A320 Europe Regional Conference 2022

A320 Family European Regional Conference,
Lisbon
Conference Organisation - Rev 1

Presented by Philippe LE BIGOT
21st - 22nd June 2022 - Lisbon
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
Conference Organisation
Your photo
» Expertise details here
Today in A320 Family Customer Support Program as Program manager

responsible for the A320neo Watchtower / Fleet efficiency & OR3M process
Presented by
Philippe
• Previously in Engineering Operability & Maintainability department with specific focus on A320neo LE BIGOT
EIS preparation A320 Family Program
Manager
Philippe.le-bigot@airbus.com
• Joined Airbus Customer Services Engineering Powerplant department in 1990, managed CFM56 &
V2500 engine types for 11 years as Senior Engineer then moved to the PAX & Crew
facilities/Emergency Equipment's department as team Head of for 10 years
• I started my career at AIR FRANCE engineering covering aircraft maintenance then managing repair
shop team
2 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991

A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022
Customer hosts
Diogo Pedrosa Jean-Pierre GOMEZ Marc GUINOT Caroline CLAVEL Philippe LE-BIGOT Joseph SAURAS
Maintenance & Engineering | VP A320 Family Program A320 CHIEF ENGINEER Head of Systems A320 Family Program Manager SR. DIRECTOR,
Aircraft Maintenance Customer Services Customer Care Centre Customer Services A320 Family Program Customer
Engineering & Quality Manager Engineering Services
TAP Air Portugal

Conference Organisation - Housekeeping
Wifi Code: A320Airbus2022
CAQ Day 1
Ballroom A&B Side Meeting room
Demo
Demo Day 1&2
Foyer (during coffee break)
❏GenEWIS WC
❏SRM for Mechanic
❏CAQ decontamination tooling
❏“Skywise Reliability" &
2nd floor
"Skywise Reliability
Premium"
Plenary sessions
Lunch - Eduardo VII
4
Conference Organisation - Housekeeping rules
Keep your phone in You should feel free to

silence Wear a mask
Practice
Q&A time with each
presentation
social distancing
5
Agenda E-site access & Caucus Airbus
Airbus Event Apps Reception &
Social Event
Conference Organisation - Agenda Day 1 – 21st June 2022
NLG Duration Day 1 topics - 21/Jun/22 Presenters
8:00 AM 0:30 Registration Laura Massaly
Welcome & Introduction speech Jean Pierre Gomez

8:30 AM 0:20
1.1. Conference organization Philippe Le Bigot
1.2. Fleet performance - Operational Reliability & Philippe Le Bigot & Jean-Pierre GOMEZ Philippe LE-BIGOT Benoit RENAUD
8:50AM 0:25 VP A320 Family Program A320 Family Program Manager Reliability & Maintenance
Unplanned Technical Grouding Benoit Renaud Customer Services Customer Services Economics Manager
Customer Services
9:15AM 0:15 1.3. OEB Reduction Plan Philippe Le Bigot
9:30AM 0:20 1.4. How to interpret the report 15 Catherine Beros
9:50AM 0:20 Coffee break
Mário Lobato de
10:10AM 0:20 1.5. Airline Testimony
Faria Catherine BEROS Mário LOBATO de Pierre MONTANIER Alice CARSALADE
Customer Support FARIA Engineering & Cabin & Cargo electronics Customer Support
10:30AM 0:20 1.6. CIDS Pierre Montanier Engineering Quality Customer Support Engineering
Customer Services TAP Air Portugal Engineering Customer Services
Customer Services
1.7. Hydraulic general
Alice Carsalade &
10:50AM 0:30 - A320neo hyd rods AD mod
Emiliano Carosi
- A320neo LEAP leak in pylon
Michael Dubois &
11:20AM 0:20 1.8. A320neo Leap IDG delta temp
Rick Coenen
1.9. GAPCU damages due to
11:40AM 0:20 Olivier Ausseil Emiliano CAROSI Michael Dubois Rick Coenen Olivier AUSSEIL
overcurrent/overvoltage
A320 Family Program A320 Family Program Collins Aerospace Customer Support
Manager Manager Program Chief Engineer Engineering
12:00PM 1:00 Lunch Customer Services Customer Services Customer Services
7 A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
Conference Organisation - Time Duration Day 1 topics - 21/Jun/22 Presenters
1:00PM 0:30 1.10. Product evolution Marc Guinot

Agenda Day 1 – 21st June 2022 1.11. Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) & biocide
1:30PM 0:30 usage latest recommendations & fuel stat test Benoit Merenciano
kit.
2:00PM 0:20 1.12. Supply chain Readiness Sascha Horatzek
Xavier Sobra & Emiliano
2:20PM 0:20 1.13. BSCU P/N 307
Carosi
Marc GUINOT Benoit MERENCIANO Sascha HORATZEK Xavier SOBRA Emiliano CAROSI Xavier Sobra & Emiliano
A320 Chief Engineer Customer Support Leader Supply Chain Customer Support A320 Family Program 2:40PM 0:20 1.14 A321 BTS/BTMU failures
Engineering SATAIR Engineering Manager
Carosi
Customer Services Customer Services Customer Services 3:00PM 0:20 Coffee break
1.15. A320neo LEAP-1A session (only for LEAP Marco Faita & Stephane
1:20
1A customers) Ramon
Bruno Previtali & Pierre Olivier
3:20PM 1:20 1.16. Cabin Air Quality (FRESH update) Forum - Trains & Joachim Dolley &
1st session Hugo Casado
Marco FAITA Stephane RAMON Jeremy MARION Michael Dubois

1:20 All Customers - Networking & Open discussions /
A320neo Product Leader - A320 Family Program A320neo Product Leader - A320 Family Program
4:40PM 0:05 Break - Room change
LEAP-1A Manager PW1100G-JM Manager
Propulsion & APU Systems Customer Services Propulsion & APU Systems Customer Services 1.17. A320neo PW1100G session (only for
Customer Services Customer Services Jeremy Marion & Michael
1:20 PW1100G customers) & ATA 26 engine fire loops
Dubois
and AGB.
4:45PM Bruno Previtali & Pierre Olivier

1:20 1.16. Cabin Air Quality (FRESH update) Forum - Trains & Joachim Dolley &
2nd session Hugo Casado
1:20 All Customers - Networking & Open discussions /

Bruno PREVITALI Pierre-Olivier TRAINS Joachim DOLLEY Hugo CASADO
A320 Family Program Cabin Air Quality & A320 Chief Eng. In ABARQUERO
6:05PM end of day 1
Manager Comfort Expert Services Solutions Chief Engineering Manager
Customer Services Customer Services A320 Family Program A320 Family Program 7:10PM Social event - Departure from the hotel
Conference Organisation - Agenda Day 2 – 22nd June 2022
Time Duration Day 2 topics - 22/Jun/22 Presenters

8:30 AM 0:05
2.1. Agenda Philippe Le Bigot
8:35 AM 0:15 2.2 Mandated Campaigns deadline recall Joseph Sauras
Christelle Ledauphin & Eric Joseph SAURAS Christelle LEDAUPHIN Eric JEANPIERRE Gerault BAYLE
8:50 AM 0:30 2.3. Safety Beyond Standard SR. DIRECTOR, A320 Family Program Product Safety TECH DATA A320
Jeanpierre A320 Family Program Manager Enhancement Manager Program Manager
Customer Services Customer Services Customer Services
9:20 AM 0:30 2.4. Technical Data Enhancement Gerault Bayle
9:50 AM 0:20 2.5. THSA Life limits Delphine Hertens-Orlando
10:10 AM 0:20 Coffee break
10:30 AM 0:15 2.6. SGS windshields inspection Laurent Stremler

Delphine HERTENS-ORLANDO Laurent STREMLER Dominique CHARLIER
Chief Engineering Manager A320 Family Program Manager SRM Customer Support Engineer
10:45 AM 0:25 2.7. SRM simplification Dominique Charlier A320 Family Program Customer Services Customer Services
Stephane Pireyre &

11:10 AM 0:25 2.8. Cockpit window frame
Laurent Stremler
11:35 AM 0:25 2.9. Wing Skin Corrosion Frederic Doule
2.10. Galley - Corrosion of trolley retainer (AD

12:00 PM 0:20 Luna Tokiko Cristalli
– 2021-0183R1) Stephane PIREYRE Frederic DOULE Luna TOKIKO CRISTALLI
EMBODIMENT INDUSTRIALIZATION Wing Pylon Structure Customer Support Engineering
12:20 PM 1:10 Lunch PROGRAM MANAGER Engineering Customer Services
CUSTOMER SERVICES Customer Services

Conference Organisation -
Agenda Day 2 – 22nd June 2022 Time Duration Day 2 topics - 22/Jun/22 Presenters
2.11. Landing Gear

- NLG Shock absorber dynamic seal
- NLG torque link Apex pin
1:30 PM 0:40 Matthieu Burlotte
- MLG door uplock proximity sensors faults
- MLG Axle chrome overheat damage
- MLG Sliding tube chrome damage
2.12. Field Loadable Software digitalization

2:10 PM 0:25 Lilian Segonds
and data security
Matthieu BURLOTTE Lilian Segonds Christelle LEDAUPHIN
Landing Gear System Expert Operations FLS A320 Family Program
Engineering Customer Services Manager 2:35 PM 0:15 2.13. Weather Radar transceiver Christelle Ledauphin
Customer Services Customer Services
2:50 PM 0:20 2.14. SB enhancement Pascal Albarede
3:10 PM 0:25 2.15. Maintenance Optimization Claire Kauffmann
3:35 PM 0:20 Coffee break
3:55 PM 1:00 Airline Caucus /
Pascal ALBAREDE Claire Kauffmann Jean Pierre GOMEZ 4:55 PM 0:30 Debrief Caucus TAP
Retrofit solution HO Scheduled Maintenance VP A320 Program
Cross Program Engineering Services Customer Services
Customer Services Customer Services 5:25 PM 0:10 Conference Key Highlight & Closure Jean Pierre Gomez
5:35 PM End of Conference

Conference Organisation - Demo Day 1&2
❏ GenEWIS Gerault BAYLE

TECH DATA A320
Program Manager
Customer Services
Dominique CHARLIER
❏ SRM for Mechanic

SRM Customer Support Engineer
Customer Services
❏ CAQ decontamination Pierre-Olivier TRAINS

Cabin Air Quality &
Comfort Expert
tooling Customer Services
❏ “Skywise Reliability" &

"Skywise Reliability Benoit RENAUD
Reliability & Maintenance
Economics Manager
Jean Marc WATTECANT
HO Fleet Performance Control &
Monitoring
Premium"
11
Social Event
E-site access - How do we access the e-Site?
Connect to the e-site through your

Airbus World account:
https://w3.airbus.com/crs/GN61_staging/SIT
ES/Private_content/airbus_offering/symposi
um/2022_06_A320_European_Operators_C
onference_Lisbon/index.html

E-site access - How do we get access to the agenda?
e-Site main page
Click on “Agenda” in the main menu
Select the day ex: 21 June
Click on the presentation to open it
Same way for Day 2

E-site access - How do we get access to the presentations?
e-Site main page
Click on “More…” then

“DOC CENTRE” 21 June 2022
22 June 2022
Download daily presentations
Click on the day to open a zip

with all the presentations of the
day

Airbus Event Apps - How do we get access?
STEP 1: Download the App through

Play store or Apple store
STEP 2: enter your codes
➢ login - your email address

(Please type your login in small letters only)
➢ password - Given in the received

message
(if not available please contact Laura Massaly
laura.massaly@cta-events.com)
Please be aware that it might take a few minutes

until your registration data has been
synchronized and you can access the App.

Social Event
Caucus Your Caucus Chairman
➢ General feedback on the Conference

➢ Top General Issues A320 Family
➢ Top Technical Issues A320 Family
➢ Positive / Negative Diogo Pedrosa
Maintenance & Engineering |
➢ Conclusion Aircraft Maintenance

Engineering & Quality Manager
TAP Air Portugal

Social Event
Social Event,
Dress code: Business casual
MATT Kitchen Enjoy Reception & Dinner
Museu maat – Av. Brasília, 1300-598

Lisboa
7:10 pm departure by bus from

Hotel lobby
11H00 pm Back to the hotel
Thank you
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon
This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of Airbus. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of
this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the expressed
written consent of Airbus. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied.
Airbus, it’s logo and product names are registered trademarks.
Lisbon
A320 Family Fleet performance - Operational Reliability &

Unplanned Technical Grounding
Presented by Philippe Le Bigot & Benoit Renaud
A320 Family Fleet performance - Operational Reliability
Your photo

Presented by
Philippe
Manager
shop team

A320 Family Fleet performance - Unplanned Technical Grounding
» Expertise details
I work with Airlines and Programmes to measure and improve Fleet performance:
Presented by
- Operational Availability; Benoit
- Operational Reliability; RENAUD
- Maintenance Costs; Fleet performance
Manager
Since 2014: Airbus Customer Services - Reliability & Maintenance Economic Manager
benoit.renaud@airbus.com
- Airlines portfolio: easyJet, British Airways, Aer Lingus, Virgin Atlantic
- Focal point for China Region
2004 - 2014:
- A350 programme - Avionics systems - Maturity and Operability manager, EIS preparation
- In-service programmes (A320 / A330 / A380) - Reliability Analyst
- A400M programme - Flight Controls and Electrical Systems - Maintainability Specialist

Fleet Overview Fleet Performance & Unplanned Technical Conclusion
Main drivers Grounding
Worldwide Fleet overview
9670 Aircraft in Service (May 2022)

A318
A319
289.6* 157.2M* 6.6*

Flight Hours since EIS Flight Cycles since EIS Average Daily Utilisation
Operators A321
A320
357
neo Fleet
A/C Average Daily Average Flight Average Daily
2198 Nbr utilisation duration utilisation
A320ceo 4306 5.8 1.8

6.4
A320neo 1445 7.6 1.9
ceo Fleet A321ceo 1739 6.7 2.1
7472
A321neo (excl ACF/LR) 189 6.7 2.0 7.0
A321neo ACF/LR 548 8.0 2.5

A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 * Last 12 months to Feb 2022
Europe Fleet overview
2544 Aircraft in Service (May 2022) A318
A319
104.3M* 61.1M* 6.8*
Flight Hours since EIS Flight Cycles since EIS Average Daily Utilisation
Operators A321
113 A320
neo Fleet
A/C Average Daily Average Flight Average Daily
542 Nbr utilisation duration utilisation
A320ceo 1159 5.8 1.7

6.4
A320neo 308 7.8 2.0
ceo Fleet A321ceo 421 5.4 1.9
2002
A321neo (excl ACF/LR) 23 6.6 3.1 6.7
A321neo ACF/LR 211 8.4 2.8

A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 * Last 12 months to Mar 2022
Europe Fleet - Daily Utilization
DU ~6.8Hr
~Up to 12Hr
Period: Mar 21- Feb 22

Europe Fleet - Average Flight duration
AFD ~1.9Hr
~Up to 4.5Hr
Period: Mar 21- Feb 22

Fleet Overview Fleet Performance Unplanned Technical Conclusion
& Main drivers Grounding
● Worldwide
● Europe
Fleet Performance - Operational Reliability A/C < 3 Months
99,72%
OR stabilized
Main Technical
drivers identified
● A321 Brake
Temp Sensor
May OR: 99,66%
Aug OR: 99,67%
Nov OR: 99,76%
Dec OR: 99,66%

Sep OR: 99,74%
Mar OR: 99,76%
Jun OR: 99,67%
Feb OR: 99,77%

Apr OR: 99,81%
Jan OR: 99,73%

Oct OR: 99,67%
Jul OR: 99,62%
● LEAP-1A SAV
OR3M - Monthly data OR3M - 6 Months rolling data OR3M: Operational Reliability for A/C less than 3 Months
Worldwide Fleet OR
99.72
99.53
98.94
All data 06 month rolling average

Europe Fleet OR
99.63
99.54
99.39

Worldwide Fleet Severe Events
0.242
0.104
0.062
• Severe Events: is a Diversion (DIV), In Flight Turn Back (IFTB), Cancellations (CN), Long Delays superior at 2 hours (DY>2h) or an Aborted Take Off (ATO).c
Europe Fleet Severe Events
WW
WW
0.102
0.066 WW
0.048
• Severe Events: is a Diversion (DIV), In Flight Turn Back (IFTB), Cancellations (CN), Long Delays superior at 2 hours (DY>2h) or an Aborted Take Off (ATO). WW SE rate

Top European Fleet Main drivers - For A/C < 2 years
Operational Reliability Severe Events
Means 1 event per 20,000FC

LEAP - SAV MALFUNCTION - CARGO PW - ENG SENSOR PW - EEC OBS-BRAKES TEMP INDIC
FAULT DOOR OPERATION FAULT - OTHERS - A321 BTMU/BTS PN
C20464002 LEAP - SAV FAULT PW - EEC HONEYWELL MALFUNCTION - HONEYWELL - WXR -
WEATHER RADAR CARGO DOOR RTU P/N
FAULT -OTHERS OPERATION 930-2000-020
FCS 6.3 reliability
Re-introduction
SAV P06 FCS 6.2 FCS 6.3
previous BTS PN SAV P06
New RTU Hardware &
FCS 6.2
AESU/RP Software
OI rate last 12 months OI rate Sep 21 - Nov 21 OI rate Dec 21 - Feb 22 SE rate last 12 months SE rate Sep 21 - Nov 21 SE rate Dec 21 - Feb 22
Solution available Solution identified but not available On watch / Under investigation WW OI rate
Conference topic
Top Europe Fleet Main OI drivers - For A/C < 2 years
OI rate last 12 months OI rate Sep 21 - Nov 21 OI rate Dec 21 - Feb 22 WW rate
LEAP - SAV MALFUNCTION - CARGO PW - ENG SENSOR PW - EEC OBS-BRAKES TEMP INDIC NEO - ENGINE PAX DOOR ARMING AIR PACK REG PW - DATA STORAGE SMELL IN
FAULT DOOR OPERATION FAULT - OTHERS - A321 BTMU/BTS PN INTERFACE UNIT DISARMING FAULT-OTHERS UNIT DSU CABIN /
C20464002 (EIU) MALFUNCTION COCKPIT
FCS 6.3
Re-introduction Reset procedure as Fresh project
SAV P06 FCS 6.2
previous BTS PN per FCOM
Solution available Solution identified but not available On watch / Under investigation
Top Europe Fleet Main SE drivers - For A/C < 2 years
SE rate last 12 months SE rate Sep 21 - Nov 21 SE rate Dec 21 - Feb 22 WW rate
LEAP - SAV FAULT PW - EEC HONEYWELL MALFUNCTION - HONEYWELL - WXR - LEAP - SNA - Thrust PW - LP35 ADAPTER SDF - Cargo Smoke NLG Lock Stay EW-WHEEL
WEATHER RADAR CARGO DOOR RTU P/N Reverser Actuator OIL LEAK Detection Fault - OTHERS Actuator failure - N/W STRG
FAULT -OTHERS OPERATION 930-2000-020 2845GM FAULT
reliability
FCS 6.3
SAV P06 FCS 6.2 New RTU Hardware &
AESU/RP Software
Top European Fleet Main drivers - For A/C between 2 to 12 years

LEAP - SAV FAULT SMELL IN CABIN / F/CTL ELEV SERVO Spurious CIDS failures Cabin Handset low
COCKPIT FAULT - OTHERS upon departure reliability
SMELL IN CABIN / HONEYWELL - WXR - V2500 - ENG LGCIU fault - unspecified LEAP - SAV FAULT
COCKPIT RTU P/N 930-2000-020 COMPRESSOR VANE origin
reliability
SAV P06 New Handset
Fresh project New S/W -34D VSB VSV
N40 1C P/N Fresh project New RTU Hardware & SAV P06
AESU/RP Software
Conference topic
Top Europe Fleet Main OI drivers - For A/C between 2 to 12 years
LEAP - SAV FAULT SMELL IN CABIN / F/CTL ELEV SERVO Spurious CIDS failures Cabin Handset low Anti-ice ECAM Skin Air Valve AIR PACK REG WATER LEAKAGE - VENT AVNCS SYS
COCKPIT FAULT - OTHERS upon departure reliability message at Engine Misbehavior - VFT210* & FAULT-OTHERS OTHERS FAULT - OTHER
Start VFT300*
New Handset
SAV P06 Fresh project New S/W -34D N40 1C P/N
Top Europe Fleet Main SE drivers - For A/C between 2 to 12 years
SMELL IN CABIN / HONEYWELL - WXR - V2500 - ENG LGCIU fault - LEAP - SAV FAULT NAV PREDICTION CABIN Skin Air Valve Avionics Fan PW - ENG HIGH
COCKPIT RTU P/N 930-2000-020 COMPRESSOR VANE unspecified origin WINDSHEAR DETECTION PRESS-OTHERS Misbehavior - VFT210* & Misbehavior - VIBRATION -
reliability FAULT VFT300* EVT3454HC & HM01 Transient N2 vibs
VSB VSV SAV P06

Fresh project New RTU Hardware &
AESU/RP Software
Top European Fleet Main drivers - For A/C >12 years

Spurious CIDS failures Cabin Handset low SMELL IN CABIN / CFM - STARTER AIR Resetable ECAM
upon departure reliability COCKPIT VALVE (SAV) Warning SMOKE
LAV+CRG DET FAULT
SMELL IN CABIN / ceo - AIR BLEED EW-WHEEL N/W CFM - FUEL FILTER ceo - AIR ENG BLEED
on SDCU
COCKPIT Maintenance Status STRG FAULT CLOGGED (Fuel NOT CLSD - PRV
with/or OHDS LOOP filter differential
New Handset Fresh project INOP pressure switch)
New S/W -34D N40 1C P/N
Fresh project
Gold plated BMC Std 12
connectors
Conference topic
Top Europe Fleet Main OI drivers - For A/C >12 years
Spurious CIDS failures Cabin Handset low SMELL IN CABIN / CFM - STARTER AIR Resetable ECAM SDF Lavatory Smoke ceo - AIR BLEED EMER LIGHTS & EXIT FMGC FAILURE ON MALFUNCTION -
upon departure reliability COCKPIT VALVE (SAV) Warning SMOKE Detector Faults Maintenance Status SIGNS - OTHERS GROUND BEFORE CABIN DOOR
LAV+CRG DET FAULT with/or OHDS LOOP TAKE OFF -OTHERS OPERATION
on SDCU INOP
New Handset Fresh project

New S/W -34D Gold plated
N40 1C P/N connectors
Top Europe Fleet Main SE drivers - For A/C >12 years
SMELL IN CABIN / ceo - AIR BLEED EW-WHEEL N/W CFM - FUEL FILTER ceo - AIR ENG BLEED F/CTL SLAT/FLAP SYS NLG Shock Absorber Single Aisle - Sidestick ( F/CTL SPLR FAULT - EW-BRAKES
COCKPIT Maintenance Status STRG FAULT CLOGGED (Fuel NOT CLSD - PRV FAULT or SFCC inop - extended Prox Sensor SSTU) sensor faults OTHERS RELEASED
with/or OHDS LOOP filter differential OTHERS fault - 24/25GA
INOP pressure switch)
Gold plated BMC Std 12 New prox sensor

Fresh project
connectors & target
UTG introduction
Unplanned Technical Grounding
Objective Maximising the Operational Availability for revenue flights at a reasonable cost
OPERATIONAL
AVAILABILITY
Planned Maintenance
Costs
Unplanned
(UTG)
Planned
Unplanned
OI
We measure the Operational Costs
Reliability
Unplanned Technical Groundings $
Unit: Number of days per AC per Year
Definition
UTG counts the time an A/C is on ground due to unplanned maintenance (OI or A/C change)
and impacting the airlines operations

UTG Definition - Real case example
BCL 1 FAULT
1h
LGCIU 2
Flight delay 25 min FAULT
6 hrs
One OI One UTG BIRDSTRIKE TO RADOME
Change, no delay
Grounding time: 22 hours
No OI One UTG
Not A/C chargeable
No OI Oe UTG
All chargeability A/C change without OI Computation by

grounding time
BCL: Battery Charge Limiter
LGCIU: Landing Gear Control and Interface Unit
Value for customers
Benchmarking vs other operators
UTG in Days per AC per year

Potential additional revenue flights
13.6 days
Fleet size Delta UTG Equivalent to
If
-50%
50 aircraft 340 days per year ~ 1 aircraft
Operator A B C D E F G H I J
(Europe) (Europe) (Europe) (Europe)
Limited scope. Not always reported:

damages such as bird strikes;
Period: 2021 overruns of planned maintenance…

Value for customers & for Airbus
How UTG permits to identify emerging issues
Example of one A320 Neo operator
UTG in Days per AC per year
UTG permits to identify unavailability drivers

Topics not identified with the usual OR indicator
Two engine components topics
HPTACC manifold bracket - findings leading to AOGs
LPTACC manifold bracket - findings leading to AOGs
ATA
Scope : UTG + overruns + engine planned maintenance
HPTACC : High Pressure Turbine Active Clearance Control
LPTACC : Low Pressure Turbine Active Clearance Control
Value for customers & for Airbus
Product improvement
Example for A/C >12 years
UTG indicator complements the usual OR and Severe events view
UTG
UTG - in days / AC / year

Design improvement VSB VSV
Fresh project
TFU 57.24.00.001
Solution available Solution identified but not available On watch / Under investigation Nov. to Dec. 2021
How to participate - process
Prerequisite Data collection UTG feedback
●Benchmarking vs other operators

A/C change without OI ●Identification of your drivers
Events dataset ●Recommendations
or
Legacy DLI template
Duration of the events Data Loading Interface
IDOLS V2
Description of the events Same data channel as OI

The A320 Family UTG community
14 UTG participants +17 Potential UTG participants

~2200 aircraft ~1900 aircraft
+5
+3
5
4 +1
+1 +5
2
+2 2
1
Join our UTG community to improve your fleet availability

data-collection.reliability@airbus.com

A320 Family Fleet performance -

Operational Reliability
➢ UTG indicator
○ complements the Fleet performance metrics suite
○ Contributes to the A320 program improvement
➢ EU fleet performs well

○ Main drivers identified
○ Excellent Ageing fleet management
➢ Close monitoring & Secure operational performance of

growing fleet
○ Boost & Deliver pragmatic and targeted solutions

Thank you
Lisbon
OEB Reduction Plan

OEB Reduction Plan
Your photo

Presented by
Philippe
Manager
shop team

World fleet status Europe fleet status Communication on Conclusion
OEBs & Safety
Enhancements
OEBs & Safety
Enhancements
World Fleet Status
33 OEB*
● A320 Family world fleet - MSN affected by OEBs
Specific configurations
OEB 58
OEB 57
OEB 59
MSNs
5002
MSNs impacted
Fix available
(*) As of May 2022, including current operational fleet and future a/c deliveries
OEBs & Safety
Enhancements
Europe fleet status
25 OEB*
● A320 Family Europe fleet - MSN affected by OEBs
Specific configurations
MSNs
OEB 57
1190
MSNs impacted
Fix available
(*) As of May 2022, including current operational fleet and future a/c deliveries
OEB status – Europe
RED & WHITE OEB

8 RED OEBs
OEB 57
17 WHITE OEBs
1071
Maintenance Actions
OEB 46
905 OEB 58
Maintenance Actions
OEB 59
2389
2089 MSNs
MSNs

Red & White OEBs
AD 2 AD 2
02 2-009 022-
6 0028
Red OEB 57 Red OEB 59
SPEED BRAKE LIMITATION IN APPROACH WITH
GWCG ABOVE xx% OR IN OVERWEIGHT REINFORCED SPEED CHECK
LANDING
FMGC (FG part) modification ELAC modification

Available FG3G Available
Implement latest FMGC FG std: Implement latest available ELAC std:

L103+ neo
- PI18 / PC20 (FMGC 3G) => all SBs SB 27-1288 / mod 169275
available (dispatched)
- FMGC 2G update → planned 2023

Red & White OEBs
White OEB 46 White OEB 58
ENG 1(2) SYSTEM FAULT - Active Clearance

NO ENGAGEMENT OF GUIDANCE MODE
Control (ACC) valve fault
FMGC (FG part) modification EEC or FWC modification

Available Available
Implement minimum standards or Implement new FWC or EEC* std:

subsequent
- FWC std H2F13 (SB 31-1608 ceo, 31-1609
- PI13 / PC14 (FG 3G) neo)
- I15 / C14 (FG 2G) - or EEC FCS 6.2 (SB 73-1146) *
(*) Caution SB 73-1146 retrofit on hold: refer to TFU 73.21.00034.

