Indonesian Migrant Domestic Workers in H

PHOTO CREDIT: LOVE FRANKIE
INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC

WORKERS IN HONG KONG
A STUDY INTO THE CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUILDING
RESILIENCE TO ONLINE THREATS
February 18, 2020
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The study was conducted by Love Frankie’s research and insights team for Harmoni: Towards
Inclusion and Resilience Activity, implemented by Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), in
collaboration with Love Frankie and Search for Common Ground, and in partnership with
Indonesian civil society organizations and government agencies.
Research design, fieldwork management, analysis and report writing were led by Hannah Perry.
Farah Putri provided substantive assistance in all phases of the research. Adma Sari provided
interviewing support, while Vicky Aulia Febrina provided moderation and translation support. Yeyen
Soedjoko assisted with desk research, and Ploy Khongkhachan with literature review. Love Frankie
Research Director, Galen Lamphere-Englund, provided peer review, editing and final report design.
The team was also supported by Harmoni Migrant Program lead, Alva Siregar; Harmoni Strategic
Communications Advisor, Ruici Tio; Harmoni Senior Technical Advisor, Umelto Labetubun; and MSI
Senior Advisor Lynn Carter. Several key informant interviews were also conducted by Alva Siregar
and Umelto Labetubun.
Special thanks to those who have contributed technical expertise and in-depth contextual knowledge
of the situation for migrants living in Hong Kong, namely, the International Organisation for
Migration; Dompet Dhuafa; the International Domestic Workers Federation; the Taekwondo
Association; the Islamic Union; Police Attaché; Yayasan Peduli Kasih; AKU Indonesia; Migrant Care
and Nava Nuraniyah.
Thanks also to the Field Resources Consulting (FRC) team who supported with the recruitment and
management of the respondents to the online community component of the study during a difficult
fieldwork environment in Hong Kong.
Importantly, thank you also to the respondents who shared their time and perspectives as part of
this study.
CONTENTS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................II
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................... 4
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................... 4
PROJECT AIMS ................................................................................................................................. 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY........................................................................................................... 4
FINDINGS ........................................................................................................................................ 4
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P/CVE AND RESILIENCE SUPPORT ...................................................... 7
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 9
METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................. 9
KEY FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................... 10
DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW: THE INDONESIAN MIGRANT POPULATION ............................................. 10
INTOLERANCE AND EXTREMISM IN THE HONG KONG MIGRANT COMMUNITY ............................ 11
ONLINE FRIENDSHIPS, DATING AND MARRIAGES WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISTS ............................... 17
ECONOMIC EXCLUSION AND THE APPEAL OF THE ISLAMIC STATE ...................................................... 19
CHARITABLE GIVING AND FINANCING EXTREMISM ...................................................................................... 19
INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN 2019.................................................................. 21
MOTIVATIONS .................................................................................................................................................................. 21
LONG-TERM GOALS ....................................................................................................................................................... 21
INCOME, SAVINGS AND CHARITABLE GIVING .................................................................................................. 22
DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES IN HONG KONG ........................................................................................................ 24
SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES ...................................................................................................................... 26
INTERNET ENGAGEMENT ............................................................................................................................................ 30
ROLE MODELS AND INSPIRING FIGURES .............................................................................................................. 31
SUPPORT FOR INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS .................................................... 33
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT IN HONG KONG ...................................................................................................... 33
RAISING AWARENESS AND ENGAGING WITH MIGRANTS - APPROACHES AND REACH .............. 36
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................... 38
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P/CVE AND RESILIENCE SUPPORT ................................................................... 38
ANNEX A: METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................. 40
RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................................................................. 40
ANNEX B: SOURCES ........................................................................................................... 45
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 45
MIGRANT SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS MAPPING ............................................................................................ 49
MAPPING SPEAKERS TO THE MIGRANT COMMUNITY IN HONG KONG 2010-2019 ......................... 53
INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | i

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AMCD Asian Migrants Coordinating Body
ATKI Asosiasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (Association of Indonesian MIgrant Workers)
BMI Buruh Migrant Indonesia (Indonesian Migrant Workers)
BNPT Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme
(National Counterterrorism Agency )
BNP2TKI Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia
(National Agency for the Protection and Placement of International Migrant Workers)
CVE Countering Violent Extremism
DD Dompet Dhuafa
DDHK Dompet Dhuafa in Hong Kong
DDI Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia
EOC Equal Opportunities Commission
FKMPU Forum Komunikasi Mu’minat Peduli Umat
(Communication Forum for Muslim Community)
FPI Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front)
FRC Field Resources Consulting
FSM Forum Silaturahmi Muslimah Hong Kong
HKSAR Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
HTI Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
IMA International Migrants Alliance
IMSA Indonesian Muslim Student Association
IMWU International Migrant Workers Union
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPAC Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict
IR Intermediate Result
ISIS Islamic State Group
JBMI Jaringan Buruh Migran Indonesia (Indonesian Migrant Workers Network)
JI Jamaah Islamiyah
KJRI Konsulat Jenderal Republik Indonesia (General Consulate of the Republic of Indonesia)
KOTKIHO Koalisi Organisasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Hong Kong
(Coalition of Organization for Indonesian Workers in Hong Kong)
KTKLN Kartu Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri (Foreign Worker Identity Card)
LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
MCA Muslim Cyber Army
MSI Management Systems International
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NU Nahdlatul Ulama
PDV Persatuan Dakwah Victoria
PJTKI Perusahaan Jasa Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (Indonesian Manpower Services Company)
PRT Pembantu Rumah Tangga (Housemaid)
ii | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

PT Pelaksana Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia Swasta
(Implementing Private Indonesian Manpower Placement)
PVE Preventing Violent Extremism
SBMI Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia
(International Domestic Workers Federation)
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VE Violent Extremism
VEO Violent Extremist Organization
INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND
Against the backdrop of a rise in organizations promoting intolerant attitudes and violent extremist
(VE) ideologies in Indonesia and globally online, United States Agency for International Development’s
(USAID’s) Harmoni: Towards Inclusion and Resilience Activity (Harmoni) launched to build resilience
among Indonesian communities identified as potentially vulnerable. Harmoni staff designed its
Intermediate Result (IR) 3 strand in 2018 specifically for migrant workers, including a substrand of
activities specifically for female domestic workers in Hong Kong. A report published in 2017 described
at least 45 Indonesian migrant workers from Hong Kong as violent extremists (Institute for Policy
Analysis of Conflict [IPAC] 2017b; Harmoni Program Description), prompting this focus. However,
migrant-supporting organizations in Hong Kong have raised questions regarding whether the migrant
community warrants concern.
PROJECT AIMS
This study explicitly seeks to inform the design of activities under the Harmoni IR 3 substrand that
focuses on the Indonesian, female domestic worker community in Hong Kong. Within this scope, it
seeks to provide context, fresh insight and some synthesis to diverging perspectives about this group
in 2019.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Throughout this study, the research team faced numerous constraints—namely, difficulties building
trust among respondents in Hong Kong regarding the intentions of the research and political upheaval
there, which affected the team’s ability to conduct fieldwork and meet with migrants face-to-face.1
This report’s approach reflects the team’s best efforts in these circumstances.
The research team conducted a comprehensive literature review and desk research in Bahasa
Indonesia and English, including academic reports from security and development journals, gray sector
research conducted by rights-based organizations and online platforms that seek to target and engage
migrants.2
We conducted key informant interviews in July 2019 and a survey in October 2019 with six migrant-
supporting organizations in Hong Kong. Forty-five female migrant workers were subsequently
recruited for a moderated online community discussion in Bahasa Indonesia over a three-week period
in September 2019. This sample reflects the demographics of the population—the almost entirely
female composition of migrants based in Hong Kong.
FINDINGS
Our findings suggest that the migrants characterized as a potential threat in 2017 were likely to be
extreme outliers in the community (IPAC 2017b). In addition, our research has identified possible
1 One migrant-supporting organization commented that, after the media reports about ISIS in Hong Kong in 2017, “we
became very careful because we don’t want that to happen again. It’s not just us who became worried, but also the Hong
Kong citizens.”
2 Annex B: Sources references the full list of online platforms included. These are platforms identified via key informant
interviews, migrant references and keyword search.
4 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

vulnerabilities and strategies for preventing and countering violent extremist (P/CVE) ideologies among
Indonesian migrant workers, even if exposure is likely limited.
1. WORKING CONDITIONS ARE EXTREMELY TOUGH, BUT RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE ARE
PALPABLE
Reports by humanitarian and rights-based organizations lobbying for improvements to migrant rights
protections emphasize the general socio-economic vulnerability of migrants. Networks led by migrant
workers have used this evidence to mobilize and advocate for regulatory reforms in employment
contracts. This activism has resulted in significant progress in commitments toward protections for
migrant workers rights at a multilateral level and within Indonesian governmental reform, though further
work remains to implement proposed changes to directly benefit Indonesian migrant workers in Hong
Kong.3
While it’s fair to emphasise migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation in the private homes of employers
in Hong Kong, this position does not typically influence levels of vulnerability to VE in terms of their
beliefs and values (Krueger & Maleckova 2002). Furthermore, a network of community groups,
institutional support services in Hong Kong and migrant solidarity groups are already making significant
efforts to tackle possible economic vulnerabilities.
2. CHARITABLE GIVING WOULD BENEFIT FROM GREATER SCRUTINY

Domestic workers donate a varying portion of their earnings to those who suffer from poverty, natural
disasters or conflict (most often in Palestine). While this portion varies, it is likely to be extremely
small in monetary terms given the low wages afforded to workers.
Most entrust the decision regarding the end beneficiary of the money to others. For example, some
channel funds as their monthly zakat through established organizations like Dompet Dhuafa (DD),
some via their families or mosques in their home community and others to natural disaster or
humanitarian organizations. Most use a non-banking service to send remittances home and for their
charitable giving (e.g., via a food kiosk or Indonesian restaurant, rather than using fee-based bank
transfers, internet or mobile banking).
Though there was no evidence of money knowingly being sent to violent extremist organizations
(VEOs), respondents did not show a detailed understanding of how they might verify organizations’
intentions; instead, they often trust recipients to act in good faith. As such, migrants may risk being
lured to provide financial support for illicit or corrupt organizations.
3. SMALL RELIGIOUS STUDY GROUPS PROVIDE WELCOME FRIENDSHIP, BUT MAY ALSO BE A SOURCE
OF VULNERABILITY TO VE
Multiple community-led groups, according to online references, offer either a hybrid of social activities
and religious practice or purely Quranic study. Such groups appear to give workers a strong sense of
solidarity and social support and, on some occasions, the chance to hear Islamic speakers provide
religious instruction and guidance.
3Progress exemplified by Global Compact for Migration, agreed to in 2018, and the new Indonesian Protection of Indonesian
Migrant Workers (PPILN) law, agreed to in 2017.
INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 5

It is difficult to evaluate the content or ideologies of such study groups, given their closed and tight-
knit nature. Thus, it is essential to strategize ways to nudge and support such groups to act as a potent
force for resilience to VE ideologies rather than a potential vehicle for VEO recruitment.
4. FEW DEMONSTRATED AN INTEREST IN POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS CONTENT ONLINE

Working long hours each day, the time that migrant workers spend online to relax and communicate
with friends is significantly less than the average eight hours minimum Indonesians spend online at
home every day (GlobalWebIndex 2018). In addition, unlike their counterparts in Indonesia, few
suggested having any interest in discussing politics or an appetite to consume content relating to
conflict or violence. Instead, workers want to relax, seek entertaining and funny content or learn new
skills and seek inspiration via YouTube. Respondents did not mention any extremist or VE groups
when discussing negative content online or dangerous or harmful groups in Hong Kong.4 When
exposed to video content that captured conventional VEO narratives such as the violence affecting
Syrian or Palestinian Muslims, migrants responded with sympathy and empathy rather than anger,
resentment or a desire to act and prevent such actions.
5. ONLINE DATING MAY REPRESENT A RISK VECTOR

Online dating via Facebook or other social networking sites appears to be a fun activity for some,
representing a way to make friends with women and men. However, migrants shared numerous
examples of online relationships with men turning sour, reflecting the need to remain cautious to
deceptive users using romance to disguise a goal of extracting money. If VEOs and their recruitment
wings recognize this vulnerability, migrant women may be targeted. However, at this stage, no
respondents indicated having suspicions regarding ideological motivation among those seeking
friendship online.
While one organization is said to be tackling online safety, this did not appear to be a defined need
that migrants are seeking.
6. DESPITE RESTRICTIONS, MIGRANT WORKERS ARE HIGHLY SOCIAL

Social life is significantly restricted, with migrants often sharing a room with a family member of their
employer (e.g., an elderly person or child) and frequently unable to observe religious practice. Most
workers use their time off socially, with friends and in established religious and social groups (e.g.,
Majelis Ta'lim Az-Zahra or Majelis Taklim Yuen Long).5 Most have contacts in Hong Kong before they
arrive, through pre-departure training or family networks. A range of organizations and community-
led groups offer religious study, social activities and vocational skills training, with well-known locations
as well as online groups to facilitate introductions. This indicates a highly inclusive environment for
those who may otherwise feel isolated at home with their employers.
4 Respondents were not asked or prompted to discuss VE content they had seen online directly; this was to avoid a loss of
trust in the research engagement overall. Instead, respondents were invited to identify who they would describe as a
“Defender of Islam”; discuss whether Muslims are treated fairly in Hong Kong, Indonesia and around the world; and disclose
who might be an enemy of Islam. Respondents also viewed videos with narratives often deployed by violent extremist groups
and were invited to suggest their familiarity and response to such videos; none suggested having an appetite to watch such
content regularly, instead suggesting they prefer to avoid such sad or violent content.
5 Section on Social and Religious Activities of this report details such groups further.

7. INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS FOCUS ON RAISING FUNDS FOR THEIR FAMILIES IN INDONESIA
Migrants are motivated to take up two-year contracts (or more) in Hong Kong to pay off debt, save
for long-term security, and pay the day-to-day costs for their own family in Indonesia. Despite female
domestic workers being paid below minimum wage in Hong Kong, they typically send at least half of
their income home each month, motivated by the knowledge that they can return there to a more
stable future.
Contrary to suggestions that migrants have comparatively high disposable incomes, respondents
appeared highly motivated to save as much money as possible to assure their family’s security and
happiness. Migrants maintain healthy relationships and regular communication with their families. Their
monthly remittance payments demonstrate their commitment to return home as soon as they have
accrued enough savings.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P/CVE AND RESILIENCE SUPPORT
1. FINANCIAL DONATIONS
Given the risks of charitable donations contributing to nefarious actors such as VEOs and the
prevalence of Facebook users seeking to deceive migrant workers online (under the guise of online
dating), financial literacy training with modules on the above would empower migrants to
channel their donations safely. Enrich, a non-governmental organization (NGO) focused on
financial education, has a robust online presence and could be well-positioned to scale up or adapt
existing programs to further its impact. Corporate providers like Mandiri Bank who already run a
successful entrepreneur training program may also be in an excellent position to improve financial
literacy. Harmoni should clarify the existing content of these financial education modules to identify
possible partnership opportunities for targeting the potential vulnerabilities relating to charitable giving
and new online friendships.
2. ONLINE RELATIONSHIPS
Migrants should improve their resilience to ill-intentioned online users, from con artists to potential
VEO recruiters, who may operate under the guise of forming positive friendships or relationships.
Advice regarding relationships needs to stem from an authentic and trusted voice for women online.
For example, the highly visible SuaraBMI.com, a website specifically for Indonesian migrants, could offer
guidance regarding online safety. Alternatively, influencers like Merry Riana, a female entrepreneur and
educator, could play a positive role by advising on signs to watch for when dating online.
3. RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION
Migrants should receive clear and structured guidance on trusted, moderate sources of
Islamic instruction when seeking to manage their own Quranic study group. The Islamic Union, an
Islamic charity that supports the welfare and religious practice of Muslims in Hong Kong, may already
be acting in this role. In that case, they would be in a strong position for ensuring that sources of
guidance go beyond verification to assist in community-based P/CVE efforts actively, to helping
legitimately counter violent ideological narratives that group members may be exposed to. Harmoni,
or other qualified actors, should clarify the existing approach taken by the Islamic Union, if any, to
assess any gap in or appetite for such a role.
4. NETWORKING

Migrant community groups are highly inclusive, however in order to ensure their benefits reach a
wider audience, they could improve on their online advertising to ensure new migrant workers
are attracted to their respective groups. Indonesian philanthropic organizations that have
sufficient reach into migrant communities could be used to facilitate community networks in Hong
Kong and can act as an online nexus for improving online signposting and offering strategic
communications training or support for community group leaders who engage with migrants.
5. RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AMONG EMPLOYERS:

Migrants face a varying level of religious discrimination or intolerance in their working and living
environments. Harmoni should consider using existing activist workers’ rights networks, like
the International Migrant Workers Union (IMWU), to develop religious tolerance
campaigns with employers as the target audience in mind. Employers’ restrictions on religious
practice risk fostering resentment, which VEOs could instrumentalize in the future. The act of
facilitating conversations about religious tolerance as part of the development of a campaign could be
another means to develop resilience and community integration. It also would provide migrants with
the opportunity to counter suspicions raised about their beliefs directly.

