prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period,
CABRERA V. TIANO, 8 SCRA 542 (1963) interrupts the prescription period.
FACTS: Josefina Potestas Cabrera and her sister
Cresencia Potestas Omulon filed an action for
“Partition and Recovery of Real Estate, with
Damages against Mariano Tiano. Their complaint
alleged that they were entitled to a portion of the land,
since Josefina did not sign the Deed of Sale while
Cresencia was a minor at the time of the sale.
Tiano claimed that he was the absolute owner of the
land by acquisitive prescription of 10yrs, from the date
of purchase 02jul47. Plaintiffs commenced this case on
20jun57. Court issued summons on 21jun57.
Defendant received the summons on 02jul57 which was
incidentally, the end of the 10yr prescriptive period.
The trial court declared that the plaintiffs are entitled
each to 1/8 of the property in question plus P1,000
damages for both of them and P200 attorney’s fees.
Defendant moved for recon and was denied.
Defendant red to SC contending that prescription has
already set in. He insists that the period should be
counted from the date the summons was served on him.
He claims that the judicial summons, which could civilly
interrupt his possession, was received by him only of
02jul57.
HELD: Civil actions are deemed commenced from date
of the filing and docketing of the complaint with the
Clerk of Court, without taking into account the issuance
and service of summons. Commencement of the suit
SUN INSURANCE V. ASUNCION, 170 SCRA 274
(1989)
FACTS: Petitioner Sun Insurance filed a complaint with
the Makati RTC for the consignation of a premium
refund on a fire insurance policy with prayer for the
judicial declaration of its nullity against private
respondent Manuey Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent
was declared in default for failure to file the required
answer within the reglementary period.
Private respondent filed a compliant in the Quezon City
RTC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment. Only the amount of
P210 was paid by private respondent as docket fee
which prompted petitioner to raise objection. Upon
order of the SC, the case was assigned to a different
branch due to under-assessment of docket fees.
The case was thereafter assigned to Judge Asuncion
who required the parties to comment on the Clerk of
Court’s letter-report signifying her difficulty in
complying with the SC Resolution since the pleadings
filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact
amount sought to be recovered.
Private respondent filed a Re-Amended complaint
stating therein a claim of not less than 10M as actual
compensatory damages in the prayer. However, the
body of the amended complaint alleges actual and
compensatory damages and atty’s fees in the total
amount of about P44,601,623.70
Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the
second amended complaint and stating that the same
constituted proper compliance with the SC Resolution.
Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA
questioning the order of Judge Asuncion. Private
respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an
additional claim of P20M as damages bringing the total
claim to P64,601,623.70. CA denied petition and
granted writ of prelim attachment.
HELD: 1) It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. 2) Permissive counterclaims, third
party claims and similar pleadings, shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefore is paid. The court may also allow payment of
said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period. 3) If the judgment awards a claim not specified
in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Escolin: There are some compulsory counterclaim that
needs payment of docket fees, and some which does not.
HODGES V. CA, GR 87617, 184 SCRA (1990)
FACTS: Gellada filed an action for damages against
Hodges in the Iloilo CFI for some alleged defamatory
statements of defendant against plaintiff. The defendant
pointed out that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over the case unless the corresponding docket fee is
paid. CFI ruled against Hodges. CA affirmed CFI ruling.
HELD: SC reversed CA ruling. Filing fees should be paid
in full for the court to acquire jurisdiction. Partial
payment of docket fees prevents the court from
acquiring jurisdiction and any proceeding undertaken
thereafter is null and void.
SPOUSES DE LEON V. CA, 287 SCRA (1998)
FACTS: Private respondent Elayda filed in the Quezon
City RTC a complaint for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale of 2 parcels of land against petitioners.
The trial court held the fees should be based on the
value of the property. CA reversed and held that the flat
rate of P400 should be charged.
HELD: An action for rescission of contract should be
treated similar to an action for specific performance. An
action for rescission of contract is one which cannot be
estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing
should be the flat amount for actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation, regardless of the value of the real
property which is the subject of the contract.
 MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT V. CA, 149 SCRA
562 (1987)
Facts: Manchester filed an action for torts and damages
and specific performance. Body of the complaint
specified amount of damages, but the prayer did not.
Complaint was amended deleting all amounts. Only
after court order did complainant specify the amount,
but still only in the body, not in the prayer. Said
amended complaint was admitted.
Held: In civil cases, all pleadings should specify in both
the body and prayer the amount of damages sought. The
court does not acquire jurisdictions until the proper
docket fee has been paid. Where an action is both for
specific performance and damages, the docket fees must
be based on the total damages sought to be recovered,
even if it is not spelled out in the prayer. Where the
prayer clearly shows that the action was one for
damages, there can be “no honest difference of opinion”
as to the amount of filing fees. Where payment was
insufficient and there was “no honest difference of
opinion” as to the correct amount of filing fees, the court
never acquired jurisdiction over the original complaint.
There was thus no complaint to amend. Docket fees
must be based on the original, not amended complaint.
A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket
fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court.
Henceforth, the amount sought to be recovered should
be stated both in the body of the complaint and in
prayer.
Escolin: The SC in Manchester prohibited plaintiffs in
civil cases from not specifying the amount of damages.
MANUEL V. ALFECHE, 259 SCRA 475 (1996)
Facts: Manuel filed a libel case against writer/author
and editors of the newspaper Panay News. RTC found 3
people to be guilty but acquitted a fourth accused.
However the civil indemnity by way of moral damages
were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Complainant in a
libel case, where the information stated the amount of
moral damages, did not pay filing fees for the impliedly
instituted civil action.
Held: When a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal, when the amount of damages, other
than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information
filed in court, then the corresponding filing fees shall be
paid. However, when the amount of damages is not so
alleged, filing fees need not be paid and shall simply
constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an
award for actual damages (in every crime there is also
civil liability. These are the actual damages. Thus they
should not be charged docket fees). In no case shall
filing fees for actual damages be collected.
Manuel case is applicable to civil cases impliedly
instituted with criminal cases. In purely civil actions,
the Manchester ruling applies.
de Leon: Note that under the Criminal Procedure Rules
of 2000, filing fees for actual damages may be collected
in case of cases for violation of BP 22.
 CAUSES OF ACTION
Citizen Surety v. Melencio-Herrera, 38
SCRA 369 (1971)
FACTS: Spouses Dacanay were indebted to Citizens’
Surety Insurance. As security, the Dacanays
mortgaged a parcel of land in Baguio. Since they were
not able to pay said debt, the said lot was sold in a
foreclosure sale. However, proceeds of the sale were
insufficient to satisfy said debt. Thus Citizens’
Surety filed a complaint with the Manila CFI,
seeking to recover the balance, plus 10% thereof as
atty’s fees, and other costs.
At petitioner’s request, respondent Judge caused
summons to be made by publication in the Phils Herald.
But despite the publication and deposit of a prepaid
copy of the complaint at the Manila Post Office,
defendants did not appear within the period of 60 days
from last publication, as required by the summons.
Plaintiff then asked that defendants be declared in
default; but instead, respondent Judge asked it to show
cause why the action should not be dismissed, the suit
being in personam and the defendants not having
appeared. Respondent Judge dismissed the case
despite plaintiff’s argument that the summons by
publication was sufficient and valid under sec16
Rule14 RRC.
HELD: Where the action is in personam (e.g. action
for deficiency judgment), the Court could not validly
acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant,
absent a personal service of summons. Without such
personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing
defendant would be violative of due process. Summons
by publication cannot confer upon the court jurisdiction
over said defendants, who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court. The proper
recourse for a creditor is to locate properties, real or
personal, of the resident defendant debtor and cause
them to be attached, in which case, the attachment
converts the action into a proceeding in rem or
quasi in rem and the summons by publication may
then accordingly be deemed valid and effective. The
case should not be dismissed but should be held
pending in the court's archives, until plaintiff succeeds
in determining the whereabouts of the defendants'
person or properties and causes valid summons to be
served personally or by publication.
Escolin: Citizen Surety could not have availed of
summons by publication because this provision applies
only to actions in rem or quasi in rem. He should have
invoked Rule 57, Sec. 1 (f) to convert the action into
quasi in rem
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment
may issue. — At the commencement of the
action or at any time before entry of judgment, a
plaintiff or any proper party may have the
property of the adverse party attached as security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered in the following cases:
(f) In an action against a party who does not
reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on
whom summons may be served by
publication.(1a)
 Bachrach Motor v. Icarañgal, 68 Phil 287
(1939)
FACTS: Icarañgal, with Figueroa, for value received,
executed in favor of Bachrach, a promissory note;
and executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of
land in Laguna as security for the pro note.
Thereafter, promissors defaulted in the payment of
the agreed monthly installments. Bachrach instituted
in the Manila CFI an action for the collection of the
amount due. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.
A writ of execution was issued and in pursuance
thereof, the Laguna sheriff, at the indication of the
plaintiff, levied on the properties of the defendants,
including the mortgaged lot.
The other defendant herein Oriental Commercial,
interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by
virtue of a writ of execution issued in a civil case in
the municipal court of Manila City, the said lot had
already been acquired by it at the public auction.
Thus the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property
and the judgment in favor of Bachrach remained
unsatisfied.
Bachrach then instituted an action to foreclose the
mortgage. Trial court dismissed the complaint. Thus
Bachrach took the present appeal.
HELD: An action for a collection on a loan and an
action for foreclosure of the mortgage that secures
such loan are based on one a single cause of action
(i.e. default of the debtor). Such actions cannot
therefore be split or filed separately. The filing or
judgment on one action will necessarily bar the filing of
the other.
Industrial Finance Corp. v. Apostol, 177
SCRA 521 (1989)
FACTS: Spouses Padilla bought on credit 3 units of
Isuzu trucks from Industrial Transport & Equipment.
They executed a prom note for the balance of the
purchase price. This was secured by a chattel mortgage
of said trucks and, as additional collateral, a real estate
mortgage on their land.
The Padillas failed to pay several installments on the
prom note, the assignee Industrial Finance Corp. (IFC)
sued them in the CFI for the recovery of the unpaid
balance including attys fees. CFI ruled on 16 Apr 75
in favor of IFC. On appeal, CA sustained the CFI’s
ruling except for modification of attys fees from 25% to
12% of the balance.
Meanwhile on 09 Sep 71 private respondents Juan
and Honorata Delmendo filed a complaint against
IFC, as principal party, and the Padillas, as formal
parties, in respondent CFI. The Delmendos alleged that
they were the transferees of the real property which
was mortgaged earlier by the Padillas to Ind’l
Transport. The Delmendos prayed for the
cancellation of the mortgaged lien annotated of the
TCT and the delivery to them by petitioner of the owner’s
copy of said title with damages and attys fees,
considering that IFC waived its rights over the mortgage
when it instituted a personal action against the Padillas
for collection of sum of money.
IFC moved for the dismissal of the complaint,
contending that is has not waived its right over the
mortgage lien. The Delmendos filed a motion for
summay judgment which the CFI granted. CFI ruled in
favor of the Delmendos. IFC filed a MfR which was
denied. Hence this petition.
HELD: A mortgage creditor may elect to waive his
security and instead bring an ordinary action to
collect with the right to execute on all the
properties of the debtor, including the subject-
matter of the mortgage. If he fails in the collection
suit, he cannot thereafter foreclose on the mortgage.
Escolin: In case of splitting of a single cause of
action, the ground for dismissal is res judicata.
Escolin: If there is one cause of action but two
remedies, the plaintiff should have pleaded
alternative remedies in his complaint.
Progressive Development Corp. v. CA, 301
SCRA 637 (1999)
Facts: Pursuant to a lease contract, for non-payment of
rentals Progressive (lessor) repossessed the leased
properties and seeks to auction-off movable property
found therein. Westin Seafood Market (lessee) files a
forcible entry case before the MTC against the lessor.
Settlement was agreed upon which was reneged
(meaning: go back on promise) by the plaintiff. Lessor
seeks to auction-off lessee’s properties again. Lessee
now files a case for damages with the RTC against the
lessor. Lessor filed a MtD the damage suit on the
ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping. Instead
of ruling on the motion, Judge Santiago issued an order
archiving the case pending the outcome of the forcible
entry case being heard at the MeTC for the reason that
“the damages is principally anchored on whether or not
the defendants (petitioner herein) have committed
forcible entry.” Petitioner moved for recon of the order
and reiterated its motion to dismiss the damages suit.
Before petitioner’s MtD could be resolved, private
respondent filed with the RTC an amended complaint for
damages. Westin also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for the Issuance of a TRO and Motion for the Grant of a
Prelimi Prohibitory and Prelim Mandatory Injunction.
RTC denied petitioner’s MtD and admitted Westin’s
amended complaint and granting the TRO.
Progressive filed with CA a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition in the ground that Judge
Santiago acted in excess of his jurisdiction and/or
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint of
Westin and issuing a restraining order against
Progressive; in allowing private respondent to engage in
forum shopping; and, taking cognizance of the action for
damages despite lack of jurisdiction. CA dismissed the
petition due to the failure of petitioner to file a MfR of
Judge Santiago’s order, which it explained was a
prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. CA also found that the elements of litis
pendencia were lacking to justify the dismissal of the
action for damages with the RTC because despite the
pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC the
only damages recoverable thereat were those caused by
the loss of the use and occupation of the property and
not the kind of damages being claimed before the RTC
which had no direct relation to loss of material
possession. CA clarified that since the damages prayed
for in the amended complaint with the RTC were those
caused by the alleged high-handed manner with which
petitioner reacquired possession of the leased premises
and the sale of Westin’s movable found therein, the RTC
and not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action of
damages.
Petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 alleging that CA erred in finding that petitioner
failed to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate remedy
of a prior MfR with the RTC; ruling that the trial judge
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of the action for damages and injunction
despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the
MeTC; and ruling that private respondent did not
commit forum shopping since the causes of action
before the RTC and MeTC were not identical with each
other.
Held: Petition is with merit. While generally a MfR must
first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give
the lower court an opportunity to correct the errors
imputed to it, this rule admits of exceptions and is not
intended to be applied without considering the
circumatances of the case. The filing of the MfR before
availing of the remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non
when the issue raised is one purely of law, or where the
error is patent or the disputed order is void, or
questions raised on certiorari are the same as those
already squarely presented to and passed upon the
lower court. The MtD the action for damages with the
RTC on the ground that another action for forcible entry
was pending at the MeTC between that same parties
involving the same matter and cause of action.
Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue was
elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the CA.
Clearly, any MfR on the trial court would have been a
pointless exercise.
The forcible entry and damages case arose from a
single cause of action. Hence, the case for damages
may be dismissed.
Petition is granted. CA decision and order of RTC
reversed and set aside. RTC directed to dismiss the
damages case. MeTC directed to proceed with forcible
entry case.
Escolin: The SC was wrong. Previous jurisprudence
ruled that in cases filed with the MTC, a compulsory
counterclaim in excess of the jurisdiction of the MTC
should be filed as a separate action, or if filed in the
same action, the excess is waived.
de Leon: Under Rule 70, if a claim in an ejectment case
in the MTC is for reasonable use of the property, the
claim may go beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC. But if
the claim is other than reasonable use of the property, it
must be within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
de Leon: Counterclaims for moral and exemplary
damages in ejectment cases before the MTC should be
within the the amounts prescribed for summary
procedure.
Agustin v. Bacalan, 135 SCRA 340 (1985)
Facts: Administrator of estate-lessor files a case for
ejectment before the City Courts against the lessee.
Lessee files counterclaim in excess of the City
Court’s jurisdiction. City Court decides for plaintiff.
On appeal, CFI rules for defendant and grants him
damages. This became final. Plaintiff files separate
for nullifying the CFI decision on the ground that
the damages awarded was beyond the jurisdiction of
the City Court.
Held: A counterclaim not presented in the lower
court cannot be entertained on appeal. Defendant is
deemed to have waived his counterclaim in excess of the
City Court’s jurisdiction. It is as though it has never
been brought before City Court. It may not be
entertained on appeal. The amount of judgment,
therefore, obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal,
cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the
action began. Since the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in
excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate
court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the
same by its decisions or otherwise. When court
transcends the limits prescribed for it by law and
assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its
adjudications will be utterly void and of no effect either
as an estoppel or otherwise. The excess award of the
CFI is therefore null and void. Action to declare
nullity of award is proper. The award not in excess
stands.
The defendant's counterclaim for damages is GRANTED
to the extent of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.
The grant of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS in
excess of such amount is hereby declared NULL and
VOID, for having been awarded beyond the jurisdiction
of the court.
Escolin: A compulsory counterclaim beyond the
jurisdiction of the court can be filed as a separate
action.
Maceda v. CA, 176 SCRA (1989)
Facts: Transferee of leased property files an
ejectment case against the lessee. Lessee sets up
counterclaim for reimbursement of renovation
expenses, in excess of the MTC’s jurisdiction. MTC
ejects lessee. RTC reinstates lessee and orders
plaintiff to reimburse lessee. CA affirms RTC but
deletes award of reimbursement.
Held: MTC had no jurisdiction over the excess
counterclaim. Hence, neither did the RTC. A
counterclaim in excess of the limit may be pleaded
only by way of defense to weaken the plaintiff's
claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief.
Bayang v. CA, 148 SCRA 91 (1987)
Facts: Pending a quieting of title case, defendant
dispossesses the plaintiff. CA rules in favor of plaintiff.
Plaintiff now files separate action for the fruits during
the period of dispossession.
Held: Ownership of the land and income from the
land is a single cause of action in case of quieting of
title. The claim for the income from the land was
incidental to a claim for ownership of the land. During
the whole period of dispossession, plaintiff made no
move to amend his complaint to include a claim for
the income supposedly received by the defendant.
Failure to do so is res judicata to the subsequent
case.
Famador: Compulsory counterclaims should be filed
with the original case. Permissive counterclaims may
be filed in a separate case.
Escolin: Plaintiff should have filed a supplementary
complaint after the defendant has dispossessed him.
PARTIES
Chang Kai Shek v. CA, 172 SCRA 389 (1989)
Facts: Dismissed teacher sues unincorporated school.
Plaintiff tries to amend to implead school officials, but
CFI dismissed the case. CA reverses.
Held: The school cannot invoke its non-compliance
with the law to escape being sued. It is now in
estoppel.
Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 115 SCRA
783 (1982)
FACTS Juasing Hardware, single proprietorship
owned by Ong Bon Yong, filed a complaint for the
collection of a sum of money against Pilar Dolla. The
case proceeded to pre-trial and trial. After plaintiff
presented its evidence and rested its case, defendant
filed a Motion for Dismissal of Action (Demurrer to
Evidence) praying that the action be dismissed for
the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue. Defendant in
said Motion contended that plaintiff Juasing is a single
prop, not a corp or partnership duly registered in
accordance with law and therefor is not a juridical
person with legal capacity to bring an action in court.
Juasing filed an Opposition and moved for the
admission of an Amended Complaint. CFI Judge
dismissed the case and denied admission of Amended
Complaint.
HELD Correction of the designation of the plaintiff
(from name of sole proprietorship to name of individual
owner) is merely formal, not substantial, and hence
may be corrected at any stage of the action.
Chang Kai Shek v. CA, 172 SCRA 389
(1989)
FACTS Fausta Oh was abruptly dismissed for no
apparent or given reason from her teaching job in Chang
Kai Shek School. Fausta sued and demanded
separation pay, SSS benefits, salary differentials,
maternity benefits, moral and exemplary damages.
Chang Kai Shek filed MtD on the ground that it
could not be sued. Complaint was amended. Certain
school officials were also impleaded to make them
solidarily liable with the school. CFI dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, CA set aside CFI decision and
held the school suable and liable while absolving the
school officials. MfR was denied. The school then came
to SC in a petition for review on certiorari.
HELD An unincorporated entity sued as such cannot
invoke its non-compliance with the law to escape being
sued. It is now in estoppel. Petition denied. CA decision
affirmed.
Hang Lung Bank v. Saulog, 201 SCRA 137
(1991)
FACTS Hang Lung Bank (HLB), foreign corporaption not
doing business in the Phils, entered into 2 continuing
guarantee agreements with Cordova Chin San (CCS) in
HK whereby CCS agreed to pay on demand all sums of
money which may be due the bank from Worlder
Enterprises (WE). WE having defaulted in its payment,
HLB filed a collection suit against WE and CCS in the
HK SC.
Thereafter, HLB sent a demand letter to CCS at his Phils
address but again, no response was made thereto.
Hence HLB instituted in the Makati RTC an action
seeking enforcement of its just and valid claims. CCS
raised in his answer to the complaint the affirmative
defenses of; lack of cause of action, incapacity to sue,
and improper venue.
A day before pre-trial, CCS filed MtD on grounds that
HLB had no legal capacity to sue and that venue is
improper. RTC granted the MtD. HLB filed MfR but was
denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari seeking
reversal of said orders.
HELD License as a requirement for a foreign corporation
to sue applies only to foreign corporations doing
business in the Philippines. “Isolated Transaction Rule”
– unlicensed foreign corporation not doing business may
sue on an isolated transaction. A foreign corporation
not licensed to do business in the Philippines may not
be denied the right to file an action in our courts for an
isolated transaction in this country.
RTC orders set aside. Case reinstated and RTC is
directed to proceed with the disposition of the case.
Commissioner of Customs v. KMK Gani,
182 SCRA 591 (1990)
Facts: On September 11, 1982, the cargoes arrived at
the Manila International Airport on board Philippine
Air Lines (PAL) Flight PR 311 from Hongkong. The
cargoes were consigned to these different entities:
K.M.K. Gani (hereafter referred to as K.M.K.) and
Indrapal and Company (hereafter referred to as
INDRAPAL), the private respondents in the petition
before us; and Sin Hong Lee Trading Co., Ltd., AAR TEE
Enterprises, and C. Ratilal all purportedly based in
Singapore.
While the cargoes were at the Manila International
Airport, a "reliable source" tipped off the Bureau of
customs that the said cargoes were going to be unloaded
in Manila. Forthwith, the Bureau's agency on such
matters, the Suspected Cargo and Anti-Narcotics
(SCAN), dispatched an agent to verify the information.
Upon arriving at the airport, the SCAN agent saw an
empty PAL van parked directly alongside the plane's
belly from which cargoes were being unloaded. When
the SCAN agent asked the van's driver why he was at
the site, the driver drove away in his vehicle. The SCAN
agent then sequestered the unloaded cargoes.
The seized cargoes consisted of 103 cartons "containing
Mogadon and Mandrax tablets, Sony T.V. sets
1546R/176R kw, Sony Betamax SL5800, and SL5000,
Cassette Stereos with Headphone (ala walkman), Casio
Calculators, Pioneer Car Stereos, Yamaha Watches,
Eyeglass Frames, Sunglasses, Plastic Utility Bags,
Perfumes, etc." These goods were transferred to the
International Cargo Terminal under Warrant of Seizure
and Detention and thereafter subjected to Seizure and
Forfeiture proceedings for "technical smuggling."
At the hearing, Atty. Armando S. Padilla entered his
appearance for the consignees K.M.K. and INDRAPAL.
The records of the case do not show any appearance of
the consignees in person. Atty. Padilla moved for the
transshipment of the cargoes consigned to his clients.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General avers that
K.M.K. and INDRAPAL did not present any testimonial
or documentary evidence. The, collector of Customs
ruled for the forfeiture of all the cargoes in the said
containers. Consequently, Atty. Padilla appealed the
order to the Commissioner. of Customs. The
Commissioner of Customs affirmed the finding of the
Collector of Customs of the presence of the intention to
import the said goods in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act 3 and Central Bank Circular No. 808 in
relation to the Tariff and Customs Code. Atty. Armando
S. Padilla, again as counsel of the consignees K.M.K.
and Indrapal, appealed to the respondent Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA reversed the decision of
the Commissioner of Customs. Hence this petition.
Issue: WON COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN
ENTERTAINING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
NOTWITHSTANDING HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERSONALITY TO SUE
IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY
Held: YES. Unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged
in business may sue in the Philippines based on an
isolated transaction. The fact that a foreign corporation
is not doing business in the Philippines must be
disclosed in the suit if it desires to sue in Philippine
courts under the "isolated transaction rule." Without
this disclosure, the court may choose to deny it the right
to sue.
In the case at bar, the private respondents K.M.K. and
INDRAPAL aver that they are "suing upon a singular
and isolated transaction." But they failed to prove their
legal existence or juridical personality as foreign
corporations. In their petition, it is alleged that K.M.K.
Gani is "a single proprietorship," while INDRAPAL is "a
firm," and both are "doing business in accordance with
the laws of Singapore. The "isolated transaction rule"
refers only to foreign corporations. Here the petitioners
are not foreign corporations.
Escolin: In Commissioner of Customs, KMK’s personality
was not recognized because it was not able to prove that
it was a duly formed corporation by presenting a
certification from the government of its country of origin.
Unlike in Hang Lung, the foreign corporation was able to
prove its corporate existence under the foreign law.
de Leon: Even if a plaintiff foreign entity is not required
to obtain a license because it is not doing business, it
must still prove its due incorporation in its country of
origin.
Merrill Lynch v. CA, 211 SCRA 824 (1992)
Facts: ML FUTURES, operating in the United States,
had indeed done business with the Lara Spouses in
the Philippines over several years, had done so at all
times through Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc. (MLPI), a
corporation organized in this country, and had executed
all these transactions without ML FUTURES being
licensed to so transact business here, and without
MLPI being authorized to operate as a commodity
futures trading advisor. The Laras did transact
business with ML FUTURES through its agent
corporation organized in the Philippines. The last
transaction executed by ML FUTURES in the Laras's
behalf had resulted in a loss amounting to US
$160,749.69; that in relation to this loss, ML FUTURES
had credited the Laras with the amount of
US$75,913.42 — which it (ML FUTURES) then
admittedly owed the spouses — and thereafter sought to
collect the balance, US$84,836.27, but the Laras had
refused to pay on the ground that the plaintiff has
no legal capacity to sue.
Issue: WON ML FUTURES may sue in Philippine Courts
to establish and enforce its rights against said spouses,
in light of the undeniable fact that it had transacted
business in this country without being licensed to do so.
WON the Lara Spouses are now estopped to impugn ML
FUTURES' capacity to sue them in the courts of the
forum.
Held: The defendant is estopped to deny the capacity
of the foreign corporation to sue, having dealt with
the corporation.
USA v. Reyes, 219 SCRA 192 (1993)
Facts: That on January 22, 1987, after working as the
duty ID checker plaintiff went shopping and left the
store at l2:00 noon of that day; That on the way to her
car while already outside the store, Mrs. Yong Kennedy,
also an ID checker, upon the instruction of the store
manager, Ms. Maxine Bradford, approached plaintiff and
informed her that she needed to search her bags; That
plaintiff went to defendant, who was then outside the
store talking to some men, to protest the search but she
was informed by the defendant that the search is to be
made on all Jusmag employees that day; That the
search was thereafter made on the person, car and bags
of the plaintiff by Mrs. Yong Kennedy in the presence of
the defendant and numerous curious onlookers; That
having found nothing irregular on her person and
belongings, plaintiff was allowed to leave the premises;
That feeling aggrieved, plaintiff checked the records and
discovered that she was the only one whose person and
belonging was searched that day contrary to defendant's
allegation. That moreover, a check with Navy Exchange
Security Manager, R.L. Roynon on January 27, 1987
was made and she was informed by Mr. Roynon that it
is a matter of policy that customers and employees of
NEX Jusmag are not searched outside the store unless
there is a very strong evidence of a wrongdoing; That
plaintiff knows of no circumstances sufficient to trigger
suspicion of a wrongdoing on her part but on the other
hand, is aware of the propensity of defendant to lay
suspicion on Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting; That
plaintiff formally protested the illegal search on
February 14, 1987 in a letter addressed to Mr. R.L.
Roynon, but no action was undertaken by the said
officer. That the illegal search on the person and
belongings of the plaintiff in front of many people has
subjected the plaintiff to speculations of theft,
shoplifting and such other wrongdoings and has
exposed her to contempt and ridicule which was caused
her undue embarrassment and indignity.
The defendant together with the government of
the United States of America filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the action is in effect a suit against
the United States of America, a foreign sovereign
immune from suit without its consent.
Moreover, the said motion does not specify any of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Section
1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It merely recites state
immunity on the part of the public petitioner and
immunity on the part of Bradford for the reason that the
act imputed to her was done in the performance of her
official functions. The upshot of this contention is
actually lack of cause of action — a specific ground for
dismissal under the aforesaid Rule — because assuming
arguendo that Montoya's rights had been violated by the
public petitioner and Bradford, resulting in damage or
injury to the former, both would not be liable therefor,
and no action may be maintained thereon, because of
the principle of state immunity.
Issue: WON the doctrine of immunity applies.
Held: The doctrine of immunity from suit will not
apply and may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in
their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. A public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.
Flores v. Mallare-Philips, 144 SCRA 377
(1986)
Facts: Plaintiff files 1 complaint against 2 distinct
defendants before the RTC under distinct separate
causes of action. Total amount of the claim is with RTC
jurisdiction, but individual claim is under MTC
jurisdiction. RTC dismisses the complaint .
Held: In cases of joinder of causes of action, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as
plaintiffs or as defendants, the total of all the claims
shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. However, there
should be a proper joinder of parties for the totality rule
to apply. Under the present law, the totality rule is
applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having
separate causes of action against a defendant join in a
single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff
has separate causes of action against two or more
defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the
causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or
against the two or more defendants should arise out of
the same transaction or series of transactions and there
should be a common question of law or fact, as provided
in Section 6 of Rule 3.
In this case, the 2 causes of action did not arise out of
the same transaction or series of transactions and there
was not common question of law or fact. There was
improper joining of parties, hence the totality rule does
not apply. MTC has jurisdiction.
Ralla v. Ralla, 199 SCRA 495 (1991)
Facts: Rosendo Ralla had two sons, Pablo and Pedro.
The father apparently loved the former but not the
latter, Pablo and his family lived with Rosendo, who took
care of all the household expenses. Pablo administered
part of the family properties and received a monthly
salary of P250.00 plus part of the produce of the land.
Pedro lived with his mother, Paz Escarella, in another
town. He was not on good terms with his father.
Rosendo executed a will disinheriting Pedro and leaving
everything he owned to Pablo. Validly disinherited son
(Pedro) sues for annulment of sale of property from the
Rosendo to another Pable.
Issue: WON a validly disinherited son has a legal
standing to question the sale of the property.
Held: The disinherited son has no legal standing to
question the validity of the sale. He is not a real party in
interest as he does not stand to be benefited or injured
by the judgment or a party entitled to the avails of the
suit. “ Interest” means material interest.
Mansion Biscuit v. CA, 250 SCRA 195
(1995)
FACTS Ty Teck Suan, as Pres of Edward Ty Brothers
Corp (ETB Corp), ordered cartons of nutri-wafers from
Mansion Biscuit Corp. B4 delivery of goods on nov 18,
Ty issued to Ang Cho Hong, pres of Mansion, 4
postdated checks. 4 other PD checks were issued by Ty
with Siy Gui as co-signor in dec81. Mansion delivered
the good. First 4 PD checks were deposited but were
dishonored due to ISF. Ang informed Ty of the dishonor
and asked him to replace the checks with cash or good
checks. Ang sent a formal demand letter. Thereafter,
the second batch of checks were deposited but was also
dishonored. Mansion then filed a crim case for violation
of BP22 in Valenzuela RTC. Ty pleaded not guilty. Ang
filed a verified motion for the issuance of a writ of
attachment.
After prosecution rested its case, Ty filed a MtD by way
of demurrer to evidence, which Siy adopted as his own.
RTC granted the MtD stating that the stare decisis in
these cases where the check is issued as part of an
agreement to guarantee or secure payment of an
obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not
criminally liable for either Estafa or Violation of BP22.
Both accused are found not guilty. Order of Attachment
set aside. Prosecution then filed MfR and for
clarification as to the civil aspect of the crim actions.
MfR was denied.
Mansion filed certiorari and injunction with the CA
questioning RTC’s setting aside of the order of
attachment. CA annulled and set aside the portion of
the order which set aside the Order of Attachment.
Mansion filed another appeal with the CA assailing
RTC’s ruling absolving defendants from civil liability.
While appeal was pending, Ty died. MtD the appeal was
filed. CA denied MtD and granted the substitution of
Ty’s children.
CA dismissed the appeal filed by Mansion for lack of
merit. CA held that civil liab sought to be enforced by
Mansion was not the personal liab of Ty but a
contractual liab of ETB Corp. The civil liab of ETB Corp
to Mansion was not litigated and resolved in the crim
cases because ETB Corp was not a party thereto. CA
held that a separate civil action should be instituted by
Mansion against ETB Corp.
Issue: WON not the petitioner can enforce the civil
liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits in
question against private respondents notwithstanding
the fact that the latter contracted the agreement in
behalf of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation.
WON the claim for tortuous liability against the
deceased may be claimed in the same action.
HELD
First issue: The civil liability for non-payment of the
nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by petitioner to the
Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced
against the private respondents because the said civil
liability was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to
Mansion Biscuit Corporation, rather, it was the
contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation,
of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to Mansion
Biscuit Corporation.
2nd issue: No. Death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. However, the
claim for civil liability survives, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation. In cases where in the civil action is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case.
Nuñal v. CA, 221 SCRA 26 (1993)
Facts: Frank and Mary had children, one of whom was
Mary Lyon Martin. They also owned a parcel of land.
They died. Luisa Lyon Nuñal was in possession of the
land. Emma Lyon de Leon in her behalf and as guardian
ad litem of the minor heirs of Frank and Mary (but not
including Mary Lyon Martin) sued Luisa Lyon, now
deceased and herein represented by her heirs, for
partition and accounting. CFI ordered the partition but
dismissed the complaint for accounting. Affirmed by the
CA, with a finding that Mary Lyon Martin was a child of
Frank and Mary, but the order of partitioning did not
include Mary Lyon Martin. Decision became final and
writ of execution was issued.
Thereafter, Mary Lyon Martin filed a motion to quash
the order of execution with preliminary injunction.
Eventually, the lower court ordered the inclusion of
Mary Lyon Martin in the partitioning as a co-owner,
invoking the fact that the earlier decision had a finding
that Mary Lyon Martin is one of the children of Frank
and Mary. CA affirms.
Held: When a final judgment becomes executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted
to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest
Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the
correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, and, of course, where the judgment is void. Any
amendment. or alteration which substantially affects a
final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for
that purpose.
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court has
become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the
trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, any modification that he would make, as
in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be
in excess of his authority.
The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an
independent suit against the parties and all other heirs
for her share in the subject property, in order that all
the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
Escolin: Once a judgment has been rendered, even if it
is not yet final, intervention may no longer be allowed. It
is not necessary for the judgment of partition be final
before the excluded heir may not be allowed to
intervene. cf Rule 19, Sec. 2
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to
intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. xxx
Robles v. CA, 83 SCRA 180 (1978)
Facts: Heirs sign power of attorney authorizing an heir
to sell land inherited. One heir did not sign. The land
was sold and registered. Excluded heir now sues the
buyer and the RoD to “cancel” the buyer’s title. TC
dismisses the case on ground that the vendors should
have been impleaded as an indispensable party.
Issue: WON the vendors/co-heirs are indispensible
parties.
Held: The action is not really one for cancellation of title,
but really one questioning RoD’s acceptance of the
Power of Attorney as a Declaration of heirship. The
vendors are not indispensable parties. The action for
cancellation pertains only to plaintiff’s rights as an
excluded heir, and does not affect the rights and
interests of the vendors. In reality, plaintiff’s action is
one of legal redemption where the vendors are clearly
not indispensable parties. Besides, the defendant RoD
had the option of impleading the vendors as 3rd party
defendants if he wanted to.
Imson v. CA, 239 SCRA 58 (1994)
Facts: Plaintiff sues for damages from a vehicular
accident. Beneficial owner and the driver were declared
in default. Compromise was reached with the insurer
and the claim against him was withdrawn. Registered
owners now seek dismissal of the claims against them
as well.
Held: The case should proceed. The rule is dismissal of
the case against an indispensable party results in
dismissal of the case against the other indispensable
parties. The insurer is merely a necessary party.
Dismissal of the case against him will not result to
dismissal of the claim against the other defendants.
Escolin: The insurer is not an indispensable party to the
case. The only indispensable party here is the driver of
the truck. All the others are mere necessary parties.
Mina v. Pacson, 6 SCRA 775 (1963)
Facts: Plaintiffs Mina are the illegitimate children of
Joaquin Mina with Pilar Lazo while married to Antonia
Pacson. Joaquin executed a two deeds of absolute sale
to Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina (legitimate
child). These deeds bear the conformity of Joaquin’s
wife Antonia. Joaquin died in 1958. Plainitffs Mina
sued Crispino and Cresencia for declaration of nullity of
the deeds of sale and that defendants be required to
deliver to plaintiffs ¼ of said properties together with
moral damages (1st case). The RTC directed plaintiffs to
amend their complaint to include Antonia and other
intestate heirs of Joaquin. Plaintiffs failed to comply, so
1st case was dismissed. Thereafter plainitffs Mina
brought another action with the same pleading with an
additional prayer for recognition as Joaquin’s
illegitimate children (2nd case). Defendants filed a MTD
on the ground of res judicata. The court thereby
dismissed the 2 case. Plaintiffs now contend that there
nd
is no res judicata because the 1st dismissal was void.
Issue: WON res juridicata is attached.
Held: To order an amendment to a complaint within a
certain period in order to implead as party plaintiff or
defendant one who is not a party to the case lies within
the discretion of the Court.
Where it appears that the person to be impleaded is an
indispensable party, the party to whom such order is
directed has no other choice but to comply with it. His
refusal or failure to comply with the order is a ground
for the dismissal of his complaint and is res judicata to
a 2nd complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule, 30, of the
Rules of Court.
SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. — When plaintiff fails to
appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these rules of any order of the court, the action may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
provided by court.
Elements of res juridicata:
1. The former judgment must be final;
2. The court which rendered judgment must have
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter;
3. It must be a judgment on the merits;
4. There must be between the first and second
actions identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action.
Casenas v. Rosales, 19 SCRA 463 (1967)
Facts: Arañas and Caseñas filed a complaint for specific
performance and enforcement of their alleged right
under a certain deed of sale, and damages against the
spouses Rosales. After answer has been filed and before
trial, counsel for plaintiffs informed the trial court that
plaintiff Arañas and defendant Rosales had both died.
The lower court directed the surviving plaintiff, Caseñas,
to amend the complaint to effect the necessary
substitution of parties thereon. Caseñas failed to do
this, so the TC dismissed the case. The dismissal
became final. Thereafter, Caseñas filed another
complaint against the widow Rosales and heirs of the
late Rosales "to quiet, and for reconveyance of, title to
real property, with damages." This suit referred itself to
the very same property litigated in the previous
dismissed case. and asserted exactly the same
allegations as those made in the former complaint.
Defendants filed MTD on ground of res judicata. TC
dismissed the case.
Issue: WON the action barred by prior judgment.
Held: When certain of the parties died and due notice
thereof was given to the trial court, it devolved on the
said court to order, not the amendment of the
complaint, but the appearance of the legal
representatives of the deceased. An order to amend the
complaint, before the proper substitution of parties has
been effected, is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no
duty to comply therewith to the end that an order
dismissing the said complaint, for such non-compliance,
would similarly be void.
Escolin: where the defendant dies pending the case, the
duty of the court is to order the substitution of the
defendant, not to order the amendment of the complaint
to implead the heirs of the defendant
de Leon: In Mina, the court ordered the amendment of
the complaint to implead an indispensable party. The
order was proper, hence failure to comply was a valid
ground for dismissal of the complaint. In Casenas, the
court ordered the amendment of the complaint to
implead the heirs of a deceased party. The order was
improper because the proper procedure was to
substitute. Hence failure to comply was not a valid
ground for dismissal of the complaint.
Escolin: Heirs of the decedent are indispensable parties
in an action to for support by an illegitimate child of the
decedent.
Vda dela Cruz v. CA, 88 SCRA 695 (1979)
Facts: Defendant in an ejectment case died before
judgment could be rendered. TC acknowledged in its
decision that the defendant had died. Decision became
final and was executed. The conjugal properties of the
deceased Felix Jose and his wife were sold at public
auction. Heirs of the defendant now filed a motion to
substitute the deceased and to set aside as null void the
decisions, orders, writ of execution and sale at public
auction made and entered against the latter. TC allowed
substitution, but denied setting aside of the decision
and execution. CA reverses.
Held: In case of the death of a party and due notice is
given to the trial court, it is the duty of the court to
order the legal representative of the deceased to appear
for him. In the case at bar, no legal representative was
ever summoned appear in court. No legal representative
appeared to be substituted. The plaintiffs did not
procure the appointment of such legal representatives.
As a result, the continuance of a proceeding during the
pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such
having been validly substituted in accordance with the
rules, amounts to lack of jurisdiction.
Escolin: It is the duty of the court to order substitution
and such substitution is mandatory otherwise the court
does not acquire jurisdiction.
de Leon: If the heirs ordered to substitute refuses to
appear, they may not be held in contempt. The remedy
is for the creditor to procure the appointment of an
administrator for the estate and then substitute him for
the decedent.
Vda. de Haberer v. CA, 104 SCRA 534 (1981)
Facts: TC dismisses 11 complaints for recovery of parcel
of land. Plaintiff dies pending appeal. Counsel notifies
the court of appellant’s death, and prayed for
suspension of the period for filing an appellant’s brief
pending appointment of an executor. CA denies
extension and dismisses the appeal.
Held: The RoC requires appearance of the deceased legal
representatives instead of dismissing the case.
Dismissal of an appeal on the ground of failure to file
appellant’s brief must be in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play. The extension should have been
granted.
 undeniably evident that the heirs themselves sought
their day in court and exercised their right to due
process.”
Vda. de Salazar v. CA, 250 SCRA 305 Formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the
(1995) heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in
Facts: This is an ejectment case filed by private the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased
respondent against petitioner's deceased husband, defendant.
Benjamin Salazar. Benjamin Salazar died while the case
is going on. The court was not informed of the death of
the Benjamin Salazar. Until finally, there was a decision.
An appeal therefrom was interposed in the name of
petitioner's deceased husband on the ground that
Acar v. Rosal, 19 SCRA 625 (1967)
private respondents herein failed to satisfy the
An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis, need
requirements pertaining to personal cultivation and
not be a pauper; the fact that he is able-bodied and may
conversion of the landholdings into non-agricultural
earn the necessary money is no answer to his statement
uses. CA dismissed it. Almost a year after the
that he has not sufficient means to prosecute the action
termination of that appeal, a petition for annulment of
or to secure the costs. It suffices that plaintiff is
judgment on the ground that court did not have
indigent, though not a public charge. “Indigents” are
jurisdiction over her and the other heirs of her deceased
persons who have no property or source of income
husband because notwithstanding the fact that her
sufficient for their support aside from their own labor,
husband had already died on October 3, 1991, the trial
though self-supporting when able to work and in
court still proceeded to render its decision on August 23,
employment. It is in this sense of being indigent that
1993 without effecting the substitution of heirs in
"pauper" is taken when referring to suits in forma
accordance with Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of
pauperis. In class suits, the nominal plaintiffs directly
Court thereby depriving her of her day in court.
bear the cost of the suit. The proof of the indigence of
ISSUE: When there is failure to effectuate the the nominal parties is enough to support a petition to
substitution of heirs before the rendition of judgment, is sue as pauper litigants. It need not be proved that every
the judgment jurisdictionally detective? beneficiary of the class suit is indigent. The remedy in
case of denial of a meritorious petition to sue as pauper
HELD: NO, “the judgment is valid where the heirs litigants is mandamus. Appeal is unavailing because the
themselves appeared before the trial court and plaintiffs were not even accorded the status of litigants.
participated in the proceedings. Therein, they presented
evidence in defense of the deceased defendant. It is

