Week 5 - Thompson - Indonesia's Ascent PDF

Indonesia’s Ascent
Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order
Edited by
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of New South Wales - PalgraveConnect - 2015-07-25
Christopher B. Roberts
University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Australia
Ahmad D. Habir
Strategic Asia, Indonesia
Leonard C. Sebastian
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
10.1057/9781137397416 - Indonesia's Ascent, Edited by Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir and Leonard C. Sebastian
Editorial matter and selection © Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir and
Leonard C. Sebastian 2015
Chapters © Contributors 2015
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Contents
List of Figures and Table xii
Acknowledgements xiii
Notes on Contributors xv
List of Acronyms and Glossary xviii
1 Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual 1
Foundations
Christopher B. Roberts and Leonard C. Sebastian
Conceptual foundations: The nature of power and influence 3
in international relations
Book structure 9
Notes 15
Bibliography 19
2 Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia’s Regional and 22
Global Role, 1945–75
Sue Thompson
Nationalism, revolution and independence 22
Guided democracy 24
Konfrontasi (Confrontation) 26
The New Order 29
Conclusion 34
Notes 35
Bibliography 38
3 The Economy in Indonesia’s Ascent: Making Sense of it All 40
Satish Mishra
Setting the stage: The polity 40
Indonesia and emerging international perspectives on 41
development policy
Indonesia: The economy in the midst of systemic transition 44
Indonesia: Taking the economic pulse 46
Post-election development policy in Indonesia 60
Conclusion 62
Notes 64
Bibliography 66
vii
viii Contents
4 Yudhoyono’s Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National 69

Stability, and Economic Development in Indonesia
Mark S. Williams
Introduction 69
Islam in the republic: National stability and economic 70
development
Islam as a revolutionary force and the discourse of a 76
revisionist state
Democratic stability, economic development, and an Islamic 81
ethics during the SBY era, 2004–14
Conclusion 86
Notes 87
Bibliography 90
5 Key Security Fault Lines—Unresolved Issues and 93
New Challenges
Bob Lowry
Introduction 93
The utility of violence 94
Militant Islam 94
Communism 95
Separatism 96
Aceh 96
Papua 96
Cathartic violence 97
TNI 98
Notes 106
Bibliography 109
6 Democratic Achievement and Policy Paralysis: Implications 112
for Indonesia’s Continued Ascent
Stephen Sherlock
Introduction 112
A decade of democratic achievement 114
Indonesia’s third transition: A time of uncertainty 117
Stalled reform and policy paralysis 118
Failings of the party system and the 2014 election 119
Conclusion 124
Notes 126
Bibliography 128
7 Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia: The Pursuit of 130
Strategic Autonomy
Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki
Introduction 130
Contents ix
Indonesia’s ongoing security landscape 130

Indonesia’s core interest and strategic approaches 133
Fundamental trends of Indonesia’s foreign policy 136
Indonesia’s defense policy direction 141
Conclusion 146
Notes 147
Bibliography 150
8 The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values 155
and Identity
Avery Poole
Introduction 155
A ‘more activist’ foreign policy 156
‘Democratic identity’ in foreign policy 157
International role 159
Regional role 160
Public opinion and democracy 163
‘Democratizing’ foreign policy 164
Challenges to the democratic image 165
Economic growth and inequality 167
Post-2014 foreign policy 168
Conclusion 169
Notes 170
Bibliography 173
9 Indonesia and International Institutions: Treading New 177
Territory
Yulius P. Hermawan and Ahmad D. Habir
Introduction 177
Independent and active foreign policy 179
The roles of the G-20, NAM, and the UN: The Indonesian 180
perspective
Challenges in implementing vision and policy 185
Indonesia and international institutions: Beyond symbolism 187
Notes 188
Bibliography 192
10 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and 195
Potential
Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir
The evolution of political and security relations 196
Causal dynamics: The roles of perceptions, knowledge, and trade 204
Policy implications and the ways forward 208
Notes 210
Bibliography 218
x Contents
11 The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation 224

between Indonesia and Australia?
Mark Beeson and Will Lee
Middle power theory and practice 225
Is Indonesia a middle power? 228
The evolving relationship 230
Competing interests 232
Still strange neighbors? 234
Concluding remarks 236
Notes 237
Bibliography 240
12 Key Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Relationships: Opportunities and 244
Challenges
Yongwook Ryu
Introduction 244
Indonesia–Malaysia relations 245
Indonesia–Singapore relations 250
Indonesia–Vietnam relations 254
Conclusion 259
Notes 260
Bibliography 262
13 Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN: Mediation, Agency and 264
Extra-Regional Diplomacy
Christopher B. Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih
Indonesia in intra-ASEAN conflict mediation and management 265
Indonesia as an agent of institutional and normative change 269
The global nexus between Indonesia’s ascent and ASEAN 273
Conclusion 277
Notes 279
Bibliography 283
14 Indonesia among the Powers: Will ASEAN Still Matter to 287
Indonesia?
See Seng Tan
Introduction 287
Indonesia rising: Domestic and external challenges 289
Relevance of hedging in a time of rebalancing 293
Frameworks for engaging the great powers 295
Multiple paths to Indonesia’s security 297
Conclusion: Indonesia driving and suffering the region? 299
Notes 299
Bibliography 304
Contents xi
15 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The Law of the Sea, 308