INTRODUCTION
This report presents the findings of a study on female Indonesian migrant workers6 in Hong Kong
conducted by the organization Love Frankie on behalf of the Harmoni program in 2019. As determined
by the design of the Harmoni program, this study explicitly focused on female Indonesian migrants living
in Hong Kong and employed as domestic workers (working and living in their employer’s household).7
METHODOLOGY
Harmoni staff designed its IR 3 strand in 2018 specifically for migrant workers, including a substrand
of activities specifically for female domestic workers in Hong Kong. The findings of this research will
inform the design of activities under the IR 3 that aim to build the resilience of Indonesian migrant
communities to intolerant and VE ideologies and recruitment by groups supporting such ideologies.8
To provide evidence-based recommendations for activities that could achieve this outcome, the
research seeks to answer questions developed and validated internally around possible migrant
vulnerabilities and resilience to intolerant or extremist actors. Harmoni broke the study into four
distinct phases to allow findings from one phase to inform the design of the next. Annex A:
Methodology details the full research design.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
The Love Frankie team conducted a review of academic literature in February 2019 that explored the
Indonesian migrant population living in Hong Kong during the last 10 years.
2. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Between July 26 and 30, 2019, the research team conducted three key informant interviews face-to-
face with organizations and community groups that engage with migrants in Hong Kong, including
Dompet Dhuafa in Hong Kong (DDHK), the IMWU and the International Organization for Migration
(IOM).
3. ONLINE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH MIGRANTS

In Phase 3, Love Frankie sought to conduct focus-group discussions with female Muslim domestic
worker migrants in Hong Kong (n=45). Due to political unrest between July and October 2019,
Harmoni amended the research design to enable respondents to participate in the qualitative research
more efficiently over a more extended period of time and via an online community environment
including video and narrative stimuli. Annex A: Methodology provides detailed sampling criteria.
4. DESK RESEARCH AND SURVEY

In October 2019, to supplement our findings, individuals from migrant-supporting organizations
completed a survey describing their current services to migrants and perceptions of vulnerability to
VE among the migrant community: Islamic Union, Yayasan Peduli Kasih and IMWU. We also conducted
further online desk research to review services provided by migrant support organizations and events
facilitated by migrant community groups.
6 The Indonesian population in Hong Kong is 98 percent female (2016 Household Census, Hong Kong Statistics 2018).
7 Domestic work is the most frequent form of Indonesian migrant labor (BNP2TKI 2018).
8 Violent extremism refers to engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to
further social, economic and political objectives (USAID 2011).

KEY FINDINGS
DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW: THE INDONESIAN MIGRANT POPULATION

Since 2002, Indonesia has had an anti-terrorism law, revised a year later. The Indonesian migrant
community represents a significant proportion of the global Indonesian population and is the third
largest migrant population in East Asia (World Bank 2017: 2). Estimates indicate that there are
at least 9 million Indonesian migrant workers globally, representing almost 7 percent of the nation’s
total labor force (ibid). Domestic work is the most common form of Indonesian migrant
labor (Indonesian Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers [BNP2TKI 2018]).
Hong Kong represents the third most popular destination for Indonesian workers who
registered and migrated in 2018. Of the 264,092 documented by the Indonesian Agency for the
Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI), 21 percent achieved placements in Hong
Kong through BNP2TKI, below two other developed East Asian markets, Malaysia (34 percent) and
Taiwan (27 percent), but above Singapore (6 percent) and South Korea (3 percent) (BNP2TKI 2019).9
Indonesian migrants are significantly more likely to be female, particularly those migrating in
the last four years. In 2018, 68 percent of migrants were female, compared to 54 percent in 2013
(BNP2TKI 2019). The Indonesian population in Hong Kong is also overwhelmingly female
at 98 percent (Household Census 2016; Hong Kong Statistics 2018). Those documented are also
only slightly more likely to be married than single. In 2018, 44 percent were married, compared to
38 percent single and 18 percent widowed.
Indonesian migrants typically originate from rural areas, with a majority coming from Java
(65 percent) (World Bank 2017: 21). The following table outlines the point of origination in 2018 for
locations yielding 2 percent or more of those registering for migrant labor placements around the
world (BNP2TKI 2019: 24):
NUMBER OF REGISTERED PERCENTAGE OF ALL

LOCATION
MIGRANTS REGISTERED MIGRANTS
Jawa Timur 60,714 23%
Jawa Tengah 56,100 21%
Jawa Barat 54,740 21%
Nusa Tenggara Barat 32,121 12%
Lampung 17,910 7%
Sumatera Utara 17,887 7%
Bali 4,172 2%
Most Indonesian migrants (more than two-thirds) also originate from more impoverished areas,
those with a higher poverty rate than the national average (World Bank 2017: 22). They also typically
have low educational attainment levels. Between 2014 and 2019, more than 68 percent of
9ILO considers the actual volumes of migrant workers to be between two and four times the number recorded by BNP2TKI,
because of levels of undocumented migration (ILO, 2013: 3).

Indonesian migrants gaining placements via BNP2TKI had not progressed beyond middle school
(BNP2TKI 2018).
INTOLERANCE AND EXTREMISM IN THE HONG KONG MIGRANT COMMUNITY

Research by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in 2017 indicated that the Hong Kong
migrant community might indirectly support the development of VE views or be vulnerable to the
outreach efforts of extremist organizations. This section highlights the drivers of these concerns and
highlights how they intersect and contrast with findings in 2019.
PAST WARNINGS
Two IPAC studies released in 2017 identified a range of ways that women, and specifically domestic
workers, may engage in VE.
The first IPAC study, Mothers to Bombers: The Evolution of Indonesian Women Extremists, identified and
named women who had been formally charged with offenses, including domestic
workers. Evidence is based on direct interviews, trial testimonies, social media communications on
public sites and analysis of jihadi tracts (2017a: 2).10 This report identified one former Hong Kong
migrant worker, Ika Puspitasari, who had been arrested and charged in 2016. While in Hong Kong,
she had given money to fund an attack and then, once her visa expired, volunteered for a bombing
plot in Bali (2017a: 23).
The second IPAC study, The Radicalisation of Indonesian Women Workers in Hong Kong, identified 45
anonymous female migrant workers (former or current) in Hong Kong as “radical.” This
was based on analysis of official reports, social media monitoring and direct interviews (IPAC 2017b:
12).11 Specifically, this report identified three migrant workers (known in the report as Ayu, Ummu
Yasir and Ghalia) who had enabled, through funding and logistical support, ISIS activities in Syria while
working in Hong Kong (IPAC 2017b: 13-15).12 Another four migrant workers (called Najma, Shahida,
Devi and Ifa) are identified as “radical maids” who were connected to Ayu and traveled to Syria in
2014 and married foreign fighters (2017b: 15-16).13 And finally, one migrant worker (called Nur in the
report) became the second wife of Adi Jihadi, “a jihadi of impeccable extremist lineage” (2017b: 16).14
While the second IPAC report clearly states that the number of migrants likely to be engaged in VE
activities in Hong Kong is “tiny” (0.029 percent) relative to the 153,000 Indonesian migrants working
there at the time, the findings from this single study were alarming enough to generate multiple news
stories across Western and Hong Kong-based media (Carvalho 2017; Chew 2017; Nuraniyah 2017).
This reporting appears to have provoked some frustration and contestation among some migrant-
supporting organizations (key informant interviews, July 2019).
For the scope of this study, a critical ambiguity remains: how the role and experience of being a
migrant worker, in the Hong Kong community specifically, might influence the development of VE
attitudes and behaviors among the individuals concerned. This evaluation of causality is a vital
10 It is not clear how many interviews were conducted, with who, and when or what time period was used to capture the
activities of the individuals concerned.
11 As above.
12 Evidence is based on an interview with ‘Serving Islam Team’ study group members (a group the three had attended), an
interview with Ummu Yasir directly and a review of Ayu’s social media activity between 2015-2016 (IPAC 2017b: 13-15).
13 Evidence is based on an interview with the head of GAMMI in 2017.
14 Evidence for the classification of this individual migrant worker is not yet clear.

clarification for the migrant community as a whole and for the design of Harmoni’s activities that intend
to prevent other migrant workers in Hong Kong following an extremist path.
TARGETING OF MIGRANTS BY VEOs

Migrant workers may be at higher risk of being recruited to VEOs if such groups target them, either
online or offline. This section evaluates the possible level of targeting and recruitment efforts in 2019.
ONLINE TARGETING
Analysts have predicted that VEOs, such as ISIS, are more likely to target female migrant workers
instead of their counterparts in Indonesia because of the women’s relative independence, international
outlook and knowledge of English (Rizka Nurul, Institute for International Peace Building quoted in
Chew 2018; IPAC 2017a). Further, evidence shows that ISIS itself expanded its online recruitment
strategy to women (as well as men) between 2015 and 2017 (Bryson 2018). However, our analysis
has not identified any evidence that ISIS has directly and proactively targeted Indonesian
migrants online.
OFFLINE FACE-TO-FACE TARGETING
IPAC has highlighted concerns regarding religious and political figures who have visited Hong Kong
and printed materials that they handed out in Victoria Park to engage migrant communities directly
(IPAC 2017b).
Across networks of migrant workers and religious study groups, a range of organizations hold events
and invite speakers to engage their members and broader groups of attendees. However,
following a review of the events and speakers indicated by other reports and those published online,
two speakers might be a cause for concern, both of whom visited more than five years ago:
− Insan Mokoginta was invited to speak at a mass pengajian at Kowloon mosque by Birrul
Walidain in 2010. He is described as a Chinese Indonesian Muslim convert, founder of Salafist
VOA-Islam, and Mahfudz Dahlan, a member of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), an
organization that “facilitated the spread of Salafist and Islamic Brotherhood political thoughts
in Indonesia since the 1980s and is deeply anti-Christian,” and a former member of the Salafi
jihadi group KOMPAK (who had trained in Mindanao) (IPAC 2017b: 5).
− Felix Siauw, associated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and author of a book banned by
the Indonesian government on the global caliphate, was invited to speak in 2013 by the
Indonesian Muslim Student Association (IMSA), an organization for those studying at the Hong
Kong campus of St Mary’s University in the Philippines (2017b: 9). IPAC has described IMSA
as Salafist (ibid). Siauw was invited again in September and October 2014 by Majelis Dzikir
Ilham Hong Kong (MDZ Facebook page 2019).15
Our analysis has not identified any speakers following 2014 who condone support of a global caliphate,
a caliphate in Syria or Indonesia, or any VE ideology.16
In terms of print materials, Birrul Walidain, a street library in Victoria Park established in 2006, caused
concerns because of its historical links with anti-Christian advocates and because it was said to have
15IPAC 2017b: 8
16Annex B: Sources contains the full list of speakers identified who have been advertised to speak to the Indonesian
migrant community since 2010.

some members who contributed blogs to the now-banned Arammah.com website (IPAC 2017b: 5).17
However, it is not clear if this library continues to maintain these connections or if its materials might
be a cause for concern in relation to religious tensions or conflict.18 No respondents mentioned the
library during research in 2019.
News reports in 2015 referred to a leaflet circulating that advertised an event with an ISIS
logo.19 A second leaflet may have directly encouraged sympathy for the Islamic State. However, the
same source has indicated concerns about the veracity of reports about both leaflets (South
China Morning Post 2015). Again, no migrant-supporting organizations or migrants themselves raised
concerns about leaflets of this nature in 2019.
THE APPEAL OF VEOs AND THEIR NARRATIVES

Analysts have identified numerous potential reasons why female migrant workers might be motivated
to seek out VEOs in response to narratives disseminated to develop attitudes toward extremist
ideology or causes. This section explores possible indicators showing the appeal of VEOs among the
migrant community.
AWARENESS AND APPEAL OF VEOs IN GENERAL
A small but significant proportion of Indonesians support ISIS or other VEOs. One study in 2015 found
that 4 percent of Indonesian participants had a favorable opinion toward ISIS, and 10 percent of those
had heard of ISIS and did not consider them a threat (Pew Research study 2015; Zahid and Wardah
2017). Islamic Union (Hong Kong) indicated that between 2014 and 2015, “some migrants” appeared
“sympathetic to Islamic radical groups such as ISIS” based on seeing ISIS flags or other related pictures
on individual migrant workers’ Facebook pages (survey, October 2019). Thus, it is possible that in
2019 a proportion of migrant workers in Hong Kong still supported VEOs such as ISIS or other forms
of VE ideology.
However, it was difficult to identify any evidence of this in 2019. Islamic Union have observed that
the indicators of support for a VEO noted in 2015 are no longer visible (survey, October 2019).
Among migrant workers interviewed in the community, when invited to discuss any organizations or
groups that migrant workers thought were “defenders of Muslims or Islam,” none mentioned VEOs.20
Similarly, none mentioned VEOs when asked which groups represent risks, concerns or
danger in Hong Kong. No respondents suggested any awareness of groups or individuals with VE
views. Nor did they mention groups that had a noticeable online presence. Most indicated that they
were not aware of any group they could describe as “risky or dangerous for migrants to join.”21 Some
migrants did describe a group that they thought was “negative” or “heretical” and “did things that shouldn’t
be done,” but identified them visually based on “a uniform” and demeanor. This may be the same group
17 One such provocative author is “Yuliana S,” based in Hong Kong, who wrote for popular Salafist takfiri jihadi news sites,
including Voice of Al-Islam (VOA-Islam) and Arrahmah.com, between 2006 and 2016 (IPAC 2017: 6).
18 Another library based in Victoria Park called Lentera Sukses Organisasi (LSO), advertised via KOTKIHO and established
in 2009, seeks to empower migrant workers through loaning books for a small fee. But no connection has been found
between this organization and Birrul Walidain.
19 The event was said to discuss the “errors of the Shi’ite branch of Islam” (South China Morning Post 2015)
20 This is a translation of the exact question wording. The online community (Task 13.9) question was: “Siapakah tokoh
pembela muslim dan Islam menurut kamu?”