VENUE OF ACTIONS
Dacoycoy v. CA, 195 SCRA 641 (1991)
FACTS Jesus Dacoycoy filed before RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal a complaint against private respondent Rufino de
Guzman praying for annulment of 2 deeds of sale
involving a parcel of riceland located in Lingayen,
Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce, and
damages. Before summons could be served on de
Guzman, RTC judge ordered counsel for petitioner to
confer with respondent trial judge on the matter of
venue. After said conference, RTC dismissed the
complaint due to improper venue. RTC found that
petitioner’s action is a real action as it sought not only
the annulment of the deeds of sale but also recovery of
ownership of the rice land which was outside of the
RTC’s territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner appealed to IAC
which affirmed RTC’s order of dismissal.
Petitioner faults the IAC in affirming RTC finding that
the venue was improperly laid when de Guzman has not
even answered the complaint nor waived the venue.
HELD Petition granted. The court can not motu proprio
dismiss the case on ground of improper venue.
Objections to venue may be waived by the parties.
Improper venue does not necessarily divest the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.
Even granting that the action of petitioner is a real
action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a RTC vested with the
exclusive original jurisdiction over “all civil actions
which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein.”
de Leon: This does not apply in summary procedure
cases where the court may motu propio dismiss the
complaint even on the ground of improper venue (SC
Resolution 15 October 1991, Sec. 4).
Fortune Motors v. CA, 178 SCRA 564 (1989)
FACTS Metrobank extended various loans to Fortune
which was secured by a real estate mortgage on the
Fortune building and lot in Makati. For failure of
Fortune to pay the loans, Metrobank initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. After notice were
served, posted and published, the mortgaged property
was sold at a public auction to Metrobank as the
highest bidder.
3days after the expiration of the 1yr redemption period,
Fortune filed a complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging that the
foreclosure was premature because its obligation to
Metrobank was not yet due, publication of the notice of
sale was incomplete, there was no public auction, and
the price for which the property was sold was
“shockingly low”.
Before summons could be served, Metrobank filed a MtD
the complaint on the ground that the venue of the action
was improperly laid in Manila for the subject real
property is situated in Makati, therefore the action to
annul the foreclosure sale should be filed in Makati
RTC.
MtD was opposed by Fortune alleging that its action “is
a personal action” and that “the issue is the validity of
the extrajudicial proceedings” so that it may have a new
1yr redemption period.
Manila RTC issued an order reserving the resolution of
Metrobank’s MtD until after the trial on the merits as
the grounds relied upon by the defendant were not clear
and indubitable. Metrobank filed a MfR but was denied
by Manila RTC. Metrobank appealed to CA. CA granted
and dismissed the annulment case without prejudice to
its being filed in the proper venue.
HELD An action to annul a real estate mortgage
foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a
private sale of real property. Both are actions that affect
title and seek recovery of the real property sold. It is
therefore a real action which should be commenced and
tried in the province where the property or part thereof
lies. Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
Clavecilla Radio v. Antillon, 19 SCRA 379
(1967)
FACTS New Cagayan Grocery Bacolod Branch sent a
message (REURTEL WASHED NOT AVAILABLE
REFINED TWENTY FIFTY IF AGREEABLE SHALL SHIP
LATER REPLY) to New Cagayan Grocery CDO Branch
thru Clavecilla Radio Bacolod. Clavecilla Radio Cagayan
received the message. However, in delivering the same
to New Cagayan Grocery CDO, the word “NOT” between
the word “WASHED” and “AVAILABLE” was omitted,
thus changing entirely the contents and purport of the
message and causing the addressee to suffer damages.
New Cagayan filed a complaint against Clavecilla in the
MTC. After service of summons, Clavecilla filed MtD the
complaint on the grounds that it states no cause of
action and the venue is improperly laid. New Cagayan
interposed opposition to which Clavecilla filed its
rejoinder. Thereafter, MTC judge Antillon denied MtD
for lack of merit.
Clavecilla filed a petition for prohibition and prelim
injunction with the CFI praying that judge Antillon be
enjoined from further proceeding with the case on the
ground of improper venue. Respondents filed MtD the
petition but was opposed by Clavecilla. CFI held that
Clavecilla may be sued in Manila where it has its
principal office or in CDO where it was served with
summons thru the branch manager. In other word, CFI
upheld the authority of MTC to take cognizance of the
case.
In appealing, Clavecilla contends that the suit against it
should be filed in Manila where it holds its principal
office.
HELD The residence of the corporation is the place
where its principal office is established. Branch offices
are not “residences” where it may be sued.
The phrase “where he (defendant) may be found” as to
venue of actions applies only to non-residents. It does
not apply to defendants residing in the Philippines.
Applying the provision of the Rules of Court, the venue
in this case was improperly laid.
 Young Auto v. CA, 223 SCRA 670 (1993)
Facts: Young Auto (YASCO) sold its shares of stock in
Consolidated Mktg & Dev’t Corp (CMDC) to Roxas.
Purchase price 8M, dp 4M check bal 4M in pd checks
1M each. After execution of the agreement, Roxas took
full control of the four markets of CMDC. However
YASCO held on to stock certificates as security pending
full payment. First 4M was honored but the four 1M
checks were dishonored. Roxas sold one of the markets
to a 3rd party. Out of the proceeds, YASCO rcvd 600k
leaving a bal of 3.4M
YASCO filed a complaint against Roxas in Cebu RTC
praying that Roxas be ordered to pay the bal or that full
control of the 3 markets be turned over to YASCO.
Roxas filed MtD, ground: improper venue. RTC
dismissed MTD.
Roxas appealed to CA. CA ordered dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of improper venue. YASCO
appealed to SC.
The Articles of Incorporation of Young Auto Motors
stated that its principal office was in Cebu. In its
transactions with Roxas, Young Auto stated in its
letterhead that its principal office was in Manila. Young
Auto sued Roxas in Cebu based on such transactions.
Roxas files MTD on the ground of improper venue.
Held: A corporation is a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the articles of
incorporation. Hence, Cebu was a valid venue for
Young’s action.
Escolin: If it was Roxas who filed the case against Young
in Pasay City based on the address in the letterhead,
Young would be estopped from objecting on the ground
of improper venue.