Maritime Security and the Great Powers
Leonard C. Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and I. Made
Andi Arsana
Introduction 308
Archipelagic Outlook: The evolution of a concept 309
Archipelagic sea lanes, maritime boundaries, and choke-points 312
How to designate East–West sea lanes 314
Sharing the ocean: Anticipating Indonesia’s completion of 318
maritime boundary delimitation
Maritime security and defense conundrums 322
Conclusion: Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook 324
Notes 327
Bibliography 331
16 ‘Consensual’ Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, 335
and Emerging Power Aspirations
Leonard C. Sebastian and Christopher B. Roberts
Notes 345
Bibliography 346
Index 348
2
Leadership and Dependency:
Indonesia’s Regional and Global
Role, 1945–751
Sue Thompson
Despite turbulent times, Indonesia has been a rising power in Asia since
independence, and has become increasingly prominent on the world stage.
Many scholars have highlighted Indonesia’s large population and its abun-
dance of strategic resources—which was the focus of government, business
and the military—as the reason for its prominence in regional and global
affairs.2 Some have also emphasized Indonesia’s strong sense of nationalism
as a legacy of its long struggle for independence from Dutch colonialism,3
while others have stressed the importance of international relations during
the Cold War.4 Stemming from these three perspectives are considerations
of the extent to which Indonesian leaders have influenced their nation’s
future, and the degree to which outside powers have shaped the develop-
ment of Southeast Asia’s most populous country. Indeed, primary source
material shows that Indonesia’s regional position has been the result of
various factors. Internationally and historically, Indonesia has been stra-
tegically and economically significant: the close ties between the Suharto
government and consecutive United States (US) governments reveal the
increasing influence that Jakarta is capable of exerting globally, despite its
dependence on foreign support.
Nationalism, revolution and independence
Before independence, Indonesia had been a major colony in Southeast

Asia; ruled by the Dutch and known as the Netherlands East Indies, it con-
sisted of wealthy estates producing rubber, sugar, spices, tea and other
crops. Under the Dutch, the colonial administration suppressed radical
Indonesian nationalist organizations, exiled a number of nationalist leaders
and, by 1942, many Indonesians were hostile to Dutch rule.
The Second World War prepared the foundation for change. In 1942, the
Japanese occupied the Netherlands East Indies, trained and armed an
Indonesian army and encouraged the return of exiled nationalist leaders,
22
Sue Thompson 23
promising Indonesia independence. Indonesian nationalists were then able

to exploit the power vacuum created by the Japanese surrender in 1945. In
Jakarta, on 17 August, Sukarno proclaimed independence, becoming the
first president of the Indonesian Republic. Despite this declaration, The
Hague sought to re-establish its position in Southeast Asia. Indonesia
remained of great economic value, particularly for Holland’s postwar eco-
nomic recovery, but also as a symbol of its wider world importance.
However, the Dutch lacked the military power to restore their colonial
authority and sought British and Australian assistance. Britain had the
responsibility of disarming Japan in southern Indochina and western
Indonesia, including Java, the most populous island in the region. Australia
held military control over eastern Indonesia. Australian troops allowed
Dutch forces to re-establish military presence in the east Indonesian
islands, where Republic of Indonesia forces were weaker. Yet, having been
forewarned that it would be a major military endeavor to overthrow the
Republic, Britain was initially unwilling to permit Dutch troops to land on
the republican strongholds of Java and Sumatra, instead pressing the Dutch
into negotiations. London worried that one part of Southeast Asia could be
disadvantaged economically and politically by instability in other parts of
that region. Consequently, the welfare of British territories in the Far East
depended on the stability of other parts of that region.5 Recovery of the
Netherlands East Indies’ trade and assets depended on settlement of the
troubles in Java. London saw its role as ‘trustees for our Allies the French
and the Dutch, whose sovereignty in their respective colonial territories we
have a strong moral obligation to restore’ and therefore hoped to help
broker a settlement between the nationalist movements and Britain’s
allies.6
Both America and the Cold War became key factors in Indonesian inde-
pendence. After World War II, the US was overseeing the reconstruction of
the Japanese economy as a key element of its strategy to stem the spread of
communism in the region. Japan’s economic progress would depend
greatly on expanded exports of industrial goods and imports of regional
resources. Washington had begun considering Southeast Asia, and espe-
cially resource-rich Indonesia as a well-situated and wealthy market for
Japanese trade. In 1947, the US provided aid to the Netherlands East Indies
to expedite economic reconstruction and the resumption of regional trade.
This assistance was supplied on the assumption that the Dutch would
regain sovereignty over the entirety of the former colony. Washington
noted that the goal of Indonesian nationalists, despite their making public
statements welcoming private foreign capital, appeared ‘to be the achieve-
ment of a state along Socialist lines’. Indonesian republican leaders seemed
to be attempting to balance their ‘basic Socialist aspirations’ with the need
to attract foreign capital for the sake of the economy.7
24 Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia’s Regional and Global Role, 1945–75
However, the Dutch were losing control, and colonial and Western
nations considered that continued instability in Southeast Asia could work
to communist advantage. Washington lent its support for United Nations-
sponsored Indonesian–Dutch negotiations, leading to a cease-fire agree-
ment in January 1948. Later that year, the Indonesian army crushed a
rebellion at Madiun in Java launched by the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI), at the time closely associated with the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. For the Americans, this action made Sukarno a much more accept-
able independence leader. The Dutch made a last attempt to win militarily,
but Washington responded by encouraging The Hague to agree in
November 1949 to hand over all the islands of the Netherlands East Indies,
with the exception of West New Guinea (also known as West Irian, Irian
Jaya, West Papua), to the Indonesian Republic.
West New Guinea remained open for negotiation as the Dutch insisted
on keeping the territory. The Indonesians were concerned about this con-
cession because if one portion of the former Dutch colony was allowed to
break away from the region, a precedent might be set for other territories to
secede. However, during the negotiations, the urgency to achieve indepen-
dence resulted in the Indonesian leadership relinquishing West New
Guinea so as not to delay independence: acquisition of that territory would
have to wait. Indeed, Sukarno announced in a major speech in August
1950, ‘Irian is also Indonesian territory … not tomorrow, not the day after
tomorrow, but now at this very moment’.8
American support for Indonesia was associated with Washington’s
growing eagerness to halt communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Behind
this lay the growing international interest for the significant natural
resources in the region and the fact that in 1950 Malaya and Indonesia pro-
duced more than half of the world’s natural rubber and tin, and that
Indonesia’s exports in 1949 reached the value of US$500 million.9
Therefore, the threat of communist takeovers in the region could greatly
threaten Japan’s political and economic reconstruction.10 In addition,
Washington would encourage South-East Asian nations to restore and build
their own economies and expand both commerce and the flow of raw
materials with their neighbors, and in particular, Indonesia was pivotal in
achieving these aims. Washington would thus seek to strengthen the non-
communist elements in the government in Jakarta and promote
Indonesian economic development, which would then encourage regional
security in South-East Asia.11
Guided democracy
By the mid-1950s there was increasing support for communism in