21 This is a translation of the exact question wording. The online community (Task 7.7) question was: “Apakah ada
kegiatan/kelompok/organisasi yang kelihatannya aneh atau berbahaya atau menurut kamu mempunyai niat tersembunyi yang tidak
baik bahkan berbahaya bagi migran untuk bergabung? Bagaimana kamu menggambarkannya?”

that other respondents described as dressing provocatively or “tomboyish,” individuals who appeared to
like or sell drugs or cigarettes, those who had tattoos or women who appeared to be gay.22
Based on existing evidence, the visibility or awareness of VEOs like ISIS appears to be much diminished
relative to five years prior to this study.23
ENGAGEMENT WITH NARRATIVES CONNECTED TO VE
Numerous sources have indicated that a degree of support for VEOs has likely been generated
by outrage and upset regarding attacks on Muslims around the world. For example, the
Islamic Union indicated that situations such as “the plight of the Palestinians, discrimination against
Rohingya or Uyghur, racism against Muslims in Europe” all might generate “sympathetic feelings” toward
VEOs like ISIS (Survey, October 2019). IPAC has expressed concerns that a wide range of Indonesian
Muslims were using “Jihadi social media pages” (e.g., on Facebook, Twitter or Telegram) to follow the
war in Syria carefully (IPAC 2017b: 12). Strong feelings of sympathy and intense engagement with such
conflicts could translate into seeking out extremist content, in turn translating to positive support for
ISIS and similar groups while moving along a pathway to VE. Building on this hypothesis, the study
explored migrant workers’ level of engagement with conflicts involving Muslims around the world.
ENGAGEMENT IN THE ISRAEL/ PALESTINE CONFLICT: When invited to discuss who might be
“enemies of Muslims,” the most frequent response (11 migrant workers) referenced Israel and its
conflict with Palestine, although other responses were wide-ranging.24 Migrant respondents indicated
that Israel: “unjustly commits acts that kill many Muslims and children” (migrant worker [MW], 30, E. Java);
“always tortures the Muslims” (MW, 29, C. Java); is “really cruel” (MW, 27, E. Java); and “lack[s] …
humanity” (MW, 28, C. Java).
When discussing five videos presented in the online community, 10 migrants highlighted their
sympathies with Palestinian Muslims who were prevented access to Al Aqsa mosque.25 In this context,
migrants reflected their responses in terms that described sympathy and empathy rather
than a desire to commit violence. For example, one migrant worker who indicated that she
sometimes sees such videos reflected that:
“We must deliver Islam peacefully … Israeli militants are so cruel towards Muslims. I can't
bear to see my fellow Muslims being tortured. I hope justice will come soon. … Differences in
views are common. The solution is to respect each other” (MW, 41, E. Java).
Four migrants also suggested that they donate money to charitable causes that support Palestinian
victims.26 Their motivations to donate indicated a general desire to help those in need rather than
explicitly seeking to support or defend Palestinians. One migrant worker commented that her “heart
is touched when there are people who are living in difficulties” (MW, 40, E. Java), and another that “we as
humans must help each other” (MW, 27, C. Java).
Overall, although migrant workers appear to be aware of and engaged with the plight of Palestinian
Muslims, this engagement is presented in terms of sympathy rather than a desire to act retributively.
22 Moderators sought further details here, but respondents avoided providing them.
23 Though none of the respondents indicated an awareness of IPAC’s research or media coverage regarding the risks of
migrant workers turning to violent extremism, it is possible that respondents deliberately avoided mentioning any VEOs to
protect the reputation of the wider migrant community, as well as their personal employment and visa security.
24 The online community (Task 13.11) question was: ‘Siapakah musuh muslim dan Islam yang harus diwaspadai?’
25 Online community (Task 10.9-10).
26 Online community (Task 12b.2).

RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM: Opposition to communism is a dominant political narrative in
Indonesia, following a long and violent resistance to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).27
Nine migrant workers described “communism” or “communists” as an enemy of Islam. Some indicated
they hold communist views to be incompatible with Islam, for example: “In my opinion, communism
values include Islamic teachings that deviate from the religion of Islam itself” (MW, 35, C. Java); “[communism
is] very oppressive and insults Islam” (MW, 33, C. Java); and, “Islam recognizes God, while communism
doesn't” (MW, 34, E. Java). Others suggested that communism conflicts with their national identity as
Indonesians; for example: “[communist] understanding[s] … are incompatible with Pancasila and the
Indonesian people” (MW, 49, C. Java).
In the context of describing ‘defenders of Islam’, the subject of communism made another
appearance.28 Two migrant workers referenced Gus Maksum Jauhari, who was responsible for the
mass-killing of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) supporters in 1965-66, as a defender.29 One stated
that he is “a warrior who eradicated the communists” (MW, 35, Central Java).
Overall, while hatred toward communists has led to violence in Indonesia historically, our analysis has
not indicated that support for this ideology was tied to a particular VEO in 2019.
ENGAGEMENT IN THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA: When discussing five videos presented as stimuli
to the online community, eight migrants commented on a video reporting news from Syria that
represented a child’s grief (BBC 2016).30 Much like comments responding to the video regarding
Palestinian Muslims, migrant workers expressed sympathy and regret rather than anger. For example,
one migrant worker stated, “I can only pray for them and wish them the best” (MW, 26, E. Java). Others
reflected on their own good fortune, relative to those in Syria. For example, one migrant commented,
”It makes me feel blessed with the condition of my life” (MW, 49, C. Java).
Despite this sympathy, no migrant workers suggested that they donated money to “oppressed Muslims
in Syria” when prompted with a list of causes.31 Engagement with this narrative appeared to be limited,
particularly when compared to other negative situations such as Palestine or natural disasters.
DEFENSIVE OR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD CHRISTIANS: Indications emerged that

some migrant workers in the community may have negative attitudes toward Christians, though these
were indirect and few. Two migrants referred to the pope or the Catholic Church as a body that has
insulted Islam in the past.
Two other migrant workers said they consider Ustadz Abdul Somad a “defender of Islam.”32 News
reports have indicated that Ustadz Abdul Somad has made intolerant remarks regarding the Christian
faith (CNN Indonesia, 2019). However, another migrant worker referred to Ustadz Abdul Somad as
someone who has criticized or been offensive to Islam in the past and concluded “I don’t like him”
(MW, 29, C. Java). So, in this case, a controversial individual appears to split opinion.
27 In 1968, President Suharto took over from President Sukarno‘s Old Order regime, following a contested coup by the PKI
and a battle with PKI members between 1965 and 1966. Under Suharto, supporting the PKI or communism became illegal in
1966 (Anderson 1998: 287).
28 The online community (Task 13.9) question was: “Siapakah tokoh pembela muslim dan Islam menurut kamu?”
29 The entire PKI leadership were executed while the guilt of the PKI involvement in the coup was still under dispute. As a
result, 20 million PKI supporters were left essentially “defenseless” to the massacre that followed (Anderson 1998: 287).
30 Online community (Task 10.9-10).
31 Online community (Task 12b.2)
32 Ustadz Abdul Somad is regarded as a “conservative hard-liner.”

OFFENSE TO ISLAM: When asked to give examples of who may have insulted Islam in the past, four
migrant workers mentioned individuals who had been publicly charged for insults or hate speech by
Indonesian courts. Sugi Nur Rahardja, referred to in the community as ‘Gus Nur,’ was referenced by
two migrants. At the time of the fieldwork, he was undergoing court proceedings for uploading a video
in which he criticized the ‘NU Youth Generation,’ a moderate, mainstream Muslim organization. He
has since been sentenced to 1.5 years in prison (Detik 2019). The former Jakarta Governor, Ahok
(Basuki Tjahaja Purnama), was also mentioned by two migrant workers. He too has been sentenced
by the Indonesian courts to imprisonment, on charges of blasphemy toward Islam.33 Given that the
state supports this critique, such references by migrant workers in the community are relatively
insignificant.
MODERATE ‘DEFENDERS OF ISLAM’: Overall, rather than highlighting violent extremists as

defenders of Islam, respondents were more likely to highlight moderate and mainstream individuals or
groups. For example, Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama or individuals like KH. Abdurrahman
Wahid (Gus Dur) or Anwar Zahid, or individuals who had personal significance in their Indonesian
home community.34 Two migrant workers also referenced a moderate religious figure familiar to the
migrant worker community specifically, Gus Miftah.35
Individuals with a prominent media presence and views that are described by some as moderate and
others as conservative were also mentioned (by individual migrants). They include Ustadz Jefry Al
Buchori,36 Ustadz Adi Hidayat37 and Ustadz Hanan Attaki,38 who founded the Pemuda Hijrah
movement, which, while conservative, is maintained as a tolerant movement (Jakarta Post 2019).
When discussing who might constitute “enemies of Islam” or individuals who might have insulted Islam,
some migrant workers were also quite resistant to the idea that anyone could be an enemy to or
insult the religion. Rather than point to “Communists” or specific individuals (highlighted in other
sections of the report), seven migrant workers suggested that there were “no” enemies of Islam, with
one commenting that “the biggest enemy is ourselves” and another that “we have to protect ourselves from
bad feelings” (MW, 22, East Java; MW, 28, East Java). Another commented: “no Muslim or non-Muslim
leaders insult each other's religions, instead they respect each other” (MW, 28, E. Java).
(A LACK OF) INTEREST IN RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DEBATE

In general, migrant workers included in the research appeared to have minimal perspectives on debates
relating to conflicts involving Muslims globally and appeared to struggle to discuss such issues in any
detail. This is likely linked to, as highlighted below, a lack of interest or appetite to discuss or engage
in political content in general, not just more severe political or religious violence. This aligns with
33 Ahok’s comments received significant news coverage in Indonesia, particularly prior to his sentencing and in the run-up to
the Jakarta election. His comments spurred mass protests in Action in Defence of Islam (Aksi Bela Islam) in Jakarta. These
protests united two major groupings within it as “Salafi-inspired activists” and “conservative traditionalists” who have been
described as having “little in common theologically or strategically” (IPAC 2018b: p1).
34 The online community (Task 13.9) question was: “Siapakah tokoh pembela muslim dan Islam menurut kamu?”
35 Regular speaker organized by Majelis Dzikir Ilham Hong Kong who actively counters violent extremist narratives.
36 Spiritual musician and Ustadz who regularly appeared and gave sermons on mainstream TV channels. Popular among young
people before dying in a car accident in 2013.

37 Ustadz Hidayat is an active Islamic scholar with academic credentials in universities in Java and Libya. He has over 2.5 million
Instagram followers and founded Akhyar TV to share sermons.

38 Ustadz Attaki founded the Pemuda Hijrah youth movement, which some have used as an indicator of a shift to more
conservative Islam. Others offer that it does not indicate intolerance to other beliefs. He has a significant Instagram following
of over 6 million.

Islamic Union’s observation that “Indonesian migrants in Hong Kong are here to work and are quite focused
with that [rather than religious or political debate or activism]” (survey, Oct 2019).
When discussing topics that preoccupied their concerns in general, religious or political conflict was just
one of many issues highlighted rather than a burning, front-of-mind issue. For example, respondents
mentioned concerns about of from natural disasters or environmental challenges more broadly, along
with domestic violence victims, health issues or migrant labor rights. These issues appeared to be
absorbed as among many difficulties experienced by humanity rather than a singular focus.
Migrant workers within the online community were asked to watch numerous videos relating to
challenges that Muslims in other countries face.39 Five migrant workers suggested that they “often”
see videos like that, while 21 said they “never” or “rarely” see them. Even among respondents who
commented that they “sometimes” or “often” see such videos, respondents indicated that they resist
or avoid viewing such material because of its upsetting nature. For example:
“I often find the video on Facebook — on religious sites. I don't really like violent sites like this.
Although there are many messages inside that we can take, I don't have the heart to see them”
(MW, 25, E. Java).
Overall, migrants appear sympathetic to stories from countries where Muslims are suffering in conflict,
but there does not seem to be any particularly active interest or appetite in such topics. Feelings of
sympathy do not appear to translate into anything stronger, such as feelings of enmity or threat, which
can often be detected in discussions with those who continue living in Indonesia.
When summarizing typical topics migrants discuss with family and friends in Indonesia, none mentioned
typically discussing politics or religion. Most suggested they typically discuss their work, cooking and
recipes, funny things they have seen or noticed, travel and fashion or beauty. Even when highlighting
topics that cause disputes between migrant workers and their families at home, only one person
suggested having argued about politics when they disagreed on their choice of president in the national
election that year.
The majority suggested that they prefer not to discuss politics due to a lack of interest or knowledge.
For example, some suggest that it is “none of our business. The most important thing is how we can work
well, and our family in Indonesia is fine” (MW, 47, E. Java). Others commented that “I have never discussed
politics” because “I don't really understand politics” (MW, 35, C. Java) and “I don't want to debate it” (MW,
30, E. Java).
Those who did discuss politics indicated their interest in their choice of president in the national
elections, “once in a while, during the election” (MW, 35, W. Java) or during discussions regarding the
“development of the country’s economy … and fuel prices … rising” (MW, 30, E. Java).
No participants indicated that they might be interested in engaging in discussions regarding VEOs or
other political-religious ideological activism.
ONLINE FRIENDSHIPS, DATING AND MARRIAGES WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISTS

Becoming a member of and identifying with a small group of, say, childhood friends who possess VE
views—even if not initially known to the initiate—is a strong predictor of that individual ultimately
also participating in VE actions (Atran 2016). Meanwhile, some analysts have hypothesized that migrant
39 See Annex A: Methodology for links to videos.

workers in Hong Kong could be drawn to VE through meeting and developing friendships
with terrorists online.
One analyst suggested that migrants might be attracted by the perceived “social status” of someone
who appears to “deserve respect” (Huda quoted in Chew 2018). Others suggest that individuals might
“admire these men as heroes and sympathize with their cause” (Nuraniyah quoted in South China
Morning Post 2017a). Online dating and marriages might then “secure the commitment and connection
… in the movement” (Nuraniyah 2018). Online marriages, meanwhile, have been interpreted as
“alliances” and a means of facilitating safe carriage to Syria (Chew 2017; IPAC 2015; 2017a).
Online friendships and dating were explored with migrant workers in the online community.40 Sixteen
migrant workers stated outright that they do not seek friendships online, indicating that they “prefer
to befriend real people, face to face,” “tend not to trust online friends” or simply “do not need to” (MW, 28,
E. Java; MW, 43, E. Java; MW, 35, C. Java).
Twenty migrant workers suggested that they do make friends online or have done so in the past,
including five who look exclusively for female friendships. None of these respondents mentioned using
Telegram or encrypted platforms to find friends, instead referring only to Facebook, Instagram or
WhatsApp. Migrant workers described looking for friends who “can respect me,” are “good friends,
polite and mature,” are “happy to chat,” or who can “make me feel comfortable and accept me as I am”
(MW, 27, C. Java; MW, 25, E. Java; MW, 25, E. Java; MW, 30, E. Java).
Thirty-three migrant workers in the online community had heard of someone having a relationship
with an individual they met online, and seven included themselves personally. Experiences were mixed.
Three migrant workers described them in favorable terms:
“I got a very positive thing from my online boyfriend. He asked me not to wear clothes that are
too sexy … to protect the good name of my family … how we should respect parents” (MW,
22. E. Java).
“Initially, the man was fond of me. But then I began to be captivated by his very simple
personality. From him I know that men [can] treat women well … by giving advice, guiding and
protecting. … He really fought for this love. Finally, when I took time off and returned to
Indonesia, the man came to propose to me. For me this is very positive” (MW, 25, E. Java).
“From what I hear, usually those who do online dating will take their relationship to a more
serious direction, and get married” (MW, 29, E. Java).
Seven migrant workers indicated that such relationships can end up becoming financial scams. For
example:
“From what I hear, online dating is very detrimental. Many of my friends have been frauded,
and they have spent a lot of money on it” (MW, 29, E. Java).
“Most of them always ask for money and then disappear and block our Facebook” (MW, 41,
E. Java).
40 Following discussions of feelings of loneliness and frequency of contact with home, respondents were asked: (Task 9.5)
Have you ever tried to find new friends ... online? [prompted responses]? (Task 9.6) How do you find friends online? (Task
9.7) How was the experience? Have you ever heard stories from other migrant workers about this? (Task 9.8) Have you /
someone you know had an online relationship with someone you never met? (Task 9.10) Have they ever asked you to do
something for them?

