p. 642) only conjectured that “textual-
ization might have begun with single elements of custom and legal tradition.” Yet it
seems to me that certain statements or groups of statements must have been
transmitted in a fixed or semi-fixed form prior to their inclusion, at least
conceptually, into definite texts. As we have seen, certain phrases were attributed to
various teachers, some of which are worded in such a way as to give the obvious
appearance of a verbal opinion.76 Importantly, the NidS and LŚS acknowledge the
75
NidS 4.2, p. 65: tāsāṃ dharmo niyujyate na vyāhared nāśnīyād abhinaddhākṣam āsīta | … | etam
evāhaṃ brahmacaryaṃ dharmam u manya iti gautama. “A prescribed course of conduct (dharma) is
enjoined for [the Purı̄ṣa sections. The performer] must neither speak nor eat, and he must sit with his eyes
covered … I think this very [course of conduct] is brahmacārya—so says Gautama.” It is not entirely
clear where this quotation begins, but at least part of it is attributed to Gautama.
76
This is especially clear in examples like NidS 3.3, p. 44: atirātrīṃ prathamāṃ manya iti dhānañjayyaḥ.
These sorts of expressions were probably not fully fixed though they appear to have been transmitted
verbally. Some seem to have developed as an oral commentary on older texts; for example, LŚS 10.19.11:
pravrajiṣyato ’yanam idaṃ manya iti dhānañjayyas tad eva manuṣyebhas tirobhavatīti. “Dhānañjayya
[says] ‘I think this course is for the man wanting to depart [from the world;’ for a brāhmaṇa (PB 25.11.4)
123
existence of definite texts, such as the Ārṣeyakalpa, yet there is no evidence to

suggest that either acknowledges a similar source for the teachers’ opinions that
they cite. In a handful of cases, the NidS and LŚS cite identical examples of this sort
of ritual opinion.77
Summary and Conclusions
Although an examination of material from outside early dharmaśāstric discourse

