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© REFERENCE CITATION FORM ©
Richard L. Lanigan,
PHENOMENOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION:
Merleau-Ponty’s Thematics in Communicology and
Semiology.
Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1988.
 
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Ph e n o m e n o l o g y o f Co m m u n ic a t io n
PHENOMENOLOGY
OFCOMMUNICATION
Merleau-Ponty ’s Thematics in
Communicology and Semiology
RichardL. Lanigan
Duquesne University Press

Pittsburgh, PA
Copyright © 1988 by Duquesne University Press
All Rights Reserved
No part o f this book may be used or

reproduced, in any manner whatsoever, without
written permission except in the case of
short quotations for use in critical
articles and reviews.
Published in the United States of America

by Duquesne University Press
600 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15282
First Edition
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Lanigan, Richard L.
Phenomenology of communication.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Communication—Philosophy. 2. Merleau-Ponty,
Maurice, 1908-1961—Contributions in philosophy of
communication. 3. Phenomenology. 4. Semiotics.
I. Title.
P91.L34 1988 001.51 87-24587
ISBN 0-8207-0185-8
ISBN 0-8207-0199-8 (pbk.)
Contents
L is t o f F igures ix
Preface xi
A c k n o w le d g e m e n ts xv
PA R T ONE: PH ILO SO PH Y O F C O M M U N IC A TIO N 1
C H A PT E R
1. The Phenom enology of H um an Com m unication 3

2. Theoretical Models in the Philosophy of Com m unication 18
PA R T TW O: C O M M U N IC O L O G Y 43
[S e c t io n On e : E id e t ic Re s e a r c h ] 43
3. M erleau-Ponty’s Phenom enology of Com m unication 45
4. Freedom and Field: M erleau-Ponty’s Sinngebung as the
Essence of a Semiotic Phenom enology of Hum an
Com munication 56
5. Com munication Science and M erleau-Ponty’s Critique of
the Objectivist Illusion 63
6. Phenomenological Reflections on H aberm as’ Critical
Theory of Com m unication 75
[S e c t io n Tw o :Em p ir ic a l Resea r c h ] 101
7. M etajournalism : M erleau-Ponty on Signs, Em blem s, and

A ppeals in the Poetry of T ruth 103
8. Guess at the W ords, or, How to Phenomenologically
Research the H erm eneutic Experience of Language and
Logic 118
t
vi CONTENTS
9. U rban Crisis: The Phenom enology of Social Polarization

and Com munication 134
10. Life-History Interviews: A Teaching and Research M odel
for Semiotic Phenom enology 144
PA R T T H R E E : SEM IO LO G Y 155
[S e c t io n On e : E id e t ic Resea r c h ] 155
11. Structuralism and the H um an Science C ontext of

Phenom enology and Semiology 157
12. The Foundations of Semiotic Phenom enology 168
13. Semiotic Phenom enology as a Theory of H um an
Com munication Praxis 175
14. Semiotic Phenom enology as a M etatheory of H um an
Com munication 184
[S e c t io n Tw o :Em p ir ic a l Resea r c h ] 195
15. The Semiotic Phenom enology of Speech and Linguistic

Discontinuity 197
16. A Treasure House of Preconstituted Types: A lfred Schutz
on Communicology 203
17. Semiotic Phenom enology in P lato’s Sophist 223
18. The Convention of “ Conventions” : A Phenom enological
Reflection on the Ideological Practice of Discourse in
Professional Mass Com munication 246
A PPEN D IX
Maurice M erleau-Ponty: A Biographical and Philosophical
Sketch 261
R EFE R E N C E S 263
IN D E X 281
A teacher who can arouse a feeling for one single good action, for one single
good poem, accomplishes more than he who fills our memory with rows on
rows o f natural objects, classified with name and form. G oethe
In Philosophy, my teacher,
Hu ber t Gr ig g s Al ex a n d er
Professor E m eritus o f Philosophy

U niversity of New M exico
D irector, U .N .M . A esthetics In stitu te a t Taos
And, his teacher,

W il bu r Ma r sh a l l Ur ba n
Professor o f Philosophy
Y ale U niversity
In Communicology, my teacher,
Th o ma s Je n n in g s Pa c e
Professor and D irector o f G rad u ate Studies in Speech C om m unication

S outhern Illinois U niversity
And, his teacher,

El w o o d Hu ey Al l en Mu r r a y
Professor E m eritus and D irecto r o f the School of Speech

U niversity o f D enver
D irector, In stitu te o f G en eral Sem antics
F ounder of the In tern atio n al C om m unication A ssociation
List o f Tables and Figures
Tables Page
1. D em ographics for Test G roups 127

2. Message Type A lpha 128
3. Message Type B eta 128
4. Message Type G am m a 129
5. Message Type D elta 129
6. Message Type Epsilon 129
7. Message Type Z eta 129
8. Message Type E ta 129
9. Message Type T heta 129
Figures Page
1. M etatheory and M ethodology in H um an Com m unication 6

2. Theory and M ethodology of Semiotic Phenom enology 9
3. Static Com m unication 58
4. O rthogonal Static Com m unication 58
5. O rthogonal Dynamic Com m unication [Helix] 58
6. Choice Levels in M odal Com m unication according to
H aberm as 96
7. Choice Levels in M odal Com m unication according to Lanigan 97
8. Negative Signification ‘nobody’ 113
9. Substitution of ‘inm ate’ for ‘body’ 113
10. Paradigm atic Substitution 113
11. Positive Signification ‘som ebody’ 114
12. Ontological Signification ‘A ttica’ 114
13. Ontological Signification ‘body’, i.e., ‘person’ 114
14. Negative Signification ‘gets killed’ 115
15. Positive Signification ‘gets killed’ 115
16. Positive Signification ‘gonna die’ 115
17. Paradigm atic and Syntagmatic Substitution signifying the
Ontology of Power 115
18. Research Test Protocol: Guess at the W ords 125
19. Com m unication Theory E ntailm ents: L etters and Ciphers 128
20. Semiotic E ntailm ents of Inform ation Theory 130
X TABLES AND FIGURES
21. Semiotic E ntailm ents of Com m unication Theory 132

22. Semiotic Phenom enology Analysis W orksheet 148
23. Interview Protocol: D issertation on Obesity 150
24. Interview Protocol: Life-History Research 151
25. Form alization of the Semiotic Phenom enology of
Com munication 176
26. Com munication Praxis 187
27. Com munication Theory 189
28. Com munication M etatheory 190
29. The Phenom enological Structure of Schutz’s Communicology 206
30. Examples of Schutz’s Communicological Typifications 213
31. A lfred Schutz’s Postulate of M eaning-A dequacy 215
32. A lfred Schutz’s Postulate of the C oherence of Experience 220
33. B arthes’s ‘C onnotation’ expressed in his Propositional Calculus 229
34. B arthes’s ‘D enotation/M etalanguage’ expressed in his
Propositional Calculus 229
35. B arthes’s ‘C onnotation’ graphically produced 229
36. B arthes’s ‘D enotation/M etalanguage’ graphically produced 229
37. Com binatory overlay of B arthes’s Propositional Calculus for
‘C onnotation’ and ‘D enotation’ where the M etalanguage
Function is produced: Rhetoric 229
38. Com binatory overlay of B arthes’s Propositional Calculus for
‘C onnotation’ and ‘D enotation’ where the M etalanguage
Function is produced: Ideology 229
39. Exam ples of Com binatory Sufficient Condition Sets that can be
dem onstrated in Com m unication Theory 230
40. Exam ples of Com binatory Sufficient Condition Sets th at can be
interpolated in Com m unication Theory 230
41. B arthes’s com plete model in Elements o f Semiology 231
42. Lanigan extrapolation of B arthes’s model 231
43. B arthes’s interpolation m odel in Mythologies 231
44. Platonic Categories form ulated according to B arthes’s m odel of
C onnotation 232
45. Platonic Categories form ulated according to B arthes’s model of
D enotation 232
46. Platonic Categories form ulated according to B arthes’s model 232
47. P lato’s M ethod of D efinition by G enus (Class) and D ifferentia
(Characteristic) 233
48. Lanigan extrapolation of B arthes’s m odel applied to the Platonic
Categories 233
49. Lanigan model for Platonic Categories: D iscourse and W riting 233
50. The Preliminary Divisions from Sallis 238
51. Plato’s entailm ent of Com m unication Theory and Inform ation
Theory in the Categories of Being/Not-Being, M ovem ent/Rest,
and Sam e/O ther 241
52. Semiotic Phenom enology of H um an Com m unication 243
53. M erleau-Ponty’s model of H um an Discourse 245
54. The Structure of Research R eporting 250
Preface
Phenom enology and Com m unication have been related closely in the
recent history of ideas. Y et, the association usually has “ com m unication”
located in the guise of linguistics, expression, perception, or cognate
views of aesthetics. This is largely the unintentional result of professional
disciplinary lines in which the daily practice of Phenom enology as First
Philosophy tends to exclude in practice Phenom enology as a m odality in
the H um an Sciences. In this context, the research reported here as a
Phenomenology o f Communication is an affirmative phenom enological
hypothesis in the spirit of M aurice M erleau-Ponty’s philosophy. The
hypothesis is that philosophy is phenom enology, and, that phenom enol-
ogy is a rigorous hum an science in the m ode of C om m unicology— as it is
in other disciplinary m odes such as Psychology and Sociology. Indeed,
the work of M erleau-Ponty stands as a paradigm case of this hypothesis.
H ow ever, there is an earlier story to tell.
The introduction of phenom enology into the English speaking world
began with the scholarly interest of comm unicologists, the persons whose
concern is speech and m eaning in the lived-world. It was, after all, C.K.
Ogden and I.A . Richards who in 1923 first announced phenom enology in
their classic work The Meaning o f Meaning: A Study o f the Influence o f
Language upon Thought and the Science o f Sym bolism . This volume in its
famous “ A ppendix D: Some M oderns” lists as the first m odern, the first
person of the contem porary scene, one E dm und H usserl. Ogden and
Richards go on to report a very brief précis of H usserl’s Logische
Untersuchungen and Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und p häno-
menologischen Philosophie. This appendix entry is abstracted from the
syllabus for the course of lectures on the “ Phenom enological M ethod and
Phenom enological Philosophy” that H usserl gave during June 1922 at
London University. Ogden and R ichards quote H usserl’s own program -
matic words: a series of lectures to explicate “ a transcendental sociologi-
cal phenomenology having reference to a manifest multiplicity of con-
scious subjects com m unicating with one an o th er” .
A nd we should recall, as does H erbert Spiegelberg in his m onum ental
The Phenomenological M ovement: A Historical Introduction, that W ilbur
XI
xii PREFACE
M arshall U rban in his 1929 The Intelligible World: Metaphysics and Value
was the first person to introduce the A m erican (U SA ) discussion of
Alexius M einong’s “Gegenstandtheorie” in com parison to H usserl’s logic.
But as Spiegelberg fails to note, it is U rb an ’s Language and Reality: The
Philosophy o f Language and the Principles o f Sym bolism published in
1939 that provides A m erican readers with the first systematic discussion
of the Logical Investigations and their bearing on the emerging science of
symbolism (com m unication). This favorable presentation of H usserl’s
phenom enology of com m unication comes some four years before the
m ore frequently rem em bered H arvard University Press publication of
The Foundation o f Phenom enology by M arvin F ärber in 1943.
While Husserl was the focus of early w ork on the phenom enology of
com m unication, it is M aurice M erleau-Ponty who figures in the contem -
porary discussion. We may recall that Georges G usdorf’s La Parole was
one of the early works chosen as a representation of phenomenological
thought for translation into English. It is a work that highlights the many
threads of the phenom enology of communication that have their ground-
ing in M erleau-Ponty, H usserl, and R om an Jakobson (the first communi-
cologist to study with Husserl). M erleau-Ponty again receives focused
attention in the two D uquesne University Press volumes by Rem y C.
Kwant, Phenomenology o f Language in 1965 and Phenomenology o f
Expression in 1969.
It is in this context that I began my own w ork on the phenom enology of
communication as a subject m atter in both the disciplines of Communi-
cology and Philosophy. As an undergraduate and then graduate student
at the University of New Mexico, I was fortunate to study under a student
of W ilbur M. U rban, Professor H ubert Griggs A lexander. H e first
introduced me to M erleau-Ponty and to the philosophy of com m unication
recorded in his own works: Time as Dimension and History (1945), The
Language and Logic o f Philosophy (1967; 2nd ed. 1972), and M eaning in
Language (1969). I then com pleted my doctoral dissertation (published as
Speaking and Sem iology) under the direction of Professor Thom as J.
Pace. Pace was a postdoctoral student of William Earle at N orthw estern
University and did his own doctoral w ork under Professor Elwood
M urray at the University of D enver. I should note as an aside that
Professor M urray once taught an undergraduate student as a com m unica-
tion m ajor who, in addition, was on the collegiate debate team . That
student was N athan M. Pusey who becam e president of Lawrence Col-
lege and was the first supporter of one of his philosophy faculty m em bers
who w anted extensive release time to write a book. The faculty m em ber
was H erbert Spiegelberg and the book was The Phenomenological M ove-
ment.
During past years, I have had occasion to write several papers that are
both a context and an interconnection for the book length discussions that
PREFACE xiii
appeared as Speaking and Sem iology (1972) where I com pare phenom e-
nology and phenom enalism , as Speech A c t Phenom enology (1977) where
I com pare analytic philosophy of language with phenom enology, and
as Semiotic Phenom enology o f Rhetoric (1984) w here I suggest the
emergence of semiotic phenom enology in the w ork of M erleau-Ponty and
his student Michel Foucault. T he best of these papers are collected in the
present volume.
The chapters were edited to serve a num ber of purposes. As a whole
collection, the book represents a system atic research program — both in
philosophical theory and in hum an science application. It can be read as
such by the new com er to the phenom enology of com m unication. O n the
other hand, a certain am ount of overlap is retained in each essay so that it
can be read independently of other chapters by the scholar already
familiar with phenom enological thought and procedure. A balance is
struck betw een introductory and technical analyses, as well as between
eidetic and empirical projects. T here is extensive cross-referencing be-
tween the chapters so that the reader knows im mediately when and where
a particular point is treated in detail elsew here in the text. Figures are
used generously to assist the reader in following many of the more
complex relations under discussion and analysis. W hile m any of these
concepts could be accom m odated m ore easily by using a form al calculus,
such a procedure in spirit would do violence to the essence of phenom e-
nology. H um an language diagram s and figures b etter represent the lived-
experience of com m unication analysis. The author-date system of refer-
ence is used to assist the reader in finding quickly and easily the work
under discussion in the text.
L et me close this Preface in the tradition of Professor Spiegelberg’s
Preface by noting that as we approach two decades of phenom enological
research in the D epartm ent of Speech Com m unication at Southern
Illinois University, a debt is owed to a series of departm ental chairs for
their sym pathetic and continuing support: D r. R alph M icken, a Cicero
scholar who cham pioned the place of com m unication in the hum anities,
D r. R ichard Paul H ibbs, a distinguished teacher who exemplified the
beauties of the English language in perform ance, D r. E dw ard M cGlone,
a rare com bination of hum anist and statistician who likes to quote
H usserl’s Cartesian Meditations, and D r. M arvin D. Kleinau, an adminis-
trator whose genuine priority is the education of students through a
meaningful dialogue with m otivated faculty— a priority he personally
displays in person, in the classroom, and in the television studio. These
gentlem en have chaired a faculty that is uniquely distinguished by the
mutual respect and tolerance for one another that they bring to the
departm ent. The faculty is in its own way is a genuine example of the
phenom enology of communication.
I also want to note the generous and affirmative support of form er
xiv PREFACE
President Dr. A lbert Somit, D r. John G uyon, Acting President and

Academic Vice President, and D r. K eith Sanders, D ean of the College of
Communications and Fine A rts, for the faculty pursuing phenom enologi-
cal research at Southern Illinois University. T he result has been the
em ergence of a Southern Circle of Phenom enology within the norm al
structure of the university. The vitality of this interdisciplinary effort is
due to my colleagues Thom as J. Pace (Speech C om m unication), G arth J.
Gillan and Stephen Tym ann (Philosophy), H ans R udnick (English),
Jnanabrata B hattacharyya (Com m unity D evelopm ent), and Thom as O.
M itchell (Psychology). I owe a particular thanks to the graduate students
whose dialogue is a constant stimulation in the Phenomenology Seminar I:
French Communicology and Phenom enology Seminar II: German Com-
municology.
Acknowledgements
The following chapters are reprinted (with m odifications and additions)

by permission from publishers as noted. C hapter 1 from Philosophy
Today, 23(1), 1979, 3-15; Figure 1 in C hapter 1 from “ Talking: The
Semiotic Phenom enology of H um an Interaction” , International Journal
o f the Sociology o f Language, 43, 1983, 105-117 (H aw thorne, NY:
M outon D e Gruyter & Co.); C hapter 2 from Communication Yearbook 3,
ed. D an Nimmo (New Brunswick, NJ: International Com m unication
Association & Transaction B ooks, 1979), 29-49; C hapter 3 from Philos-
ophy Today, 14(2), 1970, 79-88; C hapter 6 w ritten with the partial
assistance of D r. R udolf L. Strobl [see N ote 5], from H andbook o f
Political Communication, ed. D an Nimmo & K eith Sanders (Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), 141-167; C hapter 7 from C om m uni-
cation, 7(2), 1983, 241-261 (New Y ork, NY: G ordon and Breach Science
Publishers); C hapter 9 from Central States Speech Journal, 21(2), 1970,
108-116; C hapter 11 from Review Journal o f Philosophy and Social
Science, 11(2), 1986, 55-70 (M eerut, India: A nu B ooks); C hapter 12 and
the A ppendix from Encyclopedic Dictionary o f Semiotics, 3 V ols., ed.
Thomas A. Sebeok (Berlin: M outon D e G ruyter & C o.); C hapter 13
from Journal o f A pplied Communication Research, 10(1), 1982, 62-73;
C hapter 14 from Semiótica, 27(4), 1979, 293-305 (H aw thorne, NY:
M outon D e G ruyter & C o.); C hapter 15 from Dégres, 1(2), 1973, 1-7
(Belgium); C hapter 17 from Semiótica, 41(1-4), 1982, 221-245 (copy-
right, the East-W est C enter, H onolulu, Hawaii).
The following chapters are printed here for the first time. C hapter 4 is
from a paper presented at The M erleau-Ponty Circle, C oncordia U niver-
sity, 29 Septem ber 1984, M ontréal, C anada; C hapter 5 is from a paper
presented respectively at T he M erleau-Ponty Circle, State University of
New Y ork, 12 O ctober 1979, Stony B rook, New Y ork and as revised at
the International C om m unication A ssociation C onference, 26 M ay 1984,
San Francisco, California; C hapter 8 is from a paper presented respec-
tively at the M idwest Sociological Association, 19 A pril 1984, Chicago,
Illinois and as revised at the C onference on R esearch Practice in the
H um an Sciences, 13 July 1984, Pennsylvania State University; C hapter 10
XV
xvi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
is from a paper presented in various stages of developm ent at the

Semiotic Society of A m erica C onference on 9 O ctober 1983, Snowbird,
U tah, at the Society for Phenom enology and H um an Sciences on 23
O ctober 1983, St. Louis, M issouri, and at the symposium on “ Oral
History: Theory and Practice’’ held on 2 M arch 1984 at the State U niver-
sity of New Y ork at Buffalo; C hapter 16 was presented respectively at the
International H um an Science Research C onference, 16 May 1984, W est
Georgia College, as revised at the Semiotic Society of A m erica C onfer-
ence, 12 O ctober 1984, A tlanta, G eorgia, and as revised at the confer-
ence on “ W orldly Phenom enology—The C ontinuing Influence of Alfred
Schutz on N orth A m erican H um an Science,” 30 June 1986, Ohio U niver-
sity, A thens. Schutz conference papers are being published in book form
(Lester E m bree, editor) by the C enter for A dvanced R esearch in P he-
nomenology & University Press of A m erica; and C hapter 18 is from a
paper presented respectively at the Southern Speech Com m unication
Association C onference, 13 A pril 1979, Biloxi, Mississippi (edited by S.
D eetz) and as revised at the International C om m unication Association
Conference, 26 May 1985, East-W est C enter and University of Hawaii,
Honolulu. This C hapter 18 is an em pirical illustration of M erleau-Ponty’s
theory of ideology as developed previously in C hapter 9 (1970), in a 1977
paper entitled “ Critical Theory as a Philosophy of C om m unication” (see
N ote 4), and in C hapter 7 (1983). W ith regard to C hapter 9 , 1 wish to note
in particular the work (both published and unpublished) on ideological
form ation produced by my S .I.U . colleague, Prof. Jnanabrata B hatta-
charyya, who is a specialist on politics and peasant cultures, and, Prof.
M ark Hickson III, a fellow doctoral graduate from S .I.U ., which has
been a substantial influence on my own thinking about this subject.
Most of the research reported here was supported departm entally by
assigned time for research at Southern Illinois University and by direct
grants for research by, respectively, the S .I.U . Office for Research
D evelopm ent and A dm inistration (1974 grant), the East-W est C enter
Institute for Com m unication and Culture (1980 grant), the M ellon
Foundation (1981 and 1984 grants), and the D anforth Foundation (1981
grant, with Dr. Randall Bytwerk). In addition, much of the research has
been supported indirectly through my associations with the M erleau-
Ponty Circle, with The C enter for A dvanced R esearch in Phenom enol-
ogy, directed by Lester E m bree (D uquesne University), the center’s
Com mittee on C ultural Studies and Institute for H um an Sciences, di-
rected by Algis M ickunas (O hio University), with The C enter for the
Study of C ultural Transmission, directed by M adeliene M athiot (SUNY-
Buffalo), with the G raduate Program in Semiotics [D epartm ents of
A nthropology, C om m unication, Liguistics] directed by Paul Garvin
(SUNY-Buffalo), with the Research C enter for Language and Semiotic
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xvii
Studies, directed by Thom as A. Sebeok (Indiana U niversity), and, with

the Simon Silverman Phenom enology C enter at D uquesne University
whose directors are A m edeo Giorgi, Edw ard L. M urray, R ichard Ro-
jcewicz, and A ndré Schuwer.
Part O ne:
Philosophy o f Communication
Chapter One
The Phenomenology o f
Human Communication
The Collège de France is a popular, yet respected, French institution.

The college em bodies an attitude of social consciousness that appeals to
the citizen and the intellectual alike. The French governm ent m aintains
various academic chairs at the college and on the death of a colleague, the
collegium elects a new professeur to assume the vacant place of honor.
But, such a professor does not teach according to our usual expectation.
He or she is adm itted into the college for purposes of research, dialogue
and, from time to tim e, public lectures free to those who follow the
intellectual life of Paris.
A new professor at the Collège de France is for me an exem plar of the
familiar “ fact” -versus-“value” paradox in hum an com m unication that the
speech com m unication discipline has historically referred to as rhetorical
ethics— or is it ethical rhetoric that we question? M aurice M erleau-Ponty
(1963a, pp. 4-5) sensed this historical and existential paradox when he
assumed the chair of philosophy at the Collège de France. A t that time he
said to his Parisian audience:
The philosopher is m arked by the distinguishing trait th at he possesses

inseparably the taste for evidence and the feeling for ambiguity. W hen he
limits himself to accepting am biguity, it is called equivocation. B ut among
the great it becom es a them e; it contributes to establishing certitudes rather
than m enacing them . T herefore it is necessary to distinguish good and bad
ambiguity.
In short, the speech com m unication discipline has in “ rhetoric” a

“ taste for evidence” and in “ ethics” a “ feeling for am biguity.” The
3
4 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION
conjunction of these two elem ents in the com m unication process becomes
the necessary and sufficient ground for certitude or doubt in conscious
experience. The result of good ambiguity is therefore a theme for living
and the counterresult is equivocation or bad ambiguity.
G O O D AN D B A D A M B IG U IT Y
I find the problem of good and bad ambiguity present in the com m unica-
tion theory and praxis that we, by custom , label “ rhetorical ethics.” This
is a generic reference, which has as its counterpart the predication
“ethical rhetoric.” In the present context, I take rhetoric to be pragm atic
discourse where a social value is ascribed to the explicit behavior of
persons. In a specifically phenom enological sense, rhetoric is speaking
that creates an object fo r consciousness that speaker and listener perceive.
In parallel fashion, I view ethic as a value generated in discourse that is
implicitly a condition of personal conscious experience. For the phe-
nomenologist, an ethic is the authentic choice m ade by a person in a
world of other persons. Speaking, here, is an object o f consciousness. I do
not, therefore, accept the often popular notion that rhetoric is a value-
free m ethod (has no ethical constraint) nor that an ethic is factually
indeterm inate as m ethod (has no rhetorical context).
The problem atic issue with us since the G reeks is the ratio to be
discovered betw een a rhetoric and an ethic. O r as M erleau-Ponty con-
temporizes the problem , the ratio in hum an com m unication is a m atter of
praxis: good or bad ambiguity is chosen in discourse.1 T hat is to say, good
ambiguity is “ rhetorical ethics” ; rhetoric as speaking refers to ethics as
hum an values. By contrast, bad ambiguity is “ ethical rhetoric” ; ethics as
value choices predicates diction (H aberm as 1984a; Searle 1969). The
conceptual grounding of the linguistic turn from rhetorical ethics to
ethical rhetoric requires a phenom enological analysis that will uncover
the relational presuppositions in hum an com m unication. As Frederick
Sontag (1969, p. 185) argues:
In its existence betw een the actual and possible worlds, ethics as a th eo ret-
ical enterprise is doom ed both to contingency and to the same lack of
finality that characterizes all existence. T he value norm s involved are
1. Recall th at am biguity is a condition w here two or m ore equally useful explanations are
available; ambiguity is not synonym ous with paradox, as we are often led to believe in
various historical analyses of rhetoric and ethics beginning with Plato (see chap. 17, below ).
T he nature of this “ linguistic tu rn ” is discussed by D errida (1976, pp. 216ff.) and is included
in the general discussion of “ epidictic g enre” by Perelm an & O lbrechtes-Tyteca (1971, pp.
4711.).
HUMAN COMMUNICATION 5
neither contingent nor subject to change, but the context for their applica-
tion is. Ethics transcends the actual w orld, and, just because it does, it
eludes fixed expression. T he num ber of ethical norm s is actually finite and
stable, but the possibles to which they apply are not. This indicates both the
fixed [rhetorical ethics] and the unstable [ethical rhetoric] elem ent in all
ethical pronouncem ents.
I propose to accomplish a phenom enological analysis of the conscious

relationship that unites rhetoric and ethic in the hum an act of speaking by
entertaining three basic questions that bear directly on the fact-value ratio
in hum an com m unication (Z an er 1975).
The questions th at I set myself are these: (1) W hat is phenom enology?,
(2) W hat is a phenom enology of com m unication? (3) W hat is a phenom e-
nology of hum an com m unication? The progressive answer to each of
these questions reflects a research m ethod practiced by such existential
phenom enologists as Jean-Paul S artre, M aurice M erleau-Ponty, Karl
Jaspers, and M artin H eidegger am ong others. It is a m ethod with an
A m erican tradition as well and includes w hat William Jam es called
pragmatism and later radical empiricism (M erleau-Ponty 1963a, p. xi).
The phenom enological m ethod is w hat Charles Peirce (B rinkley 1960)
referred to as semiotic and w hat I call semiotic phenom enology. All these
perspectives echo E dm und H usserl’s (1970a, b) quest for a return to
“ rigorous science” where analysis (acta) focuses on conscious experience
(capta), rather than on hypothetical constructs (data), which by definition
prom ote ethical crisis in a worldview (Weltanschauung). This failure of
“ data” is best known in the philosophy of science as Thom as K uhn’s
(1962) notion of “paradigm crisis” and in social philosophy as Jürgen
H aberm as’s (1975) thesis on “ legitim ation crisis.”
It may be helpful at this point to recall the historical m etatheory and
m ethodology relationships operating in the philosophy of science among
the concepts capta, data, and acta, and their respective m ethodological
implications (Figure 1). Capta or “w hat are tak en ” are formally known as
the Q .E .I (quod erat inveniendum', which was to be found out). It is a
m ethod for systemic analysis consisting of four steps: (1) the process of
discovery or hypothesis; (2) the testing of possibilities or verification; (3)
the description of results or explication; and (4) the achievem ent of
understanding or a proposition (Verstand). On the other hand, data, or
“what are given,” are the form al notion of the Q .E .D . (quod erat
demonstrandum; which was to be dem onstrated). It is a m ethod for
systematic analysis consisting of four steps: (1) the process of invention or
hypostatization; (2) the testing of probabilities or versimilitude; (3) the
prediction of results or explanation; and (4) the achievem ent of knowl-
edge or a statement (a Verstehen).
I. M ETATHEORY II. M ETHODOLOGY

A. THEORY A. M E T H O D
1. W issenschaft- N aturwissenschaft :
2. G e is t----------- 2. Geisteswissenschaft a. Hypostatization
b. Verisim ilitude
a. H ypothesis c. E xplanation
(1) b. Verification d. Statem ent
I
c. Explication
d. Proposition
/
B. M ODEL B. P R O C E D U R E
1. Em pirical - Quantitative:
2. E idetic — 2. Qualitative: a. Logic
b. M athem atic
N\ . Phenom enology
c. Statistic
[Ideographic] (8)
b. Semiology
[Nomothetic]
c. E th n o g ra p h y ,
[Kulturwissenschaft]
(5) d. H istoriography
[Geistesgeschichte]
C. C O N STR U C T Ç. E X E M P L A R
/ Y)\ ^ (
1. D a ta - Prototype:
a. Digital Function a. Relation [state]
b. Disjunctive b. M agnitude
Functives c. Signal
c. Probability d. M entifact
• 2. C ap ta--------------------- - -2. Paradigm
a. Binary Analogue a. Form [process]
Function b. Structure
b. Com binatory c. Symbol
Functive d. A rtifact
c. Possibility
'o f the H um an Sciences:

a. Person [Lebenswelt]
b. Peer G roup [Gemeinschaft]
c. Society [Gesellschaft]
d. C ulture [W eltanschauung]
Figure 1. Metatheory and methodology in human communication
Key to relationships'. 1. Q .E .I. (quod erat inveniendum: which was to be found out);
2. Q .E .D . (quod erat demonstrandum: which was to be dem onstrated); 3. Praxis
and 4. A pplication, Q .E .F . (quod erat faciendum : which was to be done); 5.
Synthesis (synthetic judgm ent); 6. E xperim ent (experim ental judgm ent); 7.
Analysis (analytic judgm ent); 8. Speculation (experiential judgm ent; ‘thought
experim ent’)
In general, the hum an sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) study capta

whereas the physical sciences (Naturwissenschaften) study data. The
unifying force in both cases is acta or “ w hat are d o n e.” O ur m odern view
of acta is “ science” where the analogue structure of capta and data forms
a ratio or praxis. H ere we have a theory-construction theorem where
opposition (a digital ratio) betw een capta and data is used to validate their
categorical identity. A n illustration of this point is the fam iliar proposi-
tion that all com m unication is m etacom m unication. H ence, the digital
ratio is the grounding for an analogical practice— that is, both capta and
data are the practice of science because one set is the context for the other
in acta. A cta as this m etatheory procedure are formally known as the
Q .E .F . (quod erat faciendum', which was to be done) (A pel 1967, 1972a,
b, 1975; O rth 1973).
To summarize my point, the historical notion of “ crisis” in the work of
Husserl and the contem porary view of “ crisis” offered by K uhn and
Haberm as is a scientific concern with the bifurcation of capta and data in
acta. T hat is, the hum an sciences are incorrectly seen to be or are treated
as methodologically different from the physical sciences, rath er than
essentially different.2 In consequence, phenom enology em erged and is
now reviving as philosophy of science the attitude that all science consists
in a m ethodological progression from (1) capta to (2) data to (3) acta and
(4) the progressive repetition of the process in the accum ulation and
com m unication of research findings and applications. The “ rigor” of
science is thereby achieved by m aking the conceptual whole (that which is
systemic) a dialectical function of its parts (that which is systematic) and
conversely (the familiar logics: coherence, correspondence, perform ance,
etc.).
PH E N O M E N O L O G Y
Phenom enology is the nam e for a historical m ovem ent born in G erm any
with Husserl, Jaspers, and H eidegger, sustained in France by M erleau-
Ponty, Sartre, and de B eauvoir, and com plem ented by a growing com -
munity of A m erican scholars in the hum an sciences. This m ovem ent
locates its purpose and direction in the theory and praxis we call con-
2. The “ m ethodological” issue is literally one of m ethod and logic, or in contem porary
term inology,praxis and theory. T he issue has two m odalities in my discussion: (1) rhetorical
ethics or personal com m unicative attitudes, and (2) ethical rhetoric or norm s of social
behavior. The essential, but not functional, issue is one of conscious experience— i.e ., the
differentiation and integration of (1) rhetoric(s) or rational action in society, and (2) ethic(s)
or norm s of personality in the social w orld ( Umwélt). F or a discussion and critique of Max
W eber’s notions of “ differentiation” and “ integration” as they apply to “ a ct,” “ action,” and
“ acting,” see Schutz (1967) and chap. 16, below . O n the relationship of theory and praxis as
they apply to social behavior, see H aberm as (1971a, b) and chap. 6, below.
scious experience— that is, the relationship betw een a person and the
lived world (Lebenswelt) that he or she inhabits (Zeitgeist). As a theory,
phenom enology concerns itself with the nature and function of conscious-
ness. Inasmuch as consciousness is a hum an phenom enon, phenom enol-
ogy is properly described as an attitude or philosophy of the person. In
short, the descriptive adjective “ existential” is now implicit in the term
“phenom enology.” As praxis, phenom enology operates with an investi-
gative m ethod that explains experience. The application of the m ethod
has the same range of explication that the problem atic of “ experience”
has. In short, phenom enology is a historical m ovem ent; it is a philosophy
in the existential tradition, and it is a research m ethod exemplifying a
philosophy of science. In subsequent sections I will take up the nature of
that philosophy, especially as it applies to the hum an science of com m uni-
cation.
Phenom enological m ethod is a three-step process that is synergistic in
nature. This is to say, the m ethodology entails each step as a part in a
whole, yet the very entailm ent m akes the whole larger than the sum of its
parts. In other words, relationships are created betw een “parts” and
these relationships becom e new “parts” to be added into the total
scheme. All consciousness is synergistic in this way: the m om ent that you
move from step one to step two, you have sim ultaneously invented
(experienced) step three— that is, the relationship betw een steps one and
two. The generated relationship is a presence where there was none
originally— that is, an absence or a contextual infrastructure that pro-
motes the “ presence.” In a contem porary sense we usually refer to this
presence/absence or activity/passivity phenom enon as the coincidence of
consciousness (an implicit perception) and experience (an explicit percep-
tion), which is m etaphor and m etonym y, to use a linguistic example
(H olenstein 1976). The classical nam e for this synergistic process is
rhetoric, where the joining of argum ents compels judgm ent— that is, the
joining of the experience, as an object fo r consciousness, and conscious-
ness, as an object o f consciousness, produces perception and expression
for the listener or speaker, respectively.
The synergistic process of perception and expression is form alized by
A ristotle in his “ syllogism” (Lanigan 1974). B ut a word of caution here.
A ristotle literally formalized conscious experience by m aking data out of
capta: hum an utterances are formalized and reified into abstractions—
idealizations treated as realizations. In short, statements are m ade to
conform to value norm s and are thereby constituted as propositions. This
is why a theory constructionist is always w arned about m aterial truth or
essential understanding as a “ reality check” of conscious experience on
the logical validity of argum ent or form al knowledge. Put another way,
the theory constructionist in the speech com m unication discipline is
Th eo r y Me t h o d o l o g y
Phenom enological D escription
1. D E SC R IPT IO N (entails): 1. DESCRIPTION: (Thematizing the)

a. D escription; 2. Interpretation (of the)
b. Reduction; 3. R eduction (of the)
c. Interpretation. 4. D escription (of the SIG N ).
Phenom enological Reduction
2. R E D U C T IO N (entails): 5. R ED U C TIO N : (Abstracting the)

a. D escription; 6. In terpretatio n (of the)
b. R eduction; 7. R eduction (of the)
c. Interpretation. 8. Description (of the SIGN IE 1ER).
Phenom enological Interpretation
3. IN T E R P R E T A T IO N (entails): 9. IN T E R P R E T A T IO N :
a. D escription; (Explicating the)
b. Reduction; 10. Interpretation (of the)
c. Interpretation. 11. Reduction (of the)
12. D escription (of the
S IG N IF IE D ).
Figure 2. Theory and methodology o f semiotic phenom enology

(Lanigan 1984)
warned that rhetorical ethics (propositions) cannot be equated with or

treated as equivalent to ethical rhetoric (statem en ts). Such an equation in
one case creates a “ paradigm crisis” or failure of experience in the social
world, or in the o ther case, the equivalence prom otes a “ legitim ation
crisis” or failure of consciousness in the personal world. The theory of
general semantics is a ready illustration of this point.
The first step in phenom enological m ethod is description (see Figure 2).
The usual technical nam e is appropriate, phenom enological description.
R ather than a m ere truism , phenom enologists insist on the adjective
“phenom enological” to rem ind us th at we are dealing with capta, con-
scious experience. Singular use of the term “ description” allows our
thinking to slip into hypothetical constructs, into the creation of abstrac-
tions as things, as constructs. This bad am biguity of created abstraction as
formal multiplicity can be avoided by intentionally m aking the descrip-

tion come back to conscious experience. H usserl originally called this
procedure the epoché or “ bracketing” of conscious experience. The idea
in this technique is that our thinking should establish brackets around the
experience to be described, not so much to isolate the experience “ in”
brackets as to keep external presuppositions “ outside” the brackets from
influencing our description. This is to say, an attem pt is m ade to analyze
the experience in the context of consciousness and preconsciousness,
rather than in term s of assumed boundaries of judgm ent based on
historically generated value norms.
A t this point, I believe that we can see that phenom enological descrip-
tion is rhetorical in nature; there is in the epoché an intentional control
{acta) im posed on thinking and that control reflects an objective value, in
a word an ‘’ethic.” H usserl’s rigorous scientist would call this description
a truly objective fact of hum an com m unication where data, capta, and
acta merge.
The second step in the phenom enological m ethod is reduction, techni-
cally referred to as the phenom enological reduction. The overt goal of this
step in the m ethod is to determ ine which parts of the description are
essential and which are not— th at is, merely m ethodological. In other
words, we want to find out exactly which parts of the experience are truly
part of our consciousness and which parts are merely assum ed. The
purpose of this second step is to isolate the object of consciousness— the
thing, person, em otion, and so forth, that constitutes the experience we
have. The usual technique for accomplishing the phenom enological re-
duction is called imaginative free variation (see chap. 15, below). This
procedure consists in reflecting on the parts of the experience that have
cognitive, affective, and conative m eaning, and systematically imaging
each part as present or absent in the experience. By contextual com pari-
son and elim ination, you are able to reduce the description to those parts
that are essential for the existence of the consciousness of experience
(gestalt). The description thus becomes a reduction or depicting defini-
tion, but in the phenom enological sense that my consciousness is based
directly on my experience, not a conception o /w h a t my experience may
be, which is the consensus m ethod of crisis science. W e m ust also recall
that phenom enological m ethod is synergistic so that the phenom enologi-
cal reduction perm its a m ore precise phenom enological description. In
short, there is a geom etric logic of inclusion operating as we move from
description to reduction in the phenom enological m ethod.
The third step in the m ethod is interpretation. In a general sense this
step is an attem pt to specify the “ m eaning” that is essential in the
reduction and description of the conscious experience being investigated.
The technical nam e for this operation is variously semiotic or hermeneutic
analysis. M ore recently, it is simply called phenom enological interpreta-
tion. Semiology is the study of sign systems or codes, so a herm eneutic

semiology is the specification of the value relationship that unites the
phenom enological description and reduction. F or exam ple, think of a
conscious experience of rhetoric— a hum an utterance. You might de-
scribe such an experience as hearing a speech. You may further reduce
this experience to your consciousness of being persuaded by the words
you heard. Finally, you might interpret this experience as a com m onplace
belief that you have (consciousness). The com m onplace is a code, it
signifies the value— conscious experience— that functions as the relation-
ship in the description and reduction: the speech (acta) given to you
(data) that is taken (capta) as meaningful— that is, the signification of the
language is known because you understand it. H ence, a “ rhetorical ethic”
constitutes a condition of good am biguity because it is the conscious
experience of the person who constructs the com m unication situation. In
contrast, “ ethical rhetoric” is a condition of bad ambiguity because it is
the regulation of the conscious experience per se. The social consequence
of this regulation is the legitim ation of a negative social value (e.g.,
prejudice by stereotype) or a positive value (e.g., teaching by example)
(H örm ann 1971, pp. 109-32). The am biguity here is “ b ad ” because the
value assignment is purely arbitrary; hence the difficulty in assigning a
value to a stereotype or exem plar in social situations.
Interpretation entails definition just as definition entails description, so
the value or m eaning that is the essence of conscious experience accounts
for the way in which we are conscious and the way we experience. Put
another way, we discover that the conscious experience th at each of us
knows as subjectivity in being a person is linked to the intersubjectivity of
the social world— th at is, interpersonal relationships define the person.
How ever, before we can explore this fact of being a person, we need to
examine the phenom enological n atu re of com m unication.
A PH E N O M E N O L O G Y O F C O M M U N IC A T IO N
A phenom enological definition of com m unication necessarily requires

that our analysis proceed through a phenom enological description, reduc-
tion, and interpretation. First the description. W hat is com m unication?
A t a minimum it is an ecosystem in A nthony W ilden’s (1980) sense of the
term . T hat is, com m unication is the nam e for the reversible relationship
between an organism (person) and its environm ent (lived-world), both of
which exist in a m utual context or Environm ent. A t its m ost sophisticated
level this relationship is one of language (langage). Language is, of
course, an analogue system in which sem antics (capta), syntactics (data),
and pragmatics (acta) are constituent parts (a co d e), each relating to the
other as a m atter of degree (Edie 1970). In other words, sem antics is the
meaning in language where language is a function of structure (syntax)

and use (pragm atics). Likewise syntactics is the m eaning in language
where language is a function of content (semantics) and use (pragm atics).
Last, pragmatics is the m eaning in language w here language is a function
of structure (syntax) and content (semantics).
O ur second step of analysis is the phenom enological reduction of the
description we just generated as a conscious experience of “ com m unica-
tio n .” W hen we consider that language is a key feature of com m unication
and th at language is an analogue, we see im m ediately that the nature and
function of com m unication is one of degree. In fact one can easily
imagine the organism and environm ent reversing natures and functions,
for both are contextualized by the same ecosystem. For exam ple, we can
take the hum an personality and the hum an body as a case in point.
Descartes to the contrary, the hum an body and personality often reverse
themselves in life. Personality distress becom es body dysfunction in a
psychosomatic state of involuntary paralysis; and conversely, body dis-
tress becomes personality dysfunction in a pathogenic state, as in suicide.
In m ore familiar term s, the language function of degree variation in the
lived world of an ecosystem is what we would call a social dialect (langue)
of language. The social dialect is surely language {langage), but it is
language in its reversible form of constant degree variation. W e are quite
aware of this variation when we think about it. Sem antic, syntactic, and
pragmatic nature and function reverse them selves as Hjelm slevian depen-
dencies. In linguistics these reversals are know n semantically as m etaphor
and metonymy shifts, syntactically as paradigm and syntagm shifts, and
pragmatically as diachronic and synchronic shifts (Lyons 1969). Thus the
key feature of linguistic com m unication is that it is a contextual process.
M ore specifically, let me recall that our phenom enological description
indicated com m unication as a language state, but the phenom enological
reduction disclosed that language only appears or is conceived of as a
state. The language presence in consciousness is a process experience. So
we discover that our original description of com m unication as synony-
mous with language is an inappropriately assum ed abstraction.
Perhaps an illustration of the com m unication process would be helpful.
The conscious experience of com m unication is always a triadic relation-
ship of semiology among sem antics, syntactics, and pragm atics. A t any
one time and place we focus on one of the three factors, but the other two
are ever present as context. In short, we have a variation on the
organism /environm ent them e. A specific linguistic exam ple will help
here. In careful discourse we can use the word “ statem ent” to indicate a
semantic function, the word “ sentence” to indicate a syntactic function,
and the word “utterance” to indicate a pragm atic function. All these
function nam es are related by one essential nature, which we usually
nam e by the word “proposition.” It does not m atter w hat word we may
choose at a given m om ent, for the others are its context— that is the
nature and function of an analogue: to set an essential boundary. The
words “ sentence,” “u tteran ce,” “ statem en t,” and “ proposition” all have
the same sense but are capable of distinct reference; each can have the
same reference but a different sense, as Frege (1948) dem onstrated
almost a century ago.
The third step of the phenom enological analysis is interpretation or
herm eneutic semiology. A t this point we have discovered that our con-
scious experience of com m unication is language in its analogue status as a
social dialect (langue). W hat is the m eaning, the value contained in this
description and definition? Jaspers (1970) calls it “ the will to com m uni-
cate” ; M erleau-Ponty (1962) describes it as “ being condem ned to m ean-
ing,” having critiqued S artre’s (1956) them e of “ being condem ned to
choosing” as a failure of herm eneutic analysis; and H eidegger (1962) calls
it simply “ta lk .” Saussure (1966) was the first to call it “ speaking.”
Most of us would use the word “ speech” to describe the m eaning state,
whereas “ speaking” describes the functional character (perform ance) of
the conscious experience we call com m unication. B ut we m ust recall that
state and process have an infrastructure, an implicit grounding relation-
ship, which we have previously observed only as the explicit relationship
called “ language” and “ social dialect.” The infrastructure of act and
action betw een “ speech” and “ speaking” is the same as the link betw een
consciousness and experience. So just as we would use the expression
“ conscious experience,” we discover speaking speech. O ur conventional
nam e for the conscious experience of speaking speech is the speech act or
the act o f speaking. In short, the herm eneutic semiotic of com m unication
is the speech act.
W e are now ready to take up the question of hum an com m unication. It
may be noted th at, except for two illustrations, hum an behavior has not
been discussed in our phenom enological analysis of com m unication. I
m ake this point because I, along with H usserl, believe in rigorous science.
In other words, the phenom enological analysis of com m unication I just
com pleted may, on careful analysis, apply to what we know of animal
com m unication (zoosemiotic; see Sebeok 1977) and m achine com m unica-
tion (cybernetics; see W ilden 1980 and Fauvel 1975).
A P H E N O M E N O L O G Y O F H U M A N C O M M U N IC A T IO N
We began this essay by noting that the phenomenological method is syner-

gistic, that the method reflects back on itself in a constant refinement of
reflective consciousness. By now it should be apparent that the three
questions posed at the start are an explicit use of the phenomenological
method—namely, phenomenological description (What is phenomenology?),
experiences. A person com m unicates and generates a lived-world. Such a

person literally expresses a world; the person comes to inhabit the speech
uttered—we all believe that we say! A nd, the world in which a person
lives communicates to the person— for exam ple, we all know and under-
stand what’s happening to us. Such a world expresses the person, or,
m ore appropriately expressed, the person perceives a world. So we find
that expression and perception are the same functional analogue relation-
ship specifying degrees of difference in consciousness. H owever, the same
relationship separates the expression and the perception as different,
digital experiences.
The union of consciousness and experience, analogue and digit, ex-
pression and perception, person and lived-world, rhetoric and ethic,
constitute human communication. The Stoic philosophers called this
relationship of conscious experience the lekton, the sign that held dis-
course and reason (logos) together in all hum an behavior. We would
describe the lekton of logos as the speech act, the rhetorical ethics, which
is the same phenom enon as a person in a lived-world. In sum m ary,
hum an com m unication is a sign system of conscious experience, and
conversely. Such is the phenom enological interpretation of hum an com -
m unications; it is a good ambiguity of rhetorical ethics.
C O M M U N IC A T IO N L E G IT IM A T IO N
By way of drawing to a conclusion, I should like to take up a small portion

of classical history that bears on rhetorical ethics. W e are all familiar with
the G reek stases or states of affair. The G reeks invented the stases to
solve digital problem s, to distinguish; what (data), how (capta), and why
(acta)— that is, the respective problem s of cognitive, affective, and cona-
tive meaning. W e have retained this m ode of thought, this digital logic.
We variously call it the Q .E .D ., analytic thinking, problem -solving, or
“ scientific m eth o d .” H ow ever, we do our G reek forebears a disservice
because in our fascination with the stases we have forgotten the lekton,
the sign that holds the stases together, the analogue containing the digit.
The digital logic, as an ethic in use, is rhetorical in application. We
analytically ask: W hat is known? How is it known? Why is it known?
The analogue logic, the missing lekton in contem porary thinking, is the
ethic—the hum an value. W e call this analogue logic of rhetoric the
Q .E .I., synergistic thinking, problem -stating, and “ rigorous” or truly
empirical science. Thus we need to phenom enologically ask, as did the
Stoics in a different context: W hat do I know? How do I know? W hy do I
know? A rhetorical ethic is a conscious experience where the m ethod for
knowing and understanding that experience is phenom enological and
existential (Q .E .F .).
In contrast, an ethical rhetoric starts with an assumed value— that is,

answers to the questions “ W hat is known by u s?,” “ How is it known by
us?,” and “ Why is it known by u s?” always depend on consensus of either
experience or consciousness, but rarely reflect conscious experi-
ence. A person who attem pts to live in such a world of paradoxical
consensus encounters what G regory B ateson (1972) describes as the
double bind, equally appropriate but conflicting signs in communication.
The ethical rhetoric of the double bind drives persons and worlds crazy;
we call it respectively “ insanity” and “w ar” w here the double bind of bad
ambiguity is an agreem ent (analogue) to disagree (digit). Put another
way, perception and expression are com m unicated as different kinds of
experience, rather than the experience of different levels of consciousness
(Shinner 1969).
Chapter Two
Theoretical Models in the Philosophy

o f Communication
H um an science is not an invention. Like its counterpart physical science,

it is an experiential and experim ental discovery process in the empirical
world of persons. A nd in both the hum an and physical m otif, the
constitution of research m ethods em bodies the universal laws of thought
that the ancients called philosophy. These classical formulas for exploring
the theory and praxis relationship between hum an thought and action
have their contem porary articulation in the philosophy o f communication
(Lanigan 1979a, b).
Com munication models traditionally surface as paradigm s in the stan-
dard areas of philosophical analysis. A basic reason is that the intim ate
connection among language, thought, and action leads m ost philosophers
to examine their m etaphysics, epistem ology, logic and axiology in the
context of communicology. In the current state of analysis, in the discip-
line of philosophy, com m unication m odels are progressively em erging as
interdisciplinary paradigm s in the research applications of the hum an and
social sciences (Lanigan, 1982a). The accessibility of communicative
behavior as an object of investigation largely accounts for this philosophic
turn. Y et, the significant developm ent of this renew ed interest in philo-
sophic models is due prim arily to the refined theories that philosophy as a
discipline presently offers for testing and evaluation by other disciplines.
N ot only the field of communicology, but those of anthropology, linguis-
tics, psychology, sociology, political science, and similar fields are turning
to philosophy for the theory construction accom plishm ents that are
developed already and awaiting application (Israel 1972).
My purpose in this chapter is to explicate in an introductory m anner
18
THEORETICAL MODELS 19
several constructs and m odels that dom inate the philosophy of com m uni-
cation. First, I indicate the basic harm ony th at exists betw een the theory
construction process familiar to m ost com m unication researchers and the
disciplinary param eters of the philosophy of com m unication. Secondly, I
briefly review the m ajor divisions of philosophy itself as a categorical
grounding for the discussion that follows. Thirdly, I attem pt to pinpoint
selected com m unication theory constructs as they are studied in contem -
porary philosophy. Lastly, I explore the specific m odels of com m unica-
tion that function as paradigm s in the philosophic schools of existential
phenom enology, semiology, conceptual analysis, and G erm an critical
theory.
T H E O R Y C O N STR U C TIO N A N D P H IL O S O P H Y
Theory construction in any one discipline is usually so integrated with

subject m atter as to be ungeneralizable. The discipline of philosophy is no
exception to this problem . H ow ever, one perspective that is profitable to
explore is the connection of philosophy with theory construction as a
problem in itself. In such a context, which is norm ally the province of the
history of philosophy or the philosophy of science, it is possible to
articulate construction principles th at accom m odate our basic interests in
the com m unication discipline (Lanigan 1979b; D eetz 1973a, b).
A typical division of construction possibilities in the developm ent of
theory is the distinction among (1) research-then-theory, (2) theory-then-
research, and (3) the composite approach combining the first and second
approaches (Reynolds 1971). A succinct illustration of these approaches is
K uhn’s (1970, p. 23) discussion of the process of normal science. The
research-then-theory approach is a determ ination of what Kuhn discusses
as empirical facts. These facts fit into a sequence that (1) reveals the nature
of the object under investigation, (2) form ulates the phenom enal descrip-
tion into quantitative laws or qualitative exem plars, and (3) articulates a
paradigm for applied research.
The theory-then-research approach illustrates K uhn’s notion of theoret-
ical facts. Such a theory construction procedure functions by letting
postulates specify which facts are significant. Then the theory determ ines
the ways in which significant facts are m atched to necessary causality—
that is, to axioms. The theory next articulates a research paradigm— that
is, a theorem .
The composite approach simply joins the first two approaches together
so that the researchers move from (1) exploration, where the phenom enon
is located and then appropriately quantified or qualified respectively as
data or capta, to (2) description, where an exem plar serves as a limited
paradigm— that is, a m odel, and on to (3) explanation, where inferences
are drawn from necessary facts to articulate the paradigm as a

generalization— that is, a theory per se. In this three-part sequence we
have the familiar causality of science: data, m odel, and theory as inven-
tion (see Figure 1).
Now, it is possible to relate the theory construction process to philo-
sophy. The scientist starts research with some experience that is fairly
claimed to be a “fact,” or if you will, some given phenom enon. The
philosopher begins in exactly the same way, except that the prim ary or
brute fact must be justified before being used in valid theory construction.
Put m ore concisely, science is a clear process that hypostatizes a connec-
tion from data to m odel, thereby producing a theory. Philosophy begins
with a theory from which a m odel is abstracted as criteria for locating
data. This three-part sequence is the norm al causality of philosophy:
theory, m odel, and data as discovery. Obviously, theory construction and
philosophy are two nam es for the same cum ulative research process that
moves differentially among theories, m odels, and data, and is com m unic-
able as such. Some specific com parisons help exemplify this point.
The three approaches of theory construction have their equivalent
conceptual processes in philosophy (A lexander 1972). R esearch-then-
theory has its equivalence in the philosophic notion of a necessary
condition (p. 273). Simply put, a necessary condition announces the
minimal conceptual characteristics required for a fact; this condition is
sometimes referred to as the discovery process in which an observation
can be m ade. W ith the use of a necessary condition, we assert that
something is, thereby m aking a m etaphysical claim. By contrast, a su f-
ficient condition is like the theory-then-research approach in theory
construction. A sufficient condition indicates the minimal empirical char-
acteristics th at a fact can have; this condition is often designated as the
invention process in which a conceptualization is m ade from experience.
A sufficient condition tells the observer what som ething is, thereby
making an epistemological claim. The com posite approach has its parallel
in the com bination of necessary and sufficient conditions that constitute
several possibilities of verification— that is, a truth function that is a
logical claim. W e should note that the research application of necessary
and sufficient criteria produces axiological effects by creating socio-
cultural norms— for exam ple, the study of law.
The philosophy of com m unication per se is im portant in the com pari-
son of theory construction with the process of philosophic inquiry. The
im portance em erges with the realization that the articulation of a theory
requires another higher order theory. T hat is, a philosophy of com m uni-
cation is a m etatheory in the area of theory construction. Likewise, the
articulation of any philosophy of com m unication is a m etatheory where
philosophy (or one of its subdivisions) is itself the object of analysis. In a
historical sense, m etaphilosophy consists in the interconnection among
the m ajor divisions of philosophy. E ach division of the study of philo-