Summons must be served at the principal office
of the corporation as found in the Articles of
Incorporation in order that the court can acquire
the jurisdiction over the person of the party.
Hernandez v. DBP, 71 SCRA 290 (1976)
Facts: Petitioner Jose M. Hernandez was an employee of
private respondent Development Bank of the Philippines
in its Legal Department for twenty-one (21) years until
his retirement due to illness. On August 12, 1964, the
private respondent awarded to the petitioner a privilege
to buy a lot in Quezon City by DBP. Subsequently, DBP
refused to accept Hernandez’s payment and cancelled
the award. Petitioner protested against the cancellation
of the award of the house and lot in his favor and
demanded from private respondent the restoration of all
his rights to said award. However, private respondent
refused.
Hernandez filed an action to annul the
cancellation of the award in Batangas and restoration of
all his rights thereto. DBP filed MTD on ground of
improper venue, contending that since the petitioner's
action affects the title to a house and lot situated in
Quezon City, the same should have been commenced in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the real
property is located and not in the Court of First Instance
of Batangas where petitioner resides.
Held: Hernandez's action is not a real but a personal
action. His action is one to declare null and void the
cancellation of the lot and house in his favor is an action
for specific performance to execute the contract to sell
which does not involve title and ownership over said
properties but seeks to compel respondent to recognize
that the award is a valid and subsisting one which it
cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and to accept
payment. Such an action is a personal action which may
be properly brought by petitioner in his residence.
Lizares v. Hon. Calauag, and Cacnio, 4
SCRA 746 (1962)
FACTS: Flaviano Cacnio bought from Dr. Antonio
Lizares on installment a parcel of land located in
Sinkang Subd Bacolod City. Cacnio made a
downpayment p of Php1,206 bal Php10,858 to be paid
in 10 yearly installments.
Cacnio received a letter from Lizares demanding
payment of arrears in installment payments, interests,
and taxes. Cacnio sent a check to pay the amount due
but Lizares returned the check and refused the tender of
payment. Cacnio instituted a civil case in the Rizal CFI
praying that Lizares be ordered “to accept the payment
being made” by him.
Petitioner MtD the complaint due to improper venue for
the action affects the title or possession of real property
located in Bacolod. CFI denied MtD holding that it was
a personal action. Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA
denied petition.
HELD: An action praying that defendant be ordered "to
accept the payment being made" by plaintiff for the lot
which the latter contracted to buy on installment basis
from the former, to pay plaintiff compensatory damages
and attorney's fees and to enjoin defendant and his
agents from repossessing the lot in question, is one that
affects title to land, and "shall be commenced and tried
in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies," because, although the immediate remedy is to
compel the defendant to accept the tender of payment
allegedly made, it is obvious that this relief is merely the
first step to establish plaintiff's title to real property.
Escolin: In the Bar exams of 1978, Wigberto Tañada was
the Bar examiner. There was a question using the facts
of Lizares. The consensus was the case should be filed
in the place where the property was located. Tañada
cited the Hernandez case in ruling that the case should
be filed in the residence of the plaintiff. Eventually, both
correct.
de Leon: So where should we side now?
Esuerte v. CA, 193 SCRA 541 (1991)
Facts: on September 22, 23 and 27, 1978, private
respondent Ma. Beverly Tan, a Junior Resident
Physician of Corazon Locsin-Montelibano Memorial
Hospital, Bacolod City, without any justifiable reason
shouted at, humiliated and insulted the petitioner,
Patria Esuerte, Head Nurse, Medicare Department of the
said hospital and as a result of the said incident, said
petitioner complained to the Chief of the Hospital, Dr.
Teodoro P. Motus, in writing. As a result thereof, private
respondent was advised to explain in writing by the
Chief of the Hospital, but private respondent instead of
explaining only her side of the incident also complained
against the petitioners. The Discipline and Grievance
Committee, Corazon Locsin-Montelibano Memorial
Hospital, conducted a fact-finding investigation and
later, the Chief of the Hospital, Dr. Teodoro P. Motus,
issued a resolution dated November 8, 1978,
transmitting the records of the case to the Regional
Health Office, No. 6, Jaro, Iloilo City for appropriate
action
An action for damages was filed by private
respondent Beverly Tan against herein petitioners Patria
Esuerte and Herminia Jayme with Regional Trial Court
of Cebu. Esuerte and Jayme filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of improper venue and for
being premature for failure of Tan to exhaust
administrative remedies. The RTC denied the MtD as
well as the MfR. And so with the CA.
Issue: WON the Cebu City is the proper venue of the
action.
Held: No. For purposes of venue of personal actions, the
venue is to be determined where the plaintiff or the
defendant is actually located. It is actual residence, not
legal domicile, which is relevant.
To file the case in the court of the place where the
plaintiff temporarily actually resides at the time he files
a complaint. In the case at bar, at the time of her filing
of the complaint against petitioners, she was a
temporary resident of Bacolod City. She was then
employed with the Corazon Locsin Montelibano
Memorial Hospital, Bacolod City, as resident physician.
Moreover, the acts complained of were committed in
Bacolod City. The private respondents were all residents
of Bacolod City at the time of the bringing of the action.
Though Tan's employment was only temporary there
was no showing when this employment will end. Justice
would be better served if the complaint were heard and
tried in Bacolod City where all the parties resided.
de Leon: The meaning of “residence” in determining
venue of personal actions is the same as “residence” in
determinng venue of estate proceedings.
Capati v. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 794 (1982)
Facts: Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor,
Pampanga, was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the
construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. He
entered into a sub-contract with the defendant Jesus
Ocampo, a resident of Naga City where he undertook to
construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of
the said Feati building in accordance with the
specifications indicated therein. Defendant further
bound himself to complete said construction on or
before June 5, 1967. To emphasize this time frame
Ocampo affixed his signature below the following
stipulation in bold letters: “TIME IS ESSENTIAL, TO BE
FINISHED 5 JUNE’ 67.”
At the back of the contract which reads:
“14. That all actions arising out, or relating to this
contract may be instituted in the Court of First Instance
of the City of Naga.”
Claiming that defendant finished the construction in
question only on June 20, 1967, plaintiff filed in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action for
recovery of consequential damages.
Ocampo (defendant) filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue of action was
improperly laid. Capati (plaintiff) filed an opposition to
the motion, claiming that their agreement to hold the
venue in the Court of First Instance of Naga City was
merely optional to both contracting parties.
CFI of Pampanga decided that it is an improper venue.
Held: Stipulation as to venue which uses the word “may”
is permissive and does not limit the venue of the action
only to the venue stipulated. We hold that the
stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is
simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties
did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively
with the Court of First Instance of Naga. They merely
agreed to submit their disputes to the said court,
without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court
specifically indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court.
Unimasters v. CA, 267 SCRA (1997)
Facts: UNIMASTERS has its principal place of business
in Tacloban City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City. There
is a stipulation in the Dealership Agreement that” (a)ll
suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in
the proper Courts of Quezon City.”
Issue: WON this stipulation had the effect of effectively
eliminating Tacloban as an optional venue and limiting
litigation between UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and
exclusively to Quezon City.
Held: The question should receive a negative answer.
Absent additional words and expressions definitely and
unmistakably denoting the parties’ desire and intention
that actions between them should be ventilated only at
the place selected by them, Quezon City – or other
contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire
and intention – the stipulation should be construed, not
as confining suits between the parties only to that one
place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in
Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the
plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
Stipulation as to venue which uses the word “shall” is
permissive and does not limit the venue of the action
only to the venue stipulated.
Escolin: They should have used the words “solely,”
“exclusively,” or “only.” “Shall” is not enough to confer
exclusive venue with a court.