“My friend had an online boyfriend and he forced her to send money. He promised to marry
her, but it turned out to be a lie” (MW, 49, E. Java).
“There is a migrant worker in Hong Kong who is in a relationship with a migrant worker who
works in Korea. They got acquainted through social media. Then, the one in Korea came and
visited Hong Kong. They rent hotels, and he seduces [her] … to pay for everything. When that
person returns to Korea, their relationship ends … and [he] disappeared” (MW, 25, E. Java).
As highlighted, migrants are familiar with making new friendships online though they have mixed
feelings and experiences of how online relationships develop. Any caution shown appears to be purely
in relation to feeling emotionally hurt or related to financial scams. None of the respondents attempted
to indicate where money scammed from them might be spent, indicating a lack of awareness about
whether the money was being channelled to a VEO or not.
Despite this, the fact that many migrant workers are open to forming new relationships online is an
indicator of vulnerability. If VEOs and their recruitment wings have recognized this vulnerability, then
migrant women may be targets.
ECONOMIC EXCLUSION AND THE APPEAL OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

The 2018 World Migration Report, in an evaluation of any correlations between migration and VE,
indicated that radicalization could be a symptom of economic, political or cultural exclusion, which
some Indonesian migrants experience in Hong Kong (IOM 2018: 216-17).41 IPAC has also identified in
their interviews with deportees that a critical motivator for supporting ISIS and moving to Syria could
also be economic, i.e., the belief in a secure job, free education and health care for their families (IPAC
2018). Thus, economic exclusion in Hong Kong and the potential opportunity to earn a stable income
in a caliphate state, as a supporter of ISIS, could have been a motivator for a migrant worker in Hong
Kong, prior to the collapse of the caliphate.
However, as highlighted below in the context of motivations, Indonesian migrants have moved to Hong
Kong to secure jobs and financial stability for their families in Indonesia. Their primary long-term goal
is to secure financial independence and capital to enable a return to Indonesia and their families. For
economic enticement to VEOs to be an appealing prospect, ISIS or other VEOs would
need to prove to be more financially viable and politically secure than the solution
migrant workers have worked toward and made considerable sacrifices to secure.
Overall, it is difficult to identify how economic exclusion as a driver along pathways to VE can apply
to the Indonesian migrant community in Hong Kong.
CHARITABLE GIVING AND FINANCING EXTREMISM

Some, including DDHK, have expressed concerns that some migrant workers might be sending
financial donations to VE actors. DDHK suspects that migrants do this “without knowing the organization
that well” and as such, these donations should not be assumed to be a direct indication of VE (DDHK
Interview, Jul 2019). IPAC also indicated that “Indonesian … overseas domestic helpers [were or are] …
also regular contributors to Islamic charities linked to extremist organizations” (IPAC 2017a: 6).42
41 Other scenarios included: migrants fleeing from violent extremism; recruitment from refugee camps; and the infiltration
of terrorists into migrant and asylum flows.
42 It is not yet clear how IPAC came to this conclusion or what data it’s based on specifically.

It is difficult to deduce charitable intermediaries (beyond DDHK) or the exact beneficiaries of charitable
giving based on interviews with migrant workers in 2019.43 Migrants appear to prefer to give funds
directly to small, community-led organizations connected to their homes, or via a family intermediary.
For example, one migrant worker commented “[I give donations to a] mosque in my village because I know
the conditions there and know the people” (MW, 49, E. Java), while another stated, “Usually I send money to
my family in Indonesia and ask them to donate it to people in my neighborhood” (MW, 22, E. Java).
While such an approach suggests an appetite for donations to go to a familiar or trusted source, some
migrants commented that they are happy to trust others’ decisions about how best to distribute aid.
For example, one migrant worker commented: “When we donate money, we don't need to think about it
anymore. Everything is the responsibility of those who distribute the aid” (MW, 47, E. Java). Another
remarked that “all organizations can be trusted [with donations]” (MW, 28, E. Java).
When asked if they need a report letting them know where their donation had gone, 17 migrant
workers selected the provided multiple response answer of “no, I don't think evidence is needed
because I believe in the organization / people I give money to.”44 This response suggests that a
significant proportion of migrant workers implicitly trust organizations embedded in their community
and respect such informal relationships. However, it also suggests a wider vulnerability to organizations
that may abuse that trust. If one of these organizations were an intermediary for a VEO, it would be
reasonably easy for them to indicate to a migrant worker that their donations support Palestinian
Muslims or victims of a natural disaster when actually they are channelling funds for VE purposes. Thus,
migrant workers may benefit from a greater awareness of the risks of their donations going to VEOs,
and learn to exercize greater scrutiny when choosing the beneficiary of their charitable giving.
43 IPAC refers to Azzam Dakwah Centre, Baitul Mal Ummah, Baitul Mal Al-Izzah, Infaq Dakwah Center and Gerakan Sehari
Seribu (Gashibu) as pro-ISIS charities (IPAC 2017a: 19).
44 Online community (Task 12a.13)

INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN 2019
MOTIVATIONS
MOTIVATIONS FOR BECOMING A MIGRANT WORKER

The leading motivator among Indonesians for becoming a domestic worker in Hong Kong is to increase
their household income (Latief 2017; Constable 2009). These individual motivations reflect the more
extensive regional economic shifts and national demographic, political and economic changes triggered
in the 1990s. Indonesian government policies from this period, including promoting the export of
female labor, led to a significant increase in migrant flows to developed markets across East Asia
(Constable 2009). Today, significant differences in wages remain between Indonesia and East Asian
countries—on average four to six times higher in East Asian countries—giving a strong incentive to
migrate for work (World Bank 2017).
All motivations for becoming a migrant worker as described by our 45 respondents in 2019 were
financially related. Respondents highlighted the importance of saving and paying off debt as their
highest motivator. Most respondents emphasized the need to save money for their family,
specifically for their own parents or husbands and children in Indonesia. A smaller proportion
described the need to pay off debt for their parents or their own immediate family.
When describing conditions at home, many indicated that available earnings were not enough to cover
day-to-day bills, or that the longer-term debt of their household was a concern. For example: “because
of the economy … [my income] was not enough for daily needs” (MW, 28, C. Java); “in Indonesia, Surabaya
… The salary was insufficient for my own and my family's needs” (MW, 25, E. Java); and “before [my income]
… was sometimes not enough for daily needs, let alone saving for the future” (MW, 33, E. Java).
Respondents also indicated being aware of others from their communities who had
migrated to work and had shown proven benefits to their families back home. For example: “My
neighbor had been a migrant in Hong Kong for six years and her financial situation improved. She now has a
groceries business [back in Indonesia]” (MW, 28, C. Java), while another stated, “I had friends and relatives
in Hong Kong and … judging by their work, the economy is more advanced [there]” (MW, 25, E. Java). In
keeping with other comments, a final respondent noted that “through my neighbors [in the village], I
learnt that in Hong Kong the salary difference is quite large compared to working in my area. That’s what
made me interested” (MW, 33, E. Java).
All described their time in Hong Kong in terms of a stop-gap and not a life-long solution.
LONG-TERM GOALS
Migrant workers described a consistent vision of financial stability and independence back
in Indonesia as their long-term goal. A significant majority indicated their hope to return to their
home communities once they have paid off debt and can continue providing for their families. A
considerable proportion of migrants aim to establish their own business or develop other mechanisms
for financial independence into old age, such as owning a farm, running a boarding house and even
employing others. One migrant worker commented: “[Long-term] I want to have my own home … to
have the capital for a business” (MW, 30, E. Java); another wants to “manage finances, saving and doing
business at home for needs that come later” (MW, 26, E. Java).
Though financial factors dominate logic, migrant workers closely associated stability with a feeling of
true independence and the ability to secure their own family’s happiness and well-being—including

their own parents, husbands and children. One migrant worker described success as the ability to
“make a family happy and look after themselves as well … [It is] identical with money” (MW, 28, C. Java).
One migrant worker also indicated that she sought “to employ/absorb the workforce and reduce the
amount of unemployment around them” (MW, 25, E. Java).
Overall, migrant workers appear to have a clear vision of their goals and hopes for their future back
in Indonesia.
MOTIVATIONS FOR CHOOSING HONG KONG AS A DESTINATION

Hong Kong was described as the first-choice destination for nearly half of the migrant workers
interviewed, and was second to Taiwan or Singapore in other instances. The most consistent rationale
for preferring Hong Kong to other locales was financial: Migrant workers felt that the salary was higher
and the economy more stable. Other reasons included perceptions of it being a safe country and it
has proper regulation for the protection of migrant workers in terms of being able to take days off.
Language comprehension—prevalence of English-speakers—also factored into decisions. Taiwan was
also described favorably because of salaries but was differentiated from Hong Kong on the basis that
employers in Hong Kong are said to be “very friendly.”
“Taiwan and Hong Kong [are dream destinations]. Many Indonesians choose to work in either
of those two countries for their high salaries” (first-time MW, 25, E. Java).
Saudi Arabia is consistently described as the least desirable destination to work in, though
some also express concerns about Malaysia. They describe concerns about poor working conditions
and limited protection for migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. Some bemoan workers being “treated like
slaves” and becoming victims of rape. Employers in Saudi Arabia were frequently described as “cruel.”
One respondent commented that: “Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country, but the citizens are immoral and
most of them can't appreciate their maids.” The financial benefits combined with safety and security
appear to be much more critical to Muslim migrant workers than religious affinity.
INCOME, SAVINGS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
INCOME AND WORK CONTRACTS

Migrant workers’ earnings per month are set in a contract before their departure and agreed on with
the employer via the private employment and placement agencies in Indonesia and Hong Kong.
Indonesian migrant workers are categorized as a distinct economic group in Hong Kong law, even
from other migrant workers such as Filipinos, and are excluded from Hong Kong’s Minimum Wage
Ordinance (IPAC 2017: 2). This results in Indonesian migrant workers being paid below the
minimum wage: on average, US$517 per month in 2014 (Amnesty 2014). This is more than
double the average salary of Indonesian migrant workers in the Middle East or Malaysia (World Bank
2017: 32). Though none of the respondents in our 2019 study indicated concerns about their current
pay, Amnesty International and the IMWU consider typical contracted payment conditions as non-
commensurate with workload (IMWU survey, Amnesty 2014).
Migrant workers are notably worse off in their first six to seven months of their contract in Hong
Kong because they must pay a proportion of their salary back to the employment and placement
agencies. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) regulation is meant to ensure a cap
of a payment of 10 percent of the first month’s wages (roughly US$55); in reality, migrants frequently
pay more than 50 percent of their salary (over US$380) on a monthly basis for the initial seven months

(surpassing US$2,100) (Amnesty International 2014; World Bank 2017: 36). Because many migrant
workers struggle to pay such large sums, workers describe being locked into debt with their
placement agency from the outset (Amnesty 2014). IMWU also indicated that placement
agencies could often obtain and then refuse to return workers’ official documentation such as their
personal graduation certificates so that migrants struggle to move on from their jobs (IMWU
interview, July 2019).
The two-week employment work visa requirement, where migrants cannot go more than two weeks
without a work contract or risk being deported, prevents many migrant workers from ending
contracts with their employers out of fear that they will not find a new contract quickly enough. This
causes many migrant workers to endure abusive working environments, for risk of being
deported or returning without fully repaying their recruitment fees (Amnesty 2014).
Migrants are in highly dependent positions with their employers, with limited capacity to gain financial
independence. However, the work of rights-based organizations over the last decade appears to have
made significant progress in informing and mobilizing Indonesian migrants to advocate
for their rights as workers. For example, domestic worker trade unions like the IMWU and
Asosiasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (ATKI) have facilitated and enabled a new politically empowered
group that can regularly mobilize for better rights protections, not just nationally but in transnational
spaces (Rother 2017: 969-970). Such developments are reflected among respondents in 2019, nearly
a third of whom voluntarily indicate knowing their rights. One commented: “My contract is clearly written
according to Hong Kong immigration rules. [If I did not receive my] full salary? We are official, legal workers,
so we must receive a full salary” (MW, 49, C. Java). Another suggested that if she felt her “rights are not
fulfilled” then she “must report to the agency” (MW, 27, E. Java), and yet another said ”the salary is our
right after we do our obligation for one full month” (MW, 25, E. Java).
Conditions remain difficult for Indonesian migrants, and individual cases of employer exploitation
continue to emerge, yet local unions and workers continue to develop strategies to enable a sense of
agency while making progressive gains to labor rights over time.
FAMILY SUPPORT AND PRESSURES

Migrant workers surveyed highlighted that they send most of their income each month
to their family to cover bills and build savings in Indonesia. The majority of respondents indicated
that they send at least 50 percent of their salary, and some above 75 percent, to their families every
month.45 Though it appears that employers pay all workers in cash, most workers seem to deposit the
money in an Indonesian bank account in Hong Kong, then use a “non-banking” service to transfer
funds home each month. The majority appears to prefer this non-banking service, e.g., using a food
kiosk or restaurant-based service, though a small proportion pays the fees to use mobile banking or
an ATM-based service.
The practice of sending money home to the family appears regular and reasonable, but it is also a
subject of worry for workers. The most consistent reason for migrant respondents to fight or argue
with their family in Indonesia was money. This would suggest that despite maintaining long-term
placements, financial problems can remain at the front of mind for workers and their families.
45 This aligns with the World Bank remittance study in 2013-2014 (World Bank 2017: 36).

CHARITABLE GIVING
Migrant workers surveyed frequently engage in charitable giving. Those who engage with
DDHK, an Islamic philanthropic organization, often contribute as much as 10 percent of their salaries
to charity each month (DDHK interview, Jul 2019). Among migrant workers in 2019, around a third
suggested they gave monthly zakat and several specifically mentioned DDHK. A slightly higher
proportion give donations to victims of natural disasters. Some also donate to those in Palestine46 or
victims of poor health in Indonesia.47
As with transferring money to families, most migrant workers interviewed in 2019 suggested they
used a non-banking service, generally via a food kiosk or restaurant, to make charitable donations. It
is not clear if this is direct to a beneficiary or if families in Indonesia are asked to make donations on
behalf of workers. Numerous respondents described their preference to give to beneficiaries in
Indonesia and specifically those in their community, for example, via their own mosque.
Migrant workers can also quickly become beneficiaries of fundraising, for example, if they
face an exploitative or abusive working relationship, or need food, shelter and legal assistance on short
notice. DDHK considers migrant workers not just fund givers but also zakat beneficiaries when they’re
not paid appropriately or if they experience abuse (Latief 2017: 224). DDHK will “collect funds from
fortunate migrant workers, or what can be referred to as ‘migrant philanthropy’ to support unfortunate fellow
migrants in Hong Kong,” as section on Support for Indonesian Migrant Workers in this report describes
in more detail (Latief 2017: 248).
DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES IN HONG KONG

All domestic workers live in their employers’ home. Living arrangements and the nature of the work
heavily influence migrant workers’ sleeping patterns, their ability to observe religious practices,
communication with others or access to the internet and attendance of activities in-person outside of
the household.
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE DOMINANCE OF WORK

A migrant worker having her own room in her employer’s home was possible, though
certainly not typical, in 2019. Just under half of those interviewed shared a room with another
member of the employer’s family, either a child or older relative under their care. Most accepted this
situation as part of the job. Those who shared a room with a member of the family mainly indicated
that they were able to gain privacy when they needed it but did sometimes struggle with lack of sleep.
One commented that while “my boss treats me well” and “my privacy is … maintained,'' her “problem is
lack of sleep because I have to sleep with babies” (MW, 41, E. Java). Others suggested that while “I share
a room with an employer's daughter … in my opinion, it is very safe and pleasant” (MW, 25, E. Java) or that
“I stay at the employer's house and share a room with an old lady. My accommodation [needs] are well
fulfilled. My privacy is also well preserved” (MW, 49, E. Java).
However, one respondent highlighted a more outlier case of not having her own room at all: “My job
now is cleaning the employer's house and cooking. I cannot sleep well … and lack the rest time. I sleep on the
sofa. I feel neutral; not happy nor suffering.”
46The section on appealing VE narratives includes further analysis on motivations to support Palestinian victims.
47Using a prompted list, no migrant worker respondents in 2019 suggested they gave money to “Muslims in Syria.” The
section on appeal of VE narratives explores this theme further.

