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The impact of
Who is cooperative in political skill
negotiations? The impact of
political skill on cooperation,
reputation and outcomes 801
Kevin Tasa and Mehran Bahmani Received 20 November 2022
Revised 28 March 2023
Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto, Canada Accepted 27 April 2023

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to predict cooperation in negotiation through the lens of individual
differences. Specifically, this paper examines how a social competence variable called “political skill” relates to
cooperation and subsequent effects on negotiation process, outcomes and negotiator reputation. The authors
demonstrate how political skill fits in the evolving literature focusing on individual differences in negotiation
by comparing political skill to a wide range of other individual difference measures.
Design/methodology/approach – This study was conducted by assessing individual difference measures
at the beginning of graduate-level negotiation courses and tracking negotiation behaviors and outcomes over
several months. This approach was chosen to minimize the potential for short, time-limited interactions to mask
existing relationships. It also allowed the authors to include multiple negotiation interactions, which takes a
broader view of negotiation performance, and assess negotiator reputation by allowing it to emerge over time.
Findings – The results of this study show that political skill, self-rated at the beginning of this study, is
significantly related to a negotiator’s overall use of cooperative behavior as rated by peers. Political skill also
showed a significant relationship with reputation for cooperativeness and aggregate outcomes in
negotiations. These results control for other individual difference measures such as personality, implicit
negotiation beliefs, social value orientation and negotiation self-efficacy.
Originality/value – Using a method that allows the effects of an individual difference to materialize over
time, this study empirically establishes the connection between political skill and negotiation reputation,
process and outcomes. The methodological contributions of this study explore the relations between self-rated
individual difference variables, peer-rated cooperative behaviors and objective coded negotiation outcomes in
evaluating political skill in negotiation.
Keywords Political skill, Cooperation, Individual differences, Reputation, Negotiation
Paper type Research paper

Imagine you are about to negotiate with a business counterpart who you have never met
before. What do you do? Most likely you inquire with your colleagues about your
counterpart’s reputation. You ask what the person is like to deal with, including whether they
are cooperative, competitive, reasonable or tough. This common practice, known as
“reputation audit,” is used frequently by professional negotiations, like lawyers. The practice
assumes that professionals tend to behave similarly from one negotiation to another and
highlights how our past behavior can influence future interactions. Negotiators who believe
their counterpart to be more cooperative than competitive tend to share greater amounts of
information and reciprocate trusting behavior in negotiation (Tinsley et al., 2002). Therefore,
International Journal of Conflict
our negotiation interactions can be influenced by our past behaviors and in ways we cannot Management
fully predict. Research shows that a negotiator’s reputation is more strongly related to their Vol. 34 No. 4, 2023
pp. 801-817
past behavior when negotiators are socially connected, have more social ties and tend to be © Emerald Publishing Limited
1044-4068
more prominent and visible within a particular field (Anderson and Shirako, 2008). Given the DOI 10.1108/IJCMA-11-2022-0197
IJCMA importance of one’s reputation, can we predict why some individuals are more likely to
34,4 behave cooperatively than others?
We begin to answer this question through the lens of individual differences that link
social competence with behavior and outcomes in negotiations. We hypothesize that a
construct called political skill is influential in determining cooperative bargaining behavior,
which in turn predicts negotiator reputation and negotiation outcomes. Political skill refers to
802 “the ability to effectively understand others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence
others to act in ways that enhance one’s personal and/or organizational objectives” (Ferris
et al., 2005a, 2005b, p. 127). Individuals with higher levels of political skill are better able to
appear sincere, exert interpersonal influence, recognize the underlying motivations of others
and build personal connections that foster productive relationships (Ferris et al., 2005a,
2005b). We hypothesize that these skills make them more likely to engage in cooperative
behaviors that contribute to the emergence of a positive reputation and ultimately perform
better while negotiating. Next, we elaborate on how political skill should be associated with
cooperative behavior in negotiations by explaining the theoretical basis for the research and
the hypotheses that will be tested.

