FIELD STUDY REPORT (Completed Version)

FIELD STUDY REPORT
An Evaluation of the Reconstruction in

Southern Lebanon, Following the July
War in 2006
MARCH 2010
FIELD STUDY REPORT
An Evaluation of the Reconstruction in
Southern Lebanon, Following the July
War in 2006
MARCH 2010
Field Study Report: An Evaluation of the Reconstruction in Southern Lebanon, Following the July War in 2006
Preface
The Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), established at the University of York in 1993,
is an international centre of excellence for the study of war-torn societies and their recovery. The PRDU
engages in teaching, trainings, research and advisory services to improve the design, management and
impact of development programming and service delivery in countries in or recently emerging from conflict.
Central to the work of the PRDU is its flagship MA programme in Post-war Recovery Studies. This report has
been written by our current MA cohort following an intensive 10-day field study visit to Lebanon in
December 2009. The field-study visit is a key part of the MA programme which encompasses the
philosophy of the department to link both theory and practice and allows the students to gain first hand
experience of the practical challenges of conducting research in a post-conflict environment. The results of
this report and the high standard of research and analysis contained within these pages reflect the
students efforts and depth of knowledge, which has allowed them, in a short period, to make some firm
conclusions regarding the recovery process following the 2006 conflict.
It is often difficult to be well received as outsiders in post-conflict environments and thus it is important to
maintain solid partners on the ground with whom we can collaborate. This is essential to the building and
sharing of knowledge. Over a number of years the PRDU has built a productive relationship with the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Lebanon and I am extremely grateful for their efforts in
receiving the students and supporting their programme of activities both in Beirut and Tyre. Without their
assistance the extent of data collected would have been severely limited. I would also like to thank those
who presented to the students or took time out of their busy schedules to be interviewed. The conclusions
reached and level of student understanding is credit to the insight of these individuals. Thank you.
Although the students have focused on three separate areas of the recovery process this report effectively
brings together the various fields offering an insight into the holistic nature of recovery and the impact that
physical reconstruction, in the form housing and infrastructure can have on the lives and livelihoods of the
affected population. Moreover the focus on social cohesion stems from my involvement with the West
African and North Asia (WANA) Forum in which the role of societal integration, beyond economic and
physical development, was deemed essential to long term peace and development. This case study of
Lebanon, a country which absorbs many of the challenges faced across the WANA region, presents a
number of interesting lessons and recommendations which expand beyond the country‘s borders and
emphasise the need for a regional approach to reconstruction and recovery.
I am extremely honoured to have been able to send my students to Lebanon, a country which, despite all
the controversy is full of people of great generosity, spirit and diversity. We hope to return again in the near
future.
Professor Sultan Barakat

Director Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit.
II
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................... V
Credits & Disclaimer ................................................................................................................................ VI
Acronyms & Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... VII
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ VIII
Background ............................................................................................................................................. XI
MAP OF LEBANON ...................................................................................................................................................................XIV
Methodology ............................................................................................................................................ 1
A. Qualitative Research Process ............................................................................................................................................... 2
B. Techniques Utilised For Data Gathering ................................................................................................................................ 2
B1. Semi-Structured Interviews ........................................................................................................................................... 2
B2. Focus Groups ............................................................................................................................................................... 3
B3. Unstructured Interviews ................................................................................................................................................ 3
B4. Quantitative Techniques ............................................................................................................................................... 3
B5. Research through Observation ...................................................................................................................................... 4
C. Challenges in the Field: Conducting Research in a Conflict-Affected Context ......................................................................... 4
PART I HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE .................................................................................................. 8
A. Lessons from the Field: ......................................................................................................................... 9

A1. Introduction....................................................................................................................................................................... 9
A2. The Post-War Reconstruction Context ............................................................................................................................... 10
B. Analysis .............................................................................................................................................. 11
B1. Stories from the Field: The Reputational Implications of the Reconstruction Process ......................................................... 11
B2. The Centre-Periphery Conflict........................................................................................................................................... 14
B3. Recommendations .......................................................................................................................................................... 16
PART II SOCIAL COHESION ..................................................................................................................... 18
A. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 19
B. Background theory of Social Cohesion................................................................................................. 19
C. Finding ............................................................................................................................................... 21
C1. How does the current political structure in Lebanon impact social cohesion on a community level?.................................... 21
C2. How deep do social divisions run at the community level, and how are they manifested? ................................................... 23
C3. What do the governmental, non-governmental and inter-governmental institutions and actors do to build positive peace and
social cohesion? ................................................................................................................................................................... 23
C4. Have the mechanisms and processes of reconstruction had a deconstructive effect on Lebanese society, and if so how?.... 26
D. Analysis and Recommendations.......................................................................................................... 26

D1. Census ............................................................................................................................................................................ 26
D2. Political Structure............................................................................................................................................................ 26
III
D3. Electoral reform............................................................................................................................................................... 27

D4. Youth .............................................................................................................................................................................. 27
D5. Education........................................................................................................................................................................ 28
E. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................... 29
PART III ECONOMIC LIVELIHOODS .......................................................................................................... 30
A. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 31
B. Background: Economic Livelihoods in Lebanon.................................................................................... 31
C. Research Analysis: .............................................................................................................................. 32
C1. Women‘s Co-operatives ................................................................................................................................................... 33
C2. Tourism in Southern Lebanon ........................................................................................................................................... 34
C3. Agriculture ...................................................................................................................................................................... 35
C4. Vocational Training .......................................................................................................................................................... 36
D. Conclusions........................................................................................................................................ 37
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................... 39
Appendices ............................................................................................................................................ 43
Appendix 1: Key Stakeholders Consulted ............................................................................................................................... 43
Appendix 2: Communities Studied ......................................................................................................................................... 45
Appendix 3.1: Household Questionnaire ................................................................................................................................. 46
Appendix 3.2: The Web of Research Themes ........................................................................................................................... 47
Appendix 3.3: The Composite Approach ................................................................................................................................. 48
Appendix 4.1: Social Cohesion Questionnaire ........................................................................................................................ 48
Appendix 4.2: Correlation between Assistance from Political Group and Sect .......................................................................... 49
Appendix 4.3: Correlation between Personal Social Relations and Sect ................................................................................... 49
Appendix 4.4: Correlation Between Intermarried Relatives and Sect........................................................................................ 50
Appendix 5: Livelihoods Questionnaire ................................................................................................................................... 51
IV
Acknowledgements
The following report emerges from the findings of a field study visit to Lebanon by the MA in Post-War
Recovery Studies, Class of 2009/2010. The aim of the field visit was for the students to develop field
research skills in a real post-conflict setting; a goal that was more than achieved. The students of the MA
course would like to take the opportunity to thank a number of individuals and organisations for the help,
advice and assistance prior to, during and after the field visit. The field trip would not have been such a
success if it were not for the support of the staff at the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit
(PRDU) at the University of York, in particular the leadership and advice provided by Dr. Rajesh Venugopal,
Natasha Price and Richard Brown who accompanied us to Lebanon. Particular thanks are given to Dr.
Venugopal who guided and inspired us in compiling our findings.
We specifically wish to extend our gratitude to the UNDP in Lebanon, our host organisation, for their
invaluable help in facilitating the research trip. The dedication of UNDP staff both in Beirut and Tyre, and
field team staff throughout the country, made the trip run smoothly and enabled us to put into practice what
we had learned in the classroom in a meaningful way. Their contacts were invaluable for us, allowing us
access to a wide range of key stakeholders, beneficiaries and community members, and the insight and
input of Saifuddin Abbaro, Christine Sylva Hamieh, Manal Fouani, Lamya Karkour, Mireille Karaki, and Lana
Ghandour, Rosy Tayyar, and Layal Abu Darwich was especially appreciated.
Furthermore, we would like to thank the many international, national and local leaders and practitioners
who gave their own time to meet with us and share their valuable experience and insight. In particular, the
feedback and insight on our initial findings from Dr Ibrahim Chahrour, Council for Development and
Reconstruction, and Mr Abdel Salam Al-Khalil, Deputy Mayor Ghobeiry District, was of great value. We
would like to thank Dr Ali Fayyaz M.P. and Dr Bassel Salloukh from the American University of Beirut for
introducing us to the complex history and culture that makes Lebanon such a vibrant country. Thanks also
go to Richard Evans of the Norwegian Refugee Council who provided help and advice throughout the field
visit. We would also like to thank the international, national and local NGOs and institutions that supported
our research, including, amongst others, UNDP, NRC, ILO, UNHABITAT, Jihad al Bina'a, and the Mines
Advisory Group.
We would especially like to thank the municipalities of Tyre, Nabatieh, Haret Hreik and Bint Jbeil, and in
particular the mayors and local officials who took time out of their busy schedules to meet with us and who
supported our research project with enthusiasm. Representatives of the Council for Development and
Reconstruction, the Council of the South, the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the Lebanese Government also
provided support and insight without which this research would not have been as fruitful. A complete list of
all those who contributed to this research can be found in Appendix A.
The students would also like acknowledge the generous donation made by the Association for Cultural
Exchange. Their contribution significantly reduced the costs of the field visit for each of the students for
which we are all sincerely grateful.
Finally, we would like to thank the many community members that we met in Lebanon who welcomed us into
their homes with kindness and hospitality and who shared their experiences and insights with us. The
content of this report would not have been possible without the participation and contribution of all those
who took the time to speak with us; for this, we are very grateful.
V
Credits & Disclaimer

Executive Editors: Philip Owens and David Willey
Design Editors: Ajmal Poya and Yuki Umekage
Executive Summary Editor: Bertram Chambers
Background: Jamal Abbasi
Proof Readers: Samuel Donaldson and Hugh Frere-Cook
Photograph Editors: Eileen Carlson and Rory O'Toole
Gravity Editor: Jennifer Weatherall
Housing and Infrastructure Section

Lead Author: Eirik Iversen
Research Team Leader: Michael Hands

Senior research collaborators
and contributing authors: Jamal Abbasi, Brianna Cacace Wilson, Sonia Eqbal, Nicholas Martin,
Tojiddin Najmedinov, Rory O'Toole
Social Cohesion Section

Lead author: Michael Irish'Stephenson
Research Team Leader: Eileen Carlson

and contributing authors: Hashim Alavi, Hugh Frere-Cook, Simon Le Tocq, Philip Owens,
Julia Smith, Yuki Umekage
Economic Livelihoods Section

Lead author: Kathryn Rzeszut
Research Team Leader: David Willey

and contributing authors: Bertram Chambers, Samuel Donaldson, Charles Martell, Ajmal Poya,
Tomoko Shimada, Jennifer Weatherall
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this report represent the collective finding of a Masters Programme
field visit. As such they are not the official stand-point of the University of York, or of any of the
organisations and individuals listed. Unless expressly stated, this work represents the opinions of the
authors‘ alone, based upon their research and observations.
All photographs were taken during the field trip by the students of the MA course.
VI
Acronyms & Abbreviations
AUB American University of Beirut

BBJ Biet Biljnoub
CDR Council for Development and Reconstruction
CoS Council of the South
ILO International Labour Organisation
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
JaB Jihad al Bina'a
LAF Lebanese Armed Forces
LMAC Lebanese Mine Action Centre
MAG Mines Advisory Group
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
PRDU Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UXO Unexploded Ordinances
VII
Executive Summary
This report presents the findings of a field study visit conducted by students in the M.A. degree course in
Post-War Recovery Studies at the University of York in December 2009. The focus of the M.A. course is to
study the planning and management of reconstruction after war, humanitarian intervention in complex
emergencies, and peacebuilding. The purpose of this visit to Lebanon was to gain a first-hand view of the
economic, social and infrastructural damage caused by the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, and to gain
insights into the challenges and experiences of reconstruction.
The effects of the 2006 war with Israel had a devastating effect on the Lebanese population, resulting in the
loss of almost 1,200 civilian lives and 5,000 people injured. It also caused massive destruction to the
physical infrastructure of the country. In the aftermath, the Lebanese government was presented with a
golden opportunity, not only to deliver real results in terms of renovation and modernisation, but to bring the
country together against a common enemy. In light of the considerable reconstruction and development
effort that has taken place in the intervening period, our analysis was focussed on three specific areas;
housing and infrastructure, social cohesion and economic recovery and livelihoods. Each group began with
a research question:
 How were plans for the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure implemented since the 2006
war?
 How did the July 2006 war affect social cohesion in Southern Lebanon?
 What impact did the 2006 hostilities have on economic livelihoods in Southern Lebanon?
Methodology
While attempting to present their findings through an analytical framework, all three groups discovered that
the opportunities for qualitative research were governed by the art of the possible, particularly in terms of
security and access. The inherent limitations experienced when carrying out such work are likely to be
applicable in any conflict situation; trust, time constraints, the use of interpreters and translation difficulties
in general, plus the lack of a detailed knowledge of all the underlying cultural sensitivities. Despite these
constraints, both quantitative and qualitative methods of research were implemented, including
questionnaires, focus groups and semi-structured interviews.
Housing and Infrastructure
Students in this team set out to gain an understanding of the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure in
Southern Lebanon since the war and how it is perceived by the beneficiaries, as well as the donors. An
attempt was made to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the process and to highlight any lessons
learned for future reference. Research indicated that there was a significant failure by the central authority
to provide sufficient support. This served to delay the reconstruction process and compounded the already
volatile political situation between the government and Hezbollah.
The research also indicated that there was a lack of nationally recognized standards for needs and damage
assessments. Added to this was a very poor quality of construction work that, when all these factors were
combined, created less than optimal results in the areas visited. This led to the unequal distribution of
damage compensation and reconstruction assistance, and added to the perception of the local population
that the government was disinterested in aiding the people of the South.
VIII
The reconstruction of housing and infrastructure is in many ways the enabling factor that moves a society
forwards, towards the holistic requirements of post-war recovery development and progress. The analysis
emphasized the failure of the Lebanese government to seize a window of opportunity to address the centre-
periphery conflict in Lebanese society. More visible infrastructure reconstruction and development efforts
along with improved service delivery from the government could still create lasting improvements for the
people of South Lebanon. Consequently, the government should develop a clearer vision for recovery and
development in dialogue with the war-affected communities in the periphery.
The weaknesses in reconstruction standards and coordination could be addressed through greater
governmental presence in coordinating reconstruction actors, and by increasing the visibility of government
systems responsible for monitoring and evaluating results, to ensure improved reconstruction outcomes.
Those studying housing and infrastructure – the backbone of the recovery process - quickly realised that a
gap existed between the needs of the people and what was actually delivered. Once again, this was largely
due to the failure by the central authority to provide the necessary institutional support to war-shattered
communities, empowering them and making them active stakeholders in planning for their own future
developments.
Social Cohesion
The Social Cohesion group set out to identify how the 2006 war affected social cohesion in Lebanon,
particularly focusing on the South. The group defined a set of indicators of cohesion and refined these into
overarching questions. The questions needed to be refined to be more specific to the Lebanese context,
which involved a greater emphasis on the vertical as well as horizontal dimensions of cohesion.
The field visit found that individuals and communities in the South of Lebanon have a strong sense of
community and are willing to assist each other in times of adversity; the 2006 hostilities provided a brief
spell in which individuals and communities rallied together to support each other, regardless of religion or
sect. Furthermore, those communities visited displayed a definite sense of national identity (mainly
galvanised by the Israel-Lebanon conflict).
However, political rifts exist in the country and these are exploited by leaders, who use religious identity to
separate communities and shore up political support for their parties. Individuals are forced to align with
political parties or non-states actors for material benefit and this has further undermined the effectiveness
of the central government. This situation was exacerbated further by the government‘s delay in
reconstruction and compensation, and general lack of attention to the South following the 2006 war. Non-
state actors took this opportunity to re-enforce their political position resulting in society‘s re-appraisal of
the role of Lebanese Government.
However, what appeared to be the case is that these fractures were present prior to 2006 and that the 2006
war did little to change the political status quo. Internal political dynamics continue to play a prominent
feature in Lebanese society, as do external, international actors. Therefore, if anything has altered social
cohesion in Lebanon over the past three years it is a consequence of other driving factors distinct from the
2006 war.
It was concluded by those who focused their attention on social cohesion that, although they had been led
to believe there were distinct factions within the social framework, there is a sense of national pride that
transcends sectarian divisions. The confessional system has undoubtedly made a positive contribution to
IX
stability in Lebanon and contributed significantly to ending the civil war. However, it was felt that - despite
the people who were interviewed denouncing their rifts - there are underlying differences that might well
resurface in the face of war or recession.
Economic Livelihoods
The aim of the economic livelihoods study group was to determine how successful the economic re-
development efforts had been following the 2006 war. The team expected to find—and did—that the war had
a catastrophic effect on the Lebanese economy. By focusing on four sectors in Southern Lebanon—women‘s
co-operatives, tourism, agriculture, and vocational training—the team attempted, in the short time allotted,
to establish if the efforts made by the international community and local actors had a positive impact on
economic re-development in that part of the country.
In the brief time that the team conducted its research, it uncovered a central truth that seemed to
overshadow all sectors of economic livelihoods in the South: historically, because of the long period of
Israeli occupation, the South‘s relationship with the Lebanese central government has been tenuous and
many of the region‘s economic issues existed long before the 2006 war and continue to impact and
complicate the post-conflict re-development. Making up for the limited involvement of the central
government in economic recovery and planning, the international community and NGOs have worked at the
local, small-scale projects level to assist communities in the recovery of their livelihoods. These projects are
not intended to fill—nor could they—the vacuum left by the central government‘s lack of involvement in the
economy of Southern Lebanon.
The monumental re-development efforts made by many local and international actors in Southern Lebanon
after the 2006 War could not address the underlying problems that were affecting economic livelihoods
there prior to that conflict. The root of many of these problems seemed to be the Lebanese government‘s
lack of strategy or effective governance in the region. International organizations and NGOs cannot and
should not attempt to fill the role of central authority. At present, the Lebanese government has an
opportunity to seize the general good-will of the people and demonstrate that it cares about the problems
facing its citizens in the South by crafting and implementing policies that will foster and protect the region‘s
economic development.
It was concluded that, although attempts were effective in restoring people‘s livelihoods in the short term,
underlying issues in Lebanon – particularly the marginalisation of the Southern region by the central
government in Beirut - hindered the overall aim of long term sustainability. Ultimately there is a need to
focus on livelihood transformation rather than restoration.
Conclusion
This research identified a number of key issues and underlying trends that linked the work of the three
groups. Internal politics and the lack of effective governance remains a highly contentious issue since many
Lebanese citizens feel unrepresented and even isolated by their elected representatives. As a result, failure
to persuade those living in the Southern region that their concerns have been recognised has led to a lack of
trust and faith in the democratic system. Furthermore, aid has not been distributed fairly or according to
need, and there have been significant shortcomings in the reconstruction process. It also became clear that
the continual threat of future Israeli aggression exerts an important and lasting influence over the people of
Southern Lebanon. It affects their attitudes, colours the decisions they make and is a constant reminder of
the fragility of their existence.
X
Background
Division
Lebanon is a ‗divided society‘.1 Since independence in 1941 Lebanon has experienced intense divisions
between Maronites, Druze, Sunnis and Shias. Tensions first escalated after the creation of the state of Israel
in 1948 which resulted in an influx of Palestinian refugees to Southern Lebanon. The subsequent ousting of
Palestinian refugees from Jordan in 1970 further exacerbated the problem resulting in the Palestinian
Liberation Organisation establishing a base in Beirut. Rifts emerged between Muslim groups supporting the
Palestinian cause and Christians fearing a balance of power shift due to increasing numbers of Muslims.
Tensions turned to violence culminating in a