The difficulty such individuals have with resting or accessing privacy on their own terms shows the
extent to which migrant workers remain responsive to the needs of their employer and household.
Domestic workers’ day-to-day activities prior to a 2014 study were typically highly restricted to
work-based tasks and they can be “on-call 24 hours” per day (Amnesty 2014). This observation
remains true today, as respondents described waking to prepare and serve breakfast between 5 a.m.
and 8 a.m. and returning to bed only after clearing the evening meal and putting dependents to bed,
between 9:30 p.m. and 11 p.m. Most indicated they were able to rest for an hour or two in the
afternoon, so they worked typically between 12 and 14 hours a day.48
TIME OFF
The overwhelming majority of workers interviewed receive at least one day off a week, typically over
the weekend.49 Some were even able to visit friends while running errands. However, three respondents
mentioned that they receive less time off, just a day or two a month. While clearly exploitative and
against Hong Kong’s Employment Ordinance, this is a much smaller proportion than the over 50 percent
of migrants who reported receiving no rest day at all in 2012 and 2013 (Amnesty 2014).
ADDITIONAL JOBS
Most migrant workers interviewed suggested that they had not taken on additional work or money-
earning activities during their time in Hong Kong. Most were aware of such options, but respondents
suggested that they did not have enough spare time to take on further work or preferred to use their
spare time to rest instead. Still, one in nine respondents indicated that they had taken on additional
work. At least three mentioned selling items via an online shop, and one said she had taken on
additional hours via her existing employer, e.g., at his office.
FREEDOM AT HOME: COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS

Most migrants interviewed said that, during the working week, they could use their phones and
the internet easily. Numerous migrants explained that they had access to the household internet
and could readily call family and friends as needed, though some described intense frustration, with
calls being cut off frequently. Others suggested that their ability was more constrained, doing so only
in the evenings or when their employers were out of the house. Despite these constraints, at least
half of respondents (including those who had contracted away from home for over a decade) indicated
that they spoke to a family member or friend from home in Indonesia every day. None of
our respondents suggested they were unable to access their phones or the internet during the week.
Overall, this indicates that while the amount of time online is limited, and significantly less than the
average minimum of eight hours spent online by Indonesians at home, online access during the week
is achievable on a regular basis for most (GlobalWebIndex 2018).
FREEDOM AT HOME: RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

Employers appear to take a firmer attitude toward religious practice in their home. DDHK has
highlighted the difficulties that some migrants face in observing their religion, particularly in terms of
having space to pray and being required to eat the same food as their employer (DDHK interview,
48 This is lower than the “average 17-hour days” documented by Amnesty International during fieldwork in 2012 and 2013.
This discrepancy could be because workers in this period were sampled by Amnesty via migrant support organizations and
thus may represent those in the worst conditions, or because working conditions may have improved after significant lobbying
for improvements in employer practices over this period (Amnesty International 2014).
49 IMWU indicated that some placement agencies require workers to pursue vocational training during their time off in their
first three months, and some are obliged to pay extra for it. None of our respondents mentioned this (IMWU KII Interview).

July 2019). This aligns with a survey in 2013 that suggested that nearly a third of workers were
prevented from practizing their own religion at home (Amnesty 2013).
Religious practice appears to be difficult for around half of the migrants interviewed. In
terms of prayer practices, around a third indicated that they were able to do so without difficulty.
However, many suggested that they needed to ask permission, needed to do so secretly or were
simply not allowed to pray. Such constraints appear to stem more from the attitudes of the employer
than issues around workload. For example, the employer is “afraid to see prayer” (MW, 25, E. Java) or
“afraid of … [the] white mukena” (MW, 49, C. Java), or simply states that “nothing can be worshipped”
(MW, 28, C. Java).
Thus, some migrant workers face heavy restrictions on their religious practice during the week. In
addition, numerous migrants commented on their need to cook and often consume pork when sharing
meals with the household. While this is not a proscribed requirement in their contract, it is clearly a
frequent habit of Hong Kong households and thus an expectation for domestic workers to perform
without discussion.
Overall, most respondents who raised the issue of restrictions on religious practice described it as a
manageable and straightforward downside of the nature of their work. However, others suggested
that this caused them some personal discomfort.
SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES
FRIENDSHIPS IN HONG KONG

A high proportion of migrant workers appear to remain in regular contact with friends they had made
during their training in Indonesia and through their recruitment/placement agency once they have
arrived in Hong Kong. This remains the case for migrant workers who have been based in Hong Kong
for between four and 10 years and does not appear to be limited to recent arrivals in the city.
Some migrant workers also indicated that they had friends in Hong Kong from before they
became migrant workers, such as relatives, school friends or neighbors from their original
communities in Indonesia. This indication of existing transnational networks also connects with a
further finding that numerous migrants who travel to Hong Kong receive a recommendation from
existing contacts who already work there.
Migrants frequently emphasized that their Indonesian friends in Hong Kong are also Muslim. This may
have been raised to underline a sense of reliability and trust, or because it emphasizes the type of
activities they pursue together, such as religious study groups and attending the mosque for prayer.
Migrant workers suggested that if they were to avoid anyone in Hong Kong from the Indonesian
community, it would be due to that person’s desire to borrow money. Numerous respondents
commented that they try to avoid people who like to take out bank loans or ask to borrow money
from them. Though none of the respondents indicated that they would avoid friendships with anyone
of a different faith-based or political view, some expressed concern or fear of anyone who took drugs
or appeared to be engaging in sex work.

SOCIAL ACTIVITIES AND SPACES
During their free time, most migrant workers rest, spend time with friends outside the household,
observe their religious practice and learn or pursue interests including sports, dance, cooking, fashion
and make-up.
Victoria Park in Causeway Bay has been described as a particularly prominent

destination during migrant workers’ free time, as “one of the most important social gatherings for
Indonesian maids” and “hugely popular” (IPAC 2017: 4). The gatherings in Victoria Park are a
combination of: “a source of emotional support and community” and the space appears to represent a
vital combination of social and religious activities (ibid). For example, migrants can combine more
formal meetings for noon prayers, recitations of the Quran and lectures from an Ustadz with informal
sessions such as sharing celebrity gossip or discussing problems with their employer or at home with
their families. Because of this mixture, it can be challenging to separate the religious from the social
activities of domestic workers in Hong Kong within this space.
Migrants in 2019 frequently mentioned parks, along with other meeting places, including mosques, the
shopping area Mong Kok, Mei Foo plaza and dedicated spaces for exercizing, e.g., for running, yoga,
gymnastics or dancing.
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND GROUPS

A wide-range of community-based migrant worker networks appear to facilitate social and religious
activities in a way that is much more informal than the “services” or “activities” described in the
migrant support services section that follows (section on Support for Indonesian Migrant Workers).
Media reports suggest around 200 associations, although it is challenging to confirm exact numbers,
particularly given that activity seems to fluctuate dramatically year to year (New York Times 2017).
Some of these groups appear to be exclusively religious and for the purposes of Qur'anic study.
However, a significant proportion offer a hybrid of religious and social activities, highlighting how
migrants can develop community ties and social or economic skills while observing their religious
practice. This combination reflects both the interests of many migrants, and a dedicated strategy on
the part of Islamic philanthropic organization DDHK, which frequently acts as a facilitator, partner and
funder of community groups in Hong Kong, including the secular. DDHK aims to protect migrant
workers from the influence of non-Muslim or risky organizations in Hong Kong through developing a
sense of solidarity among Indonesian, Muslim migrant workers.50 In an interview in 2010, the director
of DDHK’s branch in Hong Kong explained that it sought to protect and empower women migrants
and thus “have started to address the ‘cause’ and the ‘symptom’” by creating “agents of social change”
through offering activities intended to empower and build social relationships between migrants
themselves (Ghofur quoted in Latief 2017: 246).
The following organizations reflect this hybrid combination of religious and social activities51:
NAME PUBLIC ROFILE REACH ACTIVITIES
501- 1,000 Islamic teaching
Forum Silaturahmi
Advertized on members
Muslimah Hong Kong English language
DDHK Only (according to
(FSM)52 Sewing classes
DDHK)
50 Risky in this context, as interpreted by DDHK, could also mean Christian missionaries.
51 It is not possible to indicate whether such groups are moderate or otherwise based solely on their public profile.
52 Held at branches in Causeway Bay, Tuen Mun and Yuen Long.

NAME PUBLIC ROFILE REACH ACTIVITIES
Islamic teaching (An-Nahdliyah method and
Collaborate with 201-500 Tauhid) every Sunday.
Majelis Taklim Yuen
DDHK, Nahdlatul Facebook
Long53 Arabic music classes
Ulama and KJRI. followers
A blog to facilitate donations for “the poor”
Member of Public lectures for Islamic teaching with
KOTKIHO and prominent speakers. Religious teaching
managed under 201-500 classes.
Persatuan Dakwah the Islamic Union Facebook
Victoria (PDV) of Hong Kong Training for workers related to
followers
entrepreneurial skills.
Open Facebook
page Overseas travel.
Advertised on 201-500
DDHK and Facebook Islamic study groups for migrant workers
coordinated with followers for held daily, with one altogether on Sundays,
Haloqah - ‘Circle’54 Islamic Union different pages “Halaqoh Bersatu.”
(for each daily
Multiple open Haloqah, or Sewing classes
Facebook pages circle)
50-200 Islamic studies
Advertised on
JDU Firdaus Facebook Comedy events
DDHK
followers Hijab decorating competition
Ikatan Warga Muslim
Indramayu Cirebon Advertised on 50-200 Islamic studies under the advice of Islamic
(Muslims Society from DDHK and Facebook Union Hong Kong; held on Sundays.
Indramayu and Cirebon) Facebook members Fundraising, e.g., for a house refurbishment.
(Wamic).55
Hong Kong Muslimah Advertised on
DDHK Islamic studies and entrepreneurship training
Migrant Workers
Unknown (a savings and loan service is said to be
Sisterhood Association Closed Facebook available).
(IPMH) group
Islamic studies
Komunitas Migran Advertised on Shelter and advocacy support
Unknown
Indonesia (KOMI) DDHK Entrepreneurship workshops
Health workshops
Groups that are more explicitly and exclusively religious include:56

NAME PUBLIC PROFILE REACH ACTIVITIES
12,200
Private Facebook
Majelis Ta'lim Az-Zahra57 Facebook Islamic teaching
page.
followers
Advertised on
DDHK and via Public events on Islamic teachings inviting
Majelis Dzikir (MDZ) open Facebook 6,000 Facebook
prominent Muslim figures (conservative
Ilham page followers
and moderate)
Member of PDV
53 Held at MT Al-Hidayah, Ning Road, Yuen Long.

54 Held at Masjid Ammar Wan Chai.
55 Near the canteen in Victoria Park, Causeway Bay.
56 It is not possible to indicate whether such groups are moderate or otherwise based on their public profile alone.
57 Held at Tin Hau bus terminal.

Member of the
Indonesian Muslim
400 attended
Al-Istiqomah International Migrant Workers Islamic teaching, tours of mosques in
the ‘masjid tour’
Moslem Society (AIMS) Association in Hong Kong and public lectures
in 2019
Hong Kong
(GAMMI-HK)
Advertised on
Forum Komunikasi DDHK Under 50
Mu'minat Peduli Umat Facebook Religious study group
(FKMPU) Open Facebook followers
page
Islamic studies from 11 p.m. to 1 a.m.
30 members weekly and via online web-conferencing
Advertised on
Salikul Lail58 (according to with Indonesian teachers
DDHK only
DDHK)
Invite prominent teacher annually
About 15
Islamic studies under the guidance of
Advertised on members,
Young Kartini59 pesantren / boarding school - An-Nur
DDHK according to
Soditan Lasem, Rembang, Central Java.
DDHK.
Islamic studies, library and public lectures.
Advertised on
Held during weekends and holidays.
DDHK
Al-Hikmah Unknown Events: “halal bi halal” in conjunction with
private Facebook
Eid Mubarak and Kartini’s day to celebrate
account
women’s empowerment.
Majelis Taklim Sabtu Advertised on Islamic studies held on Saturday and
Unknown
Taipo60 DDHK only Sunday at 3PM
Some groups are purely social; for example:

Private Facebook
account 2,000-3,000
Preserving Indonesian traditional art and
Sanggar Budaya Facebook
Publicized via news culture
followers
media
Political activism among migrant
Liga Pekerja Migran 1,000-1,500 workers
Open Facebook page
Indonesia (LiPMI) followers Indonesian flag ceremony
Traditional costumes fashion show
Advertised on
Yogya International Club 500-1,000
DDHK and open Entrepreneurship and cooking
(YIC) followers
Facebook page
Loan and sell books to Indonesian
50-200 migrant workers publicly
Irsyad Geperbumi61 Facebook Collaborate with Irsyad publication in
followers Indonesia
Musical group that perform rebana
58 Held near the basketball courts in Victoria Park, Causeway Bay.

59 Based in Causeway Bay, Tin Hau.
60 Held under the Tai Po Cungsam bridge, Taipo Center.
61 In front of the Indonesian market store in Causeway Bay.

Association for Open Facebook page
50-200
Indonesian Society and Briefly mentioned on Facebook Fashion and Dance
Former Domestic KOTKIHO followers
Workers (Amanah) Facebook page
SENSE OF AGENCY AND STATUS AMONG SMALL COMMUNITY GROUPS IN HONG KONG
Though some of the community groups described above appear small, with just 10 to 15 members,
and from the outside it may appear that the community is quite fragmented, their existence enables
individual migrant workers to take on leadership roles. These roles, such as “meeting organizer” or
“secretary,” confer status and a sense of agency to their lives in Hong Kong (Rother: 968). Such groups
may appear secretive or suspicious to those with concerns about the development of terrorist cells.
However, it’s likely that such groups enable and strengthen friendships and trust, without a sense of a
need to communicate externally or be transparent concerning their activities.
INTERNET ENGAGEMENT
USE IN DAY-TO-DAY LIFE

As highlighted, spending time browsing the internet does not feature prominently in the descriptions
of free time by migrant workers. Where respondents did discuss the internet, it was in the context of
calling or messaging with close friends and family, reading specialist migrant worker media like
SuaraBMI or learning (through YouTube videos). Few suggested having sufficient time or desire to use
their limited free-time browsing websites or speaking with people they don’t know.62 Instead, migrant
workers suggested that their time off is their “opportunity to meet friends” and so they “only focus on
going out, eating out, making jokes with friends” and that that “makes me forget the internet” (MW, 40, E.
Java). Another that she tries to “forget the internet because I want to be happy by meeting friends or
sightseeing” (MW, 27, E. Java).
When describing their use of YouTube, nearly all indicated that this was for learning skills such as
cooking or languages. While few explicitly mentioned using YouTube for religious study, some
mentioned specific Ustadz they like to follow online (see “Role Models and Inspiring Figures”).
ONLINE ENGAGEMENT
When describing the type of content migrants engage with online, i.e., liking or sharing content with
their friends, “funny things” was the most popular. Aside from the humor, migrants indicated
that they typically liked or shared content relating to education, cooking and food, music, travel and
their working conditions in Hong Kong. None suggested that they shared anything of a political or
religious nature in this context.
Migrants indicated a wide variety of content that they found offensive or frustrating online. The most
frequent theme was a strong dislike of content that reflected disputes or acts of violence
within families, between parents and their children. Some respondents commented on how they
disliked seeing parents mistreat their children or vice-versa.
62 SuaraBMI.com’s Facebook page launched in 2015 and has 467,000 followers.