Diaz v. Judge Adiong, 219 SCRA 631
(1993)
Facts: On 16 July 1991, the Mindanao Kris, a
newspaper of general circulation in Cotabato City,
published in its front page the news article captioned "6-
Point Complaint Filed vs. Macumbal," and in its
Publisher's Notes the editorial, "Toll of Corruption,"
which exposed alleged anomalies by key officials in the
Regional Office of the DENR. On 22 July 1991, the
public officers alluded to, namely, private respondents
Sultan Macorro L. Macumbal, Sultan Linog M. Indol,
Atty. Macabangkit M. Lanto and Atty. Mohamadali
Abedin, instituted separate criminal and civil complaints
arising from the libel in the RTC Marawi City. The City
Prosecutor dismissed the criminal case. The civil
complaint for damages was set for Pre-Trial Conference.
The defendants therein had already filed their respective
Answers with Counterclaim.
On 18 November 1991, petitioner Diaz moved for the
dismissal of the action for damages on the ground that
the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter. He vehemently argued that the complaint
should have been filed in Cotabato City and not in
Marawi City. Respondent judge dismissed the MtD for
lack of merit as well as the MfD.
Petitioner Diaz contends that the civil action for
damages could not be rightfully filed in Marawi City as
none of the private respondents, who are all public
officers, held office in Marawi City; neither were the
alleged libelous news items published in that city.
Consequently, it is petitioner's view that the RTC in
Marawi City has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil
action for damages.
Issue: WON venue for the action for damages filed in
Marawi is proper notwithstanding the fact that none of
the respondents held office in Marawi nor were the
alleged libelous news items published in that city.
Held: The petitioner is correct in saying that the venue
was improperly laid. However, unless and until the
defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss
prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be
said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical
intents and purposes, the venue though technically
wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties
for whose convenience the rules on venue had been
devised. Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in the court
below, should have timely challenged the venue laid in
Marawi City in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4,
Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner
had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint
with Counterclaim. Thus, filing of answer waives MTD
on ground of improper venue.
Escolin: the rules now allow raising the issue of
improper venue as an affirmative defense in the answer
even if there was failure to raise it in a motion to dismiss
(Rule 16, Sec. 6).
ENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN
PUBLIC OFFICIAL. — From the provision of Article 360,
third paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by R.A. 4363, it is clear that an offended party who is at
the same time a public official can only institute an
action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place
where he holds office, and the place where the alleged
libelous articles were printed and first published.
IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A MOTION TO
DISMISS PRIOR TO A RESPONSIVE PLEADING. — Unless
and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion
to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue
cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since,
for all practical intents and purposes, the venue though
technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to
the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue
had been devised.
Sweetlines v. Teves, 83 SCRA 361 (1978)
Facts: This is a Cagayan de Oro case which involves
Sweet Lines, a shipping company with the head office in
Cebu. The respondent Teves is the former City Fiscal of
Davao City, former Mayor and became judge of CFI of
Cagayan de Oro City.
There was a group of passenger who rode on the Sweet
Lines bound for Cebu City. During the trip, they were
given a crude treatment by the officers of the vessel.
When they came back in Cagayan de Oro City, they filed
a suit for damages against Sweet Lines. They file the
case in the former CFI, now RTC, of Cagayan de Oro
City because the plaintiffs are residents of Cagayan de
Oro City.
Sweet Lines filed a motion to dismiss questioning the
venue of the action because in the ticket issued by
Sweet Lines, it is stipulated that “…in case of a civil
action arising from the contract of carriage, the venue of
the action shall be the City of Cebu ONLY and in no other
place.” So there is a restrictive word. Obviously the
lawyers of Sweet Lines knew about Polytrade because
they moved to dismiss the case citing this case.
Judge Teves denied the motion to dismiss the case
despite the stipulation. According to him, it is unfair. If I
will dismiss the case based on this stipulation, the
aggrieved parties will be discouraged in going to Cebu. It
is very expensive and they will be inconvenienced. But,
if the case will go on in Cagayan de Oro, it will not
inconvenienced Sweet Lines because they have their
branch office, their manager and their own lawyer.
Held: Although venue may be changed or transferred by
agreement of the parties in writing, such an agreement
will not be held valid where it practically negates the
action of the claimants. Considering the expense and
trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would
incur to prosecute a claim in the Cebu City, he would
most probably decide not to file the action at all. The
condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends
of justice. On the other hand, Sweetlines has branches
or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and
can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the
filing of the suit in residence of plaintiff, as was done in
the instant case, will not cause inconvience to, much
less prejudice Sweetlines. The stipulation, if enforced,
will be subversive of the public good or interest, since it
will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of passenger
claimants outside of Cebu City, thus placing Sweetlines
company at a decided advantage over said persons, who
may have perfectly legitimate claims against it. The said
condition should, therefore, be declared void and
unenforceable, as contrary to public policy
Escolin: The SC characterized a contract of adhesion as
void for being against public policy.
de Leon: Contrast the rationale in the cases of
Sweetlines and Clavecilla re: “confusion” and “untold
inconvenience” on the part of defendants.
PLEADINGS
CALO V. AJAX, 22 SCRA 996 (1968)
Facts: Sometime on May 7, 1959, plaintiff-appellant
Calo ordered from defendant-appellee Ajax
International, Inc., 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire rope at
P2.85 per foot. The transaction was evidenced by Charge
Order No. 37071, for P3,420.00.
According to plaintiff Calo, when the wire rope
was delivered to Butuan City, the same was found short
of 300 ft. Plaintiff then wrote two letters to defendant
asking for either completion of delivery or account
adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. of wire
rope.
On November 20, 1961, a complaint docketed as
Civil Case No. IV-93062 was filed in the Municipal Court
of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have
acquired the outstanding credit account of Calo from
defendant Ajax International, Inc. Charge Order No.
37071 was among those included in the assigned
account. Subsequently, a judgment by default was
entered, and a writ of execution issued, against plaintiff
Calo
On January 23, 1962, plaintiff Calo, assisted by
her husband, Marcos Calo, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Agusan a complaint against defendant
asking (1) that the latter either effect complete delivery
of Charge Order No. 37071 or that she be relieved from
paying P855.00 and (2) that the latter indemnify her for
P12,000 as attorney's fees, damages and expenses of
litigation
Instead of filing an answer, defendant moved for
the dismissal of Civil Case 860 on the ground, inter alia,
that the subject thereof was involved and intimately
related to that in Civil Case No. IV-93062 of the
Municipal Court of Manila. The court a quo sustained
the motion and dismissed the case on the ground that
plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that
should be filed in the MTC.
Issue: WON the plaintiff's claim is a compulsory
counter-claim that should be filed in the MTC.
Held: No. Counterclaims that are beyond the jurisdiction
of the MTC are not compulsory and are not waived by
the failure to set up before the MTC. The rules allow
such counterclaims to be set-up only for the defendant
to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This
means that should the court find both plaintiff's
complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an amount
exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will
simply dismiss the complaint on the ground that
defendant has a bigger credit.
 However, any counterclaim set-up in excess of
the court’s jurisdiction is waived. Failure of the
defendant to set-up such claim does not bar him from
filing a separate civil action on the same claim before the
RTC.
de Leon: compare this with the Progressive Development
Corp. v. CA, 301 SCRA 637 (1999) which Escolin said
was wrong.
SINGAPORE AIRLINES V. CA, 243 SCRA (1995)
Facts: Rayos was an overseas employee who has a
renewed contract with of Aramco. Aramco reimburses
the amounts its returning employees pay for excess
baggage. Rayos took a Singapore Airlines and validly
claimed reimbursement. Aramco investigates Rayo for
fraudulent claims. Rayo asked Singapore Airlines to
issue a certification. Singapore delays in issuing the
certification. Rayo’s contract with Aramco was not
renewed. Rayo sues Singapore. Singapore blames PAL
and files a 3rd party complaint against PAL. PAL
answers that the tampering was Singapore’s fault.
Judge rules for Rayo on the main case, and for
Singapore in the 3rd party complaint. Judgment for
Rayo became final. PAL appeals the 3rd party complaint
claiming for the 1st time that Rayo was not entitled to
damages from Singapore because his contract with
Aramco was not renewed because of his unsatisfactory
performance.
Held: Judgment for Rayo being final, PAL may not
question it. A 3rd-party defendant is allowed to set up
in his answer the defenses which the 3rd-party
plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have against
the original plaintiff's claim. However, he must do so
in his 3rd party answer, and not raise it for the 1st time
on appeal. PAL should have raised in its 3rd party
answer everything that it may conceivably interpose by
way of its defense, including specific denials of
allegations in the main complaint which implicated it
along with Singapore.
Applicable rule: Rule 6, Section 13.
CHAVEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 193 SCRA 282 (1991)
Facts: The RP, through PCGG with the assistance of SG
filed with the respondent SB a civil case against Enrile
and among others for alleged illegal activities made by
Enrile during the Marcos era. Enrile filed a motion to
dismiss but it was denied. Thereafter, he filed his
answer compulsory counter-claim and cross claim with
damages. In the counter-claim, Enrile moved to implead
Chavez and other PCGG officials on the basis that the
case filed against him was a “harassment suit”. The
motion to implead Chavez and others was granted by
the Sandiganbayan. The plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider but the SB denied the same.
Issue: WON the claim against the SG arising from the
filing of the alleged harassment suit constitute a
compulsory counter-claim.
Held: A claim for damages based on malice and evident
bad faith of a litigant’s counsel in filing a case is not a
compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him.
It must be filed as a separate and distinct civil action for
damages against such counsel. A counterclaim is
possible to a case filed by a respondent against a
petitioner or parties in the litigation. In the present case,
the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not
against the party plaintiff itself. A counterclaim is
 A lawyer shall not be bothered with the
possible only against a party to the action.
counterclaim so that he will be effective in
defending his client.
BULACAN V. TORCINO, 134 SCRA 252 (1985)
Facts: Complaint for forcible entry and damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction was filed in the MTC
of Leyte against Torcino. The complaint was signed by a
non-lawyer friend of the plaintiff but was verified by the
plaintiff himself. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant
appeals before the RTC and moves to dismiss the case
on the ground that the complaint was not signed by the
plaintiff or by an attorney.
Issue: WON a complaint for forcible entry and detainer
should be dismissed by the MTC on the ground that the
plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member of the bar to
sign and file it to him.
Held: The complaint is valid as non-lawyer friends or
agent may assist litigants before the MTC. However, in
cases before the RTC, the litigant must be aided by a
member of the bar.
Rule 138; Section 34 provides:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted.—In the court of
a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar.
ESTOESTA V. CA, 191 SCRA 303 (1990)
Facts: Petitioner-accused was convicted to suffer
imprisonment for slight physical injuries. Petitioner
through counsel filed a notice of appeal to the RTC and
the judgment was modified as to the penalty imposing a
straight penalty of 11 days. MtD to the RTC was denied.
Later, petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, filed
with the CA a motion for extension within which to file a
petition for review on the ground that she has to look for
another lawyer and filing thereafter a motion to
withdraw petition for review of an RTC judgment
modifying an MTC conviction for slight physical injuries,
in order to apply for probation. Probation was denied on
the ground that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted when the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Accused now moves to reconsider the withdrawal and to
reinstate the petition for review because its withdrawal
was filed without advice of counsel.
Held: A party can always conduct litigation personally or
by an attorney in Courts. If in the process his cause
suffers reverses, he only has himself to blame.
CORTEZ V. CA, 83 SCRA 31 (1978)
Facts: Due to the driver's negligence, a truck owned by
Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and driven by Macario Supan on
August 20, 1957, hit and killed Severino Cortez. Judge
E. Soriano of the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered a decision ordering defendants Kuy Guam Kay,
Ltd. and Macario Supan to pay solidarily the sum of four
thousand pesos as damages to the plaintiffs, the heirs of
Severino Cortez. Defendants Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and
Supan appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the
pendency, the Court of First Instance of Manila in Case
No. 41549 acquitted Supan of homicide through
reckless imprudence. Because of that acquittal Kuy
Guam Kay, Ltd. and Supan filed petition in the Court of
Appeals to re-open Civil Case No. 34092 so that the
judgment of acquittal could be presented in evidence.
On November 17, 1969 the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision the judgment of the lower court in
Civil Case No. 34092 with the modification that the
amount of damages was increased to P12,000. A copy of
that decision was served on November 21, 1969 on Atty.
Joaquin C. Yuseco, the defendants-appellants' counsel
of record. However, Atty. Yuseco returned that copy and
informed the Court by letter that he had ceased to be
the lawyer for defendants-appellants Supan and Kuy
Guam Kay, Ltd. The Court of Appeals in its resolution of
January 13, 1970 noted Yuseco's letter and made the
observation that Yuseco had "not filed any formal
motion for the withdrawal of his appearance" in that
case.
The decision became final and the writ of
execution was issued. Defendant through a new lawyer
filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration and suspension of execution. It alleged
that there was no valid service of the decision upon it.
The motion was granted. Plaintiff filed an appeal from
the resolution of August 18, 1970.
Issue: WON the service of summons was duly served to
plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that his counsel
returned the copy of summon to the Court with the note
that he was no longer appellants' counsel.
Held: Until counsel of record formally withdraws, court
processes may be validly served upon him, even if his
services have in fact been terminated. Service to him, is
service to his client, even if he returns the document
served on him to the court.
Requirements for Substitution of Counsel during
proceeding
1. Written application for substitution
2. written consent of party
3. written consent of attorney to be substituted
4. approval of court
JUREIDINI V. CA, 83 SCRA 90 (1978)
Lawyers' rights to fees from their clients cannot have a
standing higher than the rights of the clients or parties
themselves and may not be invoked by the lawyers
themselves as a ground for disapproving or otherwise
holding in abeyance the approval of the compromise
agreement, since said rights can be enforced in the
proper court in an appropriate proceeding. A petition for
intervention cannot prevent the approval of a
compromise agreement entered into by and between the
parties litigants and the same will be denied where the
claim of the intervenor can be properly ventiliated before
the proper court in a separate proceeding.
Escolin: In criminal cases, the accused has a
constitutional right to counsel. Hence if his defense was
handled by a fake attorney which resulted in to a
conviction, the case should be remanded. The same is
true when it comes to civil cases (Telan v. CA, 1991)
STO. TOMAS UNIVERSITY V. SURLA, 294 SCRA 382
(1998)
Facts: On 26 December 1995, respondent spouses filed
a complaint for damages against petitioner Santo Tomas
University Hospital with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City predicated on an allegation by the spouses
that their son, Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while confined at
the said hospital for having been born prematurely, had
accidentally fallen from his incubator on 16 April 1995
possibly causing serious harm on the child. On 28
February 1996, petitioner hospital filed its Answer with
"Compulsory Counterclaim" asserting that respondents
still owed to it the amount of P82,632.10 representing
hospital bills for Emmanuel's confinement at the
hospital and making a claim for moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney's fees, by reason of the
supposed unfounded and malicious suit filed against it.
On 21 March 1996, petitioner received a copy of
respondents' Reply to Counterclaim, dated 12 March
1996, that sought, inter alia, the dismissal of
petitioner's counterclaim for its non-compliance with
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94
requiring that a complaint and other initiatory
pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim, third
(fourth, etc.) party complaint, be accompanied with a
certificate of non-forum shopping.
In its Rejoinder to respondents' Reply to Counterclaim,
petitioner contended that the subject circular should be
held to refer only to a permissive counterclaim, an
initiatory pleading not arising out of, nor necessarily
connected with, the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim
but not to a compulsory counterclaim spawned by the
filing of a complaint and so intertwined therewith and
logically related thereto that it verily could not stand for
independent adjudication. Petitioner concluded that,
since its counterclaim was compulsory in nature, the
subject circular did not perforce apply to it. Petitioner
forthwith elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by
way of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
Revised Rules of Court, asseverating grave abuse of
discretion by public respondent in dismissing the
compulsory counterclaim and in espousing the view that
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 should apply even to
compulsory counterclaims.
Issue: 1.) WON special civil action for certiorari is the
proper remedy of petitioner against public respondent in
dismissing the compulsory counterclaim.
2.) WON a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an
Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to
accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Held: 1). No. The order of the trial court dismissing
petitioner's counterclaim was a final order since the
dismissal, although based on a technicality, would
require nothing else to be done by the court with respect
to that specific subject except only to await the possible
filing during the reglementary period of a motion for
reconsideration or the taking of an appeal therefrom. As
a rule, errors of judgment, as well as of procedure,
neither relating to the jurisdiction of the court nor
involving grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable
by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
2.) A party need not execute a certification of non-forum
shopping on a compulsory counterclaim. Only a
permissive counterclaim must contain such
certification. This is because CC is not an independent
and distinct pleading.

In permissive counterclaim, file a pleading, pay
the docket fees and attach a certificate a non-
forum shopping. It has the status of a pleading by