OEBs & Safety
Enhancements
Communication on OEBs & Safety Enhancements Key points
● Safety First Refer to existing

documentation to
● Reduce number
of OEBs
● Benefit from
other safety
and operational
enhancement
● A320 Digest of Available
Safety Enhancements
Edition 2022

OEBs & Safety
Enhancements
OEB Reduction Plan - Conclusion
PLAN, SECURE AND PRIORITIZE YOUR RETROFIT

- RED OEB IN PRIORITY
- WHITE OEB REQUIRING SPECIFIC ATTENTION
BENEFIT FROM SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL ENHANCEMENTS

- MANY OEB CORRECTIVE STANDARDS (ELAC, FG, FAC, …) ALSO
EMBED VALUABLE OPERATIONAL SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS
Reduction of OEBs as a priority

Reference documents table
OEB Ref. Document reference Fixes Other supporting materials RIL,AD,..
OEB 57 FOT 999.0034/20 Implement FMGC FG 3G PC20/PI18 (available neo ceo) SA22D21022406, SA22FM2200391,
TFU 22.10.00016 - neo: 22-1827, 22-1824, 22-1819, 22-1828, 22-1822, 22-1821 SA22FM2200445, SA22M21001923,
TFU 22.00.00209 - ceo: 22-1826, 22-1825, 22-1818, 22-1829, 22-1823, 22-1820 SA22M21002334, SA22M21003901,
Note: FMGC FG 2G pending (exp Q1 2023) SA22M21003904, SA22M21003922,
SA22M21003923, SA22M21003964
OEB 58 FOT 999.0029/21 EEC FCS 6.2 or FWC H2F13 modification (available) SA31M21004114
TFU 75.24.00001 - FWC: ceo SB 31-1608, neo 31-1609
TFU 73.21.00034 (*) - EEC: SB 73-1146 (* retrofit on hold)
OEB 59 ISI 00.00.00411 Implement ELAC std: L103+ neo (SB 27-1288) SA22M21003034
TFU 27.93.00026 EASA AD 2022-0028
FOT 999.0042/21
OEB 46 FOT 999.0028/14 PI13 / PC14 (FMGC FG 3G)

TFU 22.30.00.021 I15 / C14 (FMGC FG 2G)
General ISI 00.00.00325 /

(list of TFUs associated with OEBs)
General FOT 999.0078/20 /

ISI 00.00.00319
(changes to OEB management)
Thank you
Lisbon
How to interpret the ACMS R15

Presented by Catherine BEROS
How to interpret the ACMS R15
Your photo
Airbus Product Leader for A320Fam

➢ Product Leader
➢ In charge of ACMS & Recording System since 2018 Presented by
➢ Previously Flight Ops engineer Catherine
➢ 8 years experience in Customer Support for Engine & APU systems BEROS
➢ 15 years experience in Tech Data and Maintenance Training courses ACMS & Recording System
In-Service Engineering
A320Fam & A380
Product Leader
“As for the future, your task is not to foresee it but to enable it”
Antoine de Saint Exupéry (Le Petit Prince) catherine.beros@airbus.com

ACMS Load Report Major In-Service Conclusion
<R15> Problem - Spurious
ACMS report
ACMS report
● Description
● Known issue
● Mitigation
● How to readA320
it?Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
ACMS Load Report <R15>
Description Previous report <15>
A new ACMS load report 15 has been developed to support the introduction of New Hard Landing
criteria.
Information was provided to the customers through the Airbus OIT REF.999.0012/11 rev 02 (25 Oct
2013): ISE campaign has shown that for A320Fam the vertical and lateral acceleration are a more
reliable set of parameters for event classification.
ACMS R15 layout change

○ Introduction of Nz kpi parameter: Computed parameter taking consideration of A/C
weight, vertical acceleration (incremental), Roll Angle. Directly computed by the new ACMS
(FDIMU) software and available in Report 15. No calculation is required by the operators. Load Report <15> evolution
○ Ny kpi (lateral acceleration at touch down) is directly available from load report 15
○ Red/Amber /Green limits (RAG method) is incorporated in AMM chapter 05
Issue
Since the introduction of the last FDIMU software, several events of spurious triggering, mostly
on LATA criteria have been experienced by the customers.
The AMM 05-51-11 & AMM 05-51-17 instructions refer to AMM task 31-37-00-200-001-A f to read the
ACMS load report <15> but do not provide details about potential spurious parameters.
Mitigation
AMM TASK 31-37-00-200-001-A (Check of the Load-Report Parameter after Hard/Overweight Landing
or Excessive Turbulence) has been updated to help identifying spurious cases
ACMS Load Report <R15> Purpose
Context :
An A320 family A/C has sent by ACARS or Printed a Report <15> showing an exceedance of the turbulence accelerations
limits.
An A320 family A/C has landed, and sent by ACARS or Printed Report <15>, showing an exceedance of the landing limits.
In both cases, the event can be confirmed or not confirmed by the pilot.
The maintenance instructions to be applied are the following :

● AMM task 05-51-11-200-004-C Inspections After a Hard Landing or a Hard Overweight Landing
● AMM task 05-51-17-200-001-A Inspection after In-flight Excessive Load Factor due to Turbulence or Maneuver or in
Excess of VMO/MMO
The AMM 05-51-11 & AMM 05-51-17 instructions refer to the AMM task 31-37-00-200-001-A to correctly read the load
report <15>.

A320Fam- In case of event refer to AMM 05-51-11
Flow Chart can help for the analysis
AMM 05-51-11-200-004-C (last version)
AMM 05-51-11-200-004-B
Main trigger: the pilot report
ACMS report R15 is used as a

support for data analysis

A320Fam: ACMS New Load Report Processing
New method and associated criteria
The following stages are used to assess the severity of in-service landing events:
● Extract the measured event maximum Nz and minimum Nz and aircraft mass, roll and aircraft type.
→ DNz KPI: Computed Delta Vertical Acceleration

→ Ny KPI: Computed Lateral Acceleration
● Extract the measured event Ny and factor by 1.2
● Take the Delta Nz KPI and Ny KPI and apply these values to the RAG-Chart (Red Amber Green Chart) to assess in what
band the event falls.
Refer to AMM 31-37-51/00 for the report description and triggering logics
The result of the above described stages is the ACMS Load report <15>, which shall be used to identify in an easy way the type of
aircraft landing:
• An event in the Red area would ground the aircraft pending an analysis by Airbus once DFDR data is available (AOG basis)
• An event in the Amber area would define the need for further analysis of the DFDR data by Airbus but during this time aircraft
operation may be allowed within the Grace Period under RDAF process (Repair Design Approval Form).
• Events in the Green area will not have exceeded loads and the aircraft may be considered for release back into normal operation.

Maintenance Instructions: RAG (Red/Amber/Green) method
AMM 05-51
The Enhanced LOAD Report / ACMS report <15> introduces the “RAG”
Method (Red/Amber/Green method), based on Vertical and Lateral
accelerations at touch down to detect a hard/overweight landing.
- 4310: Overweight red bounce hard landing

- 4320: Overweight amber bounce hard landing
- 4410: Overweight red hard landing
- 4420: Overweight amber hard landing
- 4510: Red bounce hard landing
- 4520: Amber bounce hard landing
- 4610: Red hard landing
- 4620: Amber hard landing
Not to be used for NLG or 3 points landing
Airbus Webinar : ISI 31.37.00129
9
New ACMS Load Report <R15>
How to read/use it? Check the load parameter
Code:
4520 or 4620 or 4420 or 4320: Hard Landing (Amber Event)
4510 or 4610 or 4410 or 4310: Severe Hard Landing (Red Event)
RAG criteria
Nz kpi / Ny kpi deltaNz/Ny
1.80 ≤ NZ kpi < 2.06 or 0.45 ≤ Ny kpi < 0.5 Hard Landing (Amber Event)
NZ kpi ≥ 2.06, or Ny ≥ 0.5 Severe Hard Landing (Red Event) Time series
AMM 31-37-51 describes the Load report 15
10
New ACMS Load Report <R15>
How to read/use it? Spurious case
➢ The Triggering CODE that generates the “on-event” report 15 Out of

range
➢ DNZKPI shown in line U1 (U2) sample
➢ NYKPI shown in line U1 (U2)

RAG criteria
➢ LATA parameter check in the time series deltaNz/Ny
From lines G1 to L8 (up to R8)
When DNZKPI < 180: Time series

LATA must be in the range of -009 to 0009 (-0.9 to 0.9g)
● For Hard Landing event (TC44xx and TC46xx)
● For Bounce Hard Landing (TC43xx and TC 45xx)
Spurious report can be disregarded only:

- if one sample value of the LATA parameter is out of range
- If no sample value in the time series confirm any out of range
value
AMM task 31-37-00-200-001-A
11
Triggering Code
ACMS Load Report in case of turbulence event
The list that follows shows the trigger codes and the event AMM 31-37-00-200-001-A provides
that causes the print-out of the load report after excessive the spurious cases. In particular, when
turbulence: Reason:
the VRTA, LATA and LONA values are
LATA (Red)
out of operational range on one
- 5100: Excessive Normal Acceleration (VRTA) - compared
to the positive limit, flap in clean configuration sample: ignore the report.
to the negative limit, flap in clean configuration Time series
to the positive or negative limit with extended flaps.
AMM 05-51-17: Flow Chart
The list that follows shows the trigger codes that causes
the print-out of the load report after aircraft operation with
high lateral acceleration:
- 5600: Lateral Acceleration (LATA) Amber - The load

report shows trigger code 5600 if the value of the in-flight
lateral acceleration is
between 0.35g and 0.41g.
- 5700: Lateral Acceleration (LATA) Red - The load report Out of
shows trigger code 5700 if the value of the in-flight lateral range
acceleration is more sample
than 0.41g.

ACMS report
● Description
● Root Cause
● Mitigation
● Solutions
Major In-Service Problem - Spurious ACMS report
Description
A new Load Report / ACMS report <15> introduces the “RAG” Method (Red/Amber/Green method),
based on Vertical and Lateral accelerations at touch down; which is implemented by new ACMS
software versions (Teledyne and Safran suppliers),
Since the introduction of these new softwares, an increasing number of spurious ACMS reports has
been observed in the field. Significant number of reports are submitted on AOG basis to confirm if
there is a hard landing event leading to safety criteria assessment.
Root Cause / Investigation
• Data analysis has shown that most of the spurious ACMS Report 15 are due to spike values
from the accelerometer sensor
• Investigation has also determined that some parameters discrepancies can be found between
ACMS R15 and DFDR decoded data. Data acquisition samples might differ leading to
unreliable data interpretation. TFU 31.37.00007

Major In-Service Problem - Spurious ACMS report
Key points
● TFU 31.37.00007
● Strictly apply
AMM instructions
Mitigation / Interim Action
● AMM 05-51-11 &
• AMM task 31-37-00-200-001-A updated to introduce additional 05-51-17
maintenance guidelines
● AMM task
31-37-00-200-001
Terminating action: ● Airline Webinar

planned in next
October 22
Root cause investigation is ongoing and conclusions are
expected in June 22

ACMS report
How to interpret the ACMS <R15> - Conclusion

Refer to AMM procedures, issued by Aircraft System Configuration
● Apply AMM task 05-51-11-200-004-C

Inspections After a Hard Landing or a Hard Overweight Landing
● Apply AMM task 05-51-17-200-001-A
Inspection after In-flight Excessive Load Factor due to Turbulence
or Maneuver or in Excess of VMO/MMO
● AMM task 31-37-00-200-001 provides the appropriate criteria to

identify the spurious parameters that trigger the report
● Any other parameter value will require additional analysis for the
event classification


Glossary
Acronym Definition
ACMS Aircraft Condition Monitoring System
FDIMU Flight Data Interface and Management Unit
ISE In-Service Evaluation

Reference documents table – Follow-up to be done through TFU/ISI
Topic Status Ref
FDIMU Airbus standard software content OPEN ISI 31.36.00131
A320fam ACMS new Software OPEN ISI 31.36.00129
WebConference
FDIMU - Nuisance Report <15> OPEN TFU 31.37.00007

Thank you
Lisbon,
CIDS
Presented by Pierre MONTANIER
CIDS
Your photo
• Cabin & Cargo Electronics & FLS A320 Product Leader

• ATA23-73 & 23-4x - Cabin Intercommunication Data System - CIDS
Presented by
• ATA 26-14/15/16/17/18/19 - Smoke Detection in pressurized area Pierre
• ATA 25-1x - Cockpit seats Montanier
A320 Product Leader
• ATA 25-2x - Cabin seats Cabin & Cargo
• ATA 33-5x - Emergency Lighting System Electronics & FLS
• ATA 33-2x - Cabin Lighting System

• ATA 25-6x - Emergency Equipments pierre.montanier@airbus.com
• ATA 52-51 - Cockpit Door System

• ATA 52-71 & 52-73 - Door Monitoring System

Reliability Status Available solutions On-going Conclusion
investigations
Reliability Status Key points
558 A/C
• CIDS reliability
degrades except for
327 A/C
“-34D” fleet
751 A/C • Degradation limited to

236 A/C
280 A/C few operators
Stable ○ Enhancement
209 A/C New issue
OI rate of maintenance
on -36x fleet practices
possible with
Expert Forum
• “-36x “ issue affecting

reliability under
investigation

investigations
Efficiency of Available solution - OBRM “-34D” Key points
• Efficient to reduce
CIDS
○ OIs
○ Removals
○ Fault
messages
triggering in
93% of 86% of PFR
improvement improvement
89% of achieved achieved
improvement
achieved
• FOC Monitored retrofit
extended until
*available in Skywise Reliability Premium
November 2023 to
reach 100%
63% embodiment
SB Embodiment rate as of May 2022

* about 445 aircraft still to retrofit

Available solution - new Handset Key points
23% due to handset issues
clustered in 3 main causes: • Solution to OI main

Coiled cord, microphone contributor available
capsule & keypads since Feb’ 22
Other CIDS
root causes • Upgrade on-wing
Bringing the following improvements for available
ALL CIDS Generations
Operational interruptions due to CIDS
clustered by root causes ● New P/N N40-1C (available since Feb ‘22)
○ Improved coiled cord using additional aramid string
(also available via AMM) - (main contributor)
○ New microphone capsule exchanged due to
obsolescence
○ Improved build of the assembly
● Continuous improvement via AMDT planned for Q4-2022
○ New FPC layer of keypad improved by providing a
more robust contact surface

investigations
● Issue/Description
● Root cause
● Mitigation
On-going investigations - solution defined
Description
Since the introduction of the CIDS/SDF software P/N Z064H010036x in April
2021,
1. Spurious E/W “SMOKE LAV DET FAULT” occurred on the ground
SMOKE LAV DET FAULT
2. CIDS auto reset in flight: cabin light goes full bright

1. Shortened available response time for smoke detector within the CIDS
initialization loop TFU 23.73.00.112
2. A identified deadlock between “CODP” application and core software

1. Perform an CIDS BITE TEST (on ground) or CIDS RESET ● FOC Solution -37A soon
2. Self recovery available
Solution ● Mitigation available
Upcoming CIDS Software P/N Z064H010037A via FOC SB planned for the Q1 of
2023
On-going investigations
Description
Since the introduction of the CIDS/SDF software P/N Z064H010036x in April
2021,
Spurious E/W “SMOKE FWD CRG DET FAULT” & “SMOKE AFT CRG DET SMOKE AFT CRG DET FAULT
FAULT” occurred either in flight or on the ground SMOKE FWD CRG DET FAULT

TFU 26.16.00007
• Investigation and test on-going on the root cause analysis
• To help the investigation, for any event, provide SDF BITE DATA detailed
in TFU ● Your feedback is key for
root cause understanding
Mitigation / Interim Action ● Root cause planned for

DEC 2022
• Perform an SDF BITE TEST (on ground) or SDF RESET as per
FCOM/QRH computer reset table (in flight) ● Mitigation available

investigations
CIDS - Conclusion
• New handset available with an anticipated

reliability improvement
– Upgrade on-wing available
• Software fix (–34D) available with a proven

efficiency on reliability
– FOC monitored retrofit until Nov 2023


Topic Status Ref
Spurious CIDS Failures upon departure Monitored retrofit ongoing 23.73.00.112
SPURIOUS ECAM WARNING SMOKE FWD Root Cause analysis 26.16.00007
CRG DET FAULT & SMOKE AFT CRG DET
FAULT
Cabin Handset N40-1B series reliability Closed 23.73.00.113

Glossary
Acronym Definition
CIDS Cabin Intercommunication Data System
CODP Cabin Operation Data Provider

Thank you
A320 Family European regional Conference,
Lisbon
Hydraulic Systems Review

Presented by Alice CARSALADE
21st Regional
A320 Family European - 22nd Conference,
June 2022 - Lisbon
Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
Hydraulic issues review
Your
Expertise details photo here
• Joined customer services in November 2019

• Single Aisle and Wide Body hydraulic systems specialist
Presented by
Alice
CARSALADE
Hydraulic systems
Engineer
alice.carsalade@airbus.com
A320 Family European Regional EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991

2 A300/A310 Family Symposium, 10-11 May Conference,
2022, Mobile Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022
Hydraulic leakage A320NEO - PW - A320NEO - LEAP - Conclusion
Rods in pylons Hydraulic leakage
in pylon
in pylon
● Top items
● Solutions
Hydraulic leakage - Worldwide status Key points
• Different problematics
depending on aircraft
age

Hydraulic leakage - Operational interruptions (Europe) Key points
How many OI analysed? 565 OIs Younger a/c Older a/c
<35% >65%
How many aircraft? 422 aircraft JAN 2019 - OCT 2021
How many airlines? 50 airlines • Old MSNs:
Represents 45% of
the useable OIs
6
Under investigation
Under monitoring
Solution available
<35% >65%
How many airlines? 32 airlines • Younger MSNs:
Represents >60% of
the useable OIs
7 Under investigation
Under monitoring
Solution available
<35% >65%
How many airlines? 32 airlines • Younger MSNs:
Represents >60% of
the useable OIs
8 Under investigation
Under monitoring
Solution available
SEALS
Hydraulic systems seals
Issue
● Main equipment affected are HP, PTU, brake manifolds
HP manifold PTU manifold

SEALS
Issue

Seal degradation contributors:
- connection tightening
- pressure pulse
- pressure transient
- installation
Black deposit

SEALS
Issue

- pressure pulse
- installation
Maintenance recommendations
● Purchase o-ring from Airbus approved supplier
● Use o-ring tool for installation/removal

SEALS
Issue

- pressure pulse
- installation
● Purchase o-ring from Airbus approved supplier
● Use o-ring tool for installation/removal
Terminating action Preventive inspection

Preventive inspection shows positive result regarding leakage reduction
ISI 29.00.00150
Inspection program to be customized depending on customers needs
LINES
Hydraulic systems lines
Issue
● Several hydraulic lines are subject to hydraulic leakage
● Main location are MLG bay, pylon and engine

LINES
Issue
● Several hydraulic lines are subject to hydraulic leakage

Several cause identified depending on hydraulic line PN and location :
● Chafing
● Pinhole corrosion
● Installation issue / stressed pipe

LINES
Issue
● Several hydraulic line are subject to hydraulic leakage:

● Chafing
● Preventive inspection or replacement shows positive result
● Be prepared with raw material and swaging tool - AMM 20-23-11

LINES
Issue
● Several hydraulic line are subject to hydraulic leakage:

● Chafing
● Preventive inspection or replacement shows positive result
● Be prepared with raw material and swaging tool - AMM 20-23-11
Recurrent issue
Terminating action
addressed via ISI
Depending on location or pipe PN majority of leakage are addressed
29.00.00004
• Preventive inspections to avoid operational interruption

• Adapt the interval depending on the age of your fleet
• Rely on ISIs that have been issued on that purpose

in pylon
● Root cause
● Mitigation
A320 Family European ● Solutions
Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
A320NEO – INSPECTION ON RODS AT ENGINE/PYLON INTERFACE
Issue
● During inspection, damaged rods discovered: rod eye-end of both rods and
spherical bearing with abnormal wear and play
● Rupture of rod could lead to chafing with fuel tube underneath of the rod
Pylon area
Issue

● Tribo-corrosion (corrosion due to vibration under load)
● Post MOD 163348 (SB 29-1189): a second investigation led to identify
vibrations (shocks) as a contributor to rod damage
Issue

Mitigation / Interim Plan

● MOD 163348 (SB 29-1189) from A/C MSN 8498 (October 2018) → specific
coating to improve the corrosion
● Mandated inspection via SB 29-1192 to replace worn rods and inspect
fittings - AD 2021-0177
● New rod installation procedure (planned Q3 2022)
● MOD 171159 and SB 54-1053 → installation of rod in stress to reduce
shocks and rod wearing
Issue

Mitigation / Interim Plan

● MOD 163348 (SB 29-1189) from A/C MSN 8498 (October 2018) → specific Terminating action
coating to improve the corrosion
● Mandated inspection via SB 29-1192 to replace worn rods and inspect Several final fix contemplated:
fittings - AD 2021-0177 Elastomer rod
● New rod installation procedure (planned Q3 2022) Fixed support instead of rods
● MOD 171159 and SB 54-1053 → installation of rod in stress to reduce
shocks and rod wearing (planned Q4 2022) TARGET : 2024
Hydraulic review - Current status

Current status on rod inspection
FOC replacement of the rods in case

of findings as per ISB

in pylon
● Root cause
● Mitigation
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 ● Solutions
EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
A320NEO - LEAP - HYDRAULIC LEAKAGE IN PYLON Leakage
Issue
• Several cases of hydraulic lines leakage under swaging area reported
• Leaks at both right and left pylons area
• 110+ cases reported over 1000 aircraft in-service
• Risk: in-flight hydraulic system loss with operational interruptions

A320NEO - LEAP - HYDRAULIC LEAKAGE IN PYLON
Issue
FWD

Pylon area
• Fatigue crack confirmed to be the cause of the hydraulic pipe leakage
• Tap test performed: vibration modes detected around 500Hz → closed to EDP Tap point
pulsation frequency
• Hydraulic pipe stress installation is also a contributor
Accelerometers
position
Issue
Position of the elbow ➜13mm
• Leaks at both right and left pylons area +/- 3mm relative to the
• 110+ cases reported over 1000 aircraft in-service structure

• Tap test performed: vibration modes detected around 500Hz → closed to EDP
pulsation frequency

• Customized AMM procedure available by Aug 2022: removal/installation of the
hydraulic pipe subject to failure - procedure available via advance copies upon
request
• Recommendation: in case of pipe replacement → use customized procedure
Current part New part
Issue

• Tap test performed: vibration modes detected around 500Hz → closed to EDP
pulsation frequency
Terminating action
Final fix: machined hydraulic
• Customized AMM procedure available by Aug 2022: removal/installation of the
hydraulic pipe subject to failure - procedure available via advance copies upon pipe (planned: Q4 2022)
request SB 29-1196
• Recommendation: in case of pipe replacement → use customized procedure
Hydraulic review - Current status

Current status on hydraulic leak in pylon
118 events reported to Airbus
6000 FC
FOC replacement of the pipes in case
of finding
2000 FC

Thank you
in pylon
Topic Status Ref
A320NEO – INSPECTION ON Rods P/Ns: AOT A29N008-16
RODS AT ENGINE/PYLON D0003107000000 (pre mod 163348) TFU 29.00.00.084
INTERFACE D0003107000200 (pre mod 163348) MOD 163348 / SB 29-1189 (coating)
D0003107000400 (post mod 163348) ISB 29-1192 (inspection)
D0003107000600 (post mod 163348) MOD 171159 (July) / SB 54-1053
(installation)
AD 2021-0177
A320NEO - LEAP - Pipes P/Ns: TFU 29.11.00.018
HYDRAULIC LEAKAGE IN D29020831000 (pre mod 160313) MOD 171444: new pipe P/N
PYLON D29020808000/002 (pre mod 160313) D0003100300000 Monitored SB
D29020838000 (post mod 160313) 29-1196
D29020839000/002 (post mod 160313)

Lisbon
A320neo Leap IDG delta temp - Rev 1

Presented by Rick COENEN & Michael DUBOIS
IDG High oil Temp / Delta temp
Collins Program/Chief Engineer responsible for Airbus legacy programs
(A320, A330, A380) electrical power generation & emergency power (10 yrs.)
Presented by
• Engineering Manager – Emergency Power (5 yrs.)
Rick Coenen
• Manufacturing Manager – Emergency Power (6 yrs.) Collins Aerospace
Program Chief Engineer
• Project Engineer – Emergency Power (12 yrs.) rick.coenen@collins.com

Your photo
• Today A320 Family Program manager in charge of the system topics such
as Electrical generation & Harnesses, Lights and Fire protection.
Presented by
• Previously, A320neo Fleet Performance Manager for the Fleet Performance Department Michael DUBOIS
A320 Family Program
within Customer Services for 3 years. Manager
• Manager of In-service data & information system for 6 years michael.dubois@airbus.com
• Performance monitoring Manager for 2 years
• I started my career in Airbus technical data department like responsible of Component

Maintenance Manuals in 2003

Issue Description Investigation & Mitigation Conclusion
Root cause Solutions
Contemplated
Conclusions
Contemplated
Issue Description
● IDG high oil temperature (>147°C)
● IDG oil Delta Temp Failure Message during in taxi-out, take-off or at the top
of the descent when engine thrust at idle.
● Inconsistent oil level displayed at IDG sight glass (for instance, in lower red
band or yellow band after ENG S/D)

Conclusions
Contemplated
Investigation
○ Slow Drain Down phenomenon
■ Oil level above top of the green band (Collins’ investigating with oil servicing
tests)
■ Higher heat rejection.
■ It did not lead to exceed the heat management system capability.
■ AMM task (servicing) not in line with in service experience
○ Oil system contamination by Silicon