Indonesia. In that nation’s first national election in 1955, the PKI, which
increasingly adopted Maoist policies and had been allowed to campaign
Sue Thompson 25
openly, received almost 16 per cent of the vote, a major comeback after the
Madiun uprising in 1948. After these elections, the Communists were the
fourth largest party in a parliament where no party had a majority of
seats.12 In 1957, Sukarno suspended parliamentary government in favor of
presidential rule under the term ‘Guided Democracy’. Under this new
system, the PKI and the army started to consolidate their positions.
From the mid-1950s, Jakarta moved away from Western support,
reflecting not only the growing influence of the PKI in the Sukarno
government, but also the Indonesian leader’s pursuit of an independent
foreign policy. Sukarno emphasized that Indonesians should see them-
selves as part of a global struggle against the forces of imperialism. In that
context, he sought to become leader in a group of non-aligned states,
hosting a conference of African and Asian nations at Bandung, Java in
1955. However, although Sukarno sought to maximize Indonesian inde-
pendence, many regarded internal subversion as the primary threat to
national security.13
During the 1950s there was growing resentment in the outer islands
towards the government in Jakarta, with a number of rebellions occurring
in the Moluccas, northern Sulawesi, and northern Sumatra. While much of
Indonesia’s population lived on the island of Java, a large proportion of the
country’s natural resources were located on these outer islands. In March
1957, Colonel Sumual, the regional military commander in east Indonesia,
proclaimed martial law over his district and declared a Charter of Universal
Struggle, named Permesta. Other military officers and civilian leaders sup-
ported the Charter, which called for the restoration of regional rights in
Indonesia, including financial autonomy and a greater input regarding the
appointment of government officials. The Charter did not call for seces-
sion, but rather for fundamental reform in Indonesia.14
In February 1958, another insurrection occurred in northern Sumatra in
which the rebels received outside help in the form of weapons and equip-
ment. Australia, Britain and the US were involved covertly because of both
the anti-communist views expressed by the rebels, and concern over devel-
opments in Sukarno’s government. The Indonesian military quickly
crushed the regional uprisings, leaving a legacy of Indonesian hostility to
the West. Sukarno then turned more toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union (USSR) for military support and economic aid. Soviet leader Nikita
Krushchev visited Indonesia in 1960. His visit resulted in an arms deal
between the two nations.15 Armed with new Soviet weapons, Jakarta
renewed its attention on West New Guinea.
There was now deep concern in Washington that Jakarta might move
closer to the communist bloc. Eager to halt the spread of communism in
Indonesia, Washington leaned on The Hague to participate in peace talks
with Jakarta. In January 1961, President John F. Kennedy’s new administra-
tion sought peaceful settlement of the dispute in Indonesia’s favor. Britain
also backed down from supporting the Netherlands. The result was that in
August 1962 Indonesia achieved the right to occupy West New Guinea on
1 May 1963, although the agreement included a face-saving clause to
assuage the Dutch. In 1969, there would be a UN-supervised vote on the
future of the territory by the indigenous people. Indonesia had finally com-
pleted its struggle for independence from the Netherlands. However, the
international environment in 1963 was significantly different to that of
1945. Indonesian nationalism and independence had moved from being
part of the postwar decolonization process to an important factor in Cold
War strategy in Southeast Asia.
The Kennedy administration also looked to expand economic and mil-
itary assistance to Jakarta, thus laying the groundwork for a clash between
the PKI and the Indonesian military in which Washington hoped that the
latter would eliminate the communists.16 However, despite American aid,
Sukarno’s policies coincided with economic decline. The government had
neglected restoration of the domestic economic infrastructure, which the
Second World War and the war for independence had devastated.
Indonesia could not reap the full benefit of its great natural resources; there
was a massive national debt and accelerating inflation. This period saw a
contest between leaders striving for economic stabilization and those
wanting to perpetuate the revolution.17 Under those conditions, Sukarno
initiated another regional military campaign, this time against the newly
formed Federation of Malaysia.
Konfrontasi (Confrontation)
The Federation of Malaysia, inaugurated on 16 September 1963, was a solu-

tion to the problem of the decolonization of Britain’s remaining Southeast
Asian possessions: Singapore and the territories of Brunei, Sarawak and
British North Borneo. Malaya had achieved independence in 1957 after its
defeat of the communist insurgency, but Singapore—which Britain admin-
istered separately, and which contained an important British naval base—
was not initially included in independent Malaya. However, continuing
pressure for Singapore’s integration into Malaya resulted in opposition
among Malay political leaders, because the incorporation of Singapore,
where the majority of the population was ethnically Chinese, would give
the latter a clear majority population in Malaya. To prevent this occurring,
in May 1961 Malayan Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman advocated the inclu-
sion of the British territories in Borneo within an amalgamated state of
Malaya and Singapore. That proposal would give the new nation a majority
of ethnically Malay people.18
Britain agreed to the proposal to incorporate their Borneo territories into
Malaysia, as they would otherwise have difficulty surviving economically as
independent countries, or even as an independent federation. In addition,
Sue Thompson 27
competing Malayan and Indonesian influences in the region might eventu-