Theoretical framework
Political skill and negotiation
Negotiation is a specific interpersonal process of clarifying interests and priorities and
engaging in strategizing behaviors to reach a consensus agreement or an impasse leading to
pursuing other alternatives (Brett and Thompson, 2016). Because negotiators are
interdependently linked and often have limited information about their counterpart’s
interests and priorities, they face the perennial dilemma between bargaining cooperatively
or competitively. Lax and Sebenius (1986) described this enduring tension as the
“negotiator’s dilemma,” which represents the idea that attempts to aggressively push for
one’s own interests may backfire by lowering the chances that value is created between the
parties. Others have observed that negotiators may respond to this dilemma by using tactics
that can be categorized into competitive and cooperative types (Raiffa, 1982; Walton and
McKersie, 1965). While competitive behaviors, such as making ambitious requests, carefully
guarding information and being resolute, are often necessary to advance one’s interests, so
too are cooperative behaviors such as sharing information, active listening and flexibility in
trading-off issues (Lewicki, Saunders and Barry, 2011). The negotiator who masters the art
of balancing these somewhat contradictory behaviors stands to succeed in the long term,
both through enhanced reputation (Anderson and Shirako, 2008) and outcomes (Pruitt and
Rubin, 1986; Thompson, 1990).
The view that an individual difference construct like political skill can explain why
some individuals are more skilled at balancing the dilemma between cooperation and
competition runs counter to the historical perspective in the negotiation literature
(Elfenbein, 2021). Research on individual differences in negotiation stalled after several
studies concluded that further exploration could only lead to mixed findings (Rubin and
Brown, 1975; Thompson, 1990). While there has always been an intuitive appeal to the
use of individual differences as predictors of negotiation behaviors and outcomes, past
research has not been conclusive (Bazerman et al., 2000; Elfenbein, 2015; Sharma et al.,
2013; Thompson, 1990). Despite these cautions and mixed findings, researchers found
that characteristics shown to impact negotiation include cognitive ability (Fulmer and
Barry, 2004); personality traits (Sharma et al., 2018); motivational styles (De Dreu et al.,
2000); and expectations and beliefs such as self-efficacy (Sullivan et al., 2006); implicit
negotiation beliefs (Kray and Haselhuhn, 2017; Tasa and Bell, 2017); and cultural
intelligence (Imai and Gelfand, 2010). Overall, research has shown that, in certain The impact of
situations, focal individual difference variables are influential on negotiators’ behaviors political skill
and negotiation outcomes (Elfenbein, 2015; Sharma et al., 2013).
More recent reviews, including a meta-analysis by Sharma et al. (2013), conclude that
we should not abandon research on individual differences but rather reconsider and
change the way we study them in negotiation (Elfenbein, 2015). Notably, these authors
argue that the “strong situation” inherent in studies with single negotiation episodes
likely dampens the impact of individual difference variables. As a result, they 803
recommend studying individual differences over an extended duration of multiple
negotiations and examining individual differences that more closely align with
negotiation theory (Sharma et al., 2013, p. 321).
Before we can explain how political skill might affect negotiators and impact
negotiations, we must first explain the theoretical core of the political skill construct in
organizational studies. Ferris et al. (2005a, 2005b) theorized that politically skilled
individuals have an enhanced ability to effectively interpret others’ behaviors, appear to
interact genuinely, build relationships through networking and exert positive influence to
advance their own and/or their organization’s goals. The four sub-dimensions of political
skill are described as follows. Social astuteness refers to individuals who are very self-aware
and known to be adept in identifying interests and dealing with others. Interpersonal
influence is described as flexibility in adapting one’s behavior to each situation in a way that
evokes a positive response from others. Individuals high on networking ability ensure they
are connected to influential others and foster productive relationships. Finally, those high on
apparent sincerity appear to show a great degree of integrity and genuineness, as well as an
open and forthright nature, as perceived by targets of influence attempts. In combination,
these dimensions form a social competency construct that is strongly associated with a wide
range of positive organizational outcomes (Munyon et al., 2015).
Until recently, political skill was perceived to be associated with the dark side of human
behavior, evoking Machiavellian imagery. After all, it is hardly complementary to describe
someone as “playing politics.” In response to this concern, Treadway et al. (2014; p. 505)
stated: “[. . .] political activity is the dominant mode of organizational functioning and the
ability to effectively operate within the political arena is the most critical skill a leader can
possess.” A solid body of modern scholarship has demonstrated the favorable dynamics of
strong political skills in correlation with positive organizational performance. Leaders (and
negotiators) with high levels of political skill seem to accept the inherently political nature of
organizations and adjust their behavior accordingly. Prior research in organizational
settings supports this and points to several reasons why political skill can be a key predictor
of the degree to which negotiators are successful in managing social interactions. For
example, research has shown that political skills engender effective practice of influence
tactics and strategies and skillful networking, positioning and coalition building
(Kolodinsky et al., 2007). Those high on this construct inspire trust and confidence in others,
as well as promote credibility, and a positive reputation (Ammeter et al., 2004; Zinko et al.,
2007). Given the interdependent and interpersonal nature of bargaining, these factors should
be important in negotiations, and the research we report in this paper was designed to
elucidate the nature of the potential relationship between political skill and negotiation
reputation and outcomes.
Political skill is a unique and powerful constellation of qualities that are distinguishable
from the constructs that have been previously studied in the negotiation literature.
Personality traits like extraversion and agreeableness reflect general behavioral tendencies
across a wide range of situations. Similarly, measures like implicit negotiation beliefs and
IJCMA social value orientation reflect general observations about whether one’s ability is fixed
34,4 versus malleable and whether one strives for selfish or prosocial outcomes. Although each of
these variables can impact negotiation processes or outcomes, they differ from political skill
in an important way; political skill is a competency that is explicitly focused on one’s ability
to navigate complex social environments and exchanges. Assessments of political skill
contain an overt focus on managing and interacting with others. For example, we can
804 contrast political skill with another self-reported perception, negotiation self-efficacy.
Negotiation self-efficacy is a task-specific assessment of how well one can perform (e.g. “I
am confident that I can make each concession look difficult”), whereas political skill focuses
more precisely on our relationships with others (e.g. “I am able to communicate easily and
effectively with others” or “I try to show genuine interest in other people”) (Ferris et al.,
2005a, 2005b). In this study, we will test the impact of political skill on negotiation while
controlling for a wide range of other measures previously addressed in negotiation research.
One facet of political skill that makes it such a promising predictor of negotiator behavior
is the specific focus on understanding and influencing others. When people are considering
their level of political skill, they are guided to self-reflect on how they work with, influence
and are attuned to the needs of others. This twofold self- and other-focused perspective
aligns with negotiation theory because of the inherently interdependent nature of
negotiation activity. Theories such as the dual concerns model (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986), “the
relational self” (Gelfand et al., 2006) and the general negotiation theory proposed by Jang
et al. (2018), all observe that focusing on just one negotiator is insufficient to explain such a
complex and interconnected process. Because negotiation is a complex, multiparty and
possibly recursive process (Jang et al., 2018), individual difference variables that concentrate
exclusively on one’s own perspective fail to capture this relational aspect. We expect
political skill to align well with the relational side of negotiation because of its distinctive
focus on balancing the “self” with the “other.”
Finally, it is important to highlight that we designed our research to monitor the
emergence of political skill effects over time using multiple interactions with different
negotiation counterparts. This follows the advice of Sharma et al. (2013) noted above, who
criticized prior negotiation research which used short, one-shot interactions that potentially
reduces the impact of individual differences. In the case of political skill, it is a construct that
focuses on developing an understanding of others and using that information to adapt to
future interactions. As a result, the impact of political skill on negotiation behavior is likely
to be strongest when negotiators have opportunities to get to know one another. It is also
likely that political skill will be impactful when negotiators are given opportunities to speak
with others about their prior interactions with someone. In other words, political skill should
affect negotiator reputation and future interactions within a given field (i.e. Anderson and
Shirako, 2008).

