AGRARIAN CASES

Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 79310 – Expropriation and Just Compensation under CARP

GIST: The constitutionality of section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 – Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law of 1988 was challenged.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of
the landowner:
1. Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions for lands:
a. Above 50 hectares — 25% cash
b. > 24 hectares, = 50 hectares — 30% cash Balance paid in government
c. 24 hectares and below — 35% cash financial instrument,
2. Shares of stock negotiable any time
3. Tax credits
4. LBP bonds

Rationale of the above terms: It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the
payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more
than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of
value.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 18 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional

HELD: No. The present case does not involve a traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where specific property is taken
for a specific purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation where the

expropriation affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed by their
owners.

DOCTRINE: Just compensation under revolutionary kind of expropriation is payable

not only by cash, payment made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits is not unreasonable.

NOTE: Under the traditional kind of expropriation:

 Medium for the payment just compensation is only Cash.
 Expropriation affects all kinds of land, not only agricultural land.
 HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Declaration of Congress or the President to be alienable

GIST: Malabanan presented a certification issued by the Community Environment

and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.

ISSUE: WON agricultural land subject of the application needs to be classified as

alienable and disposable on June 12, 1945, or earlier for it to be converted to private
property.

Ruling: No. As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not
clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State. Public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to
have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.

EXCEPTION:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable

and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated
under Section 11 of the Public Land Act.

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as

no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth.

If the mode of acquisition is prescription, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a
condition sine qua non in observance of the law. Property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

Land is considered of public dominion if it either:

a. is intended for public use; or
b. Belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.

DOCTRINE: Declaration of Congress or the President that the public land is classified
as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth is
required before the land becomes alienable

Note: Corporations may acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands
were already converted to private ownership
 DENR v. Yap
G.R. No. 167707 – Unclassified lands is inalienable unless:

GIST: President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay
Island, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay

Island: reserved forest land (protection purposes); agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). The Proclamation likewise reserved for right-of-way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

ISSUE: whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay.

HELD: Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create
a presumption that the land is alienable.

Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation

No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No.
705. PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay
into agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay
Island an agricultural land.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law.

DOCTRINE: Unclassified lands belongs to the state and inalienable, unless the
Congress or the President declare otherwise.
 Del Rosario v. Delos Santos et al.
G.R. Nos. L-20589-90

GIST: Petitioner assails the validity of Section 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of
1955, which empowers a tenant "to change the tenancy contract from one of share
tenancy to the leasehold tenancy and vice versa and from one crop-sharing
arrangement to another of the share tenancy."

Purpose of the act - "The purpose of this Act, according to Section 2 thereof, is 'to establish agricultural
tenancy relations between landholders and tenants upon the principle of social justice; to afford adequate
protection to the rights of both tenants and landlords, to insure an equitable division of the produce and
income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient
agricultural production; to bolster their economic position and to encourage their participation in the
development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities.'"

ISSUE: WON there was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of an existing

contract

HELD: None. Obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police
power when such power is exercised to preserve the security of the State and the
means adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are not
arbitrary or oppressive.

Roxas v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127876

FACTS: This case involves three (3) haciendas owned by petitioner and the validity of
the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657
(CARL). Petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda
Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad
were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance
with the CARL.

ISSUE: WON the Court can take cognizance of the petition despite petitioner's failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.

RULING:
1. As a general rule, all means of administrative redress should first be exhausted
before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts , EXCEPT:
a. when the question raised is purely legal;
b. when the administrative body is in estoppel;
 c. when the act complained of is patently illegal;
d. when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
e. when the respondent acted in disregard of due process;
f. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego
of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter;
g. when irreparable damage will be suffered;
h. when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
i. when strong public interest is involved;
j. when the subject of the controversy is private land; and
k. in quo warranto proceedings.

IMPORTANT NOTE: The agency charged with the mandate of approving or

disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR. 

For valid implementation of CARP, 2 notices to the landowner are required:

a. Notice of Coverage (DAR A.O. 12, series of 1989)
b. Notice of Acquisition (Sec. 16 of CARL)

The first notice is in compliance with administrative due process considering that
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of police power and the power of eminent
domain

Discussion:
Is the expropriation valid? No. The expropriation of petitioner's lands was effected
without a valid payment of just compensation, thus violating the Constitutional
mandate that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation" (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 9).

Is there a valid payment? No, the LBP opened trust account deposits in petitioner’s
name which does not constitute payment under the law. Trust account deposits are
not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds
did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation;
ii. Case:
Hacienda Luisita Inc. v. PARC, et al.
G.R. No. 171101 – Authority of PARC/Necessary implication

FACTS: Following the promulgation of the Courts Decision in the above-captioned

case on July 5, 2011, the petitioners present for resolution several issues concerning
the said Decision. To recall, in the 2011 Decision, the Court ordered, among others,
that the lands subject of Hacienda Luisita Incorporated's (HLI) stock distribution plan
(SDP) be placed under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of
the CARP and declared that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker beneficiaries
(FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) have jurisdiction, power
and authority to nullify or revoke the Stock Distribution Option Agreement
(SDOA)
2. Was the PARC correct in nullifying the SDOA?
3. Was the PARC correct in including the lands that RCBA and LIPCO had
acquired from HLI in the coverage of CARP
HELD:
1. Yes. While the CARL or other executive issuance on agrarian reform do not
explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke an approved Stock
Distribution Plan, such power or authority is deemed possessed under the
doctrine of necessary implication (What is implied in a statute is as much a part
of it as that which is expressed). Thus, the express power to approve includes
the power to revoke the approval.

Note: the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value (buyer in good faith) should not
be disregarded

The Operative Fact Doctrine – the subsequent invalidation of a statute does not
affect its validity prior its declaration as invalid or unconstitutional.