sophy provides the necessary and sufficient conditions by which that
particular division can be com m unicated— th at is, expressed and p er-
ceived as a system of thought and action.
M A JO R D IV ISIO N S O F P H IL O S O P H IC AN A LY SIS
Philosophy as a discipline is usually categorized into four main subareas

according to the type of justification th at can be accom m odated by an
answer to the basic questions: W hat do I know? H ow do I know it? A m I
sure? A nd, am I right? M ore form ally, these questions relate to system a-
tic inquiries th at are known, respectively, as the study of metaphysics,
epistemology, logic, and axiology. F or our introductory purposes, some
arbitrary limitations need to be im posed on the definitions and explica-
tions of these m ajor divisions..
M etaphysics is a study of the nature and function of theories of
“ reality.” W ith particular regard to com m unication theory, m etaphysics
concerns such issues as (1) the n ature of a person and the individual
contextual relationship to o th er realities in the universe; (2) the nature
and evidence for purpose, cause, rule or intentional behavior; and (3) the
problem of choice, specifically, freedom versus determ inism in hum an
behavior. These m etaphysical issues are particularly illustrated in the
communication m odel of existential phenom enolgy with its focus on
“ intentionality.”
Epistem ology concerns the acquisition of knowledge and, m ore funda-
m entally, the criteria for judgm ents of truth and falsity. It is appropriate
to associate epistem ology with the usual sense of the term methodology.
Most m ethods follow the general p attern of factual (1) location, (2)
definition, and (3) valuation. T hat is, the knowing process constitutes the
origin, organization, and verification (validity) of content. Semantically
the process is frequently specified as the progressive m ovem ent from
cognition to affection to conation.
Particular epistem ologies rely on one or m ore theories of truth. T here
are four standard theories: (1) correspondence, in which the identity or
equivalence of facts is tested, (2) coherence, in which the systemic or
systematic consistency of facts is m easured, (3) pragmatic theory, in which
causal prediction is the standard of decision, and (4) perform ative theory,
in which consensus is the criterion. In m any respects, these epistemologi-
cal them es are the chief elem ents in the semiology m odel of com m unica-
tion with its focus on inform ation boundaries and code conditions.
The third basic area of philosophy is logic. T he nature of reasoning and
the rules for correct or right thinking constitute the study of logic. A basic
historical separation is norm ally m ade betw een rhetorical logic and
symbolic logic. Rhetorical logic subdivides into deduction (rule + case =

result), induction (case + result = case), and abduction (rule + result =
case). Sym bolic logic is occasionally called form al logic and consists of
propositional calculus (either analytic or synthetic) and m athem atical
calculus (either differential or integral). M ost logics, how ever, can be
reduced to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that operate with a
predeterm ined num ber of values. In this sense, rhetorical logics are
usually two-valued systems, which most com m unications theorists would
recognize as a digital system, whereas symbolic logics are normally
m ulti-valued and resem ble an analogue system. The conceptual analysis
model of com m unication is a good illustration of a logic-based theory of
rule-governed linguistic behavior.
Axiology, the fourth m ajor category of philosophy, is the study of
ethics and aesthetics. T hat is, axiology is the exam ination of w hat hum an
values are and the ways in which they can be symbolized or expressed.
My prim ary concern in reviewing the G erm an critical theory approach to
hum an com m unication is its focal concern with ethics; yet the presence of
social norms as symbolic artifacts— that is, institutions— requires an
equal concern with aesthetics when the com m unication m edium is a
central factor in the hum an valuing process in society.
Given this brief review of philosophy as a discipline in the context of
theory construction, I can now suggest the specific constructs utilized by
the various models in the philosophy of com m unication. C ertain schools
of philosophy take as a focal point one of the traditional divisions of
philosophy as the theory by which to locate data for a com m unication
model. Having located these data, a particular construct is hypostatized
as a key proposition in the m odel by which a theory can be articulated
with the goal of achieving a paradigm atic philosophy of com m unication
(Apel 1972).
C O M M U N IC A T IO N T H E O R Y C O N STRU CTS IN PH ILO SO PH Y
All the philosophic models of com m unication share a systematic concern

with certain problem atic features of hum an com m unication. I have
selected four of these features and will treat them , for purposes of
explication, as constructs in an overall com m unication theory context.
Each construct has a dual function. First, it suggests the particular focus
that a given m odel offers for analysis. Secondly, the given construct
exemplifies one of the m ajor divisions of philosophy as a research p er-
spective. H owever, please be cautioned that the coherence of the com -
munication theory context that I am constructing as a review and
com m entary is achieved at the expense of the particular philosophic
models being discussed. Thus, my selection of certain propositions in the
philosophic models represents a selective description and interpretation

rather than a com plete exposition of the given philosophies.
In particular, the construct intentionality is a key item in the existential
phenom enological m odel and allows us to exam ine a m etaphysical ap-
proach to research problem s. The construct punctuation or system -code is
a main them e of semiology and undertakes an epistemological approach.
A nd, the approach of conceptual analysis locates the construct conven-
tion or rule use as a logical program of form ation and transform ation.
Finally, the construct legitimation figures in the critical theory approach,
which concerns the use of axiology in the creation of social norms.
With this sum m ary view of com peting m odels in m ind, we can now
begin a m ore detailed study of each construct as located in the general
background of the relevant m odel. A fter this initial definition process,
the analysis can then shift to a discussion of the m odels proper, which will
be the next section of this chapter. It is necessary to review these
individual constructs prior to a com plete explication of the various
individual m odels, for all the constructs are featured in each m odel. B ut,
three of the constructs will always contextualize the fourth, prim ary,
construct.
In t e n t io n a l it y
As with all the constructs I shall be discussing, there is both a usual

reference for the construct m eaning and a technical referent suggesting
the philosophic m odel being discussed. In the case of “intentionality,”
the usual m eaning is a sense of purpose or m otivation in thought or
action. Occasionally this purpose is built into the com m unication itself as
a sort of thought in action. For exam ple, the verb prom ise provides such a
perform ative utterance. W hen I say th at “ I prom ise to m eet your tra in ,” I
utter a sentence that both announces my purpose and is itself an action—
the act of promising.
In a m ore precise sense, intentionality points to and includes the object
receiving the action of my speaking. From the phenom enological p er-
spective, intentionality refers to th at object o f consciousness. This is to
say, I as a person am a conscious being engaged in the communicative
activity of perception and expression. P art of my inventory of experience
is the unique hum an feature of reversibility. I can quite objectively
convert my perception into an expression, and conversely. My principal
vehicle for this feat is speech com m unication. Speech captures and
sediments my perceptions in a form th at can be expressed and shared with
another. In reverse fashion, my speech is a system of perceptions learned
from others in the form of their expression. Speech com m unication
allows perception and expression to blend together and be the cause of
one another, even to the point of experienced synesthesia, w here one is
the direct stimulus for the other (Lanigan 1970)— for exam ple, as in oral
narrative.
Normally a com m unication theorist speaks of encoding and decoding a
message in order to distinguish “purpose” from “ object of conscious-
ness” in a discussion of intentionality. B oth coding processes indicate a
reified item: the message as intention. In m ost cases, the message is
assumed to be a static construct that can be m anipulated and examined
for its salient features. O ne param eter for m aking this feature determ ina-
tion is the nontechnical sense of intention. T hat is, a message suggests
one of its distinctive features through its characteristic purpose. This
perspective is the well-known “ effects” approach to message analysis.
By contrast, the phenom enologist as a philosopher inquires about the
dynamic nature and function of the message. T he message is not assumed
to be a static construct. Indeed, no assum ption is m ade about the
message. The message is exam ined as part of its context or situation of
use. The message is rigorously m atched to its em pirical condition of
occurrence. It may well be determ ined that a m ajor description of the
message relates to its purpose or concom itant effect. Y et, the phenom e-
nologist withholds that assum ption as an initial criterion of analysis; the
conceptual assum ption of purpose is bracketed—that is, initially m arked
as a theoretical presum ption th at should not influence the analysis.
Given the com m unication context, the phenom enologist sees several
values for the message as an object of consciousness. The message is an
expression (one type of object) for the speaker, for the listener (a second
typology), or for both (a third typology), or the message is a perception
for the speaker (a fourth typology), or for the listener (a fifth typology),
or for neither the speaker or listener (a sixth typology), and so on.
It is quite obvious that the typologies are extensive in what may be
judged as their typicality. H ence, the nature and function of intentionality
will vary with the essential features of the com m unication situation and
the connection to the researcher m aking the analysis (B randt 1970; Ihde
1977). The phenom enological approach to intentionality can stim ulate a
rethinking of many com m unication theory assum ptions. For example,
communication researchers whose orientation to intentionality is the
assumed “ purpose” approach tend to study the viewer in front of the
television as participating in a “ m ass” m edia situation, when in fact (as a
m atter of phenom enal logic) it is an “ interpersonal” m edia typology: one
viewer listening (or expressing?) to one new scaster, for instance.
One of the key features of intentionality for the phenom enologist is the
condition of reversibility betw een perception and expression (Ihde 1976).
H ere is the interest in speech com m unication. The ability of hum an
communicators to switch back and forth betw een speaking and listening,
to do both sim ultaneously, to rem ove the spatially real into m em ory, or
project the conceptually real into m em ory, or project the conceptually
real into tim e as a future expectation— all suggest the way in which
communication is an object of consciousness and not the m ere announce-
m ent of purpose (Lanigan 1977).
Pu n c t u a t io n
A consistently problem atic variable in com m unication theory is coding,

or the nature and function of transactional boundary setting— that is, the
problem of com m unicative punctuation. Punctuation as a technical term
in semiology (B arthes 1968; W ilden 1980) derives from the theoretical
practice in linguistics of distinguishing syntagm atic and paradigm atic
elem ents in the form ation of natural languages. F or our purposes, these
elem ents are best illustrated at the level of the sentence.
If you take a simple declarative sentence like “ John ate the tu rk ey ,”
you will im mediately notice certain features about this sentence based on
your knowledge of the English language. First, it is easy to substitute
another noun or pronoun for “Jo h n .” For exam ple, you could say “ Sam
ate the turkey” or “ H e ate the tu rk ey .” In all cases the noun or pronoun
subject substitution has a paradigm atic relationship; each can substitute
for the other in th at place and function in the sentence. It is helpful to
think of a paradigm atic substitution as being a “vertical” rearrangem ent
of similar items. By contrast, syntagm atic relationships are the linear or
“horizontal” relationships of typicality. In our example sentence,
“Jo h n ,” “ a te ,” “th e ,” and “ turkey” are all in a syntagm atic relationship.
Thus, you can say th at “ John hit the turkey” because of your knowledge
of English, which tells you that verbs follow subject nouns, and verbs are
interchangeable given the linear context of the sentence originally used.
In a different perspective, you m ight be childlike in using an unexpected,
but legitim ate, syntagmatic shift and say, “ The turkey ate Jo h n .”
Norm ally, there would be nothing interesting or unusual about these
paradigm atic and syntagm atic shifts, but their presence in speech com m u-
nication m akes them a transactional variable that goes beyond mere
language description. First, we discover that one shift is the context for
the other. Paradigm atic elem ents contextualize and perm it syntagmatic
elem ents, and vice versa. Two static linguistic elem ents can now be seen
as a dynamic control elem ent in com m unication (Lanigan 1973).
Punctuation in its technical sense in semiology refers to the typological
continuity or discontinuity that com m unication theorists usually describe
as systematic and systemic features, respectively. Systematic features are
essentially atom istic; they are constituents in a system. In this context,
continuity relates to the syntagm atic function, for one type of speech
communication used in a given situation suggests the ways in which
similar com m unications can be m ade. Likewise, the idea of discontinuity
(the French term rupture is m ore often used [Lem ert 1981]) reflects the
paradigm atic function. T hat is, one type of speech com m unication indi-
cates certain transactional boundaries that by definition suggest what is
and is not appropriate. R em em ber that punctuation is a boundary re -
lationship that sim ultaneously indicates the technical condition of infor-
mation as a systematic boundary or context of choice, and com munication
as a sytematic boundary of choice of context (W ilden 1980).
Co n v e n t io n
Rules that define the transactional boundaries of speech com m unication

are conventions (Lewis 1969). Conventions are a logical outgrow th of
both intentionality and punctuation. This connection relies on two key
ideas in the conceptual analysis approach to com m unication. First, we
must distinguish betw een natural and nonnatural m eaning (Grice 1967;
Lanigan 1977, p. 51). Next, regulative rules have to be com pared to
constitutive rules (p. 36).
W e may refer to G rice’s now famous distinction betw een natural and
nonnatural m eaning in discourse as the intentional theory of meaning.
This theory is based on the description of m eaning as the effect intended
to be produced in a listener by a speaker through the listener’s recogni-
tion of the speaker’s purpose in attem pting to com m unicate (Lanigan
1977, p. 53). Put m ore simply, natural m eaning occurs w here the speaker
by m eans of speaking purports to act.
For example, my utterance, “ I will m eet your train ,” has a natural
meaning—that is, the declarative sentence I just used has one purpose: to
inform. N atural m eaning suggests w hat the message has to do. In com -
parison, nonnatural m eaning indicates what has been done by the m es-
sage. Following the same exam ple, my rephrasing of the com m itm ent by
the sentence “ I prom ise I will m eet your train ” is a case of nonnatural
meaning. In this second exam ple, the m eaning of the sentence is con-
tained in the listener’s recognition of my intention as em bodied in my
action: to promise.
The next step is to locate nonnatural m eaning in the com m unication
situation. Searle’s (1969, p. 33) discussion of rules does just this. The
so-called regulative rules are conventions that govern a preexisting condi-
tion or situation. T hat is, a com m unication exchange has certain bound-
aries that suggest a natural m eaning. Social m anners serve as a frequent
example in the literature. Norm s of appropriateness suggest w hat should
be talked about and how the com m unication should proceed. Regulative
rules often have the form: “if Y do X ” or simply “ D o X .” W ith regulative
rules a boundary already exists and, hence, is m erely applied as needed.
Eliminating the rules does not logically elim inate the meaning— for
example, bad m anners do not destroy etiquette.
On the other hand, constitutive rules bring a situation into being. The
conventional practices indicate what m ust be done for the m eaning to

exist. A gain, a frequent example is a game. F or exam ple, certain rules
indicate w hat a game of chess is; elim inate the rules and you elim inate the
game— that is, its m eaning. T here is a logical necessity betw een the rule
and the m eaning th at is created thereby. Constitutive rules create nonna-
tural meaning. In the case of constitutive rules a boundary is brought into
being; it is created. Constitutive rules create the possibility of behavior
and typically have the form: “X counts as Y in context Z .”
Le g it im a t io n
In a simple sense, legitim ation is the process by which facts and values are
linked together. The opposition betw een conditions of fact and value is
one of the classic problem s in philosophical analysis. The basic difficulty is
one of perspective, which counterposes the individual against society in
the determ ination of norm s of behavior or belief (G ellner 1974). The
issue of legitim ation is a central topic in all the philosophy of com m unica-
tion models with which we have concern.
In particular, there is the apparent connection betw een conventions of
discourse and the facts or values that consensus creates by the use of that
discourse. In a well known assertive argum ent, Searle (1969, p. 175) links
the developm ent of values out of facts to the com m unicative situation in
which speech acts are self-legitimizing. Searle’s argument is fairly straight-
forward. H e contends that speech communication is an institution in soci-
ety. Thus, a speaker participates in and thereby appreciates the institution,
whether positive or negative in consequence. Participation that is factual in
nature has the sim ultaneous function of giving value to the institution.
Searle further argues th at the m eaning of language as a socio-cultural
institution determ ines the ways in which a person is com m itted by the act
of speaking.
As a conceptual analyst, Searle is concerned with legitim ation only as a
secondary consequence in the determ ination of speech act conventions.
However, legitim ation is the focal point in the G erm an critical theory
approach to com m unication, as suggested in the work of K arl-O tto A pel
(1967) and Jürgen H aberm as (1970a, b). For exam ple, H aberm as sug-
gests that in a rational society a fundam ental distinction can be drawn
betw een (1) instrumental action (variously called “purposive-rational
action” ) and (2) communicative action (H aberm as 1971b). B oth types of
action em erge in the com m unicative situation w here an individual legiti-
mizes a social institution by the action of speech com m unication (M ueller
1973; Patem an 1980; H aberm as 1979b).
Instrum ental action is the product of “ technical rules” that are derived
from empirical knowledge— that is, em pirical facts in K uhn’s sense of
normal science. Every person develops certain “ strategies” for making
rational choices. These are based on conditional predictions about ob-

servable events, w hether physical or social. Persons can then m ake
choices that derive from “preference rules” and decision procedures in
the value system they hold. In short, technical rules are implied deduc-
tions that can be tested as correct or incorrect. H ence, the action is or is
not instrum ental (institution) in that a purpose (individual) coincides with
a reason (social purpose) or does not. Technical rules are either em piri-
cally true or analytically correct propositions— that is, legitimized beliefs
(H aberm as 1971b, pp. 91-92).
Com municative action, by com parison, is symbolic interaction among
persons, or at least betw een two acting persons. “ Consensual norm s”
direct such actions that indicate, in a definitional m anner, the reciprocal
expectations about behavior that com m unicators m ust understand and
recognize. Consensual norm s become objectified in everyday speech
com munication and are sim ultaneously enforced by m eans of social
sanctions on misuse. Com municative actions thereby result in K uhn’s
version of theoretical facts as legitimized behaviors. In sum, consensual
norms are grounded exclusively in the m utual understanding of intention
by the persons in symbolic interaction and are secured by the obligation
of the persons who are in com m unication with each other as a shared act.
H aberm as’s theory of instrum ental and com m unicative action suggests
a new perspective for com paring the em pirical infrastructure of the
physical sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the theoretical infrastructure
of the hum an sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). O n the one hand, we have
a conjunction betwen nomological and instrum ental knowledge and on
the other we have herm eneutic and reflective knowledge (W ellm er 1971).
Y et, in both cases there is the legitim ation or valuing process that
categorically forms facts, whether physical or social. Regardless of whether
or not the valuing process is positive or negative, institutions are affirmed by
the use made of them . H ence, individual com m unicative perform ance
legitimizes certain norm s of social com petence.
In summary, my analysis thus far has taken up the general issue of fact
versus value, consisting in a subdivision into intention and punctuation on
the factual side, and convention and legitim ation on the value side. I have
also treated of the relationships am ong intention and metaphysics, punc-
tuation and epistem ology, convention and logic, and legitim ation and
axiology.
T H E IN T E R P E R SO N A L C O M M U N IC A T IO N P A R A D IG M IN
PH ILO SO PH IC R E SE A R C H
Intention, punctuation, convention, and legitim ation as com m unication

constructs are among the key elem ents in a theory of hum an communica-
tion. As such, this theory is a base upon which all the contem porary
models in the philosophy of com m unication build from an interpersonal
to a social level of explanation for com m unicative behavior. In the
discussion th at follows, I describe each m odel in term s of those four
theory constructs. In this way, a parallel discussion em erges that allows
for com parison and the contextual location of construct em phasis that
makes each theory unique by contrast with the others.
Th e Mo d el o f Ex is t e n t ia l Ph en o m en o l o g y
Phenom enology is a rigorous fo rm of em pirical research applied to

hum an consciousness and experience (Schm idt 1967; Lanigan 1984).
Originally suggested by E dm und H usserl (1970a; 1965; 1969) as a reac-
tion against subjective psychologism in the early tw entieth century,
phenom enology represents a logical perspective in the social sciences
(Natanson 1973; 1974) and natural sciences (Kockelm ans & Kisiel 1970)
that com petes as a theory in both scientific and applied research. H us-
serl’s work is known as descriptive or transcendental phenom enology. It
bears the label descriptive from its early contrast with the intuitive
theories of psychologism. In tim e H usserl’s m ethod becam e known as the
transcendental form of phenom enology because he argued for an ulti-
m ate and ideal (nonem pirical) form of logical description (1931); 1960;
1964; 1967).
Intention. W e may for convenience subsum e all of H usserl’s descrip-
tive phenom enology under the heading of intentionality, as a special form
of the construct “ in tention.” T hat is, intentionality is the location of an
object of consciousness through a series of logical analyses that H usserl
called reductions. T here are th ree such reductions, typified as categories
containing secondary reductions. The first category is the phenom enologi-
cal epoché or bracketing of previous experience— that is, the correction of
an objective attitude (often called the “ natural attitu d e” ). H usserl argues
that the “ rigorous science of phenom enology” requires a bracketing at
three levels:
1. A philosophical reduction, in which the researcher removes episte-
mological presuppositions about the project— that is, does not prejudge
the best m ethod for research.
2. A scientific reduction, in which logical presuppositions are
rem oved—th at is, a particular logic and its values are not assumed.
Instead, all possible values are m anipulated in order to arrive at the
appropriate logic system. This procedure is often called the technique of
“free im aginative variation” (see chap. 15, below).
3. A phenomenological reduction, in which the researcher is sensitive to
the ontological presuppositions being made—that is, the investigator does
not assume a certain type or degree of “reality” before it is described.
Further, the phenom enological reduction is a dem and for empirical

experience as it is logically known to consciousness. O ur norm al sense of
“ testing” our experience captures this idea. The researcher does not
hypostatize the ideal objectivity of the research observation, but puts the
observation in context as a logical hypothesis.
The second category reduction that follows directly from the epoché is
the eidetic reduction. This reduction is a procedure designed to locate, in
a literal sense, the realistic elem ents of the description generated under
epoché conditions. H usserl suggests two stages of analysis for accom-
plishing the eidetic reduction:
1. Focus on the abstract and general properties of, ideas about, or
forms of the phenom enon under investigation.
2. Avoid the uncritical use of analysis that leads to differentiating and
particularizing the description. A good illustration of this process is the
developm ent of a postulate from a research phenom enon we have em piri-
cally observed or logically described.
The third category reduction, which com pletes H usserl’s m ethod, is the
transcendental reduction. A t this stage, H usserl attem pts to move from a
philosophic position of realism to idealism. H e suggests that the transcen-
dental experience has three levels of description. Before detailing these
levels it will be helpful to suggest that by “transcendental” H usserl does
not m ean an illusory or spiritual progression beyond the empirical.
R ather, his m eaning is closer to a com m unication theorist’s notion of
transaction or encounter as a logical structure of conscious experience.
Schmidt (1967) provides a detailed discussion of the special logical
meaning that phenom enologists attach to the term “ em pirical.” An
excellent review of transaction as a fundam ental unit of com m unication in
a sense that is com patible with H usserl’s is the discussion by Smith and
Williamson (1977), although these authors ignore the historical contribu-
tion of Husserl and phenom enology to interpersonal com m unication
theory.
A transcendental reduction consists in the following levels of analysis:
1. A focus on the Lebenswelt—the “ life-world”— of the person in
which consciousness and experience com bine into a sense of reality in
both a preconscious/prereflective and conscious/reflective modality.
2. The process of an attem pted “ total bracketing” in which self, other,
and world are explicitly describable.
3. The m anifestation of “ pure E go” as a culm ination of the reductions.
The transcendental reduction led H usserl to form ulate the theorem that
subjectivity is intersubjectivity. Thus, Husserl deserves credit for the
discovery of encounter or transaction as the fundam ental unit of analysis
in communication theory (1960; 1967, p. 90).
Punctuation. W ith the historical context of H usserl’s descriptive phe-

nomenology com plete, we can now turn to the work of Maurice
M erleau-Ponty as a formal illustration of the m odern existential focus in
phenom enological research. M erleau-Ponty’s existential phenom enology
consists in three m ethodological steps: (1) phenom enological description,
(2) phenom enological reduction, and (3) phenom enological in terp reta-
tion (also called “ herm eneutic or sem iotic phenom enology” ) (Lanigan,
1972; 1984). In the continuing parallel style of my analysis, I shall
examine phenom enological description as a form of punctuation, p he-
nomenological reduction as a form of convention, and phenom enological
interpretation as a form of legitim ation. H ow ever, a brief com m ent
should be m ade about the label existential in the present discussion.
M erleau-Ponty’s work is an advance upon the work of H usserl. In
many respects it is an attem pt to correct several of the idealistic tenden-
cies in H usserl’s work that took phenom enology away from the em pirical
experience em bodied in the person. Existentialism as a basically solipsis-
tic philosophy of the subject was not uncritically incorporated into phe-
nomenology. R ath er, existentialism (historically) raised m any issues that
allowed phenom enology to explore the em pirical nature and function of
the person. H ence, existential phenom enology is best viewed as a form of
“ empiricism” whose object of analysis is the consciousness and experi-
ence of the person as part of the interpersonal encounter. In this sense,
M erleau-Ponty is responsible for the com m unication theory theorem that
the object of analysis in com m unication is always the person— that is, the
lived-body (corps propre) experience. This theorem lies at the center of
all research in the hum an and social sciences (M erleau-Ponty 1964a, b, c).
M erleau-Ponty’s phenom enological description as a form of punctua-
tion consists in three elem ents. (1) Perception assumes a prim acy in the
reflective process. (2) Consciousness is located in the Lebenswelt—that is,
consciousness of the person (corps propre) is the discovery of subjectivity
in intersubjectivity (M erleau-Ponty 1962). (3) A person becom es capable
of the lived-body experience by m eans of consciousness, which is the
inform ed connection am ong self, others, and the world (être-au-monde).
In short, a person’s perceptions set the expressed boundaries of transac-
tions. A good linguistic illustration is the structural concept of language
(jlangage) as the formal sym bolization of a natural language such as
English but devoid of personal or cultural use— as one finds in a gram m ar
book. A m ore familiar exam ple, perhaps, is our experience of learning a
so-called dead language like Latin or classical G reek. In both examples,
the speaker brings m eaning to the language and brings the language into
the world of pragm atic consciousness. Language is an em pty shell before
it envelopes the Lebenswelt.
Convention. M erleau-Ponty’s second m ethodological step is the p h e-
nomenological reduction that illustrates the com m unication construct of
convention. H ere also there are three levels of analysis constituting the
reduction. First, The traditional notion of the epoché derived from
Husserl. T hat is, the researcher suspends disciplinary theory construction
presuppositions deriving from a special interest point of view. Second,
there is the creation of a radical gestalt perspective in which the research
observer and subject are the focal point of the description. This process is
frequently referred to as locating the thematic in the data from the
description. Third, the researcher attem pts to locate the prereflective
source of the them e as derived in the description. T hat is, the researcher
finds out what the conscious experience was prior to reflections and
judgm ents about it.
Again, a typical linguistic example is the social or dialect level of
language (langue) in which language carries a cultural m eaning that is
uncritically assum ed and used by persons. Such a m eaning is not the
product, initially, of reflection. Early language acquisition by infants is
also a good illustration of this linguistic phenom enon. In both cases, the
investigator m ust discover the prereflective connotation that exists prior
to the denotative use.
Legitimation. The third step in M erleau-Ponty’s m ethod is phenom e-
nological interpretation as a form of communicative legitimation. There
are four stages in this herm eneutic procedure:
1. The principle of reversibility is used— that is, locates those elem ents
of the description that are present to experience and those that are not.
These elem ents form in consciousness as a radical gestalt of self-other-
world.
2. A radical cogito is produced as a result of the reversibility. The
norm al cogito function of “ I th in k ,” which produces the reflective phe-
nom ena present to consciousness, reverses itself as absent to conscious-
ness (rem oved in space and tim e), thereby becoming a function of
prereflective capability, of “ I can, I am able to. . . .” A bility and capa-
bility become contextual referents for each o ther in an ongoing process of
transaction.
3. The result is the m anifestation of preconscious phenom ena. These
phenom ena are part of everyday experience, which is displaced in time or
space for various situational reasons. Such phenom ena em erge from the
preconscious/prereflective state to becom e part of the here-and-now
consciousness of reflective experience. O ur usual sense of speaking
(parole) is a linguistic example. The psychoanalytic technique of verbal
free association, for instance, relies on the ability of preconscious them es
to emerge in language before they are reflected upon by the speaker.
4. The end result is a herm eneutic judgm ent or specification of existen-
tial meaning— that is, the m eaning of the phenom enon as the person lived
it in the flesh (M erleau-Ponty 1968; 1973a; Lanigan 1972; 1984).
In short, existential phenom enology utilizes the paradigm of interper-

sonal com m unication to articulate its m etaphysical starting point for
research by focusing on the conscious experience of the person (inten-
tion), which allows epistem ological boundaries to be set at the individual
level of description (punctuation). By the use of logical inference, reduc-
tions of conscious experience (convention) allow the researcher to locate
those elem ents of m eaning th at are empirically present in the situation as
perceived or expressed (legitim ation).
Th e Mo d el o f Se m io l o g y
Semiology or semiotics is the study of sign systems and philosophically

has its classical roots with Stoic philosophers. Y et, m ost contem porary
work bases itself on the extensive logic system developed by the A m eri-
can logician Charles Sanders Peirce and Swiss linguist F erdinand de
Saussure. W e will not be concerned with Peirce’s existentialism or very
technical logic w ork, but we should note in passing that his systematic
logic of perception and expression provides an often forgotten link (see
chap. 12, below) betw een the intentionality construct of the existential
phenom enology m odel and the punctuation construct of m odern sem iol-
ogy (Freem an 1934; Brinkley 1960; Coward & Ellis 1977).
Intention. Saussure (1966) first argued that natural languages could be
viewed with two conceptual values. O ne is associated with the “ plane of
content,” which is the signified. It is usually helpful to think of the
linguistic context, w here we can generally suggest with caveat that the
signifier is a “w ord” and the signified the “ referen t” for the word.
However, we should be careful to note that the “w ord” can occur in three
modalities: (1) as a sign in an abstract system (langage), (2) as a sign in a
diachronic (historical) system (langue), and (3) as a sign in a synchronic
(current) system (parole).
Given these qualifications, Saussure argues that linguistics is properly
the study of language (langue), w hereas the study of speech (parole) is
semiology. This original distinction is now generalized to the extent that
semiology includes all forms of com m unication, w hether anim al, hum an,
or machine (Culler 1977). Y et, the focus of much research is on the ways
in which signifiers and signifieds com bine into specific sign systems. The
special im portance of semiology is its focus on punctuation that derives
from the special theories of sign-production. Production occurs where
signifiers and signifieds form syntagmatic and paradigmatic relation-
ships—that is, they code contextual boundaries.
Punctuation. The conjunction of signifiers and signifieds as system
values of expression and content (perception) formally constitutes the
Theory of Codes (Eco 1976). M orris (1971) popularized a behavioral
version of the theory with his well-known distinction among sem antics,
syntactics, and pragmatics. In brief, sem antics is the code betw een signs
and their referents, syntactics is the code betw een signs and other signs,
and pragmatics is the code betw een signs and their application.
However, the sign systems advocated by B arthes (1968) are the stimu-
lus for much of the current research in semiology (see chap. 17, below).
H e suggests that in a syntagm atic connection (recall the horizontal
connection) signifiers are coded to signifieds at three levels: (1) a real
system or reality level in which the signifier and signified are the same—
for example, the word is the thing; (2) a denotation or m etalanguage
level, which is one degree of abstraction away from the real system where
a new signifier is attached to the signified of the real system—for example,
the use of a verbal synonym for an item already m entioned in conversa-
tion; and (3) a connotation where the signifier is used w ithout any
signified—for exam ple, a specialized proper noun— lose the nam e and
you lose the constituted meaning.
Reversing the code relationships is also im portant. C onnotation can
exist with the singular use of the signified. W here this is the case, B arthes
refers to the com m unication as an exam ple of the system of ideology. In
contrast, the singular use of the signifier is the system of rhetoric (see
Figure 41, chap. 17, below). O f course, both systems presum e a paradig-
matic condition (recall the vertical connection). T hat is, rhetoric has a
paradigm atic code consistency of the signifier through the three levels of
reality, denotation, and connotation. Ideology has the same consistency
through the levels of the signified (B arthes, 1968, p. 89).
Convention. The com bined paradigm atic and syntagmatic systems that
Barthes calls rhetoric and ideology represent two examples of convention
as a com m unication construct in semiology, but there are an infinite
num ber of possible systems that signifiers and signifieds can produce
within the context of com m unication (B arthes 1972; Leach 1976; Lanigan
1979b). These possibilities of sign production have been explored chiefly
by W ilden (1980), Eco (1976), and Lyons (1977).
F or our purposes, the best explanation of convention is the com bined
Theory of Codes and Theory of C om m unication th at Eco discusses. The
theory of codes begins with a context of experience that divides into
(1) content, consisting in interpreted units (tokens) and a sem antic system
(types); and (2) expression, consisting in produced units (tokens) in a
syntactic system (types). B oth expression and content are connected by a
code that results in stuff—that is, phenom ena produced by the code
condition. A theory of com m unication is then derived in which experi-
ence becomes a source converting content into meaning and expression
into a sign-vehicle. The code is now a message produced in a channel by
which the phenom ena are known. The theories of code and com m unica-
tion provide, in E co’s w ork, the basis for a T heory of M entions and a
parallel Theory of C om m unicational Acts. T aken together these theories

constitute a form of legitim ation.
Legitimation. The social and em pirical presum ptions of semiology are
apparent in the developm ent of E co’s theory of m entions. For a clearer
explication, I m ust reverse the linear presentation of elem ents for the
theory of m entions, as com pared with the form at used above in the
theories of code and com m unication. For Eco, the specific channel
(theory of com m unication) in a theory of m entions is an utterance having
the explicit form of a sentence. The sentence is a production form of
behavior such that mentioning suggests a proposition drawn from a world.
W orld, then, is parallel to source in com m unication theory and to experi-
ence in code theory. In the theory of com m unicational acts we begin with
an overall pragmatic process in which a sender creates a message for an
addressee.
E co’s semiology presents a straightforw ard philosophic m odel of com -
munication by beginning with the epistem ological considerations of a
code theory (punctuation) leading to a m etaphysics in the theory of
communication (intention). T he theory of m entions as a logical elem ent
(convention) grounds the theory of com m unicational acts as an axiologi-
cal phenom enon (legitim ation). In short, the semiology m odel of com m u-
nication emphasizes punctuation as a starting point for theory construction
with interpersonal com m unication as the basic research paradigm .
Th e Mo d el o f Co n c e pt u a l An a l y s is
Conceptual analysis is a collective nam e for the work of the Anglo-

Am erican philosophers who have their historical roots in the ordinary
language m ovem ent th at grew out of logical positivism in post-W orld W ar
II Britain (R oche 1973, p. 39). As the nam e implies, the focal procedure
in this m odel of the philosophy of com m unication is to analyze the
conceptual nature and function of interpersonal com m unication.
Intention. In an attem pt to further clarify the initial work of Grice
(1967) with respect to intention and convention in speech acts, Strawson
(1971, p. 150) suggests four issues that are the heart of the conceptual
analyst’s approach to interpersonal com m unication. Strawson first indi-
cates that any account of intersubjective com m unication raises a “ ques-
tion as to how what was said was meant by the speaker, or as to how the
words spoken were used, or as to how the utterance was to be taken or
ought to have been taken.” Secondly, the locutionary act o f saying
something is distinguishable from the illocutionary act perform ed in
saying something— that is, natural and nonnatural m eaning. T hird, expli-
cit perform ance verbs in the first person present indicative nam e kinds
(types) of illocutionary acts. This issue is usually taken to be a truism.
Fourth, the illocutionary act is a conventional act— that is, an act done as
conforming to a convention. These issues concerning intention em erge
m ore explicitly in the interplay among punctuation, convention, and
legitimation.
Punctuation. A fundam ental discovery about the purposeful use of
sentences in verbal discourse was m ade by the late John Austin (1962).
He noticed that some sentences are factual in nature and function to the
extent that they describe phenom ena easily confirmed or denied by
experience. T hat is, some sentences are simply true or false to experi-
ence. Austin called such statem ents constatives.
Y et again, A ustin found that many statem ents that deal with questions
of value, w hether they be ethical or aesthetic in scope, are not simply true
or false, because it is inappropriate to experience to m ake such a judg-
m ent. R ather, our judgm ent is m ore on the order of being sincere or
insincere. Such a judgm ent occurs because the utterance of the sentence is
itself an action and is merely appropriate or not. Such sentences Austin
called performatives. For exam ple, saying the words “ I sw ear” as a
witness testifying in a courtroom perform s a particular institutional action
by the very utterance of the words. In a similar sense, a perform ance
sentence illustrating a personal action is the use of the verb “ prom ise” in
an utterance. W e may judge oaths or prom ises as sincere or insincere, but
not as true or false in a logical sense. Y et, the constative/perform ative
distinction left Austin with as many questions as answers, for there is too
much of the interpersonal situation being ignored in the simple utterance
classification.
Convention. Searle (1969) expands on A ustin’s work by making the
theory of perform ative utterances match the theory of nonnatural m ean-
ing in a new theory of speech acts. First, we should note that Austin
provides a technical division of perform ative utterances into three classes.
Initially there are locutions that belong to a natural language, but are
devoid of context. Second, A ustin suggests that som e locutions take on a
semantic force and become illocutions. T hat is, the action perform ed by
the m ere utterance of the statem ent has a com m unicative im pact, al-
though it is not necessarily a behavioral reaction or response. W here
there is such a reaction as a feedback elem ent or behavioral effect in the
situation, you have a perlocutionary act.
Searle argues that there is no logical differentiation in A ustin’s classifi-
cation. In fact, Searle m aintains that all utterances fit the category of
illocutionary acts and are what he calls propositional acts. His form al
theory is beyond the scope of this chapter. H ow ever, he does present a
simplified version as a set of propositions that indicates the position held
by most conceptual analysts working with language.
The theory of speech acts (Searle 1967) consists of the following set of
postulates:
1. Speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior.

2. The minim al unit of com m unication is the illocutionary act.
3. Saying som ething and m eaning it involves saying it plus:
(a) intending to produce certain illocutionary effects [force] in a
h earer (which effects are a function of the rules governing the
sentence uttered);
(b) intending to produce these effects by getting the hearer to recog-
nize intention “ a ,” and
(c) intending to get him to recognize intention “ a” by m eans of his
knowledge of the rules governing the sentence uttered.
4. W hatever can be m eant can be said.
5. Systems of sem antic rules are constitutive and not regulative.
Legitimation. Searles argues that language is a rule-governed form of
behavior th at m ust be analyzed in “ idealized forms of speech behavior”
(1967, p. 120). In this context he says that the constitutive rules that
naturally exist as part of any language com bine with G rice’s theory of
nonnatural m eaning to result in propositional acts. T hat is, the m eaning
of an utterance by a speaker is the listener’s recognition of a particular
purpose on the part of the speaker in m aking a given utterance. The
speech act thereby has an explicit m eaning whose value is the proposition
that the speaker and listener m utually recognize. This theory seems to
work only when cast in an ideal, hypothetical situation and is conse-
quently limited in its application to actual conversational analysis (Lani-
gan 1977), although it has stim ulated a great deal of theoretical w ork, like
that of Sadock (1974).
In short, the conceptual analysis m odel begins with a logical approach
to speech com m unication (convention) as a basis for its idealized m eta-
physics of nonnatural m eaning (intention). By distinguishing types of
utterances on a fact-versus-value basis, an epistem ological priority (punc-
tuation) is assigned to perform ative speech acts that have the special
quality of being neither true nor false, but sincere or not (legitim ation) as
an axiological condition.
Th e Mo d el o f Cr it ic a l Th eo r y
The critical theory m odel of interpersonal com m unication derives from a

long historical tradition in G erm an philosophy and sociology that is
essentially neo-M arxist in orientation (Jay 1973; Schroyer 1975; A dorno
1976). Because much of that tradition applies to the problem s of speech
communication at a social level in a way suggested by Jürgen H aberm as
(1971a, b; 1973; 1976; 1979b; 1984), I shall deal exclusively with selected
portions of his theory of universal pragm atics, with special attention to
the issue of communicative ethics. Limiting the analysis in this m anner
provides a direct connection betw een critical theory and the speech act
theory of conceptual analysis just discussed (G iddens 1976).
Intention. H aberm as (1970a) locates intention as the object of con-
sciousness in the general theory param eters of psychoanalysis. Explicitly
he argues that psychoanalysis gives the researcher: (1) a preconception of
the structure of nondistorted ordinary com m unication, (2) an attribution
of the systematic distortion of com m unication to the confusion of two
developm ental levels of symbols organization, the prelinguistic and lin-
guistic, and (3) a theory of deviant socialization to explain the origin of
deform ation.
On this psychoanalytic base, H aberm as builds a parallel set of th eo re t-
ical propositions that indicate the m eaning param eters in norm al com m u-
nication. First, in the case of nondeform ed language games there is a
congruency of all three levels of com m unication as presented in the
psychoanalytic m odel above. Second, norm al com m unication conforms
to intersubjectively recognized rules; it is public in this sense. Third,
speakers are aware of the categorical difference betw een subject and
object in norm al speech. Fourth, norm al com m unication provides a
contextual situation in which an intersubjectivity of m utual understand-
ing, which guarantees ego-identity, develops and is m aintained in the
relationship betw een individuals who acknowledge one another. Finally:
N orm al speech is distinguished by the fact that the sense of substance and
causality, of space and tim e, is differentiated according to w hether these
categories are applied to the objects within a w orld or to the linguistically
constituted world itself, which allows for the m utuality of speaking subjects
[H aberm as, 1970a, p. 212],
Punctuation. The boundary lim itation for the analysis of norm al com -
m unication results from two postulates that H aberm as draws from his set
of five propositions. H e argues that psychoanalysis in the study of com -
m unication relies on a genetic connection beyond successive phases of
hum an symbol organization. First, “the archaic sym bol-organization,
which resists the transform ation of its contents into gramm atically regu-
lated com m unication, can only be disclosed on the basis of the data of
speech pathology and by m eans of the analysis of dream m aterial”
(1970a, p. 212). Second, the symbol organization th at the psychoanalyst
utilizes is a theoretical construct in that it genetically precedes language.
In brief, H aberm as goes on to suggest that such a theoretical construct
presumes a theory of communicative com petence m odeled on Chom sky’s
model of linguistic com petence/perform ance.
H aberm as’s theory of com m unicative com petence is a com bination of
the problem as defined by psychoanalysis and the m ethod of ordinary
language analysis suggested by the conceptual analysts: A ustin, Grice,
and Searle. In particular, H aberm as (1979b) adopts Searle’s (1967; 1969)
general form ulation of the speech act theory and applies it in the social
context of com m unication (Sullivan 1978). T hat is, an interpersonal
m odel of com m unication at the perform ance level is generalized to a
m odel of social discourse (as a legitim ation process) at the com petence
level. In this generalization of social levels from the individual to the
mass, H aberm as m aintains the ideal speech situation as a construct. Let
me simply indicate th at there are serious problem s in m aintaining such an
ideal in the analysis of em pirical social research (W ellm er 1976).
H aberm as offers the following set of theoretical propositions, which
correspond at the social level to those that Searle (1967; 1969) presents
for the interpersonal speech act:
1. The personal pronouns and their derivatives form a reference system
between potential speakers. The identity of m eanings, the foundation
of every com m unication, is based on intersubjectively valid rules—
that is, at least two speakers understand the m eaning of a symbol on
the basis of reciprocal recognition.
2. The deictic expressions of space and tim e, as well as articles and
dem onstrative pronouns, form the reference system of possible deno-
tations.
3. Form s of address (vocative), forms of social contact (greeting), forms
of speech introduction and speech conclusion, indirect discourse,
questions and answers, are perform atory in that they are directed at
the act of speaking as such.
4. The perform atory speech acts form a system th at finally enables us to
m ark the basic differentiations fundam ental for any speech situation.
Thus system relationships are form ed between:
(a) being and appearance;
(b) being and essence; and
(c) fact and value—w hat is and what ought to be (H aberm as 1979b).
Convention. The summary result th at H aberm as’s m odel of com m uni-
cation achieves is a specification of the social levels of com m unication and
the parallel validity claim th at can be based on speech acts as rule-
governed behavior with social im port. By examining the form ation and
transform ation of speech acts, H aberm as (1976) arrives at two levels of
communication. First, the level of intersubjectivity at which speaker and
hearer, through illocutionary acts, bring about an interpersonal relation-
ship that allows them to achieve m utual understanding. Secondly, the
“ level of objects in the world, or states of affair about which they would
want to achieve a consensus in term s of the com m unicative role as laid
down in the level of intersubjectivity” (p. 159).
In principle, therefore, every com petent speaker has the responsibility
of choosing among three m odes of social com m unication (H aberm as
1979b, p. 58). First, com m unication to state a proposition that can be
illustrated in the propositional attitude of a nonparticipating third person

who hears a speech act. Second, com m unication to stress an interpersonal
relationship as such, as illustrated in the perform ative attitude of a
participant conforming to the expectations of a second person. Third,
communication to express an intention as such— th at is, a speaker p re-
sents himself before others. Each form of com m unication carries a claim
to validity that is situationally recognized for its value (H ooft 1976).
Legitimation. H aberm as m akes an explicit connection betw een com -
munication and axiology, both in term s of how hum an comm unication
leads to ethical judgm ents about persons and in term s of the social
aesthetic values that dom inate personal existence. U ltim ately, his con-
cern is with the special connection in com m unication by which personal
ethics and social aesthetics form into political norm s of existence— th at is,
social legitimation.
In careful propositional language, H aberm as (1975) suggests that “ only
communicative ethics guarantees the generality of admissible norm s and
the autonom y of acting subjects solely through the discursive redeem a-
bility of the validity claims with which such norm s appear” (p. 89). We
should recall that com m unication is an action that deals with theoretical
facts— values that have a pragm atic effect because they are form ed in
speech acts. In this context, H aberm as advances three basic pragmatic
universals derived from the linguistic universals apparent in all speech
communication.
First, “ each specific language offers a reference system which perm its a
sufficiently reliable identification of som ething in the world about which
one would want to m ake propositions.” Second, “ each specific language
offers a system of personal pronouns and a system of speech acts with the
aid of which we can bring about interpersonal relationship.” A nd third,
“ each particular language offers a system o f intentional expressions for the
self-presentation of subjectivity which, in spite of the degree of variation
of its expression in particular languages, reflects the system of ego-
delim inations” (H aberm as 1975, p. 161).
For H aberm as, then, social and political legitim ation of personal and
public action, w hether technically instrum ental or comm unicative, results
in the form ation of a com m unication ethic. T hat is, the rational society
that manifests a universal pragmatics is a transform ation of “ the com m u-
nication com m unity (K ommunikationsgem einschaft) of those affected,
who as participants in a practical discourse test the validity claims of
norm s, and, to the extent that they accept them with reasons, arrive at the
conviction that in the given circum stance the proposed norm s are ‘right’ ”
(p. 105). A parallel argum ent in non-M arxist term s is m ade by A pel
(1967; 1980).
In short, the critical theory m odel begins with an axiological pragmatics
(legitimation) of speech com m unication, based on the logical notion of
ideal speech acts (convention). F or Flaberm as, as a critical theorist,

speech acts are part of the symbol form ation process (punctuation) that
derives its epistem ological stages of developm ent from the metaphysical
approach of Freudian psychoanalysis and its theory of consciousness
(intention). Thus, a theory of a rational society is an ideal generalized
from a theory of norm al com m unication in the rational person (H ab er-
mas 1979b, pp. 67-68).
C O N C LU SIO N
Throughout this chapter, I have dem onstrated a theoretical parallel

among the m ajor divisions of philosophy (m etaphysics, epistem ology,
logic, axiology), the key constructs in com m unication theory (intention,
punctuation, convention, legitimation), and selected models in the philos-
ophy of com m unication (existential phenom enology, semiology, concep-
tual analysis, critical theory). A lthough I em phasize the particular form at
that each philosophic position takes in respect to the various com m unica-
tion constructs, the positions do share a com m on reliance on the interper-
sonal aspects of Com municology as a general philosophic project in the
hum an sciences.
The best articulation of the contributions of each m odel in the philoso-
phy of com m unication is, I believe, the following set of theorem s. They
may be regarded as a prelim inary attem pt to state the fundam ental
constructs required by a theory of communicology with a well-founded
philosophical base.
Th eo r ems
1. The theorem of intentionality. Conscious experience is the m inim al

unit o f meaning in com munication. This theorem derives from H usserl’s
proposition th at subjectivity is intersubjectivity. It is associated with
M erleau-Ponty’s, Schutz’s and F oucault’s proposition that the person is
the object of analysis in conscious behavior.
2. The theorem of punctuation. The reversibility o f expression and
perception is the m inim alsystem -code fo r com munication. This theorem is
drawn from the proposition advanced by Peirce, Saussure, H jelm slev,
and B arthes that speech entails levels of expression and content individu-
ally and jointly the result of sign-production. E co’s construction of the
theory of com m unicational acts on the basis of sign-production further
supports the theorem .
3. The theorem of convention. The transaction is the m inim al rule-
governed behavior required fo r com m unication. This theorem expresses
the logical elem ents in discourse discovered by A ustin, G rice, and Searle.
The analogue nature of com m unicative perform ance provides analytic
insights about the constitution of speech com m unication— insights o b -

scured by simple linguistic description.
4. The theorem of legitim ation. Interpersonal speech competency is the
minimal norm in society fo r communication. This theorem form ulates a
key relationship in which historical fact/value and individual/mass bifur-
cations are resolved as a ratio of com m unicative actions. F or A pel and
H aberm as, the conjunction of herm eneutic and norm ative actions ex-
plains the com m unity achieved by persons in society.
These theorem s suggest certain implications for research and the
consequent refinem ent of com m unication theory utilizing the philosophic
paradigm. First, the philosophy of com m unication is a form of rigorous
theory construction. It provides a systemic and systematic review of the
theoretical propositions that describe com m unication. Secondly, these
propositions explicitly provide a context for qualitative and quantitative
analysis and synthesis in the human science of com m unicology. Such a
critique provides, in addition, a problem -centered investigation and
explication of com m unication behavior th at avoids disciplinary lim ita-
tions based on preconceived m ethodological paradigm s for theory and
praxis. In short, the philosophic m odels may perm it us to encounter a
basic empirical discovery: the philosophy of com m unication discloses a
phenom enal logic of the person in which consciousness constitutes a
world of others in experience.
Part Two:
Communicology
[S e c tio n O n e : EIDETIC RESEARCH]

Chapter Three
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology
o f Communication
During his inaugural lecture on January 15, 1953, at the Collège de