ally lead to pressure from the Borneo territories for an end to colonial
rule.19 Furthermore, the agreement would ensure security for Britain’s mil-
itary installation in Singapore, as two of the main conditions were the
extension of the defense agreement between Britain and Malaya to all the
territories in the new federation, and that the British would not be
restricted in their use of the Singapore base.20
In 1961, Indonesia’s foreign minister, Dr Subandrio, initially indicated
approval for the creation of the Federation of Malaysia. However, this soon
changed with Sukarno’s suppression of uprisings in Sumatra and Sulawesi,
as well as the incorporation of West New Guinea into Indonesia. These
events had strengthened Sukarno’s position in Jakarta, while opposition to
Malaysia provided a useful distraction from economic problems and the
factional conflict between the PKI and the army within the Indonesian
government.21 The PKI presented an image of Malaysia as a colonial
outpost, worried that the new federation would provide Malaysia with eco-
nomic success and threaten the socialist agenda in Indonesia. The army
opposed the new nation because the inclusion of Singapore could result in
Chinese domination with loyalties to China.22
Sukarno also labeled the Federation of Malaysia as British neo-imperialist.
He claimed that the creation of Malaysia would ensure continued British
presence in Southeast Asia—militarily at Singapore and economically
through British ownership of resource industries. During the previous year,
Sukarno had been gradually moving Indonesia closer to Chinese anti-
imperialist ideals. In October 1962, Sukarno’s second wife had been guest
of honor at national celebrations in Beijing and Subandrio had held talks
with his Chinese counterpart, Zhou Enlai, in April 1963. These links were
encouraged by the leader of the PKI, D. N. Aidit, because Zhou was steadily
increasing support for the communists in Indonesia.23
In opposition to the creation of Malaysia, Sukarno launched a campaign
known as Confrontation (Konfrontasi). Within Britain’s Borneo territories,
the major source of opposition to federation came from the Sultan of
Brunei, and that territory remained external to the new federation. For the
other Borneo leaders, the merger was the only path to independence from
Britain. However, there were also anti-Malaysian tendencies within these
territories, which Sukarno sought to exploit. By late 1963, Indonesia was
sponsoring and supporting Sarawak guerrillas opposed to the Federation.24
Indonesia faced major military problems in launching Confrontation.
One was the nature of its army. The Indonesian army was essentially a
guerrilla force, which its doctrine reflected. Its leaders in the 1960s had
mostly gained their first major military experience in the guerrilla war
against the Dutch. Therefore, the Indonesian military had developed a
defensive territorial doctrine: to defend Indonesia and its core principles.
This included maintaining internal security against threats of rebellion that
had become a major concern for the newly independent government.

Another objective of the army was to counter PKI influence.25
While the conflict never became a full-scale war, hostilities continued,
and Malaysia secured reinforcements from Britain, Australia and New
Zealand. The United States had initially left Confrontation to the British,
with Kennedy stating clearly that American forces would not commit
support for Malaysia. Nonetheless, he had agreed to resuscitate multilateral
aid to Indonesia in exchange for a commitment from Sukarno to negotia-
tions and a withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Borneo, reflecting the
strategic and economic importance he placed on the resource-rich nation.
Following Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, the new Johnson
administration altered the direction of United States policy towards
Indonesia.26
Johnson disliked Sukarno’s accommodation of communists in his gov-
ernment; Congress drafted a resolution halting aid to Indonesia unless it
was in the national interest. By the end of March 1964, Johnson decided to
cut United States’ aid to Indonesia significantly.27 However, from as early as
September 1963 American assistance to Jakarta had been steadily declining.
United States aid was concentrated on training civilians within Indonesia
and military personnel in the United States. Concerned that the anti-
Malaysian cause in Indonesia might influence radical nationalists or the
PKI, Washington was careful not to provide aid that would help Sukarno’s
campaign against Malaysia. Nevertheless, it sought to perpetuate a military
training program that would continue the special links that the United
States had developed with Indonesian army officers, ties ‘which have rein-
forced the army’s anti-Communist posture and have given us unique
entrée into the leadership of the country’s strongest politico-military
force.’28 Efforts such as these reveal that Washington’s support for politico-
military and economic development in Indonesia in the early 1960s
encouraged the emergence of a military regime in Jakarta in the mid-
1960s.29
While Konfrontasi resulted in external pressure on Sukarno, tension also
continued within Indonesia. A meeting in early 1965 of the Supreme
Operations Command (KOTI)—a military command headed by Sukarno—
recommended that the government seize all Western business interests;
declare persona non grata any US officials engaged in subversive activities;
and investigate clandestine radio broadcasts believed to be contributing to
conflicts between Islamic activists and the PKI. Washington was alarmed
that the PKI appeared to be increasing its influence in Jakarta and that
Sukarno either did not want to curb the communists’ growing power or
was unable to do so.30
Konfrontasi ended because of an attempted coup in Jakarta from the night
of 30 September to the early morning of 1 October 1965 that involved the
murder of six army generals. The British Embassy in Jakarta informed
Sue Thompson 29
London that a coup attempt by ‘elements of the Indonesian armed forces’

had been put down.31 The following day, the embassy reported that the
cause of the attempted coup appeared to be a split within the Indonesian
army and that General Suharto had taken charge of the situation. Rumors
had already begun that the PKI was behind the operation.32
Between the beginning of October 1965 and the middle of March 1966,
the PKI was destroyed as a political force, and many of its members and
associates killed. Political power gradually shifted from Sukarno to Suharto,
and by the end of March 1966 a new government was formed that was
committed to economic reform and new foreign policy. While Sukarno
remained president in name, Suharto had effectively taken power.33 The
new Suharto government ended Konfrontasi in August 1966.
The New Order
Under the staunchly anti-communist Suharto, Indonesia’s foreign and