NOTE: I urge you to read Page 83-87 of Agra book for the discussion of Hacienda’s
ruling, esp. the ruling on issue# 2. I did not include here the discussion for what is
important in the case is the jurisdiction and authority of PARC to revoke the SDOA.
 Luz Farms v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 86889 - livestock and poultry industry not included

GIST: Petitioner Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and poultry business.
It seeks to nullify Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 in so far as they apply to livestock
and poultry business

ISSUE: WON certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in its

definition of “Agriculture” the livestock and poultry industry

HELD: Yes. The SC declared the provision unconstitutional because in livestock,

poultry, or swine farming, no land is tilled and no crop is harvested. Land is not the
primary resource in raising of livestock, poultry or even swine. Livestock, poultry, or
swine do not sprout from the land, hence, they are not fruits of the land

Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry, and swine are classified as industrial,
not agricultural, hence, exempt from the CARP.

Note: The exact discussion of the SC in this case is that the intention of the framers
based on the transcript of the CONCOMM of the meaning of agriculture is not to
include poultry….

Alita v. CA
G.R. No. 78517 –Homestead patent is superior

ISSUE: WON lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian
Reform under P.D. 27.

HELD: NO. The Court agrees that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a
sweeping social legislation. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the
very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141.

The Philippine Constitution respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over
the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute (see Section 6 of
Article XIII of the Constitution). CARL MAINTAINS THE INAPPLICABILITY OF P.D.
27 OVER HOMESTEAD GRANTEES
 Paris v. Alfeche, et al.
G.R. No. 139803 – Homesteads are not automatically exempt from CARL

See full text: http://www.lis.dar.gov.ph/documents/4098

DOCTRINE: Homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law.
The right to retain seven hectares of land is subject to the condition that the
landowner is actually cultivating that area or will cultivate it upon the effectivity of the
said law.

GIST: Petitioner alleged that she owns one of the subject property as original
homestead grantee who still owned the same when Republic Act No. 6657 was
approved, thus she is entitled to retain the area to the exclusion

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act
are automatically exempted from the operation of land reform
(2) whether or not the Emancipation Patents issued to the respondents are valid
notwithstanding lack of payment of just compensation.
(3) On the assumption that homesteads are exempt from land reform and/or
the emancipation patents are illegally issued hence, void, can the respondents be
ejected from the premises in question?

RULING: (1) No. Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and
retain the original homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to cultivate"
them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically
exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by
the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands
from land reform coverage.

(2) No. Petitioner's contention has merit. Although, under the law, tenant
farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to pay
the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen years before the title is
transferred to them.

(3) No. There is no justification for ejecting respondents. Besides, Section 22 of

RA 6657 expressly states that "actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be
ejected or removed therefrom."

In relation to Alita ruling:

In Alita, the owner was also desirous of personally cultivating the
homestead; but the tenants, not wanting to relinquish it, were asserting their
own right to continue cultivating it. Thus, under these circumstances, the
Court upheld the right of the homestead owners over that of the tenants.
 In the case at bar, petitioner herself has not personally cultivated the
parcels of land. Neither has she or her heirs expressed, at any time, any desire
to cultivate them personally. She is invoking, yet is clearly not intending to ever
actually exercise, her alleged right as homesteader to own and personally
cultivate them.

ii. As to controversy:
Stanfilo Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose
Cooperative v. DOLE Philippines
G.R. No. 154048 – DARAB JURISDICTION
See full text: http://www.lis.dar.gov.ph/documents/9379

GIST: parties entered into a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement (BPPA)
wherein petitioner violated the agreement. Respondent filed a complaint which was
answered by petitioner with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the claim. RTC ruled that the case at bar does not involve
agrarian conflict.

Issue: Whether or not the case falls under the jurisdiction of DARAB?

Ruling: No. DOLE's complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, not the
DARAB.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. The essential elements are:
1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2. the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3. there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4. the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5. there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee ;
and
6. The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.

Jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following:

a. adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform;
b. resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and
c. Approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.
 People v. Vanzuela
G.R. No. 178266 – Court’s Jurisdiction

GIST: Respondent, as agricultural tenant, was charged of estafa when it failed to pay
the lease rental under the share tenancy.

ISSUE: WON has the jurisdiction over the estafa case

HELD: Yes. The case involve is a criminal case which is within the jurisdiction of the
court. However, the petition is denied

Note: Share tenancy has been outlawed for being contrary to public policy as
early as 1963, with the passage of R.A. 3844.

Under R.A. 6657 there is agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship, and all
instances of share tenancy have been automatically converted into leasehold tenancy.
In such a relationship, the tenant’s obligation is simply to pay rentals, not to
deliver the landowner’s share.

JOSE MENDOZA vs. NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO

G.R. No. 165676

GIST: Petitioner Mendoza filed a complaint in the MTC against respondent Geronimo
for forcible entry. The MTC remands the case To DAR-Adjudication Board (DARAB).

ISSUE: WON DARAB has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: No. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the MTC
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer.

Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of Executive Order No. 129-
A, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, among others, tenancy
over lands devoted to agriculture. For a case to involve an agrarian dispute, the
following essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship must be
present (See Stanfilo)
Allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of jurisdiction neither did the
amendment of the complaint confer jurisdiction on the DARAB. In the absence of any
allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties, the action was for
recovery of possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.

Note: (In examination) if the jurisdiction of DARAB is in question, mention the

agrarian dispute and the essential requisites. Focus on whether the case is an
agrarian dispute.

Bumagat, et al. v. Arribay

G.R. No. 194818

Issue: WON the dispute within the jurisdiction of DARAB

Ruling: No. The CA failed to realize the fact that as between the parties, there is no
tenurial arrangement, not even an implied one.

In the present case, it is quite evident that not all of the elements of tenancy
relationship are present. For one, there is no tenant, as both parties claim
ownership over the property.

Del Monte Phils. Inc. Employee Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative

(DEARBC) v. Sangunay and Labunos
G.R. No. 180013

GIST: Petitioner filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Specific Performance
with Damages with the DARAB Region 10 Office against several respondents claiming
that the latter illegally entered a portion of its property.