filing a complaint in another court.
No need to pay in compulsory counterclaim
KAVINTA V. CASTILLO, JR., 249 SCRA 604 (1995)
Facts: On 11 May 1994, private respondent represented
by his attorney-in-fact, Angeles F. Arroyo, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against
petitioner Lazaro V. Kavinta and others 2 a complaint
for Recovery of Possession and Issuance of Writ of
Demolition. The case was presided over by public
respondent Judge Castillo.
On 20 June 1994, the petitioner and his codefendants
moved to dismiss the complaint 3 on the ground that "it
does not comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94
of the Supreme Court which took effect on April 1,
1994."
On 20 July 1994, Judge Castillo issued an order
denying the motion to dismiss in view of the submission
of the aforesaid certification. Petitioner filed a special
civil action for certiorari.
Issue: WON the certification of non-forum shopping
required under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 which
was, subsequently submitted after the filing of the
motion to dismiss constitutes a substantial compliance.
Held: No. Mere submission of a certification of non-
forum shopping after the filing of a motion to dismiss on
the ground of such failure does not operate as a
substantial compliance and does not cure the defect,
otherwise the Circular would lose its value or efficacy.
The case may still be dismissed.
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL V. CA, 249
SCRA 389 (1995)
Facts: On February 3, 1988, the Philippine Ports
Authority issued Administrative Order No. 02-88 (A.O.
No. 02-88) entitled "Implementing Guidelines on Open
Pilotage Service". It opened pilotage services in the
Philippines to all licensed and accredited harbor pilots
regardless of their non-membership in existing harbor
pilots association.
Private respondent Manila Pilots and United Harbor
moved to set aside the implementation of A.O. No. 02-88
claiming that it violated their exclusiv right to provide
pilotage services in the Philippines before the DOTC and
PPA. Failing in their efforts to obtain a reconsideration
of the said administrative order, "United Harbor" and
private respondent "Manila Pilots" sought to invalidate
A.O. No. 02-88 by filing with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order.
The RTC rendered a decision in their favor and the
Administrative Order No. 02-88 is declared null and
void. The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals
via a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as it raised a purely
legal question. The dismissal was appealed to this court
by way of a petition for review on certiorari which was
denied with finality on June 8, 1992.
Notwithstanding the finality of the decision recognizing
the exclusive right to pilotage of "United Harbor" and
private respondent "Manila Pilots", petitioner
"International Container" took over the pilotage services
at the Manila International Port area on October 28,
1992 by virtue of a contract it entered into with the
Philippine Ports Authority.
"United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots"
filed a series of petitions in Civil Case No. 88-44726 to
hold then Philippine Ports Authority General Manager
Rogelio A. Dayan and "International Container" officials
and other persons in contempt of court.
Pending resolution of the contempt petitions, private
respondent filed another case against petitioner
"International Container" before Branch 32 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for damages suffered by
private respondent "Manila Pilots" between April 19,
1993 and April 29, 1993 as a result of petitioner's
usurpation of its sole and exclusive exercise of harbor
pilotage in the South and North Harbors of Manila and
Limay, Bataan, except the Manila International Port
area.
Similarly, aggrieved by the unjust actuations of
petitioner "International Container", and its continuing
refusal to relinquish pilotage services in the Manila
International Port area, private respondent "Manila
Pilots" instituted a petition for mandamus, prohibition
with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages
against petitioner "International Container" before
Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In the second petition, the RTC issued the writ prayed
for, thereby "restoring and reinstating private
respondent "Manila Pilots" to the exclusive exercise of
harbor pilotage in the Manila International Port (MIP)
area and commanding petitioner "International
Container" to cease and desist from usurping or
exercising the right to compulsory pilotage in the said
Manila International Port.
Petitioner assailed this order of the lower court by filing
a petition for certiorari with respondent court
contending that there is forum shopping
Issue: WON private respondent committed forum-
shopping.
Held: No. For forum shopping to exist, both actions
must involve the same transactions, same essential
facts and circumstances. The actions must also raise
identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.
There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another.
In the case at bar, there is no similarity of facts nor
identity of causes of action where one case is for the
recovery of damages as a result of petitioner’s
usurpation of the right to pilotage of private respondent
in the South and North Harbors of Manila and Limay,
Bataan, except the Manila International Port area only
from October 28, 1993 to April 29, 1993 while the other
case was brought to enjoin petitioner from usurping the
same right of private respondent in the MIP area only
from October 28, 1992 up to the present.
ORTIZ V. CA, 299 SCRA (1998)
Facts: The spouses Rodriguez filed an action for
ejectment in the (MeTC) of Parañaque against Valentin
and Camilla Ortiz, herein petitioners who are lessees of
Christopher and Angelica Barramedas, on the ground
that they are the real owners of the house and lot or the
subject property. MeTC awarded the possession of the
property in favor of the Rodriguezes.
The Ortizes appealed the Parañaque MeTC decision to
the RTC of Parañaque. On August 30, 1996, the latter
court found no reversible error in the assailed judgment,
and thus affirmed it in toto. On September 27, 1996, the
Rodriguezes filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution of judgment, which was opposed by the
herein petitioners on October 24, 1996.
Upon the Parañaque RTC's denial of the Opposition to
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the petitioners
Ortizes appealed to the Court of Appeals ("CA"). The
petition was dismissed on the ground that the
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by the
counsel and not by the petitioners themselves.
Issue: WON the certificate of non-forum shopping
should be signed by the parties.
Held: A petition for review, for certiorari, for mandamus,
and even appeal requires a certificate against forum-
shopping. It must be the party himself who must certify
for it requires personal knowledge by the party who
executed the same. If only counsel certifies, the case
should be dismissed, unless there is a statement of a
reasonable and sufficient cause why the party could not
sign the certification.
It should be recalled that Revised Circular No. 28-91 5
provides that the party must certify under oath that he
has not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, and that to the best of his
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency.
de Leon: A perusal of the rules on appeal reveal that
ordinary appeals does not require a certificate against
forum shopping while petitions for review, petition for
review on certiorari, and special civil action for certiorari
does require a certificate against forum-shopping.
Rule 8:
TORIBIO V. BIDIN, 134 SCRA 162 (1985)
This petition is premised on the interpretation and
application of Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court on actionable documents
Facts: Engracio Francisco and Juliana Esteban were the
registered owners of the parcel of land Zamboanga. At
the death of said spouses, they were survived by their
ten (10) children who inherited their state in equal pro
indiviso shares. Subsequently, the property was
subdivided among the heirs and a portion designated as
Lot No. 1943-B was allotted to the Justa Francisco.
Justa died and was survived among by eight (8) children
namely: Dionoso, Eufremia, Alfonso, Rafael, Petrona,
Olegario, Segundino and Eusebia, all surnamed Toribio,
who eight heirs, Eufremia, Alfonso and Petrona, sold
their in the property to Ramon Ledesma. Rafael also
sold his share to Dinisio who, in turn, sold the same to
Ramon Ledesma. Thus, the latter acquired four (4)
shares out of eight (8) shares, or a ½ pro indiviso share
of Lot 1943-B.
Subsequently, Dionisio sold his own hereditary
share in the aforesaid estate of his mother to Juanito
Camacho, who by said sale acquired a 1/8 pro indiviso
share of the property.
 The three other heirs, petitioners Segundino
Eusebia and Olegario alleging that their shares had
never been sold nor in any wise transferred or disposed
to others filed a case against herein private respondents
for recovery of hereditary rights.
In their answer, the defendants-respondents
alleged that the shares of plaintiffs-petitioners had
likewise been sold to Dionisio Toribio, their brother,
who, in turn, sold the same to Juanito Camacho and
Dalmacio Ramos. The alleged sale from petitioners to
Dionisio and the sale from Dionisio to the respondents
were evidenced by deeds of sale, xerox copies of which
were appended to and made an integral part of the
respondents' partition agreement between the
respondents and also a xerox copy of the respondents'
transfer certificates of title.
While testifying during the trial, Eusebia Toribio
was asked whether she executed any sale of her share in
the parcel of land in litigation. The counsel for private
respondents objected, raising the proper mode of
contesting the genuineness of an actionable document
pursuant to Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The trial court sustained the objection.
Petitioners filed a constancia with a motion for
reconsideration stating that the documents submitted
by the respondents were merely evidentiary in nature,
not a cause of action or defense, the due execution and
genuineness of which they had to prove. They argued
that a simple specific denial without oath is sufficient.
The court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
1. WON the deeds of sale allegedly executed by the
petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio
Toribio and appended to the respondents' answer
are merely evidentiary in nature or the very
foundation of their defense which must be denied
under oath by the petitioner.
a. The records show that the deeds of sale are
actionable document which must be
denied under oath by the petitioner. It is
clear that the respondents anchor their
defense on the deeds of sale by virtue of
which the hereditary rights of all the
petitioners over Lot 1943-B were sold,
transferred, and conveyed in favor of their
brother, Dionisio Toribio, who in turn sold
the same to herein respondents. The deed
of sale executed by the petitioners in favor
of their brother Dionisio is an essential and
indispensable part of their defense to the
allegation that the petitioners had never
disposed of their property.
2. WON the document be made the subject of
material issue.
a. The genuineness and due execution of the
deed between the co-heirs is also elemental
to the defense of the respondents. The first
deeds of sale, to which the respondents
were not parties but which they seek to
enforce against the parties are also
actionable documents.
3. WON Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8 applies.
a. Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8, therefore,
apply. The proper procedure was for the
petitioners to specifically deny under oath
the genuineness and due execution of the
questioned deeds of sale and to set forth
what they claim to be the facts.
 The requirement of denial under oath applies also
to defenses based on a document attached to an
answer. The offeror need not be a party to the
instrument in order to require a denial under oath, as
long as the adverse party is a party to the instrument.
Allegation in a previous sworn pleading negating the
possibility of execution of the instrument subsequently
offered by the opponent is sufficient denial under oath of
such instrument.
Escolin: Objection to evidence barred by the rule
requiring denial under oath must be upon calling the
witness, even before the question is put forth.
BOUGH AND BOUGH V. CANTIVEROS, 40 PHIL 209
(1919)
Facts: Matilde Cantiveros is reputed to be the richest
resident of the municipality of Carigara, Leyte. In the
latter part of the year 1913, she was the owner of
various parcels of realty of the value of thirty thousand
pesos or more. On December 24, 1912, Matilde
Cantiveros and her husband Jose Vasquez, signed a
marital contract of separation. At this time there lived
with Matilde Cantiveros, Basilia Hanopol, a cousin and
protege since childhood, who was married to Gustavus
Bough. For this reason, Gustavus Bough was regarded
by Matilde Cantiveros with great confidence, even as her
child. Through the influence of Gustavus Bough, who
brought a story to Matilde Cantiveros that her husband
Jose Vasquez was in town and might contest the
contract for the separation of the conjugal property,
Matilde Cantiveros was induced to sign a fictitious
contract of sale of all her property to Basilia Bough. This
document, introduced in evidence as Exhibit A, was
prepared in due from and acknowledged before a notary
public, the amount of the consideration, ten thousand
pesos, being last inserted with a pen. By this deed,
Matilde Cantiveros purported to convey sixty-three
parcels of land, the real value of which was over thirty
thousand pesos, for ten thousand pesos, although no
evidence that any such sum ever passed between the
parties was introduced, to her cousin, Basilia Bough. In
order to reassure Matilde Cantiveros that they would not
take advantage of the fictitious sale, Gustavus Bough
and Basilia Bough prepared and signed another
document, introduced in evidence as Exhibit 1, which is
a donation by them to Matilde Cantiveros of all the
property mentioned in Exhibit A, to be effective in case
of the death of themselves and their children before the
death of Matilde Cantiveros. The defendant, Matilde
Cantiveros, has remained in possession of the property.
An action was begun in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, pursuant to a complaint by means of
which the plaintiffs Basilia Bough and Gustavus Bough
sought to have themselves put in possession of the
property covered by the deed of sale quoted in the
complaint, and to require the defendant Matilde
Cantiveros to pay the plaintiffs the sum of five hundreds
pesos by way of damages, and to pay the costs.
Matilde Cantiveros answered with a general
denial and a special defense, not sworn to, in which
she asked that judgment be rendered declaring the
contract of sale theretofore made between herself and
Basilia Bough null. The plaintiffs, thereupon, denied
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
so-called donation intervivos set forth in the answer.
Presbitera Hanopol was permitted to intervene as a
defendant. After trial, judgment was rendered by the
Honorable W. E. McMahon, judge of first instance, in
favor of the defendants, declaring the deed of sale,
Exhibit A, fictitious, null, and without effect, and
absolving the defendants from the complaint.
Issue: WON failure of a party to deny under oath the
genuineness of an actionable document bar him from
proving fraud, mistake, or other defenses.
Held: No. Failure of a party to deny under oath the
genuineness of an actionable document does not bar
him from proving fraud, mistake, compromise, payment,
statute of limitations, estoppel, want of consideration or
other defenses that do not deny the genuineness and
due execution of the instrument. In the case at bar,
although defendants did not deny the genuineness and
due execution of the contract of December 9, 1913,
under oath, yet the defendants could properly set up the
defense of fraud and want of consideration.
HIBBERD V. ROHDE, 32 PHIL 476 (1915)
Facts: This is a suit on a promissory note against the
makers. Only defendant Rhode appeared and answered.
Rhode not having entered verified specific denial of the
genuineness and due of the note, the plaintiff claims
that his special defense of illegality of consideration is
cut off.
Issue: WON failure to deny under oath the genuineness
and due execution of an actionable document bars the
defense of illegality of consideration.
Held: Failure to deny under oath the genuineness and
due execution of an actionable document bars only
evidence to controvert its due execution. Execution can
only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it
cannot involve other matters without enlarging its
meaning beyond reason. The party whose signature it
bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him with his authority; that at the time it
was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out
in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered and that any formal requisites
required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him
(memorize!). It does not bar evidence of other defenses
like want or illegal consideration.
Defenses that are barred by failure to deny under
oath a document upon which an action or defense is
based
1. signature is a forgery
2. the signature was by an unauthorized agent or
partner
3. the corporation was not authorized under its
charter to sign the instrument
4. the party charged signed the instrument in some
other capacity than that alleged in the pleading
setting it out
5. the instrument was never delivered
JABALDE V. PNB, 7 SCRA 791 (1963)
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant Perfecto Jabalde seeks recovery
of P10,000.00 allegedly deposited by him with the
defendant-appellee Philippine National Bank, P5,000.00
in genuine Philippine currency on 21 July 1941 and
another P5,000.00 on 30 August 1943 in mixed genuine
Philippine currency and Japanese military notes.
 The defendant's answer was not under oath, and
admits the making of the foregoing deposits, but denies
the dates of deposit, alleging as the true dates 21 July
1944 and 30 August 1944, and avers that the entries in
the passbook as to the deposit dates were "knowingly,
unlawfully and maliciously" altered by the plaintiff; and
that the deposits were all in Japanese military notes.
The CFI of Cebu dismissed the case.
The testimony of the expert witness as to the last
two numerals of the first date year, that it is "1944", is
logical, and eliminates whatever doubt exists by means
of enlarged photographs. He explained how both the
slant (diagonal) and the vertical lines in both figures are
parallel to each other, and the angles created by the
slant and horizontal lines are congruent; the bases of
the two "4's" are on the same plane. Therefore, we agree
that no other conclusion is possible than that the two
last digits are both "4".
Defendant's witnesses have also shown, by their
testimonies and business sheets of account during the
war years (Exhibits 5, 6, and 7), that appellant Perfecto
Jabalde did not have a pre-war, or "controlled", account
with the defendant bank, although he did open a
wartime, or "free", account. The passbook states on its
face that it is a "Free Account". The difference between
the two kinds of accounts, as instituted by the bank,
has been well explained.
Issue: WON the bank's failure to deny under oath the
entries in the passbook as "copied" in the complaint
constitutes an admission of the genuineness and due
execution of the document.
Held: Ordinarily, such failure is an admission. However,
this rule cannot apply in the present case because the
plaintiff introduced evidence purporting to support his
allegations of deposit on the dates he wanted the court
to believe, and offered no objection during the trial to
the testimonies of defendant's witnesses and
documentary evidence showing different dates of
deposit. By these acts, the plaintiff waived the
defendant's technical admission through failure to deny
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
document
Presentation of evidence as to facts admitted by
the failure to deny under oath, and failure to object
when the opposing party offers evidence to controvert
what he has already deemed to have admitted, amounts
to a waiver of the admission.
Escolin: Counsel for Jabalde should have objected on
the ground that the fact that the evidence sought to
prove had already been admitted.
de Leon: If counsel did object, I submit that the offeror’s
mere presentation of supporting evidence was enough
waiver of the technical admission. cf Rule 10, Sec. 5
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence. — When issues not raised by
the pleadings are tried with the express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall
do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of
the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance
to enable the amendment to be made. (5a)
Presentation of evidence by the offeror of the
actionable document treats the issue of authenticity and
due execution of the actionable document as having
been raised in the pleadings (i.e. as if there had been a
specific denial under oath).
CENTRAL SURETY V. CN HODGES, 38 SCRA 159
(1971)
Facts: Prior to January 15, 1954, lots Nos. 1226 and
1182 of the Cadastral Survey of Talisay, Negros
Occidental, had been sold by C. N. Hodges to Vicente M.
Layson, for the sum of P43,000.90, payable on
installments. As of January 15, 1954, the outstanding
balance of Layson's debt, after deducting the
installments paid by him prior thereto, amounted to
P15,516.00. In order that he could use said lots as
security for a loan he intended to apply from a bank,
Layson persuaded Hodges to execute in his (Layson's)
favor a deed of absolute sale over the properties, with
the understanding that he would put up a surety bond
to guarantee the payment of said balance.
Accordingly, on the date above-mentioned,
Layson executed, in favor of Hodges, a promissory note
for P15,516.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 1%
per month, and the sum of P1,551.60, for attorney's fees
and costs, in case of default in the payment of the
principal or interest of said note. To guarantee the same,
on January 23, 1954, the Central Surety and Insurance
Company — hereinafter referred to as petitioner —
through the manager of its branch office in Iloilo, Mrs.
Rosita Mesa, executed in favor of Hodges the surety
bond Annex B, which was good for twelve (12) months
from the date thereof.
When Layson defaulted in the discharge of his
aforesaid obligation, Hodges demanded payment from
the petitioner, which, despite repeated extensions of
time granted thereto, at its request, failed to honor its
commitments under the surety bond. On October 24,
1955, Hodges commenced, therefore, the present action,
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, against Layson
and petitioner herein, to recover from them, jointly and
severally, the sums of P17,826.08, representing the
principal and interest due up to said date, and
P1,551.60, as attorney's fees. In his answer to the
complaint, Layson admitted the formal allegations and
denied the other allegations thereof.
Petitioner was declared in default.
In its answer, petitioner disclaimed liability under
the surety bond in question, upon the ground (a) that
the same is null and void, it having been issued by Mrs.
Rosita Mesa after her authority therefor had been
withdrawn on March 15, 1952. CA ruled in favor
Hodges. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Held: Where a case has been tried in complete disregard
of the rule and the plaintiff having pleaded a document
by copy, presents oral evidence to prove the due
execution of the document as well as the agent’s
authority and no objections are made to the defendant’s
evidence in refutation, the rule will be considered
waived.
Hodges had neither objected to the evidence introduced
by petitioner herein in order to prove that Mrs. Mesa
had no authority to issue a surety bond, much less one
in excess of P8,000.00, and took no exception to the
admission of said evidence. Hence, Hodges must be
deemed to have waived the benefits of said rule and
petitioner herein cannot be held liable in excess of the
sum of P8,000.00.
Failure of the plaintiff to object to evidence of the
defendant constitutes a waiver of admission from failure
to deny under oath
CAPITOL MOTORS V. YABUT, 32 SCRA 1 (1970)
Facts: On March 1, 1966, Capitol Motors Corporations
filed a complaint against Nemesio I. Yabut. It was
therein averred that on April 24, 1965, the defendant
executed in favor of the plaintiff a promissory note (copy
of which was attached to the complaint) for the sum of
P30,134.25, payable in eighteen (18) equal monthly
installments with interest at 12% per annum, the first
installment to become due on June 10, 1965, that it was
stipulated in the promissory note that should the
defendant fail to pay two (2) successive installments, the
principal sum remaining unpaid would immediately
become due and demandable and the defendant would,
by way of attorney's fees and costs of collection, be
obligated to the plaintiff for an additional sum
equivalent to 25% of the principal and interest due; that
as of February 23, 1966, the sum remaining unpaid on
the promissory note was P30,754.79, including accrued
interest; that the defendant defaulted in the payment of
two (2) successive installments, and likewise failed to
pay the interest due on the promissory note; and that in
spite of demands by the plaintiff, the defendant failed
and refused to pay the said principal sum and interest
due. Prayer was made that the defendant be ordered to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P30,754.79, as well as the
interest due thereon from February 23, 1966, and an
additional sum equivalent to 25% of the amount due,
plus costs.
On April 27, 1966, and within the reglementary
period, the defendant, through his counsel, filed an
answer which reads:
Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint
are specifically denied for lack of knowledge
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof.
Issue: WON defendant-appellant's answer constitutes a
specific denial under Rule 8 (10).
Held: We do not think so. The rule authorizing an
answer to the effect that the defendant has no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of an averment and giving such answer the
effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to
which want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and
necessarily within the defendant's knowledge that his
averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue.
The rule that deems as a denial an allegation of “lack of
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
allegation of the adverse party” does not apply where the
fact as to which the lack of knowledge is asserted is
plainly within the defendant’s knowledge and his
averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue (e.g.
whether or not he executed a PN). The allegation of lack
of knowledge must be in good faith and in sincerity.
Mere allegation of ignorance is insufficient to raise an
issue. Defendant must aver positively how it is that he is
ignorant of the facts so alleged.
de Leon: This in effect ruled that in order to effectively
deny an actionable document, there must be a specific
denial, and not just an allegation of lack of knowledge.
Lack of knowledge as a denial is ineffective against
actionable documents because the adverse party is
always a party to the instrument being offered. Being a
party to the instrument, it is always “plainly within his
knowledge” whether the instrument offered is authentic
or duly executed. Hence, to deny an actionable
document, the denial must always be specific, and not
just a mere allegation of lack of knowledge.
Rule 9
FERRER V. ERICTA, 84 SCRA 705 (1978)
Facts: In a complaint for damages against respondents,
dated December 27, 1974 but actually filed on January
6, 1975 it was alleged that defendants Mr. and Mrs.
Francis Pfleider, residents of Bayawan, Negros Oriental,
were the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car; that
at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 31,
1970, in the streets of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, their
son, defendant Dennis Pfleider, who was then only
sixteen (16) years of age, without proper official
authority, drove the vehicle, without due regard to traffic
rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary
precaution to prevent injury to persons or damage to
property, and as a consequence the pickup car was
overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette
Ferrer, who was then a passenger therein, which
injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment
and confinement at different hospitals for more than two
(2) years; that as a result of the physical injuries
sustained by Annette, she suffered unimaginable
physical pain, mental anguish, and her parents also
suffered mental anguish, moral shock and spent a
considerable sum of money for her treatment. They
prayed that defendants be ordered to reimburse them
for actual expenses as well as other damages.
Defendants filed their answer, putting up the
affirmative defense that defendant Dennis Pfleider
exercised due care and utmost diligence in driving the
vehicle aforementioned and alleging that Annette Ferrer
and the other persons aboard said vehicle were not
passengers in the strict sense of the term, but were
merely joy riders and that, consequently, defendants
had no obligation whatsoever to plaintiffs.
Respondent Judge rendered judgment against
private respondents, finding that the minor Dennis
Pfleider, was allowed by his parents to operate a Ford
pick-up car and because of his reckless negligence
caused the accident in question, resulting in injuries to
Annette, and ordering the defendants, as a result
thereof, to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs for
actual, hospitalization and medical expenses; moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs
of suit.
Private respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision and of the order denying
the motion to set aside order of default, based on the
following grounds: (1) the complaint states no cause of
action insofar as Mr. and Mrs. Pfleider are concerned
because it does not allege that at the time of the mishap,
defendant Dennis Pfleider was living with them, the fact
being that at such time he was living apart from them,
hence, there can be no application of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, upon which parents' liability is premised;
and (2) that tile complaint shows on its face "that it was
filed only on January 6, 1975, or after the lapse of
MORE THAN FOUR YEARS from the date of the accident
on December 31, 1970", likewise appearing from the
complaint and, therefore, the action has already
prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
A Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was
subsequently filed by defendants-private respondents,
alleging that their defense of prescription has not been
waived and may be raised even at such stage of the
proceedings because on the face of the complaint, as
well as from the plaintiff's evidence, their cause of action
had already prescribed.
The Opposition to the above supplemental motion
interposed by plaintiffs-petitioners averred that the
defense of prescription had been waived while the
defense that the complaint states no cause of action "is
available only at any time not later than the trial and
prior to the decision.”
Respondent judge issued an order absolving
defendants from any liability on the grounds that: (a) the
complaint states no cause of action because it does not
allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his parents at
the time of the vehicular accident, considering that
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity the mother, are only
responsible for the damages caused by their minor
children who live in their company; and (b) that the
defense of prescription is meritorious, since the
complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the
date of the accident, and the action to recover damages
based on quasi-delict prescribes in four (4) years.
Issue: WON the defense of prescription had been
deemed waived by private respondents' failure to allege
the same in their answer.
Held: No. The defense of prescription, even if not raised
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed
waived unless such defense raises issues of fact not
appearing upon the preceding pleading.
The general rule that the defense of prescription
can only be considered if invoked in the answer does not
obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action
upon which plaintiff’s complaint is based is already
barred by the statute of limitations. More so if the
plaintiff’s own allegation in the complaint or the
evidence it presented shows clearly that the action had
prescribed.
In the present case, there is no issue of fact
involved in connection with the question of prescription.
The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges that the
accident which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff
Annette Ferrer occured on December 31, 1970. It is
undisputed that the action for damages was only filed
on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from
physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within
four years. The four-year period begins from the day the
quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident
GARCIA V. MATHIS, 100 SCRA 251 (1980)
Facts: Sulpicio Garcia sued Colonel Paul C. Mathis in
his capacity as Base Commander, CAFB, acting for and
in behalf of the United States of America. The complaint,
which was filed on November 8, 1977, alleged that
Garcia was a civilian employee at Clark Air Force Base
from May 26, 1949, to August 23, 1956, when he was
dismissed for alleged bribery and collusion. He prayed
inter alia that he be reinstated to his former position,
and paid back wages, moral damages, attorney's fees
and costs of the suit.
The defendant Mathis entered a special
appearance and filed a motion for the dismissal of the
complaint upon the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over his person because he was being sued
as the representative of a foreign sovereign "which has
not consented and does not now consent to the
maintenance of the present suit."
The respondent judge issued an Order and ruled
that without considering the issue of jurisdiction raised
by the defendant in his motion to dismiss, the Court
dismissed the case on the ground that the cause of
action has already prescribed, because paragraphs 3
and 5 of the complaint alleged that the services of the
plaintiff has been terminated on August 23, 1956.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription which the defendant did not raise
in any of his pleadings.
Held: No. The general rule is an action cannot be held
as prescribed if this was not raised in a motion to
dismiss. An exception is when plaintiff’s own allegations
in his complaint show that the action has prescribed. A
MTD on this ground is not necessary. In this case the
complaint shows clearly that the plaintiff's action had
prescribed for he alleged that he was removed on August
23, 1956 (par. 5) but the case was filed only on
November 18, 1977, after a lapse of more than 21 years.
Prescinding, therefore, the defense of jurisdiction which
is apparently meritorious, the complaint was properly
dismissed.
Furthermore, because of the special appearance
which the defendant had entered, he was constrained to
confine himself to showing that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over his person and had to exclude all
other non-jurisdictional grounds in his MTD, otherwise
he would have been deemed to have abandoned his
special appearance and voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court.
de Leon: cf Rule 14, Sec. 20.
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. (23a)
This is a reiteration of La Naval case. Assertion by the
defendant of an affirmative relief in the MTD or filing of
an answer is a voluntary appearance before the court.
GABUYA V. LAYUG, 250 SCRA 218 (1995)
Facts: Antonio Layug entered into a contract with
petitioner Rodrigo Gabuya for the purchase of twelve
(12) lots situated in Iligan City for the price of
P120,000.00 payable in three (3) yearly installments.
Respondent Layug paid the first two (2) annual
installments totaling P80,000.00 but failed to pay the
last installment of P40,000.00. When formal demands
for payment were made by petitioner and respondent
repeatedly failed to pay the former brought suit in the
then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte (now
Regional Trial Court) for annulment of contract and for
recovery of damages against Layug.
After trial judgment was rendered in favor of
petitioner. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the judgment. The appellate court (1)
ordered the rescission of the conditional sale of the
twelve (12) lots described in the contract; (2) declared as
rentals for the twelve (12) lots from 1978 to the present
(30 August 1985) all payments made by respondent
Layug to Gabuya plus the legal interest thereon from the
execution of the contract; (3) ordered respondent Layug
to vacate the twelve (12) lots and deliver the possession
thereof to petitioner Gabuya; and, (4) ordered
respondent Layug to pay petitioner Gabuya the sum of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals particularly insofar as it authorized the
cancellation by petitioner Gabuya of the contract of sale
with respondent Layug. The decision became final and
executory. A writ of execution was issued by the trial
court.
The sheriff submitted to the trial court a return of
the writ of execution with the recommendation that the
buildings of private respondent found in the property be
demolished.
Layug filed a complaint for specific performance
with prayer for a temporary restraining order against
petitioner seeking reimbursement for the value of the
improvements, buildings and materials he (Layug)
introduced in the premises covered by the contract of
sale which by final judgment of this Court was already
ordered rescinded.
His motion to dismiss in the court below having
been denied petitioner filed his answer to the complaint.
Respondent judge issued an order directing Deputy
Provincial Sheriff Salcedo "to refrain from
disposs(ess)ing plaintiff of the possession of the property
until ordered by the court."
Issue: WON the orders restraining the deputy sheriff
from implementing the writ of execution of the final
judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 75364 were issued by
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held: The claim for reimbursement should have been
raised as a counterclaim in the previous case. Failure to
do so precludes the re-litigation of the same facts in a
separate complaint. The claim for such improvements
and indemnity is necessarily connected with the suit for
the restitution or recovery of land.
cf Rule 9 Sec. 2
Sec. 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set
up barred. — A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-
claim, not set up shall be barred. (4a)
CAVILI V. FLORENDO, 154 SCRA 610 (1987)
Facts: Private respondents Clarita, Ulpiano, Estrella, &
Placida (all surnamed Cavili) filed a civil case against
herein petitioners Perfecta, Primitivo, and Quirino (all
surnamed Cavili) with the Neg Occ CFI for Partition,
Accounting, and Damages. Petitioners failed to file their
Answer within the requested period. Upon motion of the
private respondents, the petitioners were declared in
default.
 Counsel for petitioner received a copy of the
decision and filed a motion for new trial on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction over Primitivo and Quirino who
had not been legally served with summons. Motion for
new trial was granted in an Order in 23April.
Private respondents filed MfR of the order
granting new trial and prayed that a writ of execution be
issued but only in so far as Perfecta is concerned.
On 21July CFI set aside the order granting new
trial and directed the execution. Petitioners MfR which
was denied. Thus petitioner brought the case to the SC.
SC granted petition, setting aside the 21July Order and
reviving the 23April Order.
Thereafter, the pre-trial and trial was scheduled
before RTC. Petitioners presented Perfecta as their first
witness. The respondents moved for her disqualification
as a witness on the ground that having been declared in
default, Perfecta has lost her standing in court and she
cannot be allowed to participate in all proceedings
therein, even as witness. Respondent judge Florendo
sustained the respondents’ contention and disqualified
Perfecta from testifying. Petitioners filed MfR which was
denied.
Issue: WON Perfecta Cavili is disqualified to be a witness
on the ground that having been declared in default, she
has lost her standing in court.
HELD: No. Parties in default are not disqualified from
testifying in favor of non-defaulting co-defendants.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying
parties declared in default from taking the witness stand
for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide
default as an exception.
As a party, he cannot participate but as a
witness he can.
The respondents, however, cite Section 2, Rule 18
on Defaults, to wit: Section 2. Effect of order of default.
— Except as provided in section 9 of Rule 13, a party
declared in default shall not be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings nor to take part in the trial.
They advance the argument that to allow Perfecta Cavili
to stand as witness would be to permit a party in default
"to take part in the trial."
Loss of standing in court is the consequence of an
order of default. Thus, a party declared in default is
considered out of court and cannot appear therein,
adduce evidence, and be heard and for that reason he is
not entitled to notice. However, "loss of pending" must
be understood to mean only the forfeiture of one's rights
as a party litigant, contestant or legal adversary. A party
in default loses his right to present his defense, control
the proceedings, and examine or cross-examine
witnesses. He has no right to expect that his pleadings
would be acted upon by the court nor may he object to
or refute evidence or motions filed against him. There is
nothing in the rule, however, which contemplates a
disqualification to be a witness or a opponent in a case.
Default does not make him an incompetent.
As opposed to a party litigant, a witness is merely
a beholder, a spectator or onlooker, called upon to
testify to what he has seen, heard, or observed. As such,
he takes no active part in the contest of rights between
the parties. Cast in the cited role of witness, a party in
default cannot be considered as " a part in the trial." He
remains suffering the effects of an order of default.
A party in default may thus be cited as a witness by his
co-defendants who have the standing and the right to
present evidence which the former may provide. The
incidental benefit giving the party in default the
opportunity to present evidence which may eventually
redound to his advantage or bring about a desired
result, through his co-defendants, is of minor
consequence.
Of greater concern or importance in allowing the
presence of Perfecta Cavili as a witness in the case at
bar, is the preservation of the right of petitioners
Quirino and Primitivo Cavili to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in their behalf.
To reject Perfects Cavili's presentation of testimonial
evidence would be to treat Primitivo and Quirino, as if
they too were in default. There is no reason why the
latter should also be made to bear the consequences of
Perfecta's omission. Moreover, we cannot deprive
Quirino and Primitivo of the only instrument of proof
available to them, as Perfecta alone has been in
possession and administration of the claim.
PACETE V. CARRIAGA, 231 SCRA 321 (1994)
Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de
la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between
Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of
property. In her complaint, she averred that she was
married to Pacete on 30 April 1938 before the Justice of
the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child
named Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that
Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan,
North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only
on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete,
the latter acquired vast property consisting of large
tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles;
that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in the names
of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that
Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement;
and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living
with Clarita.
The defendants failed to file an Answer to the
complaint. The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then directed to
present her evidence. 2 The court received plaintiff's
evidence during the hearings and issued an order for the
issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation of the marriage
between, the plaintiff, Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis
Pacete and the herein defendants, Enrico L. Pacete,
properties to include parcels of land and vehicles
declared as the conjugal properties of the partnership of
the plaintiff, Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and
the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, and declaring the
subsequent marriage between defendant Enrico L.
Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion to be void ab initio.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato
City, gravely abused its discretion in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision which
decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L.
Pacete and private respondent Concepcion Alanis and
held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico
L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion.
HELD There can be no defaults in actions for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation. The court should
instead order the prosecutor to investigate whether or
not collusion between the parties exists, and to
intervene for the State to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
Escolin: Actions for nulliy or annulment of marriage,
and legal separation need not pass thru the
Katarunggang Pambaranggay because the law does not
authorize settlement of such cases.
RAMNANI V. CA, 221 SCRA (1993)
Facts: Spouses Juliette Dizon and Cenen Dizon filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against
the spouses Josephine Anne Ramnani and Bhagwan
Ramnani for the collection of a sum of money
representing the alleged unremitted value of jewelry
received by Josephine from Juliette on consignment
basis.
Josephine Ramnani submitted an answer with
counterclaim in which she alleged that although she did
receive pieces of jewelry worth P934,347.00 from Dizon,
the latter had likewise received from her jewelries worth
P1,671,842,00, including cash and unpaid checks in the
amount of P159,742.50; that she paid Dizon P50,000;
and that Dizon still owes her P787,495.00.
The trial court set the case for pre-trial but the
Ramnanis did not appear. Consequently, they were
declared in default. They filed a motion to lift the order
of default, but this was denied.
Conformably to the default order, evidence of the
Dizon spouses was received ex parte. Judge
Buenaventura J. Guerrero rendered judgment against
the Ramnanis, holding them liable to the Dizons. The
Ramnanis filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that a "personal obligation contracted by the
wife without the consent of the husband (was) being
made enforceable against the spouses' conjugal
partnership despite absence of any allegation and proof
that the same redounded to the benefit of the family as
required by Article 121 of the Family Code." The motion
was denied.
Bhagwan Ramnani filed a petition for certiorari
before the respondent Court of Appeals. However, the
appellate court dismissed the petition.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
refusal of the trial court to set aside the order of default
and the default judgment thereafter issued.
Held: The remedies available to a defendant who has
been declared in default are: a) before judgment – file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on
the ground that his failure to answer was due to FAME,
and that he has a meritorious defense; b) after
judgment, but before it has become final and executory
– file a motion for new trial; c) after judgment has
become final and executory – file a petition for relief
(60days to file petition for relief); d) He may also appeal
(certiorari – 60days to file) from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition to set aside the order of default has
been presented by him.
A motion to lift order of default requires a
showing of meritorious defense and FAME. A
meritorious defense must concur with the satisfactory
reason for the non-appearance of the defaulted party.
The defendants were less than conscientious in
defending themselves and protecting their rights before
the trial court. They did not pay proper attention and
respect to its directive. The petitioner has not shown
that his and his wife's failure to attend the pre-trial
hearing as required was due to excusable neglect, much
less to fraud, accident or mistake.
The petitioner insists, however, that they had a
meritorious defense which the trial court should not
have disregarded. A meritorious defense is only one of
the two conditions. Even if it be assumed for the sake of
argument that the private respondents did owe
Josephine Ramnani P900,000, as alleged in the
counterclaim, that circumstance alone is not sufficient
to justify the lifting of the order of default and the
default judgment. The obvious reason is that a
meritorious defense must concur with the satisfactory
reason for the non-appearance of the defaulted party.
Rule 10: AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Gulang v. Nadayag, 214 SCRA 355 (1992)
Facts: Nadayag filed with Iligan CFI a complaint against
Gulang. The Nadayags are co-owners of a parcel of land
located in the port area. Gulang is also an owner of a
parcel of land located in the port area. Before Gulang
acquired the lot, she rented a portion of the same from
Lasmarias. Lasmarias purchased from Nadayag’s
predecessor-in-interest a parcel of land adjacent to the
lot of the Nadayags. Nadayags complained against
Gulang’s occupancy in their lot, the rentals of which
Gulang paid to Lasmarias instead of Nadayag.
Nadayags pray that Gulang be ordered to vacate and
restore possession and/or ownership to them and that
defendants be ordered to pay back rentals, moral and
exemplary damages, and atty’s fees.
In their answer, defendants deny the claim of plaintiffs
and by way of affirmative and special defenses alleged
that the defendants are the true, legal and lawful owner
and in actual possession and occupation of the land in
question.
A survey by the Bureau of Lands was conducted and in
conclusion stated that Gulang is occupying a portion of
Nadayag’s land. But defendants counsel made an open
court manifestation that his clients will not abide with
the survey results.
Lasmarias filed a motion to admit his amended answer
in which defenses of want of cause of action,
prescription, estoppel, laches and fraud were
introduced. Gulang filed a similar motion introducing
the same defenses. Both motions were denied. MfR was
also denied.
CFI ruled that Gulang encroached on Nadayag’s land.
Gulang appealed to the IAC. IAC held that CFI correctly
denied the motion to amend the answer considering that
it was filed after the case had been set for hearing and
that it substantially altered his defense by adding
grounds of prescription, estoppel, laches and fraud.
Held: Though substantial amendments may be made
even after the case has been set for hearing provided
prior leave of court is obtained, such leave may be
refused if the motion requesting for the same would
delay the action or the cause of action or defenses would
be substantially altered by the proposed amendment
(e.g. raises issues of want of cause of action,
prescription, estoppel, laches and fraud)
Goyala filed MtD the complaint on the ground of failure
to submit amended complaint. TC dismissed complaint
without prejudice. Thereafter, Goyala filed a motion to
declare Gojo in default for failure to answer the
counterclaim. TC declared Gojo in default.