France, M aurice M erleau-Ponty asserted th at “ the m ore energetic our
intention to see the things them selves, the m ore the appearances by
which they are expressed and the words by which we express them will be
interposed betw een the things and us” (1963a, p. 20). W ith this rem ark
he emphasizes the philosophic concern with language in its m odalities of
expression and perception. It is a m ajor them e of those French philoso-
phers of the Paris school of existentialism who have developed projects
beyond the pioneering work of the founder of m odern phenom enology,
Edm und Husserl (see chap. 12, below).
In particular, M erleau-Ponty’s philosophic regard for language and
reality as existential styles of expression and perception is a central issue
in his phenom enology. His original and provocative philosophy em erges
in a process that turns the freedom of phenom enological m ethod— that is,
description, reduction, and interpretation— to the service of existential
ontology in a rigorous attem pt to locate m eaning as the hum an situation.
This is to say, M erleau-Ponty presents the process n ature of personal and
interpersonal Being by examining the lived-encounters of perceptive and
expressive signs that are experienced as com m unication. As he (1962,
p. 50) puts it, “ the recognition of phenom ena, then, implies a theory of
reflection and a new cogito.'”
In this chapter I wish to suggest that M erleau-Ponty’s original and
distinct form ulation of phenom enology is a semiotic system or synergic
theory of signs founded on an interplay of: (1) the recognition of the
presence of phenomena by description—that is, a “primacy of perception” ;
45
48 COMMUNICOLOGY
also determ inate of speakers’ perceptions of their own expression, and

indeed, perception of their ability to further engage the communicative
act. As M erleau-Ponty (1964c, p. 97) concisely states, “ to the extent that
what I say has m eaning, I am a different ‘o th er’ for myself when I am
speaking; and to the extent that I understand, I no longer know who is
speaking and who is listening.”
Y et, one must go beyond the superficial designation of essential struc-
tural relationships to the existential structure of m eaning. T hat is, one
must “ bracket” o n e’s experience as a conscious act. By bracketing one
engages in the process of analysis devoid of the influence of personal
lived-experience as an “ objective” orientation. In particular, investiga-
tors should suspend their analytic, philosophic, sensual, and other p re ju -
dices or predispositions as to the nature of perception or the phenom ena
to be perceived. W ith the com pletion of bracketing— as far as it be
possible— one is able to recognize the essential structures of phenom ena
as reductive to existential phenom ena. For exam ple, one witnesses and
engages in private behavior that is universal to o n e’s interpersonal experi-
ence with others, as opposed to situationally dependent behavior (see
chap. 9, below).
A t this level of inquiry, m eaning em erges as a structural unit indepen-
dent of affective or rationalized content borne by a person or a person’s
situation. Put another way, the transcendent signs of phenom ena com -
pare and contrast with im m anent signs thus specifying the phenom enal
presence. W hat is essentially given as signified unites with w hat is tran-
scendentally given as signifying; thus em erge m eaningful, significant
phenom ena. This is by way of saying that the phenom enological reduc-
tion allows an experiential structure to becom e knowable as the existen-
tial fiber or style in a person’s lived-experience. Indeed, one comes to the
genesis of m eaning, which is the sign-to-signification; it is the “ sedim enta-
tion” of personal experience into intersubjectivity.
If one fails to bracket o n e’s perspective inquiry, an inability to distin-
guish structure and the consciousness o f structure arises, where in fact the
consciousness of structure functions as a content for structure, an “ objec-
tivity.” In consequence, structure (the existential) is perceived incorrectly
as a sole function of content (the essential). In other words, the phenom e-
nological reduction involves the suspension of the consciousness of phe-
nomenal content (sign-to-signification) and the realization of the
phenomenal structure that is the preconscious (sign-as-signification) or
existential meaning. This process m ethod of perception links the im m a-
nent phenom ena of description to the transcendent phenom ena of reduc-
tion to discover or create a presence that is existential per se.
The process can be exemplified in o n e’s everyday experience of aw ak-
ening from sleep. O ne wakes up, so to speak, by progressing in percep-
tive awareness, with varying degrees of meshing, from (1) corporeal
MERLEAU-PONTY 49
awareness of self to (2) m ental or conscious recognition of self to (3) the

actual synergic point where one is fully aw are of o n e’s lived-behavior as a
unitary body-m ind (Body-subject) able to act in fulfillment of precon-
scious capabilities— capabilities that are not m erely physical or m ental,
but both. O ne is alive, not m erely breathing or thinking.
In the brief period before one is fully aw are of being aw ake, there is the
beginning of a conscious awareness of how things really are— prior to any
conceptualization, cognition, or affection about the things “ being as they
should b e .” O ne in point of fact is perceiving the content of am bient
phenom ena prior to one’s consciousness of it— that is, prior to the
structuring or designating of phenom ena as meaningful. T here is an
existential, lived-meaning to phenom ena before they are nam ed as essen-
tial, as “objective.” In short, the sign m eaning is a priori to the act of
signification.
The third and final step in M erleau-Ponty’s phenom enological m ethod
is the “ radical cogito” or intentionality. A t this juncture M erleau-Ponty
directly moves his phenom enology to an existential project. For one is
now concerned with pure intentionality devoid of consciousness and
absent from the structural phenom ena that are hidebound to the precon-
scious as sign-to-signification. This is to suggest th at one progresses
beyond bracketed experience or “ operative intentionality,” which m arks
the first and second phase of phenom enological inquiry— that is, descrip-
tion and reduction. In the third step one arrives at the process of “thetic
intentionality.”
Thetic intentionality m eans the lived-experience or act of perception
that contains m eaning precisely because it is not dependent on the
calculated m aneuver of the bracketing experience; one transcends o n e’s
“consciousness of” phenom ena to the phenom ena them selves. Thetic
intentionality or existential m eaning is the preconscious perception of self
prior to the interpersonal perception that is communication. As Merleau-
Ponty (1964c, p. 90) says, “for the speaking subject, to express is to become
aware of; he does not just express for others, but also to know himself
what he intends.” Existential m eaning is the knowledge base from which
“ I” realize th at “ I am able to ” or “ I can” perceive and express, as
opposed to the bracketed or essential m eaning in which “ I think th a t”
and “ I sense th a t” perception and expression are engaged. In brief,
bracketed experience is operative intentionality at the em pirical level (a
history of phenom ena), w hereas thetic intentionality is existential experi-
ence (prim ordial phenom ena). In consequence, the existential creates the
essential in the process of perception. Indeed, says M erleau-Ponty
(1963a, p. 63), “ the philosopher is the m an who wakes up and speaks.”
M erleau-Ponty’s phenom enological m ethod is in fact the very process
of perception. This is to say, perception is m arshaled to determ ining the
essential constructa of experienced phenom ena as a key to interpreting
50 COMMUNICOLOGY
existential meaning. The counterpart to perception is, of course, express-

ion, and in this conjunctive role expression is the phenomenon of percep-
tion. The expression of factual knowledge presents a ready-made
lived-structure of meaning (signification) in the language used (signs). By
applying phenom enological techniques to articulated language (speak-
ing), one arrives at an understanding of the semiotic m eaning force of
communication acts. M erleau-Ponty sum m arizes it well:
W hat we have now understood is that symbolic m atrices, a language of self

to self, systems of equivalences built up by the past, effect groupings,
abbreviations, and distortions in a simple act and which analysis reconsti-
tutes m ore and m ore closely” [1969, p. 83].
EX PR ESSIO N AS T H E P R IM O R D IA L IT Y O F B EIN G
An exam ination of the levels of expression helps to further clarify

distinctions prom oted by a phenom enological m ethod. Expression at the
level of descriptions, according to M erleau-Ponty, should be designated
as language (langage). A t this initial stage of com m unication analysis
M erleau-Ponty follows the explanation of the linguist Ferdinand de
Saussure (1966) and defines language as the synoptic presentation of two
structural subunits that compose any given “w ord” in relation to other
contextual signs (verbal and nonverbal)— nam ely, the signifier and the
signified. The signifier m eans simply the value category (logic typology)
of the sound-image of a word; the signified (another value category) is the
concept as implied or as understood. Thus, one narrows down a given
communication act to the ordinary language (langue) used and within that
utterance the distinct words articulated, which are indentifiable by the
holistic sound-image and concept. Y et, such a description still leaves the
analyst far short of determ ining the intended m eaning of a message. In
short, linguistic structure is a behavioral factor of linguistic content as
perceived, not an expressed structure of lived-experience.
Investigators should move to the second phase of inquiry by bracketing
their perceptive experience of the language used in the message. Lan-
guage should be approached in its neutral structural sense, much as one
might attem pt to do in defining a new word for a young child: unadorned
structure to be filled in by lived-experience. H ere language em erges as a
structure devoid of historical content— that is, rem oved from the public
situation in which it is uttered and reuttered. B racketed language and its
meaning are what might be called cultural or social significations. The
French use the word langue (roughly m eaning a society’s current spoken
tongue) as opposed to langage (a symbol code and gram m ar) to get at this
distinction. In term s of m eaning analysis, a crude A m erican equivalent
MERLEAU-PONTY 51
might be the denotative or consensus m eaning of language as opposed to

the connotative or personal m eaning. In any event, the task is to find the
language structure implicit in a tongue or cultural signification. As Merleau-
Ponty (1963a, p. 30) suggests, “expression presupposes someone who
expresses, a truth which he expresses, and others before whom he
expresses himself. The postulate of expression and of philosophy is that it
can sim ultaneously satisfy these three conditions.” Once the m eaning, as
a herm eneutic of the Weltanschauung, of a message is ascertained at the
structural level, one can move to the third area of phenom enological
analysis. T hat is, one can exam ine intentionality in m eaning, which is the
penetration of the lived-experience (Lebenswelt).
M erleau-Ponty argues that the act of speaking (parole) is at the core of
the “ radical cogito.” H e stresses the prim ordiality of em bodim ent in
communication. As he says, “ expression is a m atter of reorganizing
things-said, affecting them with a new index of curvature, and bending
them to a certain enhancem ent of m eaning.” T hat is, “ speaking to others
(or to myself), I do not speak o f my thoughts; I speak them, and what is
between them — my afterthoughts and underthoughts” (M erleau-Ponty
1964c, p. 19).
F or example, when one speaks, there is an expression that is at the
preconscious level of the speaker at the m om ent the words are uttered
and thus rendered perceptible to myself and o th er conscious body-
subjects. O ne might readily object th at the speaker thinks before speak-
ing and hence is conscious of the words spoken. This objection can be
granted, not as existential speech (sign-as-significations), but as a descrip-
tion of bracketed speech or the use of a cultural m eaning, an “ objectiv-
ity” of sign-to-signification. W hen the conscious, rational scrutiny of
language is absent—for example, in the impromptu speech—one is speaking
at the existential level or preconscious level of expression. T here is in the
im prom ptu speech experience an awareness of personal com m unication
with self and others through language and body that is the felt or
lived-awareness of prim ordial self-expression— a fact exploited by the
psychologist in the verbal technique of “ free association.”
One can therefore express oneself at the level of existential awareness
that is properly preconscious and revelatory of o n e’s private reality.
Being, in the m etaphysical sense, is recognizable in expression as the
hum an structure of verbal and nonverbal behavior that is em bodied
lived-intentionality. In the existential m odality of expression, a personal
act of com m unication can indeed reveal one’s “ real” self at the interper-
sonal level of perception. Speaking is an existential risk, for “ at the
m om ent of expression the other to whom I address myself and I who
express myself are incontestably linked to g eth er” (M erleau-Ponty 1964c,
p. 73). O ur great care (or the lack of it!) in the use of language before
other persons is dem onstration enough of this point.
52 COMMUNICOLOGY
M erleau-Ponty indicates the prim ordiality of being entailed by ex-

pression in his definition of speech:
Speech, as distinguished from language, is th at m om ent w hen the significa-

tive intention (still silent and wholly act) proves itself capable of incorpo-
rating itself into my culture and the culture of others— of shaping m e and
others by transform ing the m eaning of cultural instrum ents [1964c, p. 92].
This is to say, speaking displays a preconscious structure of private,

existential m eaning that becomes frozen by its verbalization— frozen into
a cultural pattern that is the tongue we speak and the reality we inhabit.
The interpersonal perception of existential expression (prim ordial signs)
sediments into empirical speech (empirical signs) allowing its reuse by
anyone. Thus, speech rem oved from its value or social context of private
or public lived-experience is m ere language; it is a symbol code barren of
any personal awareness in the absence of hum an utterance and social
perception. This is precisely the distinction betw een speech speaking and
speech spoken (M erleau-Ponty 1962, p. 197).
S E M IO LO G Y AS A P H E N O M E N O L O G Y O F C O M M U N IC A T IO N
Having examined the parallel structure of perception and expression as

reflected in com m unication analysis, an explanation of the semiotic
system or sign theory underlying M erleau-Ponty’s existential-
phenom enological m ethod is particularly relevant. H e uses an explicit
system of signs to explain both the lived-experience of perception and
expression. Again em ulating Saussure, M erleau-Ponty argues th at m ean-
ing is a product of the conjunction of signs. It is the synergic connection of
signs, not the individual sign, that produces m eaning. Even in the case
where there is a void or “chasm ,” one encounters m eaning, for the
specific absence of a sign is also a sign to be linked to other signs. For
example, the force of speaking derives in part from silence— m eaning is
the com m unication of what is said and what is not said.
Put another way, the occurrence of m eaning is not a sign-to-
signification structure, but a sign structure in which the signs are the
signification. The existential signs are by structure prim ordial and self-
definitive, whereas empirical signs are historical and definitive only in the
congruence of structure with usage content. Existential m eaning consists
of signs in which signifiers and signifieds (sound-im age and concept in
expression, or, im m anent and transcendent perspective in perception)
are synergic and inseparable: the sign is the signification. M eaning is the
same as expressed and perceived at either the intrapersonal level or the
intersubjective level. In contrast, em pirical m eaning consists of signs in
which the signifier or im m anent perception is variously joined syntheti-
MERLEAU-PONTY 53
cally (not synergically) to an intended signified or transcendent percep-

tion, respectively. Thus, empirical expression or perception is a
sign-to-signification structure w here m eaning as semiotic structure d e-
pends on semiotic content (Lanigan 1984).
The encompassing Gestalt nature of the sem iotic process can be illus-
trated with two visual examples. Em pirical signs are observed in the
perception of a painting where the foreground is apparent in com parison
with the background precisely because the perceived plane of the back-
ground is itself devoid of a “foreground.” Similarly, the plane of the
foreground is clearly perceptible with its equally lacking “background.”
The two planes join synthetically to posit one foreground and one
background; the structure (signs) is a function of its content (significa-
tions). On the o th er hand, existential signs are equally obvious in most
so-called optical illusions where foreground and background as sign
structures on one plane are identical and thus erratically reverse them -
selves to observers’ consternation in attem pting to focus their perspective
on two planes. H ere content m ust be a function of structure, for content is
structure— the signs are the significations. In the “ illusion” one is a
constant witness to the birth of a visual object.
In both perception and expression several sem iotic relationships o p er-
ate at the verbal and nonverbal levels of com m unication. The most
common system is of course linguistic semiology, which provides a
structural m odel for m ultilevel perception and expression in a given
com m unication analysis. Thus, speaking is semiotically divisible into
language as im m anently and transcendentally expressed or as im m anently
and transcendentally perceived. In this sense, M erleau-Ponty (1964c,
p. 67) correctly asserts that “ all perception, all action which presupposes
it, and in short every hum an use of the body is already prim ordial
expression.”
To explain briefly, im m anent language is both expressed and perceived
as a “ tongue” spoken in a speech com m unity or cultural-social significa-
tion. This is the level of empirical speech and m eaning. O n the other
hand, transcendent language is speaking (parole) in the existential sense
of language th at creates personal lived-experience. By a process of
historical approval, disapproval, or m odification, certain existential ex-
pressions or perceptions becom e sedim ented. They assume a public
meaning content th at can be used over and over again as an im m anent
sign structure for personal content meaning. In short, transcendent signs
become sedim ented into one or two possible im m anent signs— that is,
only one or two possible significations-for-signs.
For example, im m anent signs in expression form a sedim ent or cultural
meaning that allows com m unication at an em pirical level. Speakers,
however, in their use of com m unication elem ents (language, voice,
gesture, etc.), can express transcendent signs that form an existential
54 COMMUNICOLOGY
meaning not dependent on em pirical m eanings. Indeed, language that is

eloquent to our ears is of this order. Y et, such existential speech may well
sediment to affirm, alter, or replace em pirical speech at the personal or
social level. A similar structure of signs exists in the act of perception.
The cultural orientation to given perspectives is on the level of em pirical
perception. A n original and existential perception that transcends the
empirical can still occur. Such a perception is generally classified as an
“ insight.” Indeed, how m any such existential “ insights” are now sedi-
m ented as “ accepted” or even as the “ only way” of doing and saying
certain things? Wise sayings and epigrams are exemplary of this percep-
tual phenom enon.
By way of caution, one should note that the im m anent and transcen-
dent elem ents of M erleau-Ponty’s semiology are reversible at the inter-
personal level when expression and perception constitute intersubjective
communication (Lanigan 1972). This is to say, for exam ple, that o n e’s
personal articulations using language considered to be im m anent may be
perceived by another as transcendent for various reasons. Similarly, a
speaker uttering existential or transcendent speech may be perceived as
using empirical speech. The point to be m ade is that the proper under-
standing of the synergic union of perception and expression as a single
agency can be achieved only by a phenom enological analysis of com m uni-
cation acts based on a semiotic division of elem ents.
Interpersonal structures must lead back to personal structures when
perception and expression are explored for their m eaning, w hether at the
empirical or the existential level. Y et, an existential-phenom enological
exam ination of com m unication is by definition limited to finding the
meaning present in the elem ents of a lived-experience that is strictly
speaking a subjectivity born of intersubjectivity (Husserl 1960). To sepa-
rate the intrapersonal from the interpersonal in the herm eneutic analysis
of perception and expression is to deny the possibility of a phenom eno-
logical reduction to the existential. On the contrary, meaning is a deter-
m inate lived-experience manifest in the communication act.
TH EO R EM S
Several com m unication theorem s can now be drawn from the present
analysis of M erleau-Ponty’s semiotic phenom enology (see chap. 2,
above).
1. Com m unication is a synergic process of perception and expression,
which is both intrapersonal and interpersonal.
2. Com munication is a synergic process (a) of em pirical and existential
speech, and (b) of im m anent and transcendent perception.
3. Existential-phenom enological analysis utilizes a semiotic system to
MERLEAU-PONTY 55
distinguish empirical and existential m odes of perception and expression.

4. The semiotic integration of description, reduction, and intentionality
allows for an existential herm eneutic of com m unication acts.
By way of final com m ent, we should note th at M erleau-Ponty’s existen-
tial-phenom enological approach to com m unication analysis is by defini-
tion a project in intersubjective semiotics as a function of personal
expression and perception. It is a philosophic approach that utilizes the
semiotic m odel as a paradigm for an approach to locating m eaning in
personal and public encounters with being and reality. As M erleau-Ponty
(1964c, p. 21) rem arks, “ in a sense, the highest point of philosophy is
perhaps no m ore than rediscovering these truisms: thought thinks, speech
speaks,the glance glances. B ut each tim e betw een the two identical words
there is the whole spread one straddles in order to think, speak, and see.”
Chapter Four
Freedom and Field

M erleau-Ponty’s Sinngebung as the Essence o f a Semiotic
Phenomenology o f Human Communication
The phenom enological them atic of field and freedom finds its problem -
atic expression in M erleau-Ponty’s m ajor w ork, the Phenom enology o f
Perception (1962). On the one hand, the Preface to the book m arks out in
a general com m unication to the public reader w hat the field of phenom e-
nology is. It is Sinn, a sense-giving expression discovered in perception.
The field is m arked by a m ethod. The field sets eidetic boundaries, which
are m ethodological for philosophy rigorously conceived as phenom enol-
ogy. In this Preface, M erleau-Ponty announces the synergism that he
m akes of the Husserlian reflections on becoming. For M erleau-Ponty, the
phenom enological m ethod takes its existential turn in the world by
moving progressively from the phenom enological description, to the
phenom enological reduction, and then to the phenom enological interpre-
tation. We all come to the realization that the field of expression is the
choice made in the process of perception.
On the other hand, the final chapter of the book m arks out in a specific
com m unication to the person as reader what the freedom of phenom enol-
ogy is. It is G ebung, the act-character of perception discovered in the
process of expression. As with the field, freedom is m arked by a m ethod.
Freedom sets the empirical boundaries that are m ethodological for the
human sciences rigorously conceived as phenom enology. In this final
chapter devoted to the subject and freedom , M erleau-Ponty articulates
the syncretism that he makes of the Sartrian reflection on being. For
M erleau-Ponty the existential m ethod takes its phenom enological turn in
conscious experience by moving progressively from the hum an situation
56
FREEDOM AND FIELD 57
to a direction (sense) of history, and to a historical truth (com m itm ent).

Each of us comes to the instantiation of freedom as the perception
constituting choice. In short, M erleau-Ponty (1962) signals the ambiguity
of the Sinn-G ebung, the problem atic of field and freedom , of choice and
context, when he says:
By defining ourselves as a universal pow er of Sinn-Gebung, we have

reverted to the m ethod of the “thing w ithout w hich” and to the analytical
reflection of the traditional type, which seeks the conditions of reality. We
m ust therefore resum e the analysis of the Sinngebung, and show how it can
be both centrifugal and centripetal, since it has been established th at there
is no freedom w ithout a field [p. 439].
By m aking the Sinn-G ebung the existential problem atic of field and
freedom (see Figure 3), M erleau-Ponty constitutes the Sinngebung as the
phenom enological them atic of field (see Figure 4) and freedom (see
Figure 5). This them atic of the em pirical and eidetic m om ent is precisely
hum an com m unication as lived.
In the analysis that follows, I suggest the way in which M erleau-Ponty
relies on certain eidetic characteristics of com m unication theory in order
to argue that the synergism (see Figure 4) of field and freedom is an
empirical phenom enon— nam ely, tolerance. In this instance, tolerance is
my reflexive capability of seeing in the choice not m ade the ability of the
other to choose. Tolerance is the field in which freedom can be lived as
conscious experience. Second, I explore the reflexive m om ent of this
argum ent by which M erleau-Ponty establishes several em pirical charac-
teristics of com m unication theory as the syncreticism (see Figure 5) of
field and freedom . This coming together of field and freedom as an eidetic
phenom enon constitutes an existential style. Style is the freeedom within
which the field of conscious experience is the ontological capability that
Heidegger (1984, p. 205) calls ek-stase. Last, I affirm in this dialectic
examination th at M erleau-Ponty’s analysis of freedom and field is a
semiotic phenom enology of the person.
M erleau-Ponty suggests that the Sinngebung “ can be both centrifugal
and centripetal.” In this short phrase, he utilizes the substance and
structure of m odern com m unication theory (Lanigan, 1970; 1979a, b;
1982a, b; 1983a; 1984). The com binatory opposition betw een the centrif-
ugal and centripetal directions of experience is the substance of con-
sciousness existentially lived. The com m unicative structure of
com binatory exchange records equally well the categorical force of the
centrifugal and the centripetal together with the syncategorim atical term s
“ both”/“ and” that announce a binary analogue logic. Just as Saussure’s
sign emerges always in the context of other signs, and just as the signifier
is always connected to the signified in a reflexive m om ent, so too the
58 COMMUNICOLOGY
o —* Centrifical
o <— Centripical
Figure 3. Static communication [ o = nexus]
C entripetal
t
— o —» Centrifugal
Figure 4. Orthogonal static communication
Centripetal
Centrifugal
Figure 5. Orthogonal dynamic communication [Helix]
centrifugal and centripetal m om ents of hum an action are reflexive to one

another. In the centrifugal m om ent of com m unicative behavior, we
witness consciousness form itself into an extensional dim ension of signifi-
cation. Choices always secure their own context. In parallel fashion, it is
also the context that gives definition to the choice. The centripetal
m om ent of communicative behavior constitutes experience as an inten-
tional dimension of m eaning in consciousness. Hall (1969, p. 108) p ro -
vides an empirical confirmation of this analysis of centrifugal/centripetal
meaning in his parallel discussion of sociofugal/sociopetal behavior.
The force of M erleau-Ponty’s analysis is all the m ore persuasive as we
realize that his argum ent parallels that put forth by Jakobson in his early
critique of Saussure’s linguistic structuralism . H olenstein (1976) provides
a convenient sum m ary schema of Saussure’s language theory where

parole and langue are counterposed in inform ation theory term s. This is
to say, the analyst m ust choose either parole and its static features or
langue and its static features. T he choice offered by such a structural
description is digital and has its coherence in the operation of disjunction.
Thus, the Saussurian static m odel (H olenstein 1976, p. 160) offers:
langue parole
(1) linguistic norm (1) linguistic utterance
(2) language as (2) language as individual,
supraindividual, social private property
endow m ent
(3) the unifying, centripetal (3) the individualizing,
aspect of language centrifugal aspect of language
Jakobson effectively shows that the Saussurian static concepts of langue

and parole are an inadequate description, reduction, and interpretation
of hum an communicative practice. Jakobson’s solution is the suggestion
of a dynamic conception in which the concept of code replaces that of
langue, and message is used in place of parole. As a communicologist,
Jakobson is aw are of the principle that com m unication theory entails
inform ation theory. T hat is, the ability of the poetic function to m ake
static oppositional distinctions with a digital logic of disjunction is contex-
tualized by the prior ability to m ake dynamic differentiations with the
binary analogue logic of conjunction (H olenstein 1976, p. 163).
It is quite true th at langue and parole can be distinguished in many
cases. B ut it is equally im portant to note that in essence this is not true.
W here we are sensitive to the fact th at a person in the practice of
discourse is sim ultaneously a speaker and a listener, the static conception
gives way to the dynamic practice. A lthough the speaker encodes dis-
course by relying in a prim ary way on the paradigm atic features of speech
as articulation (eidetic), the listener decodes discourse prim arily on the
basis of the syntagm atic features of language as silent deconstruction
(empirical). In short, the com m unal features of langue as the centripetal
force of discourse that unites persons, and the individualizing aspects of
parole as the centrifugal force of discourse that separates person from
person, are dynamic lived-elem ents of conscious experience.
H ere we must rem ind ourselves th at consciousness is displayed in the
paradigm atic function w hereas experience is contained in the syntagmatic
function of discourse. The fact th at “ conscious experience” and the
“ paradigm atic/syntagm atic” axes are individually and jointly com bina-
tory is precisely why Jakobson insists on code in place of langue, and
60 COMMUNICO LOGY
message for parole. N onetheless, Jakobson’s analysis falls short in one

way that is critical for our understanding of M erleau-Ponty’s position.
Jakobson still identifies the code with a centripetal function in discourse.
Language as code unifies theory and practice by assuming that the level of
analysis is intersubjective. Thus, the code becomes a characteristic of
dynamic society and messages are created as social norm s. By com pari-
son, this view holds that the message is an aspect of the dynamic
individual. Language as message is deictic by assuming a subjective level
of analysis— for exam ple, as pronouns are deictic in place of naming
nouns. The centrifugal function of discourse separates person from p er-
son in dynamic interaction. Put in com m unication theoretic term s, Jakob-
son uses a binary analogue logic (both/and) to join the code and message
functions together, yet he also perm its any one description of either code
or message to stand as a digital logic (either/or) representation of the
discursive process.
M erleau-Ponty’s position is corrective. N ot only do code and message
combine in a binary analogue logic, that very logic is an entailm ent of the
digital function, not of one, but of both the code and message (or their
dialectic absence) as presentations in the com m unicative process. It is in
this sense that w hat is not present in the disjunction is m ore m eaningful
than what is, when considered in the context of conjunction as an
originary analogue boundary. M erleau-Ponty put the issue this way:
In all uses of the w ord sens, we find the same fundam ental notion of a being
orientated or polarized in the direction of w hat he is not, and thus we are
brought back to a conception of the subject as ek-stase, and to a relation-
ship of active transcendence betw een the subject and the world [1962, p.
430],
Thus in certain key respects, M erleau-Ponty’s discussion of the Sinn-

Gebung and Sinngebung opposition displays the sense in which the law of
noncontradiction form ulates the com m unication theory entailm ent of
inform ation theory. The opposition of field and freedom in which the
conjunction of the two allows their praxis disjunction is an empirical
illustration of the eidetic them atic. A nd I might add that this very
methodology is exploited to great advantage by Michel Foucault (1970;
1972; see Lanigan 1984) in his studies of freedom and field.
For M erleau-Ponty as semiotic phenom enologist, then, a centrifugal
phenom enon is an act of expression that moves outw ard from the person
and thereby comes to constitute a perception for others. This centrifugal
construction of expression and perception is a signifier with extensional
consequence. Discourse and gesture are expressive insofar as they can be
so lived by an other, and insofar as an act of com m union becomes a
lived-world. By com parison, the centripetal phenom enon is an act of
perception that moves inward from the other and thereby comes to
constitute an expression of self. This centripetal construction of percep-

tion and expression is a signified with intentional purport. G esture and
discourse are perceptive insofar as an act of com m unication becom es a
world of living. The centrifugal com m unication becom es an exem plar of
the phenom enological constitution of the Sinngebung. T hat is, expression
as an act-character (-gebung) entails the sense-giving (Sinn-) trait of
perception. As the communicologist would sum m arize, choice is always a
choice of context.
But what of centripetal com m unication? It also becom es an exem plar,
yet it is an existential exem plar of the Sinngebung. This is to say,
perception as sense-giving (Sinn-) entails the act-character (-gebung) of
expression. Again in strict com m unication theoretic term s, choice in
context is always grounded in the originary choice not m ade. The on to -
logical point is explicit in M erleau-Ponty’s (1962, p. 454) thesis: “ We
choose our world and our world chooses u s.” This is to say that the
centrifugal and centripetal m om ents of expression and perception are the
reflexive substance of hum an com m unication. Expression entails percep-
tion just as perception entails expression; freedom and field are a dialecti-
cal discourse. C om m unication em erges as the eidetic phenom enon in
which consciousness entails experience as the condition of the W orld
(intersubjectivity) and in which experience entails consciousness as the
condition of Self or the absent O th er (subjectivity).
A nd so we discover the hum an situation that is the result of phenom e-
nological description. The centrifugal m om ent of hum an com m unication
constitutes a field of expression and perception within which freedom is
both choice and the capability of choosing. Choice becom es the necessary
condition of experience and the sufficient condition of consciousness in
the act of choosing as an em pirical phenom enon. Field and freedom form
a synergism of conscious experience in which freedom instantiates hum an
choice (the empirical) as the capability of choosing (the eidetic). The
name of this synergism is tolerance.
Recall M erleau-Ponty’s proposition that the Sinngebung “ can be both
centrifugal and centripetal.” The analysis of the com m unicative situation
in which the substance of the centrifugal and centripetal m om ents consti-
tute a phenom enological description allows us to move to a phenom eno-
logical reduction of the Sinngebung. The binary analogue (both/and)
logic of the proposition suggests an eidetic structure for com m unication
that accounts for the unlikely com bination of the countervailing empirical
m om ents so precisely nam ed “ centrifugal” and “ centripetal” by the
hum an sciences.
The answer to the empirical paradox lies in M erleau-Ponty’s suggestion
that, just as phenom enological reduction follows on the description, we
discover existentially th at upon every hum an situation there follows a
sense of the “ direction of history.” Just as the hum an situation is valued
62 COMMUNICOLOGY
as an act-character (-gebung), so too is the sense-giving (Sinn-) essence of

history. O f course, this is to recall with Benveniste (1971b, p. 206) that
discourse and history are already present in the phenom enological reduc-
tion as an existential syncretism in the very em pirical condition of parole
(l’histoire as lived) and langue (l’histoire as text).
The “ truth of history” as the phenom enological interpretation of
freedom derives from the Sinngebung as the field of capability. Recall
that the Sinngebung “can be both centrifugal and centripetal.” Significa-
tion can signify, just as expression can becom e perception in the outw ard
m ovem ent of the centrifugal sign. The signifying act can be a significa-
tion, just as perception can becom e expression through the inward
m om ent of the centripetal sign. As a semiotic phenom enology of com m u-
nication, the binary analogue logic uses the syncategorm atic “ both/and”
term s to combine the empirical signifier and signified elem ents of a sign
(experience) into an eidetic signification (consciousness). The centrifugal
movem ent of hum an com m unication becom es a signifier signifying— that
is, an expression of perception: M erleau-Ponty’s parole parlante. The
reflexive m om ent of centripetal com m unication is thereby a signified
signifying—or perception of expression: M erleau-Ponty’s parole parlée.
In other words, the Saussurian stylization of the hum an com m unicator as
an auditor who listens in order to understand is a false synthesis. R ather,
M erleau-Ponty argues, the hum an com m unicator is a person whose
expression and perception are existentially reflexive. Com m unication is a
syncretic synergism— that is, a hyper-reflection. Signifier and signified as
a sign constitute the syncreticism of expression and perception, yet the
very com bination of signs is a synergism— the synergism we live as
conscious experience. This conscious experience is the Sinngebung in
which the sense-giving-act-character of com m unication is signification
signifying— that is, a semiotic phenom enology. T he vertical structure of
consciousness combines with the horizontal essence of experience as an
orthogonal nexus. Just as the semiotic structure of signs is an orthogonal
synergism of the paradigm atic and syntagm atic elem ents of discourse, so
too the phenom enological essence of conscious experience is an orthogo-
nal syncretism of freedom and tolerance in history (H olenstein 1976, p.
31). With this insight, we com plete the herm eneutic helix (see Figure 5).
As M erleau-Ponty argues in his Preface to the Phenom enology o f
Perception, the phenom enological description, reduction, and interpreta-
tion are three ways of saying the same thing about the field as Sinnge-
bung. So too in the final chapter of his book, the hum an situation, a
direction of history, and the truth of history are three ways of perceiving
the same thing about freedom as Sinngebung. T here is no b etter hyper-
reflection than M erleau-Ponty’s (1962, p. 455) own words: “ I am a
psychological and historical structure, and have received, with existence,
a m anner of existing, a style.”
Chapter Five
Communication Science and

Merleau-Ponty’s Critique o f the
Objectivist Illusion
Com m entary is them atic in the work of M aurice M erleau-Ponty. W e

recall with familiar ease that his inaugural lecture at the Collège de
France is a com m entary on the philosopher as a person and as an agent
provocateur in hum an com m unication. W ith dialectic explication,
M erleau-Ponty’s lecture describes the philosopher’s consciousness of
good ambiguity in the personae of Lavelle, Bergson, and Socrates, and in
the hum an encounters we know as the discursive institutions of religion,
history, and philosophy. “ B u t,” as he rem arks (1963a, p. 27), “ it is not
merely a question here of confronting ideas but of incarnating them and
making them live, and in this respect we cannot know what they are
capable of except by trying them out. This attem pt involves a taking of
sides and a struggle” (cf. Lingis 1979). A nd we might recall the m ore
poignant version of hum an com m unication that R . D. Laing (1967, p. 44;
cf. Ruesch 1972; Leach 1971) offers— nam ely, that the struggle is the
“estranged integration we call sanity.” It is in this herm eneutic sense that
M erleau-Ponty struggles with com m unication science by taking sides and
making conscious experience as lived the horizon of discourse.
I should like to characterize the position that M erleau-Ponty takes on
the practice of com m unication as the critique of the objectivist illusion in
therapeutic philosophy. In my analysis I w ant to rely initially on
M erleau-Ponty’s (1973a, p. 147) view of the objectivist illusion that one
finds in the last pages of the Prose o f the World. H e says, “ Nowadays we
encourage every form of illusive and allusive expression, especially pictorial
63
64 COMMUNICOLOGY
expression, and in particular the art of the ‘prim itives,’ the drawing of
children and m adm en, as well as every genre of involuntary poetry, the
‘testam ent’ or spoken language.” Second, I briefly characterize the be-
havioral notion of therapeutic philosophy that Levin and Koestenbaum
counterpose to M erleau-Ponty’s m ethod of philosophic consciousness as
a phenom enology of encounter bracketed by com m unication science—
that is, his herm eneutic of positive ambiguity. Having set the context in
this way, I shall then return to the passage from the Phenomenology o f
Perception (p. 291) that grounds my analysis.
T H E O B JEC TIV IST ILLU SIO N
As M erleau-Ponty rem arks,
The objectivist illusion is firmly established in us. We are convinced that the
expressive act in its norm al or fundam ental form consists, given a significa-
tion, in the construction of a system of signs th at, for each elem ent of the
signified, there corresponds a signifying [signifier] elem ent in other words,
in representation [1973a, p. 148; cf. H aym ond 1967].
Thus, in the spirit of Saussure, M erleau-Ponty rem inds us that dis-

course analysis is not the illusory world of acoustic images and
concepts— that is, the objective illusion of words and things. For the
apparent objectivity of the historical connection among persons, words,
and referents is an illusion; it is the natural attitude writ general. “ H ere,
as everywhere, it seems at first sight true that consciousness can find in its
experience only what it has itself put there. Thus the experience of
communication would appear to be an illusion” (M erleau-Ponty 1962,
p. 178). R ather, discursive analysis m ust seek a return to the speaking
subject and the rediscovery of philosophic consciousness as a “ rigorous
science” of communication (Dreyfus 1979; Foucault 1970; Searle 1982;
1983; 1985). “ Speaking, in the speaker, does not translate ready-m ade
thought, but accomplishes it” (M erleau-Ponty 1962, p. 178). H ere the
expressive arts, and discourse in particular, become the gesture that
articulates and em bodies in place of the sedim ented representations of a
text.
The very perception of the semiotic unity of signifier and signified for
M erleau-Ponty is good ambiguity:
The philosopher is m arked by the distinguishing trait th at he possesses

inseparably the taste for evidence and the feeling for ambiguity. W hen he
limits himself to accepting am biguity, it is called equivocation. B ut am ong
the great it becom es a them e; it contributes to establishing certitudes rather
than menacing them . T herefore it is necessary to distinguish good and bad
ambiguity [1963a, pp. 4—5].
COMMUNICATION SCIENCE 65
Positive ambiguity is the diachronic and synchronic synergism of dia-

critic values produced in the labor of discourse— that is, what Jakobson
defines as the “poetic function” in hum an com m unication. Speaking
{parole parlante) and speech {parole parlée) are not to be confused with
representation, with the objectivist illusion of language (langage) and
meaning {langue). Indeed, as “ idle talk ” in the H eideggerian sense (1962;
see Dreyfus & R abinow 1982) begins to take hold of our being-in-the-
world, we confuse gesture (practice) and its text (/’histoire). Speaking
lapses into language, things becom e rooted in the body, and sanity
becomes my exclusive space, for in pathology only I am in-sanity. Only
my philosophic consciousness offers to disclose the “ oneness of m an and
the world, which is, not indeed abolished, but repressed by everyday
perception or by objective thought” (M erleau-Ponty 1962, p. 291).
But where can I find the philosophical consciousness th at “protects the
sane . . . against delirium or hallucination” or defends against the natural
attitude or m yth or the objectivist illusion? This question should be
carefully com pared with the diagnostic question: A m I em bodied? O r in a
m ore lived, albeit H eideggerian, sense, am I in-sanity? O r finally in its
communicative typicality as a clinical question for the patient: “ C an’t you
hear my voices?” The answer to both questions m ay be found in the
problem atic that Levin characterizes as the therapeutic process and that
Koestenbaum advocates as clinical philosophy.
T H E R A P E U T IC P H IL O SO PH Y
As Levin (1979, pp. 2-3) describes his own philosophic analysis, its
prim ary goal is “ to open up new fields for thinking to play and deepen our
experience of life.” O r m ore specifically, he notes that “we need not only
to question his [M erleau-Ponty] working notions of sanity and m adness,
but also to explore the hint th at there are alternative ways o f structuring
space and inhabiting its w orld.” In my view, Levin is proposing and
carries out a project in clinical philosophy in which the object of analysis
is not M erleau-Ponty’s philosophical position, but rather that M erleau-
Ponty’s text (like the discourse of a patient) is a clinical condition in need
of rem edy (Poole 1966). A t this point it may be helpful to review several
selected criteria th at K oestenbaum offers as com m unicative ingredients in
the practice of clinical philosophy:
Clinical philosophy operates within the following param eters: a. T he atm o-

sphere is sincerely and profoundly supportive. E ven confrontation exists in
an atm osphere of support, b. T he initial com plaint is not nearly as signifi-
cant as the need to explore th e undisclosed and originary projects of the
patient or client, c. Regardless of contrary claims, the only problem s are
(i) the p atien t’s inadequacy in (or resistance against) taking charge of his or
66 COMMUNICOLOGY
her own life, and (ii) lack of contact with the world or not reaching tow ard
the future (self-transcendence). . . .
D iagnostic procedures: a. Symptoms are essentially ignored. A lthough
they may help to initiate therapy by saying “ h elp ,” symptoms are mostly
objects whose function is to prevent access to the transcendental ego.
b. D iagnostic m easurem ent can be taken only by the inw ardness (or
unconscious) of the therapist. T raditional tests and techniques are at best
only peripherally relevant. . . .
Therapeutic strategies: T he sense of individual identity of Existenz and
self-transcendence can be encouraged to grow in the following ways:
a. Identify existing strengths; b. R epeatedly use accurate “universality-to-
individuality” fantasy; c. E ncourage anger, protest— including anger-at-
self—perhaps through confrontation; d. Be an exam ple of a self-made
person [1978, pp. 535-36].
Thus when Levin’s analysis of such questions as “ Is this repression

necessary for sanity, for health?” and “W hat is the experiential signifi-
cance of this repression?” with regard to the passage (in the chapter
section below) in the Phenom enology o f Perception (p. 291), he illustrates
two points. First, the text is taken to be an inadequate attem pt to take
charge of the problem of sanity and spatiality. The text is seen as a case of
M erleau-Ponty’s lack of contact with the experiential world and the
communicative extrapolations that are possible. Second, the text as cited
by Levin constitutes a paradigm atic case of the objectivist illusion. R ather
than focusing on the text as the philosophic consciousness recovered from
a clinical condition cited in a patient (with a structural affinity to m ythol-
ogy), which is in fact M erleau-Ponty’s procedure, Levin takes the de-
tached text as a representation of the transcendental ego.
Recall M erleau-Ponty’s explanation of the objectivist illusion:
We are convinced that the expressive act in its norm al or fundam ental form
consists, given a signification, in the construction of a system of signs such
that, for each elem ent of the signified, th ere corresponds a signifying
elem ent— in other w ords, in representation [1973a, p. 148].
T H E M E R L E A U -PO N T Y TEX T
Many of the issues that I have raised can now be illustrated by going back
to the M erleau-Ponty (1962) text in question. Let me stress that I begin
two sentences ahead of the citation that Levin uses for his analysis. These
two sentences clearly entail com m unication science as part of philosophic
consciousness:
No appeal to explicit perception can arouse the patien t from this dream ,
since he has no quarrel with explicit perception, and holds only th a t it
proves nothing against w hat he experiences. “ C an ’t you h ear my voices?” a

patient asks the doctor; and she com es resignedly to the conclusion: “ I am
the only one who hears them th e n .” W hat protects the sane man against
delirium or hallucination, is not his critical pow ers, b ut the structure of his
space: objects rem ain before him , keeping their distance and, as M ale-
branche said speaking of A dam , touching him only with respect. W hat
brings about both hallucinations and m yths is a shrinking in the space
directly experienced, a rooting of things in our body, the overwhelm ing
proximity of the object, the oneness of m an and the w orld, which is, not
indeed abolished, but repressed by everyday perception or by objective
thought, and which philosophical consciousness rediscovers [p. 291],
W hat M erleau-Ponty accomplishes in this passage is a specification of a

pathological hum an com m unication. H ere there is not only a failure of
authentic being-in-the-world (être-au-monde), there is even a failure of
the natural attitude as an ego defense. The critical power of the patient is
dysfunctional in the natural attitude inasm uch as the p atien t’s explicit
perception cannot m atch the doctor’s perception in at least typicality. The
patient’s existence becomes inauthentic in the appeal to experience, for
the pathological experience is precisely a representation where prim or-
dial presence should be. T hat is, the patient has constructed a system of
signs in which the referential values (signifieds) consistently point back to
her clinical experience as lived. T he patient has an illusion of objectivity,
which is confirmed when it does not m atch th at of the doctor. The classic
symptomatology of schizophrenia is thus displayed. The p atien t’s explicit
perception is pathologically m aintained by associations, am bivalence,
autism, and altered affect (K oestenbaum 1978, pp. 450ff.).
M erleau-Ponty (1962, p. 291) captures this com plete pathological
condition in his epigram m atic example: “ C an’t you hear my voices?” a
patient asks the doctor; and she com es resignedly to the conclusion:
“ I am the only one who hears them th e n .” W e witness delirium in the
question “ C an’t you hear my voices?” . A nd in the statem ent “ I am the
only one who hears them th en ,” we are party to hallucination.
But what of the doctor, the sane person who is protected from delirium
and hallucination— that is, from pathological expression or perception?
Why, in M erleau-Ponty’s exam ple, does the doctor rem ain silent? W ith-
out speech there is no discursive connection to the patient. The doctor
sees the paradox of legitim ation that the p atien t’s behavior presents. For
the doctor to respond by speaking is to equivocate, to live in bad
ambiguity (M erleau-Ponty 1963a, pp. 4—5; 1962, p. 339; cf. V irasoro
1959). The utterance of an affirmation (“ Yes, I h ear the voices” ) or
denial (“ N o, I don’t hear the voices” ) becom es complicity. To affirm the
patient in discourse is to join the clinical representation of pathology; it is
to hallucinate with the patient. To deny the p atien t’s experience is to
concede delirium , to adm it to confusion w here there is none on the
68 COMMUNICOLOGY
doctor’s part. The doctor does understand th at the patient hears voices
that he does not hear, but to say so is to participate in the objective
illusion of the patient (M erleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 289, 337; Lederm ann
1970). As N atanson concisely notes:
The pathology of com m unication itself involves a different dim ension of

hum an reality. W hat is at issue here is the m eaning of th ere being a world in
which ego and alter ego share an experiential order in virtue of normalcy
and lose that com m unality in m ental m orbidity. T he psychotic’s world can
be understood but not shared [1969, p. 103].
W hat protects the doctor, the sane person, is the structure o f space,
according to M erleau-Ponty. This is a complex answer within the horizon
of communication science. H ow ever, we can achieve a certain am ount of
clarity and understanding by initially differentiating betw een the concepts
“structure” and “ space.” In this philosophic pair, I should like to begin
with “ structure” because it seems to be fundam ental to M erleau-Ponty’s
discussion in a way in which “ space” is not. Indeed, I concur with
Kockelmans, who argues:
Nevertheless, I think one should recognize that the problem of space as

such cannot be called one of prim ordial im portance for M erleau-Ponty.
T he chief concern of his works lies in the query about the very Being of man
and about the fundam ental significance of our body-subject; he explains
and justifies his views on these issues by m eans of reflections utilizing
hum an behavior and perception as prim ary them es. In these reflections the
space problem is recurrent, but only as a touchstone for the general theses
he wants to defend [1970, p. 280].
First, then, the problem of “ structure.” For M erleau-Ponty there are

two senses in which we can explore the idea of structure relevant to our
analysis. O ne is the semiotic structure diacritically m anifest in the dia-
chronic and synchronic m ovem ents of speaking, or m ore generally as the
behavioral reversibility of expression and perception (see chap. 3,
above). The other is the herm eneutic structure in the sense of good
ambiguity— that is, the multiplicity of perception that is them atic in
explicit expression, in com m unication.
In speaking of the sane person’s protection against delirium or halluci-
nation, M erleau-Ponty says of the structure of space: “ O bjects rem ain
before him, keeping their distance . . . touching him only with respect.”
This is pure diachronic description as phenom enological reflection. O b-
ject confronts object in linear progression. Each object seeks its value by
contiguity with its predecessor and its successor. The patient speaks:
“ C an’t you hear my voices?” The doctor answers by rem aining silent.
The patient responds: “ I am the only one who hears them th e n .” The
doctor com m unicates by continued silence. D octor and patient have

touched each other with respect. T he structure of protection for the
doctor is manifest. The synchronic m om ent of the doctor’s sanity con-
tinues, he does not become an active participant in the pathological
discourse, which is the p atien t’s version of “ sanity.” The doctor’s behav-
ior is not a discourse in-sanity but with-sanity; the doctor (in M erleau-
Ponty’s phrase) becomes the “ indirect voice of silence.”
But what is the synchronic m om ent of the patient in com m unication?
It is delirium and hallucination: “ a shrinking in the space directly ex-
perienced”— th at is, “ C an’t you hear my voices?” The voices possess
me and I possess them , surely in hearing me you can hear them — this is
the patient’s claim for the immediacy of space (N atanson 1965). The
patient’s synchronic m om ent is em bodied, “ a rooting of things in her
body” and “the overwhelming proximity of the object, the oneness of
man and the w orld.” The illusion of objectivity retains its structural
integrity for the patient. The p atien t’s pathology is diacritically m arked
by associations, am bivalence, autism , and altered affect, which are the
repressions of everyday perception and objective thought. The very
illusion of the pathological behavior as objective com m unication for the
patient is an inauthentic structure of diachronic and synchronic being.
The patient lives a discourse of subjectivity w ithout body. The very
pathology of the patient is, in M erleau-Ponty’s sense, the existential
creation of intersubjectivity in subjectivity by abandoning em bodim ent
before other persons.
This process stands in direct com parison to belief and participation in
communication as myth. The myth is structurally parallel to the objectiv-
ist illusion in pathology in that myth is the creation of intersubjectivity in
subjectivity by the invention of em bodim ent before other persons and
things,— that is, anthropom orphism . Levin (1979, p. 7) queries w hether
or not such a mythic experience “ is not a sym ptom of pathology so much
as it is a sudden perceptual opening, initiating a very wholesom e, but also
a very scary process of experiential deepening and expansion?” The
answer is to be found in the second sense of structure that I want to
discuss. This is to say, I would like to call attention to the multiplicity of
perception that becomes phenom enologically them atic in expression, or
what M erleau-Ponty (see chap. 1, above; Silverman 1979b) calls the
herm eneutic of “ good am biguity.”
Myth has its existence in com m unicative discourse or similar semiotic
systems (B arthes 1972; see chap. 17, below). In a cryptic sense, we can
view the generation of myths as pathology in reverse. In pathology, the
person uses discourse and behavior to abandon em bodim ent, to create
bad ambiguity, and to confine intersubjectivity in spatial subjectivity
(Smith 1977). The reverse condition in mythology is the use of discourse
and action (ritual) to invent em bodim ent (anthropom orphic beliefs), to
72 COMMUNICOLOGY
(structure) th at is a technical condition of “ inform ation.” T hat is, both

are a situation in which behavior results in a context that creates an
acceptable range of choices (see chap. 14, below).
In either the pathological or m ythological context, the person is (as
Sartre argues) condem ned to choose. As M erleau-Ponty describes the
problem atic, “ It is essential to space that it continually is already consti-
tuted. O ne can therefore never understand it if one withdraws to a
perception w ithout a w orld.” Thus, for “ our prim ordial encounter with
things, being is identical with being-situated” (Kockelm ans 1970, p. 288).
W hat is pathological or mythological here is the choice to locate the
person by reference to the world.
In other words, the objectivist illusion of the world constituted in
pathology and m ythology is the positing of a spatializing space in an
already constituted world, in a spatialized space. First, the positing is
especially clear as a positivist phenom enalism in the discourse of every-
day perception, which represses conscious experience. The sentences of
the schizophrenic and the m ythical story are always grammatically correct
and recognizable as oral com petence. W hat signals m isadventure is the
discursive perform ance, the gesture m ade. The perform ance is a “ prim or-
dial encounter with things” and not the person’s being-in-the-world. As
Ellul (1975, p. 97) descriptively puts it, “ m yth is an anonym ous discourse.
No one is talking to anyone.” Second, but in parallel fashion, the
deceptive positing is clear in the appeal to “ objective thought” that
represses conscious experience. T hat is:
O bjective, geom etrical space appears before us only w hen we them atize
perceptual or lived space, w ithout questioning its origin. O bjective,
geom etrical space cannot be divorced from o rientated or lived space,
because it is m erely an explication of them from a certain point of view
[Kockelmans 1970, p. 288].
We are now in a position to suggest what M erleau-Ponty offers as an
account of lived-space. In turn, this explication will perm it a com parison
with the interpretation that Levin and K oestenbaum offer. M erleau-
Ponty says:
How, then, can I who perceive, and w ho, ipso facto, assert myself as
universal subject, perceive another who imm ediately deprives me of this
universality? T he central phenom enon, at the root of both my subjectivity
and my transcendence tow ards others, consists in my being given to myself.
I am given, that is, I find myself already situated and involved in a physical
and social world — I am given to myself, which m eans th a t this situation is
never hidden from m e, it is never round about me as an alien necessity, and
I am never in effect enclosed in it like an object in a box. My freedom , the
fundam ental pow er which I enjoy of being the subject of all my experi-
ences, is not distinct from my insertion in the w orld [1962, p. 360; cf.
Seam on 1979; D illon 1978],
Several issues are resolved by M erleau-Ponty’s explanation. First, he

makes us sensitive to the operation of the phenom enological reduction of
freedom , which carries with it an explication of lived spatializing. Again,
a discourse example is helpful in illustrating the intentionality M erleau-
Ponty describes. H ere I refer to the technical concept of “ com m unica-
tio n .” Com m unication is a discourse practice in which my speaking
(parole parlante) is a choice that establishes a context. Recall that this
form ulation is the reverse of “inform ation” in which context sets up a
choice range. Com m unication, as a choice that grounds a context, is the
horizon of freedom confirming that “ I am given to myself” (Lanigan
1977, pp. 86ff.). It is only on this infrastructure of practice that freedom
can manifest the inform ational, albeit functional, distinction of spatial-
ized space, which is the physical world represented in langue and that of
the social lived-world of spatializing space re-presented in parole (Jam e-
son 1972).
A nd further, it is this infrastructure that is presupposed in the dysfunc-
tions of pathology and m ythology. In the dysfunctions I am surely in a
situation hidden from me that is around me as an alien necessity and in
effect encloses me as an object in a box. W hen I am no longer given to
myself, I am no longer condem ned to m eaning. In-sanity becom es the
transform ation of non-sense; and in the structuralist fallacy, langue
becomes the space of parole.
A lthough Levin (1979, p. 21) clearly does not advocate pathological
behavior as a function of therapeutic philosophy, he does so for m ythol-
ogy. In fact, on the issue of sanity as a norm related to repression he
suggests to us th at “ the functioning of the m yth narratives and images
directly corresponds to a dim ension of our experienced em bodim ent
which we have ‘repressed,’ and which therefore continues to haunt us
with its crying need for release.” Y et as M erleau-Ponty (1962, p. 294)
warns, “ If myths, dream s, and illusion are to be possible, the apparent
and the real m ust rem ain am biguous in the subject as in the ob ject.” If
myth is therapeutic, it rem ains so at the expense of philosophic conscious-
ness, which does not explore it and does not lend positive value to the
ambiguity as a herm eneutic (G eertz 1973, pp. 88ff., 1983, p. 77; M orris-
ton 1979). “ T hat is to say that subjectivity is a flux, that it does not
become static and does not know itself” (M erleau-Ponty 1962, p. 292).
The same point applies to K oestenbaum ’s use of philosophic conscious-
ness as therapeutic, as the phenom onalist practice of discourse as
intervention.3
In short, Levin’s account of sanity and m yth, and K oestenbaum ’s
3. I am indebted to Professor Jnanabrata B hattacharyya, director of the graduate

program in the D epartm ent of C om m unity D evelopm ent at Southern Illinois U niversity, for
my understanding of intervention as a discursive practice of cultural and political dom ina-
tion.
74 COMMUNICOLOGY
approach to therapeutic practice, suggest to me that pathology is an

objective illusion of the soul that should not be em ulated. Y et, mythology
for Levin and philosophy for K oestenbaum are an objective illusion of
the heart that should be cherished in a vigorous therapeutic philosophy. I
hope it is apparent that I disagree with these proposals. I disagree on two
counts, which I stress in my analysis. First, when philosophy becomes
therapeutic com m unication, it falls into a psychologism in the Cartesian
tradition. The structure and content of conscious experience becom e a
bad ambiguity that confines freedom and spatiality; choice and context
become a binary equivocation instead of a phenom enological them atic
grounded in the analogue of discourse. Second, when philosophy be-
comes therapeutic, it m ust rely on an objectivist illusion rather than on
lived conscious experience. In pathology the objectivist illusion is con-
tained in expression, and in mythology the illusion is enveloped in
perception. H ence, pathology and m ythology becom e functional because
of their structural affinity with repression in the natural attitude.
Yet we cannot, to my m ind, accept the proposition that the objectivist
illusion in therapeutic philosophy can be a com m unication science appli-
cation of philosophic consciousness. As Schrag (1980, p. 120) insightfully
argues, “ The m eaning of m yth is not the achievem ent of a representation
m ediated by an objectifying concept, but rather the logos incarnated in
the experience of presence as the fulfilled m om ent of vision and action.”
Thus with M erleau-Ponty (1963a, p. 52), I prefer to conclude that in
a rigorous phenom enology of com m unication “ philosophy is not an
illusion.”
Chapter Six
Phenomenological Reflections on
Habermas’ Critical Theory o f
Communication
The years 1967 to 1969 are now a m em ory. Y et, m em ories shape desires
as com m itm ent. Persons commit them selves, as the French say, to
Γhistoire. Persons are the story of the m om ent th at vehem ently m arks out
a value choice that should be lived through in society. This social living
through, this history, becomes for m ost a desire, a reminiscence. F or a
few, it is a m em ory. The m em ory is th at consciousness and reflective
capability by which we come to m ake personal choices of social conse-
quence.
O ur m em ory is critical of our actions: each person values society by
participating in it. Indeed, this is the nature of governm ent and the
function of politics. B ut when action fades into habit, m em ory becomes
an uncritical desire to be forgotten in the rem iniscent familiarity of
institutions or lost in fear. The years 1793 and 1794 are such a rem inis-
cence. Only the student of political history has a m em ory that instantly
pieces together the puzzle that was the infam ous “ Reign of T erro r” by
the Com m ittee of Public Safety in the Paris Com m une.
The political years 1967 to 1969 are a guaranteed m em ory, never to be
lost to reminiscence. R arely has such a brief m om ent of history been
recorded so m eticulously and analyzed so critically for its story. Two
extraordinary examples are the critical case study analyses of the O ctober
27, 1968, dem onstration in L ondon, E ngland, against the V ietnam war
(H alloran, Elliot, & M urdock 1970), and that of the “ M ay M ovem ent”
by French students in Paris from N ovem ber 1967 to June 1968 (Schnapp
& V idal-N aquet 1971).
75
76 COMMUNICOLOGY
The years 1967 to 1969 exist as a paradigm case in the evolution of a

critical theory of political com m unication. They signal not a new reign of
terror displaying the collision of theory and praxis, but a renaissance of
hum ane discourse, a Selbstbestsinnung or critical self-awareness of the
political meaning attached to social science research— the discovery of
ideology as a level of m eaning in research p er se (Frankfurt Institute
1972). These years announce a rebirth of concern by E uropean and Latin
Am erican scholars with the power of discourse in all m odes of hum an life
and the social responsibilities th at attach to the exercise of that power. As
Schnapp and Vidal-N aquet (1971, pp. 2, 49) suggest, La C ommune
Etudiante’s failed university strike dem and for a return to the m ethod of
oral exam ination and the abolition of w ritten exam inations illustrates the
critical theory perspective. T hat is, “ the dream of a society that would be
pure speech characterized the m ovem ent, but it was just that: a dream ,
since in reality ‘pure speech’ can only lead to ‘pure action,’ another dream
of the m ovem ent.” Thus Max H orkheim er, founder of the Frankfurt
Institute for Social R esearch, rem inds us:
M en of good will w ant to draw conclusions for political action from the
critical theory. Y et there is no fixed m ethod for doing this; the only
universal prescription is that one m ust have insight into o n e’s own responsi-
bility. Thoughtless and dogmatic application of the critical theory to prac-
tice in changed historical circumstances can only accelerate the very process
which the theory aim ed at denouncing. All those seriously involved in the
critical theory, including A dorno, who developed it with me, are in agree-
m ent on this point [1972, p. v].
M emories shape com m itm ent, but we must m ake our com m itm ents
critically.
W H A T IS C R IT IC A L T H E O R Y ?4
Following upon H orkheim er’s rem ark about m ethod and application, it is
now apparent why it is necessary to begin this essay with an exercise in
critical thought about a m em orable event in political com m unication, the
1967-1969 epoch. Critical theory variously evokes denotations and con-
notations of a long tradition in G erm an philosophy and sociology essen-
tially located in a M arxist or neo-M arxist orietation, and historically
referenced by the work of the F rankfurt Institute for Social R esearch
4. Portions of the analysis presented in this chapter are based on “ Critical T heory as a
Philosophy of C om m unication,” a paper presented on M ay 30, 1977, at the International
Congress on C om m unication Science sponsored by the International C om m unication
A ssociation, in W est Berlin, G erm any. It contains a short elaboration on a section from
chap. 2, above, giving contextual clarity to the argum ent in the present chapter.
HABERMAS’ CRITICAL THEORY 77
(H orkheim er 1972; A dorno et al. 1976; Jay 1973; Schroyer 1975). A t the
m ore recent end of this G erm an tradition, the work by Jürgen H aberm as
(1970b; 1971a, b; 1973; 1975; 1979b), director of the Max-Planck-
Institute at Starnberg, specifically focuses critical theory on the problem
of com m unication, although this is not an exclusive direction in G erm an
social science (M erton & G aston 1977). The result, over the long term , is
a growing diversity of application (R ogers 1981). Originally a calculated
attack on philosophic and scientific positivism, critical theory now has
become a questioning of, and qualitative approach to, the study of
communication in a world dom inated by quantitative m ethodologies and
the social perspective of an advanced industrial society m odeled on the
U nited States.
This new “ second force” in critical theory shares the problem atic
determ ined by the older G erm an “ first force” school of thought whose
advocates have been a m ajority in G erm any and a m inority in the U nited
States. But this second force, which is often non-M arxist, owes its
m otivation to a num ber of grass-roots efforts— a political legacy of the
1967-1969 period— to move the academ y into the com m unity. I shall
m ention only the m ost im portant of these efforts, leaving the m ajority to
citation.
In E urope, the second force effort began at a plenary session of the
1969 conference of the E uropean A ssociation of E xperim ental Psychol-
ogy held in Belgium at the University of Louvain:
O n the one hand, there was genuine respect for much th at has been
achieved through the well-tried m ethods of clear-cut em pirical hypotheses
and their experim ental testing. O n the other hand, many felt that an
unquestioned acceptance of the assum ptions— social, scientific, and
philosophical— underlying much of this research was a heavy price to pay
for achieving a modicum of “ scientific respectability” and even for making
some gains in knowledge. It is possible that the “ student revolution”— very
much in evidence in the spring of 1969— had som ething to do with these
conflicts [Israel & Tajfel 1972, p. 2],
The culm ination of these and subsequent discussions was the publica-
tion of a now classic book edited by Joachim Isreal and H enri Tajfel, The
Context o f Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment.
R epresentative of a similar m ood in L atin A m erica was the publication
of “ Ideology and Social Sciences: A Com m unicational A pproach” by
Elíseo V erón (1971), then director of the R esearch Program on Social
Com munication at the Torcuato Di Telia Institute, C enter for Social
Research in Buenos A ires, A rgentina. In this im portant article, V erón
speaks in the voice of second force critical theory: “ From the point of
view of com m unication theory, ideology is a level of m eaning, and this
implies that it is a structural condition of production of messages within a
78 COMMUNICOLOGY
hum an language system, including scientific com m unication” (p. 74).