ISSUE: WON DARAB has jurisdiction over the instant case

HELD: NO. The DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. Only the DARAB,
as the DAR's quasi-judicial body, can determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the CARP. But in the instant case, there was no agrarian
dispute between the parties. In fact, the respondents were contending for the
ownership of the same parcels of land. Hence, the regular court has the jurisdiction
over the case.
g. Cases:

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 139285 – Exemptions and Exclusions

GIST: Petitioner is the owner of several properties covered by Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) under PD no. 27. The Archbishop filed an exemption from OLT coverage of all
lands planted with rice and corn which were registered in the name of the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres.

ISSUE: WON an administrator of the property is exempt from the coverage of CARL

HELD: No. Section 10 of RA 6657 exclusively list its own exemptions and exclusions:

1. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds
and mangroves

2. Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and
fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That said
prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian Reform Program.

3. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm
stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes,
seeds and seedlings research and pilot production center, church sites and
convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers
appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies
and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private
research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%)
slope and over, except those already developed

DOCTRINE: The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further
interpretation––there is only one right of retention per landowner, and no
multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party
 Natalia Realty v. DAR
GR No. 103302 – CARL covers Agricultural lands only

FACTS: Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land located. When

Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 was passed, it applied for the inclusion in the
town site reservation.

ISSUE: WON the undeveloped portion of the Natalia properties are covered by CARL

RULING: No, the undeveloped portion are not agricultural lands. The agricultural
lands do not include commercial, industrial or residential land. The Natalia properties
ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the town site
reservation.

Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.

NOTE: not part of the case but I think is important (baka matanong)
Classification of Lands:
1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain are (ATM): Agricultural, Timber and
Mineral.

1973 Constitution, lands of the public domain are (CRIM-GRAFT): Agricultural,

Industrial or Commercial, Residential, Resettlement, Mineral, Timber or Forest, and
Grazing land

1987 Constitution are (ATMN): Agricultural, Timber or Forest, Mineral, National

parks.

DAR v. Sutton
G.R. No. 162070

GIST: DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of
private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In
determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention
limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be
retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure
for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.
ISSUE: WON DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention
limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional.

RULING: No. DAR A.O. No. 9 is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.

The Constitution excludes all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultry-raising.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been
exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has
exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

Note: The CARL prohibits the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural
purposes after the effectivity of the CARL.

Milestone Farms, Inc. v. Office of the President

G.R. No. 182332, 23 February 2011
Difference between Milestone and Sutton: In this case, the petitioner leased another
ranch which defeats their contention that the lands are exclusive for livestock and
poultry.

In Sutton, the subject property remained a livestock farm. We even highlighted therein
the fact that "there has been no change of business interest in the case of
respondents."

CENTRAL MINDANAO VS DARAB

Exemption from CARP

ISSUE: WON the CMU is exempt for the coverage of CARP

HELD: Yes. It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals is not covered by the CARP because: brar

(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;

(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by
Congress;

(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;

(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school
site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and
for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers.
 DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS)

FACTS: Respondents owned a land and were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation
for 10 agricultural crop years

ISSUE: WON the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No.
6657

RULING: No. Not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually,
directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to
Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land
per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes.

In order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be “actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary;” and 2) the purpose is “for school sites
and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes.

COMPARISON TO CMU CASE

CMU
the land involved was not alienable and
disposable land of the public domain
because it was reserved by the late
President Carlos P. Garcia under
Proclamation No. 476 for the use of CMU
The land was actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school sites and campuses.
DECS
The lands fall under the category of
alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.
The lands were not actually and
exclusively utilized as school sites and
campuses, as they were leased to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation, not for
educational purposes but for the
furtherance of its business

Also, as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract of lease
and not the subject lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the
schools in the locality
 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. CA
G.R. No. 103125

DOCTRINE: The exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the
provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly
Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural
land

FACTS: Petitioner passed Resolution No. 129, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to
establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the provision,
petitioner filed expropriation cases against the respondents.

The Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur
must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of
the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

ISSUE: whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government

units is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform

HELD: No. The power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute

lands under the land reform program. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate
in the least that local government units must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings.
Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to
the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform

If the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands without first
applying for conversion with the DAR, in effect, it would then be the Department of
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public
purpose or public use.

ADDITIONAL INFO LANG BAKA MATANONG

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public
purpose.

- The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general
public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the
constitutional requirement of "public use".

- Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit,
which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community,
like a resort complex for tourists or housing project

Samahan ng Magsasaka v. Valisno

GIST: A 12 hectare portion of the late Nicolas Valisno Sr’s property was mortgaged to
the Bantings. This was foreclosed and thereafter redeemed by 4 of Nicolas’
grandchildren. 3 of them were minors then. Retention rights were granted to them by
the CA. This is being assailed by petitioner. Court said that an action to annul their
redemption could only have been initiated by said minors. Since they haven’t filed
any action, said redemption is valid.

ISSUE: whether or not the grandchildren of the late Dr. Nicolas Valisno Sr. are
entitled to retention rights as landowners under Republic Act No. 6657

HELD: Yes.

X. Roxas & Company Inc., v. DAMBA-NFSW

Facts:

Aninao v. Asturias Chemical Industries

G.R. No. 160420

GIST: Emancipation Patents (EPs) covering the disputed lands were issued to agrarian
reform beneficiaries pursuant to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of PD No. 27 and/or
EO No. 228.

Years later, Asturias, wrote a letter to the DAR Region IV office saying that its
Calatagan landholding could no longer be considered for CARP coverage, it having
“already been declared as mineral land pursuant to a Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (‘MPSA’) between the government and Asturias”
Asturias formally protested the OLT coverage of portions of its Calatagan property and
the threatened cancellation of its titles . . . . The grounds cited for the protest fall
under these headings: (1) "The Asturias Landholding is NOT AND NEVER WAS a RICE
and CORN farm"; and (2) The issuance of the alleged 818 EPs and the coverage of the
Asturias property under PD # 27 is ERRONEOUS, . . . AND WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS."