Some respondents also commented on their frustration when seeing information about hoaxes or
offensive political or religious content. However, this was a small proportion of the overall group and
does not appear to be a reliable or consistent concern across the sample.
A high proportion of migrants appear to be members of a group specific to migrant

workers63 either on Facebook or WhatsApp, as well as using the same apps for private chats and
discussions with friends. Such groups appear to be separate from the online presence generated by
offline groups whose central mode is offline activity (see below).
Some migrants also appear to enjoy specific groups for cooking, sport and business
purposes. The use of the migrant workers' community groups appears to have numerous benefits.
Some have used them for “finding work in Hong Kong” (MW, 22, E. Java), learning “the latest news, [in]
Hong Kong situation etc.” (MW, 28, C. Java), to “know the conditions of fellow migrant workers” (MW, 34,
E. Java). They are also used to gain help and inspiration, provide opportunities to vent “about employers”
(MW, 26, E. Java) as well as arranging offline meet-ups and making friends.
ROLE MODELS AND INSPIRING FIGURES

Respondents highlighted numerous individuals whom they found to be a good source of inspiration or
guidance in their day-to-day lives. Some have prominent online profiles, whereas others appear to be
based much more on their day-to-day, direct relationships.
More than one migrant worker in the online community highlighted the following individuals either as
a source of inspiration or as someone they regard as a “defender of Islam.” Where the individuals
have visited Hong Kong to speak, the specific organization who invited the speaker has been indicated.
AFFILIATION TO
ONLINE RELIGIOUS
NAME PROFILE ORG IN HONG
PRESENCE GUIDANCE
KONG
Inspirational, Indonesian
Prominent YouTube
female entrepreneur who
Merry Riana channel - over 2m None known _
shares motivational videos
subscribers
on YouTube
Prominent Muslim
Ustad Sholeh preacher in Indonesia. He
Persatuan Dakwah
Mahmud (‘Ustad hosted a TV show (2015- Instagram - 341k Y
Victoria
Solmed’) 16) discussing Islamic
values
A Muslim preacher known
for his activities in non-
Majelis Dzikir Ilham
Gus Miftah conventional places such Instagram - 794k Y
Hong Kong
as in night clubs or in
migrant communities.
Muslim preacher with a
Ustad Hanan Majelis Dzikir Ilham
focus on issues affecting Instagram - 7.8m Y
Attaki Hong Kong
young people.
KH. Anwar Muslim preacher known Instagram - 59k Majelis Dzikir Ilham
Y
Zahid for his humor. followers Hong Kong
Ustad Adi Muslim preacher known Instagram - 2.4m None known Y
Hidayat for his intellectuality and
63Examples of groups include the Indonesian Migrant Workers group and Suara Migrant Indonesian Workers in Hong
Kong.

AFFILIATION TO
ONLINE RELIGIOUS
NAME PROFILE ORG IN HONG
PRESENCE GUIDANCE
KONG
contribution for
community service and
international Islamic
sermon
In addition to those described above, some migrants also suggested that they benefit from speaking to
a family member such as their father or sister for religious guidance or a teacher from home. This
highlights that, for some, religious advice is safeguarded quite carefully.

SUPPORT FOR INDONESIAN MIGRANT WORKERS
This section highlights the range of support services available to migrant workers in Hong Kong in
order to support the identification of possible gaps, opportunities or partners for future Harmoni
programmatic activities.
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT IN HONG KONG

Organizations engaging with migrants at different stages of their experience and the services they
provide can be categorized into the following broad groups. Organizations understood to be operating
these services are summarized in the table:
NO. DETAILS
1 Supporting the recruitment, training and placement of migrant workers
2 Providing security and physical safety support to Indonesians in Hong Kong
3 Advocating for and on behalf of migrants regarding legal and rights-based issues and offering rights-
based education
4 Providing emergency housing, healthcare advice and psycho-social counselling
5 Providing vocational skills education and social activities
6 Providing religious education, activities, sermons and study groups
7 Building resilience to violent or extremist narratives
Service areas 1, 3 and 5 to 7 summarized above are described in further detail below.
RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND PLACEMENT

Private recruitment agencies and the Indonesian Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant
Workers (BNP2TKI) typically coordinate with Hong Kong placement agencies to train and place
Indonesian migrants with employers. Ownership of the training curriculum and delivery is understood
to be undergoing a transition to the government and the ‘Law on the Protection of Migrant Workers’
is intended to offer better regulation of the practices of private agencies and migrant worker contracts
(GFMD 2019; UN Women 2019).
Prior to these recent reforms, rights advocates in Hong Kong have raised strong concerns about the
role of these agencies and the extent to which they are regulated to protect the rights of workers on
their workload, pay and freedoms in their role. For example, concerns have been raised that the role
of the agent reflects “an attitude of control [rather] than of assistance” (Rother 2017: 962). The
training has also been described by some migrant activists as: “a form of brainwashing, where you have
to give yourself in… they teach you how to obey” (Interview with Hong Kong migrant activist quoted
in Rother 2017: 964).
However, as highlighted above, progress does appear to be forthcoming. In 2019, migrants indicated
that they felt satisfied by the training they had received prior to commencing their role in Hong Kong
and that the agent continued to play an important role. When asked where migrants would turn to if

they faced a problem in Hong Kong, e.g., with their employer, the worker’s agent (“P.T”) (together
with the Indonesian Consulate) was highlighted most frequently:
“If there is a problem then I contact the agent. If there is no response, then the Consulate or
the police” (MW, 30, E. Java).
“Alhamdulillah, until now I have no problem, and if there is a problem, we can go to the agent
or consulate” (MW, 38, E. Java).
“If I have a problem with an employer, I ask for help from the Agency, so that it is explained
and does not cause misunderstanding between me and the boss” (MW, 49, C. Java).
While there are limited examples of placement agencies actually being used, their frequent mention
underlines the amount of trust afforded to them in their relationships with migrant workers, alongside
migrants’ friends and families based in Hong Kong or in Indonesia. NGOs, religious study groups or
informal community groups were also mentioned for this role but very infrequently.
In terms of the benefits of the training, at least half of the respondents suggested that they still return
to the notes or guidance books they received during their training, particularly for practizing their
Cantonese or checking vocabulary, as well as for checking specific recipes. Workers also indicated
that they benefited from some advice shared by their employer as well as YouTube videos to continue
improving their skills.64 When recommending what other aspiring migrant workers should focus on,
the majority of those interviewed recommended developing skills in languages and cooking.
RIGHTS-BASED ADVOCACY AND SUPPORT

A broad range of organizations work on longer-term campaigns to improve workers’ rights in Hong
Kong, as well as direct one-to-one advocacy support and advice for individual cases. Organizations
assisting in this way include the Konsulat Jenderal Republik Indonesia (KJRI); the IOM; Serikat Buruh
Migran Indonesia (SBMI); Migrant Care; Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC); HELP for Domestic
Workers; Pathfinders; Koalisi Organisasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Hong Kong (KOTKIHO); Kabar
Bumi; Justice Centre Hong Kong; and Christian Action.
Such organizations often mobilize together to achieve change, uniting across religious and secular lines,
and empowering migrants to play an active role. For example, during Ramadan in 2011, IMWU, DD
and the Indonesian Migrant Workers League, and others organized a seminar entitled: Dengan
Semangat Ramadan Melawan Perbudakan Modern untuk Mewujudkan Perlindungan Sejati bagi BMI
(With the Spirit of Ramadan [we] Fight Against Modern Slavery in Order to Provide a Comprehensive
Protection for Indonesian Domestic Workers). Secondly, during the ‘Junk WTO’ counter-event held
parallel to the WTO Ministerial Conference in 2013, migrant organizers from Hong Kong launched
the ‘C 189 Campaign Toolkit’ which contained ‘The Foreign Domestic Workers’ Guide to
Organizing’.65 This toolkit explained how migrant workers can self-organize from the steps of ‘social
investigation’ and ‘contact building’ to ‘organizing a group’ and ‘formalizing the organization’ (APMM
2013; Rother 2017: 968). Furthermore, organizations like IMWU often heavily rely on migrant activist
volunteers over the weekends. Volunteers and activists can wear = badges exclaiming: “Reject
outsourcing” and “Give us holidays and rest days.”
64 The YouTube channels Cooking Mama and Nikmatul Rosidah were specifically highlighted for providing additional
cooking training as well as pages called “Popular Hong Kong Cuisine” on Facebook.
65 Organized in support of the ILO Convention on Decent Work for domestic workers.

Some migrant workers highlighted that they would welcome a community peer support group for
exchanging concerns or ideas for how to resolve problems in their workplaces or for migrants who
have just arrived in Hong Kong, much like a face-to-face version of the ‘Suara BMI’ Facebook group.
These comments indicated not just an appetite to improve rights but also to support one
another to do so as a mutually-reinforcing community.
This approach to organizing and self-organizing by the labor movement reflects a drive to support one
another as migrants mutually. It also shows that a migrant can be simultaneously vulnerable in a private
space in a Hong Kong household while also being a respected activist, political organizer and friend in
the public space of Hong Kong (Rother 2017:960). It also demonstrates how, when it comes to migrant
workers’ rights and protections, there is an active and thriving network already.
Separately, IMWU has suggested that its approach to promoting “unity among Indonesian migrant
workers” can act as a means for building resilience to VE messages (IMWU interview, Jul 2019).
“They have a strong bond with their friends, and it serves as a community-based safety net
against violent extremism” (ibid).
VOCATIONAL SKILLS INCLUDING FINANCIAL EDUCATION

A number of organizations offer vocational skills training including entrepreneurial skills
and/or financial education, for example Mandiri Sahabatku, Enrich, DD and Pathfinders (Enrich
website 2019; DDHK interview, Jul 2019; IMWU interview, Jul 2019).
Such skills appear to be particularly popular among migrant workers. When invited to suggest what
their ideal community group or support service might be, the most common area was support
for developing entrepreneurial skills such as creating and selling products that could be sold
online. Though one migrant worker suggested that: “there are a lot of communities that teach us to be
an entrepreneur,” she was still interested in forming a “community about business and stuff that I do right
now [like selling products online]” (MW, 29, C. Java). Mandiri Sahabatku was referenced which engages
2,000 annually (Enterprise Asia 2019). Other respondents commented on a desire to learn or improve
their language skills, cooking skills or beauty and make-up skills.
RELIGIOUS STUDY, PRACTICE AND COMMUNITY BUILDING

A range of organizations offer the opportunity to pursue religious study as a group and offer additional
social activities, reflecting the broader, multi-faceted appetite and needs of migrant workers. For
example, DDHK offers Quranic study as well as classes in make-up, sewing, computer skills, financial
literacy and English language. DDHK is not alone: organizations like the Islamic Union and AKU
Indonesia also combine both.
When invited to indicate which organizations offered services or support to migrants in general,
Dompet Duafa was the second-highest reference, second only to the Indonesian Consulate. Migrants
indicated that fellow migrant workers had recommended this organization to them.
“I know about the organization from friends in Hong Kong. I learnt that they do activities that
add knowledge and a lot of lessons about Islam” (MW, 41, E. Java).
“I know this activity from fellow BMI friends. They offer recitation activities, then collect
donations or assistance in the form of money, and later distribute [them] to the poor” (MW,
40, E. Java).

DD has very intentionally developed a capability to offer this range of services, beyond narrower
definitions of Islamic philanthropy or religious study. It describes itself as a “social organization” and one
that “holds social activities... invites speakers to educate the BMI about religion and formal education. We
create a religious community. During their days off, we invite them to gather in parks and make study groups”
(DDHK Interview, Jul 2019). In interviews with other analysts, DDHK has indicated that “building
solidarity among migrants has become the priority of the DDHK program, under which social and
moral awareness among migrants are a necessity for helping each other evolve” (Rother 2017: 248).
This facility to coordinate and develop groups and mutual solidarity is regarded as an accurate
translation of Islamic values and messages.
P/CVE APPROACHES
Two initiatives have been identified to date, though in general there appear to be very few current
or consistent initiatives seeking to prevent or counter VE ideology directly. This may stem
from the view that there is limited risk of such ideologies being supported or circulated among the
migrant community. As highlighted above, there are also organizations, like the Indonesian Consulate,
the Islamic Union and DD, who offer other kinds of support which may indirectly also assist in P/CVE.
Peduli Kasih has indicated that it is currently collaborating with INFEST to organize Indonesian migrant
workers in Hong Kong to establish a P/CVE working group to “provide media management training to
prepare to be an ‘agent of peace’ and develop counter-narratives to extremist propaganda online” (Survey,
Oct 2019).”
AKU Indonesia, the National Alliance for Indonesia, facilitates well-publicized talks from prominent
Indonesian figures in Hong Kong. This has included a lecture in 2017 by Dedy Mulyadi, the Mayor of
Purwakarta, who gave a speech on diversity specifically for Indonesian migrant workers in Hong Kong.
The press release about the event indicated that the event’s purpose was to increase Indonesian
migrant workers’ understanding of the fight against extremism.
There are initiatives seeking to counter extremist ideology, but they appear to be ad hoc. Given that
organizations such as Islamic Union suggest that there are limited signs of support for ISIS in 2019 and
that migrant-supporting organizations remain sensitive to suggestions that there may be cause for
concern or a need for resilience-building or counter-extremism activities, it appears unlikely that any
other organizations will organically develop their own programming in this area.
RAISING AWARENESS AND ENGAGING WITH MIGRANTS - APPROACHES AND REACH

Migrant workers indicated a number of ways in which they first heard about different migrant support
organizations. Most commonly, awareness is said to stem from fellow migrant worker friend
recommendations, be it in person or online via Facebook.
Agents from placement agencies also play a prominent role in recommendations. Some
migrants suggested that their placement agency had recommended the Consulate and DD to them for
support but did not mention if they received recommendations from the same source to any other
organizations. The IMWU has separately highlighted concerns that private placement agencies
deliberately do not share information about support organizations because of concerns that migrant
workers will mobilize against them.
The presence of different support organizations online and their online approaches to engagement
with migrant workers differs significantly. Organizations like the Indonesian Consulate and DD have
audiences of between 150,000 and 170,000 respectively, whereas organizations such as Migrant Care,

Infest or AKU Indonesia have below 10,000. This highlights essential differences in the capacity of
different organizations to influence migrants using online communications approaches or engagement
methods. It also highlights the benefits to organizations like DD that offer a broad range of activities
that offer wide-reaching appeal to different corners of the migrant community.

