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    = > - sophical possibilities of Pythagoreanism, chat isto say, the postulation cof @ mathematical model for the universe. Mathematics seems to have been a discipline rmuch worked on in the Academy, and the insights derhed fom his (sop by che reveches of wc colleagues as joxus, Menaechmus and Theaeretus) drove Plato progressively to jefe Petal cio Ha mcted a wegvmsotien inrctves pair of opposed frst principles, and a triple division of levels of Being, ‘which latter doctrine gave a vital central and mediating role to the Soul, hota World Soul and individual soul. Reflections of these basic doctrines can be seen in such macure dialogues as the Republic, Philebes, Tinee and Laws, but they could not be deduced from the dialogues alone. As First Principles he established The One and the Indefinite Dyad (Ax. Met. 16, 987a29f.), in this, as in many other respects, developing the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. The One is an active principle, imposing ‘limit’ eras) on the formlessness (opeiro) of the opposite principle. The Dyad is regarded as a duality (also termed by him ‘the great-and-small’) as being infinitely extensible or divisible, being simultaneously infinitely large and infinitely small. The influence of the Dyad is to be seen all through Nature in the phenomena of con- tinuous magnitudes, excess and defect in which has continually to be checked by the imposition of the correct measure. This process hasan ethical aspect as well, since the virtues are to be seen as correct measures means’) between extremes of excess and deficiency on a continuum. ‘That such a theory of virtue was not distinctive to Aristotle is shown by such a passage as Pelitcus 2846-2858, where the all-pervasiveness of measure is asserted, with a probable reference to the Pythagoreans 4s originators of this concept.t ‘The Unlimived Dyad is primarily the basic unli redness or een pl at tna oeittanvecrmn ist nasi 4 The Old Academy and the Themes of Middle Platonism cothemess’ on which The One acts, but itis also the irrational aspect of the Soul, and again the substrate of the physical world, the Recep- tacle of the Timacus. ‘By acting upon the Dyad, ‘limiting’ it, The One generates the Idea Numbers. At this point, however, the evidence becomes confused, mainly because Aristotle, in his always tendentious testimony, assumes that his readers, of hearers, know what he is referring to. We unforta- nately do not have this knowledge. Tt seems that Plato came finally to view the Ideas as numbers, or mathematical entities of some sort. A special importance is attached by him, as it was by the Pythagoreans, to the ‘primal nurmbers’, one, two, three, and four, and their sum-rotal, ten (the Decad). The first four numbers seem to be in some way in- herent in The One, and come to actuality in the process of the initial Fimitation of the Dyad. In Mer. xin 7, Aristotle seems to deseribe a process whereby the primal numbers are generated by, firs, the Dyad producing the number Two, by doubling the One, and then producing the other numbers by adding to Two and to each successive num! cither the One or itself, But the whole process remains obscure, as haps it was in Plato's own mind. PeFrom this action of the primal numbers upon the Dyad, and its reaction on them, all other Idea-Numbers are generated. This seems the most reasonable explanation, apart from emendation, that can be derived from the important passage of Ar. Mer. 1 6, which has been mentioned above: other principle a Dyad, because [ofthe fact that] the numbers, a nce medio thy astro (api from a mould (ckmageion, the word used for the Receptacle by Plato at Tim. 500). ‘These numbers, then, are what the Platonic Teas have become, How many of them are there? The numbers up to ten certainly holdsomesort of distinctively basic position, but the multiplicity of physical pheno- ‘mena requires that the basic numbers combine with each other in some ‘way to produce compound numbers which can stand 2s the formulae for physical phenomena, We must not neglect, however, a bother- some passage, Met, x11 8, where Aristotle seems 10 be saying that Plato took ony the numbers up rower constituting