ISSUE:
 WON the subject landholding should be subject to the Operation Land Transfer
under PD 27 or WON petitioners are farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property

RULING:
1. No. The nullification by the offices a quo of the coverage of the property in
question under the OLT program was rightly decreed.
As may be noted, EPs were issued to petitioners as agrarian reform
beneficiaries or successors-in–interests pursuant to the OLT program under
P.D. No. 27. To come within the coverage of the OLT, there must be showing
that the land is devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system
of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein when P.D. No. 27 took
effect on October 21, 1972. If either requisite is absent, exclusion from the
OLT coverage lies and EPs, if issued, may be recalled.
In the case at bench, it has been peremptorily determined by OP and,
before it, by the DAR, acting on investigations reports of its provincial office, as
reviewed and validated by its regional office, that the OLT coverage of the
disputed landholdings was erroneous, it being established that the lands
covered are not primarily devoted to rice and corn and that the tenancy
relationship has not been clearly established.

REMEMBER: That the subject land in this case ceased to be an agricultural land
before the issuance of PD 27, as it becomes mineral land. Hence, the issuance of EPs
and the coverage of the property under PD 27 is erroneous. The existence of tenancy
relation is likewise not established. Thus, the Eps issued may be recalled.

Xii. Republic v. CA., G.R. No. 139592, 5 October 200

Republic v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 122256 – Court’ Jurisdiction to determination Just
Compensation

GIST: The lands owned by Private Respondent Acil Corporation was subjected to
expropriation. It rejected the just compensation offered by the government. ACIL filed
a ‘Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court
(SAC), but it dismiss the petition reasoning Acil should appealed to DARAB.
ISSUE: Whether or not fixing of just compensation for the taking of lands under R.A.
No. 6657 is a matter involving the implementation of agrarian reform and under
jurisdiction of DAR.

RULING: No.

DAR PRIMARY JURISDICTION (Sec. 50, RA 6657)

General Rule: to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform

Exception: Those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR

SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS JURISDICTION (SEC. 57, RA 6657)

All petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses

DOCTRINE: The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted

jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases.

Procedure for land valuation:

1. Under the law, the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining
the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for
their taking
2. The DAR notifies the landowner (NOC) and thereafter makes an offer.
3. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is
held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the
central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the
land, fixes the price to be paid for the land.
4. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the
RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the
determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 128557 – Consent of FB not necessary

GIST: Private respondent Jose Pascual’s lands were placed its Operation Land
Transfer (OLT).

Under EO 228, the formula for computing the Land Value (LV) or Price Per Hectare
(PPH) of rice and corn lands is 2.5 x Ave. Gross Production x Government Support
Price = LV or PPH.

The valuation and judgment became final and executory. However, the LBP refused to
pay the respondent because of the lack of concurrence of the farmer-beneficiaries.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the consent of the farmer-beneficiaries is necessary before just

compensation be paid to the respondent
2. Whether private respondent Pascual should file a case in the Special Agrarian
Court to compel LBP to pay just compensation.

RULING:

1. No. A perusal of the law however shows that the consent of the farmer-beneficiary
is not required in establishing the vinculum juris for the proper compensation of
the landowner. As may be gleaned from Section 18 of RA 6657, the landowner,
the DAR and the Land Bank are the only parties involved. The law does not
mention the participation of the farmer-beneficiary

2. No. Although it is true that Sec. 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian
Courts shall have jurisdiction over the final determination of just compensation
cases, it must be noted that petitioner never contested the valuation of the
PARAD. Thus, the land valuation stated in its decision became final and
executory. There was therefore no need for Pascual to file a case in the Special
Agrarian Court.

Petitioner participated in the valuation proceedings held in the office of the PARAD
through its counsel, Atty. Javier. It did not appeal the decision of PARAD which
became final and executory.

EDGARDO SANTOS v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 137431

FACTS: Santos claimed that the payment of just compensation in LBP Bonds is not
acceptable and that it should be paid in cash or certified check.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is correct in insisting that he be paid in cash instead of
bonds.

RULING:

No. As explained in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform:

 "It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional method for the
payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has
just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do
not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This
is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
 limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation.”

DOCTRINE: The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) provides that just
compensation to landowners shall be paid in cash, bonds, shares or stock, or tax
credits

Land Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 118712, 6 October 1995

FACTS: Respondents argued that DAR and LBP committed grave abuse of discretion
and acted without jurisdiction when they opened trusts accounts in lieu of the
depositing in cash or bonds, before the lands was taken and the titles are cancelled.
Respondents claim that before the taking of the property, the compensation must be
deposited in cash or bonds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the opening of trust account tantamount to deposit

RULING: No.

Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides:

Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession
of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

It is very explicit there that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in
any other form. - SEE ALSO ROXAS V. CA, ABOVE

Land Bank of the Phils. v. Natividad

G.R. No. 127198. 16 May 2005

GIST: Private respondents (landowners) filed a petition before the trial court for the
determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands acquired by the
government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27).

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case for the determination of
just compensation
RULING: No.

At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that there is
nothing contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of
questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional
trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first
refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is

vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the
lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.

Determination of just compensation PD 27 or RA 6657? RA 6657.

The reckoning point of the determination of just compensation – time of taking or filing
of complaint, whichever comes first.

Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Phils.

G.R. No. 170220
NOTE:  In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered.

GIST: Petitioners property was placed under the land reform program pursuant to PD
No. 27 (1972) and EO No. 228 (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land which
was deposited in cash and bonds.

Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties. They insist that the determination
of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at
the time of payment.