domestic policies changed. Jakarta severed ties with Beijing, Hanoi, and
Pyongyang, banned the PKI, and re-joined the UN and other international
organizations. The new regime also pursued efforts to obtain Western aid.
Washington in particular was keen to help to establish the new leadership
and, in addition to providing emergency assistance, indicated privately to
Jakarta that the US would participate in multilateral efforts to reschedule
Indonesia’s debt, indicating how significant Indonesia was to the
Americans. Yet Washington was aware that, despite Jakarta’s change of
direction, the new government would remain nationalistic and non-
aligned in its foreign policy position.34
In the new government, Suharto chaired a Cabinet Presidium that con-
sisted of five ‘first ministers’, each responsible for a group of portfolios. The
new president was responsible for defense, internal security, and the army.
While Suharto included high-profile civilians in his government, his ‘inner
circle’ predominantly comprised army generals and colonels, as he was
generous in apportioning executive and administrative positions to the
military. The army leadership had already benefited from roughly 20 years
of participation in political affairs under the Sukarno regime, and following
the demise of the PKI, the military could now play a leading role in
Indonesian affairs.35
One of Suharto’s main priorities in taking charge of government was to
concentrate on economic reconstruction. With the exclusion of petroleum,
domestic agriculture and mineral production since the mid-1950s had stag-
nated, and manufacturing had declined. Indonesia’s external debt at the
end of June 1966 was US$2.3 billion, and between December 1964 and
June 1966, the Jakarta cost-of-living-index increased more than 25-fold. In
response, Suharto prepared a stabilization program with IMF assistance that
included cuts to government expenditures, increased taxation, revision of
the banking system, strict credit controls, and the promotion of domestic
and foreign private investment.36
Suharto’s other main priority—a change in Indonesian foreign policy—
reflected not only his own dislike of communism and distrust of China, but
also his ambitions for Southeast Asia. While he sought Western economic
aid and implemented Western-leaning policies, he also pursued a foreign
policy posture of non-alignment. However, unlike Sukarno’s non-aligned
position, Suharto showed no interested in Latin America, Africa and the
Middle East; once Indonesia was on the path to economic reconstruction,
Suharto’s focus was steadfastly regional.37
Indonesia’s interest in its near neighbors was reflected in Jakarta’s deci-
sion to participate in a new regional forum, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), made up of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. The initiative to form ASEAN originated in
the Bangkok talks to end Konfrontasi. Member governments were all anti-
communist, and the new organization received support from the US and
Britain. For the Western powers, the creation of ASEAN heralded a new era
of regional stability. London and Washington believed that the greatest
threat to the region would derive from internal insurrection rather than
external invasion; therefore, economic development was essential. There
was also a decreasing need to maintain an externally directed military pres-
ence because Indonesia had ended its confrontation campaign and cut its
ties with China. This represented a new diplomatic strategy that
Washington supported, indicating that in order to achieve a ‘stable polit-
ical security situation’, it wanted to see the disbandment of bilateral rela-
tionships and the introduction of cooperative organizations: to achieve
this, American assistance and leadership was vital.38
The British were also keen for Indonesia to take a leadership role among
this new grouping and take charge in containing communist advances in
the region:
What the United States want—and what we too want—is a strong

Indonesia able and willing to maintain her independence from the
Communist bloc and acting in close collaboration with Malaysia and
the Philippines. If this turns out to involve a considerable degree of
Indonesian ascendancy over Malaysia, I think the United States will be
prepared to pay that price and I think we probably would too.39
The inauguration of ASEAN on 8 August 1967 included the declaration that

the member countries would share responsibility for ensuring the eco-
nomic and social stability of Southeast Asia. Although ASEAN was not
directly concerned with defense, it also required that all foreign bases
remain temporary and that the countries in the region share the main
responsibility for defending Southeast Asia. Of the five founding members,
Sue Thompson 31
Indonesia was the only country that did not maintain Western forces
inside its territory, and Jakarta insisted that the declaration should stress
the temporary nature of the regional Western bases. At first, the Philippines
opposed this stipulation, but backed down after the inaugural meeting
began. However, the final statement was nonetheless a compromise.
Indonesia initially wanted no reference to foreign bases, but accepted the
notion that bases remain ‘temporary’; and Malaysia accepted this as a con-
dition of Indonesian membership.40 This result suited Indonesia. Suharto
reportedly stated earlier in February 1966 that the defense of Southeast Asia
was a matter for the countries in the area, and that the British base in
Singapore was a target for China’s expansion, while the Malaysian and
Singaporean governments, on the other hand, had preferred that the base
remain in the region.41
Initially, ASEAN’s structure permitted considerable latitude, with no eco-
nomic unity among member-states and only Singapore gaining any great
benefit from intra-ASEAN trade. Internal tension also persisted. Manila’s
ongoing claim to Sabah—the northern region of Borneo—caused the break-
down of Philippine–Malaysian diplomatic relations in 1968. However,
ASEAN encouraged resolution to the crisis, essentially by keeping the dispute
outside the ASEAN framework, which in turn encouraged Malaysia and the
Philippines to resolve their tensions through bilateral engagement.42
Another factor encouraging ASEAN unity was a change in the strategic
environment in Southeast Asia. This was signaled by Britain’s announce-
ment in 1968 of its withdrawal from its military commitment to the
defense of Malaysia and Singapore and closure of its military base in
Singapore by 1971. In 1969, US President Richard Nixon declared, in what
became known as the Guam or Nixon Doctrine, that henceforth the United
States expected Asian nations to provide increasingly for their own defense,
although the US would continue to uphold its treaty obligations.
The Indonesians ostensibly accepted much of what was outlined in the
Guam Doctrine, as it appeared consistent with the basic Indonesian policy
that Southeast Asian nations develop responsibility for their own security
and defense. It also provided Jakarta with a platform from which to stress
the need for extensive foreign aid to counter the militarily weakness of
countries in the region. Jakarta’s attitude was that Indonesia lacked the
capacity to contribute to joint defense and military security; rather, the
country’s first priority was economic development—only once Indonesia
grew in economic strength would it be able to take on regional responsibil-
ities commensurate with its size and importance.43
Jakarta then became a beneficiary of an expanded US military aid
program when in March 1970 Washington approved approximately
$15 million per year—an increase of $10 million from the original
budget.44 However, the Indonesian government sought increased support.
It attempted to negotiate for the Americans to remain in the region until at
least 1973, based upon a graduated withdrawal in order to avoid a power