■ Flight Test performed with contaminated oil by Silicon in Jan 2022.
■ Results not conclusive → no thermal runaway reproduced whatever electrical
loads (up to 60KVA).
■ Foaming Phenomenon can occur for Silicon concentration above 14 ppm.
8
Investigation
• Collins Testing:
■ A320neo CFM IDG’s (with Semtech diodes) had a silicon increase (up to 10 ppm) within 3 hrs.
■ A320neo PW & CFM “cold weather” IDG’s (with Power-X diodes) had minimal change in silicon content in 3 hrs.
■ A320neo CFM IDG (with Semtech diodes and 500-600 FH’s) had minimal change in silicon content in 3 hrs.
■ A320neo CFM IDG (with Semtech diodes) had a silicon increase to 8 ppm in 3 hrs., then minimal change for 6 hrs.
■ The same IDG will be tested for additional 150 hrs. to determine if silicon level increases further
■ Oil samples to be taken periodically throughout the test for post-test analysis
9
Investigation (cont.)
■ Collins to perform lab testing of diode packs (Semtech vs RDPA)
to determine if they are a source of silicon in the oil
■ Submerge components in heated oil for extended period
■ Assembly fluids, solvents, etc. used in IDG mfg. are being

evaluated as possible sources of silicon.
■ Heat rejection testing to be performed on A320neo CFM IDG

with different oil types
■ TN-600 (new oil)
■ Mobil Jet II (new oil)
■ TN-600 (used oil pulled from Collins’ test stands with

elevated silicon content (16-20 ppm)
10
Investigation (cont.)
● Evaluation of oil servicing procedure
● A delayed rise in the oil level can occur 1-2 hours after
servicing due to drain-down of oil within the IDG.
● Oil level rises from top of green band into yellow band.
● Perform oil servicing tests with vented vs non-vented

IDG.
● Current IDG vent valve opens at vacuum >1 psig.
● Possible solution: offer a vent valve with a “push-button”
feature (used on other IDG applications) to allow
manual venting during oil servicing and when checking
oil level.
Root Cause Analysis

■ Expected by July 2022
11
Issue Description Investigation & Mitigation & Conclusion
Conclusions
Contemplated
Mitigation
● If High Temp and/or Delta Temp is recurrent, it is recommended to perform a

flushing of the oil circuit as per AMM Task 24-21-00-612-807-A.
● TSM 24-00-00-810-812/813-A updated on Feb 01 2022 with Flushing

procedure.
● TFU 24.21.00.061 recommend to take opportunity of MPD oil servicing

(150FH and then 800FH) to perform a full flushing of the oil system when
IDG delta temp message continue to trigger.
13
Solutions contemplated
● FRV (Fuel Return Valve) opening logic modification

○ FADEC FCS 10 ⇒ released 2024
● SI Contamination eradication to avoid oil foaming

○ to be established based on the last Collins Lab test results (suspected
source of silicon)
● Oil servicing improvement (slow drain down)

○ Improve venting during servicing
○ Shorten IDG stand pipe
Still under investigation thanks to COLLINS lab tests
14
Issue Description Investigation & Mitigation & Conclusion
Conclusions
Contemplated
IDG High Oil Temp / Delta Temp - Conclusion
➢ Investigations and Root cause

under validation
➢ Mitigations available
➢ Solutions contemplated on track

Thank you
Lisbon
GAPCU damages due to overcurrent/overvoltage - Rev1

Presented by Olivier AUSSEIL
GAPCU damages due to overcurrent/overvoltage
Your photo
Today in Customer Support Engineering as Electrical Power Generation and

Distribution specialist on the A320Family, A330Family and A380 program
Presented by
Olivier
• Joined Airbus Customer Services Engineering two years ago (in 2020). AUSSEIL
Electrical Power Generation &
Distribution Specialist
• Previously in Engineering Electrical (ATA24) Design Office Department with specific focus on olivier.ol.ausseil@airbus.com
In-Service Support for 5 years.
“”Make it as simple as possible, but not simpler”

Albert EINSTEIN

Issue Description Investigation Mitigation and Conclusion
solution
solution
Issue Description
Description
• Aircraft effects :
– Impossibility to connect External Power from Ground Power Unit (GPU) during ground operations.
– GAPCU back-up power supply Circuit Breaker tripped.
– Smell of smoke in the cockpit and at GAPCU level.
• Consequences :
– No Operational Interruption or Delay.
– High cost repair for GAPCU.

solution
Investigation results and Root Cause Analysis
Root Cause
● Investigations confirmed overheating
traces on different GAPCU boards.
E =>
● Two main failure modes and potential A US PU
G
contributors have been identified: O T C tive
RO efec
1. On 115 VAC Circuit (On PWB A5 & A7) D
› Circuit damaged due to overstress in
the input capacitor
2. On 28V interlock circuit (On PWB A5)

› Internal GPU relays not protected (i.e
not equipped with fly-back diode) may
lead to overvoltage peak when the
GPU is disconnected from the aircraft
7
solution
Mitigations
Mitigation/interim action
Maintenance recommendations to reduce GAPCU potential damages during ground operation:
● To prevent mishandling issue >
○ AMM 24-41-00-861-002-A (procedure to energize the aircraft from the external power)
● To prevent propagation of damages >
○ AMM 24-41-00-220-801-A (Inspection of the External Power Receptacle)
● To prevent damages due to lightning strike >
○ AMM 20-17-00-910-001-A (Maintenance in Storm Conditions - Safety Practices)
In addition, it is recommended:
● To check regularly the GPU harness condition (for any wiring damage).
● To verify if repetitive defects on different aircrafts can be attributed to one particular GPU (and to
replace the unit in case of doubt).
9
Final solution proposal
Solution proposal
Introduction of a new Ground Power Receptacle including a Lightning Protection Unit (LPU) to
reduce the impact of electrical overstress on the GAPCU inputs.
28V circuit
LPU
Ground Power Receptacle

Ground Power
Receptacle with
LPU (in white)
integrated
115V circuit
10
Final solution proposal
Solution validation
• For A330/A340Family aircraft, a Controlled Entry Into Service (CEIS) has been started in June 2022 for
12 months to validate the solution (for A320Family and A330/A340Family aircraft - similar architecture).
• For A320Family aircraft, additional development (which will take at least 12 months) is needed to adapt
the protection cover of Ground Power Receptacle to include the LPU.
Note : No additional validation nor CEIS for A320 Family, at the end of this development, as the solution concept
will have already been validated on A330Family aircraft.
• Following the CEIS, this modification will be introduced in production and also in-service through an
Airbus Service Bulletin.
11
CEIS Planning
Controlled Entry Into Service (CEIS) Planning

CEIS validation => Retrofit Retrofit and forward fit
and forward fit solution solution launched on
● 2 airlines selected launched on A330Family A320Family
● 5 MSNs by Airline
April 22 May 22 Oct 22 June 23 Oct 23
Spare Purchase
Airbus / Airline CEIS
Order and part CEIS 12 month effectivity
contractual agreement
installation
A320Family new LPU cover development (at least 12 months)
12
12
solution
GAPCU damages due to overcurrent/overvoltage - Conclusion
Root cause (GPU defective)
Solution under validation (CEIS)

TFU 24.41.00.016


Type Ref Title
TFU 24.41.00.016 GAPCU Issue During Ground Operations

Glossary
Acronym Definition
CEIS Controlled Entry Into Service
GPU Ground Power unit
GAPCU Ground And Auxiliary Power Control unit
LPU Lightning Protection Unit
PWB Printing Wiring Board

Thank you
Lisbon
A320 Family Product Evolution - Rev1

Presented by Marc GUINOT - A320 Family chief engineer
Product Evolution
Your photo
»Senior Vice President Airbus Commercial Aircraft

Presented by
• In the early phase of his career Marc took several engineering roles in Propulsion systems Marc
GUINOT
performance, flight mechanics and flight controls, loads and aeroelasticity, and overall aircraft A320 Chief Engineer
design covering several Airbus programs from their early concept phase up to certification and
marc.guinot@airbus.com
service operations. He was then nominated in 2004 as Wide Body Aircraft Programme Chief
Engineer, covering A300/A310/A300-600/A300-600st Aircraft and from 2007 to 2016 as A380
programme Chief Engineer. From 2016 to 2020 he led the Propulsion Engineering Centre
covering all engines application over the Airbus fleet. He also supervised the expert’s community
across Airbus Commercial Division.
• Since early 2021 Marc is now Head of A320 Family Programme Chief Engineer.

Innovation Timeline Project Description Conclusion
A320 Family: Non-stop innovation to enhance airline profitability
DMC Airspace eRudder A321XLR STEPs New BSCS NG

Reduce DMC by The most valuable “Best in class” Up to 4700 nm Continuous avionics Under study
6% vs. 2016 space in the sky flight by wire (EIS 2024) products Under study
(EIS 2021) architecture enhancements
(EIS 2024 )
Floor High Altitude A320 / A321 Engine Substance SAF iCMP

Running A319neo & P2F Continuous roadmap compatibility Under study
The real game Power Plant
Loads A320neo 2022-2027 2026+
changer in freight efficiency
Up to 868kg/m on High Altitude
conversion market improvement
all A320 family operations up to
(2020-2022)
14,500ft

Innovation Timeline Projects description Conclusion
A320 Family: A321 XLR First flight
15th June 2022

A320 Family: A321 XLR
Maximum Take-Off Weight

Performance package from 97t up to 101t 4700nm range
Airspace cabin including inboard
packages single slotted flap
Versatility
Commonality with A321neo
30% cost saving

New potable water tank (188L) Rear Centre Tank (RCT)
and waste tank (up to 300L) integrated in the Aft fuselage Modified main and nose
landing gear
Current engine and nacelle
Opening new markets from 2024

A320 Family: STEPs evolution
5+
5
A321XLR STEP5+
○ 4700nm range Further SA
STEP5 under study
GTF Advantage 4 ○ New Avionics developments
○ Halon replacement
○ Substances Roadmap follow up
STEP3 STEP4
○ Lighter wing and pylon ○ Commonality across A320 family
○ DMC & Corrosion improvements
3
○ 100% SAF compatibility
STEP2 ○ Substances roadmap
○ Fuselage improvements ○ eRudder generic laws G* on A320 and A321
○ XLR prerequisites (eRudder) 2
○ Cabin Air Quality enhancements
○ Cabin full flex zone
1
STEP1
○ Industrial improvement
Ramp-Up to Rate 75
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 …

A320 Family: EFW Pax to Freighter
FBW safety Standards
Improved CoC
Fully containerized decks

● Main Deck: 14 AAA/AAY (88x125”)
A321P2F ●
●
Lower Deck: 10 LD3-45W
Max. Structural Payload: 28t & Range: 1500nm (w/o ACT) OEM supported
certified in 2020 (EASA & FAA) ● Containerized Volume: 208m3
● ACT1/2 option
Noise Ch. IV
A320P2F ●
●
Main Deck: 11 (88x125”)
Lower Deck: 7 LD3-45W
certified by EASA in March 2022, ● Max. Structural Payload: 22t / Range: 1800nm
FAA certification in progress ● Containerized Volume: 158m3
New Narrow-body converted Freighter

A320 Family: eRudder
Actuator adaptation Weight savings

Yaw damper & rudder mechanics removal
Cockpit interfaces
Pedals, panels
FBW standard Improvement
Mechanical cables replaced by electrical cables
Improved OR
Fewer components
Flight control
Back-up Control Module ELAC – SEC – FMGC – FCDC modified
FAC & SEC3 canceled
& Back-up Power Supply installation Displays, warnings, maintenance, FWC, CFDIU, EIS, HUD DMC savings
eRudder on A320neo family from 2024 (first EIS with XLR)

A320 Family: New Avionics
Enhance safety
Reduce new functions

implementation time
Prepare the future

Section 15/21 Harness
iFCS and nFMS Product Lines
modification
as a standard
New Avionics is an under study Product Line

A320 Family: Substances Roadmap - Airbus Radar
1 Banned and addressed 2 Banned Substances 3 Obsolescence (O) 4 Regulatory Pressure today 5 Future Substances
Substances with authorized usage Restriction date known (R)
MCCPs
PIP Beryllium
NICKEL phthalate
SALTS HHPA
Bromo LEAD MHHPA
NMP
OPEO/ propanol Organotin
BASIC (R) - 2020 Terphenyl BADGE
Diisocya Phenol Compounds
HBCDD BROMO- NPEO PRIMER nates
Hydrogenated
PROPANE 2025 (R) - 2023 alkylation
2026 CADMIUM
D4-D5-D6 products
Bonding Diuron
(PDDP)
CC’Azodi
PCP TSA Primer DMF Silver Organo
Wash Bisphenols Trilead
Phosphates
Sealing 2026 HALON dioxide Orthoboric
Primer F-GHGs
Trichlor
Phthalates 2024 (O)-2035 phosphonate Dechlorane acid salts
R-134A UV-328 2026 (O) Caution: 10 year Plus
oethylene
Aerosols (B) - 2023 of retrofit BORATES Resorcinol Cobalt
Chemical Boron
Chromates Hard Conversion Glutaral Compounds Compounds
Toluene- CHROMATES Nonylphenol Ethylene- PFAS
DecaBDE AVIOX External w/o Chrome Coating
Authorization diamine
37124 Paint Plating 2024
COBALT DMAC
2024 TBBPA
/ NEP
SALTS
Already removed In Progress In investigation or research
Permanent anticipation on substances regulation evolution

A320 Family: Engines evolutions
PW
CFM
2022 2023 2024+ 2022 2023 2024+

Wave 4 / 5 GTFA- Q2 2024 FCS8.5 Q1 2023 RBS - Q1 2023
Redesigned fan blades 4Q2024 Continuous improvement
#3 Dry face seal Fuel burn improvement Fuel nozzle coking New ratings
PSS heaters controls
resolution
Additional thrust
Improved Time On Wing

A320 Family: Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF)
Flight test campaign: More sustainable flights

Demonstration stream
Reduce CO2 emissions
Impact analysis to
A320 Family aircraft fleet Use of renewable sources
Airbus and partners leading SAF capabilities journey

Innovation Timeline Projects description Conclusion
Product Evolution - Conclusion

Superior cabin comfort
Maintain high level of safety
Maximum commonality by design
Unbeatable fuel efficiency
Leading sustainability path
A320 Family: Opening new markets for all business models. A true family concept.

Glossary
Acronym Definition Acronym Definition
BSCS NG Break and Steering Control System New Generation HUD Head-Up Display
CoC Cash Operating Cost iCMP Intelligent Core Management Platform
CFDIU Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit iFCS Integrated Flight Control System
DMC Direct Maintenance Cost Lean PLM Lean Product Lifecycle Management
DDMS Digital Design, Manufacturing & Services nFMS New Flight Management System
EASA European Union Aviation Safety Agency OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
EIS Entry into service OR Operational interruption
EFW Elbe Flugzeug Werke P&W Pratt and Whitney
ELAC Elevator Aileron Computer P2F Pax to Freighter
FAA Federal Aviation Administration PSS Pressure Sub System
FBW Fly by Wire RBS Reverse Bleed System
FCDC Flight Control Data Concentrator RCT Rear Center Tank
FCS Flight Control System SAF Sustainable Aviation Fuel
FMGC Flight Management and Guidance Computer SEC Spoiler Elevator Computer
FWC Flight Warning Computer XLR Extra long range
GTFA Geared Turbofan Advantage

Thank you
A320 Family European Operators Conference, Lisbon
XLR text
A321XLR is the latest addition to the A320neo Family. It will enter service in 2023 offering our customers access to new markets thanks to its unbeatable economics and its 4700nm range
A321neo is the most successful large single-aisle available and the A321XLR will benefit from all its qualities. Single aisle economics with up to 4,700 nm of range.
30% lower cost per seat than previous generation aircraft (vs. 757, Airbus did not have a product in this niche)
A321XLR is the latest variant of the A320neo Family. It is a derivative based on A321neo Airbus Cabin Flex (ACF) aircraft.
Pilots, Flight attendants and Mechanics will require only minimal training
Spare: We recommend staying at the “more than 90%“ value if possible on spare commonality. The exact value at MG5 (“End of concept” milestone) is 93% in part-numbers and 96% in spare cost but as the design evolves during
A321XLR development this figure evolves as well.
The most visible new spares are the Main Wheels, Tyres & Brakes which are dedicated to A321XLR. Note that the landing gear itself is not considered a spare is the standard recommended spare list.
A321XLR includes the following major modifications:

• Rear Centre Tank (RCT): It is an additional fuel tank fully integrated into the aircraft fuselage primary structure. It is located behind the Main Landing Gear bay and in front of the rear cargo bay. The rear cargo bay is shortened
compared to A321neo to accommodate for this tank. The remaining rear cargo volume is equivalent to the A321neo with 2 ACTs configuration (ACTs are already reducing the available cargo volume). RCT fuel volume is 12,900
litres / 3,400 US Gallons
• MTOW 101t: Highest MTOW option is increased to 101t (from 97t on A321neo ACF). The rationale is to allow the same payload as A321neo ACF with the additional fuel load of the A321XLR. The enablers for the MTOW increase
are structural reinforcements on the wing and fuselage and new landing gear.
• A321XLR is reinforced where needed in line with the new increased loads. It is a full nose-to-tail load re-computation / reinforcements. The design principles do not change. There is no impact / change on the way to
maintain the aircraft structure.
• The Main Landing Gear (MLG) has the same geometry and attachment principles but includes a reinforced single-shock absorber. New Wheels, Tyres and Brakes are also needed. The full set is specific to A321XLR and
not interchangeable with A321neo.
• The Nose Landing Gear (NLG) is a reinforced version of the current A321neo ACF NLG design. However, NLG is specific to the A321XLR and not interchangeable with the A321neo one. The Nose wheels and tyres are the
same as the A321neo but will be requalify to the higher loads / ground speed.
• Airspace cabin packages: Airspace cabin is included into the A321XLR definition. Airlines can select between the standard, the premium and the premium plus packages.
• New potable water tank (188L) and waste tank (up to 300L)
• Current engine options
• Take-off performance package includes the following changes:
Tire speed & brake energy
We take the opportunity of the MTOW 101t related changes (new tires and wheels) to also improve takeoff performances on long runways (~4,000m) in hot or hot & high conditions.
Inboard Single-slotted flaps
A321neo has double slotted flaps whereas A319neo/A320neo have single-slotted flaps. The difference is linked to landing performance. Double-slotted flaps improve lift in full-configuration but it generates more drag and
it weighs more as well. It is useful to reduce approach speed for A321neo higher MLW but it has a negative impact on conf 2 takeoff. For A321XLR, we will develop a hybrid solution: inboard single-slotted flap and outboard
double-slotted flap. It is the best compromise for A321XLR: better takeoff performance and limited impact on approach/landing (~ +1.5 kt approach speed)
Additional flap/slat configurations
It is a software modification creating intermediate configurations to offer more takeoff optimization opportunities. The benefit is different on each runway / temperature as it depends which configuration is optimum for a
given case.

XLR LTT
A321XLR first flight:
Key Messages:
Long Haul (LH) Range, LH comfort, Single-Aisle economics
The next evolutionary step single-aisle aircraft ever,
Delivering extra Long Range - up to 4,700nm / 8700km (+700nm / + 15% compared to A321LR) equivalent of up to a 10hr flight
New route opportunities, targeting environmental challenges with less fuel consumption (30% lower fuel burn / seat v previous-gen competitors)
Best travel experience with the Airspace cabin and real capacity flexibility from true long haul full flat seats .
New optimised permanent Rear Centre Tank holds more fuel than several optional Additional Centre Tanks (ACTs) and taking up less cargo hold space thus allows additional cargo and baggage on long range routes
The A321XLR’s new Airspace cabin will provide passengers long haul wide-body comfort in all classes with the low cost of a single-aisle aircraft. Up to 244 passengers in a single class layout
The entry-into-service is expected to take place in early 2024 in order to meet certification requirements. We are in constant dialogue with the airworthiness authorities.
Safety is the No 1 priority and we let independent authorities like EASA do their work without rush / time pressure.
With + 500 orders so far, with 20+ customers we see a great need for this aircraft which is unique in its capabilities.
EASA public consultation on the 2nd special condition for the A321XLR:
Background | LTT:
Authorities are applying more scrutiny across the board on all certification activities in the current environment.
There is a focus on certification of the RCT (Rear Centre Tank) design for the XLR.
Airbus expects no significant impact on the XLR’s unique range advantage in the single-aisle segment.
As the discussions with the airworthiness authorities are still ongoing, we are not in a position to comment and will share more details once this process is completed.
The A321XLR flight-testing process is just about to start and will aim to confirm the aircraft’s performance and capabilities.
The Company continues to work towards a first flight in June 2022.
The entry-into-service is scheduled in early 2024 in order to meet certification requirements.
Only if pushed: What are these new proposed requirements?
It is about modifications to the belly fairing structure linked to the specific design of the XLR.
For reference, latest EASA statement on the Special Conditions being published for comment:
“EASA has published a Special Condition for public comment that is applicable to the Airbus A321XLR, for which a major design change is proposed through the inclusion of a rear centre tank. It is the responsibility of the
manufacturer to demonstrate compliance with the Special Condition. A further Special Condition will be published at a later stage addressing the crashworthiness of this design.
Note: The Special Condition published is a generic document and is not specific to the A321XLR.”
Media challenging A321XLR EIS early 2024:

LTT:
The entry-into-service is expected to take place in early 2024 in order to meet certification requirements under discussion with the airworthiness authorities.
Safety is the No 1 priority and we let independent authorities like EASA/FAA do their work without rush / time pressure.
As the discussions with the Airworthiness Authorities are still on-going, we are not in a position to comment. We will share more details once this process is completed. Again: Safety is the No 1 priority, and we work in a
very open way with the Certification Authorities.

STEPs main bricks
STEP4
○ MG3 closure planned for June 2022
○ EIS in early 2026
STEP5 (internally 4.2)

○ Minimum scope of former STEP5
○ Focussing on Product Line integration (New Avionics, FCMS)
○ Mandatory items to be defined (Reach, Halon, ...)
STEP5+
○ EIS shifted to late 2020’s
○ Focussed on Customer Value & Industrial improvements
○ Certification, societal & environmental requirement compliance for the 2030+
○ Transition and de-risking of future single aisle program)

P2F messages
- A321P2F Continuous Development activities by EFW & Airbus in progress:
– ACT 1 & 2 option, offering range extension (400Nm at max structural payload)
– Noise Chapter IV (ICAO annex 16) offered for all configurations:
– especially for CFM-powered highest WV (001/011), flight control law upgrade under development
- Customer Support organization set-up by EFW and Airbus, objective is to ensure the appropriate coordination between STC and
TC holders
- A321P2F > 7 a/c in-service, 20 redeliveries in 2022

- A320P2F certified by EASA in March, EIS in June (Pradhaan Air), FAA STC expected by Aug 2022

eRudder
- Safety improvement: UERF, rudder doublet

- Weight saving : -35kg per aircraft
- DMC reduction : -0,3$ per FH/aircraft
- Removal of 2 FACs & 1 SEC
- OR figures: saving of 1OI/10000TO
- eRudder First Flight in May 2021
- eRudder baseline on XLR Aircraft (first eRudder EIS)
- certification targeted for Q1 2023
- EIS on A321NEO (2025) and A320NEO (2026) with STEP4
- eRudder… as on all Airbus Long Range Aircraft

New avionics
Context
- Traffic growth
- High level of safety of our Single Aisle fleet & functional enhancement needs.
- Current avionics platform is approaching hard limits for this enhancement
=> New Flight control & Flight management architecture enable to prepare the future
Product development
New Avionics IFCS & nFMS will enable:
- Increased flight control protection domain & normal laws availability
- Enhanced Autopilot availability
- Generic Laws Introduction on whole SA family
- Support Safety Beyond Standard Fly functions deployment
- Flight Management System more robust & resilient, with A350 functions
=> First step to prepare the route to Single Pilot Operation thanks to the exposition of flight control & flight management “bricks”
=> Easier future upgrades thanks to more evolutive Software & Hardware architecture

Substance Roadmap
- Increased pressure from regulation on substances roadmap

- Rolling topics -> Airbus try to group / rationalize replacement within STEPs policy to minimize as much as possible operational impact
- Big Wave to replace chromate before sept 2024 (Anti corrosion Bath + hard chrome plating)
- Challenge is not only for Airbus but also monitor and check carefully Supply chain -> potentially 800 modifications request from now
until 2024.
- Next to come before 2026 Primers ( last chomate part)
- Halon replacement / obsolescences (not easy potentially +80kg)
- Permanent survey on substances regulation evolution ( like lead, PFAS , carbon ..)and active contribution at sectoral level

SAF
Background & objective

- SAF is an important part of aviation’s path towards more sustainable flights.
- Airbus is engaged on Sustainable Aviation Fuels since 2011 and is pioneering research to understand the benefits and challenges
of using SAF on aircraft.
- In 2021, Airbus and partners launched studies ECLIF3 (A350) & VOLCAN (A320neo) to test 100% SAF capability and to better
understand in-flight emissions.
Business benefits
- 100% blend for all products between 2025 and 2030
- Up to 80% reduction of CO2 emissions on its life cycle
- Better understand the impact of using 100% SAF, not only on the propulsion system, airframe and aircraft performance, but also
on non-CO2 cruise emissions (NOx, contrails)
Next steps
- Accelerate regular use of sustainable fuels within the aviation industry
- ECLIF3 & VOLCAN first studies results in 2022

Engines

Lisbon
Biocide & test kit usage - Sustainable Aviation Fuel

Presented by Benoit MERENCIANO
Your photo
• A300/A310/A330/A340 Fuel System Product Leader also Focal Point for Fuel
Transverse topics such as SAF, microbiological contamination.
Presented by
• A330/A340 Fuel System Specialist for three years Benoit
• A318/A319/A320/A321 Fuel System Specialist for three years. MERENCIANO
A300/A310/A330/A340
Fuel System Product
Leader
benoit.merenciano@airbus.com

Update of Biocide Sustainable Conclusion
Aviation Fuel
Update on biocides & test kits
Engine IFSD and Ban of Kathon on GE, Improvement to AMM Several reports of accuracy
stall events CFM, EA engines biocide application issue with Fuelstat Resinae
Suspicion of biocide Aim at reducing human error Review of data and in-service trial
overdosage
2019 2020 2021
OIT 999.0053/19 AMM update: Kathon removal OIT 999.0027/21 Removal of test kit
and improvements from AMM
No known airframe issue. Engine OEM concern

Update on biocides & test kits
By OEM: Slow progress due to industry

By MOD concern
Industry:
By UE:
ASTM BPR approval Lengthy process
BPR: Biocidal Product Regulation
In service data may

be needed for
approval
Airbus remains actively involved with operators and at industry level to find and introduce
alternatives while ensuring A/C safety