This critical judgm ent derives from the fact that “in science, the ideologi-
cal level of m eaning stems from all those options in the construction of
scientific language that are not decidable in term s of the form al rules of
scientific procedure. This field, as everyone knows, is very wide in the
social sciences today” (p. 70).
A t nearly the same time in G reat B ritain, a profoundly personal, yet
parallel statem ent was issued by Trevor Patem en (1976) with the private
(he refused complicity with commercial publishing houses) publication of
Language, Truth, and Politics: Towards a Radical Theory fo r C om m uni-
cation:
O f course, since I was a P h.D . student in Philosophy, I was m eant to get on

with a conceptual rather than a substantive analysis, and the impossibility
or em ptiness of doing such a thing is one reason why this book exists and
not a thesis shelved in the Library of the U niversity of London. In any case,
this book refocuses the problem of consciousness in a com m unicational
perspective [p. 26],
Last, I should note that the once clear line existing betw een what I have
called the first force, G erm an, and the second force strain in critical
theory is now becoming blurred. If I can characterize the overall m ove-
m ent or developm ent of critical theory, it is to say that first force critical
theory began with the M arxist problem atic (that is, a theoretically defined
problem ) of social interaction and has developed a m ovem ent tow ard the
problem of language (Apel 1967; 1972a, b; 1980; H aberm as 1971b; 1976;
M cCarthy 1978; D allm ayr & M cCarthy 1977). By contrast, second force
critical theory began later in various countries besides G erm any and often
with a non-M arxist concern for the problem of language— in particular,
the political nature of speech or language use— and m oved to the proble-
matics of society, especially those directly associated with the definition
of situation within a speech com m unity (Giglioli 1972; Sandywell et al.
1975; Smart 1976; Poster 1979; Fiske & H artley 1978; Bisseret 1979;
Blake 1979; C otteret 1979; Grossberg 1978; H arm s 1980; Jacobson 1980;
Kress & Hodge 1979; Lem ert 1979).
A n especially good illustration of this second force orientation and of
the empirical, qualitative m ethod used by critical theorists is M ueller’s
study of the political sociology of language (1973; see Tsuda 1985). H e
begins his dialectic analysis with the data specifying the rewriting of
standard G erm an dictionaries and encyclopedias by the Nazis and subse-
quent modifications by the E ast G erm ans. This paradigm case is then
used as a standard by which to generalize criteria inductively for com par-
ative (dialectical) analysis with other data, such as linguistic stratification
in social classes, and subsequent mass m edia appeals designed for m ain-
HABERM AS’ CRITICAL THEORY 79
taining these classes. M ueller’s analysis is particularly useful for A m eri-

can political com m unication scholars, for he offers a very readable
account of empirical research ranging over G erm an and A m erican mass
m edia, voters, and political authority from a critical theory perspective.
A t the risk of oversimplification, let me suggest that the empirical
qualitative approach of critical theory, especially in its second force
context, consists in the following process: (1) A paradigm case of em piri-
cal data is exam ined because it displays certain overt norm ative features.
(2) A set of inductive generalizations is m ade from the paradigm case
(that is, a theoretical exem plar is constructed). (3) The exem plar is used
to locate and specify new data (often linguistic), which are, at least by first
perception, value-free or “ objective.” (4) The ideological value inherent
in the “ objective” data is discovered and its actual value com m itm ent
exposed because of the exemplar.
W here the critical theory is inform ed by a M arxist perspective, we need
to add a fifth step, which consists in (5) a dem and for ideological
correction of the “objective” situation by restoring decision-making
power and control to the people whose actions constitute that situation.
Such a dem and usually rests on an analysis showing that the apparent
“objective” situation exists as an institutional force that systematically
frustrates an individual’s ability to act otherw ise. T he extent to which the
M arxist perspective is required by second force critical theorists has
prom pted in part the republication and translation of classic articles by
first force authors (A dorno et al. 1976; H orkheim er 1972; Frankfurt
Institute 1972) and new com m entaries by their adherents and critics (R .J.
B ernstein 1978; O ’Neill 1976; Bologh 1979; Jung 1979).
In order to explicate the key issues with respect to the developm ent of a
critical theory perspective on political com m unication, I propose to
divide the rem ainder of this chapter into three parts. The first section is a
brief discussion of the H IST O M A T exem plar of W ulf D. H und and H orst
Holzer, which is a characteristic illustration of second force critical theory
em ergent in contem porary G erm any. The second section discusses the
communication m odel offered by Jürgen H aberm as, largely because this
model is the best effort by a first force critical theorist and typifies the
Frankfurt School theoretical grounding. This theoretical position is to be
distinguished from the technical, philosophical position articulated by
K arl-O tto A pel (1980), which I shall note at relevant points of analysis.
And third, I offer a critique of H aberm as’s m odel of universal pragmatics
as a philosophy of political com m unication.
80 COMMUNICOLOGY
ELEM EN TS O F A N E O -M A R X IA N T H E O R Y O F
C O M M U N IC A T IO N 5
In recent years the work of G erm an sociologists W ulf D. H und (1980)

and H orst H olzer (1973) began to attract increased international atten -
tion alongside the work by H aberm as. H und and H olzer are principally
known for their writings on m edia theory and their orientation on
historical-dialectical m aterialism (H ISTO M A T). Their work is strongly
rooted within the philosophical tradition of G erm an social thought. It
brings together the insights of critical theory and contem porary M arxist
philosophy and can be called neo-Marxian in orientation.
This approach proceeds from the basic societal contradictions to be
found in mass m edia production, distribution, and consum ption. For
example, it underscores, m ore em phatically than does critical theory, the
antagonism of interests existing betw een capital and labor in m edia
production. A nd it points to the com m odity character of m edia products
as an instrum ent of m anipulation by mass com m unications. In addition,
this approach assigns a fundam ental role to the historical conditions of
developm ent and traces the em ergence of mass com m unications back to
the needs of the capitalistic m odel of production (Bisky 1976).
In this view, the antagonism betw een capital and labor m anifests itself
in the subjugation and dependence of m edia producers to m edia capi-
tal—that is, in the placem ent of the producers at the bureaucratic disposal
of owners. The conditions of capitalist m edia production based on profit
maximization considerations are seen as leading to increased concentra-
tion and m onopolization. Thus, the com m odity character of the m edia
determ ines the selection of the content in accordance with the criteria of
saleability and attractiveness to ensure profit m aximization.
The indictm ent of manipulation is directed against those m edia p ro -
ducts, such as sensationalist press reportage, that divert the attention of
the mass audience from their objective interest and basic needs, from
“ the basic orientations rooted in specific fundam ental conditions of the
possible reproduction and self-constitution of the hum an species, nam ely
work and interaction” (H aberm as 1971a, p. 196). The accusation in
flagrante delicto also encompasses the consum ption of pure entertainm ent
m aterial for regenerative and recuperative purposes, as well as advertis-
ing that creates artificial needs and thereby produces delusions of a
harm onious and hom ogeneous society.
5. This section was w ritten originally by D r. R udolf L. Strobl independently of any

knowledge of the o ther sections. W ith S trobl’s perm ission, I have adapted and included this
section to provide a concrete indication of a current m odel not generally know n to
researchers who lack fluency in G erm an. F or a m ore detailed discussion o f this historical-
dialectical m aterialist analysis of com m unication, see Strobl (1980), C ow ard & Ellis (1977),
Micunovic (1979), and G rossberg (1979).
To recapitulate, this m edia theory can be described as an historically

and dialectically determ ined analysis of mass com m unication, specifically
in term s of the antagonism betw een capital and labor in m edia produc-
tion. From this antagonism results the com m odity character of m edia
production and distribution, which is closely related to m anipulation
through mass com m unication consum ption. Such an analysis calls for a
proletarian-em ancipatory alternate publicality (a neologism m eaning the
sphere where com m unications take place) utilizing the achievem ents of
the bourgeois m edia under transform ed structures of control.
Such a m edia theory aims essentially at the democratic transform ation
of prevailing conditions in the entire scope of mass com m unications.
W hereas first force critical theory, which also has the same aims, tends to
offer nothing m ore than abstract postulates and generalizations, neo-
M arxian m edia theoreticians specify the aims of such a new m edia theory.
In addition, they are proposing a long-term strategy for the dem ocratiza-
tion o f the mass media, which has the following political goals:
1. changing the content of the mass m edia so th at m aterialism and

com m unication are not distorted as consum erism and persuasion (dis-
cussed below in the critique of H ab erm as), which has perm eated deeply
into the consciousness of em ployees and wage earners;
2. dismantling of the capitalist system and thereby the existing struc-
tures of mass com m unication and the subsequent creation of a political,
proletarian publicality (Negt & Kluge 1972);
3. w orker participation in all areas of mass m edia production (on the
editorial, technical, and adm inistrative levels); liberation of the workers
in m edia production from subjugation and dependence on the providers
of capital;
4. transferring m edia control from private owners to producers, expro-
priation of privately run m edia business, decentralization and dem ono-
polization of m edia firms and their transform ation into socialized
institutions open to participation on the entire allocative and operational
spectrum;
5. the form ation of advertising and publicity cooperatives to distribute
advertisem ents and publicity orders to all affiliated m edia on an equal
basis and thereby to prevent concentration of com m unication powers;
and
6. the political activization of the masses for com m unicative em ancipa-
tion and the developm ent of com m unicative com petence— th at is, action
oriented tow ard reaching understanding (H aberm as 1971a)— in the spon-
taneous creation of m edia program s through public articulation of objec-
tive societal needs and interests.
H und and H olzer have been sharply critical of the traditional bourgeois
mass com m unication research and its theories. According to them , the
82 COMMUNICOLOGY
bourgeois com m unication research accepts mass m edia as tools of dom i-

nation and the state of speechlessness in societal com m unication as
given— that is, the lack of individual participation illustrated, for exam -
ple, by the issue of “ local access” in cable television licensing. They refer
to it as adm inistrative, directed, and bureaucratically enacted research:
its findings and conclusions serve only those who are already dom inating
the existing order for the consciousness industry. F urtherm ore, it p re-
sumes the dualism of subject and object, and the divergence of what is
from what ought to be. Bourgeois m edia theory is thus seen as a theory of
domination.
Critical and neo-M arxian m edia theoreticians, on the other hand, focus
on the mass m edia as instrum ents of liberation (Negt 1978; Negt & Kluge
1972). They see them as a m eans through which the objective and
authentic interests of the masses can be articulated. Their com m unication
research reflecting this perception centers on the social state of the m edia,
culture, and the educational system in the context of conflicts betw een
social strata, rather than within the m edia. These theoreticians reject the
distinction betw een w hat is and what ought to be. Science is seen not as
something separate from daily experience, but as a process that should
contribute in form and substance to the proletarian context of life, which
itself organizes the experiences of the masses in a specific way. The
objective of critical and neo-M arxian com m unication research therefore
is not the distribution of mass com m unications through ,mass m edia, but
an absolute societal com munication itself through the exchange of infor-
mation about the objective interests and needs of the masses.
As a final point of em phasis, H und and H olzer’s philosophical orienta-
tion and thought based on historical-dialectical materialism (HISTO -
M AT) pertains to social research generally and to com m unication
research specifically at the following three levels (H ahn 1968):
1. H ISTO M A T contains, as a dialectic and m aterialistic philosophical
theory of society, the basic solution of epistemological problem s that we
find in sociological research. These problem s stem from certain peculiari-
ties of this research and from social reality. This applies especially to the
m aterialistic determ ination of the subject-object relationship.
2. H ISTO M A T represents the basic solution of general theoretical
questions that sociological research centers on and with which sociologi-
cal research is connected through a num ber of special theoretical asser-
tions. H ISTO M A T offers the basic theoretical fram ew ork, term inology,
and categories that also m ake possible the scientific analysis of single
problem s in an empirical way.
3. These two relationships are at the same tim e essential parts of the
methodological function of H ISTO M A T in relation to sociological re-
search in term s of the use of certain logical procedures.
H aberm as provides a theoretical discussion of these issues in part 2 of

his Knowledge and H um an Interests (1971a). M icunovic (1979) provides a
specific illustration of them in his analysis, “ B ureaucracy and Public
Com m unication. ’’
H A B E R M A S ’S M O D E L O F U N IV E R SA L PR A G M A T IC S
In the latest essay describing universal pragm atics (H aberm as 1979b),

which extends the discussion of an earlier working position (H aberm as
1971c [cf. 1984, Lxxxix]; 1976), H aberm as explains that the purpose of
such a pragmatics is “ to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of
possible understanding ( Verständigung) .” As he further notes, such an
analysis concerns the general presuppositions of com m unicative action,
which is fundam ental to working out the problem of understanding. W hat
makes the m odel of universal pragm atics one of political com m unication
is highlighted in his forthright declaration:
Thus I start from the assum ption (w ithout undertaking to dem onstrate it
here) that other forms of social action— for exam ple, conflict, com petition,
strategic action in general— are derivatives of action oriented to reaching
understanding ( verständigungsorientiert) [1979b, p. 1],
The axiological context for action H aberm as outlines is thus inclusive

of all the norm al subtopics of axiology: politics, ethics, and m orality
(H aberm as 1979a). In particular, we might characterize the universal
pragmatics m odel as one of com m unicative ethics in which the standard
constructs of com m unication theory are displayed: intention, punctua-
tion, convention, and legitim ation. It is a viewpoint H aberm as (1979b,
p. 2) confirms by stating: “ I shall develop the thesis that anyone acting
communicatively must, in perform ing any speech action, raise universal
validity claims and suppose that they can be vindicated (or redeem ed:
eingelöst).'”
In t e n t io n
H aberm as (1970a) locates intention, the object of consciousness experi-

ence, within the herm eneutic theory of psychoanalysis. Explicitly he
argues th at psychoanalytic theory gives the researcher (1) a preconcep-
tion of the structure of nondistorted ordinary com m unication; (2) an
attribution of the systematic distortion of com m unication to the confusion
of two developm ental levels of symbols organization, the prelinguistic
and linguistic; and (3) a theory of deviant socialization to explain the
origin of deform ation. The m odel of logic Freud provided in his analysis
of thought, discourse, and behavior is widely recognized by E uropean
84 COMMUNICOLOGY
scholars but, A nglo-A m erican researchers tend to discount F reud’s work

as empirically represented in its questionable contem porary use as a
successful therapeutic procedure. In term s of H aberm as’s work in parti-
cular and E uropean scholarship in general, it is well to recall that the
Freudian heritage is the logic m odel (an exem plar) that is utilized to focus
on new problem s, issues, or data. The best detailed discussion of F reud in
this context is that of W ilden (1980), w herein the Freudian semiotic
model of condensation and displacem ent is specifically related to the
theory constructs that constitute inform ation theory and com m unication
theory (cybernetics) and are exemplified in the technology of digital and
analogue com puters.
On this psychoanalytic base, H aberm as builds a parallel set of th eo re t-
ical propositions that indicate the m eaning param eters in normal com m u-
nication. First, in the case of nondeform ed language games, there is a
congruency of all three levels of com m unication as presented in the
psychoanalytic m odel above. Second, norm al com m unication conforms
to intersubjectively recognized rules; it is public in this sense. Third,
speakers are aware of the categorical difference betw een subject and
object in norm al speech. F ourth, norm al com m unication provides a
contextual situation in which an intersubjectivity of m utual understand-
ing, which guarantees ego-identity, develops and is m aintained in the
relationship betw een individuals who acknowledge one another. Fifth:
N orm al speech is distinguished by the fact th at the sense of substance and

causality, of space and tim e, is differentiated according to w hether these
categories are applied to the objects within a world or to the linguistically
constituted world itself, which allows for the m utuality of speaking subjects
[1970a, p. 212],
Pu n c t u a t io n
The boundary limitation for the analysis of norm al com m unication results
from two postulates H aberm as draws from his set of five propositions. He
argues that psychoanalysis in the study of com m unication relies on a
genetic connection beyond successive phases of hum an symbol organiza-
tion. First, “ the archaic sym bol-organization, which resists the transfor-
mation of its contents into grammatically regulated com m unication, can
only be disclosed on the basis of the data of speech pathology and by
means of the analysis of dream m aterial” (1970a, p. 212). Second, the
symbol organization the psychoanalyst utilizes is a theoretical construct in
that it genetically precedes language. In brief, H aberm as goes on to
suggest that such a theoretical construct presum es a theory of com m uni-
cative com petence m odeled on C hom sky’s m odel of linguistic com -
petence/perform ance .
H aberm as’s theory of communicative com petence is a com bination of
the problem as defined by psychoanalysis and the m ethod of ordinary

language analysis suggested by the conceptual analysts: A ustin (1962),
Grice (1967), and Searle (1967; 1969). In particular, H aberm as (1979b)
adopts Searle’s general form ulation of the speech act theory and applies it
in the social context of com m unication (Sullivan 1978). T hat is, an
interpersonal m odel of com m unication at the perform ance level is gener-
alized to a m odel of social discourse (as a legitim ation process) at the
com petence level. In this generalization of social levels from the indivi-
dual to the mass, H aberm as m aintains the ideal speech situation as a
construct— that is, Searle’s m odel, w here the interpersonal com m unica-
tion is always logical, literal, and contextually unam biguous. Let me
simply indicate that there are serious problem s in m aintaining such an
ideal in the analysis of em pirical social research (W ellm er 1976).
H aberm as offers the following set of theoretical propositions, which
correspond at the social level to those that Searle (1967; 1969) presents
for the interpersonal speech act. (1) The personal pronouns and their
derivatives form a reference system betw een potential speakers. The
identity of m eanings, the foundation of all com m unication, is based on
intersubjectively valid rules— at least two speakers understand the m ean-
ing of a symbol on the basis of reciprocal recognition. (2) The deictic
expressions of space and tim e, as well as articles and dem onstrative
pronouns, form the reference system of possible denotations. (3) Form s
of address (vocative), forms of social contact (greeting), of speech intro-
duction and speech conclusion, indirect discourse, questions and answers,
are perform atory in that they are directed at the act of speaking as such.
(4) The perform atory speech acts form a system that finally enables us to
m ark the basic differentiations fundam ental for any speech situation.
Thus system relationships are form ed betw een (a) being and appearance;
(b) being and essence; and (c) fact and value— that is, w hat is and w hat
ought to be.
Co n v e n t io n
The sum m ary result th at H aberm as’s m odel of com m unication achieves is
a specification of the social levels of com m unication and the parallel
validity claim that can be based on speech acts as rule-governed behavior
with social im port. By examining the form ation and transform ation of
speech acts, H aberm as (1976) arrives at two levels of com m unication.
First is the level o f intersubjectivity, at which the speaker and hearer,
through illocutionary acts, bring about an interpersonal relationship that
allows them to achieve m utual understanding. Second is the “ level of
objects in the world, or states of affair about which they would want to
achieve a consensus in term s of the com m unicative role as laid down in
the level of intersubjectivity” (p. 159).
86 COMMUNICOLOGY
In principle, therefore, every com petent speaker has the responsibility

of choosing among three m odes of social com m unication (H aberm as
1979b, p. 58): (1) com m unication to state a proposition that can be
illustrated in the propositional attitude of a nonparticipating third person
who hears a speech act. (2) C om m unication to stress an interpersonal
relationship as such, as illustrated in the perform ative attitude of a
participant conforming to the expectations of a second person. O r (3)
communication to express an intention as such (that is, speakers present
themselves before others). Each form of com m unication carries a claim
to validity that is situationally recognized for its value (H ooft 1976).
Le g it im a t io n
H aberm as m akes an explicit connection betw een com m unication and

axiology, both in term s of how hum an com m unication leads to ethical
judgm ents about persons and in term s of the social aesthetic (m oral)
values that dom inate personal existence. Ultim ately, his concern is with
the special connection in com m unication by which personal ethics and
social aesthetics form political norm s of existence: social legitim ation.
Fiske and H artley (1978) provide a useful em pirical illustration of H aber-
m as’s view in their analysis of a British Broadcasting C orporation “ News
at T en ” program in which the main story is coverage of British troops in
N orthern Ireland. Their study provides a typical second force critical
analysis in which the intended (by BBC program ers) visual and oral
inform ation messages— a “ social aesthetic” for H aberm as— are structur-
ally semiotic and thereby substantially perceived as norm s of the “ reality”
of the situation, the “ political norm s of existence” for H aberm as. In
short, a political norm is offered as “ inform ation,” thereby distorting the
actual political situation and obviating viewers’ opportunity to judge as
individuals. Instead, m ere viewing of the political norm message m akes it
legitimate inform ation; this is social legitimation.
In careful propositional language, H aberm as (1975) suggests that “ only
communicative ethics guarantees the generality of admissible norm s and
the autonom y of acting subjects solely through the discursive redeem -
ability of the validity claims with which such norm s appear” (p. 89). We
should recall that com m unication is an action that deals with theoretical
facts, values that have a pragm atic effect because they are form ed in
speech acts. In this context, H aberm as advances three basic pragmatic
universals (levels of understanding th at em erge in hum an action), which
are derived from the linguistic universals apparent in all speech com m uni-
cation.
First, “ each specific language offers a reference system which perm its a
sufficiently reliable identification of som ething in the world about which
one would want to m ake propositions.” Second, “ each specific language
HABERMAS' CRITICAL THEORY 87
offers a system of personal pronouns and a system of speech acts with the
aid of which we can bring about interpersonal relationships.” A nd thirdly,
“ each particular language offers a system o f intentional expressions for the
self-presentation of subjectivity which, in spite of the degree of variation
of its expression in particular languages, reflects the system of ego-
delim itations” (p. 161).
For H aberm as, then, social and political legitim ation of personal and
public action, w hether technically instrum ental or com m unicative, result
in the form ation of a com m unication ethic. T hat is, the rational society
that m anifests a universal pragm atics is a transform ation of the com m uni-
cation com m unity (K om m unikationsgem einschaft) of those affected, who
as participants in a practical discourse test the validity claims of norm s
and, to the extent that they accept them with reasons, arrive at the
conviction that in the given circum stance the proposed norm s are “ right”
(p. 105). A parallel argum ent in non-M arxist term s is m ade by Apel
(1967; 1980).
In short, the critical theory m odel begins with an axiological pragm atics
(legitimation) of speech com m unication based on the logical notion of
ideal speech acts (convention). F or H aberm as, as a critical theorist,
speech acts are part of the symbol form ation process (punctuation) that
derives its epistemological stages of developm ent from the metaphysical
approach of Freudian psychoanalysis and its theory of consciousness
(intention). Thus, a theory of a rational society is an ideal generalized
from a theory of norm al com m unication in the rational person (H aber-
mas 1979b, pp. 67-68). The resultant im plications of the critical theory
approach for political analysis and research as they relate to the trad i-
tional A m erican view of em pirical research are explored at length in the
now classic essay by R eid and Y anarella (1974) entitled “Tow ard a
Post-M odern Theory and A m erican Political Science and C ulture: P er-
spectives from Critical M arxism and Phenom enology.”
A C R IT IQ U E O F H A B E R M A S A N D C R IT IC A L T H E O R Y
M a r x a n d P r a c t i c a l C o n s c io u s n e s s
The concept and som etim e slogan of “ dialectical m aterialism ” is, for all
the caution of liberal politics in the W est, intim ately tied to the theory
and practice of hum an com m unication. As W ellm er rem arks:
Only because M arx could rely on a revolutionary tradition, in which the

intentions of achieving the freedom of the individual and personal happi-
ness w ere already m ore or less clearly bound up with the idea of a public
political arena constituted by citizens able to com m unicate with one
another w ithout coercion, and with the idea of public freedom and public
88 COMMUNICOLOGY
happiness, was the young M arx’s critique of H egel able to becom e a

criticism of the ideology of the bourgeois constitutional state of the ad-
vanced W estern type [1971, p. 87].
The very concerns of “ dialectical m aterialism ” and “ com m unication”

are contem porary paradigm s (Hickson & Jandt 1976) of w hat H aberm as
(1970a) calls distorted communication. As M arx suggests, “ the chief
defect of all previous m aterialism (including Feuerbach) is that things
(<Gegenstand) and reality, and the sensible world, are conceived only in
the form of objects (Objekt) o f observation, but not as hum an sense
activity, not as practical activity, not subjectively” (B ottom ore & R ubel
1963, p. 82; cf. Symthe 1977). O r as A pel (1972a, p. 3) asserts, “ in my
opinion, the chief question still is: w hether it does or does not m ake a
difference for the philosophy of science that in the hum an sciences, the
object of science is also the subject of science, nam ely hum an society as a
communication com m unity.” It is no surprise, then, that the technologi-
cal consciousness of postindustrial dem ocracy reifies, as a pragm atic of
argum entation (A pel 1975, p. 247), the concepts of m aterialism and
com m unication, thereby distorting them into consumerism and persua-
sion, respectively.
In the analysis th at follows, I should like to illustrate the sense in which
critical theory functions as a “ m ilitant philosophy” in the defense of
communication as a hum an activity constituting the person as a subject in
society. In addition, I should like to argue that critical theory as exem pli-
fied in the proposal by H aberm as (1970b; 1971c; 1976; 1979b; 1984) for a
“universal pragm atics” is grounded in the phenom enology of com m uni-
cation. H ere I take the phenom enology of com m unication to be the
subjectivity inherent in the existential speech act that m akes conscious-
ness a social product— that is, the constitution of the K om m unikations -
gemeinschaft. Finally, my analysis attem pts to raise the issue of the
creation of values by positing a speech act phenom enology within the
wider context of a universal pragmatics, which is a them e in the current
research of H aberm as (1979b, pp. 66-68; 1984a, b). In the developm ent
of these three them es, I hope to illustrate the appropriateness of M arx’s
contention:
Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness, as

it exists for other m en, and thus as it first really exists for myself as well.
Language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of
intercourse with other m en. W here a relationship exists, it exists for me;
the animal has no “ relations” with anything, has no relations at all. F or the
animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is
therefore from the very beginning a social product and rem ains so long as
men exist at all [Bottom ore & R ubel 1963, pp. 85-86].
In short, I wish to point out that the necessary dialectical m aterialism

that com m unication creates is not consum erism grounded in persuasion.
R ather, com m unication accounts for the dialectic in society by which
individual persons constitute their consciousness of a lived-world (Lebens-
welt) by the practical activity of speaking for them selves and others in the
em ancipatory process of identity, an authentic social existence. In terp er-
sonal com m unication is thereby the legitim ation of society as humanly
lived (Lefebvre 1968, p. 66). As M erleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 130) suggests,
“ Marxism is not a philosophy of the subject, but it is just as far from a
philosophy of the object: it is a philosophy of history (Γhistoire).”
M il it a n t Ph il o s o p h y
“ For the first time since H egel m ilitant philosophy is reflecting not on
subjectivity but on intersubjectivity,” says M erleau-Ponty (1964b, pp.
133-34) of M arx’s insistence on the critique of the “ objects of observa-
tio n ,” which ignore the dialectic betw een the subject and the lived-world.
A t this point, we need to rem ind ourselves th at hum an com m unication is
itself an object of observation— a fundam ental grounding. This is to say
that m etacom m unication is a condition of hum an interaction in which
com m unication is the m ethodology utilized to critique itself with atten d -
ing implications for the description and explication of consciousness as
bounded by society. In m ore fam iliar term s recalling the exam ple of
consumerism and persuasion, I am saying th at a critical analysis of
communication by a hum an com m unicator can lapse into reifying com -
munication as language behavior (an object of consum ption; the m ethod
of positivism) and into reifying the person as cognition (an object of
persuasion; the m ethod of ordinary language philosophy).
Haberm as (1971b) correctly draws attention to the danger of reification
by pointing out the appropriate social distinction betw een purposive-
rational action (variously referred to as “instrum ental” ) and com m unica-
tive action. In this context, purposive-rational action is a condition of
persuasion; that is, the state of affairs in which a preconceived m etacom -
m unication constitutes what com m unication is or can be— hence assigns a
negative value to the em ergence of an individual act in society. This
negative value (consumerism) em erges in m ost cases as the role of the
person in society as prescribed by society (m etacom m unication). By
contrast, communicative action is a condition of em ancipation (from the
dom ination of persuasion), the state of affairs in which com m unication
regulates what m etacom m unication is or can be— thereby assigning a
positive value to the engagem ent of persons in individual acts (parole).
The positive value is the generation of authentic existence (parole par-
lante) within the interpersonal boundaries (langue) of the social group
(H aberm as 1979b, p. 6).
90 COMMUNICOLOGY
A t this point it is helpful to review the technical com parison H aberm as

draws betw een purposive-rational action and com m unicative action, b e-
cause the distinction drawn illustrates what I have previously character-
ized as the “ inductive” m ethod of critical theory generally. In the form er
case;
Instrum ental action is governed by technical rules based on em pirical

knowledge. In every case they imply conditional predictions about observ-
able events, physical or social. These predictions can prove correct or
incorrect. T he conduct of rational choice is governed by strategies based on
analytic knowledge. They imply deductions from preference rules (value
systems) and decision procedures; these propositions are either correctly or
incorrectly deduced [1971b, p p .91— 93],
In contrast, H aberm as continues:
By “interaction,” on the other hand, I understand communicative action,

symbolic interaction. It is governed by binding consensual norms, which
define reciprocal expectations about behavior and which m ust be under-
stood and recognized by at least two acting subjects. Social norm s are
enforced through sanctions. T heir m eaning is objectified in ordinary lan-
guage com m unication. W hile the validity of technical rules and strategies
depends on that of empirically true or analytically correct propositions, the
validity of social norms is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of the
mutual understanding of intentions and secured by the general recognition
of obligations.
I have previously (Lanigan 1979a) m ade the argum ent that com m unica-
tion is by definition a speech act that succumbs to ambiguity when
restricted to the status of an action. T hat is, interpersonal actions at any
semiotic level are burdened by a good or bad ambiguity. O r, as H aberm as
(1979b, pp. 31-34) is forced to concede, the predictions of purposive-
rational action prove correct or incorrect. Likewise, communicative
actions are enforced or not by sanctions. In either case, the action is
legitimized by the presence or absence of conative m eaning (H aberm as
1979b, p. 58). T hat is, a group expectation (social state of affairs)
constitutes a negative value (it is a m etacom m unicative condition) of
ambiguity— any result is held in question. A lthough H aberm as contends
that “learned rules of purposive-rational action supply us with skills,
internalized norms with personality structures,” we do not escape the
metacomm unication context. O ur speech act may be the product of
skill—for example, in the expression of an argum ent— or the act may
reflect our personality structure, as in the perception of another’s argu-
ment. Y et, the action is still M arx’s object of observation in which the
preconditions of com m unication (m etacom m unication) constitute inau-
thentically the human act. In short, ethical rhetoric (authentic discourse)
is dom inated by rhetorical ethics (inauthentic discourse; see chap, 1,

above).
On reflection, then, it is apparent that critical theory is a m ilitant
philosophy in the problem atic shift from an exclusive concern with
subjectivity (bad ambiguity when counterposed to objectivity) to an
inclusive concern with intersubjectivity (good am biguity). Y et, the mili-
tancy of critical theory is subdued by the reification of practical activity as
an object of analysis—which M arx warns against. R esolution of the
problem atic is, how ever, possible in the larger project of the philosophy
of communication.
Ph en o men o l o g y o f Co m m u n ic a t io n
Com m unication as a focus of phenom enological analysis is problem atic

when our analysis is limited to the “ effects” of discourse at the interper-
sonal level. T hat is, the conception of com m unication as an action forces
the analysis into a consideration of the causality of “m eaning” (pur-
posive-rational action) or “ behavior” (comm unicative action). W hat is
w anted, by contrast, is an account of the conditions for the performance
(as production) of com m unication. H ere the focus is on the dialectic of
semantics, syntactics, and pragm atics in the sense of a sem iotic phenom e-
nology. In this context, semantics constitutes capta, or that which is taken
to be the case (hypothesis). Syntactics accounts for data, or th at which is
given as being the case (hypostasis). A nd pragm atics is the realm of acta,
or that which is done as the case (herm eneutic). The com m unication
problem atic advanced by H aberm as is a digital logic that attem pts to
counterpose capta (comm unicative action) against data (purposive-
rational action).
I am, therefore, in disagreem ent with the confirming interpretation
that W ellm er (O ’Neill 1976, pp. 248-49) ascribes to H aberm as: “ As
epistemological categories, consequently, ‘instrum ental’ and ‘com m uni-
cative’ action represent the distinction betw een nomological and instru-
m ental knowledge, on the one hand, and herm eneutic and reflective
knowledge on the other. Correspondingly, they also reflect the m ethodo-
logical distinction betw een the ‘natural sciences’ and ‘Geisteswissenschaf-
ten.’” This confusion is another instance of allowing familiar methodology
to confuse the levels of communication and metacommunication—that is,
the analogue distinction betw een a prereflective and reflective process
(act) on the one hand and a preconscious and conscious act on the other.
Although there is a categorical opposition betw een the prereflective/
reflective and the preconscious/conscious that is binary in process, it is not
a digital function in effect (as H aberm as and W ellm er im pute).
It is thus ironic th at H aberm as proceeds to argue for an “ outer n atu re”
(instrum ental actions) and an “ inner n atu re” (comm unicative actions):
92 COMMUNICOLOGY
Linguistic com m unication has a double structure, for com m unication about
propositional content may take place only with sim ultaneous m etacom m u-
nication about interpersonal relations. This is an expression of the specifi-
cally hum an interlacing of cognitive perform ances and m otives for action
with linguistic intersubjectivity. Language functions as a kind of transfor-
m er; because psychic processes such as sensations, needs, and feelings are
fitted into structures of linguistic intersubjectivity, inner episodes or experi-
ences are transform ed into intentional contents— th at is, cognitions into
statem ents, needs and feelings into norm ative expectations (precepts and
values) [1975, p. 10; cf. 1979b, p. 41].
In this argum ent there is an equivocation generated in the following

sequence of analysis. Nomological knowledge proceeds according to
prescribed rules of reasoning, which in consequence becom e tools (instru-
ments) for legitim ate description (explication). H erm eneutic analysis
describes the instrum ental nature of legitim ation and in consequence
prescribes the reasoning that m ust be found in rules (legitim ate explana-
tion).
The equivocation occurs at two points in the argum ent. O ne is the
concept of rules. Nomological knowledge relies on constitutive rules that
entail regulative rules; explication entails (logically) explanation. In
similar fashion, herm eneutic knowledge relies on the use of regulative
rules that may be asserted as (but are not) constitutive; explanation can
be m ade to explicate. In this sequence of events, we m ake the false
assumption that rules define a state of consciousness (“ inner n atu re” ),
rather than specify the relational process betw een the preconscious and
the conscious. A nd we also incorrectly assume that rules indicate the
em ergence of the reflective from the prereflective as a static condition
(“ outer n atu re” ). In point of fact, then, H aberm as tends to m ake the
instrum ental-com m unicative action distinction rest on “ action” as an
object of observation, where observation is defined by rules conceived as
norm ative conditions—th at is, abstractions reified as perceptions (the
form of the object of observation for M arx).
The second part of the equivocation concerns the concepts of nom o-
logical and herm eneutic judgm ent as they bear on the disjunction b e-
tween the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften. W here the
process of observation is reified into the “ state” of observation, we
extend the ambiguity of rules (abstractions) utilized as conditions (per-
ceived experience). It is widely assum ed that this reification is legitim ate
in the physical sciences, for they are data-based, w hereas the reification is
illegitimate in the hum an sciences, for they are capta-based. As H ab er-
mas puts the issue,
The cultural life context is form ed on a level of intersubjectivity that is

presupposed by the attitude of strictly empirical science but cannot be
analyzed by it. If this is so, we are confronted by the question w hether the
cultural sciences in fact do not proceed within a different m ethodological
fram ew ork and are not constituted by a different cognitive interest than the
natural sciences com prehended by pragm aticism [1971a, pp. 140-41],
O f course, the point at issue is the nature and function of acta. (By
identifying the problem as one of pragm atics, H aberm as is entirely
correct— even if we contest his conclusions.)
W hen we pay close attention to the place of action in the process of
observation, we cannot dispose of the observer, the hum an agent. In this
sense, the m ethodology of the natural and hum an sciences participates in
the same process of legitim ation. The dialectic is such that the natural
scientist moves from the nom ological to the herm eneutic as a process of
legitim ation, whereas the hum an scientist moves from the herm eneutic to
the nomological as a process of value ascription. The point is that the
dialectic process while directionally [descriptively] different [binary] is
anological [‘n atu re’] and not digital in consequence [‘inner’ or ‘o u ter’]
(W ilden, 1972; cf. 1980).
In short, the process of observation m ust be throw n over in preference
to the observer, as M arx suggests. The practical activity of consciousness
must be located in the person; we m ust focus on the act rath er than the
action (dataicapta). In this sense, act is the nam e we can apply to the
universal pragm atic th at takes account of reified actions: nomological
consciousness reified as data and herm eneutic consciousness reified as
capta, where “ reification” is rule-governed hypostasis (m eaning) and
hypothesis (behavior).
Before we take up the issue of pragm atics in the universal pragm atic,
we need to discuss the ideal situation preconceived in the concept of
“ universal” as H aberm as (1970b; 1979b, p. 29) derives it from the thesis
of communicative competence.
Sp e e c h Ac t Ph en o men o l o g y
The discussion of speech acts (A ustin 1962; Searle 1967; 1969; Lanigan
1977) is a record of shifting perspective betw een the contexts of inform a-
tion theory (data) and com m unication theory (capta). H aberm as locates
this shifting argum ent within the “ ideal” situation of language behavior
by contrasting linguistic competence (according to Chomsky) with com -
municative competence. A lthough this move provides a certain am ount of
technical insight about hum an com m unication theory, I believe it is
ultim ately an unsatisfactory direction that falls victim to the very objec-
tion it is fleeing: “ the idealization of pure com m unicative action would
have to be reconstructed as the condition under which the authenticity of
speaking and acting subjects can be im puted as well as verified” (H aber-
mas 1973, p. 19).
94 COMMUNICOLOGY
According to Haberm as:
“Linguistic com petence” is C hom sky’s nam e for the m astery of an abstract
system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus, regardless of how
the latter is in fact used in actual speech. This com petence is a monological
capability; it is founded in the species-specific equipm ent of th e solitary
hum an organism. F or such a capability to be a sufficient linguistic basis for
speech, one would have to be able to reconstruct the com m unication
process itself as a “ m onological” one. T he inform ation m odel of com m uni-
cation is suitable for this purpose [1970b, p. 361].
In contrast to the Chomsky theory of linguistic com petence, which

must assume an inform ation theory m odel of hum an discourse (langue is
reified as langage), H aberm as argues th at “ on the contrary, in order to
participate in norm al discourse the speaker m ust have at his disposal, in
addition to his linguistic com petence, basic qualifications of speech and
symbolic interaction (role-behavior), which we may call communicative
competence. This comm unicative com petence m eans the m astery of an
ideal speech situation” (p. 367). H aberm as (p. 369) further clarifies this
thesis by suggesting that “ com m unicative com petence is defined by the
ideal speaker’s m astery of the dialogue-constitutive universals, irrespec-
tive of actual restrictions under em pirical conditions.” Thus, H aberm as’s
proposal is the reification of parole as langue (which is assum ed to be a
reification of langage via linguistic com petence).
The contribution H aberm as m akes to the ongoing analysis of speech
acts is that he recognizes the semiotic requirem ent th at com m unication be
analyzed as the interaction of persons at the syntactic, sem antic, and
pragmatic levels. In this view, he advances beyond the w ork of Searle,
who restricts his analysis to an inform ation theory m odel grounded in a
“monological” syntactics and developed as a “ dialogical” semantics.
However, H aberm as accepts the sam e conditions of analysis Searle does
by assuming the necessity of an ideal speaker in an ideal situation. This
procedure repeats the m istake outlined above, in which rules are con-
ceived as conditions of behavior and not inversely. “ Ultim ately, H ab er-
mas would want to argue, such com m unicative equality could only exist
on the basis of real social equality. H ere the theory of com m unication
(aimed at truth) turns into political theory: the ideal speech situation
becomes the ideal decision situation of R ousseau’s Social Contract”
(Patem an, 1976, p. 6).
In addition, the assum ption of the “ universal” perspective of the ideal
speaker/situation does violence to the very concept of pragmatics. “ Since
most, if not all, signs have as their interpreters living organism s, it is a
sufficiently accurate characterization of pragm atics to say that it deals
with the biotic aspects of semiosis, that is, with all the psychological,
biological, and sociological phenom ena which occur in the functioning of

signs” (M orris 1938, p. 30; see also Lanigan 1972). T he lesson of Saussure
that parole, langue, and langage are dialectically hum an com m unication is
ignored by the technical approach H aberm as takes.
I have argued in my Speech A c t Phenom enology (1977) that a com plete
speech act analysis that includes a theory of com m unicative com petence
that legitimizes hum an interpersonal com m unication m ust be approached
as a phenom enology of hum an interaction. In other words, an adequate
account of communicative com petence in a com m unication situation
requires a “ dialogical” consideration of pragm atics as the ground for
syntactics and semantics. This is another version of the argum ent that acta
{parole) m ust be the key for interpreting data {langage) and capta
{langue). The social product of com m unication becomes the authenticity
of a person speaking. Thus, the person legitimizes the act of com m uni-
cating, rather than the false consciousness of the action defining the
person—the mistake of positive behaviorism is thereby avoided.
It is necessary to point out that H aberm as is quite aware of the
difficulty attendant upon the notion of a “ universal” in pragm atics as
applied to speech acts. As he suggests:
First, we would have to show th at the structural change of world-views

obeys an inner logic, such th at the system atic variation of a basic p attern
can be reconstructed. O ver and above this, it would have to be possible to
derive from the social evolution of world-views a universalistic m orality
based on the basic norm s of speech and the ideas of the responsibly acting
person developed in the model of pure com m unicative action. T hen we
could com prehend all divergent concepts of the person and the expressions
of persons as modifications of the one universal idea of responsibility
similar to those that guide us in relating to children [1971c, pp. 11-12; see
also 1976; 1979b; 1984],
The consequences of this view of the idealization of the com m unication

situation is in fact pragm atic to the extent that it allows H aberm as to
hypostatize levels of choice betw een various m odes of com m unication.
Choice is a fundam ental concept here because it accounts for the “ inner
logic” th at is possible am ong the pragm atic rules governing com m unica-
tion, such as social and cultural variation, psychological condition, and so
on. In addition, this “ levels” m odel of the com m unication act suggests
the conditions under which the authenticity of com m unicating (m orality)
may be “im puted as well as verified.”
T here are four levels of choice betw een the different modes of com m u-
nication. “ O n condition of free choice, every choice at a higher level
eliminates choices at the next lower level.” H aberm as (1971c, p. 25)
offers the schema presented in Figure 6 as an illustration of his m odel. As
a m atter of inform ation, we should note that this working schema (and its
96 COMMUNICOLOGY
LEVELS M O D E S O F C O M M U N IC A T IO N
A U T T E R A N C E VS. N O N -U T T E R A N C E
B C O M M U N IC A T IV E A C T IO N VS. D IS C O U R S E
C C O M M U N IC A T IV E VS. C O G N IT IV E
U SE O F U SE O F
LANGUAGE LANGUAGE
D N O N -V E R B A L VS. VERBAL
E X P R E SSIO N EX P R E SSIO N
(G estures, (Speech
Bodily Acts)
Expressions)
Figure 6. Choice levels in m odal communication

according to Habermas
variations [H aberm as, 1979a, p. 196; 1979b, pp. 40, 209; 1984, 1:333, fig.
18]) of the modes of com m unication offered by H aberm as already exists
in large m easure in the M odel o f Sign Production form ulated by Eco
(1976, p. 217). Eco divides the “physical labor” (empirical conditions)
required to produce expressions into progressively higher levels of com -
munication beginning with “ recognition” advancing to “ ostensión” and
then on to the level of “ replica” and finally “ invention.” E co’s concern
focuses on the production of “ aesthetic texts” in which the herm eneutic
of hum an sign production exemplifies as authentic social product in
language— that is, signification in hum an code systems.
However, both H aberm as and Eco take the restrictive view that
dialogical com m unication in its pragm atic stance does not provide a basis
for authentic choice where that choice is restricted to “ freedom ” in a
social rather than personal sense. A t the same tim e, they are unable to
remove their analysis from the constrictions of the universal pragm atic
that seems to be required for a transition from the problem of subjectivity
to intersubjectivity in the analysis of com m unication as a system. H aber-
mas concedes this point in his 1984 analysis (l:xxxix) by noting that the
argum ent in the Gauss Lectures (1971c) “ turned out to be m istaken.” I
believe this difficulty results in part from the failure to recognize the
semiotic, rather than formal (H aberm as 1979b, pp. 8-9), link betw een
perception and expression (Lanigan 1979a). Perception is the social level
that results from the infrastructure of expression, variously constituted by
speech and com m unication acts (Lanigan 1979b). My position is illus-
trated in the schema in Figure 7 using the same general structure that
H aberm as presents.
LEVELS M O D E S O F C O M M U N IC A T IO N
A Perception: t h o u g h t v s . s il e n c e
/ \.
B Expression: s y n c h r o n ic v s d ia c h r o n ic \
LA N G U A G E LANGUAGE
C Speech:
X \
R H E T O R IC A L A C TS VS. M A S T E R S P E E C H A C TS [Non-linguistic A cts]
D Communication: s p e a k in g v s . s pe e c h a c t s
Figure 7. Choice levels in m odal communication

according to Lanigan
The perspective in this form ulation is, of course, a specification of the

dimensions of authentic choice as m anifest in com m unication. As such,
the social product of com m unication is produced by the inclusion of the
choices at a lower level when the choice at a higher level is m ade. This
position is clearly phenom enological in term s of social choice and existen-
tial in term s of personal choice. The argum ents supporting this schema
and analysis, which are technical and lengthy, have already been m ade
elsewhere (Lanigan 1977). In short, I believe H aberm as offers a success-
ful parallel argum ent for social free choice in his discussion of social
legitimation (which I will take up below) in his concept of communicative
ethics, even though his analysis m ust still treat the person as an idealiza-
tion in a like situation.
Th e Po l it ic s o f Se m io l o g y
H aberm as (1975, p. 10) argues that “ linguistic com m unication has a

double structure, for com m unication about propositional content may
take place only with sim ultaneous m etacom m unication about interper-
sonal relations. This is an expression of the specifically hum an interlacing
of cognitive perform ance and motives for action with linguistic intersnb-
jectivity.” Speech acts then perform the function of a herm eneutic
assessment for society. Speaking creates values; yet those values may not
be overtly present to reflection on a social scale (W hat is a prudent act?),
and the conscious values may be articulated but not known (W hat is an
act in good faith?). In point of fact, the com m unication ethic is largely
preconscious and prereflective:
Only communicative ethics guarantees the generality of admissible norm s

and the autonom y of acting subjects solely through the discursive redeem a-
bility of the validity claims with which norm s appear. T hat is, generality is
98 COMMUNICOLOGY
guaranteed in that only norm s that may claim generality are those on which
everyone affected agrees (or would agree) w ithout constraint if they enter
into (or w ere to enter into) a process of discursive w ill-form ation [H aber-
mas 1975, p. 89].
In short, when com m unicators engage in com m unication acts that are
both reflective and conscious (therefore political), they create values that
morally link the subjective and the intersubjective. The sem iotic connec-
tion of the personal and the interpersonal guarantees that the act joins, at
one level, the preconscious and the reflective (expression). Y et again, the
conscious and the reflective join (speech), as do the preconscious and
prereflective (com m unication). Thus, the sem iotic link that unites person
and society is also the one that unites the m odes of com m unication with
pragmatic values. Recall M arx’s assertion th at “language is practical
consciousness.”
On the social level, H aberm as (1979b, p. 49) provides an excellent
statem ent of the political nature of semiotic analysis as the problem
communicative action m ust address.
“ It is a consequence of the fundam ental contradiction of the capitalist
system that, other factors being equal, either
• the economic system does not produce the requisite quantity of con-
sumable decisions, or;
• the administrative system does not produce the requisite quantity of
rational decisions, or;
• the legitimation system does not provide the requisite quantity of
generalized m otivations, or;
• the socio-cultural system does not generate the requisite quantity of
action-motivating m eaning.”
The expression “ the requisite quantity” refers to the extent, quality,

and tem poral dim ension of the respective system perform ances (value,
administrative decision, legitim ation, and m eaning).
It should not be difficult to see that in the phenom enological schema I
present in Figure 7, Level A: “ perception” is equivalent to H aberm as’s
“socio-cultural system” ; Level B: “ expression,” equal to “ legitimation
system” ; Level C: “speech,” equivalent to “ adm inistrative system ” ; and
Level D: “ com m unication,” equal to “ economic system .” In m aking
these ratios I want to assert the connection betw een authenticity of choice
and language use/speech as a social product— th at is, the M arxian thesis
that “hum an sense activity” becomes a social product with personal
value. H um an com m unication is per se a political act (Cushm an &
Dietrich 1979).
To the extent that there is a system failure in a postindustrial capitalist
society, there is a crisis of hum an identity. T here is m oral and political

alienation and dom ination. The causality of this value interest in the
person/society link is, as H aberm as senses, contained in the com m unica-
tion codes that link the observation of action with the act of observing.
The operative concept here is “ code” where action, act, value, and
interest are joint products of em ancipation (Lanigan 1984). In this in-
stance, “ code” is the concept discovered by M erleau-Ponty that a pri-
mary characteristics of hum an com m unication is parole parlante: the
speaking th at is a speech act (com m unication ethic) and the speech act
that is speaking (authentic com m unication) :
In the language of the G eistesw issenschaften we could say: T he possibility

that linguistic signs have m eaning cannot be understood w ithout presup-
posing a “m eaning-intention” which expresses itself in the signs. In other
words, not even the facts of science are facts for the unchanging “ subject as
such” (of “ the language as such” ), but they are constituted in a concrete
and therefore historically determ ined hum an horizon of m eanings [Apel
1967, p. 33],
In conclusion, let me suggest that the critical theory approach to a

com m unication theory of society, initiated in the developm ent of the
speech act theory and the herm eneutic phenom enology of com m unica-
tion, represents a starting point in the analysis of the fundam ental
relationship betw een persons and societies. From M arx we gain an insight
based on the nature of person and m oral value. The fundam ental
grounding of em ancipation from cunsum erism and persuasion as reified
in social institutions is linked inseparably to the discovery of the com m u-
nication com m unity (K om m unikationsgem einschaft) as a source of au-
thenticity and interpersonal legitim ation. Thus, “ the greatness of M arx-
ism lies not in its having treated economics as the principal or unique
cause of history but in its treating cultural history and economic history as
two abstract aspects of the same process” (M erleau-Ponty 1964b, p. 107).
[SE C TIO N T W O : EMPIRICAL RESEARCH]
Chapter Seven
Metajournalism
Merleau-Ponty on Signs, Emblems, and A ppeals
in the Poetry o f Truth
A ttica is a political m em ory. O n S eptem ber 13, 1981, we m arked the

tenth anniversary of a ten-m inute period at the New Y ork State C orrec-
tional Facility at A ttica, New Y ork, in which forty-three inm ates and
employees died, thirty-nine under gunfire by police and N ational G uard
troops. In com parison with the A ttica prison rebellion, there have been
worse examples of property dam age to a penal institution— for exam ple,
the $20 million w orth of physical dam age during the eight days of rioting
at the state prison in M cA lester, O klahom a, in 1973. T here have been
worse examples of bloody m ayhem , such as the riot at the maximum-
security prison in Santa Fe, New M exico, during 1980 in which thirty-
three persons died. “ Y et A ttica rem ains the yardstick” (A non. 1981).
But of w hat is A ttica the m easure? W e should not be too hasty in
perceiving A ttica as a criterion only for penal disorders. W e should
consider the political characterization of A ttica as a rebellion rather than
a riot. The incidents at M cA lester and Santa Fe are only riots. A ttica is
rebellion. As Foucault rem inds us in his discussion of the A m erican
historical m odel for prisons, the A uburn, M assachusetts, prison of the
nineteenth century: “ The prison m ust be the microcosm of a perfect
society in which individuals are isolated in their m oral existence, but in
which they come together in a strict hierarchical fram ew ork, with no
lateral relation, com m unication being possible only in a vertical direc-
tion” (1979, p. 238). “The only way for prisoners to escape from this
system of training is by collective action, political organization, rebellion”
(Foucault 1974, p. 157).
A ttica is a rebellion because A ttica was open, organized, arm ed
103
104 COMMUNICOLOGY
resistance to the power of authority on the A uburn m odel. A ttica was

overt rebellion against the penal institution and its vertical structure of
communicative authority. A nd yet, A ttica was a story about hum an
beings, about individual lives suddenly and unexpectedly brought to their
most existential m om ent. A ttica was a covert rebellion of hum an dim en-
sion against the moral failure of the idea of the prison as a “perfect”
society (W icker 1975, p. 64; Foucault 1979, p. 305). This covert rebellion
by prisoners was the dem onstration of a political necessity in society—
that is, the personal and social need for lateral comm unication. Com -
munication among equals is the political dem onstration of hum an society,
of civility, and of morality. Thus, the A ttica rebellion m arked a social and
political paradigm crisis in communality. A ttica in the tw entieth century
stands as the anomaly for the historical A uburn m odel of the nineteenth
century that yet endures.6 A ttica is a sign of A uburn. A ttica is an emblem
of failed civility. A ttica is an appeal for a communicative ethic.7
The analysis that follows is my attem pt to indicate the m anner in which
M erleau-Ponty offers us, through his semiotic phenom enology, a philo-
sophic and theoretical account of hum an com m unication as coded in the
genre of mass com m unication. This account in his essay “ O n News
Item s” (“ Sur les faits divers” ) can be extended in Hjelm slevian function
to Tom W icker’s A Time to Die. This book recounts W icker’s experience
as an observer and rep o rter for the N ew Y ork Times during the A ttica
rebellion.
I propose to develop the analysis of the A ttica problem atic and them a-
tic in several parts. First, there is a brief discussion of m etajournalism and
its philosophic grounding in M erleau-Ponty’s essay. Second, I suggest the
phenom enological way in which W icker’s book is an illustration of
M erleau-Ponty’s sem iotic m etajournalism . Third, I offer some interpreta-
tions of m etajournalism as a political code in constituting w hat A pel
(1980, pp. 255ff. ; 1981, pp. 28ff.) calls the K om m unikationsgemeinschaft.
MASS C O M M U N IC A T IO N AS SEM IO TIC P H E N O M E N O L O G Y
M erleau-Ponty begins his essay “ O n News Item s” by recounting an