The CA ruled that the computed amount was erroneously computed. The land value
should be:

Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price. The value
of the government support price for the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and
corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural
land when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by
virtue of P.D. No. 27

ISSUE: WON the just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated
properties at the time of payment.

RULING: YES. The LBP v. Natividad case reiterated the Court's ruling in Office of the
President v. Court of Appeals that the expropriation of the landholding did not take
place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure would take
effect on the payment of just compensation judicially determined.

The expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 took place, not on the
effectiveness of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just
compensation.

We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated
under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that
the just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be settled. Considering the
passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, R.A. No.
6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory
effects. Citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Jose Pascual.

ESTRIBILLO V. DAR
G.R. No. 159674, 30 June 2006

DOCTRINE: The EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of its issuance.

FACTS: Petitioners are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of
land. These parcels of land were owned by respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI).
Subsequently, HMI filed for the cancellation of the EPs because the area was not
devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no
compensation was paid therefor.

ISSUE: Whether or not EPs can be cancelled after 1 year from the date of issuance.

RULING: No. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the
patent, Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."
There would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the distribution of
government-acquired lands to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee
of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was
issued in an administrative proceeding

MAMON V. QUIRINO
G.R. No. 198770, 12 November 2012

DOCTRINE: Upon the promulgation of P.D. 27, farmer-tenants were deemed owners of
the land they were tilling and given the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for themselves

FACTS: Prisco Quirino executed a Deed of Conditional Sale (deed) covering the
subject landholding to Ernesto Bayagna (Ernesto) with the condition that the former
and his heirs may redeem or repurchase the land.

Ernesto possessed and cultivated the subject land for more than 10 years
before Prisco offered to redeem the same, which was refused. Instead, Ernesto allowed
the former owner of the land, petitioner Aurelia Gua-An (Aurelia) to redeem the lot.

Respondent Gertrudes Quirino, Prisco's widow, filed a Complaint for Specific

Performance, Redemption, Reinstatement and Damages with Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and TRO against Ernesto and petitioners.

Petitioners averred that Prisco's right over the subject land was merely inchoate
for failure to establish payment of just compensation to the landowner.

The CA set aside and reversed the decision of the DARAB and afforded the
heirs of Prisco the preferential right of redemption over the subject landholding. It
ruled that the pacto de retro sale between Prisco and Ernesto was a mere equitable
mortgage, hence, not a prohibited transaction under P.D. 27

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Prisco Quirino abandoned the subject landholdings

RULING:
 1. Yes. The SC held that while the land remains in Prisco's+ name, it cannot
turn a blind eye to the fact that Prisco+ surrendered possession and
cultivation of the subject land to Ernesto, not for a mere temporary period,
but for a period of 11 years without any justifiable reason. Such act
constituted abandonment despite his avowed intent to resume possession of
the land upon payment of the loan. As defined in DAR Administrative Order
No. 2, series of 1994, abandonment is a willful failure of the agrarian reform
beneficiary, together with his farm household, "to cultivate, till, or develop his
land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose
continuously for a period of two calendar years." It is a ground for cancellation
by the DARAB of an award to the agrarian reform beneficiary
The redemption made by petitioner Aurelia, former owner of the land, was
ineffective and void since reversion of the landholding to the former owner is likewise
proscribed under P.D. No. 27

ANITA VIANZON V. MINOPLE MACARAEG

G.R. No. 171107, 5 September 2012

DOCTRINE: R.A. No. 6657 or the CARL "is a social justice and poverty alleviation
program which seeks to empower the lives of agrarian reform beneficiaries through
equitable distribution and ownership of the land based on the principle of land to the
tiller."

FACTS: Lucila, the mother of the petitioner (Anita Vianzon), entered into a contract
denominated as "Agreement to Sell No. 5216" involving Lot No. 1222 with the DAR.

After almost 30 years, Vianzon executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of her
daughter. In connection with this, Macaraeg also affixed his signature on a document
denominated as "Waiver of Right" purportedly relinquishing all his rights as well as his
interest over the same property. Thereafter, Anita filed two applications to purchase
the subject property, however, Macaraeg also filed his own application to purchase the
same land on September 9, 1996.

The Chief of the Legal Division of the DAR Provincial Office recommended that the
subject land be "divided equally" between the two applicants since both had been in
some way "remiss in their obligations under the agrarian rules.

The DAR Secretary found that it was Macaraeg who was the "actual possessor/
cultivator of the lot in consideration." He pointed out that Lucila’s act of "hiring"
Minople to render service pertaining to all the aspects of farming did not only violate
the old LTA (DAR) Administrative Order (A.O.) but it also contravened the very
undertaking made by Lucila’s representative and heir, Anita, in her latest sales
application warranting its rejection.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraeg (respondent) has a rightful claim to the subject
landholding

RULING: Yes. Respondent as the actual tiller of the land is entitled to the land
mandated by our Constitution and R.A. No. 6657.

DAR A.O. No. 3 lays down the qualifications of a beneficiary in landed estates: he or
she should be
1. landless;
2. Filipino citizen;
3. Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the
family at the time of filing of application; and
4. Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land
productive.

Item 2.1.3, states that if it is found that the allocatee or awardee employs others
to till the land, the MARO should cancel the Order of Award (OA) or Certificate
of Land Transfer (CLT) and issue a new one in favor of the "qualified actual
cultivator/occupant."

ARGUMENT COURT’S ANSWER

Anita questions the In this case, the issue is farm or agricultural

existence of a tenancy
relationship between
her/Lucila and Macaraeg
insisting that Macaraeg
was only a farm worker
initially engaged by the
late Pedro Candelaria
tenancy and, inescapably, the applicable law
is the CARL and its implementing rules
The act of Lucila Candelaria Gonzales in
allowing Minople Macaraeg to perform all the
farming activities in the subject lot
established a tenancy relationship
between the former and the latter because
the latter is doing the farm chores and is
paid from the produce or harvest of the land
in the amount of 20 cavans of palay every
harvest
SEC. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. – The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed
as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence
thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) Agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) Regular farmworkers;
(c) Seasonal farmworkers;
(d) Other farmworkers;
(e) Actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) Collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) Others directly working on the land.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to
cultivate and make the land as productive as possible.