CONCLUSION
While our research has identified possible vulnerabilities to VE ideologies among Indonesian migrant
workers, the migrants characterized as a potential threat in 2017 were likely to be
extreme outliers inside the community as a whole (IPAC 2017b).
There are three areas where migrants may be vulnerable to VE: charitable giving; online dating and
small off-line religious study groups.
Though there was no evidence of charitable donations knowingly being sent to VEOs, respondents did
not show a detailed understanding of how they might verify the intentions of their beneficiaries.
Instead, they often trust recipients to act in good faith. As such, there is a risk of migrants being lured
into providing financial support for illicit or corrupt organizations.
Online dating may also represent a risk vector. While none were perceived as ideologically motivated,
migrants shared numerous examples of where online relationships with men had turned into a disguise
for the purpose of extracting money. Should VEOs and their recruitment wings recognize this
vulnerability, migrant women may be targeted.
Small religious study groups could also be a potential vehicle for VEO recruitment. Such groups appear
to give workers a reliable source of social support and, on some occasions, the chance for religious
instruction and guidance. While it has been challenging to evaluate the content or ideologies of such
study groups, it is crucial to strategize ways to ensure such groups act as a potent force for resilience
to VE ideologies.
Overall, while there are areas of vulnerability, there is limited evidence of risk of support for VE among
the Indonesian migrant community in Hong Kong.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P/CVE AND RESILIENCE SUPPORT
1. FINANCIAL DONATIONS
Given the risks of charitable donations contributing to nefarious actors such as VEOs and the
prevalence of Facebook users seeking to deceive migrant workers online (under the guise of online
dating), financial literacy training with modules on the above would empower migrants to
channel their donations safely. Enrich, an NGO focused on financial education, has a robust online
presence and could be well-positioned to scale up or adapt existing programs to further its impact.
Corporate providers like Mandiri Bank who already run a successful entrepreneur training program
may also be in an excellent position to improve financial literacy. Harmoni should clarify the existing
content of these financial education modules to identify possible partnership opportunities for
targeting the potential vulnerabilities relating to charitable giving and new online friendships.
2. ONLINE RELATIONSHIPS
Migrants should improve their resilience to ill-intentioned online users, from con artists to potential
VEO recruiters, who may operate under the guise of forming positive friendships or relationships.
Advice regarding relationships needs to stem from an authentic and trusted voice for women online.
For example, the highly visible SuaraBMI.com, a website specifically for Indonesian migrants, could offer
guidance regarding online safety. Alternatively, influencers like Merry Riana, a female entrepreneur and
educator, could play a positive role by advising on signs to watch for when dating online.

3. RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION
Migrants should receive clear and structured guidance on trusted, moderate sources of
Islamic instruction when seeking to manage their own Quranic study group. The Islamic Union, an
Islamic charity that supports the welfare and religious practice of Muslims in Hong Kong, may already
be acting in this role. In that case, they would be in a strong position for ensuring that sources of
guidance go beyond verification to assist in community-based P/CVE efforts actively, to helping
legitimately counter violent ideological narratives that group members may be exposed to. Harmoni,
or other qualified actors, should clarify the existing approach taken by the Islamic Union, if any, to
assess any gap in or appetite for such a role.
4. NETWORKING
Migrant community groups are highly inclusive, however in order to ensure their benefits reach a
wider audience, they could improve on their online advertising to ensure new migrant workers
are attracted to their respective groups. Indonesian philanthropic organizations that have
sufficient reach into migrant communities could be used to facilitate community networks in Hong
Kong and can act as an online nexus for improving online signposting and offering strategic
communications training or support for community group leaders who engage with migrants.
5. RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AMONG EMPLOYERS

Migrants face a varying level of religious discrimination or intolerance in their working and living
environments. Harmoni should consider using existing activist workers’ rights networks, like
the IMWU, to develop religious tolerance campaigns with employers as the target
audience in mind. Employers’ restrictions on religious practice risk fostering resentment, which
VEOs could instrumentalize in the future. The act of facilitating conversations about religious tolerance
as part of the development of a campaign could be another means to develop resilience and community
integration. It also would provide migrants with the opportunity to counter suspicions raised about
their beliefs directly.

ANNEX A: METHODOLOGY
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The findings will inform the design of activities (under Harmoni IR 3) which aim to build the resilience
of Indonesian migrant communities to intolerant and VE ideologies and recruitment by groups
supporting such ideologies.66 In order to provide evidence-based recommendations for activities that
could achieve this outcome, the research seeks to answer the following questions:
1. What are the possible migrant vulnerabilities and challenges in their environment and incentives
which may, in turn, motivate or expose them to engagement with intolerant or extremist actors?
a. Who are the different actors who share intolerant or extremist ideology who may seek
to recruit or engage Indonesian migrants in Hong Kong? What are their different messages
or narratives, and how might they appeal to migrants?
b. What are the potential motivations for migrants to be susceptible to extremist recruiters
or ideologies?
c. To what extent are migrants exposed to these narratives and to what extent do they
agree and/or engage with them, and why?
2. What are the Indonesian migrant community structures, relationships, and how can we describe
their use of media and communications?
a. What is the demographic make-up of the Indonesian migrant population living in Hong
Kong?
b. What are the motivations for Indonesian migrants to work in Hong Kong, and to what
extent are these goals currently realised?
c. Which media and online platforms do migrants turn to for different forms of
communication and information?
3. What are the different ways in which organizations or individuals offer support to migrants? To
what extent do they utilise online platforms and media/ communications, and what are examples
of these?
a. To what extent do current organizations offering services to migrants seek to engage on
issues relating to intolerant or extremist ideologies or actors?
b. What are the current approaches used by organizations engaging with migrants to support
them, including pre, during and post their departure?
The study was broken down into four distinct phases to allow findings from one phase to inform the
design of the next.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
The Love Frankie team conducted a review of academic literature that explored the Indonesian
migrant population living in Hong Kong in the last ten years in February 2019.
66 Violent extremism refers to engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically-motivated or justified violence
to further social, economic and political objectives (USAID 2011).

2. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS
Between 26 and 30 July 2019, three key informant interviews were conducted face-to-face with
organizations and community groups who engage with migrants in Hong Kong, including Dompet
Dhuafa in Hong Kong (DDHK), the International Migrant Workers Union (IMWU), the IOM.
3. ONLINE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH MIGRANTS
In Phase 3, Love Frankie sought to conduct focus-group discussions with migrant respondents. Due to
significant political unrest between July and October 2019, the research design was amended to enable
respondents to participate in the qualitative research more efficiently over a more extended period
of time, via an online community environment.
COMMUNITY STRUCTURE
TASKS TOPICS SAMPLE

1 About you All
2 Motivations for becoming a migrant worker All
First contract
3A Motivations for migrating to Hong Kong
migrant workers
Non-first contract
3B Motivations for migrating to Hong Kong
migrant workers
4 About the work and skills needed All
5 Challenges and support available in Hong Kong All
6 Day-to-day life in Hong Kong and at weekends All
7A Offline support system - friends, activities, groups All
7B Online support system - friends, activities, groups All
Communication with and about Indonesia- sending money, topics
8 All
(politics/ religion)
9 Finding friendship and love online All
10 Exploring online narratives through different videos All
11 Challenges and obstacles pre-departure and during the stay in Hong Kong All
Hong Kong life - Challenges in managing your money (Earnings, expenses,
12A All
charitable donations)
12B Online petitions and trusted/non trusted organizations All
13 Risks and threats for migrants All
14 Advice for upcoming migrants All
STIMULUS
In order to explore interest and engagement with different online narratives and content, five different
videos were selected from online forums.67 As part of Task 10, participants were asked to watch all
five videos within the platform before proceeding to questions.
1. Detik.com video reporting on China’s Xinjiang moslem concentration camp (Detik.com

2018)
67 Videos were carefully chosen to ensure they reflected key topics raised in extremist narratives but were themselves not
inflammatory or reflecting extremist views. Three are from mainstream news organizations, one from an NGO and one
from a YouTuber who actively seeks to counter extremist narratives.

2. BBC News video of a child in Syria when his friend told him that his friend has died (BBC
2016)
3. ACT Foundation video reporting on the restricted access to Al Aqsa mosque by Israel (ACT
2019)
4. Video by YouTuber and counter-extremism activist ‘Aab Elarimi’ discussing fairness: ‘We are
sometimes not fair’ (Elarimi 2019)
5. NET News coverage of Rohingya Muslims fleeing Myanmar (NET News 2017)
4. DESK RESEARCH AND SURVEY
In October 2019, to supplement our findings, individuals from the following migrant-supporting
organizations completed a short survey describing their current services to migrants and perceptions
of vulnerability to VE among the migrant community: Islamic Union, Yayasan Peduli Kasih and
International Migrant Workers Union (IMWU). We also conducted further online desk research to
review services provided by migrant support organizations and events facilitated by migrant community
groups.
SAMPLE
Based on pre-designed criteria, the qualitative research engaged 45 female, Muslim, domestic worker
migrants. These criteria included:
• Migrants who were aged 18 to 30 years old (n=22) and 31-50 years old (n=23)
• Migrants who were single (n=21) and married with children (n=24)
• Migrants who were first-time migrant workers, i.e., in their first contract (n=22) and more
experienced migrant workers, including those who have had more than one contract in Hong
Kong (n=14) and those who have worked in other countries prior to Hong Kong (n=9).
• Migrants from Java only, including East Java (n=31), Central Java (n=11) and West Java (n=3)68
• All Muslims, some of whom are affiliated with the NU (n=21), Dompet Dhuafa (n=4), a
Qur’anic study group (n=4), an ad hoc group (n=12), or outside of any organized group (n=4).
The following table demonstrates how these quotas were reflected in the panel groups:
AFFILIATION IN HONG MIGRATION

DETAILS AGE/ LIFE STAGE
KONG EXPERIENCE
PANEL 1
Mostly active in religious

11 women
group/community or affiliation
18-30 y.o. (single / All 1st-timer migrant
before marriage) workers
Mostly active in non-religious
10 women
68 Respondents were specifically sampled from particular areas of Java in order to offer a level of cultural homogeneity and
a reflection of where the majority of migrants come from. 86 percent of Indonesian migrants worldwide come from either
Java or Nusa Tenggara (World Bank 2017: 21).

AFFILIATION IN HONG MIGRATION
DETAILS AGE/ LIFE STAGE
KONG EXPERIENCE
PANEL 2
Mostly active in religious

6 women
25-40 y.o. (married w/
1-2 children)
Mostly active in non-religious
6 women
group/community or affiliation All experienced migrant
workers (in Hong Kong/
Mostly active in religious overseas)
6 women 40+ y.o (married & had
returned to Indonesia
for a break at least
Mostly active in non-religious once)
6 women
Each panel also included a mix of those who were:
• Happy or unhappy with their work conditions and current employer.
RECRUITMENT AND FIELDWORK
Migrants were invited to participate in the online panel via face-to-face recruitment in key public
meeting hotspots between 30 August date and 14 September 2019.
Respondents were invited to participate in an online community between Saturday 14th September
and Monday 30th September - including three Sundays which are most typically the ‘day-off’ for migrant
workers and when they are most likely to gain internet access.
Respondents were invited to participate online, via a mobile or computer-based device, from wherever
they were comfortable. Respondents were also given the option of participating from a private room
at two FRC office locations in Hong Kong.
Respondents had the opportunity to ask questions of the moderator or FRC team at any time and
received a cash payment upon completion of the discussion. The discussion was moderated in Bahasa
Indonesia and respondents were requested to create an anonymous online profile, rather than identify
themselves to one another.
ANALYSIS
Data from the online community phase was translated into English, before being analysed for key
themes and insights in English. This analysis was triangulated with findings from the other phases in
line with the overall research questions highlighted above. The Bahasa Indonesia moderators then
reviewed the analysis for interpretation.
APPROACH TO VE QUESTIONING AND LIMITATIONS
While the community guide was explicitly structured to elicit information pertinent to our research
questions subtly, migrant worker respondents were not asked directly about or prompted to discuss
VE groups or VE online content directly at any stage of our research. Given strong concerns among
migrant-supporting organizations about trusting researchers working on subjects relating to VE,

researchers sought to create conditions where migrant respondents could speak as comfortably and
truthfully as possible about groups and content to which they had been exposed. As such, respondents
were asked open questions on a variety of topics, including:
● What content and groups they like to engage with online day-to-day, for what purpose, for
different topics, for Indonesian politics and religion, and when feeling negative or low (Tasks
5, 6, 7 and 12)
● Their perceptions of the treatment of Muslims in Hong Kong, Indonesia and around the world,
who they would describe as a ‘Defender of Islam’ and who might be an enemy (Tasks 8, 10,
12, 13)
● Perception and approaches to particular activities that were hypothesised by the research
team as areas of risk: online dating and charitable giving (Tasks 9 and 12)
● Their perception and familiarity with online video content that presented narratives often
shared by VE groups. (Task 10)
● What negative content or individuals they had been exposed to online or around Hong Kong
(Task 12)
None of the migrant worker respondents indicated an awareness of IPAC’s research or media
coverage regarding the risks of migrant workers turning to VE, nor were migrants asked to discuss
this research or coverage directly. However, there is a strong possibility that respondents were aware
of these suspicions and as such, might have deliberately avoided mentioning any VEOs in order to
protect the reputation of the broader migrant community, as well as their own personal employment
and visa security.

