Now that I have provided a little background, let me return to my earlier complaint: that positive

theorists have taken too much of the politics out of the politics of structural choice. The problem
has two important sources. The first is that the positive theory of institutions is heavily oriented
by the methodology of social choice, which sees politics largely in terms of voting. The second is
that positive theorists are increasingly taking advantage of the new economics of organization,
which sees politics as an extension of economics.

MAIN POINT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: TWO SIDES TO THE STORY

The unneglected side: The "new institutionalists" (what Moe calls "positive theory of
institutions") employ their core technology (a combination of social choice and economics) to
study how institutions solve collective action problems. They generally view institutions as an
agreement that enables us to act.

The neglected side: Institutions are themselves a result of politics and decision making. Like
other public policies, institutional design results from an "authoritative means by which some
people may legally force other people to accept outcomes they would never agree to
voluntarily" (250). They neglect to consider how "political institutions are also weapons of
coercion and redistribution" (213).

Result of this neglect: Many of the other scholars working on political institutions "regard
positive theory as irrelevant to what they do. And to a large extent they are right" (249). Thus,
Moe offers a "friendly warning about the autopilot features of" new institutionalist ideology
that lead them to look primarily at one side of the story, "to encourage mid-course corrections
that might help accelerate their progress" (250).

Politics Economy and Organization

The positive theory of institutions has two basic concerns. One is to explain institutions-where
they come from, why they take the forms they do. The second is to understand their effects for
political and social behavior.

Majority rule does not promote good governance. Because politicians decide on what makes
them popular just so they win again.

Solution: Political Institutions that will solve both collective action problems and realize gains.
Fre from majority rule.

Public Authority and Political Institutions

The public authority is usually voted to be in the public institution.

Neglected side is how the public authority, after being elected, makes the public institution
about himself.
Public Authority and Effective Institution

Public authorities usually pass judgment on actions.

However, Public institutions MUST have strict rules so that the public authorities will not abuse
their power and impose their will upon the institution.

Public Authority and Political Uncertainty

There is uncertainty because public authorities cannot assume to hold office forever.
Effective design in institution as well.

Public Authority and Political Compromise

Losers in politics often compromise. However, they often cannot do their jobs well because their
ideals don’t align with the winners. Hence, we should not compromise often.

Public Authority, Autonomy, and Fear of the State

Citizens must be afforded protection against the state. This is because the state is likewise
created or is a result of politics with their own agenda.

Presidents and Legislators

Presidents are autonomous beings. They usually do not bow nor work with others misaligned
with their goals.

Separation of Powers and Parliamentary Systems

Parliamentary Systems are better:

(i) Public agencies are less encumbered by protective formalconstraints, and their
structures better suited to the jobs they are expected to do.
(ii)There is no layeringof bureaucraticstructurescreated separatelywith- in the executive
and legislative processes.
(iii) The whole of public bureaucracy more closely resembles a rational, centralized, top-
down structure of control.
(iv) Interest groups, in playing the game of structural politics, are es- pecially motivated
by fear of the state.

Some Blatant Speculations about the Parliamentary System

Basically, parliamentary systems are more inclusive and tends to unite more.
Conclusion

(1) the allocation of public authority and the struggle to control and exercise it-which, more
than majority-rulevoting, are the true foundations of politics; (2) the politics of structural
choice- which generates the authoritative decisions about the design and imposition of most
political institutions; (3) the structures conducive to effective organi- zational performance-
which is a crucial strategic concern for most major players in the politics of structural choice
(and a matter of great theoretical salience within the new economics of organization that begs
for comparisons
between firms and public agencies); (4) political uncertainty-which prompts actors to seek
structures that protect them from one another and
from the state, structures that often undermine the capacity for effective
organizationalperformance; (5) political compromise-which allows the en-
emies of public organizations and programs to participate actively in their design, and thus to
imlose structures fully intended to promote failure;
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(6) distinctions among different types of public officials-which recognize potentially crucial
differences in power and motivation that, as with presi- dents and legislators, find their
reflection in truly distinct "contributions"to the structure of government; (7) distinctions
between public officials and social actors-which highlight differences in their
structuralpreferences and point to the crucial role of state autonomy (and corresponding fear of
the state) in shaping the strategies and outcomes of structural choice; and (8) distinctions
between institutional settings, such as parliamentaryand separa-
tion-of-powers systems-which allocate public authority very differently, provide strikingly
different foundations for the politics of structuralchoice, and generate their own distinctive
brand of political institutions.
Paying attention to these sorts of things does not, of course, mean ignor-
ing collective-action problems or the role of institutions in mitigating them.
These problems and solutions are pervasive in politics, and, as my com-
parison of separation-of-powersand parliamentarysystems helps show, an
adequate explanation of political institutions clearly makes them a funda- mental theoretical
concern.
But the fact is that, in practice, they are alreadyfundamentalto the stories that positive theorists
tell about institutions. The problem is simply that this justifiable concern for collective-action
problems needs to be more fully
balanced by a correspondingly serious concern for exploring the neglected side of the story.
Both have crucial roles to play-and, in a well-fashioned
explanation, will not be separate at all, but integral parts of a coherent whole.