Hypotheses
This research examines the relationship between political skill and negotiator behavior,
reputation and outcomes. Our first set of hypotheses consider whether political skill leads to
differences in negotiation behavior across a range of negotiation episodes. As noted
regarding the negotiator’s dilemma, the interdependence between parties and limited
information exposes negotiators to choices between acting cooperatively and acting
competitively (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). At the individual level, cooperation refers to an
orientation toward working with others to create mutually beneficial solutions (Kramer
et al., 1986; Masters-Waage et al., 2021). In negotiation, cooperative behaviors include openly
sharing information, active listening, attempting to uncover the interests of negotiation
counterparts and trading-off issues. These behaviors are more likely to be used when a The impact of
negotiator is willing to trust and be trustworthy to achieve better joint integrative outcomes political skill
(Brett and Thompson, 2016). Although political skill has not, to our knowledge, been
associated with cooperation, empirical findings in situations other than negotiation have
shown political skill to be positively related to coalition building (Kolodinsky et al., 2007),
ratings of apparent sincerity (Ferris et al., 2007) and ratings of trustworthiness (Ammeter
et al., 2004). The theoretical elements underlying political skill theory point to a general 805
orientation toward healthy professional relationships. For example, individuals with high
social astuteness, apparent sincerity and networking ability will see added value in
behaviors that reinforce healthy relationships and positive impressions. Therefore, they can
be expected to adopt a more cooperative orientation and use more cooperative behaviors
than negotiators with lower levels of political skill.
In contrast to cooperation, competition refers to a general orientation toward the
attainment of self-focused goals. Negotiators use competitive, or distributive, tactics to
achieve unilateral concessions from the other party (Pruitt, 1983) and to maximally claim
resources in one’s favor (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). While it might seem natural to
hypothesize that political skill would also be associated with less competitive behavior,
there are theoretical reasons why this might not be the case. Lax and Sebenius (1986)
observed that “value that gets created must also be claimed,” which highlights the notion
that negotiators should first attempt to create value, likely through cooperative behavior,
and then attempt to claim a sufficient amount of that created value, likely using more
competitive tactics. This tension between creating value and claiming value points to the
conclusion that competitive behaviors, such as making ambitious requests and carefully
guarding information, are sometimes necessary to advance one’s interests. A negotiator who
is only focused on using cooperative behavior might find themselves unable to claim enough
of the overall value.
As Ferris and colleagues have noted (2007), politically skilled individuals are able to use
influence tactics effectively while also appearing genuine and sincere when doing so. As a
result, a negotiator with superior skills in terms of social astuteness and apparent sincerity
is unlikely to conclude that excessive levels of competitive behavior are appropriate because
of their tendency to focus on building healthy relationships. Although this seems to suggest
a negative relationship between political skill and competitive behavior, the occasional need
to use competitive behavior discussed above might also suggest the opposite. Therefore, we
expect the relationship between political skill and ratings of competitive behavior by
counterparts will be neither positive nor negative and instead be equivocal. This leads to our
first pair of hypotheses:

H1a. Individuals with higher levels of political skill show higher levels of cooperative
behavior, controlling for personality traits and negotiation-specific attitudes.
H1b. Individuals with higher levels of political skill have no differences in competitive
behavior, controlling for personality traits and negotiation-specific attitudes.
These first two hypotheses focus on actual behaviors that will be assessed by negotiation
counterparts. We also expect that political skill will impact the reputations negotiators
develop after numerous interactions with peers in a particular field. Reputation is defined as
a “set of judgments a community makes about the personal qualities of one of its members”
(Emler, 1990, p. 171). Anderson and Shirako (2008) developed a functionalist perspective on
negotiator reputation and found that individuals’ reputations are linked to their history of
IJCMA behavior in interpersonal settings. They drew a distinction between reputation for
34,4 cooperativeness and reputation for selfishness.
Past research on political skill has shown that individuals high on political skill are also
reported to have more positive reputations (Munyon et al., 2015). However, these findings
are based on research in organizational settings using general measures of reputation that
do not differentiate between cooperative and selfish aspects. These studies were also
806 conducted in settings other than negotiation, so the degree to which they align with the
negotiation literature needs to be verified. As noted earlier, those negotiators who have high
levels of political skill practice influence tactics and strategies more effectively and are
better in networking, positioning and coalition building (Kolodinsky et al., 2007), which
leads to having other people trust them more (Ammeter et al., 2004; Zinko et al., 2007). Thus,
the behavioral differences between people with high and low political skill should relate to
reputation via their impact on trustworthy and cooperative behaviors.
On the other hand, a reputation for selfishness arises when an individual shows more
aggressive and ruthless behavior and subsequently generates a lower level of perceived
trustworthiness (Anderson and Shirako, 2008). Although politically skilled individuals are
known to have greater success when using influence attempts, they also are seen to have
high levels of apparent sincerity and integrity (Ferris et al., 2005a, 2005b). Therefore, we
expect that negotiators who have high levels of political skill will not generate detectable
differences in their reputation for selfishness. In other words, politically skilled negotiators
are not likely to be perceived as people who push their own interests to the point where
others’ interests are secondary. This leads to our second pair of hypotheses:

H2a. Individuals with higher levels of political skill have higher levels of reputation for
cooperation, controlling for personality traits and negotiation-specific attitudes.
H2b. Individuals with higher levels of political skill have no differences in reputation for
selfishness, controlling for personality traits and negotiation-specific attitudes.
Will political skill also predict the outcomes a negotiator achieves? We would not expect to
find differences in relatively short negotiation interactions between strangers. This is
because political skill is a type of social competence that is most impactful when people have
had opportunities to receive cues from the environment and learn about their peers and
counterparts. A meta-analysis by Munyon et al. (2015) found that the relationship between
political skill and general task performance was significant and positive. Most of the studies
they analyzed temporally separated ratings of political skill and task performance over
weeks and months, which gave participants sufficient time to better understand their
working environment and adapt their behavior accordingly.
Political skill is about competence in building relationships, developing understanding of
the motivations of others and choosing strategies to advance one’s interests while coming
across as genuine (Ferris et al., 2005a, 2005b). If the cooperative orientation we hypothesized
earlier holds true, then negotiators with higher political skill will use more integrative (or
cooperative) behaviors. Specifically, they are more likely to show greater concern for a
counterpart’s interests, try to uncover those interests, share relevant information or data,
listen with an open mind and ask questions about priorities (Weingart et al., 1996). These
types of behaviors are the foundation of value creation in negotiation (Lewicki et al., 2011)
and serve to increase the probability that negotiators will discover integrative potential. We
posit that the benefits arising from cooperative behavior make it more likely that a
negotiator with high political skill will successfully create value in their negotiations.
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
 H2c. Individuals with higher levels of political skill achieve higher levels of cumulative The impact of
negotiated outcomes, controlling for personality traits and negotiation-specific political skill
attitudes.
Finally, we propose that cooperative behavior is the primary mechanism that connects
political skill with both reputation and outcomes. Negotiators who behave more
cooperatively will be seen to engage in conduct like sharing information, active listening and
trading-off issues (Weingart, Hyder and Prietula, 1996). In negotiations, these types of 807
behaviors are associated with value creation, and as such, they increase the chance that
negotiated outcomes are favorable. Similarly, being observed using those behaviors is also
associated with a reputation for cooperativeness (Anderson and Shirako, 2008). Therefore,
we expect that political skill is associated with a reputation for cooperativeness and
negotiation outcomes through the mediator of cooperative behavior:

H3. The relationship between (a) political skill and reputation for cooperation and (b)
political skill and negotiation outcomes is mediated by cooperative behavior.