complicates our understanding of the early semantic history of smr. ti, it also
provides potential insight into the processes whereby traditional norms were
codified. As we have seen, the LŚS uses smr. ti in a somewhat ambiguous fashion
amenable to both a textual and non-textual interpretation. Conversely, the
Nidānasūtra uses smr. ti—clearly when qualified by the term ācārya—to speak of
something transmitted verbally. And although the meaning of ācāryasmr.ti is not
entirely apparent, it seems most reasonable to connect it with statements attributed
to important seers and teachers that deal with the origins of the modified sāmans
used during the Soma sacrifices.
Perhaps more difficult is the SVB’s use of smr.ti together with liṅga. I have
hypothesized that, as an ensemble, they point to a textualized meaning for smr. ti.
Otherwise, I see no obvious reason why liṅga would be used in this context at all.
As a result, I have conjectured that smr.ti there also points to something like certain
statements or groups of statements that codify specific observances related to the
Sāmavedic liturgy—statements, that is, like those dealing with various religious
penances prescribed for the performer of the Mahānāmnı̄ verses and preserved in the
Nidānasūtra.
If my proposed interpretation of smr.ti is correct, then the Sāmavedic technical
literature could be said to provide support for Wezler’s (2004, p. 642) intuition
about the textualization of smr. ti. In other words, the Sāmavedic material provides
evidence that supports his hypothesis that single phrases—and, though this was not
included in his formulation, groups of phrases—may have assumed a transmitted
(though perhaps not totally fixed) form prior to their collation into definite texts and
states] ‘There he disappears from the (eyes of) men.’” The translation of the quoted section from the PB is
Caland’s (1931, p. 639). Parpola (1968a, p. 75) argues, however, that “the wording of the quotations,
including those with iti, must have been formulated by the sūtrakāra…”, though he also notes that the
LŚS may have “wanted the quotations with iti to be taken as genuine, for in three cases the wording is
distinctly marked to be original.” Here he refers us to quotes that include the word manye.
77
For example, NidS 6.8, p. 104: ṣad..rce sarvasminn ity ācāryāḥ | arddharceṣv anugānāny evam
asaṃrodhataro gītānām iti | dvādaśarca iti śāṇd.ilyaḥ and LŚS 10.9.8-9: ṣad..rce sarvasminn ity ācāryā
arddharceṣv anugānāny evam saṃrodhataro gītānām | dvādaśarca iti śāṇd.ilyaḥ …. It is of course
possible that one of these texts simply makes use of the other; this is the opinion of Parpola (1968b,
p. 1:133–134), who bases his conclusions on the examination of one set of corresponding sections.
Perhaps here too we should pay attention to Wezler’s methodological caution when it comes to texts.
Both Caland (1908, p. xviii) and Bhatnagar (1971, p. 28) conclude that the LŚS and the Nidānasūtra do
not know each other, though both scholars suggest that in a number of instances the two texts appear to
have drawn from similar sources.
123
720 G. St. Amant
that these types of phrases may have been the first “textual” referent of the word
smr.ti. The conclusions drawn from the Sāmavedic evidence might be taken to
suggest that smr.ti underwent a similar semantic development in the dharmaśāstric
corpus as well. We know that over time the dharmasūtras came to cite an
increasingly large number of external verses, and, as Brick (2006, p. 299) has
pointed out, this trend culminates in the Mānavadharmaśāstra, which is fully
versified.78 Perhaps the verses cited in the dharmasūtras—which correspond well
with Wezler’s (2004, p. 642) “single elements of custom and legal tradition”—were
the first textualized referent of smr.ti in the dharmaśāstric tradition.79
As Brick (2006, p. 298) has already suggested, smr.ti’s semantic shift in the
context of the dharmaśāstric discourse makes sense because the dharmaśāstras are,
in essence, the codification of a specific type of tradition, and within this corpus smr. ti
would come to refer specifically to dharmaśāstra itself. It is true that the meaning
smr.ti assumed in the dharmaśāstras would come to be the dominant one, but the
Sāmavedic evidence suggests that the textualization—or, perhaps verbalization—of
tradition under the name smr.ti may have been a wider phenomenon not exclusively
driven, at least at first, by the particular exigencies of the dharmaśāstric project.80
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Professors Sheldon Pollock and John Hawley for their
insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank Professor Asko Parpola for
kindly answering questions about one of the sources. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous
reviewer for a number of criticisms that fundamentally altered the shape of this paper.
Funding No funding was received to assist with the preparation of this manuscript.
Declarations
Conflict of interest The author has no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.
Appendix: Nidānasūtra 2.1
NidS 2.1, p. 22 contains two additional instances of the word smr.ti. Both appear in
the course of an extended pūrvapakṣa:
ṛṣikṛtāḥ svid ūhā3 anṛṣikṛtā iti | anṛṣikṛtā iti vai khalv āhuḥ | apy ādyā viratā
evohanāt | no evam ārṣeyo bhavati | athāpy ūha ity enam ācakṣate | kartavya
78
Excluding the GDhS, which contains no verses.
79
This suggestion was proposed by the anonymous reviewer of this article. It should be noted that Brick
(2006, pp. 299–301) discusses this idea, stating that, at least in early contexts, smr . ti should not be equated
with the verses. Later, he (2006, p. 301) argues that the frequent use of verses “could facilitate a
collapsing of the distinction between tradition and fixed expressions of tradition.” Yet he does not, at least
insofar as I can tell, specifically suggest that smr
. ti ever referred to individual verses as opposed to a body
of literature.
80
Though, as Brick (2006, p. 287) informs us, “medieval Sanskrit commentators” often took smr
. ti to
refer to a number of non-Vedic genres “such as dharmaśāstra, itihāsa, and purāṇa.”
123
iti vaitad bhavati | athāpi yājñikā vipratipadyante | yajñārthaḥ khalu punar