vacuum. Suharto sent General Sumitro to Washington in July 1970 to ask
for further military aid. During discussions with Nixon’s National Security
Adviser, Henry Kissinger, he stressed that Indonesia was not yet a ‘real’
power and was currently unable to accede to full responsibility for security
in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the Indonesian government had originally
not intended to build up its armed forces before 1973, deciding instead to
concentrate on economic development, sacrificing security for the sake of
national reconstruction. Now that Washington had announced America’s
departure from the region, Jakarta was worried that its neighbors—
Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia—lacked sufficient military
power to withstand potential internal instability, or confront the military
threat inherent in intensive Soviet diplomacy: these Asian nations might
turn to Moscow as a means of countering Chinese infiltration. Therefore,
Indonesia realized the necessity of strengthening its armed forces. Jakarta
was hopeful that it could acquire military supplies from Western Europe
and from the US; if America were to reduce its military strength, there
would be surplus material that Indonesia could use. In return, Indonesia
would provide AK-47 small arms to Cambodia to use against communist
forces.45
The view in Washington was that Indonesia’s requests were consistent
with the Nixon Doctrine. Therefore, when Jakarta requested additional mil-
itary assistance, Nixon agreed that Indonesia would need to play a bigger
role in regional defense and would need to modernize its forces. Kissinger
responded very positively to Sumitro’s request, stating that his relationship
with Suharto was, ‘one of the warmest he possessed,’ and that the US,
‘recognized the Indonesian role which was precisely what the Nixon
Doctrine required’.46
The Americans did not presume that Indonesia’s request for more arms
was out of regional altruism. Jakarta was extremely keen, in particular, to
secure funds or six C-130 planes and an M-16 rifle factory, and it was
observed in Washington that they might have shown support for regional
cooperation as part of their bid. This was pointed out to Kissinger by
National Security Council member John H. Holdridge, who noted that
while there was still no movement towards a regional security arrangement
in Southeast Asia, ‘the Indonesians might just be able to get things going’.47
Not wanting to appear unhelpful, or at the same time wanting Jakarta to
dictate terms, Nixon authorized an increase in military aid to Indonesia to
$18 million for the 1971 fiscal year.48
Western military retreat from Southeast Asia had been Jakarta’s aim
during the negotiations to form ASEAN, and the Indonesian strategic
outlook suited the aims of the Nixon Doctrine. Since independence,
Jakarta’s policy was to strengthen Indonesia without involving foreign
powers in any military commitment. As the US role diminished, Jakarta
Sue Thompson 33
was eager to develop Asian regional military cooperation with help from
Washington, which, in turn, was willing to continue to assist Indonesia in
its development programs and efforts to improve regional cooperation. For
the US, Indonesia was ‘one of the models of the Nixon Doctrine’. It was
using American economic and military aid, and private investments, to
build its own strength without drawing the US into any military commit-
ment. Jakarta viewed American financial assistance as vital to achieving
national economic development that would promote regional stability.
This was necessary to resist the expansion of Beijing’s political influence
and to avoid economic domination by Japan. The Australian government’s
assessment of the situation concluded that:
Indonesian attachment to the forms of an independent and active (i.e.,

non-aligned) foreign policy, and the ‘low posture’ scrupulously main-
tained by the United States in Jakarta, mask a very close relationship,
based on a shared conviction that the two countries’ policies and perfor-
mance serve each other’s national interests.49
For the US, underpinning these efforts to contain communist influence in

Southeast Asia was the region’s importance as a source of raw materials,
including petroleum.50 Washington was grateful to Indonesia for not par-
ticipating in the 1973 OPEC-led oil embargo. And, despite Indonesia’s
increased petroleum revenues, Washington continued to supply military
aid to Jakarta.51 Yet the country remained one of the poorest in the world
on a per capita basis and, while there were signs in 1973 that the
Indonesian economy was improving, there was still ‘an increasing risk of
distortions due to the use of political power to enrich individuals’.52 As a
result, the first significant opposition to Suharto’s government started to
emerge at the end of 1973 in the form of growing student protests against
official corruption, foreign investment and government handling of eco-
nomic policies.53
While Indonesia played a leading role in regional stability and worked
towards economic development, it risked causing regional instability
through its own aspirations to incorporate West New Guinea and
Portuguese Timor within its borders. The US chose not to stand in Jakarta’s
path in achieving these ambitions; for the Americans, Indonesia was ‘the
largest and most important non-Communist Southeast Asian state and a
significant Third World Country’.54
When Indonesia took control of West New Guinea, it began to prepare
the territory for a UN-supervised self-determination plebiscite in 1969, as
set out in the agreement reached with the Netherlands seven years earlier.
A little over 1,000 Papuans representing a population of approximately
800,000 people participated in the act of ‘free choice’ in front of UN repre-
sentatives and foreign diplomats. Washington chose not to become directly
involved. Kissinger viewed the so-called act of free choice as consisting, ‘of
a series of consultations rather than a direct election, which would be
almost meaningless among the stone-age cultures of New Guinea’.55
Six years later, concerned there would be a left-wing takeover in
Portuguese Timor, Jakarta sought to incorporate the territory by force
within Indonesia. Washington was aware that a guerrilla war would be the
result of any Indonesian action. US President Gerald Ford and Kissinger dis-
cussed these issues with Suharto during a visit to Jakarta on 6 December
1975, the day before the invasion. While Ford was present in the capital,
the Indonesian leader sought his counterpart’s ‘understanding if we deem
it necessary to take rapid or drastic action’. The response from Ford was
that the US would, ‘understand and will not press you on the issue. We
understand the problem you have and the intentions you have’.56
The attitude of Indonesia’s neighbor, Australia, was ambivalent. In 1974,
Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam had told Suharto privately that a
merger of East Timor with Indonesia was the only possible outcome.57
Canberra did not want to upset the improved relations that it had developed
with its northern neighbor since the end of Konfrontasi. The only support
Australia gave East Timor was to vote against resolutions in the United
Nations recognizing the Indonesian acquisition of East Timor. By the late
1970s, Canberra had shifted its vote in UN General Assembly resolutions on
East Timor to abstention. All of the ASEAN nations except Singapore sup-
ported Indonesia, reflecting growing cooperation among the member-states.
Conclusion
Regional leadership and great power dependence are dominant character-