Method
Sample and procedure
Participants in this study were 126 MBA students enrolled in a 12-week negotiation course
at a North American business school. The class was divided into three sections of
approximately equal size and was taught by the same instructor from a common course
outline. The average age of the participants was 28.6, the average years of full-time work
experience before enrolling in the MBA program was 5.4 and 37% of the sample were
female.
Data were collected throughout the semester using self-report and peer-rated measures.
During week 1 of the semester, each student completed an online self-assessment survey
containing the political skill measure and the individual difference measures that serve as
the control variables. The course included activities such as one-on-one negotiations, team
versus team negotiations, student presentations and guest speakers. To ensure that we were
capturing results attributable to individuals, rather than teams, we collected data from the
five one-on-one negotiated simulations which occurred throughout the semester. The
negotiation exercises are all published by the Dispute Resolution Research Center and
focused on different topics, including the potential sale of a manufacturing facility, the
potential sale of a gas station, which has integrative potential, a multi-issue job offer
negotiation, a licensing arrangement for a syndicated television program and a dispute
between a condo developer and a contractor.
These negotiations took place during scheduled class time in private breakout rooms at
weeks 2, 3, 4, 7 and 10. Immediately after each simulation participants were given a link to a
peer rating survey in which they assessed their counterpart on a range of behavioral
measures. Completion of all surveys was rewarded by the instructor in the form of class
participation marks, and there was no missing data.
The measures of negotiator reputation, described in detail below, were assessed during
the final class of the semester. Negotiation outcomes were assessed by coding the results
from each of the five negotiations. A notable and important aspect of the research is that we
control for the effects of several individual difference measures that negotiation scholars
have studied previously (e.g. Big-5 personality traits, implicit negotiation beliefs and social
value orientation). By doing so, we are able to establish the unique predictive impact of
political skill over a wide range of potential other predictors.
IJCMA Measures
34,4 Political skill. The Political Skill Inventory (Ferris et al., 2005a, 2005b) is an 18-item scale
created to assess the four sub-dimensions described above. Sample items include: “It is easy
for me to develop good rapport with most people.” (Networking Ability); “I am able to make
most people comfortable and at ease around me.” (Interpersonal Influence); “I am
particularly good as sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.” (Social
808 Astuteness); and “It is important that people believe I am sincere in what I say and do.”
(Apparent Sincerity). Each item was assessed using a five-point “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree” rating scale. The coefficient alpha and omega scores for the political skill
measure were 0.81 and 0.80, respectively.
Negotiation self-efficacy. The eight-item negotiation self-efficacy scale (Sullivan et al.,
2006) was used to measure two dimensions: distributive and integrative self-efficacy.
Participants assess their level of confidence about using various distributive “gain the upper
hand against the other negotiator” and integrative “find tradeoffs that benefit both parties”
negotiation tactics on a five-point “not at all confident” to “extremely confident” rating scale.
The coefficient alpha/omega scores for distributive self-efficacy were 0.80 and 0.80, while the
scores for integrative self-efficacy were 0.72 and 0.70.
Implicit negotiation beliefs were assessed with a seven-item scale created by Kray and
Haselhuhn (2007). A sample item is “All people can change even their most basic negotiation
qualities,” and scale scores could range from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). The
coefficient alpha and omega scores for the scale were 0.84 and 0.85, and to ease
interpretability, we coded the scale so that higher scores reflected an incremental (versus
fixed) learning goal orientation.
Social value orientation was measured using the Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) resource
allocation task, where participants respond to a series of nine resource allocation choices
between themselves and another person, referred to simply as “the other.” Past research has
used the resource allocation task to categorize participants into prosocial and individualistic
categories (De Dreu and Boles, 1998). We coded the results so that a higher score indicated a
more prosocial orientation and lower scores represented individualistic orientations.
Personality traits. The Big-5 personality traits were assessed with the 20-item short form
version of Goldberg’s (1999) International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) Big Five scale. Using
a five-point Likert scale (from “very inaccurate” to “very accurate”), respondents indicated
the extent to which each item accurately described themselves. Five personality dimensions
include conscientiousness (alpha/omega = 0.68 and 0.70), agreeableness (alpha/omega =
0.71 and 0.73), extraversion (alpha/omega = 0.81 and 0.81), openness to experience (alpha/
omega = 0.72 and 0.75) and emotional stability (alpha/omega = 0.72 and 0.74).
Competitive and cooperative behavior. Peer-rated behavior was assessed using short
online surveys beginning with the statement, “In the negotiation, my counterpart [. . .]” Four
items focused on competitive behaviors and five items focused on cooperative behavior. The
four competitive items were: Issued warnings or used threats, Appeared forceful and
assertive, Made strong arguments against my position and Held firm on offers or positions.
The five cooperative items were: Showed concern for my perspective, Asked questions to
understand my interests, Was willing to share relevant information or data, Listened with
an open mind and Tried to discover and share both of our interests. The items were derived
from a coding scheme developed by Weingart et al. (1996) to code the behavioral
demonstration of distributive and integrative negotiation categories. An exploratory factor
analysis revealed a clear two-factor structure in which the competitive (i.e. held firm on
offers or positions) items formed one factor and the cooperative items (i.e. asked questions to
understand my interests) formed another. Therefore, we created a four-item Competitive
Behavior scale and a five-item Cooperative Behavior scale. The average alphas and omegas The impact of
were 0.82 and 0.85 for the competitive behavior scale and 0.85 and 0.86 for the cooperative political skill
behavior scale.
Negotiation reputation. In their study of negotiator reputation, Anderson and Shirako
(2008) assessed reputation for cooperativeness and reputation for selfishness. They asked
MBA students to nominate their classmates according to these two dimensions by
providing two descriptive statements for each type of reputation: specifically, cooperative
reputations were assessed by “who were the most trustworthy negotiators in the class?” and 809
“who were the most gentle-hearted and sympathetic negotiators?”, and selfish reputations
were assessed by “who are the most aggressive negotiators?” and “who are the most likely
to stretch ethical boundaries?” In our study, we listed these statements as examples of
cooperative and selfish reputations, gave each student in the class a list of their negotiation
counterparts throughout the semester and asked them to rate each of their counterparts.
They rated whether each person’s negotiation reputation corresponded to each type using a
six-point “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” rating scale. An individual’s reputation
score for cooperativeness and selfishness was created by taking the average of all the peer-
rated scores.
As suggested by Bliese (2000), intra-class correlations (ICC) inform the suitability of the
scores for mean aggregation. The ICC(1) coefficient represents the degree of variability in
responses at the individual level, and the ICC(2) coefficient represents the reliability of the
aggregated means. The ICC(1) and ICC(2) scores were 0.22 and 0.78 for the reputation for
cooperation scale and 0.25 and 0.87 for the reputation for selfishness scale. These results
indicate that there was sufficient agreement among peers on both aggregated ratings.
Negotiation outcomes. The Anderson and Shirako (2008) paper included a detailed
Appendix describing the procedures they used to code each negotiation exercise according
to integrative and distributive outcomes. Because we used the same negotiation simulations,
we followed those same coding procedures, focusing specifically on integrative criteria. Our
measure of negotiation outcomes does not include results for the first negotiation exercise
because it was a zero-sum, single-issue negotiation with no integrative potential. An
aggregate score of integrative outcomes was created by standardizing each participant’s
integrative score in each negotiation and then averaging those standardized scores. Higher
scores represent having achieved more integrative outcomes across the entire range of
exercises.