ANNEX B: SOURCES
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in-indonesia/3889620.html

MIGRANT SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS MAPPING
ORGANIZATIONS OFFERING DIFFERENT TYPES OF SERVICES
NO. SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS OFFERING THIS SERVICE
Indonesian Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant

Workers (BNP2TKI)
Supporting the recruitment, Private company recruitment agencies and brokers (in Indonesia)
1 training and placement of
migrant workers Training centres (in Indonesia)
Hong Kong placement agencies (under the jurisdiction of the HKSAR
authorities)
Providing security and safety Police Attache

2 support to Indonesians,
including migrant workers Indonesian Consulate (KJRI)
Indonesian Consulate (KJRI)

IOM
SBMI
Migrant Care
Advocate for and on behalf of EOC
migrants regarding legal and HELP for Domestic Workers
3
rights-based issues and offer Pathfinders
rights-based education Dompet Dhuafa
KOTKIHO
Kabar Bumi (Keluarga Besar Buruh Migran Indonesia)
Justice Centre Hong Kong
Christian Action (Hong Kong)
Pathfinders
KOTKIHO
Provide support in terms of Justice Centre Hong Kong
emergency housing, healthcare
4 Christian Action (Hong Kong)
advice and psycho-social
counselling Dompet Dhuafa (shelter in Causeway Bay)
Islamic Union (shelter)
Yayasan Peduli Kasih (shelter)
Taekwondo Association;
AKU Indonesia;
Yayasan Peduli Kasih (often collaborates with DDHK);
Providing support direct to Enrich (financial education and self-confidence)
migrant workers in terms of Pathfinders (financial education and spotting scams)
5
vocational skills education and Dompet Dhuafa (make-up, sewing, computer skills, financial literacy,
social activities English language)
Suara BMI
Golpindo (Indonesian Women’s Sport Association)
MandiriI Sahabatku

NO. SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS OFFERING THIS SERVICE
Dompet Dhuafa (sermons, Qu’ran reading training)

Providing religious education, The Islamic Union
6 activities, sermons and study
groups69 KOTKIHO (Koalisi Organisasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Hong Kong)
AKU Indonesia
Building resilience to violent or Migrant Care

7
extremist narratives AKU Indonesia
Migrant Care
Indonesian-based support for INFEST
those considering being a
8 Kabar Bumi (Keluarga Besar Buruh Migran Indonesia)
migrant worker or returning to
Indonesia Indonesian Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant
Workers (BNP2TKI)
ONLINE SOURCES
The online platforms of each of the institutions offering support for migrants is captured below.
INSTITUTION WEBSITE FACEBOOK TWITTER INSTAGRAM YOUTUBE
http://www.bnp2tki.go.
BNP2TKI Yes Yes Yes Yes
id/
Christan Action http://www.christian-

Yes No No Yes
Hong Kong action.org.hk
http://www.dompetdh
Dompet Dhuafa Yes Yes Yes Yes
uafa.org
Enrich Hong Kong https://enrichhk.org Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equal Opp
https://www.eoc.org.h
Commission Hong No No No Yes
k
Kong
HELP for
https://helpfordomesti
Domestic Yes Yes No No
cworkers.org/
Workers
Infest https://infest.or.id Yes (inactive) Yes Yes Yes
Indonesian https://kemlu.go.id/hon
Yes Yes Yes No
Consulate (KJRI) gkong/id
Indonesian
Domestic
http://sbmi.or.id/ Yes Yes No No
Workers
Federation
69 It was not possible to identify the content of the religious instruction or sermons

INSTITUTION WEBSITE FACEBOOK TWITTER INSTAGRAM YOUTUBE
https://www.justicecen
Justice Centre Yes Yes Yes Yes
tre.org.hk
Kabar Bumi http://kabarbumi.org Yes No No No
http://www.pokjarbhs
Mandiri Sahabatku Yes
m.com
http://www.migrantcar
Migrant Care Yes Yes Yes Yes
e.net/
http://www.pathfinders
Pathfinders Yes Yes Yes Yes
.org.hk
https://www.suarabmi.
Suara BMI Yes Yes
com/
ONLINE ENGAGEMENT MEASURES

The online reach and level of activity and engagement of the institutions supporting migrants on key
online platforms are captured below:
FACEBOOK YOUTUBE
INSTITUTION
FOLLOWERS/
POSTS/ MONTH FOLLOWERS POSTS/ MONTH
MEMBERS
AKU Indonesia 1,195 30 per month
BNPT2KI 21,771 60 per month 522 1-2 per month
Christan Action
5 4-5 per month 57 3-4 per month
Hong Kong
Dompet Dhuafa 190,462 30 per month 7,400 4 per month
Enrich Hong Kong 7,537 15-17 per month 53 1-2 per month
EOC Hong Kong N/A N/A 460 3-5 per month
HELP for
Domestic 8,615 2-3 per month N/A N/A
Workers
Indonesian 100-150 per

171,155 N/A N/A
consulate (KJRI) month
Indonesian 100-150 per

3,064 N/A N/A
Domestic month

FACEBOOK YOUTUBE
INSTITUTION
FOLLOWERS/
POSTS/ MONTH FOLLOWERS POSTS/ MONTH
MEMBERS
Workers
Federation
Infest 83 Inactive 172 9 per month
Justice Centre 4,389 15-20 per month N/A N/A
Kabar Bumi 6,200 5-7 per month N/A N/A
Mandiri Sahabatku 19,000 20-25 per month
Migrant Care 4,947 5-6 per month 36 0-1 per month
Pathfinders 5,491 9-10 per month 50 1-2 per month
100-150 per
Suara BMI 383k
month

MAPPING SPEAKERS TO THE MIGRANT COMMUNITY IN HONG KONG 2010-2019
This list has been compiled following a review of the online platforms connected to the migrant
community groups listed, above e.g., their Facebook or YouTube platforms, as well as any media
coverage mentioning these organizations in Bahasa and English language. Posts were included from the
last five years (2014 to 2019).
INVITED BY NAME BIO DATE
PDI-P politician & member of the Indonesian House of

Representative (2014-2019)
Budiman
Student activist during the New Order regime, was captured Nov-19
Sudjatmiko
and imprisoned due to his political activity
Social media influencer
Humorous national TV show host

Former lecturer and academic background in anthropology,
Ustad
sociology and Islamic education. May-18
AKU Indonesia Wijayanto
Now manages Pondok Pesantren BIAS and pursues da’wah
outreach overseas
Current members of Indonesian House of Representatives for

policy on environment and forestry, agriculture and marine.
Former mayor of Purwakarta regency- where he implemented
Dedi Mulyadi Aug-17
policy for providing religious facilities for all religions.
Former West Java governor candidate in the regional general
election in 2019.
Advisor of the Cinta Rasul International Community -

Habib Ali promotes the teaching of Prophet Muhammad. Oct-19
Zaenal
Educated in Palembang and Yemen.
Advisor of Masjid Syubbanul Muslimin and the sholawat group

Syubbanul Muslimin who spread Islamic teaching through art.
Forum K.H. Hafidzul Sep-19
Believes in the importance of integrating nationalism and
Komunikasi Hakiem Noer
religious teaching. Oct-19
Mu'minat Peduli (Gus Hafid)
Umat (FKMPU) Completed his education in Lirboyo Islamic boarding school
and Yemen.
KH. Abdur Spreads Islamic teaching through Javanese culture, specifically

Rochim, M.Pd.I wayang (traditional puppet). June-19
(Ki Joko Goro- Originates from Demak in Central Java - known for its strong July-19
Goro) religious education.
Ustadz Aswan Fame is linked to his brother who is a prominent Muslim

Faisal preacher, Ustadz Jeffri Al-Buchori.
Persatuan Ustadz Taufik

No background available
Dakwah Victoria Syahniar Apr-13
(PDV)
Ustadz Ahmad
YouTube video of him singing Shalawat has significant
Bahir Al-
following
Ghazali

Member of Corps Da'i Dompet Dhuafa (cordofa), a group of

Ustadz Ahmad Muslim preachers under Dompet Dhuafa.
May-13
Fauzi Qosim Delivers Islamic values and teachings through Dompet
Dhuafa's YouTube account and national radio and TV.
TV host discussing Islamic teaching and values

Ustad Sholeh
Public Prabowo supporter in last election.
Mahmud May 13
(Ustad Solmed) During Ahok contraversy, supported conservative Muslim
community against Ahok
Habib Noval Descendant of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).

Majelis Ta'lim bin Muhammad Student of Darul Lughah wad Dakwah Islamic boarding school
Yuen Long/ Alaydrus in Pasuruan.
Sep-14
Majelis Dzikir
Ilham Prominent Indonesian dangdut singer popular in 1990s. Now
Evie Tamala
shifted to supporting da'wah of Muslim preacher.
Habib Segaf Dean of Islamic Religion Institute Darullughah Wadda'wah,

Majelis Ta'lim
Baharun Hasan Pasuruan, East Java and Advisor for an Islamic boarding Apr 15
Yuen Long
M.H.I school.
Known as the ‘Father of Indonesian migrant workers in Hong

Kong.’
Teaches classes and Qur'an recitation workshop for
Indonesian migrant workers organizations and other public as
Majelis Ta'lim part of Islamic Union in Hong Kong. Oct-13
KH Abdul Aug-14
Yuen Long, Contributing writer to the Indonesian tabloid, Intermezo and
Muhaimin
Persatuan Suara Indonesia and Dompet Dhuafa Hong Kong's magazine, May-16
Karim
Dakwah Victoria Iqro' and Noormuslima. Oct-19
Advisor for the Halaqoh activities at Ammar Mosque, Wan
Chai.
International Islamic University, Islamabad graduate came to
Hong Kong in 1997
Sep-14
Syech Abdul Prominent Muslim preacher from Solo, Central Java
Sep-19
Qadir Assegaf Religious sholawat performer with group, Ahbaabul Musthofa.
Dec-19
Yahya Zainul Advisor of Pondok Pesantren Al-Bahjah in Cirebon.

Sep-19
Ma'arif (Buya Al-Bahjah has subsidiaries including TV, radio, publications and
Yahya) Dec-19
Majelis Dzikir educational institutions
Ilham Hong
Kong Ummi Fairuz Wife of Buya Yahya who utilises Facebook and Telegram to
Dec-19
Ar-Rahbini facilitate Islamic teaching and values relating to women.
Nahdlatul Ulama member and advisor to Islamic boarding

Ahmad school in Sleman, Yogyakarta. Oct-19
Muwafiq Former assistant to former President KH. Abdurrahman Jan-20
Wahid.

‘Preacher of the Marginalized Community’ due to his targeting

Nov-19
‘Gus Miftah’ of homeless people, punks, and sex workers.
Jan-20
Full name: Miftah Maulana Habiburrahman
Master of traditional Javanese puppet who preaches about

Ulin Nuha Jan-20
Islamic teaching through his puppet show.
Fauzi Rizal Al- Son of the founder of Al Muqorrobin, a majelis taklim and an
Dec-19
Munawwar Islamic boarding school in Kendal, Central Java.
Muslim preacher and direct descendent of Sunan Gunung Jati

Sayyid Seif Alwi
(one of the revered nine saints of Islam in the Java island). Oct-19
Ba'alawy
Member of Nahdlatul Ulama.
Ustad Trainer in Ruqyah – an alternative healing method for diseases

Nuruddin Al- caused by unknown medical ailments. Founder of Rehab Hati Oct-19
Indunissy to facilitate training or ruqyah session.
Prominent figure from Bojonegoro, East Java.

Board member for Pondok Pesantren Attarbiyah Islamiyah Dec-19
Anwar Zahid
Assyafi'iyah in Bojonegoro. Jan-20
Member of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
Popular YouTube channel where he discusses verses of Al-

Ustad Hanan Qur'an and its meaning on issues affecting young people.
Sep-19
Attaki Lc. Some have concerns about his relationship with Felix Siauw
and support for the Caliphate.
Converted to Islam in 2002 when he studied at Bogor

Agricultural Institute and known for his absolutism in Islam. Sep-14
Felix Siauw
His book about Khilafa was banned from distribution. Oct-14
Supporter of HTI, an organization legally banned in Indonesia.
Indonesian muslim scholar also famous in Malaysia.

Ali Zaenal Studied at Darullughoh Wad Da'wah in Pasuruan, East Java,
Abidin Al Al-Azhar University, Cairo and Universiti Islam Antarabangsa,
Hamid Malaysia. Currently finishing his doctoral degree at the
university.
Oct-19
Supporter of diversity and inclusivism.
Former Arabic-Indonesian interpreter from Solo, Central Java.
Az-Zahra Saleh M. Al Jufri
Advisor of Darul Musthofa Islamic boarding school in
Karanganyar, Central Java.
Muslim preacher popular in Cirebon, West Java

Associated with the Asatidz Al-Bahjah Cirebon, the same
Novel Al-Athos institutions as Buya Yahya. Nov-19
Leads Al-Wasilah TV, YouTube channel, and weekly
WhatsApp discussion groups

Lecturer in media and communication studies and Head of

International Program Division at Airlangga University,
Surabaya, East Java.
Irfan Wahyudi Jul-19
Research fellow at Edith Cowan University with specialization
in media activism, migrant workers diaspora, and social media
engagement.
Politician for Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) - one of the

Tsamara highest votes from Jakarta and overseas.
Amany Often invited to do political debate on national TV during the
election period in 2019.
Chaplain of the Indonesian Catholic Community in Hong

Romo Kong.
Heribertus Supports discourse on nationalism, diversity and inclusivism.
Hadiarto Actively supporting the Hong Kong movement in opposing
the extradition law.
Liga Pekerja
Migran Indonesia Politician for Islamic political party, PPP
Dato'
(LiPMI) Legislative candidate in 2019, Special Advisor to the PPP
Muhammad
faction in the House of Representatives.
Zainul Arifin
Focuses on religious and social issues for Commission VIII
Feb-19
Nana Irlisa Politician for Gerindra and Prabowo supporter.
Rahmadiana Chief Editor of Economic Review magazine.
Politician for PKB - pro-migrant worker righthe ts in role as

‘Deputy of the Indonesian Migrant Workers Guard’
Imam Subali Former migrant worker in Saudi Arabia
Unsuccessful legislative candidate in Jakarta
Educated at Islamic Religious Institute Al Aqidah, Jakarta
Politician for, PDI-P

Author, and an intellectual figure from Nahdlatul Ulama and
Zuhairi Misrawi Director of Moderate Muslim Society.
Author of books promoting inclusivism, pluralism,
multiculturalism, and Islamic teachings.
Muhammad
Umair Al Background unknown Apr-19
Mumtazah
Ahmad Hasan
Caretaker for the Masjid Tiban-Turen in Malang, East Java.
Abbas
JDU Firdaus Mar-19
Ustadz Syukur
Background unknown
Romansah
Leader of Pondok Pesantren Fathul Qur'an, Depok, West

Azzkar Jaka Mar-19
Java.
Swara Nov-17
Regular speaker on national TV and public events.

Musthofa
Sayyidi Prominent Muslim figure in Jogjakarta. Mar-17
Baraqbah
Jul-16
Qur'an reciter often invited by the Indonesian migrant Oct-19
Ustadz Saiful
workers communities to discuss the meaning and
Anwar Dec-19
understanding of Qur'an.
Jan-20

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PHOTO CREDIT: LOVE FRANKIE

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | i

ii | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | iii

interviews, migrant references and keyword search.

4 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

2. CHARITABLE GIVING WOULD BENEFIT FROM GREATER SCRUTINY

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 5

4. FEW DEMONSTRATED AN INTEREST IN POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS CONTENT ONLINE

5. ONLINE DATING MAY REPRESENT A RISK VECTOR

6. DESPITE RESTRICTIONS, MIGRANT WORKERS ARE HIGHLY SOCIAL

6 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR P/CVE AND RESILIENCE SUPPORT

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 7

5. RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AMONG EMPLOYERS:

8 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

2. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

3. ONLINE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH MIGRANTS

4. DESK RESEARCH AND SURVEY

further social, economic and political objectives (USAID 2011).

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 9

DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW: THE INDONESIAN MIGRANT POPULATION

NUMBER OF REGISTERED PERCENTAGE OF ALL

Jawa Timur 60,714 23%

Jawa Tengah 56,100 21%

Jawa Barat 54,740 21%

Nusa Tenggara Barat 32,121 12%

Sumatera Utara 17,887 7%

10 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

INTOLERANCE AND EXTREMISM IN THE HONG KONG MIGRANT COMMUNITY

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 11

TARGETING OF MIGRANTS BY VEOs

OFFLINE FACE-TO-FACE TARGETING

12 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

THE APPEAL OF VEOs AND THEIR NARRATIVES

AWARENESS AND APPEAL OF VEOs IN GENERAL

pembela muslim dan Islam menurut kamu?”

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 13

ENGAGEMENT WITH NARRATIVES CONNECTED TO VE

14 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

DEFENSIVE OR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD CHRISTIANS: Indications emerged that

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 15

MODERATE ‘DEFENDERS OF ISLAM’: Overall, rather than highlighting violent extremists as

(A LACK OF) INTEREST IN RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DEBATE

people before dying in a car accident in 2013.

Instagram followers and founded Akhyar TV to share sermons.

16 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

ONLINE FRIENDSHIPS, DATING AND MARRIAGES WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISTS

39 See Annex A: Methodology for links to videos.

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 17

18 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

ECONOMIC EXCLUSION AND THE APPEAL OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

CHARITABLE GIVING AND FINANCING EXTREMISM

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 19

20 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

MOTIVATIONS FOR BECOMING A MIGRANT WORKER

INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG | 21

MOTIVATIONS FOR CHOOSING HONG KONG AS A DESTINATION

INCOME, SAVINGS AND CHARITABLE GIVING

INCOME AND WORK CONTRACTS

22 | INDONESIAN MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN HONG KONG

FAMILY SUPPORT AND PRESSURES