Roxas & Co., Inc. v. C.A.

G.R. No. 127876

Dec 17, 1999
Roxas and Co, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and the registered owner of 3 haciendas in
Nasugbu Batangas, namely Haciendas Palico, Banilad, and Caylaway. During the incumbency of
Pres. Corazon Aquino, she signed Proclamation No 131 known as CARP (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program) and E.O No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to initially
implement the program.

On July 1987, the Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657 CARL (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law), signed by the Pres and took effect June 15, 1988.

Before the law’s effectivity, Roxas & Co. filed with respondent DAR (Dept of Agrarian Reform) a
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOC) Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to E.O No 229. While Hacienda’s
Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR with the
CARL.

Roxas & Co. filed with DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from Agricultural to
non-agricultural lands under the provisions of CARL. Despite the application for conversion, the
DAR proceeded with the acquisition of 2 Haciendas, and Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) were distributed to farmer beneficiaries.

Roxas & Co. also sent a letter to Secretary of DAR withdrawing its Voluntary Offer to Sell of
Hacienda Caylaway, because the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu Batangas allegedly authorized
the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from Agricultural to Non-Agricultural. As a result,
petitioner informed DAR that it is applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway. But was
denied.

Petitioner filed a case with DARAB (DAR Adjudication Board) praying for cancellation of
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) issued by respondent DAR to farmer beneficiaries.
Petitioner also alleged that Nasugbu Batangas was declared a tourist zone, and not suitable for
agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu and reclassified the land to
non-agricultural.

In resolution of DARAB held that the cases involved the prejudicial question of whether the
property was subject to agrarian reform. Hence, this question should be submitted to the Office
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination.

On CA, dismissed the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not SC has the power to adjudicate over petitioner’s application for conversion of its
Haciendas from Agricultural to Non-Agricultural?

HELD:
No. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications for
conversion is the DAR.

At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, the Rules of Procedure
governing the processing and approval of applications for land use conversion was the
DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of 1990. Under this A.O., the application for conversion is filed
with the MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER (MARO) where the property is
located. The MARO reviews the application and its supporting documents and conducts
field investigation and ocular inspection of the property. The findings of the MARO are
subject to review and evaluation by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The
PARO may conduct further field investigation and submit a supplemental report together
with his recommendation to the Regional Agrarian Reform Officer (RARO) who shall
review the same. For lands less than five hectares, the RARO shall approve or
disapprove applications for conversion. For lands exceeding five hectares, the RARO
shall evaluate the PARO Report and forward the records and his report to the
Undersecretary for Legal Affairs. Applications over areas exceeding fifty hectares are
approved or disapproved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

The DAR's mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4 (j) and Section
5 (l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum
Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President. The DAR's jurisdiction over
applications for conversion is provided as follows:

A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to

"approve or disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses,"
pursuant to Section 4 (j) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of
1987.

B. Sec. 5 (l) of E.O. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR,

exclusive authority to approve or disapprove applications for
conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial
and other land uses.

C. Sec. 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to
authorize under certain conditions, the conversion of agricultural
lands.

D. Sec. 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the

Office of the President, provides that "action on applications for land
use conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the
responsibility of the DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference,
documents on the comprehensive land use plans and accompanying
ordinances passed upon and approved by the local government units
concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy, pursuant to
R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A.
Basiana Mining v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 191705, March 07, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner BMEC headed by its President Basiana applied for a Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) with the DENR for the extraction of nickel and other minerals
covering an area of 6,642 hectares in Agusan del Norte.

Pending approval of its application, BMEC, assigned to Manila Mining Corporation

(Manila Mining) all its rights and interest in MPSA. Later on, Manila Mining assigned
its rights and interest to SRMI. A day after, Basiana and SRMI executed a
Memorandum of Agreement where SRMI agreed to undertake technical and
geological tests, exploration and small-scale mining operations of the site subject of
MPSA. Consequently, SRMI, using BMEC's application, applied for an MPSA for the
extraction of nickel, iron and cobalt on a 591-ha area in Tubay, Agusan del Norte.

Basiana then filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City on
2007 for rescission of contract, abuse of rights and damages against SRMI.

Pending the resolution, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR
Secretary entered into MPSA with SRMI for the development and commercial
utilization of nickel, cobalt, iron and other associated mineral deposits in the
572.64-ha area in Tubay, Agusan del Norte.

ISSUE:

Whether or not courts has the authority and jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral
agreements?

Held:

No. It is the DENR Secretary that has the primary jurisdiction to approve and
cancel mining agreements and contract.

(1) the DENR Secretary's power to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his
administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral
resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987;
(2) R.A. No. 7942 confers to the DENR Secretary specific authority over mineral
resources, which includes the authority to enter into mineral agreements on behalf
of the Government upon the recommendation of the Director and corollarily, the
implied power to terminate mining or mineral contracts;
(3) the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over the MGB to
cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights under R.A. No. 7942
demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the
cancellation of mineral agreements;
(4) the DENR Secretary's power to cancel mining rights or agreements can be
inferred from Section 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR A.O. No. 96-40 on cancellation,
revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral agreement/Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement

it is with the DENR Secretary that the petitioners should have sought the
cancellation of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII, and not with the courts. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction instructs that if a case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is
had.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel., et al vs. Senate Committee of the Whole represented
by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011

On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706,

which directed the Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged
double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5
Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as
Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the
Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee, prompting
a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of
the Ethics Committee

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the

accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee.
Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved
that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the
Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the
majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the
application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and
proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on
the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is premature for failure to observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction?

HELD:
No. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The
issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues
here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and
jurisdiction of the Court , and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.