Results
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are presented in Table 1. Results show that
political skill is significantly correlated with several variables, including cooperative
behavior, reputation for cooperation and the negotiation outcome score.
We used two-step regression to test the degree to which political skill was related to
cooperative and competitive behavior. In step 1, we entered each of the individual difference
control variables, and in step 2, we entered political skill. Results are shown in Table 2. For
cooperative behavior, the step 1 analysis including the control variables was non-significant
(R2 = 0.10, F = 1.23 and p = 0.35). However, the addition of political skill produced a
significant increase in R-square (R2 = 0.14, F = 5.24 and p = 0.02). For competitive behavior,
the step 1 analysis was also non-significant (R2 = 0.12, F = 1.46 and p = 0.16). In contrast, the
incremental addition of political skill did not produce a significant effect (R2 = 0.12, F = 0.84
and p = 0.22). These results support H1a and H1b.
We used a similar type of analysis to test the predictability of political skill on reputation
for cooperation, reputation for selfishness and negotiation outcomes. The summary of these
 34,4

810
IJCMA

Table 1.

and correlations
Descriptive statistics
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

1. Political skill 3.82 0.52 –

2. Integrative self-efficacy 3.28 0.63 0.32** –
3. Distributive self-efficacy 2.63 0.70 0.24** 0.45** –
4. Implicit negotiation beliefs 3.82 0.83 0.27** 0.24** 0.03 –
5. Social value orientation 1.46 0.50 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.15 –
6. Extraversion 3.12 0.98 0.49** 0.10 0.18* 0.29** 0.02 –
7. Agreeableness 3.92 0.62 0.28** 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.21* –
8. Conscientiousness 3.68 0.75 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.09 –
9. Emotional stability 2.75 0.78 0.21* 0.16 0.26** 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.21* 0.06 –
10. Openness to experience 3.76 0.77 0.35** 0.07 0.12 0.22* 0.15 0.43** 0.24** 0.18* 0.19* –
11. Cooperative behavior 4.53 0.67 0.25** 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.20* 0.02 0.07 0.16 –
12. Competitive behavior 3.54 0.73 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.53** –
13. Reputation for cooperation 5.34 0.72 0.28** 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.20* 0.04 0.06 0.34** 0.16 –
14. Reputation for selfishness 4.52 1.02 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.06 –
15. Negotiation outcome 0.00 1.00 0.20* 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.21* 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.39** 0.02 0.30** 0.08 –
16. Gender 1.63 0.48 0.05 0.21* 0.35** 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.24** 0.02 0.09 0.06

Notes: N = 126. Gender is coded 1 = female and 2 = male; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ own work
 Cooperative behavior Competitive behavior
The impact of
Dependent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 political skill
Control
Integrative self-efficacy 0.19 0.24* 0.09 0.10
Distributive self-efficacy 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06
Implicit negotiation beliefs 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.18
Social value orientation 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.05 811
Extraversion 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.04
Agreeableness 0.19 0.11 0.02 0.01
Conscientiousness 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.12
Emotional stability 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07
Openness to experience 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.05
Gender 0.03 0.02 0.21* 0.20
Independent Table 2.
Political skill 0.28* 0.04 Regression analyses
R2 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.12
of associations
DR2 0.04* 0.01
between political
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown. Gender is coded 1 = female and 2 = male; *p < 0.05 skill and negotiation
Source: Authors’ own work behaviors

analyses can be seen in Table 3. For the dependent variable of reputation for cooperation, all
individual difference measures except political skill were included in step 1. The results
showed non-significance (R2 = 0.08, F = 0.95 and p = 0.49) for the overall model but a
significant relationship between conscientiousness and cooperative reputation. However,
after adding political skill in step 2, there was a statistically significant increase in R-square