HEIRS OF DELESTE V. LBP

G.R. No. 169913

FACTS: The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were
the owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of
34.7 hectares

When Gregorio died in 1945, the subject property was sold to Dr. Jose Deleste
(Deleste). When Hilaria died, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular
administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of
the deceased spouses, filed before the Court of First Instance an action against
Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property.

The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that the subject property was the conjugal
property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her
one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died
in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the
subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.

While the Civil case is pending, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law
mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. In 1975, the City of
Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the "Zoning Regulation of Iligan
City," reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential. Subsequently, DAR
issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were
tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property

in 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No. 1407, docketed as Special Civil
Action No. 4979. On December 11, 2000, the RTC issued a Decision granting the
expropriation. Considering that the real owner of the expropriated portion could not be
determined, as the subject property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to
any of the heirs of Gregorio and Deleste,

in 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private respondents’
Eps

PARAB declared that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of
ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a
residential/commercial land, and the violation of petitioners’ constitutional right to
due process of law.

DARAB reversed the decision of PARAB. It held that the EPs were valid as it was the
heirs of Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No.
698 at the time the subject property was placed under the coverage of the OLT
Program considering that DAR was not a party to the said case. Further, it stated that
the record is bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as mandated by DAR
Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and held that whether the subject
property is indeed exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative determination,
the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary or the latter’s
authorized representative.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or Not petitioners land is covered by CARL despite of the passing of

Ordinance no. 1313 reclassifying the lands to residential area

2. Whether or not vested rights have actually accrued in the instant case

3. Whether or not there is violation of petitioner’s right to due process’

RULING:

1. NO. Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial

land with the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be
considered as an "agricultural land" within the ambit of RA 6657. Lands not devoted
to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. However, the
reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to divest
tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 27, which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.

As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied

to defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27.
An ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light industrial
should be given prospective application only, and should not change the nature
of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over
such land. . . . .

2. No. It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are "deemed
owners" as of October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting
upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the land they were tilling. Certain
requirements must also be complied with, such as payment of just compensation,
before full ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of
the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.

It was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said
decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers’ cooperatives and
full payment of just compensation.

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or
the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either.

In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and
purposes, it was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries,
were recognized to have an inchoate right over the subject property prior to
compliance with the prescribed requirements. Considering that the local zoning
ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently approved by the HSRC in
1978, private respondents still had no vested rights to speak of during this
period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents were issued the CLTs and
were "deemed owners."

The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since
reclassification had taken place twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance.
Undeniably, no vested rights accrued prior to reclassification and its approval.
Consequently, the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the
coverage of the agrarian reform program.

3. Yes. DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the
coverage of the agrarian reform program; Notice is part of the constitutional right to
due process of law. It informs the landowner of the State’s intention to acquire a
private land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the opportunity to
present evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the
agrarian law."

DAR V. CARRIEDO
G.R. No. 176549

DOCTRINE: The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the
landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under AO No. 2, series of 1994, an
EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the
landowner's retained area

FACTS: Petitioner Pablo Mendoza is a tenant of the land sold to respondent Romeo
Carriedo. Mendoza alleged that the sale took place without his knowledge and
consent. Subsequently, the lands were sold to the Peoples’ Livelihood Foundation, Inc.
(PLFI)

On October 24, 2002, Carriedo received a copy of a Notice of Coverage dated

October 21, 2002 from MARO Maximo E. Santiago informing him that the land
had been placed under the coverage of the CARP. The DAR-CO ruled that Carriedo
was no longer allowed to retain the land due to his violation of the provisions of RA No.
6657. His act of disposing his agricultural landholdings was tantamount to the
exercise of his retention right, or an act amounting to a valid waiver of such right in
accordance with applicable laws and jurisprudence. The CA declared the land as
Carriedo’s retained area.

ISSUE:

whether or not Carriedo has the right to retain the land

Whether or not Item no. 4 of DAR Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is
invalid

RULING: Yes. Carriedo did not waive his right of retention over the land.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to

qualification by the legislature. xxx. For as long as the area to be retained is compact
or contiguous and does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a
landowner's choice of the area to be retained must prevail.

To interpret Section 6 of RA No. 6657, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 02, Series
of 2003 (DAR AO 02-03):

Section 6. Waiver of the Right of Retention. – The landowner waives his right to retain
by committing any of the following act or omission:
 6.1 Failure to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain within sixty
(60) calendar days from receipt of notice of CARP coverage.

6.2 Failure to state such intention upon offer to sell or application under the
[Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT)]/[Direct Payment Scheme (DPS)] scheme.

6.3 Execution of any document stating that he expressly waives his right to
retain. The MARO and/or PARO and/or Regional Director shall attest to the
due execution of such document.

6.4 Execution of a Landowner Tenant Production Agreement and Farmer’s

Undertaking (LTPA-FU) or Application to Purchase and Farmer’s Undertaking
(APFU) covering subject property.

6.5 Entering into a VLT/DPS or [Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)] but failing to
manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain upon filing of the
application for VLT/DPS or VOS.

6.6 Execution and submission of any document indicating that he is consenting

to the CARP coverage of his entire landholding.

6.7 Performing any act constituting estoppel by laches which is the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which he may have done
earlier by exercising due diligence, warranting a presumption that he
abandoned his right or declined to assert it.

Section 6 clearly shows that the disposition of agricultural land is not an act
constituting waiver of the right of retention.

Nowhere in the relevant provisions of RA No. 6657 does it indicate that a multiple or
series of transfers/sales of land would result in the loss of retention rights. Neither do
they provide that the multiple or series of transfers or sales amounts to the waiver of
such right.

As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 for being
ultra vires, we hold that Carriedo did not waive his right to retain the land, nor can
he be considered to be in estoppel.