Aviation Fuel
● CO2 reduction roadmap

● Fuel Specification
● 100% SAF challenges
● Path to 100% SAF
● Regional
A320 Family European Airbus Engagement
Conference, on SAF
Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022
SAF - Aviation CO2 reduction roadmap
A multifaceted approach is required to achieve industry CO2 ambitions
Latest generation aircraft

y
ienc
effic
019
zen2
Fro
Disruptive technology
Operations & Infrastructures
Sustainable Aviation Fuels
Carbon Offsets and Negative Emissions
Sustainable Aviation Fuel is playing major role in CO2 neutral aviation by 2050

SAF - Fuel Specification
Aviation fuel are defined by specifications. Other

Airbus approves specifications and not specific fuels. specifications
9 pathways in ASTM D7566: Fuel conforming to:

● 7 blending (1 max 10% and ● ASTM D1655
6 max 50%) ● Def Stan 91-091
ASTM ASTM
D1655 D7566
● 2 co-processing (max 5%) ● GB 6537
● CAN CGSB 3.23
Are certified for use on

Airbus aircraft and can
SAF contain up to 50% SAF
Specification does not define the
sustainability of a fuel
ASTM D1655

SAF - Chemistry Lesson
= +
Paraffins & cycloparaffins: 80-90% Aromatics: 10-20%
Aromatics:
Burning with Non-CO2 Aromatics are

less efficiency emissions Risk of leak
But needed for Nitrile
Rubber Seals
Persistent
Contrail

SAF - Path to 100% SAF
FUEL TYPE AIRCRAFT IMPACT EMISSIONS BENEFIT
Jet A1 “drop-in”
-80% CO2 emissions
(ASTM D1655 / D7566) No impact - to be
Benefit for climate
approved, fuel must
Some pathways can be
be compatible with
raised to 100%, Some reduction in
normally if they are all aircraft currently in
non-CO2 emissions*
blended with synthetic service.
aromatics.
Jet X “non drop-in” Change to aircraft &

-80% CO2 emissions
New fuel specification engine specification -
Benefit for climate
new certification
Extended specification
allowing 0% aromatics
activity required.
fuels, like those available Significant reduction in
on the market today, to be Some modifications non-CO2 emissions*
used at 100%. may be needed. Benefit for climate & air quality
* non-CO2 emissions: contrails, particulates

SAF - Airbus Engagement on SAF
Customer deliveries with SAF since

- 2016 Toulouse 2030
- 2018 Mobile
- 2020 Hamburg
2025
First “Perfect Flight” using 50% blend
SAF on A319 2022
2021
Airbus aircraft 100% SAF capable
50% SAF on Airbus longest flight using SAF 2020 by 2025-2030
A321 pax flights (ITAKA)
2019
100% SAF
2016 Flight test campaigns
2015
SAF: <1% jet
2008 2011 2012 2014 fuel used
SAF on Beluga Engagement with Airlines,

operations industry partners & policy makers
Launch of Sustainable Aviation Certification & Fuel

Gas to Liquid kerosene Engagement Programme Approval
(GtL) research
Biofuel initiatives
with Iberia & Spanish Government
Innovation & R&D

Copyright © Airbus SAS. 2022. All rights reserved.
Aviation Fuel

- Conclusion
• Airbus remains actively involved with
operators and at industry level to find
and introduce alternatives keeping A/C
safety in mind
• Airbus is deeply engaged on SAF and

aim at leading the path to a greener
aviation

Thank you
Lisbon
Supply chain readiness

Presented by Sascha HORATZEK
21st- 21-22nd
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 22ndJune
June 2022 - Lisbon EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
2022
Supply Chain Readiness
Your
» SATAIR Supply Chain: From demand forecasting to material on the shelf photo here
• In SATAIR since 2017

• In Airbus since 2005
Presented by
• Various roles in Procurement, Supply Chain Quality and Material Management Dr. Sascha
Horatzek
VP Supply Chain
sascha.horatzek@airbus.com

Post-Covid storm effects are surrounding Supply Chain
Global freight Changed order Export Control / Disrupted Credit blocks =

market disruption behaviour Sanctions automation manual workload
Staffing / Talents / Higher focus on

Retention CO2 footprint
Cost Lower Inbound

pressure Reliability
Raw material Longer

shortages Lead-times
Summer of
Smaller quantities
revenge travel
ordered
ahead

Risk Mitigation Internal Risk Conclusion
towards supplier Mitigation
Risk mitigation towards Suppliers -
Key points
Approach
Current crisis-mitigation Tasks Forces
• Identify potential transversal risks

due to worldwide events
• Perform market study and exposure

Polymers Electronic Transport & assessment
Components Logistics
• Evaluate risk and opportunities for
short-, mid and long-term
• Build up short-, mid and long-term

Semi finished
derisking strategy with the affected
Forging &
suppliers
metallurgical Casting
products
• Monitor success and quickly react in
case of unexpected circumstances

Risk mitigation towards Suppliers - Ramp-up risk analysis for main
Proprietary Parts Suppliers
Approach
● Supplier assessment along 7 areas
People AOG Capacity Raw Ramp- Sub-Tier General

Material up Mng. Risk
Results ➢ Main issues: raw material, subtiers and blue/white

collar capacity
7 ➢ Support suppliers within their supply chain

(finding alternatives, ...)
22 2
➢ Arbitrate parts demand between series production
and customer services

Internal Risk Mitigation - Satair Supply Chain Key points
Improvements
Handling a critical situation between Covid crisis and ramp-up
Actions taken to improve customer experience Inventory Ex-SC

GOSP
ramp-up* OTD
Advanced material ordering Improved reliability for
to allow longer lead times regional distribution
+100
90% 88%
m$
Improved analytic demand Improve & Stabilize
forecast avoiding stock-outs Reliability of Ex-SC OTD
Material Stock Operational

forecast Transfer headcount
accuracy* Order OTD** ramp-up*
Monthly Satair
Purchase Order +25%p +22%p +25%
Volume to Suppliers
* 12/2021-12/2022
19 2020 2021 22
** Within last 12 months
9
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991 GOSP= Global Off Shelf Performance
OTD= On-Time Delivery
Supply Chain Readiness - Conclusion
• The global supply chain is disrupted
• Satair is massively ramping up

inventory
• Order earlier and in larger quantities

Thank you
This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of Airbus. No intellectual property
rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not
be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the expressed written consent of Airbus. This
document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied.
Lisbon
BSCU P/N E21327307 increased rate of BRAKES SYS 1(2) FAULT

Presented by Xavier SOBRA
BSCU P/N E21327307 increased rate of BRAKES SYS 1(2)
FAULT Your photo
here
• Braking and Steering Customer support - A320 Presented by
Xavier
• Flight Control Systems Customer Support - A330/A340 - A350 actuation systems SOBRA
• Technical Support at Safran Ventilation Systems (ATA21/32 equipment) Braking and Steering
System Engineer
xavier.sobra@airbus.com

BSCU P/N 307 Conclusion
● Root cause
● Mitigation
BSCU P/N E21327307: Background and issue description
How does it work?
A320FAM aircraft are equipped with a Braking & Steering Control Unit with 2 segregated channels.
It ensures Normal Braking (including autobrake), Anti-skid regulation and Nose Wheel Steering.
Issue
BSCU P/N E21327307 introduced in March 2021 to cope with an obsolescence issue.
Higher rate of BSCU failure detected in aircraft assembly line:
➢ Scenario 1: Single BSCU channel failure - BRAKES SYS 1(2) FAULT
○ Remaining channel takes control, no loss of braking and steering function.
➢ Scenario 2: Dual BSCU channel failure - BRAKES A/SKID N/WS FAULT
○ Normal braking, Anti-skid and Nose Wheel Steering become inoperative,
○ Alternate braking without Anti-Skid available.
Mitigations in aircraft final assembly line:

➢ Increase BSCU screening before aircraft delivery since Dec 2021
➢ BSCU replaced if exhibits the problem and screening performed again.

BSCU P/N E21327307 - In-Service Publications and immediate actions
Publications Associated actions
AOT BSCU removal in case AOT fault combinaison triggered.
A32N025-22 Prevent installation of BSCU 307 on aircraft not fitted with 307 from production.
FOT MMEL update for aircraft fitted with BSCU 307 - ensure availability of retardation
FOT-999-0010-22-00 means.
FCOM/QRH reset procedure update - prevent hard BSCU reset.
Followed by EASA AD 2022-0032 and FAA AD 2022-08213.
Management of in-service BSCU

● Specific Safran LS spare support (service letter ref. E21327-32-3504 rev.1)
○ Preventive removal not supported.
● Strategy to reserve the limited pool of former BSCU standards for in-service only in case of event.
● BSCU P/N 307 not delivered as spare units.
Some figures:
● As of June 2022, 213 aircraft fitted with BSCU P/N E21327307 were delivered.
● On monitored aircraft, 15 events -all scenario 1- for 50 000 Flight Cycles (~ 90 000 Flight Hours)
● Failure Rate: 1 event every 3400 FC / 6000FH
BSCU P/N E21327307 - Root Cause and Mitigations
Root Cause
● Airbus, Safran LS, Thales fully engaged in the root cause analysis.
● Flight tests with instrumented BSCU took place in April.
→ Faulty monitoring identified,
→ Failure can be reproduced on test bench.
● Currently focusing on factors potentially affecting the monitoring, either:

○ Internal to the BSCU
○ External to the BSCU: sources of electrical noise contemplated (tachometers harness shielding, electrical
relay).
Mitigation
● Introduction of a different relay type at 24GG / 25GG - certified (MOD 171984),
○ Objective: reduce exposure to AOT fault signatures.
○ Strategy:
■ Aircraft in production fitted with relay from June,
■ Efficiency assessment for 3 months,
■ Deployment in-service.
● Continuation of BSCU screening before aircraft delivery.

BSCU P/N 307 - Conclusion
● Root cause is still under investigation

○ The BSCU monitoring at the origin of the fault is known,
○ An information session/ webinar will be organised once the complete root
cause is identified.
● TFU 32.42.00184 regularly updated to reflect progresses on

investigation and mitigations.
● Mitigation under evaluation - introduction of relay 24GG / 25GG PN

ASNE0669.
● Safran LS service letter detail the logistic and spare support.


Topic Status Ref
A320FAM BSCU P/N E21327307 increased Published 32.42.00184
rate of BRAKES SYS 1(2) FAULT detected
prior to delivery

Glossary
Acronym Definition
BSCU Braking & Steering Control Unit

Thank you
Lisbon
A321 Failure of the Brake Temperature Indication

Presented by Xavier SOBRA
A321 BTS / BTMU Failures
Your photo
• Braking and Steering Customer support - A320

• Flight Control Systems Customer Support - A330/A340 - A350 actuation systems
Presented by
• Technical Support at Safran Ventilation Systems (ATA21/32 equipment) Xavier
SOBRA
Braking and Steering
System Engineer
xavier.sobra@airbus.com

Failure of the Brake Conclusion
Temperature
Indication
Temperature
Indication
How does it work?

● 1 Brake Temperature Sensor (BTS) per brake / 4 per AC
● Brake Temperature Monitoring Unit (BTMU): one per MLG
● BTS signal → BTMU → BSCU → T° indication in the
cockpit
Issue description :
New BTS PN C20464002 introduced end 2019.
Aircraft fitted with latest BTS standard are experiencing a

significant increase of:
● Loss of brake temperature information → GO-IF situation,
● Erratic brake temperature indication → FCOM application.

A321 Failure of the Brake Temperature Indication - Root Cause Status
Multiple contributors identified:

● Change of BTS connector design from rubber to glass sealing,
○ Loads transferred to the BTS electrical pins not more
compensated.
● Vibrations:
○ Flight test to measure vibrations → result analysis
on-going.
● BTMU connector deformation:
○ Consequential to installation with BTS PN C20464002,
○ Free-play and vibrations,
○ Increase rate of failure despite BTS replacement.
BTS
The outcomes of the root cause analysis are expected by Groove deformation
September 2022.
BTMU

A321 Failure of the Brake Temperature Indication - Mitigations

● Pre-mod BTS available as spare since Jan-22, since
June-22 for production a/c.
● MMEL modification to allow ground tool to temperature

measurement → MMEL revision August 2022
● Visual inspection of BTS/BTMU connectors to identify

BTS locking partially visible
damaged BTMU connector: BTMU internal damages
○ TSM modification→ August 2022
○ BTMU CMM revision → August 2022

Temperature
Indication

- Conclusion
● Root cause analysis outcomes expected by September 2022
● PRE/POST MOD BTS are two way interchangeable as per IPC:
○ PRE MOD PN C20464001 is preferred
● MMEL modification: alternative to ground brake cooling time
○ August 2022
● BTMU connector found damaged during RC investigations
○ New visual inspection in TSM
● Solution expected by mid 2023.


Topic Status Ref
A321 - Failure of the Brake Temperature 32.47.00018 Published
Indication

Glossary
Acronym Definition
BTS Brake Temperature Sensor
BTMU Brake Temperature Monitoring Unit

Thank you
Lisbon
Cabin Air Quality - a “FRESH” update

A320Fam strategy - FRESH project
Objectives and roadmap

Jan-19 - Start
Preventing
smell
event Until Oct-19 - Collection
Until Jul-20 – Feasibility
Since Aug-20 - Development

Strategy
Since Jun-21 - retrofit needs
Efficiently Limiting
fixing it its impact
Page EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991

2
A320Fam - FRESH project - Forum objectives
For smell prevention
● Provide an overview of the APU on-going

enhancements by Airbus
● Identify retrofit needs to optimize logistic

aspects HUGO CASADO
A320FAM CHIEF ENGINEER
For impact limitation
● Detail available technologies and associated

availability timeline
● Understand your interest for such devices
For maintenance optimization

PIERRE-OLIVIER TRAINS
CABIN AIR QUALITY PRODUCT
● Exchange on additional opportunities LEADER
CUSTOMER SERVICES
● Highlight added value of new GSEs

3
Preventing Limiting its Efficiently
fixing it
smell event impact (via DEMO)
fixing it
• Via already available

options
• Via enhancement under
development A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
Preventing smell event - Via already available solutions Key points
▪ Take benefit of
APU specific solutions already existing
solutions to reduce
● Hydropad seals for APU 131-9A via VSB
131-49-8126 odors in cabin
○ - 34% retrofit performed
Note: New enhancement to come by Honeywell
▪ Adjust APU
● Carbon seals for APU APS3200 via VSB
APS-49-320171/2 inspection to limit
risk of
● Cooling Fan for APU 131-9A: contamination
○ Via VSB 131-49-8339 & 3616140-49-8340
available in Oct-21
○ ~340 units flying with no in-service issue so far
▪ ISI 21.00.00139
APU gutters preventing water ingress refers as digest for
SOF
● Now installed as standard modification linefit
recommendations
● Available for retrofit via standard Service Bulletin
52-1152, 52-1193 or 52-1192
○ Very low volume of retrofit performed so far

Troubleshooting and Good Practices Guides for SIC/OIC events Key points
▪ ISI 49.00.00010 for
APU Warm-up procedure before APU bleed selection FCTM SOP APU 131-9A
● Recommendation already
● Wait at least 3 minutes after APU start before selecting APU Bleed available to delay APU Bleed
selection after APU start.
● In some cases, selecting APU Bleed upon APU start leads to a
stressing operation of the APU before a desirable warm-up.
AMM
● The APU warm up allows the different internal seals to reach
optimum performances. ● Recommendation available on
Pre-conditioning with APU TASK.
● In some cases, traces of oil present in the APU air path due to minor Main AMM TASKs covered.
leakages can be eliminated with APU operation at Ready-to-Load
and evacuated through the APU surge duct. APU Bleed selection
upon APU start does not allow to eliminate these traces before FCOM update status
sending the Load Compressor air to the aircraft Environmental
Control System (ECS). ● Customized FCOM can be
launched at operators’ level.

fixing it
• Via already available

options
• Via enhancement under
development A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
Identified reasons for APU bleed contamination
● Internal oil leaks

● Oil over-servicing
● External leaks via drain mast Address
Over-servicing
issue
Relocate the APU

air intake
● External
pollution such
as de-icing or
hydraulic fluid
or re-ingested Develop a fixed ducting
fluid from drain
concept for air intake
mast
● Misalignment or damage of
seals leading to pollution
ingestion in the APU ducting

Proposed solution efficiency assessment by Airbus
Airline reporting analysis Focusing on re-ingestion Conclusion by Airbus
● Events analysed (official reporting tool to ● No visible contribution from APU LH side door ● Very difficult to make a commitment on
EASA) expected enhancements
● 17% seem to be related to APU over-servicing
○ From 2016 to 2021
● Best estimation as follows
○ Both APU models
● 45% would be linked to re-ingestions of APU
external oil leaks ○ Improving resistance to over-servicing =
15% savings
● 38% would be related to ingestion of other
than APU contaminants ○ Improving the sealing concept and drainage
system = 45% savings
○ Relocation of APU air intake = 85% savings
Airbus overview
● 12% are internal to APUs
○ Out of project scope
● 88% are related to leak re-ingestion

Preventing smell event – Linefit and retrofit
Aligned way-forward
Current status
● Power Electronic Control Box (ECB) during the complete APU shutdown sequence,
independently of the BATs P/B position
● Flight tests completed successfully for all APUs options

○ Performed for 131-9A and APS3200
Mitigation
Address ● APU shutdown procedure to be strictly applied as per Standard Operating Procedure
Over-servicing issue
15% of events
Develop a fixed Implementation strategy

ducting concept for
air intake ● Linefit confirmed 4Q22 (STEP 2)
45% of events
● Retrofit available in Mar-22 for APU 131-9A for a limited effectivity (see next slide)
Relocate the APU
air intake – ○ SB 49-1119(ceo) & 49-1120 (neo)
eliminate most of ○ Total MHs = 42 - Elapsed time = 24.5 MH
issues ○ Kit cost = ~5000 $

Focus on ECB wiring SB effectivity limitation
Certification challenge
● Certification for GCP 36-300 APU initially considered Next steps
2 operators included first
● Needed to have support for the flight test and ● If interested with full fleet retrofit
certification exercise
○ No technical blockers identified
○ Bespoke solution to be defined (planning
TBD)
Technical challenge ○ Support and commitment from interested
operators
● A/C pre MOD 35508 (enhanced 103VU capacity)
not included; MOD introduced in 2006 MSNs < 2835 no longer
considered
● Configuration of A/C pre MOD 35508 likely
customized by operators => not one solution fits all
SB authoring challenge Recommendation by Airbus to

first validate efficiency
● Hundreds of configuration leadings to too many SB effectivity limited to in-service with current SB
retro-drawings to be produced for a possibly low priority operators (~20) effectivity
selection rate (at fleet level) as per previous surveys
outcomes by end 2Q22
● Would impact the end availability for interested
operators

Preventing smell event – Linefit and retrofit
Aligned way-forward
Current status
● Design frozen (with operator feedback integrated)
● Very limited impact on weight and direct maintenance costs
● No APU performance impact or interface change
Implementation strategy
Address
● Linefit during 4Q22 (STEP2)
15% of events
○ Dry-run for installation will be made within RUAG during Q3 2022
Develop a fixed ● Retrofit available via SB 53-1500 (ceo) & SB 53-1501 (neo)
ducting concept for Key aspect is to properly
air intake
45% of events
○ Total MH value estimated 160MH (Elapsed Time 90MH - 4 days) anticipate the airline
▪ includes APU R/I (16MH elapsed time) selection rate
Relocate the APU
○ Kit cost ~ 50k$ (At cost by Airbus)
air intake – ○ Effectivity and content (see next slide)
eliminate most of ○ Note: APU Gutters is a prerequisite (SB 52-1152, 52-1193 or 52-1192)
issues

APU leaks ingestions 🡺 Fixed APU ducting + Drainage enhancements
Drainage enhancements RH side door
● New profile concept (fireproof tube, doubler…).
● Drainage path of the fluids will be completely fireproof (for APU

compartment and APU turbo machine drainages).
14
APU leaks ingestions 🡺 Fixed APU ducting + Drainage enhancements
Diffuser needs Elbow can remain on wing
Air intake duct replacement
● Elbow not impacted
● Diffuser can not be reused
○ Rework not possible as fittings installation in metallic

acoustic sandwich
○ Replacement of sidewall panels only reviewed but

discarded as assessed to be too complex Vs cost
benefit
15
Focus on fixed ducting concept for air intake - SB effectivity limitation
SB content But….
● New RH side door ● Not possible to trace the 3 configurations in-service (introduced via minor MOD)
● LH side door removed from the kit
○ Will be available via IPC ● Decision to limit current SB effectivity
○ Commercial conditions under negotiation for attractive price ○ MSNs => ~1500 (ST1 => 1419, ST2 => 1438, ST3 => 1440, Other ST = All)
● New drainage system
● New diffuser ● Proposed way-forward for MSNs < 1500
○ Confirm interest for retrofit by operators
○ A/C inspection to confirm configuration (based on Airbus recommendation)
S 19.1 in-service configuration ■ If conf 1 = MSN to be added to effectivity
■ If conf 2 or 3, technical solution to be developed by Airbus (planning
● 3 configurations existing TBC) and then included in relevant SB
● Minor technical changes between configurations

○ Drawings are available
○ Mostly related to internal tailcone structure changes
● Technical solution
Internal tailcone structure
○ Available for configuration 1 ( >85% of the fleet)
○ Not initiated for configuration 2
changes (false frames, Operator’s guidance
rivets, …) expected
○ Not initiated for configuration 3
Note: “Minor” retro-drawings (and kits) adaptation anticipated

Preventing smell event – Linefit only
Aligned way-forward
Design enhancement
PRE POST
● Top Air intake (COBRA)
● Fix Air intake + drainage enhancements
● Require significant changes on S19:
○ Wiring routing
○ New actuator
○ New ducts, rod and flap
○ Airframe modification…etc
Address
15% of events
Develop a fixed
ducting concept for
air intake
45% of events
New flap and
Relocate the APU connection to
air intake – New Flap actuator
eliminate most of
airframe
issues (COBRA)
New ducts and rod

Preventing smell event – Linefit only
Aligned way-forward
Current status
● Flight testing performed successfully

○ Honeywell APU in Q2 2021
○ Pratt APU in Q1 2022
● Feasibility and satisfactory APU stability and operation has been demonstrated
○ A/C aerodynamics ⇒ No impact
○ APU performance ⇒ No operation degradation on ground and in flight
Address ○ APU Time On Wing ⇒ Limited impact (under discussion with OEMs)
15% of events ● Demonstration phase finalized => Development launch now official
Develop a fixed ● APU OEMs fully engaged

ducting concept for
air intake
45% of events ● Implementation target end 2025 (STEP 4)
Relocate the APU

air intake –
eliminate most of
issues (COBRA)

fixing it
• Via efficient
mitigation
• Via early detection
Limiting its impact - Via efficient mitigation
Filtration in the ECS

System
Catalysis in the Bleed Air System

Limiting its impact - Via efficient mitigation Key points
Aligned way-forward
Recirculation filters to limit duration of event ▪ New recirculation
filter available in
● PALL Recirculation filters with additional carbon elements - remove IPC
odors as well as particulates.
● Available as option linefit and via IPC for in-service A/C

▪ No viable option
● Possible MPD update presented at last MWG (feb)
○ Outcome was that additional data needed from different exists today to filter
climatic areas before MPD can be updated. Fresh air from
ECS, despite the
Fresh air filtration system risk mitigation
Filtration in the ECS System activities
● Airbus continuously evaluates all existing and state-of-the-art
technologies that could further enhance cabin air quality.
performed by Pall
Catalysis in the Bleed Air System ● Airbus, has evaluated the implementation of filtration downstream of
the mixer unit, specifically, the system developed by Pall Aerospace
(aka MaVE), in all likely operating scenarios.
● Airbus concluded that, due to significant performance shortfalls,

there is currently no possibility to implement the existing Pall
Aerospace product across the A320 platform.

Fresh air filtration system - identified risks
▪ Several MAJOR
failure conditions
Filtration in the ECS
System
Key indicator Consequence of adding a filter Rationale remain and are
considered
Major failure Undetected filter blockage (for example by ice) will 1- Blockage of all filters
Catalysis in the scenario lead to unacceptable
Bleed Air System
(1) loss of air flow to cabin, (2) overheat of air 2- Hot trim air injection is upstream
▪ Airbus does not

conditioning ducts and (3) possible damage or of filter device and duct temp
disconnection of ducts, leading to AOG sensor is downstream of the
device support the
Cabin ventilation 1-Reduced cabin ventilation flow due to added 1- Added pressure drop on circuit development and
flow pressure drop on circuit cannot be compensated by fan implementation of
2-Potential flow imbalance across the zones with
negative effect on zone temperature 2- different clogging characteristics
the filter in its
for the 5 downstream filters current state for the
Thermal comfort Excursion of cabin temperature up to 2°C in hot day Reduced ventilation flow
A320 Family, either
conditions due to reduced ventilation flow possibly for cabin or cockpit.
leading to passengers and crew complaints
Equipment integrity On A321, potential recirculation fan failure If the filter High filter pressure drop
pressure drop is too high
Maintenance High maintenance costs due to poor accessibility of

filter elements

Aligned way-forward
Rig test campaign by Airbus
● To better understand the catalysis effect (using existing

▪ Rig testing to
OZC) on engine oil with; understand
○ Tests with pure substances catalysis effects
○ Tests with engine oil done in 2021
● Investigating ECS and bleed ducting decontamination
enhancement options
● Achieved and analyzed in 2021. ▪ Further catalyst
development way
Filtration in the ECS System
forward defined
Catalysis in the Bleed Air

System

Aligned way-forward
Take Away from tests with pure substances ▪ VOZC reduces
pure substances
● Toluene and Valeric Acid
better than
● VOC converter shows significant enhancements in the standard OZC
removal efficiency of volatile organic gaseous oil
breakdown products in direct comparison to the ▪ Removal efficiency
Standard Ozone Converter from BASF
increases with
temperature
Filtration in the ECS System
● The difference gets even more evident for low system
operating temperatures (e.g. APU cold day or some
DESCENT cases)
Catalysis in the Bleed Air
System
● Increase in system operating temperatures shows a
positive effect on the removal efficiency of valeric acid
and toluene single compounds and gaseous oil
breakdown products.