he Tes. He's ably here being deliberately obtuse, for polemical reasons, tubing Shae tte thatthe Dead copied the sum of Number vith his doctrine that the Ideas were Numbers. Obviously the mum- Plato: The Unwricten Doctrines t bers of the Decad must generate all other numbers, and there is cer- tainly a hierarchy among the Ideas, but Aristorle’s account is not like y to do justice to the full complexity of Plato’s position. That he is being less than fair here is indicated by the contradictory nature of his other references to the same issue, Mer. xm 8 (zo73ar44%.), where it is admitted to be uncertain whether the number of the Ideas is ten o more than ten, and xit 3 (1070418) where we find the statement that ‘Plato said that there are as many Idcas as there are natural beings’. Theophrastus indeed, in his Mesapkysics (6b xf.) seems to envisage a hierarchical arrangement when he speaks of Plato ‘making all other things dependent on the Ideas, and these on Numbers, and proceeding, from Numbers to the first principles’. Here a distinction is actually made between Ideas and Numbers, but I think we may take the Nun bers in question here as the Decad, the Ideas being those secondary ‘combinations dependent on them. Within the Decad, the first four numbers (the Tetraktys) came 10 play a major part in Plato's cosmology, as they did in those of Fis suczessors. They are the principles providing the link berween the absolute unity of the One and the three-dimensional physical muli= plicity around us. These four also have a geometrical aspect, though how that is linked to their essential nature is not clear in Plato (in Speusippus, we shall see, the geometrical are a separate level of Being). At any rate, One is also the point, Two the line, Three the plane, and Four the solid (the last rwo being triangle and pyramid respectively). ‘We have Aristotle's testimony (.Met.r 9, 992azcff.) that Plato refused to analyse che Line into points, but postulated rather ‘indivisible line. ‘There has been much dispute a8 to where these ft into his metaphysical scheme, but it would seem reasonable, if Plato is going to have ia- divisible lines, for him to have indivisible triangles and pyramids as ‘well, though we have no evidence of these. It may be only in the Soul thac the four basic numbers assume their geometrical aspect; at any rate the composition of the Soul in the Timaeus is intimately bound up with the doctrine of the Four Dimensions, and the relations of pr>- Portion between them, From the Soul the four dimensions are pr>= jected upon Matter, in the form of combinations of basic tiangles, to form the four elements, Fire, Air, Water and Earth. Thus an uncom- romisingly mathematical model of the universe is laid down, which drew powerful criticism from Aristotle, eg. in De Caelo ut 1. ‘The doctrine of Soul is a central, but very difficult feature of Platc’s system. Once again, the dialogues, particularly the Zimaeus, only hap 6 The Old Academy and she Themes of Middle Platonism ‘us when taken along, with what we can unravel from secondary we wren Aristotle, for instance, is quite emphatic (Met. x 6and xttt 6) rareto, besides the Ideas, postulated the existence of what he called sone Remmeal, or ‘objects of mathematics’. ‘These are distinguished ‘pean te Ideas by having ‘many the same’ and being combinable with ror other (dhe ideas being each one of a kind and ‘non-combinable! (cpbléw)), and from physical objets by being etemal and imma- (corr From other evidence it becomes clear that these mathematicls sca mooted with the Soul, The most natural conclusion is tht che Sec uhich lao is alleged by Aristotle (De dit 4, 429827) ro have Seooibed as the ‘place’ (topes) of the Ideas receives the Ideas into SST and somehow transforms chem into mathematicals, then pro- jecting them upon Matter to form the physical world, ‘When we speak of the Soul here, the reference is to the cosmic entity, the World Soul, the construction of which is described in Times soa, but which otherwise only appears in Book X of Te sia OF ibis caity the human sou! is a microcosm. In its role a aaor between the intelligible and physical realms, itis composed aspects which reflect both whatis ‘above! and what is “below It fs