15 years civil war (1975-1990) which led to
the deaths of approximately 130,000 people
and hundreds of thousands fleeing the
country.2 Lebanon soon became a battlefield
for regional interests with external actors
supporting competing factions. The war
ended with the signing of the Ta‘if Accords in
1989. The conflict ―resulted in strengthened
ethno-religious and political identities and Source: The World Factbook, 2009
agendas‖ (Barakat, 2008:4). Accordingly,

religious influences are central in Lebanese political rivalry and define the nature of Lebanese society.
Confessional Politics
A confessional system of government was established in 1943, as a power-sharing agreement whereby key
positions in government are filled on religious grounds. The Ta‘if Accords re-instigated the unwritten Unity
Pact, with a Christian President, Sunni Prime minister and a Shia Speaker. Of the four major communities
the Shias got the worst deal with only one post of any real influence (Cobban, 1983:35-36). This
―confessional power-sharing was based on a 1932 census aiming to create institutions reflecting the
religious groups‘ size of the total population‖ (Dagher, 2000:xiv).
It is thought that the demography has since changed considerably. The World Factbook estimates a 60%
Muslim majority in the present day. However, ―there has been no census since then (1932) as the balance
of power is so fragile that any attempt to change it would come with accusations of corruption from the
opposite side and could have devastating consequences‖.3 Sectional interests, clientelism and corruption
are common-place within the government; consequently trust in the government is weak. After the collapse
of central authority during the (1975-1990) civil war, civil society has emerged as an essential entity for
undertaking grassroots conflict resolution and fostering reconciliation between the various communities
(Safa, 2007:6). Years of conflict have also left the Lebanese economy weak with a public debt in excess of
US$40 billion, before the 2006 war (Mac Ginty, 2009:6).
1 ―The term 'divided society' is often used to refer to a polity in which ethnic, religious, racial, regional and allied cleavages are so fundamental that
most political relations, especially involving competition for power and scarce resources, hinge on these differences." (Osaghae, 1999)
2 Lebanon has an estimated population of 4 million and a diaspora of 18 million – many of whom fled throughout the civil wars (Mac Ginty,
2007:465).
3 Dr Ibraham Chahrour - Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)
XI
Regional Influences
Regional influences add further challenges to national stability and institution building (Cobban, 1983). On
top of internal tensions, the undermining of the political system by external actors has further reduced its
legitimacy. The neighbouring countries of Syria and Israel have periodically entertained considerable
influence within the country: Israel has conducted three raids into the South of the country, one of which
resulted in an 18 year occupation ending in 2000. The 1990‘s saw a period of relative stability. However, a
popular uprising and the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, led to the withdrawal of
Syria‘s 16,000 troops from the country.
―Lebanon is at the fulcrum of a number of regional disputes‖ and the 2006 war ―should be
viewed in this light‖ (Mac Ginty, 2009).
Parties of the Lebanese government are divided into two major alliances as a direct result of religion and
corresponding regional influences. ‗March 8‘ is considered to be Shia-dominated and supportive of
Hezbollah, Iran and Syria, whereas the ‗March 14‘ opposing alliance of the Siniora government is
predominantly Sunni and pro-Western. The rise of Hezbollah can be understood largely by its successful
symbol of resistance to Israeli (and American) hegemony and because it effectively serves its constituency in
Lebanon (Rosen, 2009:2).
The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War
In July 2006 Hezbollah killed eight Israeli soldiers and kidnapped a further two. Israel retaliated in an
unprecedented and disproportionate manner. ―Aerial, naval and artillery bombardments struck at strategic
targets across Lebanon, with the destruction of runways, power stations, roads, bridges, industry and water
treatment plants‖. (Mac Ginty, 2007:460). However, the damage was sadly not limited to strategic targets
with entire regions being destroyed in many cases (Mac Ginty, 2009).
During the 33 days 1187 Lebanese civilians were killed (a third of whom were children, and 19% women),
4080 injured, and a quarter of the population displaced. MacGinty in drawing on Salem‘s work in 2006
notes that ―130,000 housing units, thousands of small businesses, hundreds of roads, 300 factories, 80
bridges, dozens of schools and hospitals and the country‘s electricity network were destroyed or damaged‖
(2007:461)4. It also caused Lebanon‘s largest environmental disaster to date when 15,000 tons of oil
spilled into the Mediterranean after Israeli bombs struck Lebanon‘s Jiyyeh power station, affecting 105
miles of Lebanon‘s ecologically fragile coastline (Solash, 2006). In the largely agricultural Southern part of
Lebanon, Israel dropped over 4 million cluster bombs—a number that the U.N. called ―unprecedented‖—
affecting 26% of the area‘s cultivated land at harvest time (Peterson, 2007). An estimated USD $4 billion
worth of direct war damage and a further $6 billion of indirect costs was caused (Mac Ginty, 2009):
enormous sums for a state already saddled with a public debt in excess of $40 billion. The fighting came to
an end on 14th August 2006 with the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701.
This damage had a considerable effect upon livelihoods. 5 The World Bank‘s Post Conflict Social and
Livelihoods Assessment in Lebanon (2007) found a 50% decline in enterprises and that the duration of
4 These statistics were also confirmed by Dr Ali Fayyaz, MP, at the UNDP organised seminars, Beirut Dec 09.
5 According to the report (2007) UNDP‘s Participation in Lebanon‘s Recovery in the Aftermath of the July 2006 War: ―The economic impact of the war
was also immediate and severe in all sectors, especially for an economy in which the service industry generates 75% of GDP. The expected spike to
6% in the projected GDP growth rate for 2006 was reversed, declining by 11 points to -5%. Unemployment doubled, and stands in excess of 20%.‖
XII
unemployment also increased considerably (26%) in the areas researched. Furthermore, much of the
damage resulting from the war was focused in the South. It is important to note that not only did the South
experience the worst of the war, but prior to the war the South had been lagging behind the rest of Lebanon
in terms of development. Finally, whilst the July war did not have a major effect on emigration and the
country‘s institutions, due to its short lived nature, emigration and institutional ‗brain drain‘ were major
consequences of the Civil War. Both of these factors continue to influence development into the present
day.
XIII
MAP OF LEBANON
Locations visited during the field research
XIV
Methodology
The research groups used a composite approach to methodology (Barakat et al., 2002), adapting the framework
as was suitable for the requirements of this particular field study visit. Background research is an important part
of the composite approach and, prior to arriving in Lebanon, the economic livelihoods research group read
extensively about the country and its economy. The team then focused on several areas believed to be important
in evaluating economic re-development. These included mine action, the role of government, small enterprises,
the role of women, and religious divisions; however, the team resisted narrowing the focus of their research too
early, understanding that the research would be governed by multiple factors that would only be clear once the
team was in Lebanon. At this point, the team encountered its first limitation: the only literature the team was
able to read was in English and was written primarily by non-Lebanese. It would have been preferable to be able
also to review literature by Lebanese authors and to read Lebanese government documents, many of which were
available only in Arabic or French.
The Housing and Infrastructure Group set out to conduct research on an area already extensively covered in the
PRDU – NRC Report on Housing Compensation and Emergency Preparedness (Barakat et al., 2008). This
encouraged the group to include a wider focus on infrastructure in our field research – an area not extensively
covered in the report. The group wanted to explore whether or not the perceptions of the impact and results of
the reconstruction providers matches the perceptions of the receivers of the reconstruction aid. A main
overarching research question was decided: What have been the successes or weaknesses in housing and
infrastructure reconstruction?
The research group did not take an extensive holistic view on the reconstruction process, due to the time
constraints of examining housing and infrastructure reconstruction, and so chose to focus largely on the physical
reconstruction effort. However, their report explores how the recovery process of reconstruction of housing and
infrastructure could have ramifications on the broader post-war recovery of Lebanon and on the centre-periphery
conflict in Lebanese society.
Field research is a real world enquiry seeking to meet the challenges inherent in carrying out investigations in the
‗real world‘ – or the field – by making sense of ―a complex, relatively poorly controlled and generally ‗messy‘
situation‖ (Robson, 2002:4). The field research was concerned with evaluating the recovery process6 in Lebanon
after the July 2006 war through the lenses of, and with a focus on, the reconstruction of housing and
infrastructure. Consequently, data collection was conducted in real life settings.
Arriving in Lebanon, all three groups participated in a day-long information seminar in Beirut with various
members of the Lebanese and municipal governments, a university professor, and staff from UNDP and various
NGOs. The following day included a visit to a municipality in the suburbs of Southern Beirut and additional
briefings by NGOs and a Lebanese filmmaker who had produced a film about the July 2006 war. The groups also
participated in additional general information briefings by UNDP staff in Tyre and received briefings on mine
action by the Lebanese Army and staff members of one of its civilian partners, Mine Action Group. While there
was not much specific information provided on such topics such as economic livelihoods in many of these
sessions, the information obtained provided additional, first-hand background knowledge of the country, its
religious groups and political factions. They also provided a snapshot of the re-development progress from both
6 A lot of real world research is concerned with evaluating some intervention, innovation, service or action (Robson, 2002:3)
1
the official government perspective and that of Hezbollah, the government‘s primary opposition. This information
also informed the research focus and strategy.
A. Qualitative Research Process
The field research groups selected a research design dominated by the qualitative approach - the preferred
design in order to conduct this field research, and also the approach favoured by the PRDU. This proved to be
valuable in collecting data offering rich in-depth material, enhanced understanding of the recovery process, and
information on how reconstruction is perceived by the people on the ground receiving the aid as well as the
perspectives off the reconstruction actors. This design offers great potential as ―effective research design in war-
affected societies depends on an understanding of the origins and nature of the conflict as it is experienced by
those involved in, or affected by, it‖ (Barakat et al., 2002:991). The research design had the aim of linking
purpose, theory, research questions, methods and sampling strategy (Robson, 2002:81).
Qualitative research is linked to in-depth exploratory studies and involves studying ‗things in their natural
settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them‘
(Denzin and Lincoln (1994) cited in Biggam, 2008:86).
The qualitative research design can, as some groups chose to, include an element of quantitative methods of
data collection. As argued by Robson (2002:164), a qualitative design approach shows substantial flexibility in
research design, typically anticipating that the design will emerge and develop during data collection.
Consequently, the qualitative research design selected for the field research was a flexible design allowing the
design to develop and improve in the field.7
This more informal approach does not mean that the research lacked focus. The teams held meetings each
evening, during which they reviewed the list of interviews scheduled for the following day and discussed general
question topics and the specific information to be obtained in each meeting. While the structure of the teams‘
approach may have seemed informal, it was not without careful deliberation or clarity of purpose. Instead, it was
―…a flexible and changing plan that relie[d] on data to determine its next course of action‖ (King et al., 1987:24).
However, there are significant drawbacks with qualitative research methodology. As its name implies, it is much
more subjective, relying more on the researcher‘s perceptions and interpretations than quantitative data
gathering does (Gray, 2004). Additionally, it is more difficult to triangulate information obtained in interviews,
especially during the limited time of this field study (Gray, 2004). But perhaps one of the greatest drawbacks to
the teams‘ qualitative interviews was the language barrier. Most respondents did not speak English and the study
group did not speak Arabic or French, thus the teams relied solely on interpreters. Not only does translation take
time, but the quality and validity of the information received in an interview is dependent completely on the
quality of translation. The reliability of interpreters is a variable that is difficult to measure or compensate for,
especially there is no choice of who to use as an interpreter.
B. Techniques Utilised For Data Gathering
B1. Semi-Structured Interviews
The Semi-structured qualitative interview was chosen as the primary method of data gathering by all teams. Its
flexible and adaptive style gave answers to our research question through face-to-face interviews offering the
7 Robson (2002:164) prefers to refer to qualitative designs as flexible designs due to its flexible nature in real world research.
2
possibility of modifying one‘s line of enquiry, following up interesting responses and investigating underlying
motives.8 In addition, non-verbal cues may portray messages which help to understand the verbal response,
possibly changing its meaning. (Robson, 2002:270-73). This type of design demands much of the researcher:
question asking (enquiring mind), good listening (including observation and sensing), adaptability and flexibility
(balancing adherence to prepared plans and reacting to unanticipated developments), grasp of the issues (need
to interpret information), and lack of bias (the receding skills are annulled if they are simply used to substantiate
a preconceived position) (Robson, 2002:168-69).
The teams chose this method because of its inherent flexibility—it allows exploration of areas that were previously
unplanned and permits the respondent to amplify answers that they consider important (King et al., 1987).
Because the semi-structured, open-ended interview is more like a conversation, it was more ideally suited for the
teams‘ formal interviews of government officials and community leaders (King et al., 1987). Many of these
interviews were conducted by more than one team, limiting the time each team had to ask their questions, so a
long questionnaire would not have been suitable. Even in more informal settings, as in group interviews with the
members of a women‘s co-operative, it was necessary to focus the economic livelihoods study group‘s questions
to those that were most important, something that conducting a longer quantitative survey or questionnaire
would have avoided. In post-conflict environments, people are coping with traumatic events and may feel
threatened or suspicious of more formal quantitative research methods like formal questionnaires and surveys
(Barakat et al., 2002). For this reason, the more conversational open-ended, semi-structured interview allows the
researcher to establish a rapport more easily with respondents.
B2. Focus Groups
In addition to the above mentioned semi-structured interviews the research teams met with various focus groups:
The information obtained from the focus groups (described in the later reports) proved to be very useful as the
vast majority of them represented an interesting segment of society. Most of the focus groups had come in to
being through intergovernmental organizations (UNDP) and NGO‘s assistance. They represented a genuine mix of
the rural segment of society who had been educated to some degree through their involvement in these focus
groups. Their awareness and understanding of matters relevant to their past and their future seemed to be
stronger than those not involved in focus groups.
B3. Unstructured Interviews
The unstructured interviews, held largely with intergovernmental organizations, and national and international
NGO‘s, provided good background information of life during pre and post-war Lebanon. The majority of these
interviews were conducted on an ad hoc. basis and did not have a set format.
B4. Quantitative Techniques
Quantitative data was principally gathered through questionnaires (see Annex I). The Social Cohesion team
initially piloted their questionnaire on a small group of individuals in Sur/Tyre in order to get a reading on its
validity and reliability.
is according to Powney and Watt‘s terminology a respondent interview where the interviewer remains in control setting the agenda for the interview
8 This
(Robson, 2002:271).
3
In this teams‘ research, 55 individuals took part in the quantitative aspect of the team‘s research. In order to
guarantee that the results would be representative of the area the team made sure to interview people from
different ages, ranging from 15 to 85 years old, with different backgrounds. This included students, teachers,
housewives, fishermen, bank employees, and a number of other professions. Additionally, the team tried to cover
as much ground as they could in the time that they had visiting Tyre, Bazuri and Deir Quanoun.
To compensate for the lack of quantitative data in their research, team members of the economic and livelihoods
group conducted a quantitative survey of 20 small business owners in Tyre.9 Survey questions focused on the
affect the war had on businesses, assistance received after the war, sustainability, and job security.
There are many benefits associated with a quantitative survey, including the fact that it requires less time than
qualitative interviews and there is no extended writing (Gray, 2004). Quantitative data is also easier to codify and
analyze than qualitative interviews, which take time to review and adequately process (King et al., 1987).
Because the team was operating on a tight schedule and with limited time in which to conduct research, a
quantitative survey seemed an ideal way to provide a great deal of information on the research topic quickly;
however, the small business survey did not ultimately prove useful to the team‘s research, for several reasons.
First, the language barrier proved to be the major obstacle to its usefulness. When the survey was conducted, it
was mostly the interpreter conducting the survey, with little direction or involvement by the research team, which
affected the usefulness of the information received. Secondly, the questions were not straight-forward and were
written in a way that proved difficult to translate. These issues may have become evident during a pilot, but due to
time constraints, one was not performed. Finally, the research focus was not on small businesses; therefore, the
survey did not provide information about the sectors the team had chosen to study. Perhaps a survey of hotels
and businesses directly related to tourism would have been more useful to the overall research.
The quantitative data served mainly to support a number of findings derived from the teams‘ qualitative research.
B5. Research through Observation
Even though completely unstructured, research through observation allowed the teams to observe and begin to
understand the Southern Lebanese culture and envisage the effects of history‘s events on the populace and the
landscape.
C. Challenges in the Field: Conducting Research in a Conflict-Affected Context
The research design in a conflict affected context presented many challenges, including problems of access,
sampling, bias, generalization, and ethical issues.10 It is a methodological challenge to find ways to mitigate
these limitations.
Difficulties of access to information, research settings and