istics of Indonesia’s postwar history. After gaining independence from the
Dutch, outside powers perceived the new Indonesian nation’s place in the
world as pivotal. However, Jakarta struggled to balance its desire to avoid
external interference in its affairs with the need for external financial
support. Nevertheless, Indonesian leaders used their advantageous position
of internal and international support in gaining backing for some of their
foreign policy initiatives. Although the country’s large population and
abundance of resources were major determinants in Indonesia’s rise to
prominence, both regionally and globally, internal instability has remained
as a destabilizing national threat. Leadership does not derive from size and
wealth alone: it also requires vision, and Indonesia’s leaders had a role to
play in their nation’s successes as well as its setbacks. On the one hand, the
Indonesian sense of nationalism and independence was a product of the
long struggle against the Dutch, which helped to establish Indonesia’s
foreign relations. On the other hand, the failure of Indonesian leaders to
capitalize on their economic potential compounded the problems of an
already unstable region and strengthened the influence of outside powers.
Sue Thompson 35
This presented a conflict between Indonesia’s aspirations: non-alignment

and expansion in regard to East Timor and West New Guinea; which antag-
onized policies of dependence on foreign financial assistance and the desire
to strengthen regional security. The onset of regional cooperation provided
Indonesia with its chance to seize a leadership role, as Southeast Asia could
not achieve stability without the support of its largest nation. Yet, despite
its standing in ASEAN, Indonesia remained dependent on external powers,
and while this dependence supported some leadership aspirations, it
exposed internal vulnerabilities as well.
Notes
1 The author wishes to thank Dr Chad Mitcham and Dr Allison Mitcham for pro-
viding advice and reading many draft versions of this chapter.
2 Evan A. Laksmana, ‘Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size
Really Matter?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and
Strategic Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2, August 2011, p. 157.
3 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1994, p. 17.
4 Richard Mason, ‘Nationalism, Communism and the Cold War: The United States
and Indonesia during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations’, in Richard
Mason and Abu Talib Ahmad (eds), Reflections on South East Asia History since
1945, Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2006.
5 Paper on Principal British Interests in the Far East, January 1946, CO 537/4718,
The [British] National Archives (TNA).
6 Draft paper by Far East Civil Planning Unit, circulated by Cabinet Office,
14 January 1946, CO537/1478, TNA.
7 Background Information on Far Eastern Countries: Political Conditions and
Economic Recovery Problems, Prepared for the use of the Committee on Armed
Services in consultation with the Department of State, 80th Congress,
1st Session–Senate Committee Print, September 9, 1947, Papers of John D.
Sumner, ECA Files (C-I), Box 6, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (HSTL).
8 Quote in Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New
Guinea, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, p. 27.
9 Address by Mr. Allen Griffin, publisher of the Monterey Peninsula Herald,
Monterey, California, delivered at the Institute on Southeast Asia, San Francisco
State College, San Francisco, July 21, 1950, Student Research File (B File), Pacific
Rim: Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, #31A,
Box 1 of 2, HSTL.
10 Report to the National Security Council (NSC) by the Executive Secretary on
Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries,
26 August 1948, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948–6, Disaster File,
Box 33, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEL).
11 Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary, 25 June
1952, White House Office, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, Box 3, DDEL.
12 Syamsuddin Haris, ‘General Elections Under the New Order’, in Hans Antlov and
Sven Cederroth (eds), Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond,
RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2004, pp. 18–19.
13 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, ISEAS,
Singapore, 1994, pp. 18–19.
14 R. Cribb and C. Brown, Modern Indonesia: A History since 1945, Longman,
Harlow, 1995, Ch. 5.
15 Audrey. R. Kahin and G. McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret
Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, University of Washington Press,
Seattle, 1995.
16 Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and
U.S.–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2008,
pp. 38 & 83.
17 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, ISEAS,
Singapore, 1994, p. 22.
18 Cabinet submission by Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs,
25 February 1963, A5619, C470 Part 1, National Archives of Australia (NAA).
19 Cabinet submission by Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs,
25 February 1963, A5619, C470 Part 1, NAA.
20 Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire: Malaysia, Series B,
Volume 8, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 2004, p. xlix.
21 Pierre Van der Eng, ‘Konfrontasi and Australia’s Aid to Indonesia during the
1960s’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2009, p. 52.
22 Dewi Fortuna, Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1994, pp. 25–6.
23 R. B. Smith, Changing Visions of East Asia, 1943–93, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007,
pp. 76 & 80–1.
24 CIA Weekly Review: Political Trends in Malaysia’s Borneo States, 2 June 1967,
Box 276, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, LBJ; R. B. Smith, Changing Visions of East
Asia, 1943–93, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007, p. 75.
25 Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military
Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996.
26 Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and
U.S.–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2008,
pp. 126–8.
27 H. W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American
Power, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 156–64.
28 Memorandum, 15 September 1964, NSF, Country File, Asia and the Pacific,
Indonesia, Box 246, LBJL.
29 Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.–
Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2008, p. 3.
30 CIA cable, 2 March 1965 and May 1965, NSF, Country File, Asia and the Pacific,
Indonesia, Box 247, LBJL.
31 Telegram, British Embassy, Jakarta to London, 1 October 1965, FO371/180316,
TNA.
32 Telegram, British Embassy, Jakarta to London, 2 October 1965, FO 371/180317,
TNA.
33 Report on Indonesia, NSF, Country File, Asia and the Pacific, Indonesia, Box 248,
LBJL.
34 Ibid.
35 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) no. 55–67, Prospects for Indonesia,
15 February 1967, NSF, NIEs, Box 7, LBJL.
36 Ibid.
Sue Thompson 37
37 Ibid.
38 Airgram, Bangkok to Washington, 6 September 1967, Box 1850, Central Policy
Files (CPF) 1967–69, Political Affairs and Relations, RG 59, [US] National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
39 Foreign Office minute by J. E. Cable, 4 January 1966, FO 371/190783, TNA.
40 Outward Savingram to all posts from Department of External Affairs,
5 September 1967, A1838, 3004/13/21 Part 3, NAA.
41 Telegram, Canadian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur to Ottawa, 22 February
1966, FCO 15/18, TNA.
42 Nobuhiro Ihara, The Formation and Development of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 1966–1969: An Historical Institutional
Approach, Ph.D. thesis, University of Melbourne, 2010, pp. 201–6.
43 Cablegrams from Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, 2 January 1970, A5882,
CO818, NAA.
44 Kissinger memorandum for the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense,
11 March 1970, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General
Subject File: Indonesia, Box 14, GRFL.
45 Memorandum of Conversation (MEMCON) between General Sumitro and
Kissinger, 1 July 1970, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977,
General Subject File: Indonesia, Box 14, GRFL.
46 MEMCON between General Sumitro and Kissinger, 8 July 1970, Kissinger-
Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject File: Indonesia,
Box 14, GRFL.
47 Memorandum, John H. Holdridge to Kissinger, 13 October 1970, Kissinger-
Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject File: Indonesia,
Box 14, GRFL.
48 Memorandum, John H. Holdridge and Richard T. Kennedy to Kissinger,
18 November 1970, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977,
General Subject File: Indonesia, Box 14, GRFL.
49 Summary of the situation in Indonesia in mid-1973, Department of Foreign
Affairs, Canberra, July 1973, A1838, 638/72/57, NAA.
50 Memorandum, G. C. Lewis, Intelligence Assessment Section, to Peachy,
4 September 1973, A1838, 638/72/57, NAA.
51 Memorandum, Robert S. Ingersoll, Acting Secretary, to the President, 1 July
1975, Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry
Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft Files, (1972) 1974–1977, Temporary Parallel File,
Box A, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (GRFL).
52 Memorandum, Department of Foreign Affairs, July 1973, A1838, 683/72/57,
NAA.
53 Memorandum, W. R. Smyser to Kissinger, 15 January 1974, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia,
1973–1976.
54 Memorandum, Kissinger to the President, 21 November 1975, The [US] National
Security Archive (NSA).
55 Memorandum, Kissinger to the President on Djakarta Visit: Your Meetings with
President Suharto, 18 July 1969, NSA.
56 Telegram, Jakarta to Secretary of State, 6 December 1975, NSA.
57 Memorandum, W. R. Smyser to Kissinger, 4 March 1975, National Security
Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Country File:
Indonesia, Box 6, GRFL.
Bibliography
Primary documents
Australia: Australian Archives (Canberra)
A5619: Cabinet Files.
A1838: Department of External Affairs.
United Kingdom: The National Archives (London)
CAB 148: Cabinet Office, Defence and Overseas Policy Committees and Sub-committees,
Minutes and Papers.
CO537: Colonial Office and predecessors: Confidential General and Confidential
Original Correspondence.
FO 371: Foreign Office, Political Department, General Correspondence from 1906.
United States of America