SPOUSES TIONGSON V. CA
G.R. No. L-62626, 18 July 1984

No need for facts just remember the essential requisites of tenancy relationship

ISSUE: whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties

RULING: No. The decision of the petitioners not to ask for any more contributions
from Macaya reveals that there was no tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the
parties. Neither can such a relationship be implied from the facts as there was no
agreed system of sharing the produce of the property.

The Court finds it to define agricultural tenancy

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199 as amended by Republic Act No. 2263 defines
agricultural tenancy

the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture

belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm
household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain, either in produce or in
money, or in both.

Essential requisites of tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landholder and the tenant;

MEANING OF LANDHOLDER AND TENANT

Sec. 5(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed
by, another with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce
with the landholder under the share tenancy system or paying to the landholder a
price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.

Sec. 5(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner,
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants to another the use or cultivation
of his land for a consideration either in shares under the share tenancy system, or a
price certain under the leasehold tenancy system.

2. The subject is agricultural land - The property involved is a residential

property as certified by City engineer. The much bigger portions of the property are not
suitable for palay or even vegetable crops.

3. There is consent - The lot was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan area.
There was clearly no intention on the part of the owners to devote the property for
agricultural production but only for residential purposes. Thus, together with the third
requisite, the fourth requisite which is the purpose was also not present.
4. The purpose is agricultural production; and
5. There is consideration - there was no agreement as to any system of sharing
the produce of the land. The petitioners did not get anything from the harvest and
private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the land free from any charge or
expense.
 YOLANDA CABALLES V. DAR
G.R. No. 78214, 5 December 1988

Again just memorize the essential requisites

ISSUE: whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties

RULING. No. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size
farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of
land cannot produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to
meet the farm family's basic needs. The private respondent himself admitted that
he did not depend on the products of the land because it was too small, and that
he took on carpentry jobs on the side.

The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of
a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in
the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a
tenant of the said portion.

Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is

clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea
Millenes.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;

3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

HILARIO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 70736, 16 March 1987
DOCTRINE: The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to
wit: (1) The parties are the landholder and tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land;
(3) The purpose is agricultural production; and (4) there is consideration; have not
been met by the private respondent.

FACTS: CAR ruled that the land in question is not an agricultural landholding but
plain "bakuran," hence, Baltazar is not a tenant on the land. The IAC, however,
reversed the decision of the CAR

ISSUE: Whether or not Baltazar is a tenant on the subject land

RULING: No. Corazon Pengson explained that she did not receive any share from the
produce of the land from 1964 up to the filing of the case and she would not have
accepted any share from the produce of the land because she knew pretty well that
she was no longer the owner of the lot. It is clear that Corazon Pengson did not give
her consent to Baltazar to work on her land

The land in question is residential and not agricultural

The land was purchased as residential lots and the deed of sale describes them as
"residential." The inspection and appraisal report of the PNB classified the land as
residential. The declaration of real property on the basis of which taxes are paid and
approved by the Acting Provincial Assessor of Bulacan classifies the land as
residential.

QUA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 95318, 11 June 1991

DOCTRINE: The essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy
relationship, thus: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production; and (4) there is
consideration. It is also understood that (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on
the land, that (6) there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration
consists of sharing the harvest.

FACTS: petitioner Lourdes Peña Qua filed a complaint for ejectment with damages
against private respondents claiming that she is the owner of a parcel of residential
land. Inside the land in question is an auto repair shop and three houses, all owned
by private respondents

Private respondent Carmen Carillo alleged that the lot in question is a farm lot [home
lot] because she and her late husband were tenants of the same and that it was not
petitioner who instituted them as tenants in the land in question but the former
owner, Leovigildo Peña who permitted the construction of the auto repair shop, the
house of Carmen Carillo and the other two houses.
The Municipal Court found private respondents to be mere squatters, but the decision
was reversed by the RTC.

ISSUE: whether or not private respondents possess the status of agricultural tenants

RULING: No. Private respondent Carmen Carillo is not entitled to be considered an

agricultural tenant.

Three of the essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship
are lacking namely: agricultural production, personal cultivation and sharing of
harvests.
The Court is not prepared to affirm the residential status of the land merely on the
basis of the tax declaration, in the absence of further showing that all the
requirements for conversion of the use of land from agricultural to residential
prevailing at the start of the controversy in this case have been fully satisfied.

GUERRERO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-44570, 30 May 1986

DOCTRINE: Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to
continue working until such relationship is extinguished according to law.

FACTS: Private Respondent Apolinario Benitez was taken by pouses Manuel and
Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their
21-hectare coconut plantation situated at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora,
Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut
within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the
cows, he was made to clean the already fruit bearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves
and grass and to do such other similar chores. For his work related to the coconuts,
he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market.
For attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.

Benitez was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-
hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts.

Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer who was
dismissed as an employee from the landholding in question and not ousted therefrom
as tenant. They assert that the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land
Reform Code have been superseded by the Code of Agrarian Reforms

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is considered as tenants

RULING: Yes. The records establish the private respondents' status as agricultural
tenants under the legal definitions.

1. Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the landholding continuously

from 1969 until he was ejected from it. Such possession of longstanding is an
essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the
meaning of the tenancy law

2. Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy

relationships. The mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually
seeded the land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition of
cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It
includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the
ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry.

3. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of
farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times
with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant,
not a mere farm laborer
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondent is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that
is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioner-landowners.

The case of delos Reyes vs. Espinelli (supra) clearly explains the matter thus:
The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or
wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share
tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on
the amount of harvest.

Ejectment may be effected only for causes provided by law, to wit:

1. Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms and conditions
of the tenancy contract or any of the provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;
2. The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share
unless the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure;
3. Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified by the
agreement of the parties;
4. Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices:
5. Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;
6. Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate
family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his
immediate family.