Gojo appeals to CA. CA certified the appeal to SC upon

finding that the appeal involves purely questions of law.

Rule 11 HELD A plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a

compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in
Gojo v. Goyala, 35 SCRA 557 (1970) default, principally because the issues raised in the
Facts: Segundo Goyala together with his wife Antonina counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the
sold to Faustino Gojo by a “Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale” allegations of the complaint.
a parcel of agri land, repurchase to be made within one
year. About 10yrs after execution of said document,
Gojo filed with the Sorsogon CFI a petition for
consolidation of ownership of the land.

Goyala filed an opposition to the petition alleging that it

was a mere mortgage and not a Pacto de Retro sale as
evidenced by a deed of mortgage executed by the Rule 12
Goyalas. Goyala also alleged that he and Antonina went
Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100 (1994)
to Gojo’s house and tendered to him the payment of the
Facts: Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were
debt, but Gojo refused to receive the same and to cancel
married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita,
the document of mortgage. Goyala also prayed that
Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union
Gojo be ordered to pay Php1800 per annun (less the legl
turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988.
annual interest of the loan) as the reasonable monetary
Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground
value of the products of the said land. (counterclaim
of Joselita’s psychological incapacity.
Goyala’s counsel filed a manifestation informing the trial
The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional
court the Antonina was already dead. Hearing was had
Trial Court of Quezon City on 7 January 1992. Therein
on that manifestation and the trial court ordered Gojo’s
it is alleged that "[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to
counsel to submit an amemded complaint substituting
realize that respondent was psychologically
Antonina with her successors-in-interest.
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at
the time of the marriage although the same became
manifest only thereafter." Dissatisfied with the allegation
in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars
which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his Bill
of Particulars, Edwin specified that —
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita
Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that
she was unable to understand and accept the demands
made by his profession — that of a newly qualified
Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts
so that she frequently complained of his lack of
attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention
caused petitioner to lose his job.
Salita was not content, but TC upholds its sufficiency
and directed Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
Issue: Whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by
herein petitioner is of sufficient definiteness or
particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly
prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
Held: only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. Ultimate facts
has been defined as those facts which the expected
evidence will support. The term does not refer to the
details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by
which these material elements are to be established. It
refers to the facts which the evidence on the trial will
prove, and not the evidence which will be required to
prove the existence of those facts. A motion for bill of
particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while
not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient
cause of action. A motion for bill of particulars may not
call for matters which should form part of the proof of
the complaint upon trial. Such information may be
obtained by other means. The Bill of Particulars filed by
private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of
action, and to require more details from private
respondent would be to ask for information on
evidentiary matters. On the basis of the aforequoted
allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already
prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
Agcanas v. Mercado, 7 SCRA 688 (1963)
Facts: Plaintiffs filed this action to recover portions of a
parcel of land in Isabela, and damages. Defendants filed
a motion for a bill of particulars. However, defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, with a prayer
that consideration of their motion for a bill of particulars
be held in abeyance pending resolution of their motion
to dismiss. The court denied the motion to dismiss and
ordered defendants "to answer the complaint within the
reglementary period provided for by the Rules of Court."
Defendants not having filed their answer, plaintiffs,
moved to have them declared in default. The court
issued the order of default together with another order
commissioning the clerk of court to receive plaintiff's
evidence.
Defendants moved to cancel the hearing scheduled on
the ground that their motion for a bill of particulars had
not yet been resolved. The court denied the motion and
rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendants. The court denied likewise their motion for a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution of
the judgment by default.
ISSUE:
Whether or not upon denial of a defendants' motion to
dismiss the reglementary period within which to file an
answer resumes running even though the motion for a
bill of particulars of the same defendants is still pending
and unresolved.
RULING:
Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of
particulars interrupt the time to file a responsive
pleading. In the case of a motion to dismiss, the period
starts running against as soon as the movant receives a
copy of the order of denial. In the case of a motion for a
bill of particulars, the suspended period shall continue
to run upon service on the movant of the bill of
particulars, if the motion is granted, or of the notice of
its denial, but in any event he shall have not less than
five days within which to file his responsive pleading.
When appellants filed a motion to dismiss they
requested that resolution of their previous motion for a
bill of particulars be held in abeyance. This was but
practical because if the court had granted the motion to
dismiss, there would have been no need for a bill of
particulars. Resolution of the motion for the purpose
was necessary only in the event that court should deny,
as it did, the motion to dismiss, in which case the period
to file an answer remained suspended until the motion
for a bill of particulars is denied or, if it is granted, until
the bill is served on the moving party.
The motions should be considered submitted, and it was
the clear duty of the court to resolve the motion for a bill
of particulars, as it did the motion to dismiss. No action
having been taken thereon until the present, the period
to answer has not yet expired.
Famador: The filing of motion to dismiss during the
pendency of the motion for bill of particulars is
tantamount to abandonment of the motion of bill of
particulars because upon filing the MTD, the party
hypothetically admits the truth of the factual allegations
in the complaint.
Santos v. Liwag, 101 SCRA 327 (1980)
Facts: Santos files a complaint against Liwag seeking
the annulment of certain documents as having been
executed by means of misrepresentations, machination,
false pretenses, threats, and other fraudulent means, as
well as for damages. Liwag moved for a bill of
particulars. BoP was granted. Santos fails to comply,
hence his complaint was dismissed.
Issue: WON the complaint is sufficient justifying
plaintiff’s appeal.
Held: We find no merit in the appeal. The complaint is
without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers from
vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant
property to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify
issues and aid the court in an orderly and expeditious
disposition of the case. The present action is one for the
annulment of documents which have been allegedly
executed by reason of deceit, machination, false
pretenses, misrepresentation, threats, and other
fraudulent means. Deceit, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, and threats, however, are largely
conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof without
a statement of the facts to which such terms have
reference are not sufficient. The allegations must state
the facts and circumstances from which the fraud,
deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation,
and threats may be inferred as a conclusion. In his
complaint, the appellant merely averred that all the
documents sought to be annulled were all executed
through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, threats, and other fraudulent means
without the particular facts on which alleged fraud,
deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are
predicated. Hence, it was proper for the trial court to
grant the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars,
and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order,
the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint.
cf Rule 8, Sec. 5
Sec. 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. — In all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other
condition of the mind of a person may be averred
generally. (5a)
de Leon: Was this dismissal for failure to file a bill of
particulars with or without prejudice? I think it is with
prejudice because it should be in the nature of a
dismissal based on failure to prosecute.
Rule 13: Filing and Service
Benguet Electric v. NLRC, 209 SCRA 55 (1992)
Facts: Peter Cosalan was the GenMgr of Benguet
Electric Coop (BENECO). Cosalan received Audit
Memo#1 issued by the COA. The memo noted that cash
advances received by officers and employees of BENECO
had been virtually written off in the books of BENECO.
COA directed BENECO to secure the approval of the
Nat’l Electric Admin (NEA) before writing off said cash
advances.
COA issued another memo addressed to Cosalan
inviting attention to the fact that the audit of per diems
and allowances received by officials and members of the
Board of Directors of BENECO showed substantial
inconsistencies with the directives of the NEA. The
memo once again directed the taking of immediate
action in conformity with existing NEA regulations.
BENECO received COA Audit Report on the financial
status and operations of BENECO. The report noted the
irregularities in the use of funds released by NEA to
BENECO and recommended that appropriate remedial
action be taken.
BENECO board adopted resolutions. Cosalan was
removed. He filed a case. The respondent Beneco Board
members received the decision of the labor Arbiter on 21
April 1988. Accordingly, and because 1 May 1988 was a
legal holiday, they had only up to 2 May 1988 within
which to perfect their appeal by filing their
memorandum on appeal. The respondent Board
members' memorandum on appeal was posted by
registered mail on 3 May 1988 and received by the
NLRC the following day. Clearly, the memorandum on
appeal was filed out of time.
Respondent Board members, however, insist that their
Memorandum on Appeal was filed on time because it
was delivered for mailing on 1 May 1988 to the Garcia
Communications Company, a licensed private letter
carrier. The Board members in effect contend that the
date of delivery to Garcia Communications was the date
of filing of their appeal memorandum.
Issue: WON the date of delivery to private carrier Garcia
Communications is the date of filing of appeal.
HELD No. Transmission through a private carrier or
letter-forwarder, instead of the Philippine Post Office, is
not a recognized mode of filing pleadings. The date of
delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding
agency is not to be considered as the date of filing
thereof in court. In such cases, the date of actual receipt
by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private
carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.
Alimpoos v. CA, 106 SCRA 159 (1981)
Facts:
Held: Where a party is represented by counsel on
record, service of papers should be made to such
counsel. Service to the party himself is ineffective, until
the party actually gives the paper served to his counsel
on which date the paper is deemed served.
Magno v. CA, 152 SCRA 555 (1987)
Facts: Private respondents filed an action for Partition of
Certain Properties and for Damages against petitioners
in the RTC. The court ordered partition of the properties.
It also ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and
severally unto the private respondents the amount of
P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
Notice of the decision was sent to petitioners'
counsel Atty. Atinidoro B. Sison at his given mailing
address which is 33 B.M.A. Ave., Tatalon, Quezon City.
The same, however, was returned to the court with the
certification of the postmaster — "Return to sender,
Reason — moved."
The CA Resolved to resend the said copy of the
Decision to the appellants themselves at Alaminos,
Pangasinan, and the appellants are hereby informed
that the fifteen (15) days period within which to file for
reconsideration will be counted from the receipt of the
decision herewith attached.
On September 22, 1981, the respondent court
issued its now assailed Resolution ordering the issuance
of the entry of judgment. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied hence, they filed the present
petition.
Issue: WON there is a constructive service of the
decision to party’s counsel.
Held: Yes. When a party is represented by counsel,
notice should be made upon the counsel of record at his
given address to which notices of all kinds emanating
from the court should be sent in the absence of a proper
and adequate notice to the court of a change of address.
The first notice to him by the Postmaster to claim his
mail was on July 9, 1981. The rule is that in case of
failure of the addressee to claim his registered mail,
service of notice becomes effective at the expiration of
the 5-day period from the date of first notice. Therefore
in this case the service became effective five days after
July 9, 1981 which is July 14, 1981. The decision
became final on August 13, 1981.
If counsel moved to another address without
informing the court of his change of address, the
omission or neglect will not affect the date the paper is
deemed served. Under the constructive service,
subsequent service on the clients themselves is not even
necessary.
Adamson Ozanam Educational Institution v.
Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association,
179 SCRA 279 (1989)
Facts: The Adamson University (AU) was granted to
increase their tuition fees by 10% and 5% for the school
year 1983-84. The Adamson University Faculty and
Employees Association (AUFEA) believing that under
P.D. No. 451 60% thereof should be allocated for the
increase in salaries and wages of the members of the
faculty and other members of the school filed a
complaint in the Ministry of Labor & Employment
(MOLE) against the AU for the recovery of the said 60%.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. The AUFEA appealed therefrom to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) wherein in
due course a decision was rendered on September 30,
1988 setting aside the appealed decision and ordering
the AU to remit to the members of AUFEA the amount of
P1,298,160.00 representing the 60%.
The herein petition for certiorari filed by the AU.
On February 22, 1989, the court dismissed the petition
for failure to sufficiently show that respondent
commission had committed a grave abuse of discretion
in rendering its questioned judgment.
A MtD hereof was filed by petitioner contending
that SERVICE OF THE DECISION UPON THE
SECURITY GUARD OF THE TOEFEMI BUILDING,
WHERE RESPONDENT'S FORMER COUNSEL USED TO
HOLD OFFICE, IS INEFFECTIVE AND DOES NOT
CAUSE THE RUNNING OF THE 10-DAY PERIOD FOR
AN APPEAL.
Issue: WON the service of the copy of the decision upon
the security guard of the building where the former
office of petitioner's counsel was located was sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the law.
Held: Where the copy of the decision is served on a
person (e.g. security guard) who is neither a clerk nor
one in charge of the attorney's office, such service is
invalid and is not considered as service on the party.
Aramburo v. CA, 101 SCRA 146 (1980)
Facts: On January 14, 1963, the herein petitioners filed
with the Court of First Instance of Albay an application
for registration of lots Nos. 2361 and 4725 of the
Cadastral Survey of Malinao. The application for
registration was opposed by the herein private
respondent, Concepcion R. Peña who prayed that she be
declared the owner of said lots. On May 23, 1964, said
private respondent filed with the same Court of First
Instance of Albay an action for reivindicacion with
damages seeking to recover from the herein petitioners
the two lots covered by the application for registration
together with lot No. 2360 of the same cadastral survey.
On February 14, 1968, a decision was rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissing both
cases. From said decision, the herein private
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Respondent filed with said appellate court her appeal
brief; petitioners did not file any brief.
Consequently, on September 23, 1971, the Court
of Appeals issued a resolution considering the case as
submitted for decision without petitioner’s brief. More
than seven years thereafter, a decision was rendered by
the Court of Appeals in favor of private respondents.
Petitioners-appellees now assail the decision of
the Court of Appeals on the ground of lack of procedural
due process. They contend that they were deprived of
their day in court when the appeal was submitted for
decision without their brief. Allegedly they were not able
to file their brief because the respondent-appellant did
not furnish them with a copy of the appellant's brief.
They further contend that they did not receive both the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September 23,
1971, which considered the case as submitted for
decision without appellee's brief, as well as the decision
of said court dated December 28, 1978, and that it was
only on May 9, 1979, that they learned of the judgment
of said court when the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Albay
served upon them a copy of the writ of execution
enforcing said judgment.
The Court of Appeals was ordered to ascertain
carefully the allegations of the petitioners regarding the
non-service of the appellant's brief and of the resolution
and decision of the said Court and to report on the same
without unnecessary delay as follows:
1. The brief for the plaintiff-appellant filed with
this Court on January 26, 1971 does not have
a registry return receipt from petitioners'
counsel attached to it. Said brief bears only the
registry return receipt from Atty. Jose Atadero.
However, attached to the same brief are two (2)
registry receipts bearing numbers 6724 and
6725, both dated January 26, 1971, ostensibly
for the two opposing counsels. (p. 90, Rollo).
2. The Resolution of this Court dated
September 23, 1971 considering the case
submitted for decision without defendants-
appellees' brief was received by Attys. Antonio
Alfane and Delfin de Vera on October 7, 1971
per registry return receipt attached to the back
of resolution (p. 100, Rollo). Copy of said
registry return receipt is attached hereto as
Annex 'A' and made an integral part hereof.
3. The decision of this Court, incidentally, was
received by counsel for petitioner on January
10, 1979, as evidenced by the registry return
receipt, copy of with is attached hereto and
made an integral part hereof as Annex 'B'.
Issue: WON a registry receipts cannot be considered as
sufficient proof of service of the appellant's brief.