Take Away from tests with engine oil injection
● When oil reaches the
Filtration in
the ECS
converter, generation of
System
odorous breakdown
products increases
Catalysis in
the Bleed Air
System
● Either the increase of
surface area or the
catalyst itself promotes
hydrolysis and formation
of odorous breakdown
products. This effect is
stronger on the std OZC
● No significant difference
in concentration and
type of by-products
generated by the
oxidation of the Eastman
2197 and Mobil Jet
120C 140C 180C 220C 120C 140C 180C 220C
turbine oils

Summary of conclusions from rig testing
For operators with standard ● VOZC is no “universal”

OZC and having Oil odours, solution for oil
Airbus recommends the BASF contamination related
VOC OZC odors
● With oil reaching the

converter, the increase of
surface, or the catalyst
Options to install VOC OZC itself promotes hydrolysis
and formation of odorous
● As per the IPC, P/N breakdown products from
available for all MSNs fitted engine oil.
with Std OZC ● This effect seems to be
pronounced for OZC and
● As per BASF VSB is less severe for the
20499-21-001 VOZC units
○ Available (Q2 2022)
○ Estimated recoring price ● Improved VOZC unit
~13k$ under development
○ Retrofit capacity
between 35 to 45 units
per months

Limiting its impact - Via efficient mitigation
New VOC OZC option Current status Next steps
● Development of OZC with ● Result of Airbus scan of the ● One prototype is already under testing
dedicated coating for market shows that technology
engine oil catalysis may exist ● 2nd prototype would be available by end of
capacity. April
○ Increasing the current
● Targeting efficiency => OZC core surface and ● Development launch by Airbus based on
below “nose detection adapting the coating internal testing results
threshold” ○ Modifying the materials ○ How close will we be from our
and matrix architecture expectations?
● Keeping same interfaces
with currently installed ● Theoretical values for now ● Confirmation expected 2Q22
OZC
● Need testing by Airbus to ● Development lead-time depending then on
confirm specifications could be technology chosen
reached

27
fixing it
• Via efficient mitigation

• Via early detection
Limiting its impact - Via early detection – Dedicated sensor Key points
▪ Usage of such
Aligned way-forward technology to be
Portable device as short-term objective managed by
● Cross Program
regulations
● Integrated into Airbus TSM philosophy ▪ Mid-term objective

○ New task on the use of the device is to move towards
○ Within COS table for T/S odor source
system integrated
○ Within AMM decontamination task
sensors
A/C integrated sensor as long-term objective
Mass-spectrometer ▪ Sensor technology
● Launched as R&D project
robustness now
● First prototype/demonstrator expected end investigated by
2022 Airbus
○ Ultra Fine Particle (UFP) Sensing
Flight tests started
○ TVOC Sensing
Major Industrial partner Sensor B
Sensor A

Limiting its impact - Via early detection – Portable Device Key points
Test Conditions for selection of device technology

▪ Most aircraft fluids
covered
- Bleed air flow rate: 0.55 kg/s
- Bleed air temperatures: 160°C, 180°C, 200°C, 220°C ▪ Humidity effects
- Humidity: ~120 ml/min; 0 ml/min and ~220 ml/min at 200°C included
→ ~38%@25°C; → 70%@25°C
Injected fluids
- Engine oil MobilJet II

- APU oil Eastman 2389
- Deicing fluid type 1
- Hydraulic Fluid HyJet V
- Toluene (for T-VOC measurement)

Limiting its impact - Via early detection – Portable Device Key points
Test Results and technology comparison
▪ The selected device
Injected fluid resonance frequency selected technology metal-oxide ▪ detected injected
detection sensors substances reliably
▪ For all tested
Engine oil ~20% correctly identified (as oil), combinations at a
(Mobil Jet II) ~50% as wrong substance sufficient
~30% no fluid identified No tests performed at concentration, the
Airbus - accuracy to detect
APU oil 100% no fluid identified, 100% accuracy above the
not able to the correct
(ETO 2389) only detected as contamination detection limit
differentiate between substance was at
→ correct fluid identified,
Hydraulic ~20% correctly identified, different substances, 100%.
sensitivity varies with
Fluid ~10% as wrong substance, might be able to show
humidity and air
~70% no fluid identified an increase of overall
(HyJet V) temperature
contamination with low ▪ During testing, the
De-icing fluid ~50% correctly identified, sensitivity lower sensitivity limit
Type 1 ~10% as wrong substance, for all injected fluids
~40% no fluid identified was determined. It
has a relationship to
Toluene / prototype with low T-VOCs will be the bleed air
100% no fluid identified,
T-VOCs sensitivity → will be detected with low temperature and
only detected as contamination
improved for final device sensitivity humidity.

Portable Device to identify air contamination Key points
▪ Supplier contract
Overview and concept
Sensing capability made end 2021
● To identify and localise air contamination (e.g. oil) in cabin air to support airline and
▪ Prototype (lab)
maintenance operations.
testing done
● Oil, hydraulic fluid, de-icing, TVOC (total volatile organic compounds)
▪ 6 months
Two operating modes
development
● Ground: ▪ Cost around $65k

○ GSE used by maintenance operators for troubleshooting
○ Decontamination support / confirmation as per AMM
○ Integrated into TSM/AMM, envisaged as; ▪ Availability 40-50
■ New task on how to use the device per year possible
■ Cross referenced in the existing TSM/AMM tasks
(Integrated into COS sheet, linked to decontam AMM task)
● Flight (optional mode):

○ Cabin Air Quality Recorder, as a PED (Portable Electronic Device on Board).
○ “Aeroplane” mode, Safely stow (possibly in overhead bin), Data only used in
post-flight analysis by maintenance operator.

7-DEC 2021 A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022
First View of the Device under Development
Key points
▪ Preliminary
pictures
▪ Simplified post
measurement
interface on
tablet/PC

A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon,
Cabin Air Quality - A “FRESH” update - Conclusion

We started a fruitful collaboration
Let’s continue together !!

Thank you
fixing it
• Via improved
TechData
Efficiently fixing it - Via improved TechData Key points
▪ Objectives defined
▪ Full TSM task is an Delivered results with airline
overreaction! ● Odor level (A, B and C) philosophy validated community
▪ Too many steps! Limiting T/S and decontamination needs
▪ Too long!
Level A Level B ▪ Collaboration when
testing new tasks
Estimated time = 2MH Estimated time = 48MH
Level B
Estimated time = 8MH
▪ Thanks to all
▪ How to detect “light” ● 53 new tasks now available with May-21 Airnav operators involved!
Revision
oil contamination?
▪ Is it really efficient? ● 6 new GSEs developed

Efficiently fixing it - Via improved TechData
Rig testing
● Simulated contamination via fluid injection at relevant temperature and concentration (oil)
● Simulation of decontamination at different temperatures
● Efficiency assessment via mass spectrometer analysis and olfactory assessment
Example Test Rig Setup
Temperature impact on decontamination
▪ Temperature
● Confirmed through testing that the decontamination effectiveness (measured by the presence or absence of smell
during a simulated acceptance test) depends on the temperature reached.
improves efficiency
and speed of
decontamination
Bleed Air Time (min) Expected Expected risk of smell
Temperature decontamination occurrence during ▪ APU bleed
efficiency / “subsequent flight” temperature not
Rating
very good for
~230C 15 Very good / Very low decontamination
Highly recommended (HR)
~200 C 30 Good / Recommended (R) Low
170 90 Limited / Possible (P) for Possible

Level A contamination
140 >>90 Low/very low / High

Not Recommended (NR)

Decontamination bleed source recommendations arising from rig test results
• The table summarizes the recommendations for various decontamination air sources at ambient temperatures
between -30C and 50C. It is based on the expected temperature that can be reached throughout the bleed ducting. ▪ Engine bleed
always good for
decontamination.
Using GSe TCT
makes it even
better
▪ APU bleed has

limited
effectiveness for
decontamination
due to its lower
temperature

ECS pack decontamination tested on the rig
● Objective ▪ GSE Rod makes it

feasible to
○ Increase the pack internal temperatures during decontamination task on decontaminate
ground. The compressor outlet temperature shall aim to approach 220°C heat exchangers
instead of 160°C - 180°C
○ Verify ability to reproduce ECS pack odour on the ground ▪ Airbus
recommendation is
● Summary of Findings to take benefit of
the latest available
○ Using the newly developed GSE rod and the temp sim, it is possible to set of AMM tasks
get the compressor outlet up to 200 Deg C, therefore it is feasible to
decontaminate the primary and main heat exchangers.
○ ECS pack odour should be reproducible on the ground when using the GSE

Bleed Decontamination ▪ All variants

• 14 decontamination procedures available for each of the 4 engine types implemented in
• Engine, APU or HPGC can be bleed source OR used as a bleed air exhaust point AMM since May
2021
▪ Use of GSE TCT

(CEO only) during
ECS pack
decontamination to
enter AMM May
2022

Decontamination Task Structure AMM ATA36 – New Options
Key points
HP Ground
Variants 6,7 and 8 (Engine and APU bleed ducting) Connector to
be blocked
open
• HPGC (High Pressure Ground Cart) blocked open
• Improved decontamination for the engine bleed ducting
• No need to open ducts at pylon for engine bleed cleaning
• Use Engine or APU bleed air.
Decontamination Task Structure AMM ATA36 – New Options
Key points
Variant 9&10 – (APU Bleed Ducting)
• Enhanced decontamination for the APU bleed ducting
• Needs engine run
• Needs new GSE tooling
• Disconnect ECS FCVs
APU check
valve to be
removed, APU bleed ducting
GSE tool disconnected from
installed APU LCV,
Engine bleed flow
purged to ambient
● Cold ECS pack demand

Critical to decontaminate
ECS packs
● Temp sensor GSE
needed to drive ECS
pack cold In all
environments
● GSE rod to close RAI
helps to get ECS pack
upto good temperature
for decontamination
*RAD: RAM Air Door

*TCT: Temperature Control Thermostat
*BPV: Bypass Valve
Key points
New GSE
Description Part Number Note
APU Bleed Exhaust Duct 98D36109006000 Allow APU bleed line decontamination by engine ▪ TCT is for CEO
bleed or HPGC. Equated to variant 9,10,11. only
Recommended
APU Bleed Dummy Check Valve 98D36109005001
▪ Please consider
ordering the GSE
you want due to
Bleed System TCT (230 Deg C) SBE2272 Increase bleed temp upto 230C
CEO only long lead times !
HPGC Check Valve Defeater C21006-7 Allows bleed decontamination without needing
to disconnect ducting to exhaust the air
ECS pack RAI* Rod 98D21008001000

ECS Pack Decontamination
Cabin Temp Simulator 99L21008001002

Lisbon
PW Engine Fire Loops - Pylon & AGB - Rev1

Presented by DUBOIS Michael
PW Engine Fire Loops - Pylon & AGB
Your photo
• Today A320 Family Program manager in charge of the system topics such
as Electrical generation & Harnesses, Lights and Fire protection.
Presented by
• Previously, A320neo Fleet Performance Manager for the Fleet Performance Department within Michael DUBOIS
A320 Family Program
Customer Services for 3 years. Manager
• Manager of In-service data & information system for 6 years

michael.dubois@airbus.com
• Performance monitoring Manager for 2 years
• I started my career in Airbus technical data department like responsible of Component Maintenance
Manuals in 2003

Pylon fire loop Engine AGB fire loop Conclusion
Pylon fire loop detectors (PN 8891-48) - PW Fleet
Description
Pylon fire detectors removal (PN 8891-48 FIN 3WD1 – 3WD2 – 4WD1 –
4WD2) after ECAM “ENGx FIRE LOOP FAULT” due to broken detector
still experienced In-Service
● Despite improvement per SB 26-1115 (no longer be supplied)

Description
Pylon fire detectors removal (PN 8891-48 FIN 3WD1 – 3WD2 – 4WD1 –
4WD2) after ECAM “ENGx FIRE LOOP FAULT” due to broken detector
still experienced In-Service
● Despite improvement per SB 26-1115 (no longer be supplied)
• Root Cause Analysis have demonstrated that engine vibrations

are the cause of premature pylon fire detector breakages

• Mitigation plan will be made available by beg of Q3 2022

○ Update through TFU 26.12.00020 & neo Webinars
• Overall principle is to add additional clamps at strategic location.

○ These clamps will also bring damping effect that will prevent engine
vibrations from breaking the fire detectors

• Mitigation plan will be made available by beg of Q3 2022

○ Update through TFU 26.12.00020 & neo Webinars
• Overall principle is to add additional clamps at strategic location.

○ These clamps will also bring damping effect that will prevent engine
vibrations from breaking the fire detectors
• A Controlled Entry Into Service is ongoing since May 2022. Estimated time to perform the
○ 2 configurations are tested retrofit on one ramp is 3
■ 50% of ENG1 pylon fire loop will be replaced, and add. clamps Man-Hours
will be added
■ On all other engines, only add. clamps will be added SB Kit includes:
○ Monitoring phase with regular visual inspection of the area ● Sealant RTV106
■ Bi-weekly basis ● Primer SS4179
■ Approximately 1000FH per A/C exposure ● Cord NSA8420-5

Monitoring of
If successful,
CEIS start - May 22 installed CEIS end - Sep 22
SB release + kit
configurations
Solution
● Damping device introduced during CEIS will become the linefit solution.
○ Engine vibrations transmitted to fire detectors will be reduced
● Same solution will be introduced In Service through Airbus SB (fleet wide effectivity)
○ Target date: Q3 2022

Engine AGB fire loop - PW Fleet
Description
Multiple Customers reported intermittent faults and difficult troubleshooting

(because of the intermittency), mainly from AGB Fire Detector Loop A

Description
Multiple Customers reported intermittent faults and difficult troubleshooting

(because of the intermittency), mainly from AGB Fire Detector Loop A
Collins performed investigations with support from Meggitt (OEM). Most of the
time, the AGB Fire Detector is actually NFF.
According to Collins, the actual fault might come from:
• Chaffed wire in 4165KS

• Damaged Hi Temperature cables (FIN 4181KS and 4182KS)

● MMEL might be applied till final troubleshooting is achieved.
● COLLINS AOL - A320NEO - 025 provides similar information as Airbus TSM

in a more synthetic way.
● Collins training to MRO and mechanics upon request.
● Latest info in TFU 26.12.00.022

Solutions
● Collins has redesigned the electrical harness 4165KS (amendment c) to provide better resistance
to chaffing (Q1 2022)
● New (standard) harness and routing will replace Hi Temp cables (FIN 4181KS and 4182KS) in
production (Q3 2022) with VSB available to allow field modification

PW Engine Fire Loops - Pylon & AGB - Conclusion
➢ Investigations & Root cause validated
➢ Mitigations available
➢ Solutions available or on track


Topic Status Ref
PW Broken pylon fire loop Post MOD MOD 162818 - SB 26-1115 TFU 26.12.00.020
AGB Fire Detection reliability TFU 26.12.00.022

Thank you
Lisbon
Conference Day 2 Agenda

Conference Organisation - Agenda Day 2 – 22nd June 2022
Time Duration Day 2 topics - 22/Jun/22 Presenters

8:30 AM 0:05
2.1. Agenda Philippe Le Bigot
8:35 AM 0:15 2.2 Mandated Campaigns deadline recall Joseph Sauras
Christelle Ledauphin & Eric Joseph SAURAS Christelle LEDAUPHIN Eric JEANPIERRE Gerault BAYLE
8:50 AM 0:30 2.3. Safety Beyond Standard SR. DIRECTOR, A320 Family Program Product Safety TECH DATA A320
Jeanpierre A320 Family Program Manager Enhancement Manager Program Manager
Customer Services Customer Services Customer Services
9:20 AM 0:30 2.4. Technical Data Enhancement Gerault Bayle
9:50 AM 0:20 2.5. THSA Life limits Delphine Hertens-Orlando
10:10 AM 0:20 Coffee break
10:30 AM 0:15 2.6. SGS windshields inspection Laurent Stremler

Delphine HERTENS-ORLANDO Laurent STREMLER Dominique CHARLIER
Chief Engineering Manager A320 Family Program Manager SRM Customer Support Engineer
10:45 AM 0:25 2.7. SRM simplification Dominique Charlier A320 Family Program Customer Services Customer Services
Stephane Pireyre &

11:10 AM 0:25 2.8. Cockpit window frame
Laurent Stremler
11:35 AM 0:25 2.9. Wing Skin Corrosion Frederic Doule
2.10. Galley - Corrosion of trolley retainer (AD

12:00 PM 0:20 Luna Tokiko Cristalli
– 2021-0183R1) Stephane PIREYRE Frederic DOULE Luna TOKIKO CRISTALLI
EMBODIMENT INDUSTRIALIZATION Wing Pylon Structure Customer Support Engineering
12:20 PM 1:10 Lunch PROGRAM MANAGER Engineering Customer Services
CUSTOMER SERVICES Customer Services

Conference Organisation -
Agenda Day 2 – 22nd June 2022 Time Duration Day 2 topics - 22/Jun/22 Presenters
2.11. Landing Gear

- NLG Shock absorber dynamic seal
- NLG torque link Apex pin
1:30 PM 0:40 Matthieu Burlotte
- MLG door uplock proximity sensors faults
- MLG Axle chrome overheat damage
- MLG Sliding tube chrome damage
2.12. Field Loadable Software digitalization

2:10 PM 0:25 Lilian Segonds
and data security
Matthieu BURLOTTE Lilian Segonds Christelle LEDAUPHIN
Landing Gear System Expert Operations FLS A320 Family Program
Engineering Customer Services Manager 2:35 PM 0:15 2.13. Weather Radar transceiver Christelle Ledauphin
2:50 PM 0:20 2.14. SB enhancement Pascal Albarede
3:10 PM 0:25 2.15. Maintenance Optimization Claire Kauffmann
3:35 PM 0:20 Coffee break
3:55 PM 1:00 Airline Caucus /
Pascal ALBAREDE Claire Kauffmann Jean Pierre GOMEZ 4:55 PM 0:30 Debrief Caucus TAP
Retrofit solution HO Scheduled Maintenance VP A320 Program
Cross Program Engineering Services Customer Services
Customer Services Customer Services 5:25 PM 0:10 Conference Key Highlight & Closure Jean Pierre Gomez
5:35 PM End of Conference

Conference Organisation - Demo Day 1&2
❏ GenEWIS Gerault BAYLE

TECH DATA A320
Program Manager
Customer Services
Dominique CHARLIER
❏ SRM for Mechanic

SRM Customer Support Engineer
Customer Services
❏ CAQ decontamination Pierre-Olivier TRAINS

Cabin Air Quality &
Comfort Expert
tooling Customer Services
❏ “Skywise Reliability" &

"Skywise Reliability Benoit RENAUD
Reliability & Maintenance
Economics Manager
Jean Marc WATTECANT
HO Fleet Performance Control &
Monitoring
Premium"
4
Caucus Your Caucus Chairman
➢ General feedback on the Conference

➢ Top General Issues A320 Family
➢ Top Technical Issues A320 Family
➢ Positive / Negative Diogo Pedrosa
Maintenance & Engineering |
➢ Conclusion Aircraft Maintenance

Engineering & Quality Manager
TAP Air Portugal

Thank you
Lisbon
Mandated Campaigns deadlines recall

Presented by Joseph SAURAS
Mandated Campaigns deadlines recall
Your photo
» Today leads and integrates in-service fleet perfo optimization, fleet issues here
management & resolution process
● 20 years in Programme / Customer Services, leading trans-national and worldwide teams on
Presented by
Technical Data and Digital solutions fields
● Manufacturing background: Manufacturing Resources Planning (MRP) team leader Joseph
SAURAS
Senior Director A320 Family
Program
joseph.sauras@airbus.com

Monitored Retrofits Mandated Retrofits Conclusion
process outlook & deadlines
Monitored Retrofits - Process
Objective:
Steers the embodiment of the In-service product evolution within the impacted Customers and Suppliers
Decision Preparation Retrofit launch Retrofit monitoring

Monitored Retrofits Retrofit planning Retrofit Information Intention & planning
In-service fleet
based on criteria Material Letter (RIL) PO placement Fleet
product Airworthiness, Complex Mods,
speculation Evaluation / Context Retrofit Delivery & Embodiment
evolution & Risk on Supply Chain procedure, Industry support,
status
embodiment
Recommended & Supplier industrial Reporting
implementation Mandatory SB / VSB speculation SB dispatch
plan Mandated retrofits
Feedback loop & control of delivery and

embodiment

Monitored Retrofits - Process and key conditions
Global retrofit plan
. Get your specific requirements: service provider, your planning for retrofit intention, fleet
specificities
. Consolidate the retrofit plan balancing operator’s needs and industrial capacity
· Coordinate the material ordering and shipment
· Provide logistics support when required
· Follow-up the fleet embodiment status
Specific note for material industry support
. Material will be delivered only one time per a/c

. Same rule applies for Material Industry support

Mandated Retrofits - Outlook
Heavy Line
9 neo
99 43 neo 33 10 ceo
maint maint
Monitored 56 ceo Mandated

Campaigns* Campaigns* 14 family Engine
*1 Campaign = 1SB removal
A-
C- check
check
● Red OEB
● MISP mandatory
by AD Mandated
● Mandated
airworthiness
33%
● Enhancement
67% crew interface &
awareness (Safety
Recommended Beyond Standard)
● MISP / operational
reliability &
disruptions

Mandated Retrofits - Outlook

Mandated Retrofits - Outlook Key points
• Long support
conditions running
since 2016
● Reinforce structure at section 16/17/18 (ceo)
● Install aft mount retainer bracket (ceo CFM) • Average time of
campaigns: 51mo
(from 13mo to 120mo)
● Thales FMS S8A HW1 with FG PC20/PI18 - cancel Red OEB57 (neo LEAP/PW) • 6 new campaigns
● Honeywell FMS H4 with FG OC20/PI18 - cancel Red OEB57 (neo LEAP/PW) starting in 2022
● Inspection of Sensing Elements on OHDS - (neo / ceo)
• FOC or attractive
● Modify 1M AND 2M harness routing to the Low Pressure Shut Off Valve (neo PW)
conditions for
preventive and current
airworthiness

. Restrictor to flexible hose installed at
Mandated Retrofits - Deadlines . Route 1M/2M to avoid FIN 1674GM on IAE (H1 25)
interferences to the tapping unit . Inspect central and lateral fittings on
. Upgrade FMGC to Thales FMS 80VU rack (H2 26)
S8A hardware 4 and to FG PI18 . New seals on FWD & AFT cargo
. Upgrade FWD engine mount doors and bulk door (H2 26)
standard on PW neo - cancel Red
shackle or bearing - PW neo . Modify forward & aft cargo doors
OEB57
. SGS windshields structure using cold working (H2 26)
. Upload Thales FMS S8A HW1 with
. Inspect Pylon/Engine Interface Rod . Inspect Sensing Element on OHDS
FG PC20 on CFM neo - cancel Red (H1 28)
. Install improved end stop and End on PW neo
OEB57 . 1M AND 2M harness routing to the
ice drawer containers on SFE . Inspect upper panel of Trolley
. Modify route 1M/2M to avoid Low Pressure Shut Off Valve (H1 29)
galleys (Jun22) compartment and retainer on Galleys
interferences to the tapping unit
H1’22 H2’22 H1’23 H2’23 H1’24 H2’24 >24
. Modify fixation for cabin

. Doghouse latch placard
EHC OHSC
. Inspection of passenger seat rail cover (Jul22) . Upload Honeywell FMS H4
. Aft mount retainer bracket for CFM56-5A/5B associated with FG PC20 -
(Aug22) cancel Reb OEB57
. Inspect upper door frames of FWD emergency
exit on A321ceo (Oct22)
. Reinforce structure at section 16/17/18 (Nov22)
. Upgrade ELAC B 103+ std - cancel Red OEB59
(Dec22)
Alignment of Industry Support conditions with AD compliance

Mandated Campaigns deadlines - Conclusion
Takeaways
• Anticipate to ease implementation
• Secure parts availability with your planning
• Accelerate deployment wrt compliance time and
industry support conditions
• Report, report your records
Our Dedicated support (retrofit team: monitored.retrofit@airbus.com)

• Organize regular meetings to ease campaign application, share priorities and
embodiments
• Provide report operator status

Thank you
Mandated retrofits outlook

Lisbon
Safety Beyond Standard

Presented by Eric JEANPIERRE & Christelle LEDAUPHIN
Your photo
• 9 years with Airbus Product Safety

Presented by
Eric
• Expertise in Product Safety Enhancement JEANPIERRE
Director Flight Safety,
• Previous experiences in A320 family Chief Engineer team and in Flight Control
Safety Enhancement
engineering
eric.jeanpierre@airbus.com

Your photo
Today in A320 Family Customer Support Program as Program manager responsible

Presented by
for avionics topics
Christelle
LEDAUPHIN
• Previously in NAVBLUE (Airbus ProSky), subsidiary providing Flight Operations and Air Traffic A320 Family Program
Management Services, in charge of the implementation of Airspace projects. Manager
christelle.ledauphin@airbus.com
• I started my career in Airbus design office, working on ATA 34 topics.

The genesis of the Focus on Loss Of Retrofitting your Conclusion
initiative Control In flight fleet
prevention
Safety Beyond Standard: the genesis of the initiative
Key points
● Accident rate at
historically low
levels
● Safety improvement
driven by:
- Technology
- Training and Flight
Operational
Standards
Fatal accident rate
- Safety Management
divided by 5
from Systems
3rd to 4th generation - ATM
(10 year moving average)
Western-built jets above 40 seats

Source: ICAO,Cirium & Airbus databases

Safety Beyond Standard: the genesis of the initiative
Western-built jets above 40 seats

Source: ICAO,Cirium & Airbus databases
Safety Beyond Standard:

Resilience to these Top 3

Safety Beyond Standard: scope & related document
● Safety Beyond Standard initiative:
✓ aims at further enhancing the safety of the fleet beyond

requirements,
✓ aims at reducing exposure to identified safety threats

○ Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I), Controlled Flight Into
Terrain (CFIT), Runway Excursion (RE).
○ Fire, smoke, cabin depressurization, abnormal ground
control, and abnormal fuel situations.
✓ is a continuous improvement initiative.

Digest of
available safety
● More information on “Digest of available safety enhancements
enhancements”

Safety Beyond Standard: scope
Loss Of Control Controlled Runway

in Flight Flight Excursion
Into Terrain
▪ Enhanced AP / FD / ▪ Enhanced runway
▪ Enhanced
ATHR availability overrun risk awareness
guidance during
▪ Enhanced Flight Landing ▪ Enhanced runway
Envelope protections condition awareness
▪ Enhanced
availability
trajectory & energy ▪ Take-Off performance
▪ Enhanced Flight Crew management surveillance
interface during Go-Around
Fire Smoke Cabin pressurisation Ground control Fuel

The genesis of the Loss of Control In Retrofitting your Conclusion
initiative flight prevention fleet
Focus on LOC-I (Loss of Control In Flight) prevention
Design enhancements are developed for Fly By Wire fleet

with high level objectives :
★ Enhance AP / FD / ATHR availability

○ eg: Enhance autopilot robustness in case of FMS failure
and LGCIU failures
★ Enhance flight envelope protections availability

○ eg: Pitch attitude limitation in alternate law 👉 Refer to ISI article
22.00.00104
★ Enhance flight crew interface
○ eg: Digital Back-Up Speed (UAMM step 2)
Objective to provide the same level of operational capability,

resilience and assistance to the crew in abnormal conditions
as that of the A350.
The genesis of the Loss of Control Retrofitting Conclusion
initiative In flight your fleet
prevention
Retrofitting your fleet: targeted aircraft (worldwide view)
Key points
● Generational
EIS 1 EIS 2 differences within
the same fleet, with
FWC H2 different computer
hardwares
ELAC B non-DL ELAC B DL
FAC B FAC C
FMGC 2G FMGC 3G
Wiring prov. UAMM

BUSS UAMM step 1
(Unreliable Airspeed Mitigation
(Back Up Speed Scale)
Means)
Number
of a/c
5000 10000
Retrofitting your fleet: targeted aircraft (worldwide view)
Key points
● Generational
EIS 1 EIS 2 differences within
the same fleet, with
FWC H2 different computer
hardwares
ELAC B non-DL ELAC B DL
● Safety Beyond
Standard LOC-I
FAC B FAC C prevention is
supported by
(*) FMGC 2G FMGC 3G Software upgrades
of EIS2, FWC,
ELAC, FAC C,
Wiring prov. UAMM FMGC 3G (*), HUD
BUSS UAMM step 1 and UAMM step 1
(Unreliable Airspeed Mitigation
(Back Up Speed Scale)
Means)
Number
of a/c
5000 10000 (*) FMGC 2G with Safety Beyond Standard

features expected in 2023
Retrofitting your fleet
LOC-I prevention
How? Working together

Objective
✓ SB standard recommended ✓ Your support is needed to
✓ Worldwide retrofit on ALL
✓ Software upgrade provided attain this objective to enhance
capable aircraft
Free of Charge as per RIL flight safety
conditions

Retrofitting your fleet: monitored campaigns LOC-I prevention
Airbus monitored retrofit campaigns → all started except ELAC
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Today
ceo + neo
EIS2 S16
ceo + neo
HUD L7
ceo + neo
FAC CAA13
ceo + neo FWC F13
ceo + neo
FG 3G PI18/PC20
neo ceo UAMM step 2
ELAC L104 (not started yet)

Retrofit status of Safety Beyond Standard LOC-I prevention
in Europe Key points
Status for the fleet requiring SW upgrade only:

● Plan & secure your
retrofit
● Report the
- Retrofit started in 2020/2021 embodiment
- Gap between deliveries and
embodiment
Retrofit started end 2021 / Q1 2022
To be launched Q1 2023
Update from May 25th 2022
The genesis of the Loss of Control In Retrofitting your Conclusion
initiative flight prevention fleet
Safety Beyond Standard - Conclusion
Accident rate at all time low ⇒ let's keep

improving!
Solutions to increase resilience to the Top 3

threats are available
LOC-I prevention ⇒ let’s accelerate the retrofit
Let’s work together, your support is essential!