Reputation for Reputation for Negotiation

cooperativeness selfishness outcomes
Dependent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2

Control
Integrative self-efficacy 0.09 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.03
Distributive self-efficacy 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.19
Implicit negotiation beliefs 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.04 0.01
Social value orientation 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02
Extraversion 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02
Agreeableness 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.21* 0.15
Conscientiousness 0.21* 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.01
Emotional stability 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04
Openness to experience 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.16
Gender 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.18
Independent Table 3.
Political skill 0.30* 0.06 0.26* Regression analyses
R2 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09
of associations
DR2 0.05* 0.00 0.12*
between political
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients are shown. Gender is coded 1 = female and 2 = male; *p < 0.05 skill, reputations and
Source: Authors’ own work negotiation outcomes
IJCMA (R2 = 0.13, F = 5.87 and p = 0.02), with political skill emerging as the only significant
34,4 predictor.
For the dependent variable of reputation for selfishness, none of the independent
variables were significantly related (R2 = 0.06, F = 0.65 and p = 0.76). After adding
political skill in step 2, there was no change in R-square (R2 = 0.06, F = 0.61 and
p = 0.82).
812 For the dependent variable of negotiation outcomes, the step 1 analysis showed that the
individual difference measure of agreeableness was significantly related to outcomes, but
the overall model was not significant (R2 = 0.09, F = 1.02 and p = 0.43). The addition of
political skill in the second step produced an R-square change of 0.04, and the overall model
now became statistically significant (R2 = 0.12, F = 4.18 and p = 0.04). These results support
H2a, H2b and H2c.
Finally, we test the hypothesis that political skill relates to reputation for cooperation and
negotiation outcomes through the mediator of cooperative behavior. We used the PROCESS
macro created by Hayes (Model 4: Hayes, 2013). Our first test examines the relationship
between political skill and reputation for cooperativeness through the mediator of
cooperative behavior. The results of the mediation test indicate that, while the total effect
model between political skill and reputation for cooperation was significant (total effect =
0.39, SE = 0.12 and CI = 0.154–0.639), the relation is mediated by cooperative behavior
(indirect effect = 0.115, SE = 0.05 and 95% CI = 0.030–0.239). Therefore, although political
skill relates to reputation for cooperativeness, cooperative behavior mediates this
relationship.
Our second mediation test replicates the first, except the dependent variable is
negotiation outcomes. Similar to the regression results testing H2c, the total effect model
between political skill and negotiation outcomes was statistically significant (total effect =
0.38, SE = 0.17 and CI = 0.049–0.716). The indirect model was also statistically significant
(indirect effect = 0.18, SE = 0.10 and 95% CI = 0.030–0.410), indicating that the relationship
between political skill and negotiation outcomes is also indirect through the mediator of
cooperative behavior.