Held: No. The duty of proving service of the appellant's
brief upon the appellee lies with the appellant. Registry
receipts alone does not prove service by registered mail.
The registry receipts are evidence of the posting of the
mail matter with the post office of the sender — not of
the delivery of said mail matter by the post office of the
addressee. Furthermore, the date of actual delivery to
the addressee cannot be ascertained from such registry
receipts. To prove serviceby registered mail, the registry
receipts must be accompanied by the affidavit of the
serving party, and the registry return card or the
unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn
copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee.
c.f.: . PROOF OF SERVICE. — Proof of personal service
shall consist of a written admission of the party served,
or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full
statement of the date, place and manner of service, ... If
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made
by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the
mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender, or in
lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the
certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the
postmaster to the addressee.
Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricaforte, 293 SCRA 661
(1998)
Facts: Solar Team filed before the RTC a complaint
against Felix Co. Summons and copies of the complaint
were forthwith served on Co. Co then filed his answer. A
copy thereof was furnished counsel for Solar Team by
registered mail; however, the pleading did not contain
any written explanation as to why service was not made
personally upon Solar Team, as required by Section 11
of Rule 13. Offices of counsels of both parties are only
200 meters apart.
Solar Team filed a motion to expunge the answer and to
declare Co in default, alleging therein that Co did not
observe the mandate of Section 11. RTC issued an order
stating that under Section 11 of Rule 13, it is within the
discretion of the RTC whether to consider the pleading
as filed or not, and denying, for lack of merit, Solar
Team’s motion to expunge.
Held: and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Whenever
personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal
service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a
written explanation as to why personal service or filing
was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the
plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise
consider the importance of the subject matter of the
case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie
merit of the pleading sought to be expunged. This
applies to both service of pleadings and other papers on
the adverse party or his counsel and to the filing of
pleadings and other papers in court. Here, in view of the
proximity between the offices of opposing counsel and
the absence of any attendant explanation as to why
personal service of the answer was not effected, the
motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious.
However, the grant or denial of said motion nevertheless
remained within the sound exercise of the trial court's
discretion. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect
only on 1 July 1997, while the questioned answer was
filed only on 8 August 1997, or on the 39th day
following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules. Defendant’s
counsel may not have been fully aware of the pertinent
requirements. His shortcomings may be condoned.
However strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13
is mandated one month from promulgation of this
Decision.
Rule 14
CARRIAGA, JR. V. MALAYA, 143 SCRA 441 (1986)
Facts: Private respondents herein Ana Almonte Cariaga
Soon filed in her behalf and in behalf of her minor
daughter Carolina, an action for (1) Annulment of a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Property, (2)
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), (3)
Recovery of Real Property with damages, in the Laguna
CFI. All defendants in said action filed their answer with
counterclaim with the exception of petitioners herein
Jose C. Cariaga Jr. and Marieta Cariaga-Celis who were
both residing abroad and were not served with
summons.
The lower court upon motion of plaintiffs granted
them leave to effect extra-territorial service of summons
upon said defendants pursuant to Secs. 7, 17 and 18 of
Rule 14 of the New Rules of Court. Accordingly,
summons with copies of the complaint were served to
the defendants by registered mail abroad (Guam and
U.S.A.) by the Clerk of Court at the instance of plaintiffs.
Defendants, who are residents of the Philippines, filed a
motion to set aside the said summons and to declare the
service of summons abroad by registered mail as null
and void, it being allegedly irregular and unauthorized
under the provisions of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to
which motion plaintiffs filed their opposition. CFI
denied the motion and ruled that "Defendants Jose C.
Cariaga, Jr., and Marietta C. Cariaga, having already
received copies of plaintiffs' Complaint with the service
of summons on them, said defendants are given NINETY
(90) days from receipt of this Order within which to file
responsive pleadings.
Petitioner herein), residing abroad, by special
appearance and thru counsel filed their motion to
consider the service of summons upon them by
registered mail as null and void. CFI issued another
order denying the said motion.
ISSUE: Whether the service of summons by registered
mail upon defendants in the case at bar is one which is
contemplated within the principles laid down in the
provisions of Secs. 17, 7 and 22, Rule 14 of the New
Rules of Court to Wit:
"Section 17. Extraterritorial service. When the
defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines and the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or
in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or
the property of the defendant has been attached within
the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as
under Section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60)
days after notice, within which the defendant must
answer."
Sec. 7. Personal service of summons. The summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him."
Sec. 22. Proof of service by registered mail. Service by
registered mail under this rule may be proved by a
certificate of the sheriff or affidavit of the person
especially authorized by the court, showing that a copy
of the summons and papers attached thereto, inclosed
in an envelope and addressed to the defendant, with
postage prepaid, has been mailed, to which certificate or
affidavit the registry receipt and return card shall be
attached."
HELD Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of
summons is proper: (1) when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien
or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest in property
located in the Philippines; and (4) when defendant
nonresident's property has been attached within the
Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court).
In any of such four cases, the service of summons
may, with leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines in three ways: (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
such places and for such time as the court may order,
in which case a copy of the summons and order of the
court should be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant; and (3) in any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient. The third
mode of extraterritorial service of summons was
substantially complied with in this case. (De Midgely v.
Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23, 33, 34).
There is no question that the requirement of due
process has been met as shown by the fact that
defendants actually received the summonses and copies
of the complaint and as evidenced by the Registry
Return Cards marked as Annex A-1 (page 56-Record)
and Annex B-1. Whatever defect there may have been in
the service of summons was aptly corrected by the court
a quo in its assailed order dated January 16, 1978,
which gave said defendants ninety (90) days from receipt
of order within which to file their responsive pleadings.
Defendants have no reason to complain that they were
unaware of the action filed against them or claim that
they were denied due process.
The case of Habana v. Vamenta et al., L-27091, June
30, 1970, or 33 SCRA 569, cited by the petitioners in
support of their claim has no bearing in the case at bar
since in said case service of summons was never made,
even if defendant knew of the case against him, while in
the case under consideration, service of summons was
made upon them (although claimed erroneously by them
as defective).
HELD When extraterritorial service of summons is
proper, service by registered mail is sufficient (“in any
other manner which the court may deem sufficient”).
More so if the defendants actually received the
summons and copies of the complaint and as evidenced
by the Registry Return Cards. Whatever defect there
may have been in the service of summons may be
corrected by the court by giving the defendants 90 days
from receipt of order within which to file their responsive
pleadings.
Escolin: There is no provision that allows extraterritorial
service by registered mail only. In this case, it was
allowed only because the registry card was returned
which proved that the defendant abroad did in fact
receive the summons, otherwise the court would not
have allowed it.
MONTALBAN V. MAXIMO, 22 SCRA 1070 (1968
DOCTRINES: Summons is validly served if it is left with
"some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing" in the defendant’s residence, even if defendant
was abroad at that time. Plaintiff is not obligated to
ensure that the summons was actually delivered to the
defendant. The fact that the defendant did not actually
receive the summons will not invalidate the service of
such summons.
Extraterritorial service is but one of the modes of
effective service to bring a defendant in court. The
normal method of service of summons on one
temporarily absent is by substituted service.
Extraterritorial service (personal service outside the
country and service by publication) are not ordinary
means of summoning defendants. Where personal
service is impossible, substituted service becomes a
necessity.
Facts: Plaintiffs commenced suit against Fr. Gerardo
Maximo who, according to the complaint, was residing
at the parish church at Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal.
Plaintiffs' cause of action for damages sprang from a
motor vehicle accident which occurred at Padre Faura
St., Manila. Paul Hershell Montalban, son of plaintiffs,
suffered injuries.
The complaint was filed, summons was served on
defendant Fr. Maximo at the parish church of
Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, through Fr. Arsenio
Bautista — a priest in the same parish church.
Fr. Bautista sent a letter to the Clerk of Court of the
Manila CFI, informing him that defendant Fr. Maximo
left for Europe and "will be back on the first week of
November." Actually, Fr. Maximo returned from abroad
about the second week of October, 1958.
CFI declared defendant in default, on plaintiffs'
motion. Upon plaintiffs' evidence, the court rendered
judgment sentencing defendant to pay damages claimed
by plaintiff.
Plaintiffs themselves wrote defendant Fr. Maximo,
at the Malabon Catholic Church, informing the latter of
the CFI's decision, requesting prompt compliance
therewith and suggesting that he communicate with or
personally see their lawyer, Jose W. Diokno, at the
latter's address, 332 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila.
Defendant, through his legal counsel, Dr. Nicanor T.
Santos, answered the foregoing letter expressing regret
that he could not comply with plaintiffs' request,
because he (defendant) was not aware of the said civil
case, and that, in the criminal action arising out of the
same incident, said defendant was acquitted by the
Municipal Court of Manila.
 Deputy Sheriff of Rizal notified defendant of the
issuance of the writ of execution and demanded
payment of the amount set forth therein. The Sheriff's
return to the writ shows that in response to such
demand, defendant alleged that he was then "financially
hard up," and that the Sheriff found no property that
could be subject to execution.
An alias writ of execution was issued. Copy thereof was
received by defendant.
Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential
house located in Caloocan City and purportedly
belonging to defendant.
Two years and two months after defendant admittedly
learned of the lower court's decision from counsel for
plaintiffs herein, said defendant, by counsel, filed a
verified motion in the same case praying for the
annulment of the entire proceedings. His ground is this:
Summons was not duly served upon him "as provided
under Sec. 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court"; accordingly,
the lower court "did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person", and "the trial and decision by default" are "null
and void,"
The court denied this motion.
Defendant's move to reconsider was rejected by the
court.
Hence, this appeal from the orders duly certified to the
SC by the CA.
After the case was submitted for decision, defendant's
lawyer informed the SC of the death of defendant on
August 1, 1965.
Following extensive efforts to have the deceased
defendant substituted by any of his heirs or the
executor or administrator of his estate, which were to no
avail, the SC appointed the Clerk of Court of the
Maniala CFI, representative of the deceased defendant.
HELD 1. A question of transcendental importance
which necessarily involves an inquiry into procedural
due process is whether summons in a suit in personam
against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent
therefrom may be validly effected by substituted service
under Section 8, Rule 14 (formerly Section 8, Rule 7) of
the Rules of Court. A head on collision of views becomes
inevitable considering the diametrically opposing
positions taken by plaintiffs, on the one hand, and
defendant, on the other. For, plaintiffs make the point
that even with defendant temporarily abroad,
substituted service is valid under Section 8 by leaving a
copy of the summons "at the defendant's dwelling house
or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein."
Plaintiffs argue that if the ordinary method prescribed
by the rules, that is, personal service under Section 7,
Rule 14, is not feasible, then the substituted service in
Section 8 aforesaid comes into play. Section 8 says:
"SEC. 8. Substituted service. — If the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
dwelling house or residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof."
Upon the other hand, defendant advances the theory
that in a situation like the present, where defendant was
temporarily abroad, the sole and exclusive method of
service of summons in a case in personam is that set
forth in Section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules (formerly
Section 18, Rule 7), which reads:
"SEC. 18. Residents temporarily out of the
Philippines. — When an action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines,
but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines, as under the
preceding section."
Section 17 referred to in Section 18 (Section 17, Rule 7
in the old Rules) in turn states:
"SEC. 17. Extraterritorial service. — When the
defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines and the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or
in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or
the property of the defendant has been attached within
the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as
under section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time which shall not be less than sixty (60)
days after notice, within which the defendant must
answer."
Historically, in its common-law origin, the jurisdiction of
courts to render judgments in personam was grounded
on their de facto power over defendant's person.
Jurisdiction was based on the power to seize and
imprison defendant. If a defendant was absent from the
territory, the fact that he was a citizen would not enable
the court's officers to seize him and service could not
represent this power. Hence, his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction was a pre- requisite to the
rendition of a judgment personally binding against him.
Anglo-American law then emphasized the power concept
of jurisdiction.
Continental law, however, was somewhat different. It
had two fundamental principles of Roman origin: (1) in
suits in personam and those relating to movables,
courts of the domicile of the defendant have general
jurisdiction — actor rei forum sequitur; and (2) in
actions concerning immovables, the courts of the situs
have exclusive jurisdiction.
In the development of the law, the variance between
Anglo- American law and continental law became "less
and less clear-cut" because "American law has had to
yield to the increasing necessity of enlarging more and
more the catalogue of forums available to the plaintiff."
Thus it is, that American cases forged the doctrine, now
long recognized, that domiciliaries of a state, though
temporarily out of its territorial jurisdiction, are always
amenable to suits in personam therein. And this
precept is the foundation for the American rule that
declares substituted service binding on absent
residents. The leading case of Milliken vs. Meyer,
furnishes the rationale:
" . . . the authority of a state over one of its citizens is
not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the
state. The state which accords him privileges and
affords protection to him and his property by virtue of
his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties.
'Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the state
and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its
laws, are inseparable' from the various incidences of
state citizenship . . . The responsibilities of that
citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state
which domicile creates. That relationship is not
dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant
duties, like the rights and privileges incident to domicile,
are not dependent on continuous presence in the state.
One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit
within the state even during sojourns without the state,
where the state has provided and employed e reasonable
method for apprising such an absent party of the
proceedings against him."
There should be no doubt, therefore, that in suits in
personam, courts have jurisdiction over residents
temporarily out of the country.
This brings us to the question of procedural due
process. Substituted service such as one contemplated
in Section 8 upon a temporarily absent resident, it has
been held, is wholly adequate to meet the requirements
of due process. The constitutional requirement of due
process exacts that the service be such as may be
reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the
service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes
that end, the requirement of justice is answered, the
traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process
is served.
In American jurisprudence, whether a defendant be in
another state under the federal system or is abroad in
Europe, substituted service is still considered to be
valid. The language in Milliken vs. Meyer, supra, is
expressive: "Its adequacy so far as due process is
concerned is dependent on whether or not the form of
substituted service provided for such cases and
employed is reasonably calculated to give him actual
notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard. If it is, then traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice (McDonald vs. Mabee, supra) implicit
in due process are satisfied."
When the framers of our Rules adapted Section 8, it is
to be implied that they intended to give the provision the
same meaning shaped out by the jurisprudence of the
jurisdiction from whence it was patterned. Section 8 is
to be viewed in the same context it is understood in the
American legal system. The word "defendant" in that
provision is to be construed as including any resident of
this country. By comparative construction, Section 8 is
to be applied to all resident defendants — without
distinction as to whether he is physically present in this
country or not.
Chief Justice Moran shares this view. Commenting on
Section 18, Rule 14, he states: "Since the defendant is
residing in the Philippines, jurisdiction over his person
may be acquired by Philippine courts by substituted
service of summons under section 8. But extraterritorial
service is allowed also by leave of court according to the
above provision [Section 18]." Justice Martin regards
the word "residence" in Section 8 as "the place where the
person named in the summons is living at the time
when the service is made, even though he may be
temporarily out of the state at the time."
This construction is but fair. It is in accord with
substantial justice. The burden on a plaintiff is not to be
enlarged with a restrictive construction as desired by
defendant here. Under the rules, a plaintiff, in the initial
stage of suit, is merely required to know the defendant's
"dwelling house or residence" or his "office or regular
place of business" — and no more. He is not asked to
investigate where a resident defendant actually is, at the
precise moment of filing suit. Once defendant's dwelling
house or residence or office or regular place of business
is known, he can expect valid service of summons to be
made on "some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing" in defendant's dwelling house or
residence, or on "some competent person in charge" of
his office or regular place of business. By the terms of
the law, plaintiff is not even duty-bound to see to it that
the person upon whom service was actually made
delivers the summons to defendant or informs him
about it. The law presumes that for him.
It is immaterial then that defendant does not in fact
receive actual notice. This will not affect the validity of
the service. Accordingly, the defendant may be charged
by a judgment in personam as a result of legal
proceedings upon a method of service which is not
personal, "which in fact may not become actual notice to
him," and which may be accomplished in his lawful
absence from the country. For, the rules do not require
that papers be served on defendant personally or a
showing that the papers were delivered to defendant by
the person with whom they were left.
Reasons for the views just expressed are not wanting. A
man temporarily absent from this country leaves a
definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a
local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him
may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where
one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in
the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act
in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to
protect his interests; and to communicate with him from
time to time any incident of importance that may affect
him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a
man to leave at his home or with his business
associates information as to where he may be contacted
in the event a question that affects him crops up. If he
does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes
up in court against him, he cannot in justice raise his
voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of
our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed
against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned
at his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular
place of business.
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time
to enable him to contest a suit against him. There are
now advanced facilities of communication. Long
distance telephone calls and cablegrams make it easy
for one he left behind to communicate with him.
In the light of the foregoing, we find ourselves unwilling
to concede that substituted service provided in Section 8
may be down- graded as an ineffective means to bring
temporarily absent residents within the reach of our
courts.
As we go back to the case at hand, there is the
temporarily absent defendant who was a parish priest.
Summons upon him was served upon Fr. Bautista who
lived in the same convent where defendant resided. Fr.
Bautista, we must assume, is a responsible person.
Service upon him is effective.
2. The view we take of this case sweeps away
defendant's argument that Section 18 is the sole
provision that governs summons upon a defendant
temporarily absent in an action in personam, as here.
Indeed, defendant's posture strikes at the very language
employed by this reglementary provision cited by him.
The word "may" — in the statement in Section 18 that
"service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines," as under Section 17 — will not support the
deduction, without more, that Section 18 is the only
provision controlling in this case. On the contrary, the
phraseology of the rule is a recognition of the fact that
substituted service — out of the Philippines — under
Section 17 is but one of the modes of effective service to
bring a defendant in court. And upon the basic concepts
under which our rules governing processes operate, the
normal method of service of summons on one
temporarily absent is by substituted service set forth in
Section 8. And this, because personal service outside
the country and service by publication are not ordinary
means of summoning defendants.
In practical terms, we perceive that — in suits in
personam — the more circuitous procedure delineated
in Sections 17 and 18 is resorted to by a plaintiff if
defendant's dwelling house or residence or place of
business in this country is not known; or, if known,
service upon him cannot be had thereat upon the terms
of Section 8. Here, since personal service is impossible,
resort to substituted service becomes a necessity. A
comparison between the service in Section 8 and that in
Sections 17 and 18 is beside the point. They both
provide for substituted service. Anyway, as Goodrich
observed: "[I]f a substitute is to be made where an actual
personal service is impossible, 'the best is none too
good.'"
3. The judgment has long since become final. It
enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is, unless
stricken down, entitled to respect. Non quieta movere.
Because "[p]ublic policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts should become final at some definite date fixed
by law." 25
The norm of conduct observed by defendant would not,
we believe, tilt the scales of justice in his favor. We go to
the background facts. Logic and common sense tell us
that Fr. Bautista who received the summons and who
took interest in the case must have informed defendant
one way or another of the suit, at the latest upon his
return in October, 1958. By then there was still time for
him to move to set aside the default order of September
20, 1958. Defendant did not move. It is well to
remember also that judgment by default was not
rendered against defendant until June 8, 1959, or
almost nine (9) months after the default order was
issued. Again, defendant did nothing. According to
defendant, he learned of that judgment on December 20,
1959. The full impact of the judgment totalling P34,000
must have by then left an indelible mark in his mind. A
judgment of a court of justice is no piddling matter. It
should not be trifled with. Especially so when the
amount is big, as it is here. That same day — December
20 — his attorney took a hand on the matter, wrote
back plaintiffs refusing payment of the claim. The first
writ of execution was served on defendant on January
14, 1960. That time he did not pay, because according
to the Sheriff's return, defendant then stated that he
was "financially hard up."
Defendant did not bestir himself until February 20,
1962, i.e., not less than two years and two months after
he learned-by his own admission-of the judgment. And,
that was shortly after levy was made on his house in
Caloocan. It is in this factual environment that then CFI
Judge Magno Gatmaitan, in his order of March 24,
1962, correctly observed that 'the Court once again
believes that this solution (denial of the motion to
reconsider the appealed order) is just because of the
apparent intentional inaction of defendant since 20
December, 1959."
Indeed, it was not right that defendant should have
supinely sat on the decision, and deliberately
disregarded the import thereof. Neither was it correct for
him to have waited so long, slept on his rights, and only
put plaintiffs to task when his own property was
threatened because of the levy and execution thereon.
The decision below may not thus be annulled. Plaintiffs
may not be compelled to file a fresh suit. Because,
prejudice to plaintiffs, which could have been avoided by
defendant, will become a reality. The additional expense,
trouble and anxiety need not be essayed. The accident
took place on December 16, 1957. The lower court's
decision made mention of two eyewitnesses and two
doctors of medicine who testified as to injuries. To bring
back those witnesses to court becomes a serious
problem. Plaintiffs will have to search for them and if
found, they may not be able to present to the court a
narrative as accurately as they had done before. Time
has an unfortunate tendency of obliterating occurrences
from a witness' memory. Recollections are apt to be
blurred. Human memory can even be treacherous.
Lapse of time may also carry with it dissipation of other
evidence. Surely, there is great validity to the statement
that the march of time is truth in flight. 26 These, in
broad outlines, give life to the salutary policy on which
laches is founded.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from dated March 3,
1962 and March 24, 1962 are hereby affirmed.
BELLO V. UBO, 117 SCRA 91 (1982)
DOCTRINES: The enumeration of persons who may
serve summons (sheriff or other proper court officer of
the province or, for special reasons, by a person
especially authorized to serve the summons by the judge
of the court which issued the same) is exclusive. Where
summons was served by a police officer, the court which
issued the summons did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendants. Mere tender of the
summons without giving the defendant a copy of the
summons and that of the complaint makes service
highly irregular. Proof of service of a summons shall be
sworn to when made by a person other than the sheriff
or his deputy. One copy of the summons should be
served on each defendant.
Escolin: The court can deputize anyone, even civilians,
to serve summons. Had the police officer been
deputized, the fact of service of summons by him is by
itself not enough to invalidate such service of summons.
Facts: Plaintiff filed with Leyte CFI a complaint for
recovery of real property with damages against the
defendants praying, among other things, that he be
declared the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land
which had been forcibly occupied by the defendants
since 1962 under claim of ownership, and that the
defendants be ordered to pay him the sums representing
the value of the coconuts harvested from the land since
1962; moral damages in an amount the court may find
reasonable; P260.00 for expenses of relocation survey;
P300.00 attorney's fees and the incidental expenses and
costs of the proceeding.
Summonses were issued on May 4, 1967, requiring the
defendants to file their answer to the complaint within
15 days from service thereof. A certain Patrolman
Castulo Yobia of the Police Department of Jaro, Leyte,
served the summons on the defendants on May 15,
1967.
No answer was filed by the defendants. Plaintiff's
counsel filed a motion to declare defendants in default.
Acting upon said motion, the CFI declared the
defendants in default and directed the plaintiff to
present ex-parte his evidence on the 24th day of the
same month. Thereafter a judgment by default was
rendered by the CFI.
Upon receipt of the order of default, the
defendants contracted the services of Atty. Generoso
Casimpan who immediately inquired from Pat. Castulo
Yobia about the service of the summons. Pat. Yobia then
showed him a copy of the complaint which he failed to
deliver to the defendants.
Defendants' counsel filed a motion for relief from
judgment charging irregularity in the service of the
summons and praying that the order of default and the
judgment by default be set aside and that defendants'
answer, which was attached to said motion, be
admitted. The defendants alleged in said motion that the
subject land was inherited by them so that they have a
good and valid right thereto. They further alleged that
they had been paying taxes on the land that the
complaint was filed merely to compel them to settle a
criminal case for frustrated homicide which they had
filed against the plaintiff's son.
Leyte CFI issued an order denying the motion for relief
from judgment on the ground that the same was not
accompanied by an affidavit of merit. A copy of said
order was received by the defendants on September 28,
1967.
Defendants' counsel filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that since the motion for
relief from judgment was predicated on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants, the same
need not be accompanied by an affidavit of merit,
However, before the court could act on the motion for
reconsideration, the defendants' counsel amended the
same and attached thereto, their affidavit of merit.
Leyte CFI issued an order denying defendants' motion
for reconsideration. A copy of said order was received
by the defendants on January 9, 1968.
Defendants, thru counsel, filed a notice of appeal
and a motion to appeal as pauper and submitted to the
court for approval their record on appeal. The plaintiff,
on the other hand, filed on January 31, 1968, a motion
for execution pending appeal.
Leyte CFI issued an omnibus order approving
defendants' record on appeal and directing that the
appeal be given due course; granting defendants' motion
to appeal as pauper; and denying plaintiff's motion for
execution pending appeal.
ISSUE Was there a valid and effective service of
summons?
HELD We hold that there was no valid service of
summons on the defendants and, consequently, the
Leyte CFI did not acquire jurisdiction over their person.
Sec. 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides
that summons may be served by the sheriff or other
proper court officer of the province or, for special
reasons, by a person especially authorized to serve the
summons by the judge of the court which issued the
same. Contrary to appellee's contention, this
enumeration is exclusive. Thus, in Sequito vs. Letrondo,
G.R. No. L-11588, July 20, 1959, 105 Phil. 1139, We
considered as irregular the service of summons by a
police sergeant who was not a sheriff or a court officer
and who was not authorized by the court to deliver the
summons. And in the more recent case of Spouses Olar
vs. Cuna, G.R. No. L-47935, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 114,
We ruled that the postmaster of Bato, Leyte, not being a
sheriff or court officer, or a person authorized by the
court to serve the summons cannot validly serve the
summons. There, as in the case at bar where summons
was served by one who is not included in the
specification of Sec. 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
this Court had to rule that the court which issued the
summons did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendants.
Furthermore, the appellants point to other irregularities
which attended the service of summons by Pat. Yobia.
Thus, it is alleged that said policeman merely tendered
the summons to them and did not give them a copy of
the same and of the complaint. While it is true that Pat.
Yobia had denied such allegation in his counter-affidavit
which We have heretofore quoted, nevertheless, We find
appellants' version to be more credible. For, the records
of the case are replete with indications that the serving
policeman was grossly ignorant of the rules concerning
summons. Thus, the return of service shows that the
summons was first served on the plaintiff (back of p. 3,
records). Besides, such return of service was not made
under oath - in violation of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court - which requires that "the proof of service of a
summons . . . shall be sworn to when made by a person
other than the sheriff or his deputy." And even if We
were to give credence to Pat. Yobia's counter-affidavit,
We would still find the service of the summons to be
irregular since it is expressly admitted therein that only
one copy of the summons and of the complaint was
served on the two defendants.
Since a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant only by means of a valid service of summons,
trial and judgment without such valid service are,
therefore, null and void.
WHEREFORE. the trial court's order of default
and judgment by default are set aside and said court is
directed to accept defendants-appellants' answer to the
complaint and to conduct further proceedings on the
case. Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
LAUS V. CA, 219 SCRA 688 (1993)
Facts: Private respondent Torres filed against Laus a
complaint for the collection of a sum of money. Deputy
Sheriff proceeded to the defendant’s address to serve
summons. He found no one in the house of defendants
when he arrived and then waited for 10 minutes.
Thereupon, 2 women arrived and told him, upon his
inquiry, that the defendants were not around. He then
served the summons to the older woman, Josephine
Areola, then 11 years old. On the same date, Deputy
Sheriff Cruz executed and filed a return. Defendants did
not file an answer, and hence was declared and judged
in default. Defendants by way of a special appearance,
filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction
over their persons. They allege that the service of
summons was ineffective because it was not indicated in
the return that the sheriff had first exerted efforts to
serve the same personally before resorting to substituted
service.
Held: Since the defendants did not voluntarily submit to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, proper service of
summons became imperative. The general rule is that
summons must be personally served. If this mode of
service cannot be effected within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be resorted to. "Within a
reasonable time" contemplates a period of time longer
than "prompt," and presupposes that a prior attempt at
personal service, within a justifiable time frame as
would be necessary to bring the defendant within the
jurisdiction of the court, had failed. The substituted
service should be availed only when the defendant
cannot be served promptly in person. Impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the failure of
such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof
of service. The sheriff's return in the case at bar readily
reveals that it does not (a) indicate the impossibility of
service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) specify
the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and (c) state
that it was served on a person of sufficient age and
discretion residing therein. The fact of the matter is that
Deputy Sheriff Cruz resorted to a substituted service on
his first — and only — attempt to effect a personal
service. Upon being informed that the defendants were
not around at that time, he immediately resorted to a
substituted service through Josephine Areola, a person
whose age he did not even know or attempt to discover.
He did not even inquire about the whereabouts of the
defendants, the time they were expected to return home,
the hours of the day they could be contacted at their
house or the location of their offices, if any, in order that
he could faithfully comply with the requirement of
personal service. No earnest efforts were exerted by
Deputy Sheriff Cruz to effect the personal service of
summons. There was undue, if not indecent, haste to
serve the summons at the first attempt without making
sure that personal service was, by then and even
thereafter, an impossibility.
Furthermore, husband of defendant was impleaded as a
co-defendant on the theory that the liability is a
conjugal partnership liability. He was sued as an
indispensable party. It was not even alleged that he had
been served with summons at all. Hence the TC never
acquired jurisdiction over his person and judgment
against him was null and void.
VALMONTE V. CA, 252 SCRA 92 (1996)
Facts: Private respondent Dimalanta files a complaint
for partition of real property and accounting of rentals
against spouses Valmonte. Lourdes Valmonte was
residing in Wasington. Alfredo Valmonte was practicing
law in Manila. In a previous letter to Dimalanta, Lourdes
stated that in regard to the partition of the property in
question, all communications intended for Lourdes
should be sent to her husband. The complaint now
alleges that summons on Lourdes may be served on her
husband Alfredo in his office in Manila. Summons was
served on Alfredo. Alfredo accepted the summons,
insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept the
summons for his wife, Lourdes on the ground that he
was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf.
Accordingly the process server left without leaving a
copy of the summons and complaint for Lourdes. Alfredo
filed his answer with counterclaim. Lourdes did not file
her answer. RTC refused to declare Lourdes in default.
CA reverses and declared her in default.
Held: In an action in personam, personal service of
summons or, if this is not possible, substituted service,
is essential. If the defendant is temporarily abroad, but
a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave
of court, be made by publication. A resident defendant
in an action in personam, who cannot be personally
served with summons, may be summoned either by
means of substituted service or by publication. It should
be noted that the defendant must be a resident of the
Philippines. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or
quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential for giving the court
jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction
over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is
not found in the country, summons may be served
exterritorialy.
Plaintiff’s action in this case, which is for
partition and accounting, is in the nature of an action
quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the
purpose of affecting the defendant's interest in a specific
property and not to render a judgment against him.
As defendant Lourdes is a nonresident who is not
found in the Philippines, service of summons on her
must be either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication
and registered mail; or (3) in any other manner which
the court may deem sufficient. Since the service of
summons upon Lourdes was not done by means of any
of the first two modes. Neither does it qualify under the
3rd mode. This mode of service, like the first two, must
be made outside the Philippines, such as through the
Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the
defendant resides. Furthermore, service of summons on
Alfredo was not made upon the order of the court and
certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court
which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid
and on that basis declare Lourdes in default.
In the second place, service in the attempted manner
was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as
required. Such leave must be applied for by motion in
writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some
person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for
the application. Finally, because there was no order
granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given
ample time to file her Answer which, according to the
rules, shall be not less than 60 days after notice. It must
be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action
against a resident defendant (15 days from service)
differs from the period given in an action filed against a
nonresident defendant who is not found in the
Philippines (at least 60 days from notice).
Lourdes did not appoint her husband as her attorney-
in-fact. Although she wrote plaintiff that "all
communications" intended for her should be addressed
to her husband who is also her lawyer at the latter's
address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive
summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the
letter was written seven months before the filing of this
case below, and it appears that it was written in
connection with the negotiations between her and
plaintiff, concerning the partition of the property in
question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the
exchange of correspondence was carried on by counsel
for the parties. But the authority given to defendant's
husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be
construed as also including an authority to represent
her in any litigation.
Escolin: Substituted service could not be made here
because an essential requisite of substituted service
could not be complied with, cf Rule 14, Sec. 7
Sec. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes,
the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
(8a)
de Leon: I think the essential requisite that Justice
Escolin was referring to is that the defendant is a
resident of the Philippines. Remember, if a defendant is
a non-resident, he may not be summoned through
substituted service, only extraterritorial service.
CITIZEN SURETY V. MELENCIO-HERRERA, 38 SCRA
369 (1971)
Doctrine/Laws: Action for deficiency judgment is an
action in personam, in which case, summons may not
be served by publication. The remedy is to attach
property of the defendant, then serve summons by
publication. When summons could not be sereved, the
remedy is not to dismiss the case but retain the case in
the court’s archives.
Escolin: Citizen Surety could not have availed of service
by publication under Rule 14, Sec. 14 because this
provision applies only to actions in rem. He should have
attached defendant’s property under Rule 57, Sec. 1 (f)
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue.
— xxx:
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and
is not found in the Philippines, or on whom summons
may be served by publication.(1a)
to convert the action into quasi in rem, and then serve
summons by publication.
Facts: Petitioner Citizens' Surety filed its complaint in
the Manila CFI, alleging that at request of defendant
Santiago Dacanay, the plaintiff Surety Company had
issued its Surety Bonds Nos. 4942 and 4944, the first,
in favor of Gregorio Fajardo to guarantee payment of a
P5,000-promissory note executed by said Dacanay, and
the second, in favor of Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co.,
to guarantee payment of another promissory note in like
amount; that in consideration of said bonds, Santiago
and Josefina Dacanay executed Indemnity Agreements,
binding themselves jointly and severally to indemnify
plaintiff for any losses, costs and expenses which it
might sustain in connection with the issuance of the
bonds aforesaid, with interest at 12% per annum; that
as additional security, the Dacanays mortgaged to
plaintiff a parcel of land in Baguio City, covered by
Certificate of Title No. T-8116, the mortgage having been
duly recorded; that the promissory notes were not paid
.and as a result, plaintiff Surety was compelled to pay
P5,000.00 to Gregorio Fajardo and P4,081.69 to the
Manufacturers' Bank; that the Dacanays failed to
reimburse the Surety for such payments, whereupon the
Surety caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage to pay its claim of P12,941.69 representing its
payments, interest and stipulated liquidated damages:
that at the foreclosure sale, the land mortgaged was sold
to plaintiff, as highest bidder, for the sum of P2,000.00
leaving an unsatisfied balance of P10,491.69, that
plaintiff sought to recover from defendants Dacanay,
plus 10% thereof as attorneys' fees, and the costs.
At petitioner's request, respondent Judge caused
summons to be made by publication in the newspaper
Philippines Herald. But despite the publication and
deposit of a prepaid copy of the complaint at the Manila
post office, defendants did not appear within the period
of 60 days from last publication, as required by the
summons.
Plaintiff then asked that defendants be declared in
default; but instead, the Judge, by order of May 16,
1970, asked it to show cause why the action should not
be dismissed, the suit being in personam and
defendants not having appeared. Then, on May 29,
1970, respondent Judge dismissed the case, despite
plaintiff Surety's argument that the summons by
publication was sufficient and valid under section 16 of
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
HELD We agree with respondent Judge that the action
of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam, the Court
could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-
appearing defendant, absent a personal service of
summons within the forum. We have explicitly so ruled
in Pantaleon vs. Asunción, 105 Phil. 765, pointing out
without such personal service, any judgment on a non-
appearing defendant would be violative of due process.
The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation
as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of
the resident defendant debtor with unknown address
and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, section
1(f), in which case, the attachment converts the action
into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the
summons by publication may then accordingly be
deemed valid and effective.
But because debtors who abscond and conceal
themselves are also quite adept at concealing their
properties, the dismissal of the case below by
respondent Judge should be set aside and the case held
pending in the court's archives, until petitioner as
plaintiff succeeds in determining the whereabouts of the
defendants' person or properties and causes valid
summons to be served personally or by publication as
the case may be. In this manner, the tolling of the period
of prescription for as long as the debtor remains in
hiding would properly be a matter of court records and
he can not emerge after a sufficient lapse of time from
the dismissal of the case to profit from his own misdeed
and claim prescription of his just debt.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the case issued
by the Court below is hereby set aside, and in the
interest of justice, the proceedings are ordered
suspended, to be held pending until the plaintiff
petitioner succeeds in ascertaining the whereabouts of
the defendants and/or locating properties of the same,
to enable proper summons to be issued conformably to
this Opinion. No costs.
KAWASAKI PORT SERVICES V. AMORES, 199 SCRA
230 (1991)
Facts: C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha is corporation
organized under the law of Japan. It appears to have
incurred obligations to several creditors amongst which
are defendants, also foreign corporations organized and
existing under the laws of Japan. It defaulted on its
creditors. Thereafter defendants have resorted to
demanding payment from C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. filed a complaint for
injunction and/or declaratory relief. Since the
defendants are non-residents, without business
addresses in the Philippines but in Japan,
extraterritorial service of summons was resorted to.
Thereafter, defendants filed their special appearances to
question the court’s jurisdiction over their persons.
Held: Where the complaint is purely an action for
injunction, it is a personal action as well as an action in
personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. As a
personal action, personal or substituted service of
summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service,
is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. In an
action for injunction, extra-territorial service of
summons and complaint upon the non-resident
defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the
RTCs. Extra-territorial service of summons will not
confer on the court jurisdiction.
DIAL CORPORATION V. SORIANO, 161 SCRA 737
(1988)
Facts:
Where the action is purely an action for injunction (e.g.
to restrain the defendants from enforcing against
contracts and to recover damages), it is clearly a
personal action as well as an action in personam, not an
action in rem or quasi in rem. In actions in personam,
personal or substituted service of summons on the
defendants, not extraterritorial service, is necessary to
confer jurisdiction on the court.