incident he witnessed in the railway station in G enoa during Italy’s Fascist
period. A m an jum ps from the passenger platform in front of an oncom -
6. F oucault’s analysis finds affirm ation in W icker’s (1975, p. 7) com m ent th at “ the
superindendent also was uneasy about 30 inm ates who had taken p art in an abortive riot at
the A uburn C orrectional Facility in 1970, and who had been transferred later to A ttic a .”
7. I have in m ind the critical theory view of com m unality th at “ only com m unicative ethics
guarantees the generality of admissible norm s and the autonom y of acting subjects solely
through the discursive redeem ability of the validity claims with which norm s a p p ea r”
(H aberm as 1975, p. 89).
METAJOURNALISM 105
ing train. It is an act of suicide. A crowd of persons rush to witness the

event and are harshly rebuffed by the police:
This blood disturbed order; it had to be quickly w iped away, and the world
restored to its reassuring aspect of an A ugust evening in G enoa. All
dizziness is akin. By seeing an unknow n person die, these m en could have
learned to judge their life. They w ere defended against som eone who had
just disposed of his own. T he taste for news item s is the desire to see, and to
see is to m ake out a whole world sim ilar to our own in the wrinkle of a face
[1964c, p. 311].
The facial grimace of the witness to self-inflicted death is a discourse of

simultaneity. The nonverbal com m unication of the facial gesture is at
once a sign, an em blem , and an appeal. The facial discourse as a sign
contains a politically unacceptable signification. T he gesture is a lateral
com m unication of equality betw een the suicide victim and the witness.
Each acts in opposition to established order. T he act of personal freedom
in suicide violates the social norm for order. A nd in the act of recogni-
tion, the witness adm its the possibility of violation, itself a violation— but
now one of political consequence. The recognition brings with itself the
possibility of alternative norm s— that is, lateral com m unication can co-
dify a m oral hierarchy com petitive with that of vertical com m unication.
The blood of the suicide and the grimace of the witness are the same
signified. They are an em blem of authority, a free use of the hum an body
commanding political force. The signifier is, of course, the appeal to
authority that is the expressive and com m unicative pow er contained as a
communality in the shared actions of the suicide victim, the witness, and
the rebuffing police officers. The signifier is w hat each person desires to
see. “ Seeing is that strange way of rendering ourselves present while
keeping our distance and, w ithout participating, transform ing others into
visible things” (M erleau-Ponty 1964c, p. 311).
The experience of the body coupled with the consciousness of choice
powerfully codes the em blem in the appeal as a sign of political discourse.
In his semiotic phenom enology, M erleau-Ponty specifies therefore the
conscious experience that is a political discourse of authority in and for
the individual person. B ut can this conscious experience be a product of
the mass m edia? D oes the text of mass com m unications signify a personal
ethic with m oral and political consequence, as Foucault and M erleau-
Ponty hypothesize?
Affirmative answers to the questions posed have an A m erican or
E uropean flavor under various nom enclatures such as new journalism ,
docufiction, investigative reportage, critical theory, political theater,
developm ental sociology, and so on. As Davies rem arks:
106 COMMUNICOLOGY
It is possible in this kind of com m unications analysis to deal serially with

such issues as the rise of the novel, the influence of m echanization on art
and architecture, the effect of print, or the impact of radio on a non-
industrial society. It is even possible— in m ore absurd m om ents— to corre-
late “developm ent” with the ideology of textbooks [1976, p. 60].
We are, in fact, confronted with two levels of interpretation when

dealing with the m atch betw een the lived-world of other persons. First,
we realize that there is a structural similarity betw een the events of our
lives and those re-presented in the m edia. B oth can have a serial presen-
tation in the form of a linear causality of progression. T hat is, my m em ory
of a self can be constructed in the same m anner as my expectations for a
character in reading a novel. Second, we realize that such a structural
similarity is em bodied. The conscious experience that is our style of living
in a world of o ther persons is forever reversible as a semiotic. “ This unity
of the sensory experiences rests on their integration in a single life of
which they thus become the visible witness and em blem ” (M erleau-Ponty
1962, p. 319n). The system of Self-O ther-W orld is an incarnate logic of
intersubjectivity continually constituting expressions that are reversible
with our original perceptions.
Eason (1977) offers us the neologism of metajournalism to describe a
medium of the incarnate logic, the textual discourse, that a person lives in
the conscious experience of mass com m unication in the Self-O ther-W orld
problem atic. The term “ m etajournalism ” specifies the sem iotic character
of the so-called new journalism m ovem ent in the U nited States during the
late 1960s and early 1970s. As E ason notes:
The New Journalism , that form of reporting associated with the narrative
strategies of the novel and the short story, takes its energy from an
image-conscious society in which traditional assum ptions about m anners
and morals are breaking down. T he w riters find their stories in trends and
events already transform ed into spectacles by the mass m edia and use this
image-world as a background for their interpretations. T he central strategy
of the New Journalism is to in terpret public events as symbolic quests for
significance by exploring the intentions, values, and assum ptions of those
affected by the events. Stories of political changes, the em ergence of
subcultures, space travel, m urders, and executions all point to a com m on
them e: the struggle for personal and group identity in a fragm enting society
[1978, p. 1; see N elson 1986]
Thus com m unal reality as a m etajournalistic discourse presents both

the truth of the existential choice in the news item as a sem iotic artifact
and the truth of the novel as another sem iotic artifact within the phe-
nomenological context of the possible as you and I can live it. O r as
M erleau-Ponty (1964c, p. 313) expresses his sem iotic phenom enology
with respect to news item s, “ true little incidents are not life’s debris but
METAJOURNALISM 107
signs, em blem s, and appeals. . . . Y et there is m ore and less in the novel
than there is in true little incidents. It foreshadows m om entary speech
and gesture, and com m ents on th e m .”
In these two genre perspectives— news item and novel— M erleau-
Ponty indicates the poetry of truth hidden in the prose of discourse. This
is to say, a person finds existential truths signified as em blem s in the
behavior of others, and signified as appeals in the narrative of mass
communications. The two perspectives are not digital. W e are not forced
to choose one over the o ther in a futile Sartrian gesture of nothingness.
R ather, the two views are the grasp (Verständigung) of analogues. The
views are not m erely functional analogues of one another, but analogues
of the person. News item s and novels are not just examples of the serial
structure of inform ation, but hum an values coded and em bodied as poetic
com m unication (M arcus 1974). News items as artifacts of consciousness;
novels as artifacts of experience are both true to life because they are of
life. In the phenom enology of the person, news items are em blem s
forming one boundary condition of interpersonal com m unication; novels
are appeals forming the o ther boundary condition of social com m unica-
tion.
Foucault (1979, pp. 285-92; see W eiss 1978) dem onstrates this concrete
use of M erleau-Ponty’s m odel of mass com m unication by showing its
existence as a key factor in the em ergent history of the prison. The truth
of this interpersonally and socially bounded poetic com m unication, this
conscious experience, is what each of us lives in the reading of a great
author or in listening to a fam ed orator. W e sense not a choice betw een
the objective and the subjective, news item and novel, but the combining
force of discourse that comm ands the analogy of Self with O ther in their
W orld. O r as M erleau-Ponty (1962, p. 79) describes it, we are conscious
of being-in-the-world (être-au-monde). The m etajournalistic discourse as
an analogy of life is m ore true than the factual text. “T he novel is truer,
because it gives a totality, and because a lie can be created from details
which are all true. The news item is tru er because it wounds us and is not
pretty to look at. They m eet only in the greatest, who find, as has been
said, the ‘poetry of tru th ’” (M erleau-Ponty 1964c, p. 311).
TO M W IC K E R ’S TIM E
O ne of those “ g reatest,” one of the authors who finds the poetry of truth,
is Tom W icker. The poetry of his prose is his m etajournalistic book A
Time to Die (1975). A s the dust jacket of the volum e declares to even the
most casual reader: “A Time to Die is the gripping story of one of the
most dram atic events in our tim e. It is sim ultaneously a unique venture in
Am erican self-exam ination.” W icker begins his story (pp. 4-5) with a
forthright description of his about-to-be shattered bourgeois personal
108 COMMUNICOLOGY
life. He is having lunch in the executive dining room of the National

Geographic Society, “ a few blocks from Lafayette Square and the W hite
H ouse.” His lunch is interrupted by a telephone call: “ ‘The most exciting
thing,’ his secretary said breathlessly, ‘They w ant you to come to A t-
tica.’” W icker goes to the state prison in upstate New York. H e goes as a
reporter jerked out of his norm al routine. H e goes to get the facts of a
riot. A nd he naively thinks, “ A nd w hat was A ttica or a prison riot to a
political colum nist?” H e arrives and becom es m ore than a reporter. A t
the request of the inm ates, he becomes an “ observer.” Y et he em erges as
a “ negotiator” thrust into a political situation w here his own m oral values
contribute to his living or dying in the midst of the rebellion.
The text that records W icker’s conscious experience is both a novel and
a news item; it is m ore true than either one. The m etajournalistic text
codes a semiotic phenom enology in which the discourse is a sign (a news
item) whose analogue is an em blem (a novel) whose analogue, in turn, is
an appeal—that is, the existential person who is Tom W icker. For W icker
and for us, the produced text is the existential phenom enology of seeing
that binds author and audience together in one sem iotic m ovem ent of
journalistic mass com m unication.
“ H e who sees believes himself invisible: for him his acts rem ain in the
flattering entourage of his intentions, and he deprives others of his alibi,
reducing them to a few words, a few gestures” (M erleau-Ponty 1964c, p.
311). W icker’s few words, his existential gestures of seeing, are not
invisible to him or us. They are m ade all the m ore intense in his visible
use of the third person to narrate the A ttica story. The sem iotic discourse
of the third-person style allows us to see. Y et, the text also appeals to a
second-person perspective, the reading audience. The text is thereby an
emblem for the existential witness. W e see W icker as he sees himself. In
both perspectives we are privy to the first-person narrator, which is
discourse per se. Such discourse is a sign of the third-person form and the
second-person content.
W icker’s discourse is a reversible dialectic, one characterized by sug-
gesting the familiar m ovem ent of narration in term s of interlocking
paradigm atic and syntagmatic shifts. A t one level, the text is autobiogra-
phical and paradigm atic. T here is W icker the N ew Y ork Times reporter
and there is the substitutable Tom W icker, “ the youngest child of D e-
laney David W icker, a railroad conductor of forbidding rectitude, and
Esta C am eron W icker, a wom an of powerful personality from a proud
Scotch family” (p. 11).
The paradigm atic substitution of W icker the adult and W icker the child
become the m easure of personal judgm ent. W icker reexam ines his lived-
experience when his consciousness of life is threatened by the context of
death as he voluntarily and repeatedly enters D -Y ard w here the prisoners
at A ttica hold his life in their hands. W icker is, for exam ple, again
METAJOURNALISM 109
confronted and tested by the politics of race. H e is a liberal white

Southerner whose very existence invites inm ate threats. As a child, he
grows up in a family whose politics and m oral views invite the challenge
of white society in H am let, N orth C arolina. As an adult in D -Y ard, he is
part of the “political th eate r” in which he and the other “ observers”
represent the failure of white A m erica to the mostly black and Puerto
Rican inm ates of A ttica (pp. 39, 76).
A t a second level, the text is historical and syntagm atic. T he discourse
of the book is an account in fifteen chapters of six days— it takes six days
to move from the broken bolt on a hallway door to inm ate rebellion to the
death of forty-three persons. Y et, these six days are sim ultaneously the
durée of the forty-five years of W icker’s life. From Septem ber 8 until
Septem ber 13,1971, W icker relives all that he holds sacred about himself,
o ther hum an beings, and the world that m atters to both.
Picture yourself as W icker did on S eptem ber 12, 1971, when negotia-
tions are at a standstill, when the New Y ork state police and National
G uard are poised to attack the rebelling inm ates, w hen the inm ates are
close to executing their hostages. Picture W icker when the inm ates
dem and th at he com e alone to talk yet one m ore time. Listen to W icker’s
description of existential crisis:
T hat could m ean his life, either as an executed hostage or as an accident

victim of a general attack w hen the troopers finally did com e over the wall.
T here was no m oral or any other kind of law or situation th at forced him to
return to D -Y ard in such circum stances, particularly w hen it was n o t clear
that anything would be achieved by it. H e had faithfully done everything
asked of him already; surely that was enough.
O n the other hand . . . he knew . . . he m ust either finally m eet his
own expectations for himself or abandon them and his idea of who and
w hat he was [p. 211].
As M erleau-Ponty (1964c, p. 313) instructs us, and as W icker witnesses

in his m etajournalistic writing, “ The novel gives the context. The news
item on the contrary strikes us because it is a life’s invasion of those who
were unaw are of it. The news item calls things by their nam e; the novel
names them only through what the characters perceive.” Indeed, W ick-
e r’s A Time to Die is for us the novel m ade news item and for W icker the
news item m ade novel—with all the good am biguity th at these rhetorical
com binations entail. The m etajournalistic genre is, thus, not the paradox
of news item and novel. N or is it the confusion of factual reporting with
editorial-page com m ent. It is not the corruption of prose by fiction.
M etajournalism is, in M erleau-Ponty’s phrase, the poetry o f truth. It is
the positive ambiguity of discourse th at authenticates the com m unality of
the person.
110 COMMUNICOLOGY
T H E C O M M U N A L IT Y O F C O M M U N I C A T IO N
A ttica is a personal m em ory for W icker. B ut I began my analysis by

stating that A ttica is also a political m em ory (see Chap. 6). In this
apparent opposition there is a positive ambiguity. W e sense the paradig-
matic and syntagmatic m ovem ents of the A ttica events. W e see their
parallel to the reversibility of m om ents in W icker’s life. W e understand
the m ethod of m etajournalism wherein news item and novel are blended
together in a unique genre of discourse. T here is a lived-experience, a
consciousness of the com m unality of com m unication. “ In what situations
and by virtue of what criteria may one participant in a communicative
exchange, claim for himself an em ancipated consciousness, and consider
himself, therefore, to be authorized to act as a social therapist?” (A pel
1980, p. 285). O r restated in its classic Platonic version, How does one
morally and politically distinguish among the discourse of the philoso-
pher, the sophist, and the statesm an? (see chap. 17 below). Is W icker, or
perhaps we should say, is the persona of the text A Time to Die, the
conscious experience of an observer, a reporter, or a negotiator? How
does W icker the m oralist, the com m unicator, and the politician at A ttica
m ake a choice, knowing that, as M erleau-Ponty (1962, p. xix) suggests, in
choosing a role to live he is “ condem ned to m eaning” ?
There are two responses to this interrogation. O ne is a consideration of
the hum an body in its social role as a sign. Such a sign contains synergisti-
cally the elem ents of death and life. The probability for death is an overt
emblem of the life being judged, by W icker and others. Life is his appeal
to be absolved from judgm ent and its possibility. Indeed, Foucault
reminds us:
The judges of norm ality are present everywhere. We are in the society of
the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the social w orker-
-ju d g e; it is on them that the universal reign of the norm ative is based; and
each individual, w herever he may find himsef, subjects to it his body, his
gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievem ents [1979, p. 304],
W e are not surprised, then, as W icker explains his feelings after the
first round of negotiations with the A ttica inm ates: “ death was not what
Tom Wicker was at A ttica to abet. H e had realized that in the m om ent he
turned away from the hostages. N obody gets killed. That was his goal, but
the tro o p er’s guns dealt in death” (p. 56). W e are then witness to
B rother Juan, an inm ate, who pleads: “ We need your help, this is no
joke. . . . This could turn into another My Lai, right h ere” (p. 94). We
are with W icker when B rother Flip says to the negotiators: “ W e are
advocating com m unications and understanding.” It is a peroration that
itself concludes with the unexpected, but existential, truth of the mo-
METAJOURNALISM 111
m ent. B rother Flip m akes a claim for immediacy: “ I want to thank all of
you beautiful people for coming here. Stand with us now . . . walk with
us . . . die with us, if necessary” (pp. 96-98). The startling, but quiet,
impact of an invitation to die by choice is bounded by the inm ate who
goes berserk by charging the negotiators, waving a sword and screaming,
“ Everybody gonna die . . . gonna die!” (p. 106).
T here is an eloquence of the situation in which W icker the negotiator
becomes the victim through the agency of this bodily presence. The
gesture of physical presence, having his body in jeopardy— this is his
catharsis. In one syncretic m ovem ent, W icker is neither m oralist nor
reporter. W icker, who enters A ttica as an em blem of his own bourgeois
morality in order to appeal as an observer to the inm ates, exists as an
observing hum an being. H e is the bodily appeal to the inm ates and their
hostages; he is an em blem personifying the message “ Nobody gets
killed.”
Yet we find hidden in this existential problem atic a phenom enological,
albeit political, them atic—the exercise of power. The challenge to and
use of power by W icker in a m oral and reportage sense carries with it the
infrastructure of power politics. The consciousness of power is the “ poli-
tics of experience” in R .D . Laing’s (1967, pp. 25, 30-32) sense; it is the
politics of the body. Foucault captures this them atic in his Discipline and
Punish: The Birth o f the Prison, when he reviews the problem atic of
contem porary prison revolts:
In fact, they w ere revolts, at the level of the body, against the very body of
the prison. W hat was at issue was not w hether the prison environm ent was
too harsh or too aseptic, too prim itive or too efficient, but its very m aterial-
ity as an instrum ent and vector of pow er; it is this w hole technology of
pow er over the body that the technology of the “ soul”— th at of education-
alists, psychologists, and psychiatrists— fails either to conceal or to com pen-
sate, for the simple reason th a t it is one of its tools [1979, p. 30],
Thus we have from Foucault the positive ambiguity of the “ body” as a

discourse of the institutionalized person and the social (i.e., personalized)
institution. This ambiguity of the institution as the social norm is one level
of politics: the Lebenswelt versus the Weltanschauung. Politics on this
level is a condem nation to m eaning, a condem nation coterm inus with
hum an experience. To be physically situated is to be politically com m it-
ted; this is one form of the poetry of truth at A ttica.
A second response to the interrogation posed above— How does Wicker
cope with com m itm ent?— can be m ade at the level of consciousness. This
level is also a political them atic. H um an consciousness has its parallel
semiotic structure with the body. Consciousness too is a sign whose
emblem and appeal evoke a political consequence.
112 COMMUNICOLOGY
If we take two selected examples of discourse that them atically m ark

the A ttica rebellion, we can judge the sense in which the discourse is an
accurate m easure of the politics of consciousness. The examples I have in
mind are familiar to us. O ne belongs to W icker. It is the discourse of
semiotic appeal: “ nobody gets killed.” The other illustration belongs to
the frenzied anonym ous inm ate. It is the discourse of a semiotic emblem:
“ som ebody gonna die.” In these two texts we have the explicit dim ension
of a philosophic proposition (i.e., the prim acy of the Lebenswelt) whose
empirical test is the death of forty-three hum an beings and the life of one,
Tom Wicker.
Using the standard Hjelm slevian (1961; see B arthes 1968) m odel for
analysis, we can separate a signifier and signified at the level of connota-
tion and denotation for each proposition. On an initial sem antic determ i-
nation we can locate the denotative level with its constituent signifier and
signified. For exam ple, let us examine the connotation of “ nobody”
(Figure 8). As a signifier this term has two digital or analogue signified
possibilities. The term can signify “ inm ates” (the example used in Figure
8) or “ observers” or “negotiators” or “ hostages.” A lso, “ nobody” can
signify only “ inm ates” or only one of the other term s cited. In conse-
quence, the connotative level contains an essential denotative am bigu-
ity— that is, several signifier-signified com binations are possible. First, for
example, the signifier term can be deconstructed into its valence terms:
“ no” and “ body.” H ere the signifier “ no” is com bined with the signified
“ body” as the denotation supporting the connotative signifier “ nobody.”
Secondly, we can leave the denotative signifier “ no” constant and vary
the signified by the paradigm atic substitution of “inm ate” (Figure 9).
This second interpretation is in fact W icker’s initial im pression of the
situation at Attica. The denotation consisting of “ n o ” “ inm ate” has its
analogue at the level of connotation. H ere we m ake the paradigm atic
substitution of “ n o ” and “ inm ate” for “ nobody” (Figure 10). Thus, we
have a sem antic specification of the essential characteristics of inm ates
(and hostages). They are nobody—they have no bodies—they get killed—
they do not exist. Any action taken against them has no content (sig-
nified); it is neither right nor wrong, it just happens. W e have an
explication of the killing of forty-three inm ates and hostages by the
police. Consciousness becom es the politics of experience. W e have an
understanding of the terrible torture and m ayhem inflicted on the surviv-
ing inm ates by the prison guards and state police troopers. W e have the
exercise of absolute political pow er, the conscious pow er of life and
death. W e have the politics of N orbert W oods, supervising official at
A ttica, “ W e warned ‘em. . . . W e told ‘em ” (W icker 1975, p. 287).
Before looking at the syntagmatic relationship betw een “ nobody” and
“ gets killed,” we should exam ine the opposition of “ nobody” and its
valence counterpart “ som ebody”— that is, the negative and positive
METAJOURNALISM 113
Sr Sd
nobody inm ate
Sr Sd
no body
Figure 8. Connotation (C) and denotation (D) o f the signifier (Sr) and
the signified (Sd) fo r the negative signification ‘no b o d y.’
Sr Sd
nobody inm ate
Sr Sd
no inmate
Figure 9. Paradigmatic substitution o f ‘inm ate’ fo r ‘body. ’
Sr Sd
no inmate inmate
Figure 10. Paradigmatic substitution o f the denotation fo r the

connotative signifier.
signifiers. The same deconstruction used in Figure 8 for the term “ no-
body” applied exactly to the term “ som ebody” (Figure 11). The positive
valence of “ som e” connected with “ body” explicates the sense of identity
and existence the inm ates (and hostages) felt: the hostages because they
have inm ate protectors who keep them alive, and the inm ates because
they are exercising political authority over their own lives. The police are
not in control of the facility, the inm ates are. In an explicit denotative
signifier-signified that connotes “ som ebody” (Figure 12), W icker (1975,
pp. 55-56) recalls a speech m ade by B rother H erb to his fellow inm ates in
D-Y ard: “ T hat was a hell of a speech you m ade, B rother H erb. M ind if I
ask your full nam e? B rother H erb looked at him haughtily. ‘I am A ttica,’
he said, and moved with dignity into the crow d.” The R everend Jesse
Jackson has im mortalized this semiotic device (Figure 13) in the rallying
call of the Chicago-based PU SH group: “I am som e body!” (Pace et
al. 1974).
In short, the negative ambiguity of “ nobody” reflects the death of the
individual and its institutional form , which is the death of society: the
prison. In com parison, the positive ambiguity of “ som ebody” reflects the
life of the individual and its institutional form , which is the life of society:
politics—that is, a body politic literally re-presented in a body of persons
(a group) that can exert pressure as a social force (see chap. 9 below).
114 COMMUNICOLOGY
Sr Sd
somebody inmate
Sr Sd
some body
Figure 11. Connotation and denotation fo r the positive signification

‘somebody. ’
Sr Sd
somebody A ttica
Sr Sd
D
I am
Figure 12. Connotation and denotation fo r the ontological signification

‘Attica. ’
Sr Sd
C body
some
Sr Sd
D
I am
Figure 13. Connotation and denotation fo r the ontological signification

‘b o d y,’ i.e., ‘person.’
The proposition “ nobody gets killed” stands at the connotative level as

a syntagmatic whole uniting the signifier “ nobody” to the signified “ gets
killed” (Figure 14). Recalling the previous analysis of the denotation for
“ nobody,” a syntagam atic substitution can be m ade of “ n o ” “ body” for
“ nobody.” Thus, the connotative signified “ gets killed” receives the same
denotative signification and “ nobody” refers syntagam atically to “ hos-
tages” and “inm ates” (Figure 15). The explication clearly indicates the
conscious equivalence of “ gets killed” with “ hostages” and “ inm ates.”
It is no m inor point that the sem antic features of the proposition
“ nobody gets killed” reflect W icker’s preconscious understanding. The
discursive proposition has the implication of objectivity in its third-person
construction; it stresses a passive verb voice. The valence of the proposi-
tion is negative. The proposition is a sign of death. Its signifier is an
emblem of death: nobody is a dead body. Its signified is an appeal to
death: getting killed is Attica.
The proposition “ som ebody gonna die” also stands at the connotative
level as a syntagmatic whole consisting of the signifier “ som ebody” and
the signified “ gonna d ie.” Taking the signifier “ som ebody” at the conno-
METAJOURNALISM 115
Sr Sd
nobody gets killed
Sr Sd
no body
Figure 14. Connotation and denotation fo r the negative signification

‘gets killed. ’
Sr Sd
inmate gets killed
Sr Sd
no body

‘gets killed. ’
Sr Sd
som ebody gonna die
Sr Sd
some body

‘gonna die. ’
Sr Sd
C
som ebody gonna die
Sr Sd Sr Sd
D
neg. pow er assault D -Y ard
Figure 17. Paradigmatic and syntagmatic substitutions signifying the

ontology o f power, i.e., the ‘body’ as political signification [neg. =
negotiators, et. al.].
tative level, an initial supporting denotative signifier is “ som e” and its

signified is “ body” (Figure 16). W ith appropriate paradigm atic substitu-
tion, “ som e” becom es the “ negotiators” (a term that includes variously
the prison officials, the guards, the state police, N ational G uard troops,
and negotiators per se) and “ body” becom es “ pow er” or “ authority.”
Again by com parison, the signified part of the proposition, “ gonna d ie,”
at the connotative level carries a denotative infrastructure (Figure 17).
This infrastructure consists of the signifier “ assault” and the signified
“D -Y ard.” D oes the “ D ” undercode “ die” or “ d eath ” in D -Y ard? The
116 COMMUNICOLOGY
fact that the inm ates dug protective trenches in the yard and th at many
are killed in them adds sem antic force to the interpretation of “ D -Y ard”
as a chosen site of death, as a cemetery.
But there are other sem antic features of the whole proposition “ som e-
body gonna die.” T hat is, the proposition has the implication of subjec-
tivity in an implied first- or second-person construction. It implies an
active verb voice. The valence of the proposition is positive. The proposi-
tion is a sign of life. Its signifier is an em blem of life; som ebody is a live
body. Its signified is an appeal to life; going to die leaves tim e to live. As
H erm an Badillo, a corrections official, com m ents during the ill-planned
hasty assault on D -Y ard: “ T here’s always tim e to die. . . . I don’t know
what the rush was” (W icker 1975, p. 286).
In these two propositions, “ nobody gets killed” and “ som ebody gonna
die,” we have an illustration of the com m unality of com m unication, the
K ommunikationsgemeinschaft. The first proposition reflects the felt and
shared conscious experience of the Gemeinschaft, those who felt a bond
with them , the negotiators. As W icker (p. 295) describes his own con-
scious experience, ‘“ No body gets killed.’ T hat had been his aim. That
had been his prom ise to himself, never spoken to anyone else. T hat was
what he had set out to achieve, with his gifts and his standing and the trust
m en placed in him .”
Just as poignant, the proposition “ som ebody gonna die” reflects the
Gemeinschaft (i.e., the anonym ity of society’s action) in the exchange of
conscious experience lived by those who were about to do the killing, the
prison guards, the National G uard, the state police, the prison officials,
and governor of the state of New Y ork, Nelson Rockefeller, whose
participation was his refusal to com m unicate, to negotiate, to recognize
som ebody at A ttica (W icker 1975, pp. 200, 208). T here were, after all,
m ore votes outside the walls of A ttica than inside (see chap. 9, below).
We face, in conclusion, the semiotic fact that discursive action is
political. The com m unality achieved in mass com m unication is a norm a-
tive process that is reflexively sem iotic in nature and function, both
creating and destroying hum an realities. Recall that I posed a question
for m etajournalism as exemplified in W icker’s A Time to D ie: “ In what
situations and by virtue of what criteria may one participant in a com m u-
nicative exchange claim for him self an em ancipated consciousness and
consider himself, therefore, to be authorized as a social therapist?” (Apel
1980, p. 288). W icker gives us an answer in his text, which turns out to be
the existential com m unality he achieves in the exam ination of his own
life. It is a political situation where his very living com m unicates his
morality. Apel summarizes this them atic:
Everyone must take upon himself a non-groundable— or not com pletely

groundable— “m oral” decision of faith. T here exists, how ever, even in this
METAJOURNALISM 117
situation of the solitary decision apparently no b etter ethical regulative than

to realize the possible critique of the ideal com m unication com m unity in
one’s own reflexive self-understanding. I believe th at this is the principle of
potential m oral self-transcendence, [p. 288]
O ne technique for illustrating this them e of m oral self-transcendence is

political m etajournalism , like that of Tom W icker. This genre of mass
com m unication is, simply, a paradigm of the poetry of truth.
Chapter Eight
Guess at the Words

H ow to Phenomenologically Research the Hermeneutic
Experience o f Language and Logic
Communicology is the theory and practice of hum an com m unication. As

such it partakes in the m ethodologies of both philosophy and science as
research operations. It is in this sense th at this chapter is about com m uni-
cology. W hat I propose to do is to report the results of em pirical research,
but research that is phenom enological in its m ethod and herm eneutic in
its subject m atter. Having said this much, I need to im m ediately suggest
that I shall soon argue that such positivist exclusions as eidetic and
empirical, experiential and experim ental, or qualitative and quantitative,
are dysfunctional in doing hum an research. A lthough I think that this
summary judgm ent is generally true for the practice of both philosophy
and science, it seems to me to be particularly true for communicology.
By way of illustrating my argum ent, I want to first review in a general
way the problem atic of the hermeneutic experience as a subject matter for
research in communicology and the way in which that subject m atter is
eidetically the philosophic problem of parts and wholes. Second, I briefly
discuss the distinction betw een inform ation theory and com m unication
theory as they relate to the eidetic nature of the problem atic. Last, I
report the empirical them atics that derive from the problem atic. This is to
say, I illustrate how the eidetic problem atic of parts and whole in
inform ation theory com pares with th at of com m unication theory in an
empirical message that is, indeed, them atic as a phenom enology o f
m ethod and as the m eaning of a herm eneutic of experience. My goal, in
short, is to respond to R om an Jakobson’s observation:
118
LANGUAGE AND LOGIC 119
The com parison of incom plete and explicit m essages, the fascinating p ro b -
lem of fragm entary propositions, challengingly outlined in Charles P eirce’s
persual of “ blanks” and in the sem iotic studies of Frege and H usserl,
strange as it may seem , have found no response am ong linguists. The
artificial treatm ent of messages w ithout reference to the superposed context
once m ore exemplifies the illicit conversion of a m ere p art into a seemingly
self-sufficient w hole [1971a, 2:282].
In m eeting this challenge, I shall be following in m ost respects the

thesis adopted by Husserl as he opens Investigation III of the Logical
Investigations. T here he says rath er concisely:
But one needs here a supplem entary distinction betw een the phenom eno-
logical m om ents of unity, which give unity to the experience or parts of
experience (the real phenom enological d ata), and the objective m om ents of
unity, which belong to the intentional objects and parts o f objects, which in
general transcend the experiential sphere [1970, 2:442].
With this overview in m ind, I now should like to turn to a short review
of the herm eneutic experience in the context of communicology as a
hum an science perspective.
T H E H E R M E N E U T IC E X P E R IE N C E
The historical characteristics of the herm eneutic experience em erge in

some ten propositions as Palm er (1969, pp. 242-46) closes his book
Hermeneutics.
1. The hermeneutic experience is intrinsically historical. Every hum an
experience is historically located as an event, a situation, th at is lived
through. O ur conscious experience is reflexively an experience of con-
sciousness; I come to know w hat I am as a person by understanding how I
am situated among other persons in a com m only shared world. H ere we
can recall the communicological classification of Schutz (1967) in which
the historical world of intersubjectivity consists of consociates, persons
who share tem poral and spatial experience— the here and now; contem -
poraries, persons living in my tim e, but located elsew here; predecessors,
those persons who preceded me in tim e and location; and last, successors,
those persons whose history will com m ence after my death, but with
whom my discourse will be present (see chap. 16 below).
2. The hermeneutic experience is intrinsically linguistic. The language
system is not some arbitrary tool by which to m anipulate ciphers; lan-
guage is not a m ere statistic. The articulation of language is a complex
personal gesture in which unique sounds as vowels, consonants, and
120 COMMUNICOLOGY
silences in their unique eidetic structure form a hum an m edium of

communication (Schutz, 1973, 1:287-356). The experience of expression
is reversible with the consciousness of perception; language (langue) is
the empirical record of that eidetic phenom enon (parole) (see chap. 15
below).
3. The hermeneutic experience is dialectical. U nderstanding is not a
simple causality to be located and reified in a single judgm ent. Conscious-
ness as an eidetic fact is always a synergism with experience as an
empirical fact. As M erleau-Ponty (1962) so forcefully argues in his
Phenom enology o f Perception, we do not live in D escartes’ world w here I
am forced to choose constantly betw een w hat “ I think” and what “ I
feel.” R ather, we live as hum an beings w here the dialectic of m ind and
body is a constant state of capability pregnant with ability; I live in a
process of conscious experience in which “ I can” exist with others in a
lived-world of m utual history and discourse (see chap. 7 above).
4. The hermeneutic experience is ontological. B oth understanding and
language are the agency (geste) by which we live and come to know the
reality of ourselves and others in a shared world. Reality is not an
ontological construct in either the tradition of P lato’s idealism or in the
shadow of A ristotle’s realism. Reality is a constitution of hum an con-
scious experience through the com m unicative m edium of language and
related semiotic systems.
5. The hermeneutic experience is an event—a “language event.” As
Michel Foucault (1972; see Lanigan 1984) suggests in his The Archaeol-
ogy o f Knowledge, discourse is always an event in which the gesture of
writing or the articulation of sound “ opens up to itself a residual existence
in the field of m em ory” and yet it is “ subject to repetition, transform a-
tion, and reactivation” (p. 28). Last, the event of com m unication suggests
the modality of any one speech act or statem ent by locating the contex-
tual modality of the acts that precede and follow it.
6. The hermeneutic experience is “objective.” Following on the
points already m ade in the first five propositions, I agree with Palm er
(1969, p. 244) when he asserts that “ the ground of objectivity lies not in
the subjectivity of a speaker, but in the reality which comes to expression
in and through language. It is in this objectivity that the herm eneutical
experience must find its ground.” This is in fact what H usserl has in mind
during his analysis of parts and wholes.
7. The hermeneutic experience is led by the text. The text provides a
dialogical structure in which the reader or listener is invited to explore the
dimensions of understanding. As an initial stage of the dialogical process,
a person in the m odality of conscious experience comes to the text as a
modality of experienced consciousness. H ence, the text is a com m unica-
tive event of capability. I discover in the text a message— that is, my own
possibility for understanding over and above the misleading causality that
mere analysis would generate. T he m onologue of the text allows m e to

discover hum an dialogue.
8. The hermeneutic experience understands what is said in the light o f the
present. The process of interpretation requires a direct application to the
present situation. R ather than a m ere taxonom ical project, interpretation
requires an explication that m akes objective what is both eidetic and
empirical in the text as message. T he location of the text is a specification
of its synchronic and diachronic m om ent and its paradigm atic and syntag-
matic structure— th at is, the text has an ontological status and a historical
signification in the understanding of the hum an auditor. The text is
always a message in lived experience.
9. The hermeneutic experience is a disclosure o f truth. As Palm er (1969,
p. 245) suggests, “T ruth is grounded in negativity; this is the reason that
the discovery of tru th proceeds best within a dialectic in which the pow er
of negativity can o p erate.” T ruth is a m om ent of understanding, an
aesthetic m om ent, in which the text as an expressive event is m anifest to
perception. T ruth is not, therefore, merely eidetic or em pirical, but both,
and synergistically so. As F oucault’s w ork suggests, there is a herm eneu-
tic primacy to the Law of N oncontradiction.
10. Aesthetic m ust be swallowed up in hermeneutics. In other words,
aesthetics and the process of valuing perception m ust be dialectically
united with expression as the explication of understanding. Perception
and expression are a reversible m odality of conscious experience that is
overtly m anifest in the m edia of com m unication— th at is, in being a
human Being (Dasein).
Given this propositional description of the herm eneutic experience

with particular reference to hum an com m unication, we are now in a
position to examine the eidetic problem atic created by taking com m uni-
cation per se as the subject m atter of a herm eneutic experience. The
paradox of parts and wholes is im m ediately apparent as we realize that
the hum an experience of com m unication is a presentation containing a
re-presentation at several levels of analysis and synthesis. T here are two
resolutions to this paradox: one is inform ation theory as the answer of
positivism, the other is com m unication theory as the answer of phenom e-
nology.
E ID E T IC PR O B L E M A T IC
In the discussion that follows, I am summarizing an extended discussion

of the interrelationship betw een inform ation theory and com m unication
theory that appeared some years ago (Lanigan, 1979b; see Jakobson,
1971b; see chap. 14 below).
122 COMMUNICOLOGY
Let us look at inform ation theory first. This theory solves the paradox
of parts and wholes, choice and context, presentation and re-presentation,
within a “superposed context” (to recall Jakobson’s phrase). Inform ation
theory hypostatizes a context in which choices are m ade; in other words,
a whole is assumed in which parts are selected or a presentation is
assumed to control all subsequent re-presentations. “ Inform ation” be-
comes the “ reduction of uncertainty” in which a probability of choice is
constructed. Each choice m ade has inform ation value— that is, it tells you
w hether you have m ade an efficient selection or m erely confirmed what
you already knew (which is redundancy). Inform ation theory thereby
prescribes a context o f choice, but no choice per se. W e may speak
m etaphorically and say that each “ choice” narrows the “ context,” but
this type of thinking is illicit. The holistic notion of context turns out not
to be the object with which we start, but the goal with which we seek to
end, but cannot. W e reduce our uncertainty about the context, yet we
never in fact locate the context. This is why the inform ation theorist is
forced to talk about “ inform ation” as a post hoc selection, rather than the
“ m eaning,” which is the located context per se.
Com m unication theory is in an opposite stance inasmuch as “m eaning”
is the key ingredient for analysis. The com municologist hypothesizes that
a choice always leads to a context. “ C om m unication” becom es the
“constitution of certainty” in this view. Each choice m ade has meaning
value— that is, it tells you what your choice is by im m ediate com binatory
association with all the possible choices not m ade. C om m unication theory
thereby prescribes a choice o f context. U nlike the digital logic of inform a-
tion theory in which all choices are either/or selections, the analogue logic
of communication theory entails all choices as both/and selections by
combination. The paradox of parts and wholes is resolved by under-
standing that a synergistic effect occurs with an analogue logic wherein
parts constitute wholes and those wholes are sim ultaneously parts of
other wholes in a field of possibility, as H usserl argues.
W hat we have so far is a discussion of inform ation and com m unication
theories as answers to the paradox of parts and wholes when considered
at one level of analysis. Such a lim itation is usually sufficient w hen dealing
with m achines, for exam ple, that are by definition self-restricted as
one-level entities. H ow ever, when we are dealing with hum an beings,
whose com m unication systems operate sim ultaneously at several levels
and via m em ory may invoke a tem poral dim ension that reverses valences
and substitutes systems, the linear application in one dim ension of infor-
m ation theory and/or com m unication theory becomes com pletely in-
adequate for dealing with a person’s herm eneutic experience.
The answer to the multidim ensional problem lies in viewing com m uni-
cation theory as a construction principle per se— that is, as a formal
version of the herm eneutic experience (Lanigan, 1979b). This is to

suggest that the herm eneutic experience can be represented by com m uni-
cation theory where that theory both entails itself and inform ation theory
in any given description of hum an com m unication. In simple term s, I am
suggesting th at com m unication theory as a choice of context entails both
another choice of context (com m unication theory) and a context of choice
(information theory). In previous research (Lanigan, 1979b; 1982a; 1983a),
I dem onstrated the eidetic ground for this analysis. In o th er empirical
research (1979a; 1982b; 1983b), I show a similar result and this chapter is
a continuation of th at em pirical series of projects.
E M P IR IC A L TH EM A T IC S
We are now in a theoretical position to exam ine the research project I call
“ Guess at the W ords.’’ R esearch issues betw een inform ation theory and
com m unication theory are im m ediately clear when we examine an em -
pirical example of language and its m eta-representative function as a
message in hum an com m unication. The exam ple has to do with the
standard concern in linguistic communicology with the fact that all hum an
languages have a tone system roughly describable as com posed of “vow-
els” and “ consonants,” which provides a binary system of contrast
(disjunction) if viewed as an exam ple of inform ation theory or a binary
system of com parison (conjunction) if viewed as an exam ple of com m uni-
cation theory. This also is the basis of C. S. Peirce’s (1931-35/1958, 4.537)
distinction among tone, type, and token.
The linkage of vowels and consonants, thus, offers an ideal research
situation. O n the one hand, it is a situation that can be analyzed sim ulta-
neously for its eidetic structure and content as well as its em pirical
qualities. A nd the difficult conditions of dealing with representations of
representation in a hermeneutic experience can be empirically specified in
a way that m aintains the richness of th at hum an awareness of conscious
experience.
I take as my initial phenom enological description of the problem atic
the account given by Y uen R en Chao (1970), which is a prototype
analysis of the inform ation theory point of view. In discussing vowels and
consonants, he offers two empirical illustrations of “ inform ation” as the
reduction of uncertainty:
T here are ways of distinguishing vowels unam biguously, but they are not
used in norm al writing, which is intelligible w ithout full syllabic rep resen ta-
tion, just as *ngl*sh w*d [sic w**ld] b* *nt*ll*g*bl [sic *nt*ll*g*bl*] wh*n
sp*lt w*th n*th*ng b*t c*ns*n*nts [1970, p. 106],
124 COMMUNICOLOGY
L ater on in his analysis, Chao offers the follow-up illustration:
All items in a list of symbols do not have the same inform ation value, since
they do not occur with the same frequency. Since th ere are few er vowels
than consonants and vowels occur m ore frequently than consonants, each
of the latter gives m uch m ore inform ation than the form er; hence it is much
easier to g**ss *t th* w*rds w r*tt*n w*th**t v*w*ls than to *ue** a* **e
*0*** * j« ou* *0**0*a*** (cf p 106) [1970j p 205],
It is interesting to note that the artist who com posed the cover illustra-
tion for C hao’s book phenom enologically reduced and interpreted his
examples in a precise herm eneutic experience:
g**ss *t th* w*rds

UC d c u
wr*tt*n w*th**t
v*w*ls
*0¥*0*a*** [Book C over Illustration, C hao 1970]
W hen I first saw this book cover illustration of the message, I im medi-
ately recognized that the artist had reduced the inform ation theory
example to a com plete expression of the herm eneutic experience of
language, which is a m eaning in hum an com m unication— that is, the artist
renders an em pirical example of the eidetic condition of parts and wholes
in communication. The cover illustration instantiates the eidetic rule that
com m unication theory entails both com m unication theory and inform a-
tion theory. The eidetic is m ade empirical as the herm eneutic experience,
and it is done phenom enologically.
In order to confirm my analysis of w hat the artist had done, I designed
a simple empirical experim ent that requires respondents to reconstitute
the herm eneutic experience of a message w ritten in the English language.
I constructed a research protocol (see Figure 18) that asks respondents to
constitute the message encoded in the “ cover illustration” example.
Having so constituted all or p art of the m essage, the research protocol
then asks for a brief description of how the respondent proceeded to
interpret (translate) the encoding and decoding.
We need to recall that C hao’s example (p. 205) contains two sequenced
sentences that would norm ally read: “ Guess at the words w ritten w ithout
vowels. Guess at the words w ritten w ithout consonants.” It is im portant
to not use this version of the encoded m essage, because it obscures (by
suggesting a single context of choice— nam ely, the sentence) the relation-
ship between vowel and consonant, word and sentence, sentence and
message, and thereby appears to confirm an inform ation theory descrip-
N A M E __________________________ D A T E _______ F IR ST LA N G U A G E .
AGE _ _ _ _ _ H O M E C O U N T R Y __________________ S E X _______
Instructions:
The message given below is culturally encoded.
In the blank space provided, write out a com plete translation.
G**SS *T TH* W *RDS
W R*TT*N W*TH**T
V*W*LS
*0**0*^* **
Translation:
Now that you are finished with the translation, explain in a few sentences w hat the
key elem ents of the code are, that is, H O W were you able to translate?
Figure 18. Research test protocol
tion as adequate when it is not. By using the message form at of the artist’s
illustration in the test protocol, the meaning levels of vowel/consonant,
w ord/sentence, sentence/m eaning are preserved as possible choices of
context, any of which will entail both other choices of context and
contexts of choice as a synergism.
A nother point to keep in m ind about the test protocol is that it asks
respondents to constitute m eaning, not reduce uncertainty. H ere, the ten
propositions of the herm eneutic experience are relevant. R espondents
will be successful with the test protocol insofar as they intuit that eidetic
and empirical phenom ena will com bine to create understanding. As
Husserl summarizes the issues:
126 COMMUNICOLOGY
A thing or piece of a thing can be presented by itself—this m eans it would

be w hat it is even if everything outside it w ere annihilated. If we form a
presentation of it, we are not necessarily referred to som ething else,
included in which, or attached to which, or associated with which, it has
being, or on whose mercy it depends, as it w ere, for its existence. W e can
imagine it as existing by itself alone, and beyond it nothing else. If it is
intuitively presented, a context, a whole including it, may nonetheless be
presented with it, m ust inevitably be so presented [1970, 2:445],
In a m ore precise version that readily illustrates the thesis of com m uni-
cation theory, Husserls argues:
O ne sees further that the form -contents of higher level necessarily form a
whole with the whole descending series of forms of lower level, and in such
com bination always represent complex forms to the ultimately foundational
elements. In the sphere of com plex sensuous shapes, particularly visual and
auditory ones, this can be readily illustrated, w hereas the general fact can
be seen a priori from concepts [1970, 2:479-80].
In short, Husserl gives us a concise description of the phenom enologi-

cal research function we can anticipate in the research protocol provided
by the artist’s illustration of the vowel/consonant differentiation in the
English language (see Figure 18).
The research protocol was given to fifty persons in all. I devised two
test groups from the point of view of the propositional description of the
herm eneutic experience. O ne test group consisted of faculty and graduate
students in the D epartm ent of Speech Com m unication at Southern Illi-
nois University. The protocols were adm inistered in July 1983 with no
other instructions than those given on the protocol (see Figure 18).
R espondents were asked to return the protocol sometime during the
following two weeks; m ost returned the com pleted protocols in a day or
two, a few within a week. The protocol asked for certain types of
dem ographic data intended as additional descriptive inform ation about
the persons. The goal was to have a m aximum range of types of persons,
so a rough balance betw een males and females was sought and, in
addition, a wide range of ages. Because I had a hypothetical concern that
the native speakers of English would not be able to intuit the differentia-
tion between the logical syntax of English (an inform ation theory model)
as w ritten and the herm eneutic logic of their own institution (a com m uni-
cation theory m odel), I included persons whose first language was not
English to see if a contrast em erged. None did em erge in either group.
I presum ed that the departm ent respondents would provide m ore
successful (phenom enological description) and better expressed (phe-
nomenological interpretation) protocol responses because of their com -
munication training, and I also expected the second test group to be
TABLE 1
D e m o g r a p h ic s f o r Te st G r o u ps
Group Respondents Sex Age Range* First Language
GSD** 20 M = 11 1 9 -2 7 English = 13
F = 9 O ther = 7
DEPT*** 30 M = 19 2 1 -6 0 English = 24
F = 11 O ther = 6
* Years
** G eneral Studies A rea D ; students in a first year course: Interpersonal Com m unication.
*** D epartm ent of Speech C om m unication; SIU -C faculty and graduate students.
successful, but to a lesser degree. The general studies respondents were

thirty undergraduate students in an interpersonal com m unication class at
Southern Illinois University. Their protocols were adm inistered in
August 1983. The group had the same dem ographic characteristics as the
first group, but the age range was sm aller (see Table 1).
The com parative results from the two groups of respondents are
presented in Tables 2 through 9. Given these results as empirical evidence
of various levels of herm eneutic experience, we can analyze each one in
term s of its illustration of inform ation theory and com m unication theory,
and their respective interpretative levels. As an initial orientation to the
interpretation of test results, it will be useful to indicate how each group
of responses fits into the selection of possible logics betw een inform ation
theory and com m unication theory. As illustrated in Figure 19, the re -
search protocol message is a com plete sem iotic system that operates on
essentially three levels. Level one is the connotative semiotic in the
standard Hjelm slev (1961; see Eco 1976; W ilden 1980) system and here is
represented by the inscription presence of L E T T E R S representing VO W ELS
and/or C O N SO N A N T S. Level two, which is entailed by level one, is the
denotative semiotic represented by the inscription of STA RS and/or ab -
sence as visual/inscribed SP A C E S, all of which is inscription presence by
C IPH E R S . Level three is that of the m etasem iotic, the process relationship
(herm eneutic) th at allows the first two levels to operate as eidetic and/or
empirical instantiations. The herm eneutic experiences of the respondents
are illustrated in Tables 2-9.
Table 2 records the response constituted by those who understood the
research protocol message in term s of inform ation theory. They p er-
ceived the fact th at the context was fixed as a SY STEM and within it they
could (1) choose either vowels or consonants as letters to m atch the
128 COMMUNICOLOGY
PRO CESS
XE ither/ (1) V ow els.

S > L etters [empirical] —» C o d e - 1 [eidetic]
O r (2) Consonants j
SYSTEM < And
I
/E ith e r/ (1) Stars x
Ciphers [eidetic] —> C ode-2 [empirical]
I Or )
(2) Spaces·^
Legend: L etters = Connotative Semiotic

Ciphers = D enotative Semiotic
C ode-1 and C ode-2 = M etasem iotic
Figure 19. Communication theory entailments: Letters and ciphers.
TABLE 2 TABLE 3
Messa g e Ty pe Al ph a Messa g e Ty pe Bet a
GUESS A T T H E W O RDS G U ESS A T T H E W O R D S

GUESS A T T H E W O RDS G U ESS A T T H E W O R D S
W R ITTEN W IT H O U T W R IT T E N W IT H O U T
W R ITTEN W IT H O U T W R IT T E N W IT H O U T
VOW ELS V O W ELS
CO N SO N A N TS
GSD = 9 [1 = overwrite] GSD = 5

D E PT = 3 D E P T = 25 [1 = overwrite]
letters given, (2) treat stars and spaces as the presence or absence of
letters, and (3) could see stars only as spaces. Figure 20 m aps this process
on a formally defined Hjelm slevian grid. Table 3 records the same
process, except that this group was able to see that vowels and consonants
are arbitrary representations via stars for spaces in the sem iotic system.
W hat is presum ed by all respondents in Tables 2 and 3 is that the system is
the context; hence there is no eidetic provision for the fact that letters
re-present that which is absent (e.g., experience of level differentiation).
W e may consider Tables 4 and 5 as variations of Table 3 and its explana-
tion. Similarly, Tables 6 and 7 are variations on Table 2.
TABLE 4 TABLE 5
Messa g e Ty pe Ga mma Messa g e Ty pe Del t a
GUESS A T THE WORDS W RITTEN G U ESS A T T H E W O R D S

WITHOUT VOWELS CONSONANTS W R IT T E N W IT H O U T V O W ELS
GSD = 1 G SD = 1
D E PT = 0 D EPT = 0
TABLE 6 TABLE 7
Messa g e Ty pe E p s il on Messa g e Ty pe Zet a
GUESS A T T H E W O R D S [various word fragments]

W R ITTEN W IT H O U T
GSD = 1 G SD = 3
D EPT = 0 DEPT = 0
TABLE 8 TABLE 9
Me s s a g e Ty pe Et a Messa g e Ty pe Th et a
GUESS A T T H E W O R D S G U ESS A T T H E W O R D S
W R ITTEN W IT H O U T W R IT T E N W IT H O U T V O W ELS
VOW ELS A N D CO N SO N A N TS
G U ESS A T T H E W O R D S
W R IT T E N W IT H O U T C O N SO N -
ANTS
GSD = 0 G SD = 0
D E PT = 1 D EPT = 2
T a b le 9 r e c o rd s th e re s p o n s e o f p e rs o n s u sin g a c o m m u n ic a tio n th e o ry
p e rsp e c tiv e . T h e y p e rc e iv e th e fa c t th a t th e ir ch o ic e s c o n s titu te a c o n te x t
(p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l d e s c rip tio n ), w h ic h its e lf e n ta ils c h o o s in g a n o th e r
c o n te x t (p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l re d u c tio n ) a n d w ith in th a t c o n te x t a p e rs o n
ca n m a k e d isc re te ch o ic e s (p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l in te r p r e ta tio n ) . T h e y p e r -
ceiv e th e fa c t th a t c h o ic e is a PR O C E S S c o n ta in in g v a rio u s sy stem s as a
c o n te x t w h e re (1) v o w els a n d c o n s o n a n ts a r e le tte rs d isp la y in g th e ir
d iffe re n tia tio n b y c o m b in a tio n w ith th e le tte rs g iv e n , (2) s ta rs a n d sp a ce s
c o m b in e as c ip h e rs o f th e p r e s e n c e a n d a b s e n c e o f le tte rs and b re a k s
b e tw e e n g ro u p s o f le tte rs (w o rd s ), a n d (3) v o w e ls d e s ig n a te sp a c e s th a t
130 COMMUNICOLOGY
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are present (can be empirically instantiated in some way in the system) as

opposed to those that are absent and cannot be realized (see Figure 21).
These respondents intuit that the essence of the herm eneutic experience
in the research protocol message is that (1) vowels and consonants as a
com binatory set (connotative semiotic) entail (2) stars and spaces as a
com binatory set (denotative sem iotic), which in turn entails (3) the
com binatory set of letters and ciphers (m etasem iotic) that as a process is
the meaning of the message. In brief, the m eaning of the message is that
differentiation is shown by com bination. Less precisely, we can say that
contrast is best understood as com parison or that com bination allows
selection.
Table 8 represents an interesting proof of the herm eneutic experience
as grounded in com m unication theory by extending appropriately the
message with the inclusion of the word “ an d ” to m ark the com bination
rule and by the elim ination of repeated sentence elem ents (redundancy is
elim inated). O ne com binatory sentence is produced (unity is predicated).
The message becomes the m eaning. D epartm ent respondents used sev-
eral phrases to describe the successful constitution of the m eaning when
they moved beyond the digital (either/or) choices in context to the
analogue (both/and) choices o f context. F or exam ple, choice of context
was described as finding the “ content of the m essage,” “ context of the
m essage,” “ the continuous sen ten ce,” and the fact th at the message was
“ contextualized by m eaning, not lexically.”
O ne general studies respondent described the com pletion of the test
according to Table 3 as “ duplication, alternation, con trast.” H ad the
respondent been able to apply this description to the constitution of the
message, rather than its deconstruction, the result would have been
appropriately Table 9, not Table 3. This is to say, the respondent
experienced “ duplication, alternation, contrast” as a digital logic rather
than as an analogue, com binatory logic. The respondent was not able to
convert “ inform ation” into “ m eaning.” This fact in itself illustrates
readily enough H usserl’s contention:
In the sphere of the phenom enological events of the “ stream of conscious-

ness,” a law of essence paradigm atically illustrates the non-independence
just m entioned, the law, nam ely, th at each actual, fulfilled conscious-
present necessarily and continuously passes over into one th at has just
existed, so th at our present conscious state m akes continuous dem ands on
our conscious future [1970, 2:461].
O r as H olenstein sum m arizes, “ The m eaning is by no m eans objec-

tively conscious in the act of signifying. It can how ever at any tim e be
rendered objective and plain by a retroflective regard” (1975, p. 70).
A lthough the theory of inform ation may pretend to the objectivity of
132 COMMUNICOLOGY
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meaning in communication by its specification of “inform ation,” it is, as

M erleau-Ponty would say, an “ objective illusion” (see chap. 5 above). It
is in the view of com m unication theory that we can take H olenstein’s
retroflective regard in the stream of consciousness and discover m eaning
in hum an com m unication. W e have just surveyed an em pirical experi-
m ent that dem onstrates this fact. Y et it is empirical only because its
retroflective regard is eidetic·, it is experimental only because its retroflec-
tive regard is experiential·, it is a describable quality only because its
retroflective regard is quantifiable as an explication. Indeed, com m unica-
tion theory is herm eneutic only to the degree that it entails inform ation
theory and m akes of it a m eaningful hum an stream of consciousness,
rather than a rule for experience.
In short, the empirical research project that I call “ Guess at the
W ords” gives way to an eidetic understanding of the experience of
differentiation as synergistic because it is a com m unication used to
examine the essence of a particular com m unication. It is a part that is
retroflective on the whole.
Recalling the ten propositions with which I opened this chapter, we can
now see the sense in which the inform ation theorists of positive science
ask us to take hum an com m unication as a conscious experience th at is
either historical, or linguistic, or dialectical, or ontological, or an event, or
“ objective,” or led by the text, or understood in the present, or a
disclosure of truth, or a m ere aesthetic in contrast to science. This is the
digital logic of exclusion in which the first exclusion is the awareness of
hum an m eaning as lived.
Against these ten propositions so construed, H usserl offers us one
“universal proposition” when he argues as a contem porary com m unica-
tion theorist would:
“Pieces” are essentially mediate or remote parts of a whole whose

“pieces” they are, if combinatory forms unite them with other “pieces”
into wholes which in their turn constitute wholes o f higher order by way of
novel forms [1970, 2:483].
Put m ore concisely, he says simply, “ unity is in fa ct a categorical

predicate” (1970, 2:478). W e need only add th at in the hum an science of
communicology, as we see in the experim ent “ Guess at the W ords,” such
a unity is conscious experience as lived. H um an com m unication is in fact
a novel form of meaning.
Chapter Nine
Urban Crisis______________________________
The Phenom enology o f Social Polarization and
Communication
The phenom ena of “ urban tension”— or m ore properly “ urban crises”—

are distinguishable by several characteristics, not the least im portant of
which is polarization. Polarization is a behavior stim ulated by one of two
social practices: isolation or confrontation. W ithin the urban problem -
atic, polarization creates a lived perspective of reality based on value
divisions that characterize one individual as “ good, right, lawful, ra-
tional,” and the like, whereas his or her neighbor becomes “ evil, wrong,
unlawful, irrational,” and so on. Such value orientations have a logical
progression th at ultim ately has to rely on a pow er concept of self-
assertion for self-preservation (Foucault 1965; 1979). In a w ord, violence
becomes the ethic of polarization.
T here is a viable alternative to this ethic of destruction and death. Such
an alternative is suggested by the problem itself—nam ely, the need for
relevant, m eaningful com m unication. It should be a com m unication
operable within the contexts that also breed isolation and confrontation
(see chap. 1 above). A t present, com m unication exists but it is seldom
relevant or meaningful, because it does not function within the crisis
environment where isolation and confrontation compete (Habermas 1984,
1:244). T hat is, com m unication per se has come from outside the crisis
situation; a relevant and meaningful process of com m unication should
originate (in the phenom enological sense of being created) within the
situational tensions (H unter 1963).
134
URBAN CRISIS 135
POLARIZATION
Is o l a t io n a l Po l a r iz a t io n
The phenom enon of isolation is best viewed from two perspectives:

(1) the isolation of the in-group versus the isolation of the out-group; and
(2) the isolation of an elite leadership within the in-group by virtue of the
external conflict existent betw een the in-group and the out-group
(Olm sted 1959; W orth 1964). The first variety of isolational polarization
within the urban environm ent is exemplified in the growth and develop-
m ent of the Black Muslim m ovem ent. U nder the dissident, and eventu-
ally estranged, leadership of M alcolm X , the militancy of the Black
Muslims reached what may be called the crisis level of isolational polari-
zation. The followers of Malcolm X preferred to be left alone and were
willing to kill those who would interfere with their desire for privacy.
It is im portant to note that this xenophobic attitude is not what is
commonly known as “ fanaticism .” Fanatics are those who believe in their
own creed to the extent th at they wish to elim inate its opposite (Russell
1967). This is to say, the eradication of the polar opposite ideology (or its
spokesperson) is m ore im portant than the prom otion of o n e’s own
program (or leader). The isolational polarization of in-groups like the
Black Muslims (“ M uslim” literally m eans “ one who subm its” ) is akin to
the ideology of the “ new left” or “ far right” as they exist in tw entieth-
century A m erican politics.
Behavior reflecting isolational polarization is common among the urban
dwellers of the inner city. T he usual storefront organizations that provide
a structural base for this process of polarization are typically initiated and
staffed by blacks, although there are groups com posed of P uerto Ricans,
M exican-Am ericans (Chícanos), and “poor w hites” (Hillbillies: A ppala-
chian whites). In each case, how ever, the group is racially isolated (Vise
1967; B ureau of the Census 1969). T here are few perm anent working
coalitions betw een racially different groups and each in-group isolates
itself, believing that strength and pow er as a racial unit are gained
whereby the group can protect itself from opposing “ forces.” Protection
or defense is a critical concept in this situation because it draws the line
between the fanatics who are not open to com m unication with their
opposite num ber and the isolationists who are open to dialogue.
U rban individuals with the traits of isolational polarization see their
environm ent as oppressive for a variety of social, economic, and political
reasons. They experience these situational factors as the institutions of
“other” persons not living in their neighborhood— the “ E stablishm ent,”
in other words. Past experience and daily living leads them to believe—
often with adequate justification— th at they as individuals cannot
136 COMMUNICOLOGY
communicate with the institutions. They come into contact with other
persons who represent the anonymous oppressive forces in the urban
life-world (the white caseworker, the white “ ghetto m erchant,” the white
police, and others). Inner-city residents find, to their dismay, that they
are not dealing with other hum an beings but with a personified extension
of an institution or power structure.
T here is no inherent evil or wrong in an institution, but its adm inistra-
tion is another m atter. For exam ple, “ law and o rd er” is an institution that
operates in A m erican society. C ertain transgressions against society are
punished— sometimes. W ithin urban centers the institution of “ law and
o rd er” comes to represent an “ evil,” an “ enem y,” because it is adm inis-
tered as such. To wit: a study prepared for the President’s advisory
commission on crime found in an exam ination of police procedures in
Chicago, Boston, and W ashington that 27 percent of the police forces
committed offenses normally considered felonies or misdemeanors. Minor
shakedowns for meals, drinks, and small favors were too num erous to be
accurately included in the study (Advisory Commission 1968, pp. 204—96).
Such actions are almost universally against m inority groups within the
inner city.
Thus, it is com m on for individuals to band together within the inner
city and form urban organizations th at em erge as vanguards for the
protection of their m em bers. Typical organizations are the Black Panther
Party, the Latin A m ericans’ D efense O rganization (a Chicago-based
group of M exican-Am ericans), the Brown B erets, and operation Cres-
cent (a m ilitant white group in Chicago). In varying degrees, all these
organizations represent groups of urban residents functioning on a para-
military basis or striving to create an operational elite to function for
neighborhood protection.
These groups become isolated within the larger com m unity surround-
ing their “ neighborhood,” be it a city block, a school district, or an entire
community. A t a minimum there is a physical threat of enclosure by
outsiders, not to m ention the intim idation of stereotypic or psychological
enclosure. Com m unication beyond the neighborhood locale is often
term inated by the very creation of the in-group although, ironically; the
underlying purpose for organizing the neighborhood is usually to com m u-
nicate its problem s to the outside world.
My analysis is illustrated by Pinderhughes, a black psychiatrist, who
likens the Black Panther m ovem ent to the problem of independence in an
“ adolescent-parent” situation. T hat is, whites are viewed as “p aren ts”
who restrict the “ adolescents,” the blacks, in their social roles. A solution
becomes possible when the parent perceives the situation as the adoles-
cent perceives it; then com m unication can take place (G rotjah 1968, pp.
15-16). The most specific examples th at bears out the Pinderhughes
hypothesis is the m ilitant black organization in Los A ngeles called US.
URBAN CRISIS 137
“US is Black People; whites would be T H E M ” (Tim e, July 19, 1968,

p. 20). Com m unication with US m em bers is progressing slowly, and it has
eroded some of the isolational polarization (see Psychology Today,
M arch 1970, pp. 40-53).
A second perspective of isolational polarization is the appearance of an
elite leadership whose pow er is generated by progressively focusing on
the degree and kind of difference betw een the in-group and the ou t-
group. The isolation of an elite is accom plished by expanding the m em -
bership limits of the in-group to create m ore contrast betw een the elite
(which becomes the in-group paradigm ) and the out-group. The obvious
secondary effect is to allow, by degrees, a specification of “ in-ness” that
the in-group faction (or a leader thereof) can claim. F or exam ple, the
speeches of Stokely Carm ichael after the sum m er of 1968 used the
polarized term s “w hite” and “ colored.” The m ore explicit bifurcation of
“w hite” and “ black” was abandoned in an attem pt to expand the m em -
bership limits of the in-group (See N ew Republic, August 24,1968, p. 18).
“ C olored” extends beyond “ blacks” to encom pass “ brow n” persons—
M exican-Americans and Latin Am ericans who also are polarized by
“whites” (in jargon terms: Chicano versus A nglo). The functional result
of this strategem was to concentrate leadership in the elite that claims the
highest degree of in-group qualification. T hat is, the “ blacks” are more
“colored” than the “browns,” hence an elite claim to leadership by nature.
Such isolational polarization is the result of the technique of negative
definition by kind and then by degree. W hat is not “ w hite” is “ colored” ;
what is not “ black” but is not “w hite” is “ brow n,” and so on. The
criterion of judgm ent is always some natural characteristic. In the urban
environm ent the criterion is skin color or occasionally language charac-
teristics as a secondary cue if the skin code is am biguous. (This urban
phenom enon is m ore typical of M exican-Am erican in-groups and white
in-groups th at isolate on ethnic or econom ic levels. N onetheless, the
language characteristic is closely linked to “ suspected” racial characteris-
tics in a stereotypic process.) This natural criterion is a very im portant
tool. U ndoubtedly it can and does function within an in-group when it
becomes necessary to isolate one in-group faction from another faction.
In a leadership question the natural criterion will operate nicely when
“black” m ust be separated from “ brow n” or “ yellow” or w hatever.
Isolational polarization, which creates the negatively defined elite, is
the most dangerous because the channels of com m unication are based on
physical factors of race that are im m utable. By physical fiat, one group is
not interested in discourse with the other group. U nfortunately, thinking
with the color of o n e’s skin comes tragically close to thinking with o n e’s
blood, a phenom enon that A dolf H itler exploited. Y et this tendency on
the part of the urban citizen creates a polarization reaction from the
“whites” who choose to assert their own form of elite grouping.
138 COMMUNICOLOGY
The best hypothetical example is probably the white city official who
engages in isolational polarization by creating an elite that is a category
bigger than its opposite (a tyranny-of-the-m ajority schem e). T hat is, a
municipal leader can talk about “ outsiders” (persons who do not live on
your block or mine) or the “com m unist conspiracy” (persons who cannot
be recognized readily, as we can) as responsible for some problem in the
city. It was not the work of any of his residents or “ our p eo p le.” H e
creates an “ elite” by negative definition: everyone not a resident is an
“ outsider.” Values are also attached by negative definition: residents are
lawful, outsiders are unlawful, and the like. Com m unication becomes
difficult, if not impossible, because the value dichotom y is like the race
polarity, and the dichotom y is simply not visible to com m unication once it
is fixed in a situation.
Co n f r o n t a t io n Po l a r iz a t io n
Put simply, confrontational polarization is the opposite of isolational

polarization. There are two varieties of confrontational polarization:
(1) the confrontation of the out-group by the in-group to force uncom m it-
ted persons to choose within the polarity, and (2) the internal confronta-
tion of factions within the in-group th at results in a traditional “ elitism .”
The first variety of confrontational polarization operates in a situation
where opposing groups have the characteristics of the “fanatic.” Each
group (considering itself the in-group) is m ore concerned with stopping
its opponent (the out-group by negative definition) than with self-
protection. Unlike isolational polarization, which is defensive, confronta-
tional polarization is offensive in tactic. The underlying assum ption for
this offensive theory of action is that the m ajority of persons (the public at
large) belong to an uncom m itted m iddle th at will be m oved by a m inority
willing to commit itself to the point of overt action. This is the credo of
the “ new left” in particular and is not far rem oved from the philosophy of
the “far right” in the U nited States. B oth political factions depend on an
identity of direct involvem ent where they organize specifically to “fight”
or “ stop” one another from overwhelming the “ silent m ajority.”
The new left is probably represented best in the actions of the Students
for a Dem ocratic Society in their role as an in-group. Through various
projects they attem pted to define the social, econom ic, and political
problem s of A m erica as the oppression of “rightist” elem ents. Thus, the
polarization of in-group/out-group was engaged. The SDS attem pted to
work with oppressed Am ericans— blacks and “ p o o r” whites mostly— by
organizing them to take direct action against the “ institutions” of the
“power structure.” Thus, confrontational polarization becam e the appli-
cation of organized in-group action against the power structure or its
symbols (usually the police) characteristic of the out-group. For the SDS
URBAN CRISIS 139
the so-called power structure was a product of unacceptable “ rightist”

thinking whose destruction was m ore critical than the existence of the
SDS itself. T he personification of this ideology was the role of the
Chicago Seven in the courtroom . T heir disruption and attem pted destruc-
tion of the trial procedure (a symbol of the out-group) was m ore im por-
tant than saving them selves from jail.
B ut why the use of force (organized action) to confront an opponent?
The SDS would argue that the pow er structure is literally that— a struc-
ture that systematically operates by applying force in various sectors to
enforce its will. The pow er m ay be political, as in the traditional Chicago
m achine enforcem ent of “ ghetto” politics according to its will (Wilson
1965). O r the pow er may be econom ic, w here redevelopm ent program s
such as those of the D epartm ent of H ousing and U rban D evelopm ent are
used to frustrate living conditions by destroying m ore living space than
they create for given low-income groups in the inner city. H U D program s
have been used maliciously by local politicians in a system atic process of
leveling whole city blocks in the inner city— blocks th at “ coincidentally”
housed newly opened storefront offices for protest organizations. O r the
use of force may be social, w here ethnic prejudice is used as a form of de
facto segregation. In each of these cases, pow er is used against inner-city
residents under the guise of helping to relieve their situation.
The SDS w orked to create an opposing pow er base, believing that
power m ust be m et with power. The ideological presum ption is that a
confrontation of pow er blocs will force the uncom m itted m iddle to rally
to the “ju st” side— theirs! A t a m inim um , confrontational polarization
finally forces a division of “friends” and “ enem ies” by identifying respec-
tive political com m itm ents within the “ silent m ajority.”
O n the o ther side of the political question, far right in-groups attem pt
to utilize the existing power structure to m aintain the status quo as they
perceive it. Obviously, force is considered the necessary tool in an area
that does not conform , w hether it be an entire black com m unity or a
rent-strike in one building. Just as the new left works, so does the far
right. Stopping the o ther group is critical to the point of com mitting o n e’s
own group to the struggle even if it risks self-destruction. “ B etter D ead
Than R e d .”
C onfrontation polarization for in-groups and out-groups represents a
m artyr psychosis. The m ost striking confirm ation of this analysis was the
occasional assaults of M inutem en (a far right m ilitant group) on pacifist
Q uaker groups. In a very tragic sense both sides w ere victims of their own
philosophies. It is not surprising, then, to find th at the use of any m eans
up to and including violence (or silence, which can be just as deadly) is
advocated and used. For the new left the m eans may involve burning
buildings or the like, w hereas far right groups would use the m ore
sophisticated (often silent) approach of detention camps through law
140 COMMUNICOLOGY
enforcem ent (i.e., having a U .S. attorney general who would enforce the
provisions of Title II of the Internal Security A ct of 1950— presum ably
constitutional under the precedents of the Nisei internm ent by the D e-
partm ent of the Arm y in W orld W ar II).
“ Elitism ” is the second facet of confrontational polarization. W hen one
in-group, such as the new left, sets itself against an out-group, such as the
far right, there m ust be a plan of action for the confrontation to be an
in-group success. This requirem ent generally evolves into the creation of
a policy that, of course, generates an in-group faction of ideology-m akers
to lead the in-group organization. F or exam ple, the SDS at one conven-
tion was torn apart by conflicting in-group factions attem pting to gain
control of the organization so that the SDS as a whole would reflect one
particular ideology.
This is to say, there was one faction at the convention arguing for
anarchy as a pow er m ethod. A n o th er faction w anted a Peking-oriented
ideology. The “old guard” was attem pting to m aintain a status-quo-
plus-im provem ents approach (New Republic, June 29, 1968, pp. 12-13;
Glassman 1969). In each faction, “ elitism ” is considered a necessary
elem ent in organizing and initiating the in-group’s pow er function, which
is the vehicle to create polarization by confrontation. The successful
creation of an elite m akes com m unication within the organization very
difficult, and policy com m itm ents as an organization becom e impossible.
The result of an elitist pow er struggle is a disorganized m ovem ent with an
ambiguous policy. T here is a generalized desire for confronting the
out-group, but factions cannot overcome the leadership problems brought
on by elitist m aneuvers. The situation is then intensified, usually by the
creation of a secondary elite (a personality contest) as a reaction to the
prim ary elite (a m em bership faction of the in-group).
A similar analysis of a far right in-group would likely reveal the same
characteristics as the far left: m ultiple factions, no united national organi-
zation or ruling coalition, reliance on force to achieve goals, the desire for
polarizing confrontation within the in-group and with the out-group, and
an ultim ate faith in the success of the “ju st” cause.
The confrontations of in-groups and out-groups on the political right
and left leave little room for com m unication. B oth sides believe th at an
inevitable dialectic will take place. They believe a confrontation can
dissolve their opponent into their ranks or literally exterm inate those who
do not assimilate. B oth sides are convinced they will win the engagem ent
because they are right, w hether m orally, politically, socially, or econom i-
cally. Their ideologies are couched in one-dim ensional term s of kind
where the compromise of degree is not adm itted. B oth sides act as though
force is the ultimate instrument to secure the good, the right, the honor-
able— as they define it. Such total com m itm ents allow either chaos or
dictatorship, life or death.
URBAN CRISIS 141
C O M M U N IC A TIO N
Is o l a t io n Co m m u n ic a t io n
W here isolational polarization threatens to create a problem , “ isola-

tional” com m unication (self-identity as an equal com petitor) can be used
to produce a viable alternative to destructive polarization. T he same
situational elem ents that create isolational polarization can be redirected
to m ake com m unication a by-product of isolation behavior. The specific
procedures are those of the phenom enological approach to the discipline
of communicology. The individual can be instructed in the theory and
technique of egocentric speech as it occurs in a dialogue situation of
synergic perception and expression. T he basic concept is that the polar-
ization of individuals can be used as the “ content” base from which to
build a positive structure of self-identity and com m itm ent, rather than the
negative structure of defensive isolation from others (Kw ant 1969).
Egocentric discourse can be the dialectical tool used in com m unity
organizations to m ake the m em bers com petitors (not com batants) with
the out-groups perceived to be the polarized “ enem y.”
A notable example of egocentric dialogue in the political sphere was
the creation of “ balanced” delegations to the national conventions of the
Am erican political parties. These are not the products of isolational
polarization, as was the Mississippi Freedom Party that was essentially
the black substitution for the regular white D em ocratic Party delegation
from the state of Mississippi. R ather, the new challenging delegations at
the 1968 conventions were com petitors with, not com batants against, the
“pow er stru ctu re.” These delegations w ere functional alternatives in a
dialectically structured power situation that allowed the challenging p ar-
ticipants to identify with the com petitive process by their com m itm ent
to it.
W ithin the economic sphere, egocentric dialogue has brought about the
proposal for an urban bank system that would provide the financial base
that the inner cities need to com pete with, not isolate from , the surb-
urbian economy. The com m unity bank concept was first proposed by
militant leaders in several black com m unities and then was taken up by
the 1968 presidential candidates. T he dialogue appeared to be successful
with the creation of the Council of U rban Affairs th at would handle such
economic proposals (Tim e, D ecem ber 20, 1968, p. 16).
A third area of egocentric dialogue of “ isolational” com m unication is
within the social setting of the inner city, specifically in education. H ere
the m odel of egocentric dialogue is exemplified by H arlem Prep. In the
fall of 1967 the U rban League established H arlem P rep in a N ational
G uard A rm ory on the H arlem R iver in New Y ork City. The school
concentrated on fundam entals, and the literature and history of black
142 COMMUNICOLOGY
Am erica. Classes were inform al and open within a sem inarlike form at.
The use of the Socratic m ethod created a sense of com petitive identity in
the students. All twenty-seven of the original graduates of H arlem Prep
were adm itted to colleges and universities such as Vassar and Berkeley
(N ew sw eek, July 8, 1968, p. 46).
The application of positive techniques to create a sense of interlocking
identity and competition provides a basis for com m unication within a
dialogue context that otherw ise would result in varying forms of isola-
tional polarization, if left to an uninterrupted negative progression.
W here an effort is m ade to create isolated forms of com m unication to
m ake com m unication possible in the outside world, the basis of isola-
tional polarization is eschewed. Egocentric dialogue is a new and experi-
m ental technique in the urban crisis, but it is an alternative to a negative
escalation into power camps. Indeed, “ the dialectic of racism and pow er
can be transcended only by refusal to respond to the rhetoric of Black
Power as if it were a call to battle” (Burgess 1968, p. 131).
Co n f r o n t a t io n a l Co m m u n ic a t io n
Confrontational com m unication as a structural action m ust be derived

from a base similar to the one used in confrontational polarization. The
egocentric function of dialogue for individuals m ust be enlarged to a level
of group interaction. The in-group operation in the examples cited above
is an example of confrontational (or egocentric) group com m unication.
G roup dialogue identifies one in-group within the com m unity at large by
committing the in-group to interactive relationships— true dialogue—
with the community. In each of the previously cited examples individuals
with a sense of identity and purpose united to com pete as a unit in a
situation where the collectivity of the in-group required recognition and
dialogue as a basis from which individuals could em erge.
Negative and disruptive confrontation (w ithout dialogue) occurs, not
as the result of an individual polarized by conflict, but because the
individual is caught up in the crowd phenom enon of an in-group being
confronted by or confronting an out-group. C onfrontation com m unica-
tion can avoid this problem by transferring the lesson of personal ego-
centric dialogue within a single group context to the context of group
versus group. Thus, group action— like individual interaction— could
contribute in a positive m anner to a dialogue w here com m itm ent by
in-groups allows each group to develop a purposeful identify from its
interaction with the o th er group. This group identity becomes a group
entity that continually undergoes revision and adjustm ent for growth and
developm ent, but not at the expense of its dialectical partner.
The dialogue approach of both isolational and confrontational com m u-
nication can be susceptible to the charge that it really am ounts to
URBAN CRISIS 143
“ acquiescing to the power structure,” or “playing the white m an’s gam e,”
or the like. Such an interpretation frequently overlooks two fundam ental
points about the process of com m unication as egocentric dialogue: (1) the
effectiveness of “isolational” com m unication depends upon the individu-
al’s creation of an identity with a past heritage and culture, and (2) the
utility of confrontational com m unication depends upon the competitive
power of individuals who offer a united front and a w orkable alternative
to the existing system. This second point does not am ount to the destruc-
tion of the opposition, but to its reform . In both cases, the product is
positive and constructive, and in both instances the hum an agents are
“their own p erso n .” To such advantages there is only the bleak alterna-
tive of destructive and negative polarization, usually adm inistered by an
elite of some type fo r the individual.
The choice itself betw een polarization and com m unication is an indi-
vidual choice. Polarization offers life to the m ore powerful com batant;
egocentric speech offers life to all who choose to speak. “T hat we have
delayed in choosing or, by delaying, may be m aking the wrong choice,
does not sentence us to separatism or despair. B ut we m ust choose. W e
will choose. Indeed, we are now choosing” (Advisory Commission 1968,
p. 408).
C O M M U N IC A T IO N AS C H O IC E
Polarization is a social phenom enon with positive characteristics dem on-

strated in a reductive tendency tow ard isolation. Polarization has a
negative m anifestation as an attem pt to confront the opposing force by
creating a power-based offensive posture. W hen the group polarization is
positive in nature, it exhibits an “ elite” leadership characteristic of
inclusiveness. W here the polarization is negative, the growth of “ elitism ”
provides an exclusive nature to the group.
Communication also functions dialectically in an isolational and con-
frontational context. Com m unication as “ isolational” concentrates on
providing an egocentric aspect to personal speech and interpersonal
relationships. Speech as dialogue can be expanded to a collective level to
provide a group with a com petitive base of pow er; this is confrontational
communication.
In short, com m unication can be a viable alternative to silence or violent
polarization, if it is chosen. T hat choice has been m ade in some areas, and
not in others. Y et, in a very real sense the choice is always being m ade,
for inaction is the choice of not choosing. “W e are willing, frequently, to
let our silence count as consent on a good many issues which we think are
either too trivial or too delicate to push the p oint” (W orth 1964, p. 33).
Chapter Ten
Life History Interviews

A Teaching and Research M odel fo r Semiotic
Phenomenology
The Federal W riters Project was abolished in 1939 by the U nited States
Congress. The project was a victim of the now infam ous H ouse Un-
Am erican Activities Com m ittee chaired by Senator Joseph M cCarthy. A
unique undertaking of the W orks Progress A dm inistration (W PA ), the
project functioned during 1938 and 1939, the last years of the G reat
Depression. While A dolf H itler was telling the G erm an people w hat its
condition was, Franklin R oosevelt was quietly sending some sixty-five
hundred unem ployed writers out to ask the A m erican people w hat its life
was like. These writers conducted interviews and transcribed m ore than
ten thousand personal narratives. These life-history narratives are, in
fact, personal accounts of significant life-events that signify the very
lived-world of ordinary persons whose discourse reduces society and
culture to its com m unicated essence. The phenom enology of the existen-
tial narrative records hum an conscious experience.
As these persons express their life experiences, as they tell their story,
we perceive a discursive process of consciousness that explicates the
experience of personal, social, and cultural reality (K am ler 1983). In
short, the narration of the life-event instantiates the existential value and
phenom enological m eaning of society, of the lived-world of others. The
eidetic and empirical m om ents form a dialectic of expression and percep-
tion in which the life-event is the life-history. Discourse forms a l ’histoire
in which personal consciousness is social experience (Lanigan 1982a;
1984; Johnson et al. 1982).
144
LI FE-HIS T OR Y INTERVIEWS 145
Both the unique data of life-events and the m ethodology for analyzing
such data are the focus of my concern (Bogdan & Biklen 1982). My
interest in the data stems from an undergraduate course I teach, “ C om -
munication and Social Process.” Its purpose is to teach students how
hum an com m unication functions as a social institution, both in the
semiotic sense of social form ation and in the phenom enological sense of
personal identity as a transform ation in society. In this course I am
concerned with the fact that despite the enorm ous am ount of inform ation
generated under the banner of the “ social sciences” in the last fifty years,
there is precious little understanding of w hat individual persons in society
think, do, and believe as confirmed from their own lips to their own
satisfaction (Nelson 1986). In short, the social world as displayed in
survey research is largely an unacknow ledged fiction in the context of
hum an conscious experience. Persons are treated as anything but the
society they live.
As part of this ideological failure, my second concern is m ethodology.
W ith an undergraduate class, I w ant to discuss research m ethods in a
rigorous way. Y et I also want students to becom e proficient with a
m ethod that personally allows each one of them to experience the
conduct of research as a social event. In my attem pts to form ulate the
undergraduate class plan in conjunction with ongoing graduate student
research projects, it becam e obvious that although graduate students are
frequently told about research and given som ething like replication
exercises, they also seldom have the actual research experience while still
taking course work. In short, I determ ined th at w hat a teacher only tells
graduate students or only does with undergraduates might well be con-
verted into what and how students at both levels might do to learn a
research m ethod devoted to life-event data gathering and analysis.
The rem ainder of this chapter is a display of the very dialectic of
teaching and research that entails the data and analytic m ethod of
life-event investigation in the hum an sciences. First, I discuss the life-
event investigation as a pedagogical focus in the classroom. Second, I
shall take up the theoretical orientation of such research— its ideological
stance, if you will.
T E A C H IN G L IFE -E V EN TS M E T H O D O L O G Y
A fter a silence of nearly fifty years, A nn Banks (1980) presented the life
histories of eighty persons who w ere interview ed as respondents by some
forty-one m em bers of the F ederal W riters P roject. I used B anks’s book
First-Person Am erica as a data source for my class. O n the one hand, it
gave us access to uncatalogued m aterials available only at the Library of
146 COMMUNICOLOGY
Congress. On the other hand, it is a book that acknowledges its own lack
of theory and the post hoc nature of its m ethodology. The life-events of
interviewed persons are vicariously grouped under the designations Old
Times, Im m igrant Lives, The Y ards, Industrial Lore, M onum ental
Stone, R ank and File, Tobacco People, W om en on W ork, Troupers and
Pitchm en, The Jazz Language, and Testifying.
There is an anti-intellectual notion that life histories speak for them -
selves—which of course they do not. R ath er than suggest ideological
naivety, we should note with some caution at this point that B anks’s work
is considered standard scholarship in the area of “ oral history” em ployed
as a m ethodology. For exam ple, T hom pson’s classic work The Voice o f
the Past: Oral History (1978) specifies the key ingredient of such research
to be the establishm ent of a correlation, in H jelm slev’s (1969) sense,
between the official record and the personal narrative. This either/or
approach to “ facts” and “ true reality” is just w hat Banks attem pts in a
long introduction to her book. Y et w hat I want to point out (and it is a
key point in the classroom experience) is that the B anks book is merely
data collection and post hoc theory as an artifact of the editorial process.
W e can and need to move onto theoretically inform ed analysis where
“ correlation” as an either/or logic is not a conflation of the law of
identity.
The eighty narratives in the book have a sem iotic structure that can be
phenomenologically reduced— a fact that is preconsciously signaled by
Banks’s groupings of narratives and the very selection of eighty accounts
from the ten thousand available. The narrative life-events have a p h e-
nomenological m eaning that can be explicated as an interpretation of the
data— a fact prereflectively signaled by B anks’s concern to reinterview
inform ants and interview writers in order to learn w hat the experience
m eant (not to learn if the original narratives w ere “ accurate” by com par-
ing them with other records— which standard oral history m ethodology
requires!). W e should also note that a N ational Public R adio production
(1980) based on the Banks book, which aired under the title “First-
Person Am erica: Voices from the T hirties,” also filled in the theoretical
void by interviewing, not Banks; but several of the original W PA inter-
viewers to get their theoretical assessm ent of w hat they did and why,
especially with regard to the discovery of social orientations in the U nited
States of Am erica.
R eturning to the classroom experience, the first step is to learn the
communicative distinction betw een inscribed life-events and oral ac-
counts of life-events m ade explicit in the N ational Public R adio produc-
tion as opposed to the book edited by Banks. Students w ere first asked to
write an autobiographical essay— that is, an account of a life-event, a
story about themselves that rem ained in their m em ory as a critical
communication event. Their recollections were universally about a single
LIFE-HISTORY INTERVIEWS 147
event in which they had a personal investm ent of social learning that
instantiated a moral/social value. Some were positive m em ories, some
were negative, some had been expressed before, some w ere confessional,
but all were com m unication events lived through as existential m om ents.
These w ritten protocols were shared am ong the class m em bers so that
every person had both an autobiographical essay and one from each other
person in the class. A standard sem iotic phenom enological analysis was
written up for each essay. Figure 22 is a sam ple of the protocol used for
analysis (cf. Figure 2). (See Lanigan [1979a; 1982a; 1984] and especially
W atson & W atson-Franke [1985] for an overview of semiotic phenom e-
nological theory and praxis that is referred to here.)
In such an analysis, students are asked to follow the three-step m ethod
of description, reduction, and interpretation. The description in this case
is the autobiographical essay. T he reduction consists of abstracting words
and phrases that function as existential signifiers— that is, as revelatory
phrases. Such significations are revelatory in th at they signify the lived-
meaning of the discourse as a life-event. O ne way of describing such
signifiers is th at they are the words and phrases of the person, words that
nom inate w hat the discourse is about as a conscious experience. The
reduction typically specifies an affective, cognitive, or conative boundary
for conscious experience. Intentionality em erges as a communicative
focus on one of the Jakobsonian functions of discourse— that is, the
em otive, conative, referential, poetic, phatic, or metalinguistic (H olen-
stein 1976).
The third step of analysis involving phenom enological interpretation
(herm eneutic) requires two procedures. First, the list of revelatory
phrases obtained from the reduction step is critically exam ined and one or
two selected as the signified in the discourse. Second, a particular sig-
nified is then used as the key part of a herm eneutic proposition— th at is, a
statem ent, w ritten by the analyst, that gives the m eaning implicit in the
explicit discourse. O ften such a proposition does not need to be con-
structed, but rather upon reexam ination of the text a com plete sentence
can be located and used as the paradigm . In oth er words, a seemingly
unim portant statem ent (sentence) can be (is) the preconscious, prereflec-
tive m eaning used by the respondent. Confirm ation is often readily at
hand with such respondent reactions as “ th a t’s w hat I m eant, but I didn’t
know I said it” or the reaction to the analyst’s proposition, “ th at’s what I
was trying to say.” In either case, both the respondent and the inter-
viewer discover the sense in which the phrase is indeed revelatory of
lived-meaning.
Having learned the analytic m ethod of phenom enology using a w ritten
docum ent, the class then proceeds to do similar analyses of each of the
eighty w ritten narratives in the Banks book. W e have two objectives.
First, does the display of natural attitude (“words speak for them selves” )
148 COMMUNICOLOGY
Semiotic Phenomenology Analysis Worksheet
1. D E SC R IPTIO N : Them atizing C apta as Signs.

{Specify the R espondent’s Protocol for D iscourse; W hat is the them atic
context?}
2. R E D U C TIO N : A bstracting C apta as Signifiers.

{Specify the R espondent’s Revelatory Phrases; W hat is the problem atic
Focus of the text?}
3A. IN T E R P R E T A T IO N -G E N E R A L ESSEN CE: Explicating C apta as

Signified. {Specify the R espondent’s Key Revelatory Phrase;
W hat is the Locus of the text?}
3B. IN T E R PR E T A T IO N -E SSE N C E : Stating the R espondent’s H erm eneutic

Proposition. {Analyst’s protocol ascription of R espondent’s reduced
description; W hat is the existential m eaning communicated?}
Figure 22. Semiotic phenom enology analysis worksheet
in the editorial groupings (the chapters) in the Banks book have any
signification per se? Is there a semiotic system at work that expresses a
social function of the persons interview ed? Is there a phenom enological
system at work that expresses their personal nature? Secondly, does our
analysis indicate an essence of a conscious hum an experience that we all
share, that all the inform ants also share? D oes the explication of the
life-event specify an existential m eaning (“words are persons speaking” ),
a conscious experience that is just as much a part of society today as it was

in the past?
The second stage of the classroom learning experience is to move from
m ediated com m unication w here a w ritten docum ent is a com m unication
filter (a contrary logic form — i.e ., the logic of the language) to the oral
environm ent (the oral expression system or logic of the sp eak er). In this
move, from orality to inscription and inscription to orality, the semiotic
logic of inscription present in any literate use of langue is bypassed. It is in
this sense th at oral com m unication as parole (speaking) becom es a direct
(unm ediated) source of m eaning. Such m eaning is a direct expression
rather than perceived m eaning; note that inscription reverses the dialectic
of com m unication. W hen I write a m essage, I inscribe a perception— I
become the other in place of my self. By contrast, the practice of
utterance in its oral form creates a message as an expression. The
message is thereby a presentation (oral; hum an) rather than a representa-
tion (inscribed; artifact).
As an initial oral project in the class, students are assigned to conduct
oral interviews, using audio-tape recorders, relative to the social percep-
tion of obesity. This project was coordinated with ongoing research by a
doctoral student (Spitzack 1984; cf. Ablam owicz 1984; Nelson 1986). The
topical interview protocol (which is not a questionnaire) used in this phase
of the class experience is reproduced as Figure 23. Students interview ed
persons to obtain life-event narratives about body-im age and body p er-
ception in order to determ ine if obesity in A m erican society is a com m u-
nicated social m eaning and the sense that it signified. Once again, the
semiotic phenom enological procedure is followed. The audio-taped nar-
rative is the capta/data of description. R eductions are m ade indicating the
revelatory phrases, and interpretations are drawn or constructed from the
respondent’s key revelatory phrase. T he process is then repeated using
each student’s interpretation as a captum /datum . These interpretations
are then reduced and a final herm eneutic proposition generated. The
research result, a generated definition, is thereby a specification of the
meaning of obesity as com m unication by all the inform ants. H ere we
have the com m unicated process of reference, ascription, and predication,
not the location of a referent.
The research result in m ethodological term s is im portant, especially in
the sense th at we should not slip back into a positivistic hypostatization.
This is to say, the research procedure is about com m unication and the
social process by doing it, and systematically researching w hat they were
doing. The final classroom experience is a conscious experience that
entails both a reflexive and intentional activity that is a life-event per se,
that is, an actual life-history interview (see Figure 24 for the topical
protocol used).
150 COMMUNICOLOGY
Interview Opening
I’m doing research on com m unication topics in my com m unication class. O ne

of the topics w e’re interested in is how people talk about cultural perceptions of
the human body. I’m interested in getting some descriptions of your own bodily
experience in A m erican culture. I have about ten topics I w ant you to talk about.
A t most, it’ll take 45 minutes. D o you have any concerns before we begin?
Topical Protocol {use Topics in any order in spontaneous oral questions}

1. A M E R IC A N ST A N D A R D S F O R " P R O P E R ” W E IG H T .
2. M A L E /F E M A L E D IF F E R E N C E S IN W E IG H T P R O P R IE T Y ( = P R O P E R IMAGE).
3. C U L T U R A L W E IG H T ST A N D A R D S IN R E L A T IO N T O O W N E X P E R IE N C E .
4. C U R R E N T IM A G E O F B O D Y .
5. R E S P O N D E N T ’S C R IT E R IA U SE D T O ASSESS O W N A N D O T H E R S B O D Y .
6. HOW BODY CHANGES A R E M ADE.
7. B E H A V IO R A L C H A N G E S A C C O M P A N Y IN G B O D Y C H A N G E S -C H A N G E S IN PH Y SI-
CAL A PPEA RA N CE.
8. R E L A T IO N A L C H A N G E S W IT H B O D Y C H A N G E S (IN T E R A C T IO N C H A N G E S).
Hypothetical Questions (use when the R espondent doesn’t seem to be able to

answer or go on)
1. IM A G IN E Y O U R S E L F AS Y O U G O T H R O U G H A N A V E R A G E D A Y . H O W D O E S Y O U R
R E L A T IO N SH IP W IT H Y O U R B O D Y C H A N G E IN V A R IO U S SE TT IN G S?
2. L E T ’S SA Y Y O U ’R E F E E L IN G V E R Y P O SIT IV E A B O U T Y O U R B O D Y . W H A T K IN D O F
T H IN G S W O U L D Y O U D O ?
(PR O B ES: A C T IV IT IE S, A T T IT U D E S , P E R S O N A L IT Y )
3. IF A S T R A N G E R SAW Y O U O N T H E S T R E E T T O D A Y , H O W W O U L D S/H E D E S C R IB E
YO U R BODY?
4. W H EN Y O U SE E O T H E R P E O P L E , W H A T D O Y O U N O T IC E F IR S T A B O U T T H E IR
B O D IES?
Interview Closing
These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your time and
interest. I’d like to assure you that everything w e’ve talked about today is
confidential and your nam e won’t be used. I would like to ask specifically,
however, if you have any objections to this tape being used for my research?
(response) Is there anything you’d like to add at this point? (response) (standing)
Thanks again.
Figure 23. Interview protocol: dissertation on obesity

Interview Opening
I’m doing research on com m unication topics in my com m unication class. O ne
of the things we are interested in learning m ore about is how people view their
own lives. W e like to get people to tell stories about themselves th at suggest
something interesting or im portant in their lives. M ost people find it is a lot of fun
to just talk and in the process create a short biographical account of their lives. I ’ll
m ention several topics that should help you talk about your life. A t m ost, it will
take about 45 minutes. D o you have any concerns before we begin?
Topical Protocol {use topics in any order in spontaneous oral questions}
1. C H IL D H O O D OR TEENAGE EVENT TH A T YOU RECALL W IT H H A PPIN E SS /
SA DNESS.
2. Y O U R B EST F R IE N D W H E N Y O U W E R E G R O W IN G U P.
3. W H A T Y O U D O T O H A V E FU N .
4. W H A T W O R K A N D O C C U P A T IO N M E A N .
5. T H E E M B A R R A SSIN G T H IN G Y O U W O U L D L IK E T O F O R G E T .
6. T H E T H IN G O T H E R P E O P L E A LW A Y S R E M E M B E R A B O U T Y O U .
7. T H E P E R S O N A L V A L U E S Y O U H A V E ; W H A T IS IM P O R T A N T IN Y O U R LIFE.
8. W H A T Y O U R F U T U R E W ILL BE.
9. W HAT O TH ER PEO PLE M EAN TO YO U .
10. H O W T H E R E A L W O R L D IN F L U E N C E S Y O U R LIFE .
11. W H A T A “ G O O D D A Y ” IS LIK E.
12. T H E P E R S O N Y O U W ISH Y O U W E R E .
13. T H E ST O R Y Y O U R PA R E N T S L IK E T O T E L L A B O U T Y O U .
14. W H A T T H E FILM V E R S IO N O F Y O U R L IF E W O U L D B E LIK E.
15. W H A T Y O U A R E T H IN K IN G A B O U T R IG H T N O W B E C A U S E W E A R E T A L K IN G
A B O U T Y O U R PA ST.
Interview Closing
I think our tim e is about up. Thanks for your tim e and help. I w ant to assure
you that everything we talked about today is for my own use and I will not use
your nam e if you prefer. D o you mind if I use your nam e in my research report?
(If respondent says “ Y E S”-say: Y our com m ents will be confidential then. I w on’t
use your nam e.) Is there anything you would like to say at this point? (response)
(standing) Thanks again!
Figure 24. Interview protocol: life-history research
T H E T H E O R Y O F L IF E -E V E N T R E S E A R C H
I should now like to turn away from the classroom as a site of instruc-
tional research and discuss the place of life-event theory in general as a
hum an science application of m ethod (see A nderson 1987). The sense of
the current situation is hinted at in my rem arks about the B anks book and
the standard oral history book by Paul T hom pson (1978).
152 COMMUNICOLOGY
There is an established tradition with life-events data in the com m uni-

cative sense of action in society. This tradition is m arked in the discipline
of sociology by the work of the “ symbolic interactionists” at the U niver-
sity of Chicago and by the phenom enological applications of A lfred
Schutz (see chap. 16). In one perspective— nam ely, that of the working
group on life-history m ethod of the International Sociological Associ-
ation—the symbolic interactionist tradition has come full circle and we
are now in the situation of taking up the questions of life-event data and
m ethodology after decades of benign neglect in the discipline of sociol-
ogy. In this respect, we can read with insight the reports of current
research in D aniel B ertaux’s Biography and Society: The L ife History
Approach in the Social Sciences (1981). W e also have the third edition of
Symbolic Interaction by M anis and M eltzer (1978), which records the
origin and developm ent of the life-event research in the broad sense with
which I am concerned, in particular the encompassing phenom enological
basis of symbolic data and the sem iotic nature of interaction among
hum an beings. H ere— the theoretical reflection that M anis and M eltzer
offer—is a place to ground the data found in books like that of Banks.
I think I can best illustrate my point by citing the seven theoretical
propositions that M anis and M eltzer articulate for life-events research.
And these propositions can then be sum m arized in two ways. First, I cite
the reductions that Manis and M eltzer offer. Second, I abstract from
B anks’s introduction to her book those revelatory phrases that are an
interpretation of the reduction that M anis and M eltzer cite. In short, I
shall conduct part of a brief phenom enology of the semiotic system that is
symbolic interaction— a life-event. O f course, a com plete understanding
of this som ewhat pedagogical analysis requires a reading of the cited texts
(the “ description” step in phenom enological m ethod) under discussion
here.
The first Manis and M eltzer proposition states: “ Distinctively hum an
behavior and interaction are carried on through the m edium of symbols
and their m eaning” (M anis & M eltzer 1978, pp. 6-9). The reduction that
M anis and M eltzer offer is: “ the m eaning com ponent in hum an conduct”
(1978, p. 5). Banks gives us the appropriate revelatory phrase as an
interpretation; in the narratives we find “ perspectives and sensibilities”
(1980, p. xx).
The second proposition is: “The individual becomes humanized through
interaction with other persons.” R educed this m eans “ the social source of
hum anness.” For Banks this is the narrative as a “ liberating and exhilara-
ting experience” (1980, p. xix).
The third proposition is: “ H um an society is m ost usefully conceived as
consisting of people in interaction.” The reduction is “ society as pro-
cess.” The Banks interpretation is society as “m osaic” (1980, pp. xv-xvi).
The fourth proposition is: “ H um an beings are active in shaping their
own behavior.” The reduction is “ the voluntaristic com ponent in hum an

conduct.” The Banks interpretation is the “ natural association of ideas
and m em ories” (1980, p. xv).
The fifth proposition is: “ Consciousness, or thinking, involves interac-
tions with oneself.” The reduction is “ a dialectical conception of m ind.”
Banks’s interpretation is that the narratives are “ knowing-advice” (1980,
p. xii).
The sixth proposition is: “ H um an beings construct their behavior in the
course of its execution.” The reduction is “ the constructive, em ergent
nature of hum an conduct.” The B anks interpretation is narrative that is
“practice” (1980, p. xx).
The final, seventh, proposition is: “ A n understanding of hum an con-
duct requires study of the actor’s covert behavior.” The reduction is “ the
necessity of sym pathetic introspection.” The B anks interpretation is the
discovery of “ process” (1980, p. xvi).
By way of a very brief conclusion, let me suggest that the place of

life-events research and teaching as a m odel for sem iotic phenom enology
is to be found within the process of com m unication itself. A fundam ental
requirem ent for using the life-events approach to hum an science research
is to realize th at com m unication as an em pirical phenom enon is solely
dependent upon its eidetic status (H olenstein 1976). This is to say, the
unique relationship that is coded in the life-event is the fact that the life
perspective defines the event (see chaps. 5 and 7). As Michel Foucault so
eloquently summarizes, “ a statem ent is always an event that neither the
language (langue) nor the m eaning can quite exhaust” (1972, p. 28).
Part Three:
Semiology
[S e c tio n O n e : EIDETIC RESEARCH]

Chapter Eleven
Structuralism and the Human Science

Context o f Phenomenology and
Semiology
Structuralism is a revolutionary approach to research. Like m ost revolu-

tionary candidates in the social and hum an sciences, its novelty is
m atched by an ambiguity of program and a vicarious purpose. It should
be no surprise, then, to read in one distinguished survey of the subject
that contem porary structuralism is “ one of the new est and m ost exciting
schools of thought that is currently sweeping over the W estern w orld”
(Rossi 1982, p. ix)— and yet that “ there is no structuralist sociology”
(Lem ert & Nielsen 1982, p. 327). These counterposed com m ents are the
telltale sign of philosophical thinking moving into the business of theory
construction in the hum an sciences (Blackwell 1976). Y et it is the hum an
sciences like anthropology, com m unicology, linguistics, and sociology
that m ade the philosophical problem atic viable (Paci 1969).
As an analytic approach to discussing “ structuralism ,” I propose to
avoid the usual historicism that turns to the philological occurrence of the
concept. My concern is with the paradigm candidate “ French structural-
ism” as it em erges today in the context of phenom enology and semiology.
This “ structuralist” m ovem ent of thought is not sweeping the W estern
world, yet it has a track record of em pirical research in various hum an
science disciplines and a philosophical base (Lanigan 1972; 1979b;
1982a).
French structuralism is neither a disciplinary lacuna—for exam ple, Is
French structural linguistics different from an A m erican version?— nor is
it a m ethodological gestalt—for exam ple, Is structuralism a theory or
157
158 SEMIOLOGY
merely a procedure? French structuralism is, like its chief rivals French
phenom enology and semiology, a philosophical claim about the ontology
and epistem ology of science (Runcim an 1973). B ut it is a limited thesis.
French structuralism is a claim for the im mediacy of social practice as
science, especially where scientific procedure applies its practices to the
institutions of hum an conscious experience (Lem ert 1981). For example,
practice is the institutions we call language, com m unication, society, and
the person (Leach 1976). Such institutions are the problem atics of con-
tem porary disciplines in hum an science— disciplines m arked by their
philosophical orientation (Rossi 1982; Lanigan 1984).
T hree topics constitute my analysis in this chapter. First, there is a
description of the philosophical orientations that account for French
structuralism as a problem atic. A “ problem atic” is a problem atical con-
text within which an issue, or set of issues, functions as a criterion for
analysis and judgm ent of the problem per se. Such a criterion usually
meets the theory construction requirem ent of being a necessary condi-
tion, especially where “truth condition” logics are inapplicable to the
hum an behavior being analyzed. Second, I focus on the preference for
society and social norm s that structuralism displays in the practice of its
philosophical orientations. Third, there is the interpretation of judgm ent
(eidetic science) and practice (empirical science) that constitutes a the-
matic for structuralism .
A “them atic” is the use of a criterion, derived from a problem atic, that
meets the theory construction requirem ents of being a sufficient condition
description or explication of the original problem under investigation
(see, e.g., chap. 6 above). H ere the sufficient condition nom inates a
solution to the problem or suggests a typology of possible solutions within
which a possible necessary condition solution can be found as also
sufficient. In traditional theory construction language, the “ context of
discovery” in the problem atic leads to the “ context of justification” in the
them atic as a hypothesis or an abductive logic (Rule + R esult = Case),
and not conversely as either a deductive (R ule + Case = Result) or
inductive (Case + Result = R ule) hypostatization (Eco 1976, Peirce
1931-35, 1958, 2.623).
P H IL O SO PH IC A L O R IE N T A T IO N
Descombes (1980) offers one of the most com prehensive accounts of

contem porary French philosophy available, yet he does not have a
chapter on “ structuralism ” in his book. The discussion of structuralism is
there, but within the progressive context of French phenom enology and
French semiology. The philosophical theory of signs (sémiologie) is the
grounding for the concept of structure. H ence Descom bes describes the
STRUCTURALISM 159
progressive philosophical m aturation of the hum an sciences in the French

context. N ote th at it is the French paradigm of structuralism that occupies
our concern, because it is the one with which the hum an sciences debate
is sustained in the U nited States specifically and in E urope generally
(Lem ert 1979).
Descom bes notes that there are three structuralism s. H e nam es them
respectively structural analysis, semiology, the “ the critique of both
phenom enology and sem iology” (p. 81). Descom bes discounts “ struc-
tural analysis,” by which he m eans a structuralist anthropology and
linguistics with historical roots in R ussian form alism , as having little or no
bearing on the contem porary French scene. By com parison, “ sem iology”
challenges phenom enology as the proper account of “ m eaning” in the
hum an sciences and philosophy. H ow ever, structuralism in its current
status is critique. It is the critique that forecasts a counterposition to both
phenom enology and semiology.
We discover with Descom bes that structuralism is a critique of both
ontology and epistemology. Ontology is critiqued in the attack on phe-
nom enology, where phenom enology is a philosophical position that
argues for the primacy of the person as the source of all norm ative
judgm ent (eidetic science is hum an) and norm al practice (empirical
science is social). Epistem ology is critiqued by structuralism in the attack
on semiology, where semiology (or semiotics— this latter term being the
Anglo-Am erican preferred nam e) is a parallel philosophical position that
argues for culture (the primacy of hum an institutions) as the source of
norm ative judgm ents (eidetic science is individual) and norm al practice
(empirical science is conventional).
In short, structuralism as critique is axiological in the traditional sense
of philosophy. The critique is m eant to be a criterion of judgm ent (the
problem atic) and practice (the them atic), which posits or constitutes the
context of both judgm ent and practice. Creative axiology as structural
critique becomes the functional equivalent of theory construction in the
hum an sciences (B arthes 1968). In tu rn , ontology is thereby norm ed as an
inferential product, and epistem ology is norm ed likewise as an inferential
process.
How this critical m ethod argum ent of structural critique carries for-
ward requires some discussion of D escom bes’ first version of structu-
ralism— that is, the structural analysis— which he obviates. W e cannot
accept his dismissal of linguistic (H jelm slev 1961) and anthropological
(Lévi-Strauss 1969; Leach 1976) structuralism so quickly, precisely b e-
cause the structural analysis at issue has a philosophical grounding.
A t issue is the early work of Jakobson (1971) with the linguistic
structure of narrative in Russian folktales, and then with distinctive
features in com parative linguistics and communicology. H olenstein
(1976) shows th at as a student of E dm und H usserl, the founder of
160 SEMIOLOGY
phenom enology, Jakobson’s “ structural analysis” is already a phenom e-

nological structuralism. Thus, Jakobson’s theory of com m unication is
phenom enological by placing the hum an source of the social as an
ontological condition of epistemology.
The axiology of the hum an sciences is plain: eidetic distinction is prior
to empirical feature in the m ost hum an of social institutions, articulate
discourse (Hjelm slev 1961; Benveniste 1971a). This argum ent is generally
referred to as the “ primacy of the speaking su b ject.” B ut for reasons of
philosophical accuracy, we should am end that reference to the primacy o f
the person speaking as the origin of m eaning (M erleau-Ponty 1962).
D escom bes’ second version of structuralism , semiology, is the response
to Jakobson’s phenom enological structuralism . The concept and practice
of “ m eaning” is at issue. Following the Jakobson tradition of com m uni-
cology, semiology takes the linguistic m odel of structure in language
(Saussure 1966) and generalizes it to all social institutions as the code of
individual practice (Eco 1976). Phenom enology is turned on its head; the
empirical distinction becom es the eidetic feature. Y et the empirical
distinction as a convention of practice has its source in the individual
eidetic judgm ent. The code may dom inate the source of practice, but the
primacy of m eaning still rests with the person as an individual practi-
tioner. The ontological position of the phenom enologist is set aside to
accom m odate the epistemological practice of the semiotician.
Again the axiology is m anifest. Em pirical distinction is prior to eidetic
feature in the m ost conventional of individual perform ances, discourse
that articulates reality. A lthough popularly indexed as the “ death of the
subject,” this argum ent also is restated best by the positive form ulation:
culture constitutes m eaning; there are no significations by social individu-
als (Leach 1976; Lem ert 1979).
W hat, then, is the philosophical ground of structuralism conceived as
structural critique? As Hawkes (1977, pp. 17-18) argues, “This new
concept, th at the world is m ade up of relationships rather than things,
constitutes the first principle of th at way of thinking which can properly
be called ‘structuralist.’” By way of defining the relationships he has in
mind, Hawkes cites Jean Piaget: the structuralist relationships are
(1) wholeness, (2) transform ation, and (3) self-regulation. These ele-
ments are of course derived from the critique of phenom enology and
semiology with their contingent structural procedures.
In the case of structural relationships in phenom enology (Lanigan
1976), the “wholeness” of phenom enological description requires an
explicit depiction of phenom ena, their essence as relational structure and
content. Procedures of suspended prejudice (epoché) provide scientific
neutrality as a context of discovery. “ T ransform ation” is parallel to
phenom enological reduction— that is, the specification of general essence
STRUCTURALISM 161
by reason of necessary and sufficient (not truth) conditions. H ere the

procedure of imaginative free variation draws, for exam ple, on transfor-
mative moves akin to the linguistic m odel of Saussure (1966). Linear
series of item s, syntagm atic chains, are context for linear hierarchies,
paradigm atic item s, set in orthogonal position as a process boundary. The
two dimensions account for a third, com binary structure, just as in the
spatial analogy width and height account for the structure called “ dep th ”
in perception or “ articulation” in expression (see Fig. 5).
Last as a procedure is phenom enological interpretation. Because d e-
scription creates wholeness and reduction is a transform ation of the
phenom enon, self-regulation is a parallel procedure to phenom enological
interpretation. Such interpretation is the reflexive inference about the
description and reduction that is both a signification (the original depic-
tion) and a m eaning (the depiction as accurate description)— that is,
reflexivity.
In com parison with phenom enology, the structural relationships in
semiology as structural critique also follow a set of procedures parallel to
wholeness, transform ation, and self-regulation (Lanigan 1972; 1982b).
Recall that for Saussure a “ sign” is defined as the differential (paradig-
matic function) and m utual (syntagm atic function) entailm ent of a sig-
nifier (expression form) and a signified (perception form ). In such a
schema, the sign functions as a transform ation procedure in which the
self-regulation of units (i.e., signifiers) constitutes the units per se (i.e.,
signifieds) as a condition of wholeness. A simple linguistic illustration is
our usual gramm atical understanding of a noun (a transform ation con-
cept) that allows us to understand both the function as the “ subject” of a
sentence (signifier: the noun’s expressive condition) and the function as
the “object” in a sentence (the noun’s perceptive condition as a referent:
a signified).
In short, the philosophical ground of structuralism is a theoretical
com m itm ent to relationships, rather than categories, as the source of
meaning in phenom ena. Such relationships are m anifest by m ethodologi-
cal procedures that reflect wholeness, transform ation, and self-regulation.
The theory and m ethod derive their metaphysical status by opposition to
the ontology represented in either phenom enology or semiology. This is
to say that structuralism in its contem porary version as the “ critique
m odel” opposes the ontological claim of phenom enology that hum an
values are grounded in the conscious experience of persons. Likewise, the
critique m odel denies the claim of semiology for an ontology of social
values grounded in the experience of consciousness as m anifest in the
norm ative practices of everyday life.
162 SEMIOLOGY
SO C IA L N O R M AS P E R S O N A L P E R F O R M A N C E
T he concept of practice is a key idea in the critique m odel of French

structuralism . W ithin the problem atic of the “ economy of logic,” Bour-
dieu distinguishes the “ universe of discourse” and the “ universe of
practice” (1972, p. 110). These ideas have many operational schem ata in
the work of authors like B ourdieu, but those schem ata th at Eco (1976)
formalizes under two interconnected headings are the m ost systematic—
namely, (1) the Theory of Codes and (2) the T heory of Sign-Production.
In term s already familiar to our analysis, a practice can be viewed as a
social example of self-regulation. A code can be conceived as a transfor-
mation (representation of a presentation), and a theory of sign-pro-
duction functions as wholeness—that is, as process completion or
signification (sign-production).
In such a table of equivalences, structuralism places an ontological
emphasis on society and its institutions. H um an values are collective in
society; society has a worldview, a Weltanschauung, that is limited in a
hierarchical fashion by the cultural preferences and practices of a given
era, a Zietgeist. In a word, culture is the norm ative criterion for structur-
alist thought, m ethod, and research.
Structuralism is interested in all the institutions of society, but the
universe of discourse or language as the practice of the speech com m unity
{langue) is the exemplar. To be specific, Lyons (1977, pp. 231-323)
suggests that the structuralist argues “ that every language is a unique
relational structure, or system, and that the units which we identify . . .
derive both their essence and their existence from their relationships with
other units in the same language-system .” W e require a certain am ount of
caution at this point in distinguishing the nam es of sociolinguistic (com-
municological) categories.
In the context of French linguistics, discourse divides into three norm a-
tive categories of hum an expression and perception: parole, langue, and
langage. Parole is the act of speaking and signifies the discursive practice
of an individual person. Such discourse is the em pirical and eidetic record
of a Lebenswelt. Langue is the speech act (com bined lexicon and diction)
of preference in a given social group. In m ost speech com m unities, the
sense of connotation or denotation in signification involves a parallel
norming of group affiliation as betw een peers (Gemeinschaft) or nonpeers
(Gesellschaft). Langage is the “ language-system ” or “ sign-system” in
ideal form; the constitutive rules {Weltanschauung) for discourse em bod-
ied in a so-called natural, which is to say cultural, language. Perhaps it is
also helpful to note that the parole, langue, and langage distinction
functions in a com binatory m anner much like the m edieval trivium where
rhetoric, gram m ar, and logic were categories of discourse practice (O ver-
field 1984; Ferruolo 1985).
STRUCTURALISM 163
With these basic categories of discourse in place, we can now m ake an

oversimplified, but very useful, distinction am ong structuralism , p h e-
nom enology, and semiology. Structuralism m akes the theoretical claim
that discourse as practice requires only langue or its functional equivalent
in a nonlinguistic system of enactm ent, such as learning, cultural prefer-
ence, or similar norm ative behaviors that are self-reflexive. Parole (the
empirical practice of em pirical subjects) and langage (the empirical
practice of eidetic subjects) are fictions for the conservative structuralist.
They are fictions th at hide reality from persons who do not perceive that
their speech is m erely the display of the language (langue) into which they
were born and th at the logico-gram matical rules (langage) of that lan-
guage are abstractions for that sam e learned-language. B ourdieu (1977,
p. 72) nam es this phenom enon the habitus that consists in “ systems of
durable, transposable dispositions,” which are not an adherence to rules
in any knowing sense. In other words, learning and habit prom ote the
false belief that there are speaking subjects and eternal m eanings.
As historical referents for this developing m ovem ent, let me note in
passing th at structuralism often is m arked as the attack on the conception
of a speaking subject, and poststructuralism is the additional attack on
the notion th at m eaning can be ontological.
Semiology m akes a claim similar to that of structuralism with the added
ingredient of langage. This is to say, there is langue defined in “ discourse
as practice,” but there is also the analytic discovery of eidetic elem ents.
These eidetic elem ents are discovered in practice as discourse— th at is, in
langage. The practice abstracted from the discourse is B ourdieu’s “uni-
verse of practice,” the theoretical grounding of a logic that is literally
realized, m ade em pirical and real, by use. For a “ theory of signification”
as langue, there is a “ theory of codes” as langage. In brief, gram m ar is
born of logic. Parole, as the rhetoric of the person, the speaking subject,
is a fiction for the sem iotician. Parole is discounted as theoretical hypo-
thesis w ithout utility in the hum an sciences.
Phenom enology, particularly with the M erleau-Ponty heritage, is a
claim for all three com m unicological elem ents: parole, langue, and lan-
gage. The ontological base of discourse is parole in the person, but it is a
parole parlante or langage th at has a reflexive counterpart in parole parlée
or langue. Langage is a “ speech speaking” in which “ speech” as langage
is the em bodied ground of discourse, the hum an personal discourse o f
practice: parole. In addition, langage is a “ speech spoken” in that
“ speech” as langage reflects the hum an personal practice o f discourse:
langue.
In traditional discursive term s, the phenom enologist grounds rhetoric
(parole) and gram m ar (langue) in logic {langage), but phenom enology is
always reflexive— it is the logic of the phenom enon. T he phenom enon at
issue is discourse, so the concern is the incarnate logic of rhetoric and the
164 SEMIOLOGY
incarnate logic of gram m ar. For the phenom enologist, discourse is em -

bodied in the person. T here is no other ontological grounding for ex-
pression and perception (M erleau-Ponty 1962).
Given these com parative features of structuralism , semiology, and
phenom enology, my analysis can turn now to the interpretation of judg-
m ent (theory construction as eidetic science) and practice (theory con-
struction as empirical science), which are them atic for structuralism as a
hum an science m ethodology.
JU D G M E N T IN P R A C T IC E , N O T D IS C O U R S E
So far, the practical investigation of structuralism is advancing in a

structuralist fashion. My analysis progressively explores the practice of
structuralism by com parison and contrast with other theoretical prac-
tices— namely, semiology and phenom enology. A nd it does so with a
careful exam ination of the m odel of discourse that is said to account for
all forms of practice like discourse. The question to be posed now is: Can
the linguistics m odel, discourse, be left behind? Can the “ practice of
practice” inform the ontological position of structuralism as a theory and
m ethod in the hum an sciences or not?
Because we are dealing with practice and not discourse, we presum ably
are avoiding the logical paradoxes of a form alist logic m odel of language
as suggested by Russell and W hitehead (Lanigan 1972). How this struc-
turalist thesis of practice can be argued requires a return to the distinction
betw een Theory of Codes and Theory of Signification suggested by Eco
(1976).
Following Hjelm slev (1961) a code can be defined as a rule that governs
other rules— that is, a relationship am ong or for relationships. This is not
a situation in which a rule governs itself, hence a rule is not the base
condition for its own application as a m etarule. A code, by definition,
thereby avoids the logical paradoxes inherent in purely form al deductive
systems. In this context, structuralists usually define a system-code as a
structure w here the nam e “ system -code” stands for relationships (a
system) held together by another relationship (a code). As Eco (1976, p.
38) suggests, a structure is “ a system (i) in which every value is estab-
lished by positions and differences and (ii) which appears only when
different phenom ena are m utually com pared with reference to the same
system of relations.”
It should be easy to detect the m ethodological assum ptions built into
the idea of a structure as a theory of codes. Some phenom enon is
required for purposes of value reference (signification or m eaning), a
phenom enon that is both an eidetic and em pirical presentation of w hole-
STRUCTURALISM 165
ness, transform ability, and self-regulation. Inasm uch as the semiotic

paradigm candidate was langue (the discourse of the speech com m unity),
and the phenom enological paradigm was parole (the discourse of the
person), the structuralist candidate is culture. B ut the conception of
eidetic exem plar of culture m ust always be a specific, concrete culture,
otherwise the practice or em pirical exem plar of society as a fixed tem poral
and spatial phenom enon would not be a signification. Recall E co’s
specification for system values. They are established by positions and
differences with reference to the sam e system of relationships. In short, a
system value is a differentiation by com bination. This value is produced
by an analogue logic in which the differentiation is a relationship (a
presentation), one th at defines the condition under which other relation-
ships (re-presentations) can be constituted.
To illustrate the theoretical issue, then, a perform ance is a representa-
tion (e.g., obeying a traffic signal), in society, th at acts as a practice or
presentation (e.g., the social value called “ obedience” ). The perfor-
mance as practice is a structure; likewise the practice as perform ance is a
structure. To exemplify the latter point, obedience is legitimized as a
social value w hen there is no one else to observe the perform ance— for
example, stopping your autom obile at the red traffic light even though
there is no supporting or opposing traffic, and especially when there are
no witnesses at all!
Unlike a system of discourse or langue, fixed by exclusively social
usage, the structuralist argues th at the systems of a culture offer a value
stability th at is functionally fixed (even though cultures evolve over time
and situation). H ence, a structuralist argues th at the fundam ental systems
of culture— th at is, language (langage), kinship, and com m erce— are all
indexed to the same cultural value(s). Culture on this view is an eidetic
science that governs em pirical systems. Each system is in fact a system-
code where the code is a representation of the presentation of culture.
Such a reflexive logic is best illustrated m ethodologically. For example,
language, kinship, and com m erce, when individually defined according to
system values, all have the sam e eidetic characteristics, such as (1) ex-
change, (2) tem poral and spatial dislocation, (3) social use, and so on. As
a sim ultaneous condition, the various systems as a concrete exam ple of
the system-code or structures all display the sam e empirical characteris-
tics, such as (1) locus of identity (failure of exchange), (2) tem poral and
spatial location, (3) nonsocial use (deviance), and the like.
In short, structuralism takes advantage of culture for m ethodological
use in the hum an sciences, just as the physical sciences utilize nature.
Culture, just as n ature, is a relationship that governs other relationships
by ensuring th at the relationship (i.e., structure) always accounts for the
wholeness, transform ation, and self-regulation of all other relationships
166 SEMIOLOGY
based upon it. This is one reason why the structuralist doctrine of m ethod
is used in both the physical and hum an sciences, why one is frequently a
m odel for the other (Eco 1976; Jakobson 1971).
The Theory of Sign-Production is E co’s (1976) nam e for the m ore
general issues of structure as human com munication. This is to say, the
meaning and understanding of codes and system-codes is at some stage
dependent upon an em bodied structure. This is the ontological problem
per se. I have already suggested that this problem is settled in principle by
structuralism in the hypothesis that the em bodied structure is exemplified
by practice in society. By close com parison, the semiotic thesis is that the
em bodim ent is a perform ance in culture. Recall, also, that the phenom e-
nological position is m ore concrete, arguing that em bodied structure
occurs in the person, the consciousness of experience as lived reflexively
by an individual hum an being.
The basic difference in these positions can be m ethodologically sug-
gested as follows. (1) Structuralists view the process of com m unication as
a practice in which a hum an group is the channel of com m unication for
any given medium (language, kinship, com m erce, etc.). Individual p er-
formance is representation of practice; perform ance is a relationship that
is a signification (Hawkes 1979). (2) Semioticians view the process of
communication as a performance in which a person is the m edium of
communication (speaker/listener, peer/nonpeer, subject/object, etc.) for
culture as the channel of com m unication— observed m ost explicitly in
cross-cultural research where there are obvious, num erous channels at
work. G roup practice is a representation of perform ance; practice is a
relationship that signifies (Saussure 1966; Eco 1976). (3) Phenom enolo-
gists argue that the process of com m unication, m eaning, is a presentation
of perform ance in which the person is the channel of com m unication for
given practices of representation (speaking, interacting, sharing, etc.)
that are the m edia of com m unication. Perform ance is the practice of
hum an being; perform ance is the m eaning of practice (M erleau-Ponty
1962; Descom bes 1980).
Although I have m ade very effort to provide a brief analytic discussion

of the key features in structuralism as contextualized by both semiology
and phenom enology, it would be dangerous not to acknowledge certain
limitations. C ontem porary research in the hum an sciences, especially in
communicology and psychology, inherits methodological techniques and a
common Geistewissenschaften hum anistic interest from each of the three
schools of thought (Descom bes 1980). Because these schools represent a
certain historical and disciplinary evolution, they share as m any similari-
ties as dissimilarities. Some I m entioned previously, others I did not. I
noted phenom enological structuralism (H olenstein 1976), but there is also
a phenom enological semiotics (Eco 1976, pp. 157, 167, 205, 250), herme-
STRUCTURALISM 167
neutic semiology (Silverman 1979a), and semiotic phenom enology (Lani-

gan 1982a, b; 1985), am ong others.
In short, the m ovem ent in intellectual history th at we call Structuralism
is now an A m erican phenom enon some twenty-five years after its birth
and m aturity in France. W e know and use the theory along with its
contextual theories, semiology and phenom enology, but we are just
beginning to appreciate the research results th at appear in such journals
as Semiótica, Journal o f Phenom enological Psychology, Com m unication,
Research in Phenom enology, Semiotext(e) and others. As these journals
record, the first step in useful em pirical research is the eidetic research
that constitutes a theory. The theory of structuralism was the start of a
first step in the hum an sciences; semiology and phenom enology are the
conclusion of that step. These three theories are, thus, the chronicle of
contem porary ontology as a m ovem ent from habitus to understanding in
the theory and praxis of hum an science.
Chapter Twelve
The Foundations o f Semiotic

Phenomenology ____________________
Phenom enology is both a school of thought in the philosophy of science

and subsequently a research procedure in the hum an arts and sciences
(Kockelmans and Kisiel 1970; N atanson 1973; Strasser 1974; Lanigan
1979). Phenom enology is the rigorous exam ination of conscious experi-
ence, especially as m anifest in hum an com m unication and action.
T here is both an A m erican and a E uropean tradition for phenom enol-
ogy, beginning in the early tw entieth century with Charles Sanders
Peirce, in the U nited States, and with E dm und H usserl, in G erm any. As
Spiegelberg (1956) notes, there is evidence suggesting that Pierce knew
H usserl’s work in part, but the reverse was not true. Y et, there are
biographical and philosophical indications that Peirce and H usserl repre-
sent one of those fascinating historical coincidences of parallel research.
B oth were schooled as a logician and m athem atician; both sought to
establish philosophy as a rigorous science. B oth w ere systemic thinkers
reacting against introspective psychologism. A nd both were firmly com -
m itted to a systematic exam ination of phenom ena as consciously given in
experience.
A lthough phenom enology accounts for a large and influential group of
scholars and researchers (Spiegelberg 1982), there are four who directly
concern them selves with semiology. These sem iotic phenom enologists
are Husserl, Peirce, A lfred Schutz, and M aurice M erleau-Ponty. Their
contributions can be illustrated in synoptic form by outlining the elem ents
of phenom enological m ethod and its exemplification with respect to a
theory of sign-production in hum an com m unication th at each adopted in
his philosophy.
168
SEMIOTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 169
Before discussing H usserl’s w ork, how ever, brief m ention should be

m ade of the G erm an philosophical tradition that precedes him and Peirce
(Apel 1981). Hegel (1967) introduced “phenom enology” as a systematic
term in his Phenom enology o f M ind. This work is devoted to a discussion
of the triadic concepts of “ subjective m ind,” “ O bjective m ind,” and
“ absolute m ind.” Subjective m ind refers to the em ergence of conscious-
ness in a person’s psychological and anthropological constitution; objec-
tive mind is the signification of consciousness in sociological and political
experience. A bsolute m ind signifies consciousness as m anifest in the
system of judgm ents forming art, religion, and philosophy.
Following H egel, and preceding H usserl as his teacher, B rentano
(1874) investigated objects of m ental phenom ena, which he categorized
generally as (1) ideas, (2) judgm ents, and (3) the phenom enon of “ love
and h ate” that contains em otions and volitions. O f particular concern to
B rentano (1981) was his nonpropositional or m odal theory of judgm ents.
The unity of consciousness in this context defines the object of judgm ent
as the same object of the idea that the judgm ent presupposes.
H U SSE R L ‘S T R A N S C E N D E N T A L P H E N O M E N O L O G Y
Phenom enology in H usserl’s treatm ent (1970; 1962; 1950) is not system a-
tic in the sense of a schem ata of procedural steps. It is systemic in the
suggestion of several investigative reflections or reductions that constitute
a philosophical m ethod. K oestenbaum (1967) and Ihde (1977) discuss the
variety and range of reductions developed by H usserl, which can be
summarized as three procedures.
First is the descriptive reduction, which is a focus on phenom ena as
directly given in experience. H usserl gives this procedure the nam e
epoché, which m eans a “ bracketing” of experience. In precise words, the
epoché establishes the parenthetical boundaries th at allow us to focus on
a phenom enon and suspend our presuppositions about it, especially those
scientific and philosophical hypostatizations that confuse our judgm ent of
experience as lived. The epoché perm its the correction of our “ natural
attitude” about phenomena. Husserl’s epoché illustrates his famous m ethod-
ological dictum: “ Back to the things them selves!”
Second, the phenom enological reduction is an intuiting of the general
essence that is to be found in phenom ena. H usserl argues that the
technique of “ imaginative free variation” is the ground for phenom eno-
logical reflection, which follows upon the descriptive reduction. Such
variation consists of alternately including and excluding the characteristic
elements making up the description. The analytic product is a constitu-
tion and explication of the general essence of a phenom enon— that is,
a core of im m anent foregrounding and a h o rizo n of transcendent
170 SEMIOLOGY
backgrounding. The specified phenom enon, or noema, is the actual

object of experience available to the perceiver (Ego) as consciously
engaged in awareness.
The third reflection is the eidetic reduction, which Husserl often refers
to by the simple nam e “ intentionality.” As a phenom enological require-
m ent, intentionality is an equal analytic and descriptive focus on p h e-
nom ena in term s of their structure in consciousness, or noesis. Thus, the
eidetic relationship is a reciprocal and sim ultaneous concern with the
noetic intending act (e.g., the perceiving or expressing) and the noem atic
content (e.g., the perceived or expressed). Intentionality is the “ con-
sciousness of . . .” that constitutes phenom ena. H usserl’s phenom enol-
ogy is transcendental in the sense that the goal of analysis is the eidos, or
pure intentional structure of ego, which cannot be empirical. This ideal-
istic view is now largely abandoned or modified, due prim arily to the
influence of M erleau-Ponty and R om an Ingarden.
Although one of H usserl’s best students in the sense of accepting the
tenets of the phenom enological m ethod, Ingarden rejected transcenden-
tal idealism in favor of realism. A m ong his m ajor contributions to the
construction and application of phenom enological procedures is the
discussion of the literary work of art (with extrapolations to music and
painting) as constituted by intentional acts (Ingarden 1973; 1964-66).
Thus, Ingarden’s w ork is an im portant illustration and elaboration of
H usserl’s phenom enology as it bears on the problem atics of expression
(Falk 1981).
H usserl’s semiology (see 1950, vol. 12, Z u r L ogik der Zeichen (Sem io-
tik), pp. 340-73, 524-30), as discussed prim arily in “ Investigation I
“ (Expression and M eaning” ) of the Logische Untersuchungen (1900-01;
trans. 1970), is a consequence of his phenom enology. In his study of
signs, he argues for the discovery that language is not constituted as a
phenom enon of consciousness.
One of the m ore essential features of H usserl’s phenom enology is
therefore the distinction m ade betw een meaning (Bedeutung) and m an-
ifestation (Kundgabe). It is a distinction that directly derives from the
conception of the sign as a sem antic indication. B oth m eaning and
m anifestation as products of speech are tied to indication, which is the
indexical, objective genitive force of language (O rth 1973). M eaning is
signification as indication. T hat is to say in the use of language there are
statem ents, which are a “ system of habitual signs” (H usserl 1969). The
indicative force of statem ents suggests that m eaning is an expressed
judgment. M anifestation, by contrast, is affective and em erges as ex-
pressed volition. M anifestation points back to the speaker in the process
of expression. A s H usserl rem inds us, “ all expressions in communicative
speech function as indications” (1900-01; 1970, p. 277).
For Husserl, m eaning and m anifestation are m utually exclusive func-
tions. Y et they are in m utual dependence as phenom ena. M eaning leads

to m anifestation. The act of speaking is an intentional act of m eaning
where the m eaning is em bodied in speaking and in language as spoken.
Husserl (1969) contends that signs are em bodied and th at the semiotic
m ovem ent is w hat constitutes m eaning as a com m unicative experience.
The active process of expression m akes this em bodim ent (an intentional
act) known as a habitual system (a m eaning intention). B ut this very fact
of habituation establishes the conclusion that language is not constituted
by consciousness. Language is m erely constituted by praxis.
Thus, H usserl, in the com m unicative process, distinguishes betw een
the meaningful sign and the mere sign, betw een the verbal sign and the
“ sign stripped of m eaning,” and betw een indicating meaning and meaning
indicated. In short, speech as oral discourse indicates and is thereby
subjective genitive, w hereas language signifies and is objective genitive.
SC H U T Z’S D ESC R IPTIV E P H E N O M E N O L O G Y
Schutz (1973) develops his phenom enology in response to the problem a-

tic nature of intersubjective understanding (see chap. 16 below). H e
openly acknowledges his incorporation of H usserl’s semiology of indica-
tion in the exam ination of interpersonal com m unication. But Schutz
reconstructs the index thesis to apply to the dynamic intersubjectivity that
occurs in speech com m unication viewed as encounter (Eckartsberg 1965).
Husserl merely suggests that his rem arks about speakers might be applied
in like m anner to auditors, but Schutz decisively m arks out the listener
from the speaker in the sem iotic process of com m unication. Stated in a
m ore positive sense, Schutz realizes th at the roles of speaker and listener
are em bodied in the person as a com m unicator— that is, a person who is
simultaneously and synergistically a speaker and listener in one em bodi-
m ent. Such a person is explicitly conscious of speaking and listening as
the habituated experience of self in a world of others. T herefore, Schutz
(1967) suggests that intersubjective understanding is grounded in com m u-
nication acts based upon signs th at constitute first, artifacts capable of
interpretation, secondly, meaning derived from a sign system, and thirdly
the indication of past experience.
F or the speaker the three sign functions com bine into an expressive
scheme: the scheme is the indication of the com m unicator’s own m eaning.
It is the subjective and occasional m eaning displayed in speech acts.
Thus, speaking becom es an act of choice in which artifacts are created for
interpretation. These artifacts provide for an interpreted m eaning de-
rived from the system in which they occur. The speaker’s meaning
becomes the coincidence of the past in the present. T hat is, the sign as
artifact expresses a “ subjective m eaning” not dependent on in terpreta-
tion (see Figure 32).
172 SEMIOLOGY
The listener, on the other hand, is caught up in an interpretive scheme.

Within this scheme the perceiving com m unicator encounters artifacts
born of past experience. The artifacts are perceived as repeatable signs
functioning in a known semiotic system of com m unication. H ere the
indication as a present condition of consciousness directly refers to past
experience. The sign as artifact is precisely signification by a com m unica-
tive act. As Schutz explains, the listener is overwhelm ed with the under-
standing that “ I can do it again.” T hat is to say, the sign has “ objective
m eaning” th at is systematic, hence predictable and controllable.
In summary, Schutz explains th at phenom enologically the use of signs
is a basis of understanding through interpersonal com m unication. The
intersubjective function blends the speaker and listener into interlocking
conscious views of an artifact, which is understanding as a phenom enon
per se— that is, an experience that is lived. Thus, language in this view
can come to constitute consciousness as situated in com m unication acts.
Schutz discovers that either speech or language can constitute conscious-
ness in the worlds of associates, contem poraries, predecessors, and
successors (see chap. 16 below).
P E IR C E ’S PH A N E R O SC O PY
Like Husserl, Peirce (1931-35, 1958, 1.280) never gave any systematic
account of his phenom enology. Y et the direct link betw een phenom enol-
ogy as an epistem ology and ontological categories of Firstness, Second-
ness, and Thirdness does provide a systemic view of phenom ena as
Peirce’s D octrine of C ategories (Savan 1952; B rinkley 1960). As Freem an
(1934, p. 21) notes, “ the m ethod of the phenom enology consists in
dissecting out the categories by analyzing experience into its fundam ental
elem ents.”
Before offering a brief definition of the ontological categories, it may
be useful to reduce Peirce’s very technical semiology (1931-35; 1958;
1953) to those aspects of phenom enology th at he found necessary for
analysis. Peirce used a logic o f relatives in order to work out the possible
types of relationships and signs that can be found in phenom ena. The
relatives are m onads, dyads, and triads.
Reversing their order for ease of understanding, a triad is a relationship
betw een three elem ents where m eaning is impossible w ithout all three
constituents; a dyad is a relationship betw een two constituents in which
both elem ents are necessary; and a m onad is nonrelative, for it consists of
only one elem ent and as such is considered apart from any relationship to
another thing or subject. The corresponding signs are the sym bol (triad),
the index (dyad), and the icon (m onad). Using his view of logic as a
norm ative science, Peirce proposed to study signs in these three classifica-
tions by what he called, respectively, form al or speculative grammar

(formal conditions of the truth of the symbols having m eaning— i.e ., the
iconic); fo rm a l logic (form al conditions of the tru th of the symbols— i.e .,
the indexical); and fo rm a l rhetoric (form al conditions of the force of
symbols, or their power of appealing to the mind— i.e ., the symbolic).
From an ontological point of view, the m onad becomes the category of
firstness, the dyad becomes the category of secondness, and the triad
becomes the category of thirdness. In brief, firstness is existence w ithout
dependence upon any other subject or object. Secondness is the condi-
tion of being relative to, responsive to, or in reaction to, som ething else.
Thirdness is a relationship of m ediation in which a first and second
elem ent are related one to the other.
Peirce’s dedication to keeping his ontology closely related to experi-
ence led him to develop his belief in phenom enology as a m ethod of
analysis, but it also led to his abandonm ent of “ phenom enology” in favor
of the new nam e “phaneroscopy.” Ironically, the prim ary reason seems
to be the discovery of the categories. Phenom enology as a m ethod
allowed their discovery, but it also required th at the limitation to three
categories not be fixed as an ontological requirem ent. As Freem an (1934,
p. 28) rem arks, “ Thus, the lim itation of the num ber of categories to three
and only three appears to be too great a task for the phenom enology;
and, in my opinion, no thorough-going phenom enologist would ever have
undertaken such a lim itation.”
M E R L E A U -PO N T Y 'S E X IST E N T IA L P H E N O M E N O L O G Y
M erleau-Ponty (1970, p. 25) com m ents th at the task of the com m unicator
is “ to produce a system of signs whose internal articulation reproduces
the contours of experience.” His statem ent foreshadows the way in which
phenom enology functions m ost com pletely as an infrastructure of sem io-
tic com m unication. F or M erleau-Ponty (1962; 1964a, b, c; 1968) the
phenom enological m ethod consists in three procedures that are at once
systematic and systemic. T hat is, each step follows upon the other in a
dialectic progression from description to reduction to interpretation, and
yet each step is a part of the others in a systemic com pleteness of reflexive
intentionality.
The first step in the analysis is phenom enological description, which for
M erleau-Ponty is a focus upon experience (see Figure 52 in chap. 17
below). A t this level, experience consists in the dialectic betw een self and
others— that is, reflection as a signifier function is reflexively connected to
prereflection as a signified function.
The second step is phenom enological reduction , which is a specification
of experience in consciousness. A t this level, experience displays
174 SEMIOLOGY
intentionality in H usserl’s sense because it is a consciousness of (signifier)

self (signified) as an entailm ent or reflection. In the plane of prereflec-
tion, experience is the consciousness of (signifier) an other (signified) as
entailed by the perception of the other.
The third step is phenom enological interpretation, which is also known
as the herm eneutic step. A t this level the analysis turns to the interpreta-
tion of consciousness by locating the essential phenom enon in the precon-
scious ground that is the sign (signifier/signified) of self in consciousness
as part of the plane of reflection. The dialectic relationship in the plane of
prereflection is the unconscious as the sign (signifier/signified) of the
consciousness (signifier) by which an other (signified) is perceived.
M erleau-Ponty’s existential m ethod of phenom enology (1962; 1964a,
b, c) constitutes a unique semiotic phenom enology when applied to the
analysis of conscious experience as m anifest in discourse and action (see
Figure 53 in chap. 17 below). Expanding on the Saussurean notion of the
sign, M erleau-Ponty’s phenom enological description of consciousness
(signifier function) and experience (signified function) suggests three
levels of inquiry (Lanigan 1972; 1977; 1984).
First, there is the descriptive level of expression in which parole (speak-
ing), as a signifier, is dialectically related to langue (speech act), as
signified. The second step is the reductive stage of analysis, wherein
perception discloses the grounding of parole as parole parlante (speech
speaking) and the reflexive ground of langue as parole parlée (speech
spoken). Third, the interpretive level for meaning is the discovery that
the lived-body consciousness of the person (corps propre) is a sign
incarnate in the body-lived (geste) experience of gesture, also a sign.
M erleau-Ponty concludes that m eaning is a synergistic result of the
com bination of, and relationships am ong, signs. In consequence, a sign
per se is m eaningless on the same phenom enological ground that a
signifier or signified per se is m eaningless in the Saussurean sense. The
com binatory pow er of signs in paradigm atic and syntagm atic union is a
radical cogito for M erleau-Ponty. This cogito is a hum an understanding of
the semiotic act; it is the phenom enology of the invisible m ade visible in
the ontology of the Flesh.
Chapter Thirteen
Semiotic Phenomenology as a Theory

o f Human Communication Praxis
A theory of hum an com m unication that we practice as an art or science is

a philosophy in the classic sense. This philosophy of com m unication that
we apply as com m unication science is neither novel or new as an idea
about discourse and the hum an condition. For exam ple, C arl Sagan
(1978) is am ong the m ore recent popular philosophers who rem ind us
that “ our learning and our culture would never have developed w ithout
speech; our technology and our m onum ents would never have evolved
without hands. In a way, the m ap of the m otor cortex is an accurate
p ortrait of our hum anity” (p. 34).
Y et, Plato is the first to see in speech acts (m utatis m utandis, gestures)
not just words and skills, but the unique theoretical and practical problem
of the logos of logos. This to say, the problem of theory that is sim ulta-
neously and reversibly practice. In a w ord, this is the problem of co m m u -
nication. If we read P lato’s dialogue the Sophist as com m unication
theorists and practitioners, we find a theoretical account of the discourse
praxis that belongs respectively to the statesm an, sophist, and philoso-
pher. T here is a hierarchy of norm s present in these personae ranging
from the person whose art applies the science of politics, to the person
whose art employs the science of pedagogy, and to the person whose art is
the science of right thinking (Lanigan, 1982b; see chap. 17 below). As we
read the Sophist, we scan the text for signs of logic woven into the
conceptual fabric of speech and gesture. W e seek in the discussion, as
does Socrates, the form ula by m eans of which we can construct an
insightful answer to a pervasive question. To put it in hum an science
175
176 SEMIOLOGY
term s, we seek a m eans of them atizing the problem atic: How does hum an
value become social fact?
D E FIN IN G C O M M U N IC A T IO N
Such a problem atic focuses our expectation for a theory of hum an

communication praxis by anticipating the force of P lato’s maxim: “ to rob
us of discourse would be to rob us of philosophy” (Sophist: 260a).
Beginning with Plato’s maxim and tracing its connection is to contem po-
rary speculations like Sagan’s is to display the binary analogue logic in
behavior that we call humane. The Platonic discovery of the binary
analogue logic as the logos of logos is the foundation for the proposition
that defines hum an com m unication theory and praxis as a semiotic
phenom enology. C ommunication is hum an conscious experience that
entails a binary analogue logic.
Cdi 3X D [(B ' A) —» (E λ 0)]
Legend: Cdf = Definition of Com m unication (Binary A nalogue)

3 = Necessary and Sufficient Condition (Existential Q uantifier)
X = R elation of Conscious E xperience (H jelm slevian ‘Function’)
B = First T erm C om binatory Functive (“ B o th ” A nalogue)
A = Second T erm Com binatory Functive (“ A n d ” A nalogue)
E = T hird T erm Com binatory Functive (“ E ith e r” Digit)
0 = F ourth T erm Com binatory Functive (“ O r” Digit)
= Conjunction
a = D isjunction
—> = Entailm ent
3 = Im plication
Figure 25. Formalization o f the semiotic phenom enology o f

communication
Com m unication so defined (see Figure 25) specifies two basic elem ents
of understanding. First, all com m unication is semiotic by force of being
constituted and regulated by systems of signs. All such systems contain
formal and structural relationships betw een signifiers (elem ents of ex-
pression) and signifieds (elem ents of perception). These systems are
inherently binary, the com m unicative source (term inus a quo) and desti-
nation (term inus ad quern) are in fact boundary conditions— the first
logically necessary and the second sufficient—for the degrees of norm a-
tive difference established by relationships in the system— that is, the
analogue by degree of one term with another (Lyons 1977, 1:36-37).
Second, all com m unication is a phenom enology of force of being consti-
tuted and regulated by conciousness of experience (the signifier) and its
entailm ent as the experience of consciousness (the signified).
HUMAN COMMUNICATION PRAXIS 111
T H E O R E M S O F C O M M U N IC A T IO N
The uniqueness of the binary analogue logic in behavior grounds both

the function and nature of hum an discursive action as conscious experi-
ence. This focus on conscious experience requires a brief discussion of
general com m unication logics (Lanigan 1979b). W e are all fam iliar with
the digital logics (either/or choices) in which rectilinear algorithm s p re-
scribe choice procedures in a “ given” context— that is, data. This is the
familiar territory of inform ation theory. H um an speech and gesture are a
prim e exemplar. You either speak or you are silent; you either gesture or
rem ain still. Any choice m ade provides “ inform ation”— that is, a proba-
bility for the next useful choice.
By com parison, there are analogue logics (both/and choices) in which
recursive algorithm s prescribe choice procedures for selecting contexts as
“tak en ”—th at is, capta (Laing 1967, p. 62). This is the less familiar
territory of com m unication theory. H um an speech and gesture are again
a prim e exem plar. You have both speech and silence when you speak
(what is said is concretely contextualized with what is sim ultaneously not
said, but can be said). Also, you have both gesture and its absence (what
is done bounds that of which you are capable). Any choice provides a
“message”—th at is, a defined context of possibility norm ative for the
choice m ade (see Figure 26 in chap. 14).
We find these two logics, digital and analogue, in the generic systems of
machine, animal, and hum an com m unication (Eco 1976; W ilden 1980).
H um an com m unication, how ever, characteristically involves both these
logics as sim ultaneous and reversible (a semiology). This one feature of
uniqueness is enough to distinguish hum an behavior from that of m a-
chines; but it is not enough to distinguish the hum an from the anim al,
because animals do have com m unication systems that display interacting
digital and analogue logics (Sebeok 1977).
If we add the ability to use one logic to code another—for exam ple,
coding an analogue logic by a digital logic—we discover the uniqueness of
a binary analogue logic. This unique elem ent, which justifies a claim to
separate hum an from animal com m unication, is the ability to code spatial
and tem poral placem ent (or displacem ent) in one logic by using the
second logic to represent placem ent and displacem ent, respectively.
Spatial and tem poral placem ent and displacem ent are easily seen in the
linguistic elem ent of speech that predicates or ascribes as significative
present and past referents or future actions (or gestures that do the same
thing in place of speech). Thus, consciousness is a referential context that
is moved around, fixed, or changed again by m ere choice to do so in the
coding of the coded system. Y et such consciousness is always bounded by
the hum an agent, the person, who applies the logic of consciousness to
consciousness itself thereby creating experience (see chap. 8 above).
178 SEMIOLOGY
In short, the concept and practice called “conscious experience” is a

norm ed system of systems, a logos of logos. Conscious experience com -
bines the binary elem ents of consciousness and experience, yet distin-
guishes them as boundary conditions for one another (a phenomenology).
Thus, there is a logic o f phenom ena in which we discover the phenom ena
are themselves a logic. O r if you prefer, there is a discourse (speech) of
behavior (gesture) th at we understand as consciousness, and a behavior
of discourse th at we intuit as experience (Lanigan 1979a).
Recall my definition of com munication: com m unication is hum an
conscious experience that entails a binary analogue logic. This definition
is itself a construction from four theorem s discussed at length in chapter
2, above (Lanigan 1979c).
1. Theorem of intentionality: Conscious experience is the m inim al unit o f
meaning in communication.
This theorem derives from E dm und H usserl’s (1960) proposition that
“ subjectivity is intersubjectivity.” It is associated with M aurice M erleau-
Ponty’s (1962) proposition that the person (corps propre) is the phenom e-
non of analysis in conscious experience (Lanigan 1972).
2. Theorem of punctuation: The reversibility o f expression and perception
is the m inim al system-code fo r communication.
This theorem draws from Saussure’s (1966) and B arthes’ (1968) prop-
osition, based on the language theory of Louis Hjelm slev (1961), that
speech entails levels of expression and content (perception) that are
individually and jointly the result of sign-production. E co’s (1976) con-
struction of the theory of com m unicational acts, Jürgen R uesch’s (1972)
theory of social com m unication, and E dm und L each’s (1976) theory of
cultural com m unication on the basis of sign-production further support
the theorem (Lanigan 1970; 1979a, b).
3. Theorem of convention: The transaction is the m inim al rule-governed
behavior required fo r communication.
This theorem expresses the logical elem ents in discourse discovered by
John L. A ustin (1962), H .P. Grice (1967), and John R. Searle (1969).
The analogue nature of communicative perform ance provides analytic
insights about the constitution of speech com m unication that are ob-
scured by simply linguistic description (Lanigan 1977).
4. Theorem of Legitim ation: Interpersonal speech competency is the
m inimal norm in society fo r communication.
This theorem form ulates a key relationship in which the historical
fact/value and individual/mass bifurcations are resolved as a ratio of
communicative actions. For Jürgen H aberm as (1979b), K arl-O tto A pel
(1980), and H ans-G eorg G adam er (1975), the conjunction of herm eneu-
tic and norm ative actions explains the com m unity achieved by persons in
society (Lanigan 1981).
T H E O R Y A N D PRA X IS A P P L IC A T IO N
Theoretical implications and consequent applications as research methods in

the study of hum an com m unication necessarily rely on a m etatheoretical
and m ethodological position (Lanigan 1983a). Y et I shall illustrate the
four theorem s just presented w ithout regard to m etatheory and m etho-
dology constraints (see chap. 1 above). I shall exemplify each of the
theorem s with what I consider to be a study that is theoretically insightful,
but geared basically to the new com er in the area of semiotic phenomenol-
ogy as an applied research m ethod (see Guba 1981). Suggestions for the
direction of communication research will be m ade.
First, let us examine the “ theorem of intentionality” by reference to
Ih d e’s (1977) discussion of Husserl. H usserl’s extensive research on the
logic of consciousness and tests we might apply for correct judgm ent are
present in Ih d e’s discussion of the famous N ecker cube and o ther visual
objects. By examining the experim ental conditions for hum an perception
in an active dialogue with his read er, Ihde dem onstrates the observable
conditions under which “ conscious experience is the m inimal unit of
meaning in com m unication.” His point is straightforw ard. In any scien-
tific analysis there is a determ inate order of understanding— that is, what
we naively assume to be the “ real w orld.” This relationship is a norm ed
sequence in which the researcher (a person) engages in certain proce-
dures (acts according to concepts) with a certain subject m atter (subjects
or objects).
In this sequence of events, there is an isom orphism betw een (1) the
sequence set of (a) researcher, (b) theory/m ethod, and (c) subject/object
of analysis (see “ M ethodology” in Figure 2), and (2) the sequence set of
(a) a person’s perception, (b) act of conception, and (c) the act of
sensation (see “T heory” in Figure 2). As Ihde explains, this “ positive”
approach is fallacious when experim entally tested. In fact, an exam ina-
tion of a person’s logic for constituting phenom ena (e.g., visual images)
points to just the reverse sequence as betw een sets 1 and 2. So from
a phenom enological point of view, 2-a entails 1-c, 2-b entails 1-b, and
2-c entails 1-a. This is to say, we have an order o f experience in set 1
(Experiencer/Experiencing/Experienced) and the order o f analysis in set
2 (Experienced/Experiencing/Experiencer).
The starting point for phenom enological research is a person’s percep-
tion as the object/subject of analysis, which is a conceptualization used as
a theory/m ethod to specify a sensation that is a person’s conscious
180 SEMIOLOGY
experience— that is, the researcher in situ (B randt 1970). The conse-
quence by specific reference to the N ecker cube is that the cube does not
have just two “ real” reversible images as precepts, but an infinite num ber
of “ real” precepts as possibility— that is, concrete placem ent or instantia-
tion. The num ber is directly dependent on the observer’s ability to
abstract (not generalize!) possibility fro m the phenom enon (to hypothe-
size) , rather than fix probability for change by prior conceptual assum p-
tion (to hypostatize).
Eason (1977) illustrates this “ theorem of intentionality” in a mass
communication context with his analysis of the journalistic problem of
reportage in the nonfiction novel. This research approach blends the
writing form at of the novel with the factual news story to re-create for the
reader the contextual message being reported. D ue account is taken of
the w riter’s role in the form ulation of meaning as the conscious experi-
ence through which the reporter lived. A specific study reflecting this
methodology is my analysis (see chap. 7 above) of the A ttica prison
rebellion as reported in Tom W icker’s A Time to Die (Lanigan 1983b; see
Ablamowicz 1984; Presnell 1983; Sobchack 1984; and Nelson 1986).
Secondly, the “ theorem of punctuation” has its best illustration in
Spiegelberg’s (1975) various essays on m ethodology that blend an accu-
rate concern for the philosophy of science with the standards of rigorous
philosophical analysis. O ver the years, his contribution to applied under-
standing clearly focuses on the them e that “ the reversibility of expression
and perception is the minimal system-code for com m unication.”
Spiegelberg discusses the methodological issues in the comparison of
phenom enology (praxis) to m etaphenom enology (theory). H e com pares
this eidetic problem atic of the theoretical researcher to the “w orkshop
approach” in which the direction is em pirical and pragm atic. In a parallel
context, he takes up the field research dim ension of the “vicarious
experience” of the individual as an interpersonal agent in a social context.
Finally, he is a pioneer in explaining phenom enological m ethods. In his
essay, “ Existential Uses of Phenom enology” (1975, pp. 54-71), Spiegel-
berg provides one of the best accounts available of the m ethodology that
is applied in whole or part by phenom enologists. M erleau-Ponty (1962)
presents slightly m ore philosophical account of the procedure covering
the three-step m ethod of phenom enological description, phenom enologi-
cal reduction, and phenom enological interpretation.
Turning to actual communication research, Langellier (1980) and Miller
(1980) both explore the reversibility of expression and perception as it
occurs within the perform ance context of the oral interpretation of
literature. M iller focuses on the relationships betw een the perform er and
text, whereas Langellier’s concern is the nature and function of audience.
In contrast, Sochat (1978) quantitatively explores the semiotic constraints
operating in an instructional setting where interviewing skills are being
taught to medical students. A further illustration of the “ theorem of

punctuation” is the team research project in which student/instructor
com m unication and role-m odeling was studied phenom enologically as it
occurs in the Southern Illinois University basic interpersonal com m unica-
tion course (Lanigan 1981).
Third, the “ theorem of convention” suggests that the transaction is the
minimal rule-governed behavior required for com m unication. O ne of the
most successful illustrations of this theorem is the research m ethodology
developed by William J.J. Gordon (1968). He calls his method “synectics”
(a term first suggested by C.S. Peirce), not phenomenology, although even a
casual comparison of the synectics m ethod and the descriptive phenom en-
ology of Husserl suggests a direct correlation (see chap. 12 above).
The essential feature of G ordon’s m ethod is the use of analogues to
com pare what is familiar with w hat is unfam iliar. This is a necessary and
critical step in any research procedure faced with an apparently “ unsolv-
able” problem (like the N ecker cube). The synectics approach refocuses
the problem in term s of the researcher’s perception, rath er than the
conception of the problem . A nother m ain feature of the synectics m ethod
is the reliance on group com m unication in a team form at.
W hitsett’s (1979) study of H um an Sexuality Service division of the
Student H ealth Service at Southern Illinois U niversity exemplifies the
“theorem of convention.” H e used a group com m unication context to
specify phenom enologically how students perceived their conscious ex-
perience of sexuality when their conceptions of sexual behavior and
norms became dysfunctional within interpersonal settings. Spengler (1975)
studied the phenom enon of interpersonal and organizational loneliness
using a w ritten survey protocol to gather capta from m em bers of a
religious order in the Catholic Church. In this study individual respon-
dent’s perceptions could be directly com pared to the group conception of
conscious experience as a m em ber of th e religious community.
T he “ theorem of legitim ation” has a focal place in the procedures
suggested by P atton (1980; see A nderson 1987) for evaluation research.
H e explicitly points out that the roots of contem porary qualitative re-
search strategies are in phenom enology and are directly linked to the
interpersonal context, especially w here interviewing is a prim ary form of
capta/data collection (pp. 44-48, 198-200). P atto n ’s detailed review of
research m ethodologies grounds the them e that “ interpersonal speech
competency is the minimal norm in society for com m unication.” Indeed,
his guidelines for writing a research report can be read as an outline of the
essential features of a phenomenological description, reduction (analysis),
and interpretation that should be part of any such research effort (1980,
pp. 340-42; see chap. 10 above).
A lthough the empirical studies by W hitsett (1979) and Spengler (1975)
just discussed apply equally well to the “ theorem of legitim ation,” there
182 SEMIOLOGY
are also excellent illustrations of eidetic studies in the w ork of Peterson,

Diekm an, and Brooks. Peterson (1980) looks at the norm ative function
of perform ance as a com m unication elem ent using the theater as an
exemplar. D iekm an (1974) explores the process of existential legitim a-
tion in the work of M artin B uber, Em m anuel Levinas, and Jacques
Lacan. Brooks (1968) examines the original contribution of the philoso-
pher H enry Nelson W iem an to the problem atic of “ creative inter-
change.” F urther examples of appropriate research in this area can be
found in D eetz (1981), Cahill (1983), Gom es (1984), and Tsuda (1985).
R E SE A R C H IM PLIC A TIO N S
I began with the question, “ How does hum an value becom e social fact?”
I suggest that the answer is simply, and thereby profoundly, com m unica-
tion. But in an age that obscures both the intension and extension of that
term , I propose the definition of sem iotic phenom enology, that “ com m u-
nication is hum an conscious experience that entails a binary analogue
logic.” Several research implications are apparent in such a them atic
position. These implications them selves constitute a set of problem atics
to be explored.
First, there is the problem atic of theory construction. The perspective
of semiotic phenom enology asks us to reexam ine our heritage in the
trivium (see chap. 11). W e tend to conceive of logic, rhetoric, and
gram m ar as “ conceptions” to be blindly applied to this or that set of
capta/data. W hether the m ethod of analysis is qualitative or quantitative,
the conception still dictates. W ith the contem porary convergence (in the
them atic of understanding) of the problem s of “ text” (in semiology/
structuralism) and its “ interpretation” (in phenom enology/herm e-
neutics), we have in the approach of sem iotic phenom enology an
opportunity to reevaluate the theoretical pow er of the trivium. It is not
once again a digital choice to accept or reject the m ethod of the trivium,
but an opportunity to see the analogue pow er of conjunction. In the
communication discipline, we need to study the systemic and systematic
connection among logic, rhetoric, and gram m ar. In applied research this
means the science of com m unication should becom e the integration of
the disciplines of philosophy (logic), communicology (rhetoric), and
linguistics (gram m ar). In short, we should reappraise the trivium in
hum an science term s as a theoretical orientation— that is, as a them atic
research praxis.
Second, there is the problem atic of hum an behavior as the data/capta
we study. Semiotic phenom enology provides a m ethodology in which the
phenom enon studied can be handled validly as a perceived object (datum)
or perceived subject (captum ) in a m odality that is an em pirical value
(a boundary norm) or an eidetic value (another boundary norm). This is the
valence that is the binary analogue whose em pirical and eidetic status is
com binatory fact. In short, the hum an sciences do not have to be
m odeled on the natural sciences. B oth a theory and a m ethod for the
valid, scientific study of hum an com m unication are available in the
innovative w ork of semiotic phenom enology. The research foundation is
already in place.
A third problem atic, and perhaps the m ost serious, is the general
failure to realize th at semiotic phenom enology is a research m ethod with
a pedigree th at runs as far back as Plato and supports a host of m ethodo-
logical refinem ents easily rivaling the spectrum of statistical inference
models in any good textbook on quantitative m ethods. T here is, in fact,
even a school of phenom enology devoted to m athem atics (A lperson
1975; Tragesser 1977), so even the procedural ability to formalize captai
data is available.
The direct implication for research is the need for adequately trained
researchers. M uch of the justifiable criticism of semiotics and phenom e-
nology in the U .S .A . stems from research or attem pts at research by
“ one-course w onders” whose entire preparation for phenom enological
research is a graduate school lecture course or a self-taught sense of
purpose gleaned from a few journal articles or books. In this context also,
semiotic phenom enology suffers to a certain extent by being a “ research
fad.” The result is tagging various journal articles as “ sem iotic” or
“ phenom enological” or “ herm eneutic” in order to gain publication. In
most cases, they turn out to be an uninform ed use of linguistic theory
(“ semiotics” ) or a report on psychological speculation (“ phenom enol-
ogy” ). It should not be surprising to learn, then, that in the larger
international com m unity of scholars, the leading journals for reporting
com m unication research are Semiótica and C ommunication (Paris).
The them atic th at em erges from the three aspects of the problem atic
before us is fairly clear. Just as the discipline of communicology, we need
to rethink o u r uniqueness. W e do not need to follow other disciplines,
least of all those in the natural sciences. W e do need to assert our
leadership on the basis of the rather impressive results achieved since the
Platonic dialogues and the writing of A ristotle’s Organon. W e need a
theory and a m ethod of hum an science th at builds on this history. I think
semiotic phenom enology is a good possibility.
Finally, we who use sem iotic phenom enology as theoreticians and
practitioners need to pool our resources and set som e identified standards
for the w ork we do. T he first step was taken in a conference at N orthw est-
ern University by founding the Society for Phenom enology and the
H um an Sciences, and adopting H um an Studies as the society’s official
research journal. A second step was the founding of the Institute for
Hum an Sciences at Ohio University, with Professor Algis M icKunas as
director. The next step will be the applied research we do.
Chapter Fourteen
Semiotic Phenomenology as a
Metatheory o f Human Communication
Explanations of hum an com m unication are by definition projects in

m etatheory construction. Just as natural languages may be used to
describe and explain them selves, the construction rules for com m unica-
tion systems may be used to articulate new paradigm s constituting a
higher logical type of com m unication (see K rippendorff 1977).
In this chapter, I w ant to suggest the way in which certain theory
construction rules (exem plar concepts) belonging respectively to sem iol-
ogy, social systems theory, com munication theory, and existential p h e-
nomenology can be combined into a metatheory construction of commu-
nication th at is by nature and function hum an. Such a m etatheory, I
believe, is both a necessary and sufficient condition for understanding and
appreciating the concepts of signifier and signified as constituents of the
concept sign. It is the legacy of Saussure that puts these concepts at the
center of all communicative behavior that is explained by com municol-
ogy, the process of hum an expression and perception (Culler 1977; see
H örm ann 1971, pp. 109-32).
My analysis will progressively deal with six topics or general hypoth-
eses. First, semiology indicates that the coding function in com m unication
relies on the nature of the signifier and the signified. Second, the nature of
coding (as distinct from its function) is best described by social systems
theory. Third, hum an com m unication is best accounted for by com m uni-
cation theory, not inform ation theory. F ourth, any m etatheory of hum an
communication based on the foregoing hypotheses can have only func-
tional (H jelm slev’s sense) m odels in the social world. Fifth, these two
models, which I call the ecosystem m odel and the phenom enological
184
METATHEORY 185
m odel, constitute the logical universe of a rigorous science o f com m unica-

tion. A nd finally, I state the prolegom ena for com m unication theory and
praxis that are hum an in nature and function.
The usual convention for defining the signifier as a “ sound-im age” and
the signified as a “ concept” forgets Saussure’s intention that sound-im age
and concept are precisely the problem to be resolved by the new con-
structs: “ signifier” and “ signified” th at “ have the advantage of indicating
the opposition th at separates them from each o th er and from the whole
[sign] of which they are p arts” (Saussure 1966, p. 67). T ogether with the
logical theory o f coherence, Saussure further specifies two concom itant
principles: (1) the arbitrary nature of the sign, and (2) the linear nature of
the signifier. Saussure explains th at by “ arbitrary” he m eans the signifier
has no natural connection with the signified. A nd he further explains
“linear” by noting that the signifier “ unfolds solely in tim e .” H e further
limits the signifier by saying that it “ represents a span and the span is
m easurable in a single dim ension; it is a line” (1966, pp. 69-70).
W hat we have in Saussure’s form ulations are the often overlooked
rules for coding signs as binary analogues. Signs do not exist as the
behavioristic reductions of sound-im age and concept (which in m ost cases
requires an equivocation betw een “ im age” and “ concept” ). Signs do
exist as form al boundaries (W ilden 1972, p. 414; A lexander 1972)— that
is, logical fo rm s that are distinct as class entities (abstractions, qualities)
and as their com bination as a whole (relations, functions). In short,
Saussure relies on the construction rule that a class cannot contain itself.
This condition being the case, signifier and a signified have the status of
class identity (they are reflexive), the status of a reversible nature (they
are symmetrical), as either continuity or discontinuity (rupture) as bound-
ary conditions of each other, and the status of being transitive. These
conditions of the signifier and the signified suggest a synergistic nature for
the sign(s)— nam ely, that sign-signified relation can be expressed in two
functional m odalities. First, the relation can be viewed as an open system,
where the relationship functions to specify possibilities of signification
that are systemic and onto genic in nature. Second, a closed system can be
expressed, w here the relationship is systematic and phylogenetic in n a-
ture. In general, Saussure’s discussion of parole may be taken as an
illustration of the open system , and respectively, his explanation of
langue may be viewed as the closed system. In both cases the “ system ”
represents a code condition (langage) for perform ance and com petence.
The possibilities or boundaries for system perform ance (and the system
infrastructure of “ com petence” ) are best articulated with a selected
comparison of com munication theory and information theory. In the
present context, I will be using com m unication theory to illustrate the
open system and information theory to exemplify the closed system. The
system that is com m on to both theories is the entailment construction rule
186 SEMIOLOGY
that com m unication theory is inclusive of inform ation theory, but not
conversely. See Figure 25, in chapter 13, above, for a form alization of this
rule.
The logical grounds for this rule are apparent in a brief contrast
between the two theories. F or simplicity, I conceive of each theory as
being a sequential complex of three construction rules: (1) message, (2)
context, and (3) code. In the case of inform ation theory (a digital logic),
which is logically prior to com m unication theory, message is defined as
“sign presence,” context is defined as “ sign absence,” and code is defined
as “ either sign presence or sign absence.” The construction rule thereby
articulated is that in a closed system only context o f choice is established.
That is, the possibilities of choice are determ ined, but no one particular
choice is specified as appropriate, correct, or the like. The result is the
establishm ent of a system of cultural conventions or regulative rules that
suggest appropriate choices th at are, strictly speaking, arbitrary and
linear in Saussure’s sense of those term s (V erón 1971).
In short, inform ation theory allows us to account for langue as a closed
system. T hat closed system in its general application we norm ally regard
as culture. W e should note, as Israel points out, that in actual perfor-
mance hum an beings do engage in behavior that is explained by such a
closed system, although inform ation theory is perfectly suited to the
description and prediction of open systems, w hether hum an, anim al, or
machine signal (signifier/signified fo rm is invariant) systems (Israel 1972,
p. 145).
R eturning now to com m unication theory (an analogue logic), we have
a sequential complex that is the opposite of inform ation theory: (1) code,
(2) context, and (3) message. In this case, code is “ both sign presence and
sign absence,” context is “ sign presence,” and message is “ sign absence.”
The construction rule generated is that choice o f context is constituted,
thus leaving specific choice to be regulated by social convention. The
result is the creation of a system of social conventions or regulative rules
that are also arbitrary and linear. A t this point, we have a m etatheory
hypothesis that can explain com m unicative behavior that is socially
variable within culture (langue) and culturally variable in society (parole),
but displays code consistency (langage) in either modality.
My explanation so far has considered sign presence and absence as
features of both com m unication theory and inform ation theory. Let me
suggest as a postulate th at the same analysis can be applied selectively to
signifiers and signifieds, thereby generating a theory of logical exten-
sion/intension accounting for com m unication as linguistic connotation/
denotation (A lexander 1972) or as nonlinguistic system (Leathers 1976).
It may be helpful at this point to illustrate the inform ation theory/
com m unication theory connection in a diagram indicating the arbitrary,
linear sense in which communicative com petence allows for communica-
METATHEORY 187
IN FO R M A T IO N T H E O R Y
ai ^ ___________________________________________________ «
w Code Context Message . ω
a a
H H
Z
o I z
2
P Context * Context j -
<
u
z I z
3 i
S Message Context Code 1 |
g ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0
u o
IN FO R M A T IO N T H E O R Y
Fig. 26 Communication praxis

Note: 1. Com m unication T heory = Synchronic [consciousness] and Polychronic [beha-
vior].
2. Inform ation T heory = D iachronic [consciousness] and M onochronic [be-
havior],
3. Legend: * = Synchrony [person’s conscious behavior] which is either
E gocentric or Sociocentric.
— = Gemeinschaft!Gesellschaft Function.
— = Lebenswelt!Weltanschauung Function.
tive perform ance as a m etatheory phenom enon (cf. H aberm as 1970a, b).
In Figure 26 the [*] indicates the locus of a person’s conscious behavior,
which in a cultural, perform ance sense will be either egocentric or so-
ciocentric, or, if you will, the consistency of “ context” located in a person
or in a group is the m ovem ent from code to message to code ad infinitum
as it occurs in hum an interaction. In linguistic term s, we may think of
langage as the cultural connection betw een persons (Lebenswelt) and
their cultures as institutions (Weltanschauung). I have illustrated this
process with a solid line [------------ ] in Figure 26. In other words, a
cultural system of messages exists when a person is born into the culture.
Those messages contextualize individual perform ance (parole), and the
repetition of perform ance contextualizes new messages appropriate to
the system.
In m ore technical term s, inform ation theory represents the Weltan-
schauung as a closed system that is diachronic (cultural consciousness;
e.g., myth) and monochronic (cultural behavior; e.g ., social convention).
Y et the existence of the person as a cultural agent allows the generation
of com m unication theory from the inform ation theory base. Thus, com -
m unication theory represents the Lebenswelt as an open system th at is
synchronic (personal consciousness; e.g ., my lived reality) and poly-
chronic (personal behavior; e.g ., my intentional acts). Thus, we m ove to
an explanation of the ways in which cultures determ ine the context o f
choice for persons who always m ake choices in context (Fisher, G lover, &
Ellis 1977).
188 SEMIOLOGY
The other connection that needs explanation is the social m ediation

between culture and person, and vice versa. This process is illustrated in
Figure 26 by the broken line [------]. In this case the relationship is
between a person as a m em ber of a society (Gesellschaft), whose con-
scious behavior is a functional norm , and as a m em ber of a community
(iGemeinschaft), whose conscious behavior is a natural norm. Again, in a
technical sense, inform ation theory represents the Gesellschaft as a closed
system that is diachronic (social consciousness; e.g., W estern values) and
m onochronic (social behavior; e .g ., A m erican norm s). In turn, com m uni-
cation theory represents the Gemeinschaft that is synchronic (group
consciousness; e.g ., family attitudes) and polychronic (group behavior;
e.g., classroom activities).
It does not take much analysis to see that the relationships I have
described are functions in tim e, but the relationships per se cannot be
com pared as to their essential nature. H ence as I previously suggested,
the nature is achronic (indeterm inate), and the function is determ ined by
chronological condition. It is this fact that allows a system to alternate its
function betw een a state of “ openness” and “ closedness” (Blackwell
1976).
I am now in a position to suggest my third point, that hum an com m uni-
cation is best accounted for by com m unication theory as I have defined it.
Four key relationships are involved with this hypothesis. First, metaphor
and morphogenesis m ust be viewed as a condition of discontinuity for the
signifier, and the relationship of m etonym y and homeorhesis as a condi-
tion of continuity for the signified. In turn, the continuity of the signifier is
explained by the analogue/homeogenesis relationship, and the disconti-
nuity of the signified is illustrated by the digit/homeostatis condition.
These basic relationships are diagram ed in Figure 27.
In this diagram , I com bined concepts based on their logical nature and
their system function. The first com bination is m etaphor and m or-
phogenesis. M etaphor is a relational process of one-for-one substitution
of attributes and is usually, but not exclusively, an analogue based on a
difference of degree. M orphogenesis is a process of constant change
resulting from a sensitivity to noise and is consequently a condition of
ultrastability. A working paradigm of m orphogenesis is society— that is, a
collection of sociocentric nature and function, or w hat Hall (1976, p. 91)
calls a “ high contexfi’society.
The second com bination is m etonym y and hom eorhesis. M etonym y is a
relational process of the substitution of an attribute for a substance,
usually (but not exclusively) a digit based on difference of kind. H om eo-
rhesis is a process of selection and com bination within the given norm s of
a system; it is a form of m orphostasis. In brief, morphostasis is a process
of massive redundancy that reduces noise to insignificance and prevents
change. It is a condition of instability in a system, and a working
METATHEORY 189
S IG N IF IE R
D ISC O N T IN U IT Y C O N T IN U IT Y
M ETAPHOR A N A L O G IC A L ]
M O R P H O G E N E S IS H O M E O G E N E S IS
M ETO N Y M Y D IG IT ] AL]
H O M E O R H E S IS H O M E O ST A S IS
C O N T IN U IT Y D ISC O N T IN U IT Y
S IG N IF IE D
Fig. 27. Communication theory

Note: Comm unication Theory Entails Inform ation Theory.
paradigm is a person— that is, an egocentric nature/function, or H all’s

(1976) “ low context” society.
The third grouping is the analogue and hom eogenesis. A n analogue is a
relational process th at suggests both the static condition of elem ents and
their reversible com bination; it is a choice of context. Hom eogenesis is a
homologous process that is also hom eom orphous— that is, hom eogenesis
is a form of m orphostasis.
The fourth com bination is the digital and hom eostasis. A digit is a
relational process th at suggests either the static condition of elem ents or
their reversible substitution; it is the context (known choices) for a
choice. Hom eostasis is a steady-state process in which a system and its
environm ent are in balance, but in a condition of change. It is also a form
of morphostasis.
The schema articulated in Figure 27 suggests the com m unication theory
rules by which a person com m unicates as a m em ber of a society. In Figure
27 the m ovem ent from signifier discontinuity to signified continuity is the
m ovem ent from parole to langue. In a linguistic sense, this m eans having
many words (e.g., words in several languages) for the sam e referent. The
parallel m ovem ent from signifier continuity to signified discontinuity
(again parole to langue) suggests, in my exam ple, th at one word can have
many referents. The same illustration holds tru e if we shift the perspec-
tive to the signified and move through continuity or discontinuity to the
signifier.
Such m ovem ent is precisely why Saussure insists that the signifier and
signified are fo rm s in a system. Such a process reversal as I just described
is not possible if the relationships are defined as sound-im age and concept
w ith in one natural language. It is in this context th at inform ation theory is
190 SEMIOLOGY
found wanting, for this theory presum es one finite system in which there
is only one form for all functions— that is, a rule of disjunction for
elem ents (sound-im age cannot be a concept, etc.). A n interesting illustra-
tion of this point is the A m erican diplom atic response in W orld W ar II
with the Japanese word mokusatsu (A lexander 1972, pp. 11-12).
My fourth basic point in this chapter is th at, given the preceding
analysis, there are only two functional m odels perm itted by the theory
that can operate in a social world of persons. B oth models represent a
m etatheory of hum an com m unication, for they prescribe both the nature
and function of the system as direction', either “ open” or “ closed.” These
directions are, respectively, the rectilinear and the curvilinear. In detail-
ing them it may be helpful to exam ine Figure 28, which is a progressive
elaboration of Figures 26 and 27.
S IG N IF IE R
\ D ISC O N T IN U IT Y C O N T IN U IT Y /
00 Multifinality Equifinality 00
00 M ETA PHOR A N A L O G IC A L ] c/3
ω C U R V IL IN E A R M O R P H O G E N E S IS H O M E O G E N E S IS
[R E C T I]L IN E A R UJ
z
z M orphostasis Morphogenesis ω
UJ
G
O Equifinality Multifinality O
H M ETO N Y M Y D IG IT [A L ]
Z [R EC T IJ-LIN E A R C U R V IL IN E A R
o Morphogenesis H O M E O R H E S IS H O M E O ST A S IS X
M orphostasis Û-
/ C O N T IN U IT Y D ISC O N T IN U IT Y
\
S IG N IF IE D
Fig. 28. Communication metatheory

Note: 1. Phenom enological M odel = A ll O ppositions are R eversible and have a
Dialectic Function.
2. Ecosystem M odel = All O ppositions are V ectors and have an Analytic
Function.
3. Oppositions = Vertical or H orizontal M ovem ents of Relation [Form] in the
Schemata.
The rectilinear direction in a system is characterized by equifinality and

morphogenesis. In this sense rectilinear refers to a directional m otion in
time and space (consciousness and behavior), is a linear process (closed
system) or a multilinear process (open system) [see Figure 3]. W e can
conceive of this structure as functionally arithmetic, where its nature is an
equivalence betw een system output and antecedent input. The founda-
tion for the rectilinear construction rules is inform ation theory. Thus,
equifinality is a final state that may be reached from different initial states
or by different paths. Put another way, choosing a context of choice
counts as a choice— a point proven by its contradiction— nam ely, that not
METATHEORY 191
choosing is a choice function by nature. Recall that m orphogenesis is a

condition of ultrastability exemplified above as society or a sociocentric
system condition.
On the o ther hand, the curvilinear direction is a cycle m otion in time
and space that is a helical process (open system) [see Figure 5] or circular
process (closed system) [see Figure 4]. W e can think of this structure as
functionally geometric, w here its n ature is a condition of output that is
greater than its antecedent input. The base for the curvilinear direction
and construction rules is com m unication theory. T herefore, the curvili-
near process is characterized by m ultifinality and m orphostasis. M ultifi-
nality is a process state by which similar initial conditions, or routing by
different paths, may lead to dissimilar end states. F or exam ple, the same
choice in one context will be unlike the sam e choice in another context— a
point also proven by its contradiction— th at is, the same choice cannot be
repeated in the same context, for each unique choice alters the context.
Most paradoxes depend on forgetting this principle. Also recall that
m orphostasis is a condition of instability illustrated previously by the
concept of person or an egocentric condition.
A t this point I should like to move to my fifth topic. To be specific, I
want to characterize the m odel w ith rectilinear direction as the ecosystem
m odel. In turn, I describe the curvilinear direction as the phenom enologi-
cal m odel. It is not possible, given the confines of this chapter, to proceed
through a detailed proof for my construction of these models. So I m ust
limit myself to an outline description of the key elem ents in each m odel,
which will then allow me the privilege of m aking som e assertions about
future theory construction as it pertains to hum an com m unication. I also
should note th at M erleau-Ponty m akes a similar argum ent; see chapter 4,
above.
First, let me suggest that I am using the concept of ecosystem in the way
Wilden develops it (1972, p. 39 and passim ). W ith this understanding, I
want to contend th at the rectilinear direction has four rather exclusive
functions in hum an com m unication. First, it can describe the digital
nature of intrapersonal com munication. Such com m unication can be
illustrated by a person’s own perception of distinct expressions, such as
the difference betw een “ m y” writing and “ m y” speaking. Secondly, the
model can describe digital interpersonal com munication. H ere a good
illustration is the distinction betw een the perceived interaction that is
“ speech,” such as a conversation, and the interaction that is “ language,”
such as one encounters in a new spaper item . Thirdly, the m odel can
explain analogical intrapersonal com m unication— for exam ple, the differ-
ence betw een writing and speech. C ontrast, as an illustration, how my
personal letter-w riting presum es a context much like that in which my
speech occurs. Indeed, how often do we receive letters devoid of context?
Yet it rarely happens in a face-to-face conversation. Fourthly, the m odel
192 SEMIOLOGY
can describe analogical interpersonal com m unication. In this case we

have the example difference betw een speaking and language. This cate-
gory is illustrated by situations in which your language is corrected by
others when you are speaking, or you do not have the words that will
m ake your speaking express your actual m eaning, and so forth.
In this sketch I have taken some care to m ake the parts of speech
correspond with system functions— th at is, nouns suggesting a static
condition with rectilinear direction, present participles as action condi-
tions that are nom inal in a curvilinear sense, and so on. In addition, I
have mixed semiotic form s, writing versus speaking, and I haved mixed
code-systems, language versus speaking. All this is to suggest the m e-
tatheory conditions that presum e theory conditions. Thus, the m ain point
of the ecosystem m odel is its utilization of an inform ation theory ap-
proach, where a natural language is the governing paradigm for theory
construction.
The phenom enological m odel, by com parison, is grounded in com m u-
nication theory that displays the curvilinear direction in systems. In this
particular discussion I am using “phenom enological” in its philosophic
sense (Lanigan 1977). In similar fashion, with the ecosystem m odel I w ant
to characterize four basic functions for hum an com m unication. In w hat
follows, the basic point of the phenom enology m odel is the use of a
communication theory approach w here conscious behavior is the govern-
ing paradigm.
1. The phenom enology m odel can describe digital intrapersonal com -
munication. Such com m unication is exemplified by a person’s tendency to
be “conscious of behavior,” w here the norms of society (sociocentric) are
com pared to those of nature/history (egocentric), or the tendency to
behave “consciously,” where historical norm s are com pared to cultural
preferences.
2. The m odel can describe digital interpersonal com m unication. This
type of com m unication illustrates self-conscious behavior (what is exis-
tential to the organism) as com pared with the consciousness of an o th er’s
behavior (what is empirical and mechanical— often as display technique
for behaving).
3. The model explains analogical intrapersonal com m unication, where
“ being conscious of behavior” (norms in society/nature) becomes an
existential function of the organism (e.g., ego and alter-ego, or self-
concept and body-image, etc.).
4. The model describes analogical interpersonal com m unication. H ere
the use of historical/cultural norm s to “ behave consciously” allow for
technique as intention to becom e “ real” (em pirical/m echanical). For
example, the psychiatric technique of free association allows a person to
behave consciously, yet utter basic feelings, attitudes, and so forth, that
are repressed (see chap. 5 above). A linguistic example would be som e-
METATHEORY 193
thing like a perform ative utterance, such as saying “ I do” in a m arriage

ceremony. The utterance is the historical norm m ade empirical by inten-
tion to do so.
By way of connecting the ecosystem m odel and the phenom enology
model with the initial analysis in this chapter, let me point out that in
Figure 28 the operation of the m odels would have the following charac-
teristics. First, all oppositions in the diagram are conceived in the p h e-
nomenological model as being reversible. Hence, communication is
dialectical in a logical sense. Second, the ecosystem m odel conceives of all
oppositions as analytical and not reversible. Com m unication is rhetorical
in this context (see Lanigan 1974, 1984; Eco 1976).
My last point in this chapter is the general prolegom ena for hum an
com munication theory and praxis. Given the m etatheory conditions I
have outlined (see Figure 28), I believe theory construction m ust take
account of sem iology, which as a discipline focuses on the nature of digital
codes functioning in an analogical context. The prim ary benefit in this
orientation is the ability to describe interpersonal conditions that define
the person in an empirical sense. By contrast, the discipline of phenom e-
nology focuses on the analogue nature of codes used in digital contexts.
The gain here is the ability to describe personal conditions of existence
that define interpersonal situations that are likewise empirical.
In specific term s of com munication praxis, the phenom enology m odel
provides us with a methodology of (1) description, (2) reduction (i.e.,
definition of description), and (3) interpretation (i.e., reduction of defini-
tion) (Lanigan 1977, pp. 84ff.). The ecosystem m odel, on the other hand,
provides us with a technology consisting of (1) information (i.e., data
generation as cognition), (2) com munication (i.e., capta generation as
affection), and (3) legitimation (i.e., acta generation as conation) (Lani-
gan 1972; cf. R osenthal 1977; Toulm in 1977; & C uller 1976, pp. 103ff.).
B oth m odels presum e a sem iotic base in which (1) description and
inform ation are code conditions (langage), (2) reduction and com m unica-
tion are context conditions (langue), and (3) interpretation and legitim a-
tion are message conditions (parole) (Lanigan 1978). It is in the framework
of these prolegom ena that I contend that hum an com m unication is by
definition a project in m etatheory construction.
[ S e c t i o n TW O: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH]
Chapter Fifteen
The Semiotic Phenomenology o f Speech

and Linguistic Discontinuity
Many of the presuppositions that one encounters in the philosophic

literature on the phenom enology of hum an com m unication suggest a
useful parallel to the linguistic concept of discontinuity. The structuralist
view of language, in which discontinuity occurs either as a paradigm atic
or syntagmatic function of sentence use, bears a close theoretical re -
semblance to the phenom enological thesis that an “ intentional object” in
speech displays a separation and reversibility of language as (1) the act of
speaking, and (2) the act of speech perception— for exam ple, M erleau-
Ponty’s (1968) use of écart and chiasme. In this chapter, I should like to
explore in a brief way exactly how the linguistic concept of discontinuity
or rupture com pares with the phenom enological concepts of separation
and reversibility in speaking.
C O N TR A ST A N D F R E E V A R IA T IO N
As Lyons (1969, p. 73) suggests, every linguistic unit has a potentiality

of occurrence in a certain context wherein two types of structural rela-
tionships are possible. First, any language unit th at can occur in the same
context as another given unit enters into a paradigm atic relationship. For
the linguist it is not critical w hether the relationship of units is by
“ contrast” or w hether they are in “ free variation.” This is a rather
im portant point inasmuch as the phenom enologist is concerned only with
units in free variation, or w hat is historically called “ imaginative free
variation.”
197
198 SEMIOLOGY
Secondly, a linguistic unit occurs on the same level with other units and
these o th er units constitute its context, thereby am ounting to a syntagm a-
tic relationship. The similar idea in phenom enological philosophy is the
synergistic relationship of expression and perception in speaking, which is
present as an intentional object— that is, an object of consciousness in
which linguistic perform ance and com petence are coincident. In this
connection, linguistic com petence refers to a person’s tacit understanding
of the rule system of the language that person speaks, w hereas linguistic
perform ance relates to the essentially social use to which the rule system
is applied. As B. B ernstein (1971, p. 229) elaborates, “ com petence refers
to m an abstracted from contextual constraints. Perform ance refers to
m an in the grip of the contextual constraints which determ ine his speech
acts.”
Given a basic understanding of paradigm atic and syntagm atic relations
in the context of the present discussion, it is appropriate to examine
discontinuity, which is fundam entally a rearrangem ent of the relationship
betw een linguistic units. Such a rearrangem ent comes to constitute a new
set of paradigm atic and syntagmatic relations. F or the linguist, the new
set of relationships either exhibit a contrast with the original relationship
or are a product of the free variation of com parable units (Lyons 1969,
p. 223).
Thus in linguistics, discontinuity offers a tool for determ ining the
structural possibilities of language unit occurrence within specified con-
texts. The procedure is essentially negative in that it provides an internal
criterion of unit nonoccurrence, derived from natural languages and their
statistical features of unit occurrence, for application to any respective
natural language. In other words, a given language is taken as a set of
relationships that determ ine how sentence generation is possible. W here
the linguistic unit generation does not occur as an expected probability
within the limits of possibility, discontinuity can be readily identified as
the violation of linguistic potentiality.
The point to be m ade about the linguistic use of the discontinuity
concept is th at speaking or language use is delim ited by a negative process
of definition. D iscontinuities are used for the determ ination of the limits
of possible usage. It is this view that allows for the functionally equal
acceptance of contrast and free variation as m odalities for determ ining
paradigm atic and syntagmatic relationships. C ontrast is accepted as a
criterion of discontinuity because it is a direct indicator of probable
potential in speech acts. T here is an observable difference of unit kind
indicative in the relationship of units per se. The phenom enologist views
“ contrast” in this context as basically a negative criterion, because the
semantic value of the relationship is determ ined by analytically constitut-
ing a difference, and utilizes the functionally positive concept of separa-
tion (écart). W hat is m eant by separation is that the intentional object is a
SPEECH AND LINGUISTIC DISCONTINUITY 199
synergistic relationship of related (similar or dissimilar) units of speech.

Equally acceptable to the linguist as a m ethodological criterion is the
restriction on language use implied by the concept of free variation.
Given the structural characteristics of speech, only certain variations will
be within the limits of the potentiality of use in a natural language.
Violations of potentiality simply do not count as speech acts for the
linguist. This is to argue that the linguistic view of “free” variation exists
as free only in the negative sense th at violations of rule relationship are
not to be counted as an acceptable description of how language is
constituted. “ F ree variation,” then, is a rather restricted linguistic con-
cept th at is best understood only as “variation by rule” or “variation that
is use-specific.” It is precisely this limiting conception th at the phenom e-
nologist tries to avoid by not utilizing a concept com parable to “ contrast”
and by qualifying the use of “variation” as “free and im aginative” in a
positive sense.
The problem that em erges from using a negative definition of disconti-
nuity is th at linguistic analysis m ust restrict its theoretical investigation to
descriptions of actual utterances of speech, w hether initially as research
paradigm s or as pragm atic proof exam ples within theoretical constructs.
From a linguist’s point of view this restriction m ay be quite acceptable in
describing language. B ut from a philosopher’s point of view, it is a
limitation th at obscures the criteria by which speech possibility, over and
above speech potentiality, can be specified in such a way as to constitute
conditions in which the activity of speaking and listening (linguistic
perception) are coincident phenom ena— that is, the linguistic synergism
that is the speech act (G ardiner 1951).
S E PA R A T IO N A N D R E V E R SIB IL IT Y
Perhaps some of the am biguities raised in the analysis thus far can be
clarified by a closer exam ination of the phenom enological view of speech
with respect to the functions of separation and reversibility (imaginative
free variation) in the determ ination of intentional objects in speech.
Recall that these relationships parallel the linguistic view that contrast
and free variation account for structural relations that are paradigm atic
and syntagmatic.
W ithin the context of speech or language use, the phenom enological
idea of separation (écart) suggests in a conditional sense that the occur-
rence of any linguistic unit m arks itself as distinct from the context in
which it occurs, not as a division of units but as their juxtaposition. The
resulting distinction is m eaningful only when it is understood that the
individual linguistic unit and the context m utually and dialectically derive
their m eaning from one another. T he relationship indicating this m eaning
200 SEMIOLOGY
is not a product of contrast or com parison. R ath er, the relationship is a

synergism in which the joint occurrence of the context and the linguistic
unit provide a m eaning greater than the sum of the m eaning contained
individually by the unit or by its context.
The linguistic concept of a paradigmatic relationship would appear to
am ount to the same assum ption m ade by the phenom enologist. H ow ever,
this is not the case. The phenom enologist views the synergism of a
linguistic unit and its context literally as a gestalt. To change the linguistic
unit with another unit that is functionally equivalent is to destroy the
particular synergism and create a new one. In this situation, the linguistic
concept of contrast is a procedure that autom atically and by definition
destroys the paradigm atic (in the phenom enological sense of gestalt)
relationship of the unit and its context. Because of this result, the
phenom enologist does not accept the idea of contrast as an acceptable
m ethodology for determ ining paradigm atic relationships in speech.
The phenom enological view of contrast as a m ethodology for deter-
mining syntagmatic relations in language use is much the same as w hat
was just said about paradigm atic relations. F or the linguist, the syntagm a-
tic relation occurs when a linguistic unit appears on the same level with
other units that constitute a context for the original unit. In other words,
the linguistic unit or those units m aking up its context are always in a state
of contrast, for their very definition as units is by m utual, collateral
descriptive difference. This view of the syntagmatic relationship is gener-
ally unacceptable to the phenom enologist, because any given language
unit in speech is taken to be its own m eaning regardless of context. This is
to suggest th at a linguistic unit (w hether m orphem e, phrase, sentence, or
other systemic unit) is its own signification. Put another way, one might
say that a syntagm represents a gestalt and to separate a unit from its
context (in the linguistic sense) is to arbitrarily m ake an analytic division
of the syntagmatic relation. Obviously, such an analytic division creates
contrast per force. This division destroys the phenom enological m eaning
present in the linguistic unit. It destroys the gestalt in the sense that the
separation creates other phenom ena whose significance is unique. This is
to say, the m ere addition of unit phenom ena to context phenom ena (or
vice versa) does not account for the original gestalt, but rather suggests a
newly constituted phenom enon.
Reversibility is the phenom enologist’s term for “ im aginative free varia-
tio n ,” which superficially sounds like the linguistic idea of “ free varia-
tio n .” But it is only a peripheral resem blance of nom enclature. As briefly
m entioned before, the phenom enologist is m ost actively interested in the
use of reversibility to determ ine the possibilities of w hat (rath er than
potentialities of how) speech acts are. Reversibility refers to the con-
scious possibility of m anipulating the linguistic units within a given
phenom enon of speech to determ ine which are the necessary and suf-
SPEECH AND LINGUISTIC DISCONTINUITY 201
ficient elem ents that will constitute the com m unicative phenom ena per
se. This is to say th at the phenom enologist arranges the linguistic units
into varying syntagmatic and paradigm atic relations regardless of their
acceptability as potential relationships in term s of the natural language
m atrix in which they first occur. In this phenom enological sense the
variation is truly “ free” w here, by contrast, the linguistic m eaning of
“free” implies m ovem ent only within the permissible cultural limits of the
specified natural languages(s).
Also, a word needs to be said about the phenom enological implications
of the term “ im aginative” with respect to the discussion of variation.
Imaginative variation is the m ovem ent in a dialectical sense, not only of
the language units constituting a speech phenom enon, but a m ovem ent of
the perspective of the use of language, as Plato first noticed (see chap. 17,
below). For exam ple, the phenom enologist would be concerned to spec-
ify the possibilities of variation from the perspective of a speaker ex-
pressing speech and a listener perceiving speech, of these expression/
perception processes when the language units are also in variation, and so
on throughout the range of interacting possibilities. Thus, any one p er-
spective might be occurring as an actuality, w hereas the dialectical
perspectives connected to it are im aginative possibilities. These im agina-
tive possibilities may well constitute the actuality of a given speech
phenom enon when the perspective shifts. In linguistic term s, imaginative
free variation would constitute the active com parison and contrast of
com petence and perfom ance on an intrapersonal, interpersonal, and
public level to determ ine the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
potential of syntagm atic and paradigm atic relationships as dependent
variables of one another.
PR E SE N C E A N D A B SEN C E
The com bined implication of the phenom enological concepts of separa-

tion and reversibility is w hat has been referred to previously as the
intentional object or that of which one is conscious as the synergism
coincident in speech expression and perception. W ith regard to the
linguistic idea of discontinuity, the concept of an intentional object
requires a brief discussion of the “ presence” and “ absence” of phe-
nomena.
W hen a person is conscious of an object (such as a linguistic unit), it is
because that object is present within a phenom enal situation (the act of
speaking). Such a situation not only presents the object as there, but also
suggests w hat objects are not there— that is, objects that can be there. In
term s of a linguistic illustration, the existence of a syntagm atic relation-
ship betw een linguistic units has m eaning precisely because a paradigm a-
tic relation is also possible. In a similar way, the occurrence of a
202 SEMIOLOGY
paradigmatic relation is possible because of the presence of a syntagmatic

relation. In either of these cases, the presence of one type of relationship
precludes the sim ultaneous presence of another unit of the sam e type, but
that such other units are possible is implicitly given also (an “ absence” ).
In short, the intentional object is com posed of both a presence and an
absence, but it is m ore than an item and its context. The coincidence of a
presence and an absence has a synergistic m eaning— nam ely, the limits of
possibility as distinguished from the limits of potentiality (which are
strictly determ ined by the presence of a linguistic unit only).
Discontinuity from a phenom enological point of view, therefore, rep-
resents an intentional object that is a possible way of speaking (exactly
the function of tone in C. S. Peirce’s system of type, token, and tone; see
chap. 12). U nlike the linguist’s view of discontinuity, there is no implica-
tion of a structural deviation from the acceptable potential of a natural
language. Discontinuity in this context could be conceived only in ana-
lytic term s where the reversibility of presence and absence (of linguistic
units) is arbitrarily separated into presence versus absence, thereby
eliminating the very significance of the relationship. This arbitrary step is
precisely what the phenom enologist attem pts to avoid.
In a tacit sense, the phenom enologist is prim arily concerned with
utilizing the existent relationships in speech to ascertain the significance
of the speech act viewed as the interplay of hum an expression and
perception. This is to suggest rather directly that the phenom enologist is
concerned with the place of speech in the definitive process of hum an
being and becoming, and not conversely. The linguist, on the other hand,
is concerned with the sem antic implications associated with the linguistic
relationships them selves. For the linguist it is im portant to be able to
separate language units within a relationship, for this analytic division
becomes the basis of description within a given natural language. In other
words, linguists are concerned to discover how hum ankind uses language
to symbolize its behavior, w hereas phenom enologists direct their inquiry
toward discovering what part of the hum an being is, indeed, phenom e-
nally present in speaking.
Thus, discontinuity represents a feature of language usage that helps
the linguist determ ine how language functions and, within natural limits,
can function. Discontinuity or rupture for the phenom enological philoso-
pher represents a phenom ena of speech th at helps determ ine w hat the
hum an act of speaking is per se. The linguistic tools of contrast and free
variation within paradigm atic and syntagmatic relations betw een linguis-
tic units suggest how language conceptually operates, w hereas the phe-
nomenological concepts of separation and reversibility suggest how a
hum an being experiences speech as an intentional object in a world with
other persons.
Chapter Sixteen
A Treasure House o f Preconstituted

Types
A lfred Schutz on Com m unicology
O n June 6, 1922, E dm und H usserl began his L ondon lectures entitled

“ Phenom enological M ethod and Phenom enological Philosophy.” The
opening lines of his first lecture announce his thesis— nam ely, to explicate
“ a transcendental sociological phenom enology having reference to a
manifest multiplicity of conscious subjects com m unicating with one
another” (1970c, p. 18). T en years later, in 1932, A lfred Schutz concludes
his m ajor work The Phenom enology o f the Social W orld with the same
thesis: “ The prim ary task of this science is to describe the process of
m eaning-establishm ent and m eaning-interpretation as these are carried
out by individuals living in the social w orld” (1967, p. 248). The book
presents a discussion of “interpretive sociology” th at is, of course, a
hum an science application of H usserl’s (1931; 1970a) phenom enology to
various issues concerning com m unication and exchange (catallactics; see
Schutz 1967, p. 245) them atized in the writings of M ax W eber.
W hat is generally overlooked in this classic Schutz text is the explicit
semiotic stance it takes in two im portant philosophical senses: (1) the
transcendental elem ent of H usserl’s semiology is set aside, and (2) the
reinterpretation of H usserl’s semiology in term s of the hum an science of
communicology (as opposed to transcendental philosophy) theoretically
grounds much of the innovation usually associated with and reserved to
the much later work of Louis Hjelm slev (1961) and Schutz’s New School
colleague, R om an Jakobson (H olenstein 1974).
B oth H usserl and Schutz anticipated w hat is today the new hum an
203
204 SEMIOLOGY
science of Communicology. W ith its historical roots in the classical G reek

texts of Plato and A ristotle on the social function of rhetoric and the
logical form of semiotic, the discipline of communicology finds its con-
tem porary hum an science grounding in the theory and m ethods of phe-
nomenology. This phenom enology of hum an com m unication is an eidetic
science in Husserl, yet it becom es an em pirical science in Schutz (W agner
1983, pp. 43^14). I propose to explicate this eidetic-to-em pirical develop-
m ent of phenom enology that Schutz offers us in his consideration of the
ground and application of the hum an sciences. It is, w ithout exaggera-
tion, a m ajor contribution to the ongoing refinem ent of H um an C om m u-
nication Theory.
The main thesis of my analysis is the unique semiotic phenom enology
that Schutz specifies as a com m unicology within the problem atic of the
“ meaning-context of com m unication” (1967, pp. 129, 216). My them atic
analysis divides into two parts. T here is a discussion, first as a problem a-
tic, of the general process of hum an com munication. This discussion
comes mainly from Schutz’s essays, (1) “ Language, Language D istur-
bances, and the Texture of Consciousness,” (2) “ Symbol, Reality, and
Society,” (3) “ The W ell-Inform ed Citizen: A n Essay on the Social
Distribution of Knowledge” (Schutz, 1973,1 & II), and (4) partially from
The Phenomenology o f the Social World (1967). The second section of my
analysis concerns the Schutzian them atic of meaning-context. It is ex-
pressed basically in the “ Postulate of M eaning-A dequacy,” a specific
entailm ent of the “ Postulate of the C oherence of E xperience,” both of
which are discussed in The Phenom enology o f the Social World.
CO M M U N ICA TIO N : T H E P R O B L E M A T IC O F A
M EA N IN G -C O N T EX T
The original contribution that Schutz m akes to the history of com m uni-
cology as a science is his specification of time as an essence of hum an
com m unication (cf. Hall 1959). This is an eidetic elem ent of description.
Yet the eidetic core locates its em pirical horizon as the essence called
speech. Schutz gives us an explicit definition of speech com m unication as
the conscious experience— that is, “ tim e-process”— of language:
H ere we simply w ant to indicate that it is of the essence of language th at

normally any linguistic com m unication involves a tim e process; a speech
built up by sentences, a sentence by the step-by-step articulation of succes-
sive elem ents (polythetically, as H usserl calls it), w hereas the m eaning of
the sentence or the speech can be projected by the speaker and grasped by
the listener in a single ray (m onothetically). T he stream of articulating
cogitations of the speaker is thus sim ultaneous with the o u ter event of
producing the sounds of speech, and the perceiving of the latter simulta-
ALFRED SCHUTZ 205
neously with the com prehending cogitations of the listener. Speech is,
therefore, one of the intersubjective tim e-processes— others are making
music together, dancing together, m aking love together—by which the two
fluxes of inner tim e, that of the speaker and that of the listener, becom e
synchronous one with the other and both with an event in ou ter tim e. The
reading of a w ritten com m unication establishes in the sam e sense a quasisi-
m ultaneity betw een the events within the inner tim e of the w riter and that
of the reader [1973, 1:324],
A lthough it is com m onplace these days to dismiss the description of

communication as common know ledge, I quote Schutz at length to
sharpen our awareness of the key elem ents of hum an com m unication that
are quickly and easily overlooked by the naiveté of the natural attitude. It
is, indeed, our task as phenom enologists to invoke the epoché, most
especially were the typification of the taken-for-granted conscious experi-
ence of spoken language is at issue (W agner 1983, pp. 224-25).
Schutz grounds his definition with fo u r principles that constitute “ com -
munication proper” (1973, 1:321-23). These principles serve as a way of
focusing on Schutz’s semiotic description (see Figure 29) of the patterns o f
consciousness in “ appresentational situations” and subsequent world
typologies—that is, the “world within my reach and its dimensions,
m arks, and indications” with “ myself as a center” (1:306, 319).
Recall that appresentation is a technical term in Flusserl’s vocabulary; it
means the pairing or coupling of phenom ena in consciousness. It is
neither the usual notion of analogical inference nor that of induction, but
rather an eidetic and em pirical form of confirm ation. It is what Peirce
calls abduction: “ we experience intuitively som ething as indicating or
depicting significantly som ething else” (Schutz 1973, 1:296; see chap. 12).
With “ appresentational relations” as the theoretical or structural typology
of com m unication, Schutz presents w hat I shall refer to as the L aw o f
Typicality with its four “ postulates” as the m ethodological criteria for
eidetic and em pirical research on the world typologies experienced in
human com m unication.
I should note here that these postulates are the theory construction
keystone of two leading graduate textbooks in the discipline of communi-
cology. First, B. A ubrey Fisher in his Perspectives on H um an C om m uni-
cation (1978, p. 22) cites the Schutzian postulates of relevance, adequacy,
consistency, and com patibility as the m ethodological foundation for
social science research. Second, A nderson (1987) m akes Schutz in partic-
ular and phenom enology in general the focus of his discussion of “ qualita-
tive research” (pp. 237-244) in his C ommunication Research: Issues and
Methods. Polkinghorne’s (1983) M ethodology fo r the H um an Sciences:
Systems o f Inquiry echoes Fisher’s and A nderson’s position by also
affirming the Schutzian view of the hum an sciences as an account of
206 SEMIOLOGY
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research procedure. N or should we forget that Kelly (1981) opens his

theory book A Philosophy o f C ommunication with a chapter devoted to
Schutz and the place of com m unication in the everyday life-world.
In this context, Schutz suggests the phenom enological problem atic for
the hum an science of communicology: “ W e may interpret the prescien-
tific hum an language as a treasure house of preconstituted types and
characteristics, each of them carrying along an open horizon of unex-
plored typical contents” (1973, 1:285). These preconstituted typifications
are the semeion (sign-act) of hum an com m unication, which we designate
in contem porary theory as a “ tropic logic” (W hite 1978; Foss, Foss, &
Trapp 1985) and our m ethod of using them is abduction, to borrow the
appropriate term from the A m erican existential phenom enologist, C har-
les S. Pierce (A nderson 1986).
Principle 1: “ The sign used in com m unication is always a sign
addressed to an individual or anonym ous in terp reter” (Schutz, 1973,
1:321). It is im portant to note Schutz’s extraordinary scholarship with
regard to the concept of the sign in hum an com m unication. H e cites the
opening passage of A ristotle’s De interpretatione (16a4ff.), which, of
course, introduces the Rhetoric and Poetics, to specify that spoken and
written words are respectively prim ary and secondary “ symbols” (sym -
bola), but that the spoken symbols are the sign (sem eion) of conscious-
ness (1973, 1:291). This first principle of communication, thus, incorporates
the first order of semiotic phenom enology whose characteristics are sche-
matized in Figure 29, row 1.
Conscious experience em erges as an apperceptual scheme. This scheme
situates an object of consciousness “ experienced as a self” w ithout any
appresentational reference. From a com m unicative point of view, it is our
“ personal biographical situation” th at becom es the m otive for discover-
ing the uniqueness or atypicality of a phenom enon in the typical world of
everyday society (1973, 1:299, 327). The world typology begins as the
here, as the em bodied world horizon of em bodied reach. Such a com m u-
nicative context is governed semiotically by “ the principle of variability of
the appresentational m eaning” (1973, 1:304). This is a context in which
an appresented object X (or, to use contem porary term inology, a
Signified = Sd) paired with an appresenting object A (a Signifier = Sr)
enters into a new pairing with an object B (another Sr). The object A is
dropped. In short, several signifiers (like A and B) may have different
signifieds (the m eaning of A and B ), but signify the same object (like X).
We must be cautious here to rem em ber th at in symbolic com m unica-
tion (which is all hum an com m unication!) we are not dealing with a
simple Saussurian “sign” com posed of a signifier and a signified. R ather,
we have a Hjelm slevian sign whose signifier represents a signifier/signified
and whose signified represents a signifier/signified (Eco 1976; 1979). From
the perspective of a tropic logic (W hite 1973; 1978), this principle
208 SEMIOLOGY
exemplifies the discursive relationship of m etonym y: one attribute (a

Sr/Sd) substitutes for another (a Sr/Sd) in the representation (either a Sr or
a Sd) of a substance (sign). Schutz gives this example: “The Commander in
Chief of the Allied Arm ies on D Day 1944, the author of the book
Crusade in Europe, the thirty-fourth President of the U nited States, are
all proper nam es denoting Dwight D. Eisenhow er, but each appresenta-
tional reference is a different o n e .” To generalize this point as a m ethod-
ological procedure, principle 1 incorporates what Schutz calls the Postulate
o f Relevance: “ The form ation of ideal types m ust comply with the
principle of relevance, which m eans that the problem once chosen by the
social scientist creates a scheme of reference and constitutes the limits of
the scope within which relevant ideal types might be form ed” (1973,
2:18).
Principle 2: “ The sign used in com m unication is always preinterpreted
by the com m unicator in term s of its expected interpretation by the
addressee” (1973, 1:322). This second principle of com m unication, thus,
incorporates the second order of semiotic phenom enology whose charac-
teristics are schematized in Figure 29, row 2. Conscious experience
emerges as an appresentational scheme. This scheme locates an object of
consciousness that refers to som ething other than itself, because it is a
m em ber of an appresentational pair and is not experienced as a self.
These objects are not apprehended in them selves, but rather “ call fo rth ”
or “ evoke” a reference (1973, 1:299, 327). The scheme is the em bodied
world of my actual reach that is outside the self and is the “ m anipulatory
sphere” of the self.
H ere the communicative context is governed semiotically by “ the
principle of the relative irrelevance of the vehicle” (1973, 1:303). In this
case, an appresented object X (Sd) originally paired with appresenting
object A (Sr) has a new pairing with object B (Sr). Schutz considers two
options as an inform ation theoretic/digital logic: (1) Either object A and
B continue and function as “ synonym s” in all senses (not just linguistic);
(2) Or the object X is detached from object A and X is forgotten as an
original reference. R itual com m unication is an illustration (Lévy-Bruhl
1985).
There are many other sem iotic possibilities that Schutz does not con-
sider, but I shall not detail them here for they do not bear directly on his
thesis (see Eco 1976; Lanigan 1986). From a tropic logic point of view,
the “ synonym” function of (1), above, is the condition of m etaphor as an
abduction that uses preconstituted typifications. B ut the (2) function,
above, is a case of simile tropically defined. T hat is, an object X (Sd)
becomes attached to any expression (any Sr) that occurs in the presence
of object X. It is in this sense that ritual works (the Sr evokes an Sd) or
fails (the Sr does not “w aken” the appresented object, as Schutz would
say).
ALFRED SCHUTZ 209
As a m ethodological procedure, principle 2 uses what Schutz calls the

Postulate o f A dequacy— that is, “ each term used in a scientific system
referring to hum an action m ust be so constructed that a hum an act
perform ed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indi-
cated by the typical construction would be reasonable and understand-
able for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-m an” (1973, 2:19).
A t this point, we should note one of those fascinating historical coinci-
dences of parallel thinking. R eacting to M ax W eber just as Schutz does,
the French philosopher (and anthropologist, sociologist) Lucien Lévy-Bruhl
(1985) published in 1910 his classic work Les fonctions mentales dans les
sociétés inférieures in which he explicates the Law o f Participation. This
law is now appreciated as the sine qua non of field research, especially
that which involves the description of culture and com m unication to -
gether with their symbolic presentation. The law is identical to Schutz’s
own “postulate of adequacy” in hum an science research.
In the present context, I also w ant to m ention the extraordinary
empirical phenom enological research on narrative com m unication as
conducted by Tom M cFeat and rep o rted in his Small-Group Cultures
(1974). In Schutzian fashion, M cF eat’s research focuses on the tem poral
nature and function of the hum an group as a com munication m edium l To
my m ind, M cFeat’s m odel of social com m unication and related work
deserve to be b etter known: his w ork is an em pirical prototype of what
excellent qualitative research in the phenom enological tradition can be.
Principle 3: “ Successful com m unication is possible only betw een p er-
sons, social groups, nations, etc., who share a substantially similar system
of relevances” (Schutz, 1973, 1:323). This third principle of com m unica-
tion illustrates the third order of semiotic phenom enology whose charac-
teristics are schematized in Figure 29, row 3. Conscious experience
emerges as a referential scheme. This scheme locates an object of con-
sciousness that refers to a paired object by analogy, w hether in the
“reality of everyday life” or in such other “ subuniverses” as science, art,
religion, politics, fantasm s, or dream s (1973, 1:299, 328-29). The scheme
is the potential reach of my em bodim ent and “ constitutes the zone of my
potential m anipulations or, as we prefer to call it, of my potential working
acts” (1973, 1:307). H all’s (1959) em pirical research on cultural com m u-
nication is the best illustration, especially his “ high-low context” m odel of
cultural m eaning (1979, pp. 88-89).
In Schutz’s perspective, the com m unicative context of reference is
regulated by “ the principle of figurative tran sference.” As the opposite of
the principle of relative irrelevance, figurative transference occurs where
an appresenting object A (Sr) paired with an appresented object X (Sd)
entails another object Y (Sd), and another Z (Sd), and so on. Schutz
again argues th at o th er inform ation theoretic/digital possibilities exist: (1)
Either an original appresentational reference (A-X) continues to coexist
210 SEMIOLOGY
with a new coupling (A-Y) or m ore (A -X , Y, Z , . . .); (2) Or, “ the

original appresentational reference (A-X) is obfuscated or entirely for-
gotten, and merely the new one (A-Y) preserved” (1973, 1:305).
Given the context of a tropic logic, (1), above, functions as a th eo re t-
ical definition of irony and accounts for the change of valence that often
occurs with the situational use of words in everyday discourse. Indeed,
Schutz calls attention to this com m unicative fact as the ground for “ any
form of tropes in the broadest, not m erely linguistic, sense.” A gain, it is
im portant to note that Schutz in his 1955 essay “ Symbol, R eality, and
Society” offers a m ore sophisticated version of the tropic logic than does
K enneth B urke (1969) who sketched his idea of “m aster tropes” as an
appendix in his 1945 volum e A G ramm ar o f Motives. By com parison, (2),
above, illustrates the tropic function of synecdoche in which a part-w hole
relationship functions to accom m odate the contextual “ shift of m eaning”
that occurs in everyday discourse. For exam ple, the English term “ xero-
graphy” (whole = process), which is formally a word in the U nited
Nations International Scientific V ocabulary, has becom e m erely “xerox”
(part = product) in everyday discourse because of the new m eaning
attachm ent to X erox C orporation. Once again, there are m any other
semiotic possibilities with the Principle of Figurative Transference that
Schutz does not consider. They have been discussed elsew here (see
Lanigan 1986; Eco 1976).
Principle 3 as a m ethodological procedure expresses the postulate o f
logical consistency. As Schutz rem arks, “ the system of ideal types m ust
rem ain in full com patibility with the principles of form al logic” (1973,
2:19). Recall that Schutz is careful to rem ind us that A ristotle grounds his
logic in the linguistic practice of semiotic and rhetoric. This is to say, the
call for consistency is an argum ent for discovering and appreciating the
“ treasure house” of prescientific hum an language. Schutz does not substi-
tute logical validity for m aterial confirmation.
Principle 4: “ To be successful, any com m unication process m ust,
therefore, involve a set of com m on abstractions or standardizations”
(1973, 1:323). Speech becomes the em pirical, experiential m anifestation
of language as an eidetic essence of consciousness. The conscious experi-
ence of hum an discourse, in Schutz’s view, becom es the paradigm and
prototype of the com m unication process. “ Typification is indeed that
form of abstraction which leads to the m ore or less standardized, yet
m ore or less vague, conceptualization of com m on-sense thinking and to
the necessary ambiguity of the term s of the ordinary vernacular” (1973,
1:323). Typification is the com m unication theoretic/analogue logic of
differentiation by com bination. Only hum an discourse articulates the
com bination of consciousness and experience while differentiating them .
Typification is both the authentic existential discourse of the person and
the sedim ented conventional discourse of society. Typification is, in fact,
ALFRED SCHUTZ 211
the process of m eaning-adequacy th at grounds the coherence of experi-

ence, and conversely.
Thus, the fourth principle of com m unication illustrates the fourth order
of semiotic phenom enology whose characteristics are schematized in
Figure 29, row 4. Conscious experience em erges as a contextual or
interpretational scheme. The scheme situates the object of consciousness
as a reflexive condition of appresentational reference. T hat is, we experi-
ence the relationship that per se connects the appresentational and
referential schemes together— that is, typology as typification. As both
Schutz and Husserl explain, the appresentational relationship is our
system of reference as lived. A person may take any relationship as the
ground or context of interpretation in com m unication such that “the
O ther (as com m unicator or addressee) will apply the same appresenta-
tional scheme to the appresentational references involved in the com m u-
nication as I will” (1973, 1:328).
O f course, the best exam ple is “ the m edium of the vernacular of
ordinary language.” Com m unicating persons in this context live in a
world within restorable reach. As Schutz (1973, 1:308) em phasizes, this
world is a general idealization of em bodim ent, the idealization H usserl
names in the revelatory phrase: “ I can do it again.” From the perspective
of a tropic logic, any trope in the classic sense of a “ figure of speech” can
be utilized as the ground of a preconstituted typification in the hum an
sciences (Ijsseling 1976; Valesio 1980; D eely 1986; Eco 1979). Again, the
extensive cross-cultural research by H all (1959) illustrates the phenom e-
nological range of empirical com m unication possibilities that Schutz
labels the “ world of restorable reach .” Indeed, H all’s opening chapter in
The Silent Language (1959), entitled “ The Voices of T im e,” might well
have been w ritten by Schutz!
From the procedural perspective, principle 4 illustrates the Postulate o f
Compatibility. As Schutz defines it, “ The system of ideal types must
contain only scientifically verifiable assum ptions, which have to be fully
com patible with the whole of our scientific know ledge” (1973, 2:19). This
statem ent is absolutely clear in the specification of phenom enological
procedures as grounded in the theory of hum an science. It is this fact that
leads Fisher (1978, p. 23) to com m ent: “ The term social science does not
exclude hum anistic studies, phenom enological techniques, or ‘the literary
tradition’. . . . It does exclude unsystem atic inquiry that leads to no
generalizable results or explanations th at can never be applied to reality.”
Throughout his Collected Papers (1973), Schutz offers many varied
examples of the typification process and product. As a relevant illustra-
tion of two generalizable typologies (Figure 30), I want to turn to Schutz’s
examples of (1) the A rts generally and Music in particular within the
preknowledge typology, and (2), H um an Communication in general,
along with my interpolation of the Speech Communiation discipline in
212 SEMIOLOGY
particular, in the knowledge typology. For the sake of com parison, I

divide the typologies into “ socially derived” and “ socially approved”
categories. As Schutz argues, the com m unication process of typification
can be offered in com munication (socially derived) or accepted in com m u-
nication (socially approved) by a “ com m unicator” and an “ addressee.”
This focus and terminology, of course, suggest a compatibility with the
model of communication m ade famous by his colleague at The New
School for Social R esearch, Rom an Jakobson (Rutkoff & Scott 1986;
Holenstein 1976).
In the example of music, Schutz (1973, 2:133, 168) m akes the existen-
tial elements of—conation, affection, cognition— and their social institu-
tion counterparts— aesthetics, m orality, politics— come together in a
coalescence of intersubjectivity. Com m unication is both a personal and
social act with epistemological and axiological consequences. This is why
Schutz’s term inology of creator and beholder is especially indicative of the
hum an discourse that occurs in the respective “ appresentational situa-
tions” (com pare Figure 29, rows 1-4 and Figure 30, rows 1-4). In short,
the writer and reader (Figure 30) illustrate the “ apperceptual schem e”
with its respective typologies and typicality (Figure 29). In turn, the
composer and the player connect with the “ appresentational schem e,”
the perform er and the listener exemplify the “ referential schem e,” and
the executant and the nonexecutant represent the “ contextual-interpretive
schem e.”
The example of hum an com munication w here, following H usserl sub-
jectivity is intersubjectivity, Schutz (1973, 2:132-33) describes the process
from the perspective o f the beholder. H ence, the appresentation situations
are respectively described from the point of view of the analyst, the
eyewitness, the insider, and the com mentator as an O ther who beholds the
communicative situation as offered, or, as a Self whose very beholding is
accepting. In my view, incidentally, Schutz has anticipated and described
here the “ constative-perform ative” speech act distinction in the “ linguis-
tic phenom enology” of the “ com m unicational situation” later m ade
famous by Austin (1962).
As a way of extending Schutz’s exam ple and also illustrating the
com parative perspective o f the creator in the hum an com m unication
process, I offer the interpolation of Speech (act of speaking) in Figure 30.
The com parison of socially derived and approved appresentational situa-
tions allows the following form ulations: (1) speakers and listeners consti-
tute the “ apperceptual schem e” with all its characteristics (see Figure 29,
row 1); (2) audience and auditor utilize the “ appresentational schem e” ;
(3) moderator or actor and orator or critic, respectively, use the “ referen-
tial schem e” ; and (4) teacher or director and student or producer represent
the “ contextual-interpretive schem e.” O ther examples are possible, but I
ALFRED SCHUTZ 213
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214 SEMIOLOGY
have cited the historically familiar ones for the speech com m unication
discipline.
Given the specification of hum an com m unication as the problem atic of
Schutz’s notion of m eaning-context, we can now turn to a specific analysis
and discussion of m eaning-context as them atic. This is to say, the condi-
tions (which I call the “ Law of Typicality” ) for a hum an science of
communicology can be explored. The postulates of relevance, adequacy,
consistency, and com patibility (a phenom enological description) are inte-
grated by Schutz (a phenom enological reduction) into the two postulates
of “M eaning-A dequacy” and the “ C oherence of E xperience.” Last,
these two postulates are discovered (a phenom enological interpretation)
to be identical as reflexive (Schutz 1967, pp. 82, 231-32, 234). P ut m ore
pointedly, Figures 29 through 