ūho bhavati | athāpi vṛttir yonir iti gāyanti | kim u khalu smṛtau vrttyā kiṃ
yonyā bhaviṣyatīti | athāpi nātyantaṃ gāyanti | tatra yad agītaṃ kartavyam ity
evāpannaṃ bhavati | athāpy anyasaṃhitasya saṃhitām avekṣya gāyanti | tad
etat smṛtau nopapadyata iti.
I cannot at present offer a convincing interpretation of this passage. What may be
useful, however, is to compare the specific pūrvapakṣa (P) statements from the
above passage that include the word smṛtau with the corresponding refutations
provided by the siddhānta (S). The first set of corresponding arguments run as
follows:
P: athāpi vṛttir yonir iti gāyanti | kim u khalu smṛtau vrttyā kiṃ yonyā
bhaviṣyatīti.81
S: yad v etad vṛttir yonir iti gāyantīti chāndasasya pārthikā vṛttir yoni
kalpante.82
In the Sāmavedic context, yoni generally refers to the underlying ṛk-verse to
which a sāman is set. It can also mean, as Tarlekar (2001, p. 2:620) explains in his
study of the Puṣpasūtra, “the first stotrīyā of the sāman, the chant of which is
employed in the remaining two stotrīyās.” The meaning of vṛtti seems uncertain.
The opening section of the NidS defines vṛtti as a sort of rhythmic cadence
determined by the weight of a pāda’s penultimate syllable.83 Does vṛtti really mean
this here? Or does it mean something like “recitational mode?”84 In any event, the
pūrvapakṣa seems to make the point that modified sāmans are performed after
having considered the vṛtti and the yoni.
The subsequent part of the argument seems to assume an unstated ūhasya that
construes with smṛtau. The idea seems to be that if there were a smr.ti (“memory?”)
of an ūha, there would be no point in referring to or using the vṛtti and the yoni for
the performance of that ūha. The siddhānta appears to argue that people think that
the form found in the Prakṛtigāna (chāndasasya) also has a separate (pārthika?) vṛtti
and yoni.85 The point seems to be that making use of or reference to these two things
81
In a personal communication (Jan 13, 2021), Asko Parpola tentatively suggested that this statement
might mean: “They chant (the sacrificial songs) knowing on how many verses (three or one) the sāman is
to be sung and the yoni verse. For in the Smr
. ti (i.e., singing after the Ūhagānas), what use would one have
of the knowledge of these two things [as that knowledge has already been used and the singer is in the
Ūhagāna provided with the ready result of applying that knowledge]?”
82
NidS 2.1, p. 23.
83
The discussion begins with NidS 1.1, p. 2: athāto vṛttipradeśa iti yatra hrasvam akṣaram upottamaṃ
pādasya bhavati sā jāgatī vṛttir iti. The subsequent passages discuss various types and conditions.
84
As in Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya 13.46: tisro vṛttīr upadiśanti vāco vilambitāṃ madhyamāṃ ca drutāṃ ca. But
compare NidS 2.10, p. 36: athāpi bahulaiṣā chāndasī vṛttiḥ, which seems to point specifically to the
rhythmic cadences of the various meters—or does chandas point instead to the ṛks? See also NidS 2.12,
p. 39: athāpy uddhriyamāṇeṣūpasargākṣareṣu nevārtho hīyate na vṛttir duṣyati. This deals with the
problem of how to determine which syllables serve as the liturgical interpolations (upasargas) of the
Gaurı̄vita sāman.
85
The reading pārthikā vṛttir yoni kalpante is difficult to understand. The editor of the edition Bhatnagar
(1971, p. 70) suggests emending to “vṛttir yonir iti kalpante,” though unfortunately he does not provide a
translation of any sort. For the meaning of chāndasa-, see NidS 2.2, p. 24: chāndasenādhyāyenaikarcān