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (Independence, Missouri)
• ECA File: Papers of John D. Sumner
• Student Research File (B File), Pacific Rim: Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya,
Indonesia and the Philippines
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (Abilene, Kansas)
• Disaster File: White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948–6
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (Austin, Texas)
• National Security File: Country File, Asia and the Pacific, Indonesia
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (Ann Arbor, Michigan)
• Temporary Parallel File: Office of the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft Files
Secondary sources
Anwar, Dewi (1994) Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Fortuna).
Brands, H. W. (1997) The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of
American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Cribb, R. and Brown, C. (1995) Modern Indonesia (Harlow: Longman).
Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey Grey (1996) Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military
Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin).
Haris, Syamsuddin (2004) ‘General Elections Under the New Order’, in Hans Antlov
and Sven Cederroth (eds), Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond
(London: RoutledgeCurzon).
Ihara, Nobuhiro (2010) ‘The Formation and Development of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 1966–1969: An Historical Institutional
Approach’, Ph.D. thesis (University of Melbourne).
Kahin, Audrey R. and Kahin, G. McT. (1995) Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret
Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (Seattle: University of Washington Press).
Laksmana, Evan A. (2011) ‘Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size
Really Matter?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic
Affairs, 33: 2, August.
Lijphart, Arend (1966) The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea
(New Haven: Yale University Press).
Sue Thompson 39
Mason, Richard (2006) ‘Nationalism, Communism and the Cold War: The United
States and Indonesia during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations’, in
Richard Mason and Abu Talib Ahmad (eds), Reflections on South East Asia History
since 1945 (Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Sains).
Simpson, Bradley (2008) Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and
U.S.–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Smith, R. B. (2007) Changing Visions of East Asia, 1943–93 (Abingdon: Routledge).
Stockwell, A. J. (2004) ‘Introduction’, in A. J. Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the
End of Empire: Malaysia, Series B, Vol. 8 (London: Institute of Commonwealth
Studies).
Van der Eng, Pierre (2004) ‘Konfrontasi and Australia’s Aid to Indonesia during the
1960s’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 55: 1.

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Indonesia’s Ascent

Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order

List of Figures and Table xii

4 Yudhoyono’s Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National 69

Indonesia’s ongoing security landscape 130

11 The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation 224

15 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The Law of the Sea, 308

Nationalism, revolution and independence

Before independence, Indonesia had been a major colony in Southeast

promising Indonesia independence. Indonesian nationalists were then able

By the mid-1950s there was increasing support for communism in

The Federation of Malaysia, inaugurated on 16 September 1963, was a solu-

competing Malayan and Indonesian influences in the region might eventu-

had become a major concern for the newly independent government.

London that a coup attempt by ‘elements of the Indonesian armed forces’

The New Order

Under the staunchly anti-communist Suharto, Indonesia’s foreign and

What the United States want—and what we too want—is a strong

The inauguration of ASEAN on 8 August 1967 included the declaration that

least 1973, based upon a graduated withdrawal in order to avoid a power

Indonesian attachment to the forms of an independent and active (i.e.,

For the US, underpinning these efforts to contain communist influence in

Regional leadership and great power dependence are dominant character-

This presented a conflict between Indonesia’s aspirations: non-alignment

United States of America

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