Discussion
Returning to the scenario where you are about to negotiate with a new counterpart, it
appears that the “reputation audit” for your new counterpart will show them to be
cooperative and easy to connect with if they have high levels of political skill. Our research
shows that negotiators with higher levels of political skill are not the ones who adhere to a
competitive and selfish style of negotiation. In fact, they were the ones who behaved more
collaboratively over multiple negotiations and developed a reputation for cooperation.
Although we found evidence that political skill was directly related to negotiation outcomes,
we uncovered strong evidence for an indirect mediation path through cooperative behavior.
This suggests that politically skilled negotiators act more cooperatively, and this pattern of
cooperative behavior helps them achieve superior negotiation outcomes when viewed
cumulatively. Overall, the results of this study have a number of significant theoretical and
practical implications.
First, these results lend credence to claims that individual differences present import
and relevance to negotiation research and practice (Elfenbein et al., 2008; Elfenbein, 2015).
The findings also support our assertion that political skill could be one of the most
promising predictors in situations where negotiation behaviors are visible to others,
negotiators are operating in a particular field where reputations can emerge and when
negotiations occur more than once. It is noteworthy that under these circumstances,
political skill was the strongest predictor of cooperation and reputation while controlling The impact of
for a diverse set of previously studied variables. Those control variables were chosen political skill
specifically because prior studies have shown them to be predictive of negotiation
outcomes in some situations.
A critical difference between political skill and the other variables relates to the
nature of political skill itself, which focuses specifically on one’s ability to influence
others, establish positive relationships and adapt one’s behavior to succeed in complex
interpersonal environments (Ferris et al., 2007; Munyon et al., 2015). Accordingly, the 813
comparative explanatory and predictive success we see in political skill over other
variables can inform future efforts for finding and testing the impact of individual
difference constructs in negotiations. Such constructs should be focused on the task of
negotiation, from competitive behaviors like making positional arguments to
cooperative behaviors such as information sharing. These suggestions are also
consistent with suggestions for moving beyond the extensively studied higher-level
traits (e.g. the Big Five) to mapping granular-level traits (e.g. assertiveness instead of
extraversion). This is especially true if those granular-level traits are more aligned to
the relational nature of negotiation processes (Elfenbein, 2021) and can consistently
predict negotiation behaviors (Elfenbein et al., 2022). We also recommend that scholars
move beyond the negotiation behaviors that occur during the bargaining phase toward
predictors of the planning and deal implementation phases (Jang et al., 2018). For
example, we may find that political skill is also a predictor of whether negotiated
outcomes are successfully implemented but not related to a successful planning
process.
Second, what differentiates this study from many negotiation studies examining
individual differences is the extended methodology. This study took up the challenge of
Sharma et al. (2013) to examine multiple negotiations with outcomes aggregated across
those interactions, peer ratings of negotiation behavior and measures of negotiator
reputation captured several months after the assessment of the individual differences. These
methodological factors created a context that more closely mirrors those found in
professional fields. When negotiation behavior is examined over multiple interactions and in
situations where actors can discuss their prior interactions with others, political skill can
impact future perceptions and interactions.
Third, this study also contributes to the political skill literature by expanding the
domains in which political skill operates. In the recent meta-analysis and review of the
literature, Munyon et al. (2015, p. 172) observed that there has been “no study to date
evaluating political skill’s operation in a negotiation or conflict resolution context.” Our
research directly leverages how political skill can impact negotiation reputation and
outcomes, and the broader literature on political skill, by showing the relationships with:
political skill’s effects on situational responses and political skill’s effects on evaluations
by others. We found that political skill is a significant predictor of cooperative behaviors
in negotiation situations in which there is potential for integrative joint gains. However,
it remains to be seen whether similar relationships hold in the context of conflict
resolution, as opposed to a bargaining exchange. Further research is required to
determine whether politically skilled individuals have an advantage when faced with a
conflictual situation.
While some may question the generalizability of research using a sample of university
students, it is noteworthy that the MBA students in the study had several years of work
experience on average and were drawing upon behaviors they likely used in past
professional settings. It is also notable that the extended timeframe of the research
IJCMA provided an opportunity for negotiation reputations to emerge within the overall
34,4 population. As well, the course instructor did not include personal identifiers when they
posted details about negotiation outcomes in class. This means that reputation
emergence was based on more ambiguous information shared between students, both
inside and outside of class time. Thus, we believe these results to generalize reasonably
well to professional environments or fields where negotiations occur repeatedly, where
814 performance information is vague and where a negotiator’s counterparts discuss their
observations of past behavior.
While our results support the conclusion that political skill is related to cooperative
behavior and a cooperative reputation, we recognize that the unit and level of analysis in the
study were limited to the individual. We foresee numerous avenues for future research on
political skill in negotiation and conflict resolution settings, such as whether the positive
impact of political skill is applicable in negotiation teams. It is possible that negotiation
teams with higher levels of political skill, on average, will accrue the same benefits
associated with cooperative behavior. However, it remains to be seen whether this is true
and how political skill manifests in teams.
We also see great potential for research on the relationship between political skill,
reputation and behavior in conflicts. The participants in our study with higher political skill
gained a more cooperative reputation over time. Does a reputation for cooperation mitigate
the degree to which a counterpart in a conflict perceives the conflict to be deleterious,
promotes willingness to listen to someone else’s perspective and openness to compromise?
Similarly, does political skill impact the how parties frame their disputes (i.e. as gains versus
losses) and how they communicate as they work to resolve conflict? More research is clearly
warranted on these important questions.
Finally, the practical implications of political skill for negotiation appear significant.
For example, in situations where future relationships with a counterpart are important,
political skill should be a factor in determining who represents an organization in
negotiations. Also, in contrast to individual difference variables that are assumed to be
static, political skill is a learnable competency (Munyon et al., 2015). Each of the four
sub-dimensions of political skill can be a target of focus for practitioners in designing
and implementing negotiation training programs. For example, political skill can be
improved through training efforts which target networking ability, influence
effectiveness or one’s ability to adapt their behavior in accordance with changes in
situations. Because political skill is a social competence, rather than a fixed attitude,
belief or trait, it holds promise as a teachable construct that can help negotiators achieve
better individual and joint gains in their bargaining efforts. Future research is needed to
determine whether training efforts should target specific political skill sub-dimensions or
the construct as a whole. At this juncture, we can say strong political skill can enhance
your reputation as a cooperative negotiator.

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Further reading 817

Curhan, J.R. and Pentland, A. (2007), “Thin slices of negotiation: predicting outcomes from
conversational dynamics within the first 5 minutes”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 92 No. 3,
pp. 802-811.

Corresponding author
Kevin Tasa can be contacted at: ktasa@schulich.yorku.ca

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