Tayug
Rule 15
CORPUS V. CORPUS, 148 SCRA 21 (1987)
Doctrines/Law: Where a written motion does not state
the time and place of the hearing or is not served upon
all the parties concerned at least 3 days in advance, the
motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper. No
motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
such notice of hearing.
Facts: Leona and Iladia Corpus, claiming to be the legal
heirs of the late spouses Domingo Corpus and Clara
Sibayan, filed an action against the spouses Jacinta
Corpus and Pedro Aduca, in the Pangasinan CFI for the
recovery of possession, with damages, of a parcel of
land, situated in Barrio Pinmaludpud, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, and registered in the name of "Heirs of
Domingo Corpus".
After several postponements at the behest of both
parties, the CFI set the pre-trial conference on 28
August 1967. On 15 August 1967, however, counsel for
the defendants filed a motion for the postponement of
the pre-trial conference set for 28 August 1967 claiming
that he had to appear before the Nueva Ecija CFI on the
same date in connection with Civil Case No. SD-206 of
said court. A copy of the Order issued in Civil Case No.
SD-206 of the Nueva Ecija CFI was appended to the
motion.
When the motion for postponement was heard on
28 August 1967, counsel for the plaintiffs interposed
opposition thereto, claiming that he was not furnished
with a copy of said motion for postponement. CFI denied
the motion for postponement and allowed the plaintiffs
to present their evidence ex-parte before the clerk of
court who was commissioned to receive the same.
A copy of the trial court's Order dated 28 August
1967 denying defendants' motion for postponement and
allowing the plaintiffs to adduce evidence ex-parte was
received by defendants on 12 September 1967. 7
Defendants took no step to have said Order
reconsidered and set aside.
CFI ruled against the defendants and ordered them to
vacate the property. Counsel for the defendants
received a copy of the decision on 7 June 1968, and on
1 July 1968, he filed a motion for new trial, praying
that: (1) a new trial be held on the ground that the
failure of the defendants and their counsel to be present
at the pre-trial conference set for 28 August 1967 was
due to mistake or excusable negligence; (2) the decision
dated 1 April 1968 be set aside and the defendants be
allowed to cross-examine the witnesses for the plaintiffs
and to present evidence on their behalf; and (3) the
defendants be awarded such other reliefs and remedies
as are just and equitable under the premises.
In support of his motion for new trial, counsel for the
defendants contended that he complied with the
requirement regarding notice to adverse parties by
sending a copy of his motion for postponement to
counsel for the plaintiffs by registered mail on 15
August 1967; and that his non-appearance at the pre-
trial conference on 28 August 1967 was justified as he
had to attend on the same date another hearing in the
Nueva Ecija CFI.
Counsel for the defendants further claimed that
Domingo Corpus died on 15 April 1956, and not in
1948, as claimed by the plaintiffs, so that the defendant
Jacinta Corpus, although a spurious child of Domingo
Corpus, is entitled to a share in the estate of said
Domingo Corpus. A copy of the death certificate of
Domingo Corpus, attested to by the Local Civil Registrar
of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija where the said Domingo Corpus
died, was attached to the motion.
CFI denied the motion for new trial on the grounds that
the Order issued on 28 August 1967, copy of which was
received by counsel for the defendants on 12 September
1967, had already become final when the defendants
filed their motion for new trial on 1 July 1968; and that
the alleged misrepresentation by the plaintiffs of the
true date of the death of Domingo Corpus is not a
ground for new trial.
Whereupon, the defendants interposed the present
appeal. They claim that the lower court erred: (1) in
denying their motion for postponement and in allowing
the plaintiffs to present their evidence ex-parte; and (2)
in denying their motion for new trial.
HELD We find no merit in the appeal. To begin with, we
see nothing abusive or irregular in the actions taken by
the lower court in denying the defendants-appellants'
motion for postponement of the pre-trial conference set
for 28 August 1967, and their motion for new trial. A
close examination of the record shows that said motion
for postponement does not show that a copy thereof had
been served upon the adverse party as there is no proof
of service thereof. In fact, the movants did not indicate
therein the manner by which a copy of the motion was
served upon counsel for the plaintiffs-appellees. Counsel
for the defendants-appellants merely stated therein:
"Copy furnished Atty. Federico R. Vinluan, San Nicolas,
Pangasinan." In the motion for new trial, counsel for the
defendants-appellants claimed that he sent to plaintiffs-
appellees' counsel a copy of the motion for
postponement by registered mail. The motion for
postponement, however, does not contain an affidavit of
the person who mailed the motion, showing compliance
with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 11 of the Rules of
Court, and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office, as required by Section 10 of the same Rule.
Neither does the motion for postponement adverted to
state the time and place for the hearing of the same, as
required by the Rules of Court. In the said motion for
postponement, counsel of the defendants-appellants
addressed the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Urdaneta Branch, thus: "Upon receipt of
the foregoing motion please submit the same to the
Honorable Court for its consideration."
And yet, the provisions of the Rules of Court requiring
that a motion shall state the time and place of the
hearing of the same are quite clear. Sections 4 and 5,
rule 15 of the rules of Court expressly provide that a
motion shall state the time and place of the hearing and
shall be served upon all the parties concerned at least
three (3) days in advance. And, according to Section 6 of
the same Rules no motion shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of such notice, and it has been held
that, in such a case, the motion is nothing but a useless
piece of paper. The reason is obvious: unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing, the court would have
no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees
or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him
on his objection, since the Rules do not fix any period
within which he may file his reply or opposition thereto.
Besides, it appears that it was defendants-appellants'
counsel who had to be in Cabanatuan City on the date
of hearing so that the defendants-appellants themselves
could have appeared in Court on the date set for the
hearing since their presence at the pre-trial conference
was also required. But, as it stands, both defendants-
appellants and their counsel failed to appear at the pre-
trial conference. It is a well-settled rule that the grant
or denial of a motion for postponement is discretionary
on the court. The defendants-appellants, as well as
their counsel, should not have presumed that the
motion for the deferment of the pretrial conference file an amended pleading
would be granted. They had no right to rely on the File a supplemental pleading
liberality of the court or on the generosity of the adverse
party. Summons
Defendants-appellants should also have taken upon
themselves the duty to inquire as to what action the
court took on their motion for the postponement of the
pre-trial conference. In this, they failed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be,
as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as
to costs.

Yap v. ca
Facts:

Azahar v. ca
Bpi v. far east
Moya v. bartol

Rule 16
Ramos v. peralta
Libunting
Pnb v. hipolito
Continental cement