123
722 G. St. Amant
in the course of performance does not vitiate the possibility of smr.ti, whatever it
might mean. The second set of corresponding arguments is perhaps more helpful:
P: athāpy anyasaṃhitasya saṃhitām avekṣya gāyanti | tad etat smṛtau
nopapadyata iti.
S: yad v etad anyasaṃhitasya saṃhitām avekṣya gāyantīti chandasy api
vṛttijño ’nyasaṃhitasya saṃhitām avekṣya gāyet na tāvatā chando ’smṛtaṃ
manyeta.86
Here too we are confronted with a number of unclear phrases, including
anyasaṃhitasya saṃhitām, for which I can provide no satisfactory translation. The
pūrvapakṣin’s point seems to be that taking account of particular type of collection
(anyasaṃhitasya saṃhitām avekṣya) would be unreasonable if there were a smr. ti
(memory?) of an ūha. The siddhāntin argues from analogy that even those who
know the vṛttis of the underlying verses (or is it meters?) take account of the same
type of collection (anyasaṃhitasya saṃhitā) before singing. This much, however,
does not mean that the chandas has been forgotten (asmṛta). A clearer picture of the
meaning of smṛta is provided by a subsequent statement:
S: athāpi ya upavādād asmṛtaṃ manyetāpi nūnaṃ sa sarvām evāpi
trayīvidyām asmṛtāṃ manyeta tāṃ hy apy eka upavadantīti.87
Now, were someone to think that [ūha] is asmṛta because people disparage it,
then, to be sure, he would have to think that the entire triple-knowledge [of the
Veda] was asmṛta; for there are some who disparage even that.
This passage makes clear, I think, that smṛta means, in this particular context,
“remembered [rightly]” or perhaps “transmitted [authoritatively],” especially as it is
used with reference to the Vedic texts themselves.88 Given the correspondence
between smṛtau nopapadyate and na tāvatā chando ’smṛtam, I think it makes the
most sense to conjecture that smr.ti means “a memory” in the specific sense of “an
authoritative transmission.” Alternatively, it might be conjectured that smṛtau
should be read as smṛte, which could then be construed by supplying a locative ūhe:
“were ūha transmitted authoritatively.”
bhūyiṣtāñ chandasy adhı̄mahe. This refers to the fact that most sāmans in the chāndasa-reading are
recited˙ over a single ṛk.
86
NidS 2.1, p. 24.
87
NidS 2.1, p. 24.
88
See also NidS 2.1, p. 23: yad v etad yājñikā vipratipadyanta iti.
123
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Journal of Indian Philosophy (2021) 49:699–724

“Memory” Revisited: What Sāmavedic Technical Literature

Guy St. Amant1

Accepted: 19 July 2021 / Published online: 25 August 2021

Keywords Smr.ti · Veda · Scripture · Hinduism · Tradition · Memory

& Guy St. Amant

Consensus and Sm.rti

ĀpDhS 2.15.19-25: ānnaprāśanād garbhā nāprayatā bhavanti | ā parisaṃvat-

Sm.rti Beyond Dharmaśāstra?

Dhanvin’s interpretation of the term smr.ti betrays, I think, the influence of

The Nidānasūtra and Textualization

Mı̄Sū 9.2.1-2: sāmāni mantram eke smṛtyupadeśābhyām | tad uktadoṣam.

is here participating in the same discourse as the Nidānasūtra, we might expect

existence of definite texts, such as the Ārṣeyakalpa, yet there is no evidence to

Summary and Conclusions

Although an examination of material from outside early dharmaśāstric discourse

Appendix: Nidānasūtra 2.1

iti vaitad bhavati | athāpi yājñikā vipratipadyante | yajñārthaḥ khalu punar

Anekārthasaṃgraha, i.e., Sānekārthanāmamālātmakaḥ koṣavaraḥ śubhaḥ hemacandrapraṇītābhidānac-

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