Document Ref
ISI article 22.00.00104
Safety Digest In Airbus World:
Flight Ops > Operational Expertise > Digest of available enhancements

Acronym Definition
Glossary ARC Abnormal Runway Contact
ATM Air Traffic Management
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain
EIS Electronic Instrument System
ELAC Elevator & Aileron Computer
FAC Flight Augmentation Computer
FMGC Flight Management and Guidance Computer
FWC Flight Warning Computer
HUD Head Up Display
LOC-I Loss of Control In Flight
RE Runway Excursion
RIL Retrofit Information Letter
SB Service Bulletin
SBS Safety Beyond Standard
SCF System / Component Failure
UAMM Unreliable Airspeed Mitigation Means
USOS Under Shoot / Over Shoot

Thank you
Lisbon
Technical Data Enhancement

Presented by Gérault BAYLE
Technical Data Enhancement
Your photo
• As Technical Data Programme Manager, I ensure the availability of all ICA (Instructions for
Continuous Airworthiness) at each Entry into Service
Presented by
Gérault
• I am in charge of the Entry into Service preparation with Customers. BAYLE
A320Fam Technical Data
• I support our Customers in the In-Service issues resolution. Programme Manager
gerault.bayle@airbus.com

Customer feedback Content Digital Solutions Conclusion
CSIP 2021
Customer Satisfaction Improvement Program
Key points
Satisfaction Index (SI) with Tech Data Support & Services Improvement of the
Satisfaction Index from
last years
TARGET

The sp
eed see
quality ms to be fine to mee
of Tech t KPIs b
ut the
often d Suppo
oes no rt (Tech r
easy an
d
t answ eq
st work
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h Airn avX, it ju uestion
ing wit al.
u .
o rk is unus
v e w x p erience
I lo hich in
m y e
v e to us w t The te
intui t i ficul
chnolo
d i f still n gy is t
h
e x and d this has airnavX rocks ot ma ere and available
l
mp rpret an ture e b
s c o noug ut the cont
e I PC i c to inte h to tak ent is
e full a
hantifits
t h dvant
ise age.
likew e c
m par
for ao incorrect
t
lead
SPEED & QUALITY OF

AGILITY QUALITY & COMPLETENESS SIMPLICITY
SUPPORT
➢Internal upskilling plan

➢Improve processes ➢ Several initiatives and ➢Introduce simple digital
➢Reinforce team connections
➢On Demand Technical Data projects application
and processes
Quality & completeness

Improvements
Key points
Lead Completeness Several project launched

+10% for each revision from 2019 to improve quality and
completeness
Completeness Quality content

Supplier Requirement
Improve supplier data
management for 2021-2022
Technical Data Synchronisation
Ensure AMM synchronised publication

since 2020

Technical Data synchronisation
Synchronisation
One Schedule Maintenance Data Package (MPD, MRBR, ALS, etc. and AMM) published at fixed dates.
“Scheduled AMM tasks incorporation date” document provides the list of missing AMM references.
AMM remains published for 1 year after MPD task deletion

Key points

Quality First at Technical Data completeness
Cleaning factory for 2019-2021
Sustainable recovery for 2022-2023

On Demand Technical Data

Improve supplier data Improve revision cycle from 2026 for A320Fam

since 2020

Quality First at Technical Data
Operational criticalities have been massively covered. Criticality Medium and Low management will start from
mid-2022
Development of sustainable improvement and checkers from 2022 to 2025
Recurring improvement process
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Content
Linguistic
Rules application
Technical Content Discrepancies cleaning / industrialization / scope evolution management
OPERATIONAL criticality
Configuration CONSISTENCY criticality
Configuration management
Deadlinks RULES criticality
Illustration missing
Root Causes
Synchronisation Analysis
With SB, MPD, MMEL, CDL, GSE
Sustainable improvement and checkers
Improvement
From customers

Part management improvement Key points
Rotable component consistency (AIR - IPC)
Spare workflow: cleaning of interchangeability for 2021-2023
Quality First at Technical Data completeness
Cleaning factory for 2019-2021
Sustainable recovery for 2022-2023

On Demand Technical Data

Improve supplier data Improve revision cycle from 2026 for A320Fam

since 2020

● Applications
● Genewis
● Full On-Line
Digital solutions to support simplicity and quality enhancement - Apps
TroubleShooting Several project launched

to improve quality and
completeness
Quick Dispatch
Quick solution to
dispatch the aircraft
while ensuring safe
operations (reset C/B
table)
Enlarge the scope of

alert for end 2022

TroubleShooting Repair Several project launched

completeness
Quick Dispatch
SRM for Mechanic
Quick solution to
Mobile application to
dispatch the aircraft
assess your damage
while ensuring safe
and get adequate
structural repair
table)
procedure as per SRM.
Enlarge the scope for

neo from end 2022
alert for end 2022

TroubleShooting Repair IPC Several project launched

completeness
Quick Dispatch Allowed Part

SRM for Mechanic
Quick solution to Find out the right
Mobile application to
dispatch the aircraft spare in one click
assess your damage
while ensuring safe
and get adequate
structural repair
table)
procedure as per SRM.
Enlarge the scope for

neo from end 2022
alert for end 2022

Digital solutions to support simplicity and quality enhancement - GeneWIS
Wiring
Digital PAPERS to
Rising Paper Eco friendly
consumption
GenEWIS
Generate in one click

the wiring diagram Obsolete
Modern
you need
Deployment mid-2023
Time consuming Fast access
(OIT ref 999.0071/21 to data
dated from
03-FEB-2022)
Slow transmission Easy transmission

of information of information

Digital solutions to support simplicity and quality enhancement - Full Online
Wiring Browser
Online exclusive Manage revision

features lifecycle
GenEWIS AirnavX
Full Online
Generate in one click
airnavX Full Online is at
the wiring diagram Going further with
the heart of airnavX
you need airnavX Full online services
and welcome
Deployment mid-2023 extended functions on EIS June 2022
a cloud-based
(OIT ref 999.0071/21 Connect company
solution Create and Manage
dated from documents into Airbus
Access Groups
03-FEB-2022) content

Technical Data Enhancement - Conclusion
Listen and connect to customer
Quality and Completeness
Better support you while

moving into digital maintenance
Thank you
Lisbon
THSA life limits between CEO/NEO - Rev1

Presented by Delphine HERTENS-ORLANDO
THSA life limits between CEO/NEO
Your photo
» Today working within A320 Chief Engineering Team, as In Service

Solutions manager
Presented by
• I joined A320 Chief Engineering Team in 2015. Delphine
• I have previously been working within A400M Chief Engineering Systems Team for 7 years. HERTENS-ORLANDO
• I joined Airbus in 2000 as Hydraulic System engineer, working on A380 and A400 hydraulic system A320 Family
performance for 7 years. Chief Engineering
In Service Solutions
delphine.hertens@airbus.com

Customer Topic THSA Life Limit Conclusion
Management
Customer Topic : THSA Life Limits
Customer Topic
● THSA life limit is a challenge for operators to control

● Limit of 48000FC reduces to 35000FC if installed on a NEO
Desired resolution
● THSA life limit is complex to manage, especially with differences when same part numbers can be fitted to
CEO or NEO aircraft.
● What is Airbus doing to resolve this issue ?
In this presentation, Airbus provides update on testing and associated timeline to bring THSA life limit for NEO
up to 48000FC.

Management
● Context
● Part Number change
● Mitigation
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon ● Solutions
- 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
No-Back
Brake
THSA Life Limit Management
Context
● THSA PN 47145-248 & 47145-268 can be installed both on CEO & NEO A/C
● As of today, different life limit:
○ CEO : 67500FH / 48000FC (A319, A320, A321)
○ NEO : 67500FH / 35000FC (A319, A320, A321)
■ OIT 999.0116/17 rev3 dated 23May22
● NBB (THSA sub-part) is life limited at 24000FC and THSA should be removed
for NBB replacement (NEO and CEO)
○ OIT 999.0050/20 dated 17Sep20
● THSA post-VSB 47145-27-19 (overhauled) is not allowed on NEO A/C
● Difference of CEO/NEO THSA life limits requires complex tracking
THSA:
Trimmable Horizontal
Stabilizer Actuator
No-Back
Brake
Context
● THSA PN 47145-248 & 47145-268 can be installed both on CEO & NEO A/C
● As of today, different life limit:
○ CEO : 67500FH / 48000FC (A319, A320, A321)
○ NEO : 67500FH / 35000FC (A319, A320, A321)
■ OIT 999.0116/17 rev3 dated 23May22
● NBB (THSA sub-part) is life limited at 24000FC and THSA should be removed
for NBB replacement (NEO and CEO)
○ OIT 999.0050/20 dated 17Sep20
● THSA post-VSB 47145-27-19 (overhauled) is not allowed on NEO A/C
● Difference of CEO/NEO THSA life limits requires complex tracking
Part Number change

● Creation of a THSA dedicated P/N to NEO A/C has not been pursued due to :
○ Effort priority to secure endurance test activities (Final Solution) to align
CEO/NEO life limits to 48000FC THSA:
○ Loss of spare flexibility Trimmable Horizontal
Stabilizer Actuator
Mitigation
● Transfer THSA from CEO to NEO or from NEO to CEO possible as condition to
compute its remaining life as per:
○ ALS Part4 Annex1 if history available by traceability sheet (MTS)
○ Conservative Fleet Leader or Monte Carlo methods if no history
■ ISI 00.05.00002

Mitigation
● Transfer THSA from CEO to NEO or from NEO to CEO possible as condition to
compute its remaining life as per:
○ ALS Part4 Annex1 if history available by traceability sheet (MTS)
○ Conservative Fleet Leader or Monte Carlo methods if no history
■ ISI 00.05.00002
Final Solution
● Endurance test on-going to:
○ Demonstrate 48000FC life limit on NEO and align with CEO life limit
■ 24000FC has been reached in February 2022
○ Validate new design of NBB disk up (Target is to reach 48000FC) THSA Test Bench
● Planning: in Collins facilities
○ Final validation for 48000FC life limit expected for December 2025
● Fleet leader extrapolated to end 2025: 20000FC max would be reached

Management
THSA life limits between CEO/NEO - Conclusion

• THSA PN 47145-248 & 47145-268 can be installed both on CEO & NEO
A/C but have currently a different life limit (except THSA post-VSB
47145-27-19 (overhauled) not allowed on NEO A/C):
– CEO : 67500FH / 48000FC (A319, A320, A321)
– NEO : 67500FH / 35000FC (A319, A320, A321)
• Mitigations available to track such life limits in ALS Part4 Annex1
• THSA endurance tests are on-going to align with CEO life limit expected
by December 2025.


Type Ref Title
OIT 999.0116/17 rev3 ATA 27 – THSA life limit on A320 family CEO and NEO aircraft
OIT 999.0050/20 ATA 27 – A320 Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator (THSA) No Back Brake (NBB) discs -
Life limit reduction
TFU 27.44.00048 Sum up of mandated inspections or modifications applicable to A320 family THSA
ISI 00.05.00002 SINGLE AISLE - INSTRUCTIONS TO ASSIGN A LIFE TO A COMPONENT WITH

INCOMPLETE HISTORY

Glossary
Acronym Definition
NBB No-Back Brake
THSA Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator
MTS MTS: Movement Traceability Sheet

Summary table for A318, A319, A320, A321 CEO

Summary table for A319, A320, A321 NEO

Thank you
Lisbon
Saint-Gobain Windshields Inspection Status - Rev 1

Presented by Laurent STREMLER
SGS Windshields Inspection Status
• Joined Airbus in 2000.
Presented by
• 8 years: A320 Final Assembly Line - Structure Assembly Stations Manager Laurent
STREMLER
• 6 Years: A350 Final Assembly Line - Structure Assembly Stations Manager A320 Program Manager
laurent.stremler@airbus.com
• 6 Years: Working Party Resources & Operations Manager
• Since 2020: A320 Fam Program Manager

SGS windshields Inspection Status Recommendations Next step
inspection Conclusion
● Issue/Investigation
● Root cause
● Mitigation
● Solution A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
● Issue
● Investigation
SGS Windshields Inspection
Issue
In 2018, A319 aircraft experienced right windshield loss during cruise phase:
⇒ consequent rapid depressurization
⇒ damage to cockpit item/systems
⇒ significant increase of flight crew workload
Investigation
Long and complex investigation with trials performed Collaborative work
between Airbus - Saint Gobain Sully (SGS) - Authorities from 2018 to 2021

● Root cause
Root Cause
Combination of contributing factors:
○ Mechanical damage to the insulation sleeve of the
power supply (power braids)
○ wires & water ingress resulting in the wires corrosion Heating film
lead to continuous arcing at the power braids level in a humid

environment => damages to structural plies of the windshields
L/H windshield without outer ply (-7 standard)
Power braids
(protected by a sleeve
when outside the
laminate)
arcing

● Mitigation
● Solution
Key points
Mitigation action
• All listed p/n whatever
their amendment are
affected
• Other suppliers (GKN,

PPG) p/n NOT affected
• Mandatory Inspection
dispatched Jan 2021
○ SB 56-1022 (ceo)
○ SB 56-1023 (neo)
● EASA AD 2021-0111
released April 2021
updated August 2021
effective date May 2021
• SGS ViSB
STA320-56-001
dispatched Jan 2021
Mitigation action
● Fleet policy valid until end of Monitoring (extended to 30th of June 2023): RIL SA56M20003377

Mitigation action
● In case of finding during inspection, windshield may continue to be used if
aircraft is dispatched under MMEL
• MMEL 30-42-03A
• MMEL 30-42-03B

Terminating action
● New SGS Windshield design p/n -9
○ Improvement of moisture protection (watertight material)
○ Improvement of the damage protection to the electrical sleeves/braids • Mod 167352 certified in
with new sleeve material November 2020
○ Clearance increased between conductive components
• PoE MSN 10356
(delivered in Dec 2020)
Z bar modification
• p/n STA320-1-9-3 (LH)
• p/n STA320-2-9-3 (RH)
• IPC updated February 2021

Inspection timeline principle

today

Key points
Status
Status at end of May:
8141 windshields to
be inspected
226 airlines
4740 reports
(1st & repetitive
combined)
3876
1st inspection
587
2nd inspection
198
3rd inspection

Key points
Status
Status at end of April:
● Result repartition per part number for the 1st inspection
Total: 538w/s Total: 1876w/s Total: 1220w/s Total: 1127w/s
4740 reports
(1st & repetitive
combined)
Visual finding
Red finding
Amber finding
Green finding

Status

Recommendations
● Weather seal restoration

○ ordering to be anticipated
○ curing time can be accelerated
○ combination of promoter + sealant to be strictly compliant
○ PR 1425 CF recommended
● Potential mitigation if no promoter + sealant available in due time

○ 50FC authorization to fly without weather sealant restored
IF seal exposure length reduced to 25mm
(RDAF chargeable service)
NB: High Speed Tape not acceptable & non fully cured seal not
authorized

Recommendations
● Weather seal restoration

○ ordering to be anticipated
○ curing time can be accelerated • TFU 56.11.00.014
○ combination of promoter + sealant to be strictly compliant
○ PR 1425 CF recommended • SRM 51-76-00 & 51-76-12
for curing time speed up
• CML code 06AFB1
● Potential mitigation if no promoter + sealant available in due time • FAIR item 22.0004
○ 50FC authorization to fly without weather sealant restored
IF seal exposure length reduced to 25mm • ISI article 56.10.00004
(RDAF chargeable service)
• ViSB STA320-56-001
NB: High Speed Tape not acceptable & non fully cured seal not
authorized

Next step: Active retrofit

Jan 2021 today
ISB - Repetitive Inspection

Repetitive inspection
or replacement by final fix p/n -9
at contracted price between SGS & Operators
FOC
Replacement


Jan 2021 today Q1 2023

Repetitive inspection
or replacement by final fix p/n -9
at contracted price between SGS & Operators
Active Retrofit to come
FOC Repetitive inspection or replacement by final fix p/n -9
Replacement at attractive price agreed between Airbus & SGS
FOC
Replacement


Jan 2021 today Q1 2023
• Aim is to stop repetitive inspection

Active Retrofit to come
• Prioritization per critical p/n (-7 first), then Amber
FOC Repetitive inspection or replacement by final fix p/n -9
Replacement at attractive price agreed between Airbus & SGS
• Attractive price
• Applicable to all premod (p/n -3 to -8B)

FOC
Replacement
• MHs replacement FOC
• Still monitored retrofit to secure stock availability

SGS Windshields Inspection Status - Conclusion

Terminative action
❏ p/n -9 already available
Mitigation action
❏ Inspection SB with repetitive inspection per groups
❏ Industry support in case of red findings
Inspection Status
❏ Monitored, finding rate consistent with expectations
❏ Spares & GSE available
Recommendations
❏ Weather seal restoration ⇔ provisioning anticipation
Next step
❏ Active retrofit introduction expected Q1 2023

Topic Status Ref
SGS Windshields Inspection Updated 31st of March 2022 TFU 56.11.00.014
OIT 999.0039/18
FOT 999.0100/18
ISB 56-1022 (ceo)
ISB 56-1023 (neo)
SGS ViSB STA320-56-001
MMEL (no icing conditions) MMEL 30-42-03A

MMEL (cruise level FL230 maximum) MMEL 30-42-03B
RIL SA56M20003377

Thank you
Lisbon
SRM Simplification
Presented by Dominique CHARLIER
SRM simplification
Your photo
• 12 years of airline experience in aircraft structures engineering, team leading and

quality control. Presented by
Dominique
• 20 years of aircraft manufacturer experience in structures customer support and CHARLIER
SRM
continuous airworthiness. Customer Focal Point
&
• Currently SRM Customer Focal Point and SRM Working Group Chairman. Working Group Chairman
Dominique.charlier@airbus.com

SRM Standard SRM Improvement SRM You Customer
Coverage Simplification &
Us Airbus
SRM Standard Coverage
Several project launched

completeness

Coverage In-Service based Process &
Simplification
Us Airbus
SRM Improvement - In service Based Process
- Tech-Request / Daily Repair
Input - SRM Working Group
Customer needs
- Customer Feedback
Step 1 - Number of recurrent similar cases to improve quality and
Preliminary - Impact on A/C operation and A/L business completeness
Analysis
Step 2 - Possible envelope of cases

Extended - Technical feasibility
Analysis
- Activity planning
Step 3
Engineering - Engineering Design & Justification
Development
Step 4 - Data review & approval

Incorporation
- Publication
Efficiency Review - Ensure in-service needs are met

SRM Improvement - Examples
Key points
Step 1
Preliminary ● New subjects requested by the Customers
● Tech.Request dossiers identified as candidate
18 SRM
Analysis
Improvements
have been
Step 2
published in the
Extended ● Allowable Dent in riveted area + Scratch on fuselage skin
Analysis last 2 years
Step 3
● FWD PAX Door Stop Fitting No.1 & 7 Holes @ FR16 & 20 90% of in-service
Engineering New SRM repair task under 53-11-12-300-xxx to include R53113118 or cases covered by
Development R533113310 respectively depending on cracks indication found during ISB Ref the improvements
A320-53-1339 or MSB Ref. SB A320-53-1330 SRM WG 303
10 SRM
● 51-11-11 - Generic HFEC Deferral for ADL extended from 50FC to 200FC improvements
Step 4 under engineering
Incorporation
● RH APU Door Outer Skin Corrosion @ Drain mast cut-out area development for
New SRM Repair Task on ATA 52-41-22 SRM WG 318 2022

Us Airbus
● Generic ADL
● Flow Chart
● SRM4M
SRM simplification
Airframe SRM Generic ADL Development Key points
Objectives Easily & quickly usable simple data
To support A/C release & reduce AOG lead times ● 1 or 2 values for ADL dimensions
Mechanics oriented ● Only usual geometrical restrictions (e.g. pitot probes)
● MOD & WV fully independent
Example of Dent GADL on Fuselage Skin ● SRM Content

● Usual restrictions (no crack, no sharp edges, probes proximity limitation) Simplification
● No proximity / no density criteria
● Valid all WV & whole fuselage
● AOG lead times
● Task simplification with flowchart
reduction
● In addition of
Unriveted area current SRM
content
Riveted area
Depth ≤ 0,5mm (riveted area)

SRM simplification
Airframe SRM Generic ADL Coverage
● Dent on Fuselage Skin

● Dent on PAX/Cargo Doors Skin to improve quality and
completeness
● Rework on Fuselage Skin
Negligible
● Combination Dent + Rework
Combination of Generic ADL dent with the Generic ADL rework (Negligible)
● L/S Zero AOG Policies introduced in the AMM
Inspection after a Lightning Strike for One Flight
Aircraft release for one commercial flight after a lightning strike event.
No structural inspection as per SRM required under conditions.
● … and more to come

SRM simplification
ADL instructions in the old layout format

completeness

SRM simplification
ADL instructions as flowcharts Key points
● Quick decision
enabler
SRM
● Decision tree for
A320neo go/no-go
ST5
01-May-2022 ● Clear and easy to
use
TASK
53-00-11-283-005 ● End-to-End
Allowable Damage instructions in
Limits for Dents sequences
Generic
Unriveted area
Riveted area

SRM simplification
SRM For Mechanics (SRM4M) Key points
Mobile application
Damage assessment as per the SRM
Allowable Damage that may lead to AOG,

on external surface of the aircraft
Damage characterization through simple ● Enhance Customer

questions experience
● Reduce grounding
time
GO or NO GO decision
● Support mechanics
Applicability:
Damage report generation A320ceo / A321ceo / A319ceo
Package download via Airbus World
Approved under SRM DOA EASA.21J.031

SRM simplification
SRM4M Key points
2019/2020
Cobuilt Phase and DEMO deployment
2021 - First Operational Deployment

EIS for A320ceo in May
Service offering by Service

Agreement signature
2021 - Expansion 2022 - Coverage of
A319ceo and A320neo Deployment for Airlines
EIS for A321ceo in New app features done:
November
2023 - Coverage of ● A320ceo May-21
Opening to Third A321neo and A321ACF ● A321ceo Nov-21
Parties (MROs & ● A319ceo May-22
Providers)
Opening to Third Parties
SRM4M Webinars by delegation
Continuous update through SRM Working Group WebEx
SRM simplification
SRM4M Key points
● Dent***
Fuselage skin from nose to rear *
● Lightning Strike
● Rework
Doors skin (PAX, cargo, bulk and APU service
doors)
● Covering ADL on
external surface
● Dent, Rework,
Lightning Strike
Outer wing skins, wing leading edge, flaps zone 2, wing tip ● Prone to damage
areas
including sharklet
● Similar coverage for
THS leading edge and tip, elevator tip ** A321ceo and
A319ceo
*: aero requirements included
**: weight assessment of elevator included
***: generic ADL / negligible damage included where applicable

Us Airbus
You Customer and Us Airbus - Experience Sharing
SRM Working Group / Operator Information Transmission
Exchange platform between Customers and Airbus, with 3 WebEx per year:
• Discussion on specific technical subjects Several project launched

• New subjects posted by Customers and Airbus to improve quality and
• New ideas for SRM improvements completeness
• Latest SRM improvements (content & format)

• Customers feedback loop on in-progress improvements
300/100* registrations for

130/30* different customers
Operators & MROs all over the world
*European Customers
40 Items raised
per year*
* by the Customers & Airbus

SRM Simplification - Conclusion
Generic ADL development
ADL instructions in Flowchart format
SRM For Mechanics development
And all this is done in close collaboration

with you
Thank you
Lisbon
Cockpit Window Frames - Rev 1

Presented by Stephane PIREYRE & Laurent STREMLER
Presented by
Laurent
STREMLER
Cockpit Window Frames
» Laurent Stremler
Joined Airbus in 2000.
● 8 years: A320 Final Assembly Line - Structure Assembly stations Manager A320 Program Manager
● 6 Years: A350 Final Assembly Line - Structure Assembly stations Manager laurent.stremler@airbus.com
● 6 Years: Working Party Resources and Operations Manager
&
● Since 2020: A320 Fam Program Manager
Stéphane
PIREYRE
»Stéphane Pireyre
19-year structure experience on All Airbus’aircraft families as:

● Stress engineer at design office
● Structure repair engineer in Airbus Customer Services
● Leading A320 repair industrialization activities since 5 years
A320 Repair
Industrialization
Manager
2
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991 stephane.pireyre@airbus.com
Customer Topics Background Update on light Update on Frame Conclusion
repair solutions replacement
solutions
A320FAM - Cockpit window frames - Customer Topics
Repair solutions
Introduction of new repair procedures:

○ Possible Airbus support on short notice
○ Available Airbus Support Teams
○ Available toolings
○ …

solutions
A320FAM - Cockpit window frames - Inspection overview
Key points
Front framing Regular update

provided in:
ISB 53-1331 [ALI 53-11-29]
ALI 53-11-31
ALI 53-11-70
• TFU 53.11.00.016
Front framing
• TFU 53.11.00.018
Sliding window frame Sliding window frame
Upper area Lower area

ISB 53-1410/11 [ALI 53-11-05] ISB 53-1402/03 [ALI 53-11-33]
ISB 53-1448-/49 [ALI 53-11-25] ALI 53-11-30

ALI 53-11-35 ALI 53-11-36

A320FAM - Cockpit window frames - In service finding overview
ISB ALI ALI

Front framing 53-1331 53-11-31 53-11-70
In service finding rate 27% <1% < 2%
% of frame replacement
100% 0% 0%
occurrence among all inspections
Trend - -
ISB ISB ISB ALI ALI ALI

Sliding window frame 53-1448/49 53-1402/03 53-1410/11 53-11-35 53-11-30 53-11-36
In service finding rate 22% 20% 20% 15% <1% NIL
% of frame replacement
65% 12% 11% 11% 1% -
occurrence among all inspections
Trend -

solutions
Pistol & Mirror fitting repairs - Technical aspects
Targeting the main inspection drivers
Repair material & duration /

grounding time
significantly lowered
Post repair
Repair Category Influence on SB requirements
inspection
TH=28700FC Cancellation of inspection SB

Pistol fitting Cat B
IT=6400FC 53-1448/49 & 53-1410/11
TH≃26700FC
Cat B Cancellation of inspection SB 53-1331
Mirror fitting IT≃4700FC
Cat C upon conditions
Life limit = 17700FC

Pistol & Mirror fitting repairs - Industrialization with MROs
MROs MROs
supported by AIB autonomous
Awareness AIB on-site

session Advisory
(function of findings)
Airbus Engineering Support done through

TechRequest
- Confirmation of repair eligibility
- Drawings / deviations / RDAF
MROs responsible for:

Complete simulation of new 1st in service repair done by the - Repair embodiment
repairs on bench MRO - Repair kit ordering
6 days (pistol) + 12 days (mirror) & supported by AIB advisory - GSE tool strategy

Pistol & Mirror fitting repairs - Fleet policy

solutions
Cockpit frames replacement - Kit evolution
March 2019 Dec 2021 April 2022 June 2022 End 2022
Major Repair Dept Daily Repair Dept
Internal transfer
Validation of MSB 53-1336
Pre Defined Repair Solution
First availability of MSB kits

● Transition period during next 12 months
● Internal orders for spare frame routed to MSB configuration
● Progressive stock reduction of “PDRS” kits
● Long term spare coverage ensured through MSB kits

Cockpit frames replacement - Kit evolution
Current Service package management
20% discount on
Starting date
all related kits Direct A/L or MRO
June 1st
ordering of repair
materials
Cancellation of
engineering fees
solutions
Cockpit Windows Frame - Conclusion

Repairs introduction aiming at reducing the
maintenance cost
❏ Material costs
❏ MHs & grounding time
Fleet policy scope

❏ For both repairs & frame replacement
ceo fleet fully covered by new repairs

❏ Preventive mod: Your feedback is essential
neo fleet subject to iterative modifications

❏ Objective to remove complete ALI tasks

Thank you
Lisbon
Wing Skin Corrosion

Presented by Frédéric DOULÉ
Wing Skin Corrosion
Your photo
• Airbus Design Office for 15 years as Stress Engineering (CFRP & Metallic) for program in
development
Presented by
○ A400M Center wing Box
Frédéric
○ A350 Upper shell Nose fuselage DOULÉ
○ Beluga XL Customer Service
Structure
• Airbus Customer Service Engineering 4 years Engineering
• Responsible on corrosion topic on All Program on Wing All programs
ATA 54-57-57
frederic.doule@airbus.com

Customer Topics Wing Skin Fleet monitoring Hot Spot Conclusion
Corrosion
A320FAM - Wing Skin Corrosion - Customer Topics
Update on Wing Skin Corrosion [WSC]:
● Are there any preventive actions that could be introduced for late model ceo and neo to
minimise risk of future findings?
● Customer has experienced more severe findings on aircraft that have been placed in
longer term storage, especially with WSC.
○ Can Airbus provide any further experience and learnings for aircraft exiting long term
storage ?