None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been
unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure

TALAVERA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 77830, 27 February 1990

DOCTRINE: Tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong
reasons provided by law which must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with
the State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from
pernicious institutional restraints and practices
FACTS: An action for recovery of possession was instituted by the private respondent
against the petitioners over a parcel of agricultural land, alleging that respondent
Laxamana had been a bonafide tenant of the aforesaid parcel of land since 1958 until
the petitioners took possession thereof sometime in 1984; that respondent Laxamana
had been in continuous possession and cultivation of the said landholding since 1958
but the petitioners, for unknown reasons and without the knowledge of respondent
Laxamana, planted palay thereon in 1984 through force and intimidation after plowing
and harrowing were done by respondent Laxamana.

Phe petitioners counter-alleged, among others, that their tenancy relationship with
respondent Laxamana was terminated pursuant to a document captioned
"Casunduan" executed on March 30, 1973 whereby the latter sold his rights and
interests over the agricultural landholding under litigation for a consideration of
P1,000.00; that respondent Laxamana was not actually a tenant of the petitioners and
whatever tenancy rights the former had exercised over the landholding in question
were voluntarily surrendered by him upon the execution of the aforesaid document.

Petitioners argue that the execution of the "Casunduan" clearly showed the intention
of respondent Laxamana to surrender whatever rights he had as tenant over the said
landholding.

ISSUE: Whether or not by virtue of the "Casunduan", respondent Laxamana as tenant

is deemed to have surrendered voluntarily the subject landholding to petitioner

RULING: No. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations,

does not require any court authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own
volition. To protect the tenant's right to security of tenure, voluntary surrender, as
contemplated by law, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent
evidence. The tenant's intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed,
much less determined by mere implication. Otherwise, the right of a tenant to security
of tenure becomes an illusory one.

First, the agreement was prepared by petitioner Visitacion A. Talavera. Laxamana

could hardly sign his own name. He was clearly at a disadvantage in the execution of
the contract and the wording of the agreement. The intention to give up the
landholding must be gleaned from evidence in addition to the document which was
signed by an ignorant and illiterate peasant in an hour of emotional stress and
financial need.

Second, Laxamana continued to work on the farm from 1973 up to 1984 when the
petitioners ejected him

Third, it is not shown why Laxamana should voluntarily give up his sole source of
livelihood even if he needed money to pay off his debts

The very essence of agricultural tenancy lies in the cardinal rule that an agricultural
tenant enjoys security of tenurial status. Section 8 of RA No. 3844 provides:

Extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relation. — The agricultural leasehold

relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the land holding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of
which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section rune to succeed to the lessee, in the event of
death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.

SPOUSES ENDAYA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 88113, 23 October 1992

DOCTRINE: Transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural

leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal
possession, such as lease, will not terminate the right of the agricultural lessee who is
given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against the transferee
or the landowner's successor in interest

FACTS: The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of
agricultural land devoted to rice and corn. Private respondent Fideli has been
cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses respondent Fideli has been cultivating
this land as a tenant of the Spouses San Diego under a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing
agreement.
On May 2, 1974, a lease contract was executed between the Spouses San Diego and
one Regino Cassanova for a period of four years from May 1974 up to May 1978. The
lease contract obliged Cassanova to pay P400.00 per hectare per annum and gave him
the authority to oversee the planting of crops on the land. Private respondent signed
this lease contract as one of two witnesses.

During the entire duration of the lease contract between the Spouses San Diego and
Cassanova, private respondent continuously cultivated the land, sharing equally with
Cassanova the net produce of the harvests.

Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners, but Private respondent continued to
farm the land although petitioners claim that private respondent was told immediately
after the sale to vacate the land. In any case, it is undisputed that the private
respondent deposited with the Luzon Development Bank an amount of about
P8,000.00 as partial payment of the landowner's share in the harvest for the years
1980 until 1985.

Due to the petitioner's persistent demand for a private respondent to vacate the land,
the private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court praying that he
be declared the agricultural tenant of the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is an agricultural lessee in the land of

petitioner

RULING: Yes. Private respondent has been cultivating the subject farm landholding
with a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing arrangement with the Spouses San Diego, petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest.
The fact that the private respondent knew of, and consented to, the said lease contract
by signing as witness to the agreement may not be construed as a waiver of his rights
as an agricultural lessee.

It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the
consent of the true and lawful owners is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a
situation where an untenanted farm land is cultivated without the landowner's
knowledge or against her will or although permission to work on the farm was given,
there was no intention to constitute the worker as the agricultural lessee of the farm
land. The rule finds no application in the case at bar where the petitioners are
successors-in-interest to a tenanted land over which an agricultural leasehold has long
been established. The consent given by the original owners to constitute private
respondent as the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding binds private
respondents who as successors-in-interest of the Spouses San Diego, step into the
latter's shows, acquiring not only their rights but also their obligations.

viii. Milestone Realty & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135999, 19 April 2002
ix. Basbas v. Entena, G.R. No. L-26255, 30 June 1969
x. Heirs of Tan, Sr. v. Pollescas, G.R. No. 145568, 17 November 2005

ii. Cases:
1. Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. L-25326, 29 May 1970
2. Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44570, 30 May 1986

Topic 11

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. CA G.R. No. 103125, 17 May 1993

Conversion of land

DOCTRINE: Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local
government units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for
the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can
institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of
Agrarian Reform..

FACTS: Petitioner passed Resolution No. 129, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site for public
purpose, petitioner filed expropriation cases against the respondents.

The Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first
secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the plan to
expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. The CA ordered the
petitioner to secure the approval of the DAR.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands for public use needed to
be applied for conversion of land under the authority of DAR
RULING: No. The power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute lands
under the land reform program.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges,
schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands
with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally
involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose
or public use.

Topic 12
iii. Cases:
1. Cuba v. Cuenco, G.R. No. 154490, 19 September 2006
2. Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95664, 13 September 1991
3. Machete v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109093, 20 November 1995