properly atthe level of soul tha he four primal numbers ks on the takcct of Point, Line, Plane and Solid. Ariscotl ells us (Pe Ata, qoibr6E.) that Plao coasted the Soul out of these four entities, ta made te equation between them and the four modes of cognitions same Knowledge (naw), Discursive Knowledge (epistiné), Opinion (dexa) 2nd Sense-Perception (aisthési). This fourfold een gooms 0 be allided to at Lews X (pa), and something like ftis being used in the Line Simile of Republi vi where what my be its being Machemateals appear at the second level (there termed Jenni, so that this echerne may have been already in Plato's mind st Ghat stage.t Phinly the Soul ie designed as che supreme mediating nity, receiving influences from the intelligible sealm and passing Shem on, in modifed form—thatis ro say, ‘extended’ and ‘diversified’ to ring about the eration of the sensible realm. This isthe proces described, with many mythological flourishes (of which the Demi- urge is the chief one), in the Timacus. Fe principal problems lft by the Timzeus, problemas which Plt himself must have declined to solve, seem to be the following: @ 1 For a jliious diaeusion of hs difcale question, see now J: As Bes x a dics Sine ond Plato's Theory of Insermediates’, Phones vit (3963) PP 4S Plato: The Unwritten Doctrines oi Whether the cosmogonie process desctibed is to be thought of «s sting peat any plain Tame (3) dh identi of ie Deis () de Ment ofthe Young Godeo hom he Denarge delegates er fee the lower part of the human soul; (4) the nature of the ssi tht may property be aged to th Rese (6) de manner in which any combination of immaterial triangles ca sobd subrtne; (6 whac relation thee base angles ean ave othe thew clink alba! bom, On deen spoeions peammeen to tinued shroughout later Pltonism, beginning with Plato's immedi successors. =i Speusippus and Xenocrates maintained th f erates maintained that the process described she Temes we ees nd etal edt Plo had ony ene ployed an apparent reaporlsucession ‘or che purpose of instruction Aska however, who may here be simply tendentous, accuses ato of pestulting a temporal beginning forthe word (De Caelo1 12; 112), Plato himself eannot have made his position clear; otherwise this controversy could not kave arisen. Later Pl weve the ceptions of Phnsch and Aas, Sess alee wc Iie 2.cmtlen or of pirvcesy cx ooednly ate, fallow i ; flowed te lad of Seusppus and Kenocras oil ‘As to the identity of the Demiurge and of the Young Gods, thee eam confsion in ter tins Ini he Dem seco 0 have bron taken ache supreme pincply ave in the worl be under Neopythagorean infuence the One, 35 AGE SE REEL we placd shore Geach peaoard 4 oye the active principle, the Demi- wre came ob se wa second Gos Tacos at, he ee or 0 the Supreme God, and thsi the view hat peas daring de period under reve i this ook, Ths nur ws vay aber com flation with the World Soul i its rational spect, aw There en een ee 3 Rasen! Word Sel so the Word Soul of er Patni tends 9 bese aio o tet brea niyo et. Principles and requing ‘awakening’ by God (bso, 209A fs he Young Gods, tay could ster be ten a the sub-rational Wes Suh o te clas of Damons subservient ke Wed sige sm. vacillation on this point im such men as Albinas process by which the Soul cts on Matter, to Mater, and the id tentiieeeeen and the identity of the triangles are not one nds any satnenty seven arf which thew eon uh 8 The Old Academy and the Themes of Middle Platonism discussion, in surviving Middle Platoaist documents, although Xeno- trates, 25 we shall see, wrestles with them to some extent. Aristotle's ‘ctielams of the whole scheme in the PAysies and in the De Caelo were powerful, and could not really be answered. “The Fimaexs remained the most important single dialogue during the Middle Platonic period, supported by chosen texts from the » Phaedrus, Theaetetus, Phacdo, Philebus and Laws (for devils check the index of passages quoted in this volume). Particularly close js the interweaving of the myth of the Phaedrus, and its account of the celestial ride and subsequent fall of the soul, with the Timaeus. In Neopythagorean circles, as we shall se, the Permenides, taken 35 27 ‘account of metaphysical reality, comes also to be of major