Customer Topics Fleet Monitoring Hot Spot Parking Conclusion
&
Storage
● Issue / Description
● Top Skin
● Bottom Skin
Airframe corrosion monitoring up to 2021
IN SERVICE INPUTS
✔ Damage reports A320 Wing Top Skin mapping
✔ Spares consumptions (Out of SRM only)
DATA COMPUTATION
✔ Finding mapping
✔ Per a/c type, A/L, region
DATA ANALYSIS
✔ Fleet-wide issues
Corrosion monitoring also done for
✔ Root cause analysis
A320 Wing Bottom Skin
Still ongoing
A320 Floor structure
OUTPUT A330 Wing Top and Bottom Skin
✔ Corrective actions Stop in 2020 A330 & A380 Floor structure
✔ Production mods & SB
A320 Bilge area

A320 - Wing corrosion monitoring - Top skin Key points
RIB 1
Panel 1
Last 14 years monitored
Up to Feb 2021
Panel 2 A320 worldwide fleet
FRO Nb. of reports: ~ 5400

NT
SPA
R
~ 1900 a/c recorded
RIB 27
corrosion findings
Finding Rates:
>10%
Nil
REAR SPAR

A320 - Wing corrosion monitoring - Top skin
Spoiler fitting
Gnd spigot
Stringer 11
Fastener head corrosion

T/E Overhang
Subject already addressed Subject under progress or monitoring
A320 - Wing corrosion monitoring - Top skin
(Monitoring until Feb-2021)
Reported corrosion spots
Downward trend in number of findings per MSN

Downward trend in volume A/C affected
2000
5000
4000
6000
7300
3000
MSN
Top Skin Material change (Sharklet provision)

Optional TPS Wing paint-shop transfer
New paint scheme (Aeroflex) Fastener head protection Overhang rivet change
T.E. Panel edge protection Extended TPS

Customer awareness (TFU, ISI, OIT, Webinars, Forums…)
A320 - Wing corrosion monitoring - Bottom skin Key points
RIB 1
Panel 1
Last 14 years monitored
Up to Feb 2021
Panel 2
FRON A320 worldwide fleet

T
SPAR
RIB 27 Nb. of reports: ~ 2300
~ 1000 a/c recorded

corrosion findings
Scale for A/C affected:

> 2%
Nil
REAR SPAR
Panel 3

A320 - Wing corrosion monitoring - Bottom skin
Pylon pick-up fitting
Loaded FTAC Unloaded FTAC
Dry Bay
Subject already addressed

Aft Bay Rib 5-6
Subject under progress or monitoring
A320 - Wing corrosion monitoring - Bottom skin
Reported corrosion spots
Very low volume of reports respect to top skin

Slight larger number of aircraft reporting findings
fuel tank contamination
2000
5000
6000
7000
3000
4000
MSN
Optional TPS
Loaded FTAC screw change
Dry bay enhanced draining
Extended TPS
Customer awareness (TFU, ISI, OIT, Webinars, Forums…)

&
Storage
● Trailing edge
overhang
● Fastener head
corrosion
A320 Wing trailing edge corrosion
Corrosion
initiation
Wing Top Skin T/E Overhang

Trailing edge – Worldwide fleet monitoring
Number of reported corrosion findings
(Monitoring until Feb-2021) POST MOD 153904

(+5300 aircraft flying worldwide)
● 1000 a/c have passed 6 years check
● 2000 have passed 4 years check
Isolated case ( Finding rate of 1%)
10000
2000
5000
3000
4000
4100
MSN
5457
BASIC STANDARD ENHANCED
(ISB 57-1154 & 57-1155 APPLY) PROTECTIO
N
NEW
RECOMMENDED MSB EMBODIMENT FASTENERS
Final Fix Description and planning / A320 Key points
Wing trailing edge corrosion
• TFU 57.21.00.007
Split of SB 57-1172 in 8 new SBs: • SB Kit secured
✔ Dedicated application (prioritization) • Multiple SB to ease

✔ Easier schedule
embodiment
✔ Reduced downtime risk in case of findings
• Eradication of
New SBs 57-1217 to 57-1224: corrosion between
part
✔ Delivered on 10 October 2019
✔ Industrial support policy (RIL SA57M18008619)
✔ SB kits secured
Man-hours comparison:
● SB 57-1172: 84.5 hours
● SB 57-1217 + 57-1221: 7 + 7 hours
● SB 57-1218 + 57-1222: 7 + 7 hours
● SB 57-1219 + 57-1223: 13 + 13 hours
● SB 57-1220 + 57-1224: 30 + 30 hours
Fastener head corrosion
17
Evolution of fastener type on top Skin vs Aircraft type Steel fastener location
R/S
R/S
NIL steel fasteners R/S RIB 4-5 (21)

GR5 GR5 (61)
GR5
A319/A320 Classic A321 Classic
R/S R/S
R/S RIB 3-4 (17)

R/S RIB 3-7 (92) GR5 (61)
GR5 (61) GR5
GR5
A321 Sharklet A321 NEO/ACF
18
A320 Wing trailing edge corrosion Key points
Root cause
○ Paint cracking, Loss of paint adhesion on fastener head, • TFU 57.20.00.032
● Fastener
○ Degradation of Cd plated layer and steel corrosion
• No retro fit solution
● Skin ○ Cross contamination
○ Galvanic corrosion • CRES fastener
certification re-launch
Product improvement
● Significant reduction of number of Alloy steel fasteners on A321 NEO Wing critical areas (R/S)
● Overall quality review On going on wet installation, fastener drilling and cleaning
● One-by-one replacement with Ti fasteners not possible – New materials under evaluation

● Adapt inspection interval if required (current 48 months on A321)
● Good paint condition is key, repair if cracked at alloy steel fastener locations
● Remove fasteners during repair to avoid cross contamination
Next Step
● Line-fit – A321 NEO: Complete replacement of Steel fasteners (project target: Q1 2024)
● retro-fit – A321 NEO: No retrofit solution - Replacement by attrition following repair will be
assessed after qualification of new fastener
&
Storage
Parking and storage Key points
• ISI 10.10.00005
• ISI 57.21.00002
• ISI 10.10.00005 - Parking And Storage - ATA5X Corrosion Prevention
• CPCP & Inspection
– Paint crack, AMM 10-12-00-553-802-A
– TPS application on trailing edge area • Monitoring ongoing
• ISI 57.21.00002 - General recommendation on Cleaning - CPCP - paint stripping
• Preconisation CPCP, inspection task (parking storage, return to service)

– AMM SUBTASK 10-12-00-210-092-A
– P&S conditions relaxed by Airbus but with recommendation and warning
• Monitoring recuperation back log (Feb 2021)

– Only damage out of SRM
– No new hot spot detected
&
Storage
Wing Skin Corrosion - Conclusion
• For the time being monitoring of corrosion show no new hot spot
• Close look to A/C after COVID parking and storage
• Special attention of the cleaning of the A/C
• Encourage to implement the SB available
• Keep working on MOD for production
• Continue to work closely with the operator through different channel (expert forum, symposium, TRM,...)


Topic Status Ref
TFU Published 57.20.00.032
ISI Published 10.10.00005
SB Published 57-1172
SB Published 57-1217 to 57-1224
AMM Published 10-12-00-210-092-A
AMM Published 10-12-00-553-802-A

Glossary
Acronym Definition
WSC Wing Skin Corrosion
SB Service Bulletin
TFU Technical Follow Up
ISI In service Information
AMM Aircraft Maintenance Manual
CPCP Corrosion Prevention and Control Program
TPS Temporary Protection System

Thank you
Lisbon
Galley - Corrosion of trolley retainer block

(AD – 2021-0183R1)
Presented by Luna Tokiko CRISTALLI
Galley - Corrosion of trolley retainer block (AD – 2021-0183R1)
Your
» Expertise details photo here
❖ Airbus In-Service Engineering, Cabin and Cargo Mechanical Equipment Specialist.

Mainly focused on:
Presented by
➢ A320 ATA 25-30 Luna Tokiko
➢ A330/A340 ATA 25-30 CRISTALLI
Cabin & Cargo
➢ A350 ATA 25-35/36
Mechanical Systems Specialist
➢ A350 ATA 25-26
luna-tokiko.cristalli@airbus.com
❖ Previous experiences in ATR:

➢ FAL Production Quality Performance
➢ Cabin Design Office, Stress Engineer

Description Mitigation Final Fix Conclusion
● Background
● Root Causes
● Airworthiness Impact
Description
Background
● Several operators reported workdeck delamination and/or corrosion of trolley retainer blocks on Safran Galleys.
● Damages reported after 36 months into service.
Root Causes
● Blocks Material prone to exfoliation corrosion
● Lack of galvanic corrosion protection on retainer bolt
TFU 25.30.00.054
● Incomplete adhesion of adhesive during workdeck panel assembly

Description
Key points
Airworthiness Impact
A320 Family A/C Galleys can be classified in: • Non-compliance with
● Forward-facing JAR 25.561 is
identified at loads
● Aft-facing
above 6g in x-direction
• Airworthiness impact
on FWD-facing Galleys
only
JAR 25.561
The occupant experiences the following
ultimate inertia forces acting separately
relative to the surrounding structure:
● Upward, 3.0g
● Forward, 9.0g
● Sideward, 3.0g
● Downward, 6.0g
● Rearward, 1.5g
Airworthiness Impact on Forward-Facing Galleys only.
● AD 2021-0183R1
● Finding Rates
Mitigation
Key points
AD 2021-0183R1
• FOC industry
support provided
Inspection SBs available since December 2020, mandated in August 2021: by Safran
• Airbus SB A320-25-1BVS (CEO Fleet) • CAUTION:

• Airbus SB A320-25-1BVT (NEO Fleet) Inspection to be
performed by
Inspection SBs to be updated by the end of June 2022. August 18th on
some A/C
Threshold:
36 months since first installation
Grace Period for inspections:

12 months after 18 August 2021
Repetitive Inspection:
6 months or 36 months depending on the SB action selected
Mitigation
Key points
Finding Rates
• Limited number of
Jan 2021 - May 2022
findings reported
• Final Fix SBs

classification will be
based on Finding
Rates (mandatory or
recommended)
Delamination : average 5.3 years in-service

Corrosion: average 6.3 years in-service
● Linefit
● Retrofit
Final Fix
Key points
Linefit
Final Fix design introduced within 2022 and 2023 for each version. • Major MOD approved
in April 2022
Retrofit • SBs (Forward-facing)

VSBs (Aft-facing)
Forward-facing : SB 25-1CBN (CEO), SB 25-1CBP (NEO) available in batches
within Q3-Q4 2022
JUL AUG NOV DEC
End of
01 02 03,04 05 2022 • Batching details
provided in TFU
VSB supplied FOC. Both materials and MH are compensated by Safran.
• Recommendation:
SB embodiment at the
Aft-facing : VSB 601800-25-025, VSB 601800-25-026 beginning of the check
JUL OCT
End of
01 02
2022
VSB costs based on Safran contractual conditions, supported by SSC
Galley - Corrosion of trolley retainer block

(AD – 2021-0183R1) - Conclusion
• AD addressed via Inspection SBs published
since December 2020
• Limited number of findings
• Final Fix available in batches within Q3-Q4 2022


Reference documents table – Follow-up to be done through TFU
Topic Status Ref
AD Published 2021-0183R1
TFU Open 25.30.00.054
ISB Published 25-1BVS
ISB Published 25-1BVT
SB Scheduled in 2022 25-1CBN
SB Scheduled in 2022 25-1CBP
VSB Scheduled in 2022 601800-25-025
VSB Scheduled in 2022 601800-25-026

AD 2021-0183R1
Key points
Inspection SB published in December 2020, mandated in August 2021 and updated by end of June 2022: • Threshold:
• Airbus SB A320-25-1BVS (CEO Fleet) 36 months since first
• Airbus SB A320-25-1BVT (NEO Fleet) installation
• Grace Period for

inspections:
12 months after 18
August 2021
• Repetitive
Inspection:
6 months or 36 months
depending on the SB
action selected
Thank you
Lisbon
Landing Gear
Presented by Matthieu BURLOTTE
Landing Gear
Your photo
• Senior Engineer for Landing Gear Systems

• 18 years experience in Landing Gear Presented by
○ Customer Services Matthieu
○ Engineering BURLOTTE
• Safety and SMS representative Senior Engineer
Landing Gear
Systems
matthieu.burlotte@airbus.com

NLG S/Abs Dynamic Description Solution
Seal Leakage Background
NLG Shock Absorber Dynamic Seal Leakage TFU 32.21.00.018
Description
● Recurrent in-service issue on A320Fam (ref. To TFU 32.21.00.018)
● Sudden leakage due to NLG dynamic seal failure
● Risk of AOG due to need for seal replacement and shock absorber servicing
● Preventive replacement as per Safran SIL 580-32-3150 to prevent AOG (between 3000 and 4000FC)

NLG Shock Absorber Dynamic Seal Leakage TFU 32.21.00.018
Description
● Recurrent in-service issue on A320Fam (ref. To TFU 32.21.00.018)
● Sudden leakage due to NLG dynamic seal failure
● Risk of AOG due to need for seal replacement and shock absorber servicing
● Preventive replacement every 3000FC/4000FC to prevent AOG (Safran SIL 580-32-3150)
Background
● Seal failure due to wear of the back-up ring and rupture of the lip on the
elastomer part
● New dynamic seal developed to improve seal robustness whilst
keeping compatibility with the existing NLG design
● Endurance testing on bench demonstrated positive results
● In-Service Evaluation (ISE) was launched to confirm seal performance

NLG Shock Absorber Dynamic Seal Leakage
Key points
Solution • TFU 32.21.00.018
• Introduction of the new Green Tweed dynamic seal • New seal available
based on lab testing and ISE results for both Linefit and
Retrofit
• MOD introduced in production in July 2020
• Continued monitoring of in-service seal performance • Robustness
demonstrated
through fleet leaders involved in ISE
through ISE
• Fleet leaders accumulated more than 15000 FC
• ~2500 A/C equipped
with the new seal
MOD embodiment on a/c
● Linefit: MOD Introduced in Production from MSN09444
● Retrofit: SBs available – SB A320-32-1507 (CEO) & A320-32-1508 (NEO),
VSB 580-32-3199
~1000 A/C delivered with the new seal and 1500 seal kits supplied for retrofit
Topic Status Ref
TFU Open 32.21.00.018
MOD Available 167266
VSB Available 580-32-3199
SB (CEO) Available A320-32-1507
SB (NEO) Available A320-32-1508
Safran Landing Systems SIL Published 580-32-3150

NLG Torque Link Issue/Description Root Cause Mitigation/Solution
Apex Pin Corrosion
NLG Torque Link Issue/Description Root cause Mitigation/Solution
Apex Pin Corrosion
NLG Torque Link Apex Pin Corrosion TFU 32.21.00087
Issue / Description
• 3 cases of NLG torque links disconnection on
Post-MOD 153020/SB 32-1400 A/C
• Loss of steering
• Corrosion found on apex pin and nut threads
• All the affected parts accumulated more than 4
years in service
nut lock
pin plate
bolt

Apex Pin Corrosion
NLG Torque Link Apex Pin Corrosion TFU 32.21.0087
• Nut detachment due to threads corrosion damage

• Deterioration of the Cadmium protection on threads
• Main contributors to corrosion development:
○ Abrasion due to repetitive Removal/Installation (nut
torquing procedure)
○ Cadmium thickness
• Aggravating factors:
○ Variability in the Cadmium application process
○ Exposure to chemical products (e.g. de-icing fluids)

Apex Pin Corrosion
NLG Torque Link Apex Pin Corrosion
Key points
Mitigation / Interim Action • TFU 32.21.00087
• Repetitive inspection every 18MO for all parts after 4Y in-service (ISB)
• Repetitive inspection
• FOC part replacement in case of corrosion findings
• FOC replacement in
• AMM Removal/Installation procedure reviewed to: case of corrosion
○ Reduce torque value to minimize damage on Cadmium
• Terminating action
○ Avoid A/C jacking thru design change
by mid-2023

NLG Torque Link Apex Pin Corrosion
Key points
Mitigation / Interim Action • TFU 32.21.00087
• Repetitive inspection every 18MO for all parts after 4Y in-service (ISB)
• Repetitive inspection
• FOC part replacement in case of corrosion findings
• FOC replacement in
• AMM Removal/Installation procedure reviewed to: case of corrosion
○ Reduce torque value to minimize damage on threads protective coating
• Terminating action
○ Avoid A/C jacking thru design change
by mid-2023
Solution / Terminating action

● New design of apex pin and nut developed & qualified
● Corrosion-REsistant Steel (CRES) to eliminate the risk of corrosion
● Change in threads surface protection coating
● MOD and SB solutions expected by mid 2023

Topic Status Ref
TFU Open 32.21.0087
SB (Inspection, CEO) Available A320-32-1500
SB (Inspection, NEO) Available A320-32-1501
VSB (Inspection) Available 580-32-3209
OIT Published 999.0027/020
RIL Active SA32M19009264
MOD (new design) Q3 2023 TBD
SB (new design) Q3 2023 TBD

MLG Uplock Prox Issue/Description Mitigation Solution
Sensors Faults Root cause
MLG Door Uplock Prox Sensors Intermittent Faults TFU 32.31.00.039
Issue / Description
● Faults associated to MLG Door uplock position
indication (26/27/28/29GA Prox Sensors)
● ~45% of LGERS prox sensor faults
● Intermittent faults, hard to troubleshoot
● Consequence: Unscheduled maintenance, AOG, Flight
cancellations
Engaged Pin/Socket contact

(EN3155-019F2018)
Typical worn sensor pin at interface with socket

Issue / Description
● Faults associated to MLG Door uplock position
indication (26/27/28/29GA Prox Sensors)
● ~45% of LGERS prox sensor faults
● Intermittent faults, hard to troubleshoot
● Consequence: Unscheduled maintenance, AOG, Flight
cancellations
Root cause / Investigation

● Movement of electrical harness
Engaged Pin/Socket contact
● Increasing play at pin/socket contact (EN3155-019F2018)
● Chafing between pins and sockets generating wear of

pin protection Typical worn sensor pin at interface with socket
● Increase in prox sensor resistance

Mitigation
• Troubleshooting:
○ Check connector / conduit for excessive play
○ Visually check the connector pin for chafing damage
○ Replace the prox sensor and associated connector
• Preventive maintenance :
○ Check Inductance/Resistance of uplock prox sensors
lines:
➢ AMM 32-31-73-820-008-A
➢ AMM 32-31-73-820-009-A

Sensors Faults Root Cause
MLG Door Uplock Prox Sensors Intermittent Faults
Key points
Solution / Terminating action • TFU 32.31.00.039
• New support of the harness conduit to avoid
• Main contributor to
movement LGERS prox sensors
• Qualification Completed including flight testing faults
• ‘On wing’ modification (No need to send the • Solution available

uplock in shop) Linefit and Retrofit
• On-wing modification
MOD embodiment on a/c

● Linefit: MOD introduced in Production in Dec 2020 (POE MSN 10327)
● Retrofit: SBs available
○ PN 201122009: VSB 201123-32-101, SB 32-1496 (CEO) & 32-1497 (NEO),
○ PN 201122008: VSB 201123-32-102, SB 32-1509

Topic Status Ref
ISI Published 32.31.00.039
AMM (Inductance check) Available 32-31-73-820-008-A
AMM (Resistance check) Available 32-31-73-820-009-A
MOD Available 166682
SB (PN 201122009, CEO) Available A320-32-1496
SB (PN 201122009, NEO) Available A320-32-1497
VSB (PN 201122009) Available 201122-32-101
SB (PN 201122008) Available A320-32-1509
VSB (PN 201122008) Available 201122-32-102

MLG Sliding Tube A321 MLG Axle MLG Sliding Rod Solution
Chrome Damage Chrome Damage Chrome Damage
MLG Sliding Tube Chrome Damage
Description
● Operators have reported MLG sliding tube chrome

damage associated with Overheat of base metal
● Operational impact when found in-service
● Increase in cost of repairs
Sliding rod
● Scrap at Overhaul rear face
● 2 areas concerned:
○ Wheel axle inboard chrome journal C (A321)
○ Sliding rod main diameter rear face
Wheel axle
Journal C

MLG Sliding Tube A321 MLG Axle MLG Sliding Rod
Overheat Damage Chrome Damage Chrome Damage
● Root cause/Mitigation
● Investigation
● Regional
A320 Family European Solutions
Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 EU - Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
A321 MLG Axle Chrome Damage
Issue / Description
Chromium plating detachment / base
metal damage on the axle, Journal C
area (next to the brake flange)
Journal C
B
A
Protective
sleeve
Brake flange
Wheel axle

Root Cause
Contact and vibrations between axle sleeve and
axle journal C, causing excessive frictional heating
● Contact: modelling shows that contact takes
place at Journal C when under specific loading
● Vibrations: fretting between axle and sleeve Journal C
during routine operations
Mitigation
A321 operators to perform greasing of the wheel
axle/protective sleeve interface every 2000FC
(ref. ISI 32.11.00166) Journal C Protective sleeve

Investigation / Way forward
• Approach: reduce heat generation by

reducing friction
• Testing campaign performed to compare
behavior/performance of several
compounds at sleeve/axle interface
• Significant improvement demonstrated
with Aeroshell 64 grease
Low Frequency Test High Frequency Test Results Analysis Certification
Completed Started 04/2022 Q3 2022 Q4 2022

MLG Axle Chrome Damage
Key points
• TFU 32.11.00.005
Solution
• Introduction of Aeroshell 64 grease with improved resistance to high • Regular greasing @
contact pressure and temperature 2000FC
• AMM update expected by Q1 2023 • New grease to be

introduced (Aeroshell
64)
• Design revisited for

XLR
XLR
• At the opportunity of XLR development, design has been revisited:
○ Change in protective sleeve and axle stiffness
○ Specific HVOF* coating applied on the protective sleeve ID to
reduce effect of fretting
* HVOF: High Velocity Oxygen Fuel

Topic Status Ref
AMM To be Updated 32-42-71-400-001-A

MLG Sliding Tube A321 MLG Axle MLG Sliding Rod
Chrome Damage Chrome Damage Chrome Damage
● Root cause/Mitigation
● Current Solution
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon - 21-22nd June 2022 ● Further
EU -Improvement
Not Listed / Maximum US - 9E991
MLG Sliding Rod Chrome Damage
Issue / Description
● MLG sliding tube chrome damage associated with

Overheat of base metal (ref. TFU 32.11.13.024)
● Damage located on lower rear face area
● Mainly affects A/C operating on CIS* runways or
rough/degraded runways
● Requires on-wing repair
● Scrap rate at Overhaul
* CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

MLG Sliding Rod Chrome damage
Root Cause
• MLG sliding rod OD chrome damage due to localised

overheating of base material
Lower
• Overheat caused by friction and rapid sliding tube bearing
translation movements when operating on

rough/degraded runways
Mitigation
• For affected operators, reduction of MLG Lower Bearing greasing interval up to a weekly basis

Current solution
For the affected operators, introduction of a Self-Lubricated

Lower Bearing with PTFE Liner:
● PTFE liner sleeve inserted in existing Lower Bearing
● Reduction of friction between Lower Bearing & Sliding
Rod
● PTFE liner replacement every 5800 FC
● Optional MOD in Prod and SBs available