respondents presented challenges, both practical and
methodological, especially in terms of neutrality and
representation.11
9 The Economic Livelihoods Study Group Small Business Survey is attached as Appendix B.
10 Identified challenges to research in conflict-affected societies by Barakat et al., (2002:992).
11 In line with what is expected in a conflict-affected context as argued by Barakat et al., (2002:992).
4
The security situation meant that the freedom and ability to conduct research was severely restricted.12 This is
illustrated by the need of special permit from the UN to visit the areas close to the Israeli border, and by the
general tense security situation in the South.
―The selection of settings and case studies for qualitative UNIFIL presence in Tyre
research are often conditioned more by what is practically possible (in terms of access and security) than by a
theoretical analysis of their typicality‖ (Nordstrom (1995) in Barakat et al., 2002:992) This can reduce the level
of credibility of the research as the challenges of the conflict-affected context of research impacts the issues to
be studied, selection of subjects, locations and time frames (Barakat et al., 2002:992).
The sampling was problematic and a better sampling strategy should have been developed. The UNDP set the
parameters to a large extent in our field research.13 By utilizing the network of contacts the UNDP enjoys in
Lebanon, access to key stakeholders and projects became more straightforward. However, crucially, this
presented a real danger that UNDP emphasized success stories and downplayed focus on projects that had not
been considered a success.
Despite the limitation of time-constraints and problems with sampling, it was hoped that the number of
interviews conducted and the number of areas visited would allow the finding to be more widely applicable,
beyond the settings studied (See Appendix 3). It was also hoped that any finding would help to provide broader
understanding of other cases - analytic or theoretical generalization14 - reflected in the analytical framework of
the report.
Ethical issues were a challenge when conducting interviews as the need for sensitivity to the destruction, deaths,
injuries and poverty following the July 2006 War was imperative. The questions and interviews had to be
conducted in a manner that respected the context and the situation of the respondents. This may have resulted in
limited information in some instances, but enhanced information in other as respondents wanted to share such
sensitive information.
Problems of bias needed to be explored as: ―The risk of bias in particularly high in areas of violent conflict‖ and
the line between the researcher and the researched ―is affected by a number of factors specific to, or
exacerbated by, conflict situations‖ (Barakat et al., 2002:993).
The major issues identified below as challenges to research were issues the group faced in the field: trust; time
constraints; some research techniques are not universally applicable in a conflict situation; interpreters and
translation issues, (lack of knowledge of language and customs); respondents may be motivated by what they
perceive to be the researcher‘s intentions or potential usefulness (may mistrust the credibility of the process or
seek to use it for their own purposes which is likely to lead to incomplete or false information and, the
researcher‘s bias (Barakat et al., 2002:993).
Furthermore it is important to build trust between the researcher and the researched; ―The limited time […] to
carry out field-based research in conflict-affected sites does not permit a close relationship to develop‖ (Barakat
12 ―The current operational context at the time was assessed as calm but vulnerable to rapid deterioration ignited by significant security related incidents
such as rocket launchings and subsequent retaliations; issue of resistance weaponry, or clashes amongst political associations‖ (UNIFIL representatives at
the United Nations Resident Coordinator‘s Sub-Office for South Lebanon- Tyre, General Coordination Meeting 11/12/09).
13 Due to the PRDU-UNDP Lebanon partnership for the field research.
14 ‗Here the data gained from a particular study provide theoretical insights which possess a sufficient degree of generality or universality to allow their
projection to other contexts or situations‘ (Sim (1998) cited in Robson, 2002:177).
5
et al., 2002:993). Time constraints limited the exhaustive gathering of information – both qualitative and
quantitative – which might have led to a deeper and more complete understanding of the situation
The field research only considered reconstruction on the Lebanese side of the border and did not consider
destruction and reconstruction in Northern Israel resulting from the conflict. The interviewees‘ stories were to a
great extent influenced by the enemy-image of Israel, the cause of the destruction.
Possible researcher biases towards the problem setting may be present as a consequence of being new to
conducting field research and the learning-by-doing approach. Preparation was key to address these possible
challenges to the research. A possible tendency to be influenced by media coverage on the July 2006 conflict,
repeated reports on the weaknesses of the Lebanese government, and stories of the influence of Hezbollah may
be issues that influence objectivity of the analysis.
Also, as the field research was a group endeavour, the group went to the stages of team development (forming,
storming, performing and adjourning) with all the challenges and benefits of working as a team. Thus team
members‘ biases may have influenced the group‘s data collection and analysis.
Possible respondent biases may arise from expectations to the interviews (did they have anything to gain?). By
making the aims of the research clear and explaining our role this was addressed. As the South is a stronghold for
Hezbollah there is the need to keep in mind that a majority of the people interviewed are likely to sympathize with
Hezbollah and possibly portray an anti-government perspective. In addition, the research did only interview
people that had received no aid or limited aid for reconstruction, and failed to interview people that had
completed the reconstruction of their houses.15
The language barrier is a very significant limitation when qualitative research is conducted in a foreign country.
Often the language barrier is mediated by interpreters/translators. Interpreters‘ affiliations, personal experience
with the subject and its effects on the interpreter, and knowledge of the research specific language are just a few
examples of how an interpreter may affect the integrity of one‘s research. The language barrier is very difficult to
successfully navigate if one does not have the time, the resources, and trustworthy connections to ensure that
those hired are up to the task of providing an unbiased, direct translation.
The employment of interpreters in Lebanon was of debatable use. The social cohesion team commented that,
however good their intentions were, the interpreters were students. Most of them had no translation experience
at all and some had relatively poor knowledge of English. A significant proportion of the interpreters used did not
hail from the geographical area in which the research was conducted. Some of them had never been to the area
at all and were biased themselves at some level. During this task this team claimed that a lot of useful
information was lost in translation. The economic recovery and livelihoods team however felt that they overcame
the language barrier through the use of interpreters. From this team‘s experience with some of them having
worked as interpreters previously, the better acquainted the interpreter is with the researcher, the easier
interpretation becomes. Over time, the interpreter also becomes accustomed to the types of questions asked and
their order. The team spent time with the interpreters outside of the research setting to form a good relationship
with them. The team established a good rapport with the interpreters that the team used the most, leading to a
much more fruitful interview process.
The triangulation sought was a strategy for dealing with threats to validity, seeking to reduce the threat of
reactivity, researcher bias, and respondent bias. Such a strategy is valuable as it uses multiple sources to
enhance the rigour of the research (Robson, 2002:173-74). The group utilized data triangulation - the use of
15 Through observing the surroundings it was clear that many houses were complete reconstructed.
6
more than one method of data collection (e.g. interviews, documents, and attempted observation – the
prohibition of taking photographs in certain areas was an issue); methodological triangulation combining
qualitative interviews and quantitative surveys; and sought theory triangulation using multiple
perspectives/theories (secondary sources and perspectives from actors of reconstruction and receivers).16
There is no generally applicable blueprint of how to conduct research in conflict-affected contexts. In hindsight, it
emerges that an even more structured focus on, and wider use of the composite approach would have benefitted
our research and the quality and validity of our analysis. The composite approach is outlined in Appendix 2
outlining the methods used to enhance the validity of data gathered and the reliability of subsequent analysis.
With the aim of triangulating accounts provided by different sources the data is analyzed. Furthermore, the
analytical framework takes into account that our research was exploratory in nature and strives for an awareness
of possible biases and limitations of research design and field research in conflict-affected areas that impacts
the research.
16 This is in line with types of triangulation distinguished by Denzin (1988) in Robson (2002:174).
7
PART I
HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE

(Edited by Eirik Iversen)
8
A. Lessons from the Field:

Researching in a Conflict-Affected Context
A1. Introduction
This report presents and underlines the central importance of the lessons learned in conducting
field research in a conflict-affected context and through its analysis highlights the possible broader
implications of the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure post-2006 war in terms of the
recovery process. It emphasizes the failure of the Lebanese government to seize a window of
opportunity to begin to address the centre-periphery conflict in Lebanese society.
It is very hard to generalise about the findings of this report. Instead, the analysis
offers an expanded framework of thinking about and evaluating the implications
of the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure on the broader recovery of
Lebanon, outlining potential trends that may be applicable in communities in the
South. Furthermore it offers additional value when considering how the central
government could have seized the opportunity presented by the reconstruction to
start to address the centre-periphery conflict affecting Lebanon, and how the
centre and periphery can be linked in a more cooperative manner to compliment
the process of post-war recovery.
The report sets out the approach to the field research, its methodological House classified as partially
foundation and research design. Next, the challenges faced in the field are damaged in Srifa.
outlined followed by identification of steps taken, and steps that should have been taken, to overcome these
challenges.
The report moves on to present the findings of the field research through an analytical framework focussing on
the implications of the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure on the broader post-war recovery route and
on the centre-periphery conflict in Lebanese society. Finally, the report makes concluding remarks and outlines a
set of recommendations based on the analysis.
The reconstruction of housing and infrastructure is in many ways the enabling factor that can move a society
towards the holistic requirements of post-war recovery towards development and progress. After the 2006 war,
reconstruction became an arena of competition between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, offering a
showground for both to improve their reputations, and seek greater influence and legitimacy through aiding
people‘s recovering from the war.17 Hezbollah, specifically its reconstruction wing Jihad al Bina‘a (JaB) (as well as
other actors of reconstruction), was more visible and more effective than the Lebanese government in the post –
war reconstruction endeavour.
―Violent conflict is a sudden and catastrophic interruption in the natural development of society,
with infrastructure one of its major victims. The recovery process is a delicate balance between
the urgency to reconstruct and the opportunity to develop‖ (Brown, 2002:228).
17 The political context after the 2006 conflict is ―important in explaining Hezbollah‘s subsequent reconstruction activities‖ as it sought to take advantage
of the enhanced political capital from their role as ‗defenders of Lebanon‘ and self declared ‗winners‘ of the conflict (Mac Ginty, 2007:460).
9
―Reconstruction encompasses short-term relief and longer-term development. It extends far

beyond physical reconstruction to include the provision of livelihoods, the introduction of new or
reformed types of governance, and the repairing of fractured societal relationships. Thus,
reconstruction is not merely a technocratic exercise of rebuilding shattered infrastructure.
Instead, it is an acutely political activity with the potential to effect profound social and cultural
change. Post-war reconstruction holds the capacity to remodel the nature of interaction between
the citizen and the state, the citizen and public goods, and the citizen and the market‖ (Mac
Ginty, 2007:458).
A2. The Post-War Reconstruction Context
The July 2006 war caused massive physical destruction of civilian infrastructure and damage to public services
and utilities. The hostilities displaced more than a quarter of the Lebanese population18, the bulk of whom
immediately returned on the same day as the cessation of hostilities took effect. The reconstruction costs alone
were initially estimated at US $4 billion (now revised downwards to $2.8 billion). However, the indirect effects of
the war on the economy, social indicators, and employment are greater still (European Commission
Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) 2007:3).
Total Number of Destroyed and Damaged Houses, UNDP Lebanon (2007b:40).
―Civil society played a significant role during the war, providing immediate support to those in need‖ (World Bank
2007:58). According to the Higher Relief Council of the Government of Lebanon, 130.000 dwelling units were
destroyed or damaged. Water supply and wastewater infrastructure was damaged or destroyed, power plants
18 The
fighting forced about a million citizens to leave their homes seeking shelter and security in other regions of the country (most left the South, Beirut‘s
Southern Suburbs, and Beka‘a) (World Bank, 2007:48).
10
damaged, and an estimated 445,000 m2 of road network, 92 bridges and overpasses was destroyed19 (UNDP
Lebanon 2007a:xii).
The history of recurring conflict in Lebanon affects the physical reconstruction and recovery process. The
interviews revealed a determination to rebuild societies, houses, and infrastructure, which was remarkable as
this was also often accompanied by a fear of new destruction caused by a future Israeli attacks. This coping
mechanism and psychological preparation for the reconstruction challenge may be a result of Lebanon‘s
‗immense experience of reconstruction because of its civil war, previous Israeli invasions and raids, and the
Israeli occupation‘ (Mac Ginty, 2007:465). ―Lebanon is not just experiencing a post-conflict situation, but
remains in a pre-conflict situation with a fear of violent conflict to erupt again.‖20
B. Analysis
The Lebanese Government’s Invisible Reconstruction Endeavour: A Missed Opportunity for
Being Seen Coming to the Aid of its People and Reducing the Centre-Periphery Conflict in
Lebanese Society
B1. Stories from the Field: The Reputational Implications of the Reconstruction Process
―The scale of the destruction was immense, and the speed of the reconstruction was impressive. In
Lebanon the focus quickly shifted from relief to reconstruction.‖21
An often heard expression was, ―the catastrophe unites‖, referring to a feeling of solidarity during times of
extreme adversity in which the level of political and social tension lessened; thus, the war increased the level of
social capital in Lebanon (World Bank, 2007:39). The government failed to capitalise on this country-wide unity
and so failed to grasp the opportunities of reducing the centre-periphery conflict by taking the lead in a more
visible governmental reconstruction effort.
As highlighted in the PRDU – NRC report, an element of ‗reputational‘ implications in compensation for housing
became important. The research group wanted to explore the reputational implications of actors providing aid
for housing and infrastructure reconstruction with the aim to see whether or not the process, impact and results
of the reconstruction aid had reputational ramifications for how the receivers of aid perceived the donors.
As argued in the report, ‗in some respects, these reputational ramifications may be conceived as closely related
to the governance role and to the perceived legitimacy of each actor or stakeholder‘ (Barakat & Zyck, 2008:35-
36).
19 ―Although the offensive targeted various types of infrastructure across Lebanon, the areas most directly impacted due to heavy shelling include the
Dahieh region, a southern suburb of the capital Beirut, as well as the municipalities of Ayta al-Chaab, Khiam, Bint Jbeil in South Lebanon and Nabatieh,
and Baalbek in the Beka‘a‖ (UNDP Lebanon, 2007a:xii).
20 Chahrour, Dr Ibrahim (2009). Head of Planning, Council of Development and Reconstruction. PRDU Workshop, Beirut 07 Dec 09.
21 Evans, Richard (2009a) Shelter Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council, PRDU Workshop, Beirut 07 Dec 09.
11
Recipient‘s Attitudes to Key Actors, PRDU-NRC Report (Barakat & Zyck, 2008:36).
The Lebanese government, and its implementing arm the Council of the South (CoS), ―saw their standing
diminished across the South while JaB and, almost certainly, its widely reported organizational parent,
Hezbollah, grew more popular and influential (Barakat & Zyck, 2008:39). There is possibly a sense of reinforced
reputational implications because the existing perceived legitimacy of each actor was reinforced by the
funnelling aid to a certain extent along party membership lines. This cannot be verified, but was suggested in
several of the interviews conducted.
Our findings recognize the importance of Hezbollah in the post-2006 reconstruction of Lebanon – especially in
the South. JaB was visible as well as non-western actors (especially the Gulf States) as alternatives to the
Lebanese government and Western donor‘s approach – and as Mac Ginty (2007:457) indicates: ―they reveal
serious limitations in the liberal peace approach to post-war reconstruction‖.
With its local presence, expertise, funds, rapid response, and visibility for the people in the war-affected
communities, Hezbollah was able to move quickly to start the reconstruction efforts. JaB announced on the day of
the end of hostilities (14 August 2006) its housing indemnity program consisting of one-year‘s rent and
furnishings for people who no longer had houses to return to. ―The same day, the Reconstruction and Recovery
Cell, established in the Office of the Prime Minister with support from the UNDP became functional and set out to
elaborate the priority requirements for Early Recovery, in preparation for an international donor conference‖ in
Stockholm (UNDP Lebanon, 2007b:13-14). However, as our research indicates, the government is perceived as
close to invisible in the rural communities in the South. The government is blamed for a lack of clarity of
reconstruction aims, delayed reaction, limited visibility, and was expected to do more to help the people
reconstruct their houses and rebuild their lives.
The centre-periphery tension (explored below) in Lebanon facilitates the need for municipalities to get money for
service delivery through other means, further undermining the central government‘s role in peoples‘ lives. The
liberal tax system and lack of funds has also contributed to the limited amount of money finding its way from the
central government to the municipalities. Many municipalities are only now (end of 2009) receiving money that
was supposed to arrive in 2007.22
―Lebanon needs a stronger government, a stronger state to provide services. Civil society has a
right to fill the vacuum when government cannot provide services.‖23
A lack of trust in the central government has created a sense that reconstruction would be more efficient and
achieve better results if the government was not involved. This especially becomes apparent when people
compare the direct results delivered by JaB and external donors adopting villages in the South. People keep
asking where the money from the government is, since they know the government has been given a lot of money
for reconstruction purposes. A general feeling among the people of the South has developed: that delays in
compensation and lack of support from the government constitutes ―a punishment of the people of the South‖24
(Chehadi, 2009), and as the Mayor of Al Qulaylah pointed out, ―most feel let down by the government who have
failed in their responsibility to look after the population.‖ The government‘s weak position and capacity for post-
22 Evans, Richard (2009a) Shelter Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council, PRDU Workshop, Beirut 12 December 2009.
23 Dr.Ali Fayyad, Hezbollah, MP Lebanese Parliament (2009), PRDU Worksop, 7 December 2009. There are debates among Lebanese about the strength
of Hezbollah with some accusing the party to be a state within a state; delivering services that the government should be providing for its citizens.
24 Chebadi, Fatme (2009), Norwegian Refugee Council. Interview 14 December 2009.
12
war reconstruction may largely be explained by ‗limited political allegiance,

indebtedness, and inefficiency‘ (Mac Ginty, 2007:462).
Our research observes a significant competitive dynamic attached to the
reconstruction process. In Lebanon, ―ethnic, religious and tribal loyalties have
become the axis along which communities have been mobilized to press for
inclusion or separation. This mobilization has been destructive and destabilizing,
undercutting both human security and the integrity of states‖ (UNDP Regional
Bureau for Arab States, 2009a:5). In this way the political system has lost
legitimacy and been undermined by both internal and external factors.
The impracticality of the confessional structure of Lebanon goes against the very
nature of state-building as Lebanese society is in essence built on the ideal of
sectarianism, a strong civil society and a weak central state. As a consequence
the post-war reconstruction in Lebanon has always been politicized, and a contest
of who is delivering aid to reconstruction to take steps towards recovery.25 The rise
of Hezbollah can be understood largely by its successful symbol of resistance to
Israeli (and American) hegemony and because it effectively serves its constituency
in Lebanon (Rosen, 2009:2).
An example from the field that gives valuable insight was the UNDP Lebanon field
visit to Ayta al Chaab 26, a village two kilometres from the Israeli border.
According to the Mayor, the reconstruction was fast despite the lack of
government support. Qatar had adopted the village and as of December
2009 the reconstruction was 90% complete.27 The mayor highlighted the will
to rebuild, to be independent and survive as key to the rapid reconstruction.
He also criticized the government for lack aid, lack of planning and missing
government support – ―the government did nothing‖.
Lebanon‘s strong civil society – or ‗civil societies‘ provided a strong coping

mechanism and facilitated civil society‘s central role in the reconstruction of
society (Mac Ginty, 2007:465), and as our field research suggests, in the reconstruction of infrastructure and
houses. This multi-actor context of reconstruction offered ―possible problems of competition, duplication and
confused lines of communication, responsibility and accountability. It also
invited citizens to make comparisons, often unflattering, on the efficiency of War-damaged house in Srifa.
those reconstruction actors‖ (Mac Ginty, 2007:466).
―In Lebanon there are no public services – the privatization of service delivery is a major
challenge as the government is weak and fails to deliver services. People have to pay non-
government actors for private service delivery. The question of citizenship is important, and as a
result, legitimacy of governance.‖ (Carole Baudoin, UNICEF).
25 Salloukh, Dr Bassel(2009), Associate Professor of Political Science, Lebanese American University, PRDU Workshop Beirut 7 December 2009.
26 Interestingly,
the road just below the village was the scene of the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers that triggered the July 2006 war. The village quickly
came under attack and occupation by the Israelis and destroyed 80% of the village (one of the top 5 villages in terms of level of destruction).
27 Qatar adopted the village, and took charge of supporting the rebuilding of housing and the reconstruction of infrastructure. Hezbollah through JaB, the
government through the Ministry of Public Works, the municipality, and Iran all contributed to efforts to reconstruct infrastructure (electricity, water, roads).
The municipality is now in a better condition than before 2006 with improved housing and infrastructure with better connections with neighbouring villages
and Beirut (Mayor of Ayta al-Chaab, 2009).
13
Gaps still remain in the reconstruction response system, but it is important to remember the fact that Lebanon
after the July 2006 war had a central government and this government played a decisive role in the
reconstruction of Lebanon. Despite the weaknesses of the Lebanese state, it should be seen as a key
reconstruction actor (Mac Ginty, 2007:462,467).
The central response to the reconstruction was largely coordinated by The High Relief Commission with the
government‘s reconstruction effort mainly channelled through two main agencies: the Council of the South and
the Council for Development and Reconstruction (Mac Ginty, 2007:462,467). Our findings suggest that these
efforts should have been made more visible for the people.
The government‘s reconstruction response has been criticized often by referring to possible problems of a mixture
of neo-liberal orientation, incapacity, ineptitude, chronic corruption, and deeply ingrained clientelistic politics.
This has caused citizens to expect that only limited assistance would be available from the state (Hamieh, 2007).
Interviews conducted revealed that needs assessments carried out by the CoS lacked accuracy, consistency and
detail28, and mistakes were accordingly repeated by the likes of Arab reconstruction actors and JaB. A reported
lack of nationally recognized standards for needs and damage assessment and weak construction quality
standards have translated into less than optimal reconstruction results in the areas visited. This further led to an
unequal distribution of damage compensation and reconstruction assistance. These weaknesses could be
addressed through greater government presence in coordinating reconstruction actors and by increased visible
government monitoring and evaluation systems of results to ensure improved reconstruction outcomes.
B2. The Centre-Periphery Conflict: A Story of Historical Neglect of the South
The rural periphery of Southern Lebanon has been left out of infrastructure development, economic growth and
modernization as a result of decades of economic dominance by the capital, Beirut (Kiwan (2004) in Makhzoumi,
2009:129). The living conditions in the South are among the lowest in Lebanon in terms of housing, water and
sanitation, education and household income. In addition, ‗the South presents two additional constraints: under-
development, and the presence of military conflict that has affected its physical and human resource base for
more than 30 years29‘ (UNDP (2000) cited in Makhzoumi, 2009:131). Mismanagement and weak governance by
a multitude of actors limits impact and results of reconstruction and development efforts.30 The further you get
from Beirut the less developed are the communities, the infrastructure and prevalent levels of socio-economic
development.31
The current situation of physical capital and status of reconstruction (2007) ―is the result of the combined effect
of a low level of infrastructure predating the war, the destruction of the war and the selective reconstruction
programs and interventions following the war‖ (World Bank 2007:26). Our research suggests that this is also the
case as of December 2009. This acknowledgement offers a more nuanced understanding of the reconstruction of
housing and infrastructure and how it is perceived by the actors on the receiving end and on the providing end of
the reconstruction process.32
28 Mayor of Ayta al-Chaab.

29 Sustained civil conflict (Civil War 1975-1990) and Israeli occupation (1978-2000) has had its repercussions leaving the region in poverty and amplified
the political and economical marginalization of the South (Makhzoumi 2009:131).
30 UNICEF works to influence policy level and strengthen the implementation of programs and reforms from national to local level shifting a focus towards a
decade approach and sustainable development. The hope is to bring recovery projects and reconstruction together working to establish positive long-term
change and development (Carole Bandoin, UNICEF, UNDP General Coordination Meeting, Interview 11/12/09).
31 Salloukh, Dr Bassel (2009), Associate Professor of Political Science, Lebanese American University, PRDU Workshop Beirut 07 Dec 2009.
32 This refers to the evaluation of the state of the infrastructure by the people interviewed, rather to the actual state of the infrastructure. In our case, it
proved difficult to verify the actual level of infrastructure due to the complexity of the reconstruction process, multiplicity of actors, time constraints and
limited access to areas and organizations.
14
―The war has worsened an already difficult situation, with the average dropping from a below-
than acceptable level to an unsatisfactory level. The reconstruction program managed to restore
some of these indicators to their pre-war levels, i.e. to their below-than-acceptable level […] a
return to the pre-war level will not solve ‗structural‘ difficulties and ‗historical‘ neglect‖ (World
Bank 2007:25).
The village of Al Qulaylah, one of the villages targeted for the field research, is one of only a few villages in the
South with a master plan for reconstruction and development of housing and infrastructure. This plan seeks to
meet the needs of the people as well as building an awareness of the importance of long-term planning and
community cooperation to implementing projects to the benefit of the majority. It aims to achieve sustainable
reconstruction and development which includes zoning of areas for the existing village, potential expansion of
housing, and zoning to preserve agriculture and forest areas, and infrastructure development aims33 (Abo Khalil
2009).
Master Plan for Housing and Infrastructure Reconstruction and Development, Al Qulaylah Municipality, South
Lebanon.
―A key challenge is a growing sense of individualism and search for self-interest that leads to
short-term thinking and risks long-term sustainability and positive change.‖34
The research found that the reconstruction process lacked a unified vision and an integrated plan for linking
reconstruction with development objectives. Effective post-war recovery requires detailed, holistic and unified
planning, integrating relief activities with reconstruction and longer term social and economic development
issues.35
―The widespread perception of weak government contributed to the boldness (even arrogance)
of other reconstruction actors […] in forging ahead with their own plans unaware of prior-
existing government plans and proposals‖ (Mac Ginty, 2007:463).36
33 The Mayor‘s aim is to complete the plan in 6 years, hoping to see the village and Lebanon improve and enjoy elevated standards of living.
34 Abo Khalil Hassan M (2009, interviewed 11 December 2009.
35 Hassan Kazan - agricultural department leader, JaB, South Lebanon.
36 This lack of planning had a negative impact on five main areas: disabled access, earthquake preparedness, partially damaged houses, sustainability and
reconstruction of historical houses, and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
15
―Two-tiered planning has had adverse effect on the recovery in Lebanon as economic and social
recovery is planned at the macro-level, generally within the framework of national development
planning, while reconstruction and rebuilding is enacted at the micro-level‖ (Makhzoumi,
2009:153).
B3. Recommendations: Visible Government Reconstruction Endeavours for the Recovery and
Development of Post-War Lebanon
For interventions to succeed at the local level they require the institutional support of the central authority and
emplacement within a national and/or regional planning framework. Further, successful recovery requires the
enablement and empowerment of the war-shattered communities – making them active stakeholders in the
recovery and future development process (Makhzoumi, 2009:153).
The government needs to take a holistic approach to the recovery process with active planning and coordination
with other reconstruction actors, and participating in the implementation of recovery on a local level 37 (Chahrour,
2009). Accountability and transparency of the process are key. This demands visibility of the reconstruction
actors.
―Effective infrastructure forms the backbone of the recovery process‖. The reconstruction of infrastructure
requires ‗a capacity for continuance‘ – sustainability (Brown, 2002:227). As argued by Makhzoumi (2009:128),
sustainable recovery in rural Lebanon should be developmental in aim and long-term in scope.38
―A landscape approach to post-war recovery […] extends beyond the immediacy of the post-war
condition and beyond physical reconstruction to serve in initiating development to benefit rural
communities […] with the aspiration to rectify political, social and economic marginalization in
rural peripheries‖ (Makhzoumi, 2009:152).
In this way infrastructure (and its recovery) is a fabric that is affecting the recovery and development of the more
holistic dynamics of society. Consequently, the government should develop a clearer vision for recovery and
development in dialogue with the war-affected communities in the periphery.
This is in line with Mary Anderson‘s concept of dividers and connectors (Anderson, 1999:25-26), in which
infrastructure can link people together and has an impact on how they perceive each other. Thus, the
reconstruction and development of infrastructure and the experience of the reconstruction process holds
considerable potential to heal the wounds of conflict and address the centre-periphery conflict, but at the same
time entails dangers of facilitating a further division of society. There is a need for the reconstruction process,
and concurrent development efforts, to aim to support local capacities for peace39 by infrastructure and housing
recovery that delivers real results on the ground. This consequently increases the relevance and legitimacy of the
actors delivering aid and services.40 This highlights the potential of reconnecting the central government with the
local communities through bridging the gap between itself and the municipalities. More visible infrastructure
reconstruction and development efforts along with improved service delivery from the government could create
37 The Government of Lebanon has assessed the impact of Israel‘s war on Lebanon and underscores the scale of destruction and the magnitude of the
challenge of building back better, both of which require the contributions and participation of all – Government, Civil Society, Private Sector, UN agencies,
and the regional and international donor community (UNDP Lebanon, 2007b:12).
38 She further offers an approach to recovery – ‗the landscape approach‘ – which ―humanizes recovery by integrating tangible, physical reconstruction, and
intangible community needs‖. The ‗landscape‘ is a dynamic concept, continuous in time, contiguous in space and embracing the specificities of ‗place‘‖
(Makhzoumi, 2009:129).
39 Building on Mary Anderson‘s concept of local capacities for peace in the context of conflict, building blocks for peace (Anderson, 1999:24,71).
40 This is the case for Hezbollah, NGOs, foreign governments and the Lebanese government. The key is delivering results in reconstructing housing and
infrastructure.
16
lasting improvements for the people of the South, as well as displaying strengthened relevance of the central
government as it takes a leading position on shaping and developing post-war Lebanon.
The period of reconstruction after the July 2006 war was a golden opportunity for the government to not only
deliver real results in housing and infrastructure reconstruction but also to make progress in reducing the central-
periphery conflict by becoming more visible in aiding the population in post-war reconstruction towards recovery.
It is not too late in taking steps towards a more visible role in the ongoing reconstruction in the South, and
crucially, by doing so, the government can take a leading role in the post-war recovery and future development of
South Lebanon.
17
PART II
SOCIAL COHESION
(Edited by Michael Irish'Stephenson)
18
A. Introduction
―There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but
an organized peace. ― - Woodrow Wilson.
Lebanon has not had the chance to wrestle itself free from regional and international influences which have
dictated so much of its national history.
The internal cultural diversity, which should be considered an asset, has proven to be an easy tool to be
manipulated by internal and foreign powers. This has slowed down Lebanon‘s developmental progress
significantly and although individuals feel Lebanese the cohesive glue of the country is not a traditional one
bonded by common goals, but rather one derived from conflicts.
The objective of the ten-day field trip in Lebanon was to research social cohesion and more specifically how it has
been affected by the 2006 war with Israel.
The research subject of social cohesion in post 2006 Lebanon is in itself not conclusive but should rather be
interpreted as a link in the historical chain of events in Lebanon; a snap shot of a moment in time created by the
country‘s internal history and relationships with its neighbours. This became evident during the course of the
field research when instead of responding specifically to this question, interviewees instead spoke of social
cohesion both pre and post 2006, and how it is determined by the political landscape on a central level rather
than community relations.
B. Background theory of Social Cohesion

Social cohesion and the study of it is a complex matter. During the late 1990‘s several academics and
institutions attempted to define social cohesion (Stanley, 2003:7, Beauvais and Jenson, 2002). Simple
definitions exist, such as:
Social cohesion is the nature and extent of social and economic divisions within society
(Easterly et al., 2006: 4-5).
Several academics draw on Kearns and Forrest‘s work (2000:996) in which their definition contains five
dimensions of cohesion: common values and civic culture, social order and social control, social solidarity and
reductions in wealth disparities, social networks and social capital and finally territorial identity and belonging.
However, there appears to be two strands of thought concerning the definitions. On the one hand social cohesion
is about the interconnectedness of citizens and communities (Maxwell, 1996) with social capital being used a
micro level explanation (Easterly et al., 2006:5). Whilst on the other hand a much broader definition
encompassing layers of society, issues of identity, trust and governance.
However, despite the many definitions of social cohesion, further research into its measurement and applicability
in society, is currently limited (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002: Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003:79). Kearns and
Forrest explain this dichotomy:
―Typically, it [social cohesion] is used in such a way that its meaning is nebulous but at the
same time the impression is given that everyone knows what is being referred to. The usual
19
premise is that social cohesion is a good thing, so it is conveniently assumed that further
elaboration is unnecessary.‖ (Kearns and Forrest, 2000:996)
The definitions for social cohesion are overlapping and contradictory (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002). This leads to
difficulties when conducting field research, as Beauvais and Jenson note the, ―choices about definitions have
consequences for the theoretical and methodological positioning of any piece of work.‖ (2002)
Therefore, it was important that the brainstorming session produced a clear set of research questions that would
help to answer the overarching question.
Sensitivity of the subject
The overarching question, How did the July 2006 war affect social cohesion in Lebanon? contains two potentially
sensitive topics, social cohesion and conflict. Social cohesion is about peoples‘ lives and their connections to
others, this raises certain challenges when conducting research. For example if you ask somebody if they dislike
people from a neighbouring village, they might be unlikely to say, ―Yes!‖ However, they might actually harbour
those thoughts and behave in a way that suggests that they do dislike them; but, it would be morally
unacceptable to admit to this type of discrimination. So it is important not to ask leading or obvious questions.
Additionally, the topic also centred on the effects of conflict, which can be a very traumatic experience. Some
people might not want to re-live painful memories, or it may be necessary to terminate interviews which become
too distressing. This can lead to difficulties in gaining information from interviewees in conflict affected regions.
Understanding of the subject matter
As shown, the research into social cohesion highlighted that it has many definitions, but the concept is not well
known. Therefore research into the overarching question may not have yielded very promising results. For
example, during a presentation Professor Bassel Salloukh gave a commentary on Lebanese cohesion.41 However
if a lay person on the streets of Tyre was asked to do the same he might not be able to, either because he might
understand ‗social cohesion‘, or the concept of social cohesion itself might be meaningless in the context of the
location.
The research questions needed to have a broad enough definition of social cohesion so that they could be
understood, yet precise enough so that any results could be analysed and not become general sweeping
statements. Second, the definition needed to have indicators that could accommodate the localised context.
Furthermore, if an interviewee does not understand the concept of social cohesion, the interviewer might need to
re-word the interview questions to stimulate a response, but without spoon feeding an answer or corrupting the
questionnaire.
Measures of Effectiveness in Evaluating Social Cohesion
Social cohesion is not only difficult to define, but more specifically what constitutes good or bad social cohesion
and indicators of it is also difficult to define - one UN programme manager stated that indicators are lacking and
that they are always looking for ways to monitor the effects of peace-building projects. Such difficulties are wide-
spread; The State of English Cities report concludes that,
41 Salloukh, Dr Bassel (2009), Associate Professor of Political Science, Lebanese American University, PRDU Workshop Beirut 07 Dec 2009.
20
―...empirical evidence for the values, perceptions and patterns of behaviour that are at the heart
of social cohesion is limited,‖ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006:25).
Despite a lack of indicators, the effects of peace building projects can still be felt and appreciated, Anderson
points out, in her assessment of UNICEF‘s projects, in Lebanon 1989, that just because it is difficult to measure
the impact of these projects on the conflict does not mean that such projects ―were rendered unimportant‖
(Anderson, 1990:101). This suggests a greater reliance on qualitative rather than quantitative data.
From the desk-based research, it was clear that various definitions of social cohesion contained emphasised
horizontal cohesion, (i.e. between groups or individuals) and vertical cohesion connecting i.e. connecting
individuals and groups to various levels of the state. Therefore to help structure the research into the overarching
question of the research team choose to define social cohesion through four sub questions which not only related
to the academic research into social cohesion but which were also specific to the Lebanese context. The four
research questions can be found below.
C. Finding
The vast majority of this specific research was conducted in Southern Lebanon, specifically the Sur/Tyre area of
Southern Lebanon. The team‘s research was based on this area alone and it should be said that the research did
not take into account matters related to social cohesion on a national level, but rather only Southern Lebanon
and in parts of Beirut. The following section was completed as a research team. It is a summary of our findings
and representative of the information interviewees emphasized. It has been categorized as a series of four sub-
questions answered under the original research question, which the research team deemed too broad.
C1. How does the current political structure in Lebanon impact social cohesion on a
community level?
Community amiability
Our research in and around Tyre demonstrated that there is a degree of horizontal social cohesion at the
community level. While some interviewees contend that peaceful relationships between communities of different
sects are only surface deep, there seems to be a general willingness by the Lebanese people we interviewed to
interact with each other, indicating an often deep respect of the ―the other‖ by individuals, regardless of their
politics. All of the Christians we asked maintained some form of communication with Muslim neighbours. This
might be the case because Christians in and around Tyre constitute a minority and are therefore forced into
interfaith relationships by economic and other basic demands of survival, but the fact that the two major religions
cohere is important. Where the members of a cooperative were all from a single faith, this was usually because all
the members came from the same village. On the whole, all the cooperatives we visited were happy to extend
their membership to other sects, but existing geographic distribution of sects and limited transport opportunities
discouraged this.
Politicization of communal society
A major factor limiting people‘s willingness to integrate with other sects is caution aroused by the political
structure of Lebanon, and an awareness of how quickly the political climate can change. As previously explained,
the political structure is historically linked to sectarianism. As a result religious divisions are often magnified at
the community level because the political system reinforces and maintains sectarian divides. People might
desire peace and integration, but find themselves institutionally bound to a sectarian affiliation because of the
21
size and socially exclusive nature of many of the major political parties. Epitomizing this is the politicizing of a
large proportion of jobs in the formal sector. Political parties control access to employment, further re-enforcing
political affiliation at community level, contributing to community separation.
Selective distribution of aid
Our research indicates that Hezbollah‘s distribution of aid in 2006 was fairly impartial, except for in the direction
of Sunni populations, who were the least likely to receive aid during and after the war. This affected social
cohesion. Answers to the question ‗Do you think social cohesion has improved as a result of the war in 2006?‘
reflected how the Sunnis were the group the least likely to believe that the war had increased unity, and proved to
be the most evasive. Conversely, Shias were most likely to say that the 2006 war had a positive effect on social
unity.
Diagram 2: Responses to Questionnaire: ‗Do you think social cohesion has

improved as a result of the war in 2006?‘ and ‗What is your opinion of the
new unity government?‘
Percentage of
questionnaire
respondents, by
sect.
These grass-roots results are reversed at the higher political level. Over half of those people asked their opinion
responded positively to the new unity government. It is important to note that the least content group were the
Shias (thirty-five percent of Shias questioned). Clearly the rising level of Hezbollah‘s activity on the ground, and
the increased political support it has derived from the provision of services, has diminished vertical cohesion
between the state and the populace. Furthermore Hezbollah only has a positive effect on social cohesion among
selected communities at the horizontal level, not all.
22
C2. How deep do social divisions run at the community level, and how are they manifested?
The 55 people who participated in the questionnaire (residents of Sur/Tyre, Basurey, Deir Quanoun, and
Lebanese living in a settlement camp) tended to highlight the results of historical physical demographics as a
social division rather than anything particularly exacerbated by the 2006 war.
The quantitative research (Annex II) indicated that youth are more likely than their peers to have travelled through
Lebanon, suggesting a higher level of inter-cultural competence than their parents. In addition, the Israeli
occupation had prohibited people from the far South travelling to other parts of the country at all. The
participants were more likely to have stayed in an area of a different denomination during the 33-day war.
Although a portion of people who spent time in an area of a different denomination during the war spent it with
relatives in that area, the majority of those who stayed in an area denominationally different from their own
stayed with families with a different religious affiliation, and continued to maintain contact with their hosts after
their return to their homes.
This, as well as other promising signs of positive interrelations between confessional groups, suggests a
horizontal level of social cohesion at the community level. However it could very well be that these interrelations
existed before the conflict. As a program assistant of the ILO says, ―The youth today generally see the civil war as
a mistake our parents made. We‘re trying to get beyond this‖.
The research team found 64% of Shias and 70% of Sunnis interviewed have had at least one member of their
extended family intermarry with a different sect, while 40% of Maronite Christians had had a family member
intermarry with another religion. While these numbers don‘t suggest a fully integrated society, they do reflect
fairly open current attitudes about intermarriage among sects, especially among the majority Muslim population.
We also found that relationships between social groups were generally positive, with most survey subjects being
members in mixed clubs and having a mix of friends from different groups. Repeated several times was the
protest that ―my friends religion isn‘t even discussed or isn‘t important‖. Those that did not have close friends
from different groups generally said that they wouldn‘t mind to, or that they at least came into contact through
trading with the different confessional groups.
As a UNDP employee told us, ―Religion really isn‘t the issue here. You‘ll find all the members of a woman‘s coop[-
erative] will be from the same sect, but that‘s because they are from the same village. Everyone is
welcome.‖ Issues in schools were similar, with the students of a school in a homogenous area having a majority
of one confessional sect due to a geographic separation of the sect. However, projects which intentionally
brought together members of different homogenous villages together didn‘t experience problems above the
extent of social and parental anxiety for personal security and were seen in a positive light by participants
afterwards.
While some interview subjects contended that peaceful relationships between sects were only surface deep,
there seems to be a general willingness by the Lebanese we interviewed to participate in activities, clubs, and
public spaces with each other, indicating a often deep respect of the ―the other‖ by individuals, regardless of
their politics.
C3. What do the governmental, non-governmental and inter-governmental institutions and

actors do to build positive peace and social cohesion?
Organisations (including IOs and NGOs) working at all levels of society undertake activities to promote peace and
reconciliation. Limited time was spent in Beirut and so it was difficult to assess the initiatives undertaken by
23
Lebanese political institutions at fostering cohesion. Most of the evidence for this was obtained through
observation.
Municipality
The Mayor of Nabatieh said that he had started small projects in the town to show people what could be
achieved. He involved the locals to share responsibility for the development and to motivate them to do things
for themselves. He went on to say that this rebuilding has had a psychological healing effect.
Figure 1 – Beirut Street Lights

Fig 2 shows street lights in a suburb of
Beirut, which displays crescents for the
end of Eid and stars for Christmas.
Community
Some community organizations appear to foster social cohesion by disregarding social divisions, promoting
values of tolerance, openness and learning. For example the following sign was seen on a nursery.
Figure 2 – Nursery Poster
24
Individual Level
The work of UNDP, UNICEF and other similar organisations is invaluable at supporting grass roots initiatives such
as the youth groups and cooperatives
Figure 3 – Female Cooperative

The female cooperative in Deir Quanoun not only provides
employment opportunities for the ladies, but by working
together in this way, it provides them with a social
support network in which they laugh and chat as they do
their work. Following the 2006 hostilities many of the
families in the area had lost a great deal and the income
from the females was vital. This produced greater
bonding and determination amongst the women. Mrs.
Daad, leader of the cooperative said, ―The women
became as important to me as my own family and I
cannot let them down.‖42
42 From an internal newsletter of UNDP 2009b Success Stories.
25
Some argue that the material benefits of such projects are small, that the cooperatives are only just able to
survive and so struggle to justify their implementation. However the psycho-social benefits which are difficult to
quantify are invaluable.
C4. Have the mechanisms and processes of reconstruction had a deconstructive effect on
Lebanese society, and if so how?
One could say that that has been the case in Lebanon as the government was not able to respond as needed to
the after-effects of the war. Besides the bureaucratic restrictions any government has to live by, the Lebanese
government was far less capable than other actors to respond properly. This created a void which some feel was
filled by non-state actors, thereby undermining the people‘s already fragile faith in the government, resulting in
the people becoming reliant on non-governmental actors for assistance. For example, the agricultural
cooperative at Zawtar al-Charkieh considers MAG as its first contact point for any demining issues, rather than
Lebanese army (Hussein Swaydan, interviewed on December 10th 2009). The mayor of Al Qulaylah informed us
that he would like to rely on the government but understands it to be a weak and unreliable institution. Instead he
is seeking help from Italian NGOs to improve fishing opportunities in his municipality.43
An example of this is the main road from Sur/Tyre which helped improve trade to better than pre-war levels and
was built by an Iranian NGO. The first money to be received by the government was in 2009 for road
reconstruction and even then $450 000 USD came from Iran, $339 000 USD Hezbollah, and only $330 000
USD from the Ministry of Public Works.
D. Analysis and Recommendations

There are several factors in Lebanon, which, based on an analysis of the information gained from the field
research, need to change. Some of them have been systemically ignored by central government and some have
seemingly not been deemed important enough for the future of Lebanon:
D1. Census
`The last comprehensive census in Lebanon was conducted in 1932 by the French Mandate government which
found that there was a Christian majority (52%), with a Muslim minority (47%). The distribution of parliamentary
seats among the confessions was based on the findings of the census; the ratio of six Christians to five Muslims,
including Druze, has been retained to this day. In the past several decades there has been a significant shift in
these figures, so much so that Muslims are now the majority in the country (Library of Congress, Jan. 16 2010).
A new census needs to be conducted to provide a correct, up to date, representation of the countries
demographics, but certain political elements are hesitant to do so as they fear they might lose their privileges.
D2. Political Structure
Central Lebanon (Beirut) has, almost traditionally, regarded the peripheries as marginal parts of Lebanon,
although they were completely dependent on its resources. The South, in particular, has been neglected over the
43 Abo Khalil Hassan M (interviewed 11 December 2009.
26
years in terms of its development. This has contributed to an increased lack of trust and faith in the central
government by the South, although people are hopeful with regards to the new government.
The consociation type political system of the government along sectarian lines is one of the major problems. It
encourages the sectarian divide to permeate through to other sections of society, breaking up potential for any
cohesive efforts. For example, the team was told that in order to get a job one has to affiliate themselves
politically and therefore along confessional lines. 44 Systems and mechanisms designed to ensure an all
encompassing inclusive representation and discourse are essential to ensuring a stable polity. However, if
systematic misuse of individuals‘ beliefs to strengthen a political entity continues to manifest itself in society,
such as mentioned above, it will become increasingly difficult to ensure that such systems will function as
designed to do.
A recurrent phrase during the research while in the South was ―The problem is all politics.‖ In a sense one could
say that is a good thing, as that is an issue one can work on and change. The Ta‘if Agreement, in place since
September 1989, calls for sectarian reform of politics but as of yet not a step has been taken by the body politic
to achieve that aim.
The current time is a good time to make significant changes now as there is a new government in place. If the
government does not act on time and modernize government institutions and promote democratic governance a
real opportunity will be lost, as they are likely to slip into the comfort zone left by their predecessors.
D3. Electoral reform
Electoral law exists in Lebanon but the procedure is not up to par with international standards by any means. The
process of elections is marred by fraud and manipulation. For example, a pre-printed ballot does not exist. Voters
write their choices on any piece of paper and deposit them in the ―ballot‖ box. Political parties take advantage of
this by pre-selecting their candidates and telling voters that those are the people they will vote for. In some cases
they go so far as to give them pre-printed lists of candidates which they only have to deposit in the ballot box.
They are able to control who has or has not voted by colouring the names of the candidates or sequencing them in
a particular order on the pre-printed piece of paper. If and when people decide not to vote, the party can then
approach them and ask them why they did not vote, and in some cases people lose their assistance from the
party.
The voting age in Lebanon is currently 21, but there are motions to change the law to 18. If this change were to
take place there would have to be a constitutional change, which is a time consuming process. If changing were
to take place there would be an additional +/- 280,000 voters eligible Lebanese on the voters list.45 It is not
difficult to imagine that certain parties will perhaps procrastinate on this issue as it may affect the balance of
power.
It is imperative with respect to the trust of the voting population and the Lebanese people in general that the
electoral system, the actual voting process and the electoral law, are amended to be as balanced, transparent,
and inclusive as possible. If the government proves itself to be inclusive, in time the effect might very well
resonate through to the populace.
D4. Youth
44 This came forward in a number of interviews, discussions, with members of the general public.
45 The team was informed of this number by Marc Bouillon and Chantal Sarkis, UNSCOL representatives, during an interview at the UNDP regional centre.
27
The UN Resident Coordinator‘s office in Lebanon established The Summer School on Conflict Prevention and
Transformation in 2004. It has held two sessions since then providing an opportunity for students and youth to
learn about tolerance, conflict resolution, and understanding (Filippo Busconi, 2010). Participants in these
seminars are extremely positive over what they learned in these sessions and in some cases have gone on to
create Peace Clubs at universities, which advocate the above-mentioned themes. More of these sessions should
be held across the country, at a more grass roots level, and should utilize the youth group network established by
the UNDP.
The youth groups, of which the research team met and interviewed several, are proving to be extremely
successful. UNDP currently has 98 youth groups operating in Lebanon, and trains the participants in leadership,
managing the group and writing their own proposals to try to encourage and develop their self-sustainability.
The youth feel that the groups have given them new insights with regards to other people in society, their own
capabilities and the choices that they can make. Generally they feel empowered by their participation in the
groups. They provide a bridge for the youth to interact on levels they previously would not have been able to do.
Initially, parents were hesitant to let their children interact with people from other sects or villages. This
hesitation came forth from their own experiences and beliefs of other people. However, when they saw how the
groups were affecting the lives of their children they encouraged them to go to group meetings. This process has
therefore not only had a positive effect on the children, but is slowly changing the perception of their parents
towards other groups as well.
The youth groups‘ main concerns with regards to social cohesion were aimed at the politics of Lebanon,
specifically political nepotism and the sectarian nature of central politics. Political parties are beginning to
recognize the strength of the youth groups. This could be an opportunity for the youth to become involved in
politics if they choose to do so, but this is a sensitive process and although it should be encouraged it should also
be well guided. A UNDP employee told the research team that in one village, of which the name was not given for
security purposes, a certain youth group was prohibited to perform their activities by a political party. This
signifies their strength but also their vulnerability as the groups are still developing.
The future is always with the youth and this is a perfect time for Lebanon to recognize and utilize the foundation
laid by the UNDP. The government should take over funding of these groups from the UNDP when their budget
runs dry for these types of initiatives, and allow the groups to develop as much as possible using the tools gained
from their training and experience gained by the efforts of the UNDP.
D5. Education
In Lebanon different types of schools exist: private, public, religious, foreign, politically sponsored, and free
private schools subsidized by the government. Unfortunately, each type differs from the other in terms of the
nature of student attending the school (economic status, religious and political affiliation, main language
spoken, geographic location), as well as in the area of focus and content of each schools‘ curriculum (history and
religion tuition, language emphasis, methods used, resources available etc.) (Karkour, 2008).
Many of the students interviewed found that their school environment had a profound effect on their social
activities and communication with other groups. They would much prefer to have a type of system that would not
be based on the abovementioned ideas but rather an inclusive system that would allow them to interact with
youth from all sections of society. As one student leader commented,
28
―History is what unites people, without history we can't have unity.‖46
The Muslim oriented schools teach Arabic Lebanese history, while the Christian schools focus more on
Phoenician history (BBC, 2009). This in itself is worrying as generations of Lebanese children grow up without a
collective memory and in are taught that they are different from each other in many aspects.
History is taught at schools, but only to a certain period. There is no schoolbook in Lebanon which teaches
modern history, for a very simple reason, the Lebanese cannot agree on it. The result of this is that children go to
their parents to ask them what happened in the past. There are many factors which influence what parents may
tell their children: their own education, their beliefs, and their own experiences, to list only a few. This can result
in the children forming a very biased opinion or one which aggravates existing differences. In the worst case this
could lead to aggression and perhaps open conflict between groups. It is therefore essential that an agreed upon
modern history curriculum is developed for nationwide use. After all, if the Lebanese are not able to agree on
their past, how will they be able to agree on their future.
E. Conclusion
The inviting atmosphere in Lebanon is ubiquitous; its lands and its people are open and generous. It is rich in
culture and diversity, things to be proud of as a country and something that should be cherished and protected as
a whole, not in separate compartments. That is where one does notice a difference, however subtle or sometimes
direct, that something is out of balance and in doing so creates an uncomfortable underlying current. There are
situations where people have to abide institutionally by a sectarian affiliation unless they wish to work and fight
for social peace and integration amongst the other sects. In fact, people are tentatively socially cohesive, unless
disturbed by the higher levels.
Although a lot was learned during the team‘s time in the field, the two main limitations that affected the research
were time and the limited research area. The results would have been more conclusive if the team would have
been able to analyze the data properly while in the research area and conducted follow up research based on
those findings.
Even though the Southern area of Lebanon is extremely interesting for many reasons, including the research topic
of social cohesion, its ethnic composition was not representative of all of Lebanon. It would have been beneficial
to the findings of the research if the team would have been able to conduct the identical research with two teams
in vastly different parts of the country.
Lebanon again stands at a new political beginning, which brings opportunities to enhance social cohesion and to
turn Lebanon into a truly stable functioning government. The education system needs reform, to establish an
agreed history curriculum and a higher level of public education.
Government action on the Ta‘if Agreement‘s call for sectarian reform of national politics is essential. Decisive
action would send a message not only the nation, but to the region, and the world, that the Lebanese can live as
one people.
46 Ohaness Goktchian, student form the American University in Beirut, 7 December 2009.
29
PART III
ECONOMIC LIVELIHOODS
(Edited by Kathryn Rzeszut)
30
A. Introduction
Over the past three years, there have been enormous reconstruction
efforts in the areas most damaged in the fighting: the Southern suburbs
of Beirut, the Beka‘a Valley, and Southern Lebanon (Hamieh and Mac
Ginty, 2009). 47 These areas are predominately Shia, the historically
poorer and disenfranchised segment of the Lebanese population
(Ajami, 1985).
The research conducted by the economic livelihoods research team

focused on answering following the question, ―How effective were the
various attempts at rebuilding livelihoods in Southern Lebanon after the
2006 hostilities?‖ The group adopted the United Nations Development
Programme‘s (UNDP) definition of livelihoods: ―...the underpinnings of
the economic systems upon which households and communities
depend for their living‖ (UNDP, 2007:48).
Figure 4: The July 2006 war caused
an estimated $3.6 billion in damage
(Youngs and Taylor, 2007).
The economic livelihoods section of this report is divided into three sections. The first discusses the economic
situation in Lebanon within the post-war re-development context. The second explains and critiques the research
methodology employed by the economic livelihoods study group. The third section analyzes the results of the
research on the effectiveness of livelihood restoration in four sectors: (1) women‘s co-operatives; (2) tourism; (3)
agriculture; and (4) vocational training. This section also includes recommendations for improvement to each
sector. Finally, this section of the report will conclude with some general conclusions about the state of economic
livelihood re-development in Southern Lebanon.
The study group participated in some information sessions and field visits in Beirut; however, most of the field
research relevant to economic livelihoods was conducted in the area surrounding Tyre. The analysis will focus
primarily on the effectiveness of economic livelihood re-development in Southern Lebanon. It was not within the
scope of this study to establish the veracity of opinions stating that recovery and re-development efforts in the
South are very similar to those in the remainder of the country.
B. Background: Economic Livelihoods in Lebanon

Prior to the Lebanese civil war that raged from 1975-1990, Lebanon was a central banking hub and earned the
title ―The Switzerland of the Middle East‖ (CIA, 2009). From 1965 until the war broke out, Lebanon‘s economy
exhibited low inflation and high growth and the country had a per capita income equivalent to some European
countries (Stewart, 1996). Because the country was one of the region‘s most economically stable countries, it
was viewed as the ―…intermediary between the developed economies of Europe and the developing economies
of the Middle East‖ (Sena (1995) as cited in Stewart, 1996:489). However, the devastating 15-year conflict
between Lebanon‘s three main religious sects, Christian, Sunni, and Shia, left the economy in tatters (Salem,
2006). It is estimated that the country‘s productivity was diminished by at least half (CIA, 2009) and the per
capita income level decreased by two-thirds as a result of the conflict (Commission of the European
Communities, 2005).
47 A map of Lebanon is attached as Appendix A.
31
After the civil war ended, with the signing of the Ta‘if Accords in 1989, the government borrowed heavily to
rebuild the country‘s shattered infrastructure and economy, subsequently incurring the third largest national debt
in the world (CIA, 2009). Estimated to be 178% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) prior to the war in 2006, it
negatively impacted GDP growth because of high debt service payments (Commission of the European
Communities, 2005). 48 The July 2006 war caused an estimated $3.6 billion of damage to the country‘s
infrastructure and generated huge losses for the country‘s tourism industry, which annually brings billions of
dollars to the economy (Youngs and Taylor, 2007).
Capital 2006 2007 Change

Despite these obstacles, Lebanon has made progress
economically since the 2006 war even during a global Physical Capital 1.83 1.29 -29%
recession, where it faces decelerating growth, Natural Capital 2.32 1.69 -27%
decreasing tourism, and declining remittances from
Human Capital
its expatriates (Commission of the European (Economic Activity) 1.87 1.37 -26%
Communities, 2009). According to 2007 data, it has Financial Capital 1.09 1.34 22%
a labour force of nearly 1.5 million people with a 9.2%
unemployment rate (CIA, 2009). The country is Social Capital 2.01 1.95 -3%
striving to regain its position as a centre for tourism Table 1: Average and change of livelihood indicators
and financial services. Currently, the service sector, (World Bank, 2007).
which includes banking and tourism, is the largest

economic sector, employing 70% of the work force, Indicator 2006 2007 Change
followed by industry at 23% (with manufacturing Unemployment Indicator
rate 2006
1.86 2007
1.27 Change
-32%
10% of that figure) and agriculture at 6% (World Agriculture
Unemployment rate sector 2.02 1.86 1.27
1.14 -32%
-43%
Bank, 2008). economic performance
Agriculture sector
Small industries sector 2.02 1.14 -43%
economic performance 1.71 1.21 -29%
According to World Bank (2008) figures, only the economic performance
Small industries sector
manufacturing sector showed significant losses Trade sector economic 1.71 1.21 -29%
economic performance 1.29 1.24 -35%
between 2000 and 2007, with a 3% decrease performance Trade sector economic
1.29 1.24 -35%
relative to GDP (World Bank, 2008), which seems Tourism performand sector economic
1.90 .73 -61%
Tourism Table
surprisingly low considering that over 900 factories performance 2: Average
sector economicand change of human capital
1.90
(World Bank, 2007). .73 -61%
and small manufacturing businesses were destroyed performance
(World Bank, 2007).
during the 2006 war (Youngs and Taylor, 2007). At
the national level, the agricultural sector also experienced
Tablea 2:
slight
Averagedecline—1%
and change of GDP—
of humanbetween
capital2000 and
2007 (World Bank, 2008). However, mostly agrarian Southern
(World Lebanon, where the research
Bank, was focused, was 2007).
deeply affected by the 2006 war. In Tyre, some estimates of the war‘s total economic impact on the agricultural
sector range as high as $117 million, which is enormously significant in a region where agriculture accounts for
nearly 80% of the economy (Darwish, Farajalla, and Masri, 2008). Other data provided by the World Bank (2007)
provides a clear snapshot of the war‘s devastating impact on economic livelihoods throughout the country,
detailing dramatic declines in physical, human, natural, and financial capital. The conflict had a particularly
negative effect on human capital in Lebanon, with precipitous declines in nearly every economic sector
immediately following the war (World Bank, 2007).
C. Research Analysis:
How effective has economic livelihood re-development been?
48 Currently,
Lebanese national debt is estimated to be 160% of GDP, an improvement over pre-2006 war estimates (Commission of the European
Communities, 2009).
32
Once in Lebanon, the economic livelihoods study group narrowed the focus of their research on four specific
areas in the economic re-development process: (1) women‘s co-operatives; (2) tourism; (3) agriculture; and (4)
vocational training. Several factors lead to this decision: the central role women‘s co-operatives played in
UNDP‘s economic re-development programmes; the importance of tourism to the Lebanese economy as well as
the number of historic and ecological tourism sites around Tyre; and the fact that agriculture is the principal
employer in Southern Lebanon. The background information gathered in other focus areas prior to the trip as well
as the information received during briefing sessions in Beirut and Tyre informed the decision to limit the research
scope to these areas.
C1. Women’s Co-operatives: The importance of niche markets
One of the UN Millennium Goals is to promote gender equality and empower women and the UNDP has spent
approximately $1.5 million in Lebanon pursuing that goal (UNDP, n.d.a). Women‘s co-operatives are a significant
part of the empowerment strategy, but also serve as a way to fight poverty and encourage economic
development, especially in rural areas like Southern Lebanon. Team members visited three women‘s co-
operatives located in Bint Jbeil, Debel, and Deir Quanoun. All three co-
operatives existed prior to the July 2006 war and underwent varying
levels of re-development after the war.49 The focus of their research was
to determine the long-term sustainability of women‘s co-operatives.
UNDP provided project information sheets detailing the costs,
beneficiaries, and scope of the project, and team members conducted
semi-structured interviews with the members of the co-operatives. The
questions focused on the re-development process following the 2006
war, the co-operative‘s profit margin, challenges to the co-operative‘s
profitability and their perceptions of the co-operative‘s long-term
sustainability.
Figure 5: Diverse products and niche

The team found that two of the co-operatives, located in Bint Jbeil and markets seem to be factors in the
Deir Quanoun, are profitable and have good prospects for long-term success of women’s co-operatives.
sustainability; however, the Debel co-operative is struggling and without outside help would not be able to
continue its operations. The co-operative, which arguably has the nicest Figure
facilities
6: of the three,
Diverse produces
products andjams,
niche
markets seem to be factors in the
pickles, and various canned sauces. Debel co-operative members stated that last year‘s
success profit hadco-operatives.
of women’s been only $67
and that the major problems they faced included transportation to the market in Beirut and being able to afford
the rent on their market stall. Currently, a Norwegian NGO is assisting the co-operative financially, organizing
their transportation and rent for the market stall, but the NGO is ending its involvement with the co-operative in
three months. When asked what their plan was after the NGO‘s departure, the women acknowledged that at that
they did not yet have one.
Although the Debel co-operative is only a short drive from the one in Bint Jbeil, the differences between the two
are stark. The Bint Jbeil co-operative offers a multitude of diverse products, ranging from tomato paste, oregano,
cracked wheat and aromatic and medicinal herbs. They also provide tailoring services and hand-made home
accessories. Their dried herbs are rapidly becoming popular and are proving profitable, as production requires
less time and labour. While the women cannot yet sustain themselves on their co-operative earnings, they stated
that they are earning a profit and that their profit margin is increasing as they participate in more exhibitions and
obtain new customers.
49 The buildings housing the Bint Jbeil and Deir Quanoun women‘s co-operatives were completely destroyed during the 2006 war; the Debel co-operative‘s
building was not.
33
The co-operative in Deir Quanoun was the most profitable of the three, earning enough money so that its
members could sustain themselves as well as their families. When asked to compare the success of the co-
operative before and after the war, all of the women agreed that the co-operative was more financially successful
after the war. While this co-operative also produces canned goods similar to those offered by the other co-
operatives, their specialty is flat bread, which they sell to restaurants and stores. Recently, they had enlarged
their customer base, acquiring a new vendor in Beirut, and had expanded their services, providing catered
lunches to an engineering company. They also had future plans to expand into catering and wanted to open a
restaurant serving authentic Lebanese village cuisine.
Although the three co-operatives had received the same type of financial and project support, the research team
identified two factors that played a role in success absent in the Debel co-operative. The first factor is product
diversification and a niche market. All three co-operatives manufactured similar canned goods; however,
producing a unique product—bread in Deir Quanoun and herbs in Bint Jbeil—allowed them to locate a niche
market and was instrumental in their increased profitability. Secondly, the two successful co-operatives are
managed by women with very strong entrepreneurial spirits. The manageress at both Bint Jbeil and Deir Quanoun
co-operatives stated that they were constantly looking for ways to expand the co-operatives‘ business. In
contrast, the team observed that the members of the Debel co-operative seemed to lack this entrepreneurial
spirit and did not aspire towards clear goals.
Co-operatives are an excellent way to empower women, encourage them to use their skills and acquire new ones,
help them provide for their families, and to harness economic productivity and power (Andreou, 1980). The three
co-operatives we investigated are small scale projects—involving approximately $15,000 each of donor‘s funds—
and will not singlehandedly overhaul the Lebanese economy; however, they provide their members with valuable
income and because the co-operatives purchase their raw materials from local farmers, they support intra-
communal reliance.
Co-operatives like the one in Debel would be well served by the guidance of a successful entrepreneur, who could
act as a temporary consultant over a short period. The consultant could devise solutions to problems such as
marketing and transportation, counsel the members on product diversification and expanding their market share,
assist the members with drafting business plans, and provide them with introductory business management
classes. Even the more successful co-operatives would benefit from similar business advice and training. Such
training would also be a good way to enhance members‘ business management knowledge and skills, which
might have a positive effect on a co-operative‘s long-term sustainability.
Another solution to consider would be a joint effort between co-operatives and local business and marketing
university students, perhaps members of UNDP‘s youth group programmes. Like the entrepreneurial consultants,
the students, working on a volunteer basis, could share their knowledge with the co-operative‘s members and act
as advisors, researching key markets, new products and services and creating new marketing strategies. This
type of joint project would also provide the young people with real world experience and valuable skills relevant
to their field.
C2. Tourism in Southern Lebanon: An underutilized resource
Tourism is one of Lebanon‘s main industries, bringing $2.5 billion into

the country per annum (Youngs and Taylor, 2007). With archaeological
34
Figure 3: Tyre's Roman ruins are a

UNESCO World Heritage Site.
ruins from various empires spread throughout the country, beaches, mountains, ski resorts, beautiful hotels,
world-class restaurants and night life all within a short drive, it is not hard to see why so many travellers love
Lebanon . The team conducted interviews with an official from the Ministry of Tourism in Beirut and the manager
of the Tyre Beach Nature Reserve, as well as reviewed the Ministry‘s Southern Lebanon marketing brochures and
the Ministry‘s website. The team concluded that the focus of the Ministry‘s marketing strategy has been the
capital and surrounding areas. The brochure on Southern Lebanon provided by the Ministry was made before the
civil war and the Ministry‘s website highlights Beirut‘s nightlife and the ski resorts of Mount Lebanon, not the
South‘s important tourism sites, which include ecological tourism spots like the Tyre Beach Nature Reserve and
the city‘s Roman ruins, one of the country‘s five UNESCO World Heritage Sites (UNESCO, n.d.a.). The team‘s
comparisons of Beirut and Tyre concluded that development of the tourist industry had not been implemented in
the Southern city to the same extent as it had been in the capital. The lack of a comprehensive and inclusive
strategy appears to originate at the ministerial level. In the absence of government planning and support, it is
difficult for grass-roots commerce groups or private investors to create a coherent plan to build hotels and other
tourism-related businesses in an effort to create their own tourist industry.
The South‘s important historical sites and the Nature Reserve are administered by the Lebanese government and
it is the government‘s responsibility to promote them as part of a national tourism strategy. From the team‘s
observations during visits to the Nature Reserve and UNESCO World Heritage site, neither was marketed to their
best advantage. For example, the entrance to the Roman ruins was not clearly marked and initially it was difficult
to determine where the ticket office was located. While there were multiple entrance gates throughout the site,
only the least accessible one at the farthest point from the centre of town was unlocked during the team‘s visit.
The site is a prominent feature in the city, yet it is cut off from the population‘s daily activities, quite different from
archaeological sites in other cities like Rome. Ensuring that they are accessible to the local community—making
them free for Tyre residents and opening access through the site during the day—and incorporating them into
festivals and other events would generate more interest and make them a visible part of the town‘s life.
Also, domestic tourism seems to be a sector that has been largely ignored. A large part of the hundreds of
thousands tourists who flock to Lebanon in the summer are expatriates who return to visit family, especially in the
South (Steinmetz, 2009). A national campaign encouraging domestic tourism could be considered and has the
potential to prove profitable, especially during a recession when people are looking for less expensive trips close
to home.
C3. Agriculture: Small-scale projects and large-scale problems
Although agriculture compiles only 6% of the Lebanese national economy (World Bank, 2008), it is enormously
important in the South, employing up to 80% of the population (Darwish, Farajalla and Masri, 2008). Because of
its central role in the South‘s economy, the team chose to research the effectiveness of agricultural sector re-
development efforts. The 2006 War had an immediate impact on agriculture in the region because farmers were
unable to harvest their crops due to the huge amount of UXOs and cluster bombs littering their fields. UXOs
continue to be a problem, with demining teams striving hard to clear the land,
where possible adjusting their pace to the various agricultural cycles (UNDP,
n.d.a).
UNDP recognizes the importance of the agricultural sector in Southern

Lebanon and has carried out various projects in support of it. The team went
on field visits to several small-scale agricultural projects managed by UNDP
and the International Labour Organization (ILO), including a laurel press, a
thyme farm, and a bee-keeping project. Team members interviewed project
Figure 4: The laurel press at
Ayta al-Chaab is one of many
35 small-scale agricultural projects
throughout southern Lebanon.
Figure 7: The laurel press at

Aita Chaab is one of many
beneficiaries and members of an agricultural co-operative and a fledgling farmer‘s union. They also interviewed
staff from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and reviewed their project documents. Overwhelmingly,
the theme that arose in these visits and interviews is that there is no comprehensive government agricultural
strategy, especially in the South. Farmers from the new farmer‘s union stated that they had no government
protection against cheaper agricultural products imported from neighbouring countries and that many of the
problems they‘re facing now, they had prior to the 2006 war. There appears to be no coordinated effort by the
government to purchase or sell domestic agricultural products, with members of the agricultural co-operative
providing examples of the government purchasing products too late, which caused the product to spoil and
ultimately hurting the product price. It was commonly asserted that the South‘s agricultural sector was neglected
prior to the war, it was hurt by the 2006 war, and it is neglected now. The small-scale projects implemented by
UNDP, ILO, and FAO, cannot replace a strong central government agricultural strategy or protections. However,
this should not diminish the positive impact that these small-scale projects have for their beneficiaries nor the
resultant increased capacity of local institutions to plan and maintain their own economic initiatives in the future.
The team concluded that agricultural reforms are needed at the ministerial level. Indeed, a full national
agricultural strategy is necessary if agriculture in the South is to reach its economic potential. Protection from
cheap imports for farmers growing certain crops is desperately desired. Additionally, there should be a concerted
effort on the part of the Lebanese government to reach out to Southern farmers in an effort to include them in the
decision-making process. Coordination on the local level with groups like the farmers union would do much to
foster good relations with this historically neglected region and the farmers who are its economic backbone.
C4. Vocational Training: Trying to change perceptions
As an immediate response following the cessation of the hostilities in 2006, UNDP and ILO conducted a survey
on the impact of the conflict on small and medium enterprises and on household living standards in Lebanon.
They found an urgent need to ―…incorporate substantive social development component in the reconstruction
process and to establish a national strategy for employment promotion‖ (ILO, 2006). The study, through a rapid
labour market survey, identified a shortage of human resources in the construction sector. In Lebanon, Syrian
and Egyptian migrant workers have occupied most of the jobs in the construction sector, due in part to what some
interviewees attributed to a negative image of the occupation. However, because of fluctuating relationships with
Syria, ILO believes that there is a need to raise Lebanese skilled labour in this sector.
The vocational training project aims to reduce the stigma surrounding construction work, and to develop the
skills and capacity of unemployed and semi-skilled people. The ILO also provides employment assistance to
individuals by developing links between employers and jobseekers, and through facilitating communication
between employers, the government, and workers. Their main activities are:
- Organizing vocational training in plumbing, electricity,

carpentry, mosaics, and painting in 7 out of 22 existing
technical schools in South Lebanon;
- Encouraging those who express a desire to be self-employed
to setup a small business, providing business management
training, which includes financial skills assistance;
- Forming a committee to update the curriculum from the
1990s, working to gain recognition for vocational training
through national qualifications; and
Figure 5: Vocational training - Developing the capacity of the national employment office,
centres in Southern Lebanon are
trying to change perceptions about
construction sector work.
36
linking vocational skills with the labour market through job centres.
There are several issues to be discussed in terms of sustainability in this project, with the challenges faced being
divided into three categories: institutional, financial, and technical.
Although the principal government actor is the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Education is also an important
partner in curriculum development and the management of schools. Currently, collaboration between both
ministries is insufficient, with a lack of a general strategy or master plan to match skills training to labour market
needs. At present, the two ministries have differing political agendas, which impact negatively on inter-
ministerial cooperation; however, at the local level, ILO, in collaboration with related institutions and
stakeholders, has updated the curriculum to fit real market needs.
Financial sustainability of this project is questionable at this time, as the Lebanese institutions do not have the
resources to continue it at the same level, providing salaries for trainers, funding transportation, equipment and
starter kits for the students. However, this project was originally designed to meet the vast needs of the
construction sector following the massive destruction of the 2006 war and the sector has declined slightly since
then. Thus it might not be necessary for the Lebanese institutions to sustain the project at the same level, and
resources should be directed at only the most necessary parts of the project.
Finally, there is a need to mobilize existing technical schools and improve training of local trainers to ensure
enhanced technical capacity. It would be constructive to consider the schools and trainers within municipal
social development centres, run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, when selecting program beneficiaries. This
attempt to involve the local municipalities could enhance overall technical sustainability. Additionally, the
capacity of regional employment centres in Southern Lebanon is still low, although, vocational training graduates
are expected to register with them in order to find employment. This could be the area which requires further
intervention.
D. Conclusions
Lebanon is in a perpetual state of ―pre-conflict‖, with the threat of further conflict with Israel casting a shadow
over the country. Another war with Israel is expected within the next couple of years. As one mayor stated, ―It is
not a matter of if, it is a matter of when.‖ The head of an agricultural co-operative questioned the importance of
re-development and sustainability if there was certain to be another Israeli attack. While the sentiment is
understandable, the people in the South cannot simply wait for the next conflict, but must continue with the task
of rebuilding.
The overwhelming message that the team received from the interviews and the information briefings in Beirut and
Tyre was that deeply-divided Lebanese politics impeded re-development efforts, effective governance, and
service provision. Because Southern Lebanon was occupied until 2000 by Israel, there was no governmental
presence there and even after Israeli withdraw, the government was still largely absent from daily life. The
Lebanese government is still perceived to be generally absent from much of the service provision in the South.
Even the rebuilding efforts after the 2006 war were fragmented and politicized, with Hezbollah providing
immediate payments of $12,000 to recipients (Youngs and Taylor, 2007), while the government has yet to hand
out the promised second reimbursement check. As a result, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government is
challenged; however, there does seem to be a consensus amongst interviewees to allow time for the new
coalition government to grow into its role. Expectations are high and the government will need to take huge
symbolic steps to erase the damage done in the years of its absence in Southern Lebanon. The opportunity for
37
the government to make a positive impact on the lives of the people in the South is there for the taking.
Implementing inclusive and comprehensive policies in sectors such as agriculture, which are vitally important to
the region, will make a difference not only to the economy, but to the population‘s perception of the government.
Ensuring that the South is part of a national tourism plan and that it receives private investment and witnesses
the construction of new hotels and conference centres, as the areas surrounding Beirut have done, will also
provide a boost to the economy of the historically poorer region.
It is impossible and undesirable for UN agencies to fill the vacuum created by the government‘s absence or
ineffectiveness. Advocacy efforts at the ministerial level seem to be making a difference in the agricultural sector
and small-scale UNDP projects designed to encourage economic re-development generally have a positive
impact on immediate beneficiaries and their dependents. Generally, the information gathered from interviews
and observations during project visits indicated that although Southern Lebanon faces some serious obstacles,
progress is being made in the re-development of economic livelihoods there.
38
Bibliography
Ajami, F. (1985) ‗The prospects: Lebanon and its inheritors‘ Foreign Affairs, Spring 1985. Available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/39626/fouad-ajami/lebanon-the-prospects-lebanon-and-its-
inheritors. [Accessed 13 January 2010].
Anderson, M. B. (1999) Do No Harm, How aid can support Peace or War, (Colorado USA, Lynne Reinner
Publishers).
Andreou, P. (1980) ‗Co-operatives, women and their respective roles in development—the case of Lebanon‘
Agricultural Administration, 7(2), pp. 87-96.
Barakat, S., Chard, M., Jacoby, T., Lume, W. (2002) ‗The Composite Approach: Design in the Context of War and
Armed Conflict‘, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No 5, pp. 991-1003.
Barakat, Sultan and Steven A. Zyck and Jenny E. Hunt (2008) Housing Compensation & Disaster Preparedness in
the Aftermath of the July 2006 War in South Lebanon, (University of York: Post-War Reconstruction &
Development Unit).
Bazzi, M. (2009) ‗Lebanon‘s shadow government‘ Foreign Affairs, 11 September 2009. Available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65405/mohamad-bazzi/lebanon‘s-shadow-government. [Accessed 13
January 2010].
Biggam, John (2008) Succeeding with your Master‘s Dissertation. A step-by-step handbook, (Maidenhead, Open
University Press).
Brown, R. H. (2002) ‗Towards sustainable infrastructure: an adaptable model for post-war areas in developing
countries‘ Municipal Engineer 151 Issue 3.
Bruhn, J. (2009) The Group Effect: Social Cohesion and Health Outcomes (Boston, Springer Verlag).
Canadian Policy Research network, (2002) Beauvais C. and Jenson J. Social Cohesion, Updating the State of
Research. Available at http://www.cprn.org. [Accessed 08 January 2010].
CIA (2009) The World Factbook – Lebanon. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/public

ations/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html. [Accessed 8 January 2010].
Cobban, H. (1983) ‗Lebanon‘s Chinese Puzzle‘ Foreign Policy, No. 53. (Winter, 1983-1984), pp. 34-48.
Collier, P. (2000) ‗Doing well out of war: an economic perspective‘, in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds.) Greed and
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers) pp. 91-110.
Commission of the European Communities (2005) Country report: Lebanon. Commission Staff Working Paper
SEC(2005) 289/3.
Commission of the European Communities (2009) Progress report Lebanon. Commission Staff Working
Document SEC(2009) 518/2.
39
Creswell, J. (2003) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches, (California,
Sage).
Dagher, C. H. (2000) Bring Down the Walls. Lebanon‘s Post-War Challenge, (New York: Palgrave).
Darwish, R., Farajalla, N. and Masri, M. (2008) ‗The 2006 war and its inter-temporal economic impact on
agriculture in Lebanon‘ Disasters, 33(4), pp. 629-44.
Department for Communities and Local Government (November 2006) The State of English Cities – Social
Cohesion. (Crown Publishing, UK) available at www.communities.gov.uk/publications/citiesandregions/state5.
[Accessed 24 November 2009].
Denscombe, M. (2007) The Good Research Guide for Small-scale Social Research Projects, (Maidenhead, Open
University Press).
Deutsche Presse Agentur (28 February 2007) Southern Lebanese see Jihad al-Bina‘a as ―helping hand‖.
‗The search for peace—and a way to rebuild a country‘ Economist, 12 August 2006.
European Commission Humanitarian Aid (2007) ‗Rapid Rehabilitation of Key Municipal Infrastructure‘ Available
at http://www.undp.org.lb/communication/publications/downloads/Rapid_Rehab_English.pdf. [Accessed 12
January 2010].
Gray, D. (2004) Doing research in the real world, (London: Sage).
Hamieh, C. and Mac Ginty, R. (2009) ‗A very political reconstruction: governance and reconstruction in Lebanon
after the 2006 war‘ Disasters, 34(s1), S103-S123.
Hamieh, C. (2007) Intra-group competition in a deeply divided society: The dynamics of the Hezbollah vs. Amal
competition in Baalbeck-Hermel during 1998-2003, PhD Thesis, University of York, York.
Helly, D., Barsky, R. And Foxey, P. (2003) ‗Social Cohesion and Cultural Plurality‘ The Canadian Journal of
Sociology, 28 (1), pp. 19-42.
International Labour Organization (2006), ILO response to the post-crisis situation in Lebanon. Available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/relconf/documents
/meetingdocument/wcms_gb_297_tc_5_1_en.pdf. [Accessed 12 January 2010].
Jenson J. and Saint, M. D. (2003), New Routes to Social Cohesion? Citizenship and the Social Investment State,
Canadian Journal of Sociology, Special Issue on Social Cohesion, Winter 2003 Vol. 28 No 1. pp. 77-99.
Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3341873 [Accessed on 8 January 2010].
Kearns, A. and Forrest, R. (2000) Social cohesion and multi-level urban governance, Urban Studies, Vol. 37,
No5-6 pp. 995-1017 (Abingdon, Routledge) ISSN 0042-0980.
King, J., Morris, L., and Fitz-Gibbons, C. (1987) How to assess program implementation, (Newbury Park: Sage).
40
Levitt, M. (2007) ‗Shutting Hezbollah‘s ‗Construction Jihad‘ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, policy
watch # 1202 (2008).
MacGinty, R. (2007) ‗Reconstructing post-war Lebanon: a challenge to the liberal peace?‘ in Conflict, Security
and Development, 7 (3), pp. 457-482.
Makhzoumi, J. (2009) ‗Marginal Landscapes, Marginalized Rural Communities: Sustainable Post-War Recovery
in Southern Lebanon‘ in Howayda Al-Harity (ed.) (To be published in 2010) Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction.
Case Studies from Lebanon in the Aftermath of the 2006 War, (Routledge).
Maxwell J. (1996) as cited by Dick Stanley, (2003) ‗What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research
Perspective of the Federal Government's Social Cohesion Research Network‘ Canadian Journal of Sociology:
Special Issue on Social Cohesion, Winter 2003 Vol. 28 No 1. p. 7. Available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3341873 [Accessed on 8 January 2010].
Osaghae, E. (1999) ‗Conflict Research in Africa‘ International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 16, 1999.
Peterson, S. (2007) ‗Cluster bombs: a war‘s perilous aftermath‘ Christian Science Monitor, Available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/02/07/po1so1-wome.html. [Accessed 6 December 2009].
Rekacewicz, P. (2000) ‗Golan and Southern Lebanon: at the heart of Israeli-Syrian negotiations‘ in Le Monde
Diplomatique, English Edition, online at http://mondediplo.com/maps/israelnorthdpl2000, [Accessed on 14
January 2010].
Robson, C. (2002) Real World Research; A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers, Second
Edition, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing).
Rosen, N. (2009) ‗Lessons Unlearned‘ Foreign Policy. Available at

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/29/lesson_unlearned?page=0,1 [Accessed 29 November
2009].
Safa, O. (2007) ‗Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in the Arab World: The Work of Civil Society Organisations
in Lebanon and Morocco‘ Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management. Available at
http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/safa_handbook.pdf.
[Accessed 28 November 2009].
Salem, P. (2006) ‗The Future of Lebanon‘ Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006. Available
at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62084/paul-salem/the-future-of-lebanon. [Accessed on 13 January
2010].
Solash R. ‗Lebanon: oil spill causing ecological crisis‘ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, broadcast on 7 August
2006. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070380.html. [Accessed 16 January 2010].
Stanley, D. (2003) ‗What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal
Government's Social Cohesion Research Network‘ Canadian Journal of Sociology, Special Issue on Social
Cohesion, Winter 2003, Vol. 28 No. 1. pp. 5-17. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3341873 [Accessed:
8 January 2010].
41
Steinmetz, T. ‗Lebanon tourism is back from a vacation‘ eTurbo News, 26 September 2009. Available at
http://www.eturbonews.com/11945/lebanon-tourism-back-vacation. [Accessed 17 January 2010].
Stewart, D. (1996) ‗Economic recovery and reconstruction in post-war Beirut‘ Geographical Review, 86(4), pp.
487-504.
UNDP Arab Bureau for Arab States (2009a) Arab Human Development Report 2009. Challenges to Human
security in the Arab Countries Available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MWAI-7U78JZ-
full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf [Accessed 4 January 2010].
UNDP (2009b), Project report: Agricultural Cooperative for Processing And Packaging of Agricultural Products in
Deir Quanoun Ras el Ein.
UNDP Lebanon (2007a) Lebanon. Rapid Environmental Assessment for Greening Recovery, Reconstruction and
Reform Available at http://www.undp.org.lb/events/docs/DraftReport.pdf [Accessed on 9 December 2009].
UNDP Lebanon (2007b) UNDP‘s Participation in Lebanon‘s Recovery in the Aftermath of the July 2006 War,
Available at http://www.undp.org.lb/PROFORMA.pdf. [Accessed 10 December 2009].
UNDP (n.d.a) Project database. Available at http://www.undp.org.lb/ProjectFactSheet/index.cfm. [Accessed 17

January 2010].
UNDP (n.d.a) Post-conflict Socio-Economic Rehabilitation Programme for Southern Lebanon. Available at
http://www.undp.org.lb/ProjectFactsheet/projectDetail.cfm?projectId=4. [Accessed 2 December 2009].
UNESCO (n.d.a.) ―The list.‖ Available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/299. [Accessed 17 January 2010].
UNRWA: online at www.un.org/unrwa, [Accessed on 15 January 2010].
World Bank Report (2007) Post-Conflict Social and Livelihoods Assessment in Lebanon, Available at
www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/SSHN-782G7r-
full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf. [Accessed on 15 January 2010].
World Bank (2008) Lebanon at a glance, Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/

INTLEBANON/Resources/AAG-LBAM09.pdf. [Accessed on 8 January 2010].
Youngs, T. and Taylor, C. (2007). The crisis in Lebanon. The House of Commons Library International Affairs &
Defence Section Research Paper 07/08.
42
Appendices
Appendix 1: Key Stakeholders Consulted
The following is a list of people interviewed or consulted during the research trip. It was difficult to record all names
during large group meetings and discussions so we apologise if there are individuals who contributed or participated
in the research but are not cited below.
Name/Title/Position Affiliation, Area

Saifuddin Abbaro, Country Director UNDP, Beirut
Christine Sylva Hamieh UNDP, Beirut
Manal Fouani, Programme Associate UNDP, Beirut
Lamya Karkour UNDP, Tyre
Layal Abu Darwich UNDP, Beirut
Mireille Karaki UNDP, Tyre
Lana Ghandour UNDP, Tyre
Rosy Tayyar UNDP
Richard Evans, Programme Manager NRC
Fatme Chehadi NRC – Tyre Office
Abdelhamid Kalai, Chief Technical Advisor in Skills Development ILO
Majd Farhat, Program Assistant on Employment Services ILO
Ms. Farah Khawaja, Community Mobiliser ILO
Dr Bassel Salloukh, Associate Professor of Political Sciences LAU

Dr Ali Fayyaz, MP Member of Lebanese Parliament
Dr Ibrahim Chahrour, Head of Planning CDR
Mr Abdel Salam Al-Khalil, Deputy Mayor Ghobeiry District, Beirut
Yousef Saleh, Head of Board of Directors – Association of Kafra for Beneficiary of ILO Project
Agriculture, Kafra
Hassan Abady, Thyme Farmer, Yater Beneficiary of ILO Project
Fatimah Sbeity, Beekeeper, Kafra Beneficiary of ILO Project
Tarek Jisr - AUB student UNDP Youth Group Member
Allen Kelly - Chief of Operations/Plans UN Mine Action Coordination Centre
Ali Shuaib - Community Liaison Officer Mines Advisory Group
Mats Hector Mines Advisory Group
Lt. Col. Mohamed El Cheikh - Lebanese Army Mine Action Team Lebanese Armed Forces
Ahmed Hatoum - Vice President Haret Hreik Municipality
Abdul Maser Srour – Mayor Ayta al-Chaab
Afif Bazzi – Mayor Bint Jbeil
43
Mayor Nabatieh
Mayor Tyre
Hassan M. Abo Khalil - Mayor Al Qulaylah
Jamal Ismael, Mayor Deir Quanoun Municipality
Samer Hoydar, InterSOS national coordinator Social Development Centre
Hassam Badouk, Tyre Municipal Town Planner Tyre Municipality
Ghassan Ado Jahjah Social Development Council
Sara Alsankhe, CDR Logistic and Planning Officer, Tyre CDR
representative
Anonymous Former Hezbollah Fighter Hezbollah
Ali Ismair, Shopkeeper Deir Quanoun
Yousif Khalid, Shopkeeper Deir Quanoun
Atou Khalid, Shopkeeper Deir Quanoun
Hassan Kazan - Leader - Agriculture - South Lebanon Jihad al Bina'a
Azam Kaythanani - Leader - Housing Infrastructure - Tyre Office Jihad al Bina'a
Leader - Tyre Office Council of the South
Rabhi Shibli – Founder Beit Biljnoub
Carole Baudoin - Resident Coordinator UNICEF
Mr Alain Grimard - HQ representative UNHABITAT
Dr KyriaCoS Kouros - Charge's d'Affaires Cyprus aid
Ms Flora Kurikkala - Second Secretary Government of Finland
Mohammad Fneish - H E Minister - Office of the Minister of State Government of Lebanon
(OMSAR)
Tarek Osseiran - Project Manager UNHABITAT
Rony Jalkh UNHABITAT
Sylvana Lakkis Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union
Joe Khawley, Journalist MTV
Rana, Al-Manar, Journalist Participant in UNDP Peace Project
Nabil al-Haj, Maronite Archbishop Maronite Church
Official Representative Ministry of Tourism
Director of the Protected Areas Tyre Municipality
Civil Affairs Officer, UNIFIL UNIFIL
Members of Cooperative Debel Women's Cooperative
Members of Cooperative Deir Quanoun Women's Cooperative
Members of Cooperative Zawtar al Charkieh Agricultural Cooperative
Members of Cooperative Bint Jbeil Women's Cooperative
Members of Youth Group Al Qulaylah Youth Group
Members of Youth group Nabatieh
44
Appendix 2: Communities Studied
The following is a list of places in which our research was carried out, including where questionnaires and surveys
were conducted.
Kada'a Village/Town/City
Haret Hreik Dahiyeh
Bint Jbeil Bint Jbeil
Debel
Ayta al Chaab
Nabatieh Aytaroun
Harouf
Zawtar al Charkieh
Qana
Nabatieh Tahta
Yater
Kafra
Tyre Deir Quanoun
Srifa
Tyre
Marjeyoun Diber
45
Appendix 3.1: Household Questionnaire
Household Questionnaire
Please note that this questionnaire will be used by the PRDU York University
Personal
Male Female
(1) Village:__________ Number of the family members ___________
(2) Was your house damaged by the 2006 war? Y N
(3) Did you receive any help in terms of reconstruction? Y N
(4) Help received from: Gov JaB International organization Lebanese Gov
Donor Country Other_______________
(6) Help in the form of: Cash In Kind Other _______________
(7) If cash, how much did you receive?_________________
(8) a. Damage: Partially Totally
b. Reconstruction Complete: Partially Totally
(9) a. Did anyone carry out a need assessment? Y N
b. Who did it? ____________________________
(10) Are you happy with the help you received? Y N
(11) a. Has anyone carried out an evaluation? Y N
b. If yes who?______________
(12) Do you have access to the following in your home? Water Electricity Telephone
Sewage/Sanitation Road Access
(13) My home has been constructed with earthquake protection: Y N I don‘t know
State extent to which you agree or disagree with the following:
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
(14) Cluster bombs have been a problem in my village.
(15) I had total autonomy over the construction of my house.
(16) I am happy with the standard of my house.
(17) Before 2006 I was happy with my house.
(18) Before 2006 I was happy with my infrastructure.
(19) The standard of help we received in this village
was higher compared to other villages.
(20) My house will require lots of maintenance.
(21) I will receive help with my maintenance.
(22) When I moved back in I had good access to
Water and electricity.
46
Appendix 3.2: The Web of Research Themes
47
Appendix 3.3: The Composite Approach
1. Orientation phase is essential. (exploring the available information, consulting and arranging access
with key people, careful logistic preparation and initial less-structured appraisals)
2. A comprehensive literature analysis forming the basis of the research design.
3. Pilot-testing of research design (surveys or comparative research) in order to properly structure
research.
4. Careful negotiations and meetings with administrative officials and community leaders in order to
explain aim and objectives of the fieldwork and enlist respondents‘ support and cooperation. Gain
context sensitivity
5. Gain insight from previous research
6. The chosen research strategies and techniques must be closely matched to the research purpose (both
in policy and theoretical terms), to the type of research question and to the cultural context of the
region. Ability to respond to unforeseen circumstances and rapid changes in the research setting.
Creativity and flexibility are essential in devising a valid and viable combined strategy to meet these
challenges.
(Barakat et al., 2002:1001-1002).
Appendix 4.1: Social Cohesion Questionnaire
Hi, my name is _______________ and I‘m from the University of York in England. I am doing a Master‘s degree
program in post-war recovery studies and am here in Lebanon for ten days researching the effects of the 2006
conflict.
Can we ask you a few questions? And do you mind if we use the results in our reports?
1. What is your occupation?

2. How old are you?
3. Were you here during July 2006, when the bombing began?
4. During the war did you move to an area of a different religion?
5. Had you visited other regions of Lebanon before 2006?
6. Do you keep in contact with the people you stayed with?
7. Have you received financial assistance after the war? And from who?
8. Overall, do you think relations between villages are different now than they were before the war?
9. What contact do you have with members of other religious groups?
10. Have you or any member of your family or anyone you know of married into another sect?
11. Have you been a member of any group or organization?
Were the group members mixed gender?
Were the group member of mixed sects?
12. Did you vote in the last national election?
13. Why did you vote for the person that you did?
14. What are your feelings about the new unity government?
15. Anything you‘d like to add?
48
Appendix 4.2: Correlation between Assistance from Political Group and Sect
Appendix 4.3: Correlation between Personal Social Relations and Sect
49
Appendix 4.4: Correlation Between Intermarried Relatives and Sect
N.B. It should be noted that despite attempting to provide a representation of opinion across confessional divides, these
statistics are somewhat dependant on the low numbers of certain confessional groups encountered during field research,
such as Christians.
50
Appendix 5: Livelihoods Questionnaire
Note: The following was used as a guideline for semi-structured interviews. The focus was on qualitative data
collection rather than quantitative.
Livelihoods Questionnaire
1. How many people are in your household?
2. Are you employed?
If so, in what sector?
3. What was your employment status before the 2006 hostilities?
In what sector?
4. Did your motivation for going to work change after 2006?
5. Does the fear of future attacks prevent you doing certain jobs, or affect your work?
6. Do you have any children?
What do you hope your children will do in the future?
7. If you had the opportunity to move abroad to work, would you? If you have children would you want them
to work abroad?
8. Are you economically better off now than you were before the 2006 hostilities?
9. Did you get any assistance to help your business/get back into work since the war?
If so, who from?
10. To what extent does the infrastructure affect your business (e.g. electricity, roads, water)?
11. What are the biggest challenges to jobs in your community?
12. Do you see your job as viable in the short term as well as the long term i.e. is it sustainable?
13. Do you find that your cost of living is increasing?
14. Are you satisfied with your job? Given the opportunity would you change jobs?
15. Does anyone (i.e. the government) support you in terms of living costs, particularly if you are out of work
or working part time?
16. Would you sell your land for economic opportunity?
51

FIELD STUDY REPORT (Completed Version)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

FIELD STUDY REPORT (Completed Version)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

FIELD STUDY REPORT

An Evaluation of the Reconstruction in

Professor Sultan Barakat

PART I HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE .................................................................................................. 8

A. Lessons from the Field: ......................................................................................................................... 9

PART II SOCIAL COHESION ..................................................................................................................... 18

D. Analysis and Recommendations.......................................................................................................... 26

D3. Electoral reform............................................................................................................................................................... 27

PART III ECONOMIC LIVELIHOODS .......................................................................................................... 30

Credits & Disclaimer

Housing and Infrastructure Section

Research Team Leader: Michael Hands

Social Cohesion Section

Research Team Leader: Eileen Carlson

Economic Livelihoods Section

Research Team Leader: David Willey

Acronyms & Abbreviations

AUB American University of Beirut

Housing and Infrastructure

Tensions turned to violence culminating in a

agendas‖ (Barakat, 2008:4). Accordingly,

The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War

Locations visited during the field research

A. Qualitative Research Process

B. Techniques Utilised For Data Gathering

B1. Semi-Structured Interviews

B2. Focus Groups

B3. Unstructured Interviews

B4. Quantitative Techniques

B5. Research through Observation

C. Challenges in the Field: Conducting Research in a Conflict-Affected Context

Difficulties of access to information, research settings and

projection to other contexts or situations‘ (Sim (1998) cited in Robson, 2002:177).

HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE

A. Lessons from the Field:

―Reconstruction encompasses short-term relief and longer-term development. It extends far

A2. The Post-War Reconstruction Context

Total Number of Destroyed and Damaged Houses, UNDP Lebanon (2007b:40).

war reconstruction may largely be explained by ‗limited political allegiance,

Lebanon‘s strong civil society – or ‗civil societies‘ provided a strong coping

B2. The Centre-Periphery Conflict: A Story of Historical Neglect of the South

28 Mayor of Ayta al-Chaab.

reconstruction of historical houses, and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

B. Background theory of Social Cohesion

Sensitivity of the subject

Understanding of the subject matter

Measures of Effectiveness in Evaluating Social Cohesion

Politicization of communal society

Selective distribution of aid

Diagram 2: Responses to Questionnaire: ‗Do you think social cohesion has

C3. What do the governmental, non-governmental and inter-governmental institutions and

Figure 1 – Beirut Street Lights

Figure 2 – Nursery Poster

Figure 3 – Female Cooperative

42 From an internal newsletter of UNDP 2009b Success Stories.

D. Analysis and Recommendations

D2. Political Structure

43 Abo Khalil Hassan M (interviewed 11 December 2009.

D3. Electoral reform

―History is what unites people, without history we can't have unity.‖46

The research conducted by the economic livelihoods research team

B. Background: Economic Livelihoods in Lebanon

47 A map of Lebanon is attached as Appendix A.