importance. ‘The doctrine of the One present in such Neopythagoreans as Eudorus, Moderatus of Gades and Numenivs has been brilliantly shown by E. R. Dodds! to be influenced by the First Hypothesis of the Parmen- ides, though the Sun Simzile of Rep. vi, and the Three Kings of the ‘Second Leter also contributed something to the mixture. ‘ia Logic, the evidence points to Plato's maintaining, the system of Division (diairesis), as first outlined in Phaedrus 26ypfi. and even clevating it into a cosmogonic principle. It is the soul’s business t0 bring order out of chaos by making the right ‘divisions’, hiting the right means and harmonies. There is no evidence that Plato himself developed anything as elaborate «6 the Aristotelian syllogistic and categories (although Aristotle's ten Categories are only a somewhat scholastic elaboration of the two basic categories of Absolute (Sub- Sjance) and Relative). Plato seems to have operated with the basic Ccaregories of Absolute (kash? Aauio) and Alio-relative (pres Aesera), ‘which letter was subdivided into Opposite (pros enantia) and Relative proper (proc ri), which in its turn was divided into Definite and In- Tefrite, So much we are told by Hermodorus (ap. Simpl. Jn Phys. pe ‘47, golf. Diels). Hermodorus was a pupil of Plato, and was acquainted with the practice of the Academy; he is not basing himself ‘on the evidence of the dialogues, although traces of such a division can be discerned in them (eg. Soph. 25505 Parm. 133¢0; Phil. 51c0)- tis absurd to throw doubt on such reports 28 this, simply because they are not confirmed by the evidence of che dialogues. Nor should swe imagine, a some do, that the only source of information on Plato's Teaching apart from the dialogues comes from reports of his famous 1B, R. Dodds, “The Parmenide of Plo and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One! CQ 33 (928) Plato: The Unwritten Doctrines x lecture On the Good. This was undoubsedly a notorious afar at which any of those present took notes (Aristoxenus, Harm. Elem. tt >. 1 Meibom; Simpl. Zn Pays. p. 651, 6% Diels), and it may indeed have been the only time that Plato axterpted to share his philosopty vith a general audience, but itis not to be imagined that his immediaie successors were confined to this one lecture for their information. The lecture was not a success, as Aristotle used to recall with amusement (Arstoxenus, fo. cz). The audience had come expecting, from the tile, 10 hear something practical, such as how to become rich, heathy oo strong, and when Plato began to discourse on mathematics, geo- metry and astronomy, and finally stated that the Good was the O: they incontinent left. ° “In the sphere of Ethic, 2s Thave sid, there are sufficient indications that for Plaro as well as Aristotle the virtues are to be regarded 3s means between two extremes of ‘too much’ and ‘too litle’, with Justice (symbolized by the Pythagorean Tetrakiys) as the force holding the universe together, a metaphysical concept as well as en sthical one, Important abo is Plato's distinction, in Lanes 1 6310, be- tween higher, or ‘divine’ Goods—that is, goods ofthe soul, the Vir rcs—and lower, or ‘human’ Goods—goods of the body” (such as health or beauty) and external goods (ach as good fame or walt). ‘This was a favourite passage for later Platonists, and constituted an important basis for mediating between the positions of Stoic and Peri- patetic ethics, a6 these Platonists were continually having to do. A subject of active debate in later Platonism was the question whether the lower goods were oF were not an essential component of Happiness (cudzimonia). The Stoies denied that they could be; the Aristoteiaas denied that they could be excluded. The Platoaists were left in the middle, with texts to support either postion, and, 28 we shall se, the barle raged back and forth throughout our period, such men 1s Antiochus and Plutarch siding with Peripateicism, others, such as Exdorus and Atticus, adopting a Stoic line. a tei hm Lec soni ler ime tof he ov pose of life, Plato is certainly on record, in two pastages espec- Aly Phase 19648, Phavdo 642), a svercing tat consists i he ‘withdrawal ofthe soul from the things of the body. The whole simile Of the Cave