Key points
Further improvement • TFU 32.11.13.024
● New PTFE MLG lower bearing is • Proven solution to

prevent overheat
under development damage
● Objective: No replacement before • PTFE bearing limited
Overhaul (20000FC) @5800FC
● Robustness Testing is ongoing in the • New PTFE bearing

frame of A321XLR development under development
to match Overhaul
● In Service Evaluation (ISE) planned interval
before deployment on Legacy fleet as • ISE to start S1 2023

new production standard
● ISE expected to start first half 2023

Topic Status Ref
OIT Published OIT-999-0102-18-00
MOD (PTFE bearing, 5800FC limitation) Available 152042 & 155014 & 155071
SB (PTFE bearing, 5800FC limitation, pre-EV MLG) Available A320-32-1386 & A320-32-1414
SB (PTFE bearing, 5800FC limitation, EV MLG, CEO) Available A320-32-1447
SB (PTFE bearing, 5800FC limitation, EV MLG, NEO) Available A320-32-1448
VSB (associated with SB A320-32-1386) Available 200-32-307 & 201-32-58
VSB (associated with SB A320-32-1414) Available 200-32-308 & 310, 201-32-59 & 60
VSB (associated with SB A320-32-1447 & 1448) Available 202-32-04 & 203-32-05
ISB (replacement of PTFE liner @5800FC, CEO) Available A320-32-1466
ISB (replacement of PTFE liner @5800FC, NEO) Available A320-32-1467

Conclusion
Landing Gear - Conclusion
Solutions available to address main OI

drivers
✓ MLG Door Uplock prox sensors faults
✓ Dynamic Seal leak
Solutions under qualification to address

MLG Sliding Tube overheat damage

Thank you
Lisbon
Field Loadable Software digitalization & data security

Presented by Lilian SEGONDS
Field Loadable Software digitalization and data security
Your photo
Expertise details here
● Today in Customer Care Center Engineering as Field Loadable Software Operations eXpert
● Previously in Aircraft and Product Security team in Customer Services and Product Leader for Presented by
Integrated Information System Platforms. Lilian
SEGONDS
Field Loadable Software
Operations eXpert
lilian.segonds@airbus.com

FLS Media Rule making Security Conclusion
Digitalization for Portable Considerations
Data Loader
FLS Media Digitalization Key points
Description
• In most of A320 family A/C, FLS (Field Loadable Software) Media (floppy disk and CD-Rom) ● New FLS standards
are physically stored in each A/C cockpit, part of the A/C definition and managed in configuration are now proposed
• FLS Media are not compatible with wireless SW distribution dematerialized
• Associated logistical burden (about 30 FLS per A/C), media obsolescence
● A/L processes and
ground IT
Objective infrastructure to be
• Remove FLS Media from the A/C definition adapted for
• Allow FLS centralized e-delivery managing
• Secure SW for compatibility with wireless distribution / uploading and future data loader dematerialized FLS
• Ensure backward compatibility with legacy MDDU (Multi Purpose Disk Drive) / PDL (Portable (no A/C change)
Data Loader)
● A/L to anticipate the
Project Status EIS
4
•
•
•
FLS Media Digitalization is in service since September 2021
Airbus processes and Technical Publication have been adapted
Retrofit solutions start being proposed in dematerialized format
X
(ISI 00.00.00384
and Airbus Service)
FLS Media Rule making Security Conclusions
Data Loader
● Applicable standards
● Airbus involvement
Applicable Standards
Generic Rule
All the PDL references are removed from the TEM (Tool Equipment Manual) and
considered as standard tools
● Airlines can select on their own their PDL reference compatible with
ARINC 615-3 and ARINC 615A protocols
Dematerialized FLS
Digitalized FLS electronically supplied by Airbus are in format
ARINC 665 & ARINC 835 (digital signature relying on Digital
Certificates implemented by Airbus PKI [Public Key Infrastructure] ADTS [Airbus
X
Digital Trust Solutions])
● Required for electronic distribution of FLS
FLS digitalized from physical Media formats are compatible to ARINC 641 ISI 00.00.00240 includes
recommendations about the
attachment 5 adaptation of PDL
● This format enables to come back to the original Media format
Airbus involvement
PDL development
● PDL development is fully under the responsibility of the PDL suppliers
● PDL suppliers can develop their own security check function capable of ADTS
PKI check
● PDL suppliers can secure their device based on recommendations included in

the Airbus document “Security Operational Procedures for Portable Data
Loaders” ref X206RQ1900906, which is an appendix of the “A320 family and
A330/A340 Security Handbook” ref D17023482
● The Airbus security check tool LSBM (Load Secure Batch Media) may be
supplied to the PDL suppliers
Contact to establish the contract: pierre.colas@airbus.com
ISI 00.00.00317 is the reference for LSBM usage and evolution
7
FLS Media Rule making Security Conclusions
Data Loader
● FLS Security Principles
● Future FLS data loading
with ADLU
FLS Security Principles ARINC 665-2 Format
A Field Loadable Software is made of:
Digital FLS Features
◘ Data file: useful load
◘ Header file: .LUH, to guarantee the
ARINC 665-2 integrity of the load
SW Part Number (PNR)
◘ Digital signature: .LSH, to guarantee the
authenticity of the load
SW FIN SW Functional Designation
Airbus Security Handbook

LOAD Recommendation (in line with ARINC 645-1)
◘ FLS authenticity & integrity should be checked at
+ reception before storage, before shop loading and
Data
+
Load header Secured before data loading on A/C
File header file
.LUH .LSH
◘ As an example, tool to check Digital Signature:
LSBM
Future FLS data loading with ADLU (Airborne Data Loading Unit)
Airbus Solutions A615-3 Targets
Security
“Low-Speed”
FOMAX
Wireless FLS
import
Ground capability
ADLU A615A Targets
“High-Speed”
Airline Infrastructure eDLRB
UC2: ADLU FLS Wireless Import UC1: ADLU standalone

• FLS can be imported remotely • FLS can be imported
FLS repository
on a secure way through VPN through SD card or
established by FOMAX USB stick
Cell
10
FLS Media Rule making Security Conclusion
Data Loader
Field Loadable Software digitalization and data security - Conclusion
• FLS dematerialization is now in running

mode for linefit and retrofit
• FLS data loading with PDL is managed by

X
the airlines in collaboration with the
suppliers, based on ARINC standards
• Security Principles rely on Digital

Certificates and Airbus end-to-end solution
based on ADLU


Topic Ref
FLS Media Digitalization - PDL adaptation ISI 00.00.00240
How to manage FLS with LSBM ISI 00.00.00317
How to rebuild a FLS Media from a digitalized FLS ISI 00.00.00333
2nd WEBINAR A320-A330/A340 families - FLS Media Digitalization update ISI 00.00.00384
A320 family and A330/A340 Security Handbook D17023482
Security Operational Procedures for Portable Data Loaders” ref X206RQ1900906

Glossary
Acronym Definition Acronym Definition
A/C aircraft LSBM Load Secure Batch Media
A/L airline MDDU Multipurpose Disk Drive Unit
ADLU Airborne Data Loading Unit PDL Portable Data Loader
ADTS Airbus Digital Trust Solutions PKI Public Key Infrastructure
eDLRB Enhanced Data Loading Routing Box PNR Part Number
EIS Entry Into Service SW Software
FIN Functional Item Number SD Secure Digital
FLS Field Loadable Software UC Use Case
FOMAX Flight Operations and Maintenance eXchanger USB Universal Serial Bus
ISI In-Service Information VPN Virtual Private Network

Thank you
Lisbon
Weather radar transceiver

Presented by Christelle LEDAUPHIN
Your photo
Today in A320 Family Customer Support Program as Program manager responsible

Presented by
for avionics topics
Christelle
LEDAUPHIN
• Previously in NAVBLUE (Airbus ProSky), subsidiary providing Flight Operations and Air Traffic A320 Family Program
Management Services, in charge of the implementation of Airspace projects. Manager
christelle.ledauphin@airbus.com
• I started my career in Airbus design office, working on ATA 34 topics.

Description and Solutions Conclusion
investigations
Overview
Description
The Honeywell RDR-4000 weather radar is composed of Several project launched
- Radar Processor(s) (RP) completeness
- Radar Receiver Transmitter Unit(s) (RTU)
- Antenna drive unit and antenna
- Weather radar control panel
Radar Processor (RP)
Issue
- Pegasus Airlines reported low reliability of RTU.
Between April-21 and March-22
● 4 removals of P/N 930-2000-001
● 32 removals of P/N 930-2000-020
Receiver Transmitter
Unit (RTU)
Investigations status
Root cause investigations at Receiver Transmitter Unit (RTU) level

● RTU 930-2000-xxx MTBUR is below the GMTBUR completeness
MTBUR RTU - Source: Honeywell

Investigations status at RTU level
● Main root cause of the failures of the RTU P/N Several project launched
930-2000-001 to improve quality and
→ at the Transmitter Assembly module level: completeness
MOSFET Q101 component failure.
RTU and Transmitter Assembly
● More than 70% of the failures of the RTU P/N

930-2000-020
→ at the Transmitter Assembly module level: Solder
issue (MOSFET Q101), solder crack issue (U2
component) and capacitor failures.
⇒ Main root causes of the RTU failures identified.
Top failures RTU-020 - Source: Honeywell

Description & Solutions Conclusion
investigations
Solutions Key points
Terminative action
• Plan and secure
SW and HW
- In order to improve RTU -020 reliability, consider the following upgrades: upgrades
➢ SW change at RP level (PNR 930-1005-003):

• Free of Charge
Certified in Sept 2021 conditions apply
Available through IPC and VSB at Free of Charge conditions for both the SW
and HW changes.
On-wing data loading through Free of Charge RDAF
➢ HW change at RTU level (PNR 930-2000-021):

Certified in Feb 2022
Deployment in retrofit through IPC and VSB at Free of Charge conditions.
IPC release planned in August-22. VSB release planned mid-July-22.

Description & Solutions Conclusion
investigations
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Libon
Weather radar transceiver - Conclusion
Airbus and Honeywell continue monitoring the

reliability trend of RDR-4000 equipment
Solutions identified and available (or will shortly

be) to fix the RTU reliability issue.


Type Ref Title

TFU 34.41.00101 WXR - RTU P/N 930-2000-020
VSB 930-1005-34-0237 RADAR PROCESSOR (RP) - INSTALL SOFTWARE TO UPDATE THE RP-1
PN 930-1005-002
TO PN 930-1005-003; CHANGE TO THE RDR-4000 APPLICATION
SOFTWARE TO ADDRESS Q101 FIELD
FAILURE OF THE TR-1 TRANSMITTER RECEIVER UNIT
VSB 930-2000-34-0013 CONVERSION OF TR-1 PN 930-2000-020 TO PN 930-2000-021;
REPLACEMENT OF THE TRANSMITTER ASSEMBLY/RF BOARD TO
IMPROVE RELIABILITY OF THE TR-1 TRANSMITTER-RECEIVER UNIT

Glossary
Acronym Definition
NFF No Fault Found
RP Radar Processor
RTU Receiver Transmitter Unit
WXR Weather Radar

Thank you
Lisbon
SB Enhancement
Presented by Pascal ALBAREDE
SB Enhancement
• 20 years of experience with Airbus in various positions from A380/A400M Centralized
Maintenance Systems development to Maintenance Retrofit solutions / documentations
Presented by
Pascal
Today as Head of Retrofit Solution Cross Program leading a team in charge of ALBAREDE
• Service Bulletin End To End activities Ho Retrofit Solutions
• Service Bulletin Validation Cross Program
• Airline Early Involvement project.
pascal.albarede@airbus.com

Safety & Service SB Quality Repair Drawings Conclusion
Bulletins inside SB
Bulletins inside SB
Safety & Service Bulletins Key points
• SB Compliance
How to know more about Safety & Service Bulletins?
• SB Reason §
SB Compliance
• Mandatory SB & SB linked to Potential AD. • Safety Beyond
Standard
SB Reason paragraph
• Facts must be provided to assist the operator in determining the Service Bulletin's
applicability to/or effect on his operation, including
– A clear and complete description of the condition the Service Bulletin is issued to
correct or improve, including the consequences to the controllability of the aircraft
in flight and to the safety of the aircraft.
• Information relative to “Safety Beyond Standard” - ISI Article 22.00.00104 Updated May
2022 added in SB Reason §
Airbus Communications (including SB references if applicable)

• Conferences, …
• Articles - Safety Leaflet…
Bulletins inside SB
● Performance
● Collaboration
● Support
SB Quality - Performance Key points
SB Right First Time Indicator

New Indicator deployed to measure the quality of the new Service Bulletin based on
• New Customer
Customers’ Operational impacts.
SB quality
Quality
indicator
SB RFT definition:
A New Service Bulletin is considered as Right First Time when no RDAF (Repair and
• RDAF criteria
Design Approval Form) has been issued after 18 months of SB issuance. taken into
account
90%
April 2022 vs
92% as target

SB Quality - “Collaborate together” Key points
20
Airlines and MRO involved
SB Customers Working Group started
To co-design together process & product improvements
• Panel with
TOP 5 topics 16 operators part of
to enhance the content of our SBs and reduce
Customers WG • SB Quality A320 family
Customers Engineering cost. • Compliance & RDAF
• Kit availability
• Tech Data availability • 2022: implementation
• Economic Data
of SB enhancements
March 2021 June 2021 April 2022 2023

Kick-off SB Quality SB Quality SB Mandatory
meeting Planning & Material Information Accomplishment Instructions RDAF, Kit & TD availability
3 workshops 3 workshops planned in 2022

=> 40 proposals reviewed => 60 proposals to review
Improvement on ROI,
SB configuration Management &
SB conquirent Requirements

SB Quality - Support - More anticipation and reduce lead-time Key points
Anticipate expiration date for RDAF

To reduce operator's workload, anticipate the expiration date of RDAF in order to either
• RDAF anticipated
accelerate the revision of the SB or extend the RDAF.
• 14 “Fast Track” SB
revisions
Rule: 1 month before the RDAF expiration date inform the operator. dispatched in 2022
in less than 1
month
Accelerate SB revisions
Set-up a FAST TRACK process to reduce the lead-time revision and avoid RDAF.
Only applicable for simple SB following a decision tree.

Bulletins inside SB
Repair Drawings inside SB Key points
Reference inside SB • Repair Drawing
• All Repair Drawing references are identified in a specific table. Core Reference
• Only the core of the repair drawing reference is added • Repair Drawing
accessible for
A320
Accesses to the Repair Drawings

• For A320, Operators have to download the last version of the repair drawings to
apply the Service Bulletin.
SB Revisions
• The impact of any repair drawing issue change is taken into account at each SB
revision opportunity.
Under Study
• Airbus is checking the possibilities to send a notification of Repair
drawings issue change. Feasibility conclusion for Q3 2022

Bulletins inside SB
SB Enhancement - Conclusion
Safety & Service Bulletins

SB Reason § plus regular Airbus Communications
SB Quality
Quality
Focus on Accomplishment instructions in 2022
Fast Track Revisions
Links to Repair Drawings

Feasibility about notifications - Q3 2022

Thank you
Lisbon
Overall Maintenance Optimization

Presented by Claire KAUFFMANN
Overall Maintenance Optimisation
» Head of Scheduled Maintenance Services
• 20 years with Airbus in various positions from Supply Chain to Maintenance Economics
Presented by
• Previously Customer Support Director for leasing and airline customers
Claire KAUFFMANN
Head of Scheduled
Maintenance Services
claire.kauffmann@airbus.com

Planned Standard Maintenance Conclusion
Maintenance Maintenance Evolution
Overview Program Evolutions Strategy
Overall Maintenance Overview
Maintenance unavailability -
planned / unplanned breakdown
Planned maintenance is an important driver for

customers operations
Existing opportunities to reduce this impact and

Planned improve A320 Family aircraft availability
42%
Collaborate together to collect data and focus
on the main pain points
“LESS TIME IN HANGAR THROUGH INNOVATION AND PASSION”

Standard Maintenance Program Evolutions - Principles
Regular standard evolutions

in the Maintenance Planning Document (MPD)
Reduced volume of items within the MPD

with a focus on continued airworthiness and
customer pain points
Publication of the MPD at fixed dates

to secure synchronisation with Aircraft Maintenance
Manual (AMM) publication
MPD Revision 47 Published in February 2022 - Overall Content
MRBR Rev. 25
● Systems
● Structures
New policy implementation
Accidental Damage
~65%
MPD Rev. 47
● Zonal of MPD tasks ● 67 tasks deleted from ALI
and transferred to MRBR
● 31 relaxed ALI thresholds
● 7 new ALI tasks with

relaxation
ALS Parts 1 Rev. 8 ● 20 unchanged ALI tasks
ALS Parts 2 Rev. 9 ~35%
New policy implementation of MPD tasks ● 71 deleted ALI tasks
Accidental Damage
ALS Parts 3 Rev. 8
ALS Parts 4 Rev. 8
ALS Parts 5 Rev. 7
A320 Family Maintenance Program Evolutions - Status
A check: from 350 FH to 1,000 FH
Light
(A Check)
Base
(C Check)
Base
(C Check)
C check: from 15 Mo to 36 Mo

Standard Maintenance Program Evolutions - Roadmap
Engine maintenance optimization Key points
Structural checks
12 year Heavy Maintenance Visit optimization - 228 tasks
• Regular standard
Structural checks
optimizations
6 year Heavy Maintenance Visit optimization - 184 tasks
MPD 50
• Reduced volume
MPD 49
of MPD revisions
MPD 48
A & C checks A & C checks
optimization Step 1 optimization Step 2
94 Out of Phase tasks 63 Out of Phase tasks • MPD publication
at fixed dates
Aircraft development - e.g.: A321XLR, eRudder, PW PIP* & corrosion improvements
• Data collection
from customers
is a prerequisite
2022 2023 2024 2025
* Pratt & Whitney Performance Improvement Program

Your Feedback on Standard Evolutions
Too slow
Not adapted to my needs
You expect
“One size fits all” more value
12
A New Approach to Meet Your Expectations
CORE ADDITIONAL
SUPPORT SERVICES
● Continuous Airworthiness / Safety ● Tailored evolution

mission ● Standard maintenance evolution
● New mods entry into service for in-service aircraft
● Standard maintenance evolution ● On request on a chargeable
for new aircraft basis
Optimization capability enhanced with Scheduled Maintenance 2.0 (SM 2.0)
13
Tailored Maintenance Evolutions - More Value to You Quicker
More value to your operations

through maintenance program evolutions
Evolutions achieved faster to deliver value quickly
A customized approach, tailored to your individual requirements
14
Demonstrated Value in Tailored Maintenance Evolutions
25% task interval escalation
Tailored to get your tailored maintenance

evolution 6Mo
program
<12Mo Return on Investment
15
Scheduled Maintenance 2.0 (SM 2.0) - Our Future Digital Ecosystem
Our ambition: reduce maintenance downtime with a new way of working on

maintenance program definition
from fleetwide enveloppe to MSN approach

Fleet • MRBR
enveloppe • ALS
• MPD
from document centric to maintenance task centric
MSN filter Customized MPD
from conservative to enhanced optimization

capability
Deliver maintenance program in a simple way

&
enhance maintenance program optimization
16
Overall Maintenance Optimization - Conclusion

COLLABORATION
Prioritizing your key topics
thanks to FAIR forums
CONTINUOUS EVOLUTIONS
Standard maintenance evolutions
TAILORED SOLUTIONS
Adapted to your fleet
BACK TOGETHER with fully optimized maintenance

Thank you
Lisbon
Caucus
Presented by
21-22th June 2022 -
Caucus
● General feedback on the Conference
● Top General Issues A320 Family
● Top Technical Issues A320 Family
● Positive / Negative
● Conclusion

Caucus - General feedback on the Conference
Item Description
Very happy to return to face to face meeting!

1
Tailor made agenda appreciated

2
Almost impossible to book rooms on time

3
4 Meeting room and common areas too small, hard to keep social distance
There was no action visibility on the Caucus of the previous conference. It should be discussed at beginning of
5
conference.
6 Airbus did not allowed all customers to discuss the smelly topic of cabin air quality in one place

Caucus - Top General Issues A320 Family
Item Description
Supply Chain issues - Airlines cannot be expected to order more and earlier; it is not the airline’s responsibility to solve supplier
1 issues;
Airlines were disappointed with SATAIR’s response.
We need more support and less services. For example better Tech Pub data, solutions being provided
2
Airlines need one point of contact, not being directed to other OEMs
3
We need first time fixes, not coming back to the same issues
4
5 SRM previous revisions need to be available at no extra cost. We already pay for subscription.
6 Regarding wing skin corrosion, operators are not willing to accept charges.
Any design issues RDAFs should not be charged to the customer

7
8 Charging policy wording should be more transparent
Digitalization issues regarding future regulations were not properly discussed. Operators are concerned about future impact of
9
regulations.

Caucus - Top Technical Issues A320 Family
Item Description
LEAP Starter Air Valve; IPCV Engine Stall (no solution) ; HPTACC Manifold Brackets, RBS CFM implementation
1
cost
2 PW new EEC FCS urgently needed; no final fix for Engine Hydraulic Rods
3 Collins IAE Thrust Reverser corrosion
4 General corrosions issues - all over the aircraft!
5 LEAP pylon hydraulic leakage - going forward but need fleet retrofit yesterday
Very early failures on new aircraft, it is unacceptable. These are serious quality issues/escapes with suppliers; need
6
to take actions at root level.
Root cause identified as being on GPU, but the problem is in the bad design of the GAPCU.
7

Caucus - Positive
Item Description
Airbus focused on being transparent and tried to give visibility on issues

1
Airbus support and work on monitored retrofits

2

Caucus - Negative
Item Description
Some presentations did not go into enough detail; time was limited. Some topics could have been removed to have
1 more time to more important ones
Apart from Collins, other vendors were hiding

2
Commercial aspect of new service of AirnavX Full Online not fully discussed; it should be available for all users; it
3 should not be limited
Supply issues when parts are not available - there are cases where Airbus suggests a chargeable RDAF, more
4 expensive than the part itself (cat B gives problems with lessors

Thank you
A320 Family European regional Conference, Lisbon,
A320 Family European Regional Conference, Lisbon, 21-22 June 2022
Your hosts
Jean Pierre GOMEZ Diogo PEDROSA Caroline CLAVEL Marc GUINOT Philippe LE-BIGOT Joseph SAURAS
VP A320 Family Program Maintenance & Engineering Head of Systems A320 Chief Engineer A320 Family Program Senior Director
Customer Services Aircraft Maintenance Customer Care Centre Manager A320 Family Programme
Engineering & Quality Manager Engineering Customer Services Customer Services
TAP Air Portugal
Your presenters
Pascal ALBAREDE Olivier AUSSEIL Gerault BAYLE Catherine BEROS Matthieu BURLOTTE Emiliano CAROSI Alice CARSALADE
Retrofit solution Customer Support TECH DATA A320 Customer Support Landing Gear System A320 Family Program Customer Support
Cross Program Engineering Program Manager Engineering Engineering Manager Engineering
Engineering Customer Services Customer Services Customer Services Customer Services Customer Services Customer Services
Customer Services
Hugo CASADO Dominique CHARLIER Mário LOBATO de FARIA Luna TOKIKO CRISTALLI Joachim DOLLEY Frederic DOULE Michael DUBOIS
ABARQUERO SRM Customer Support Engineering & Quality Customer Support A320 Chief Eng. In Wing Pylon Structure A320 Family
Chief Engineering Manager Engineer TAP Air Portugal Engineering Services Solutions Engineering Program Manager
A320 Family Program Customer Services Customer Services A320 Family Program Customer Services Customer Services
Christelle Jeremy MARION

Marco FAITA Delphine Sascha HORATZEK Eric JEANPIERRE Claire KAUFFMANN
LEDAUPHIN A320neo Product Leader
A320 Product Leader HERTENS-ORLANDO Leader Supply Chain Product Safety HO Scheduled
A320 Family Program PW1100
LEAP-1A Chief Engineering SATAIR Enhancement Manager Maintenance Services
Manager Propulsion & APU Systems
Propulsion & APU Systems Manager Customer Services
Customer Services A320 Family Program
Benoit MERENCIANO Pierre MONTANIER Stephane PIREYRE Bruno PREVITALI Stephane RAMON Benoit RENAUD Lilian SEGONDS
Customer Support Cabin & Cargo electronics Embodiment A320 Family Program A320 Family Program Reliability & Expert Operations
Engineering Customer Services Industrialization Manager Manager Maintenance FLS
Customer Services Program Manager Customer Services Customer Services Economics Manager Customer Services
Xavier SOBRA Laurent STREMLER Pierre-Olivier Jean Marc

Customer Support A320 Family Program TRAINS WATTECANT
Engineering Manager Cabin Air Quality & HO Fleet Performance
Customer Services Customer Services Comfort Expert Control & Monitoring

A320 Europe Regional Conference 2022

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A320 Family European Regional Conference,

Conference Organisation - Rev 1

Today in A320 Family Customer Support Program as Program manager

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Keep your phone in You should feel free to

8:00 AM 0:30 Registration Laura Massaly

Welcome & Introduction speech Jean Pierre Gomez

9:30AM 0:20 1.4. How to interpret the report 15 Catherine Beros

9:50AM 0:20 Coffee break

1:00PM 0:30 1.10. Product evolution Marc Guinot

Marco FAITA Stephane RAMON Jeremy MARION Michael Dubois

4:45PM Bruno Previtali & Pierre Olivier

1:20 All Customers - Networking & Open discussions /

Welcome & Introduction speech Jean Pierre Gomez

8:35 AM 0:15 2.2 Mandated Campaigns deadline recall Joseph Sauras

9:50 AM 0:20 2.5. THSA Life limits Delphine Hertens-Orlando

10:10 AM 0:20 Coffee break

10:30 AM 0:15 2.6. SGS windshields inspection Laurent Stremler

Stephane Pireyre &

11:35 AM 0:25 2.9. Wing Skin Corrosion Frederic Doule

2.10. Galley - Corrosion of trolley retainer (AD

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2.11. Landing Gear

2.12. Field Loadable Software digitalization

2:50 PM 0:20 2.14. SB enhancement Pascal Albarede

3:10 PM 0:25 2.15. Maintenance Optimization Claire Kauffmann

3:35 PM 0:20 Coffee break

3:55 PM 1:00 Airline Caucus /

5:35 PM End of Conference

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❏ GenEWIS Gerault BAYLE

❏ SRM for Mechanic

❏ CAQ decontamination Pierre-Olivier TRAINS

tooling Customer Services

❏ “Skywise Reliability" &

Connect to the e-site through your

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e-Site main page

Click on “Agenda” in the main menu

Select the day ex: 21 June

Click on the presentation to open it

Same way for Day 2

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e-Site main page

Click on “More…” then

Click on the day to open a zip

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STEP 1: Download the App through

STEP 2: enter your codes

➢ login - your email address

➢ password - Given in the received

Please be aware that it might take a few minutes

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➢ General feedback on the Conference

➢ Conclusion Aircraft Maintenance

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MATT Kitchen Enjoy Reception & Dinner

Museu maat – Av. Brasília, 1300-598

7:10 pm departure by bus from

A320 Family Fleet performance - Operational Reliability &

Today in A320 Family Customer Support Program as Program manager

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