in Republic vit expresses the same attirude. This became the general defition among Middle Platoniss, in the form ‘Likeness 10 God’, taken from Theaetetus 1768. Antiochus, however, as we shall se, preferred the formula ‘Concordance with Nature’. This is not ro The Old Academy and the Themes of Middle Platonism properly doctrine of Plato, but was developed inthe Old Academy, Fargeularly by its last head, Polemon, and then taken up by Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. ‘On the question of the self-suficieney of the wise man, and his freedom from passions, a subject of lively debate in later times, Plato's postion is ambiguous. A passage such as Republi 1 8708 asserts the man’s self-sufficiency, but seems to envisage him as mod- cecing his passions rather than extrpating them. The problem of Shen moderated passion ceases to be a passion at all tends later to ecome a fruitful source of semantic confusion between Aristotelians and Stoics. The inner-academic tradition, then, preserving as it did both acy counts of the Unvvritten Doctrines and the interpretations of such iushorities as Speusippus and Xenoerates, continued to have a pro- found influence all through antiquity, an influence that we can only dimly comprehend. Ia the ephere of Logic, for instance, it seems t0 us that vhe later Platonists are shamelessly appropriating and fathering on Plato the distinctive discoveries and formulations of Aristotle, Now this they may indeed have done, but what is not obvious tous is how much of Aristotle's innovations erew out of work already being done, by himself and others, while he was stl in the Academy, and how son mature Aristotelian logic was accepted into the Old Academy 25 vnom-controversial. Speusippus and Xenocrates, as far 2s we can 90% ‘Maintained the properly Platonic system of Division, and the Platonic ntegories described above, but what of Polemon, Crates or Crantor? ‘Aristotelian logic was accepted as a useful rool by the Seeprical ‘New ‘Rrademy afer Polemon, and Polemon, 2 ve sll se, found himself wrery much in agreement with Aristotle on ethical matters, so hat ii Tov unlikely chat he accepted Aristotelian (and Theophrastean) logic sete. When we come to consider a man like Albinus, we will find fire assuming Plato to be well aware of Aristotelian logic and to be thing it in the dialogues in 2 non-formal way. We may regard The sssumption as abaurd, but itis not one which originates with ‘AIbinus, and for all we know it may go back all the way ro the Old Academy. “The purpose of this brief sketch of Plato's philosophy is t0 show that when later Platonists, whether Antiochus, Albinus or Plotinusy “iam vo derive thei philosophical positions from Placo himself, they cerry necessarily being quite as unhistorical as is commonly imagined. Past of che difcuky in adequately assessing the doctrines of Plato is Speusippus (c. 407-339 B.C) hn that, on 9 wide range of topes, he probably did not come « ie ee uta meter eee fering te leave his disciples to worry things out for themselves, this ie cerainly what one would expect from what we can discern sboat his view #3 to kow philosophy should be conducted. Even the dit- Togues are a way of putting forward theories, and working out thelr consequences, without having to stand over the results. Significantly, Plato never appears in any of his own dialogues. I his procedure was zs devious a imagine it 0 have bee, is easy to sec how even His immediate followers might have given quite different accounts 2f svhae he actually believed, and much of the work of Speusippus and Xenocrates ean indeed be seen as efforts ro unravel the implic tions which they thought they discemed in the Maste’s varioss suggestions. "Tha: sad, I wish now to examin the ateted doctrines ofeach of these men, with a view to seeing what they may have contributed 10 Inter Platonism, We must remember, afterall, that when we come in tie next chapter to assess the legitimacy of Antiochus" interpretation of Pisoni, we must ae into account not ony what hemay have known of Plato's oral teachings, but also wha: he had undoubtedly read of Speusippus, Nenocrates, and, lst but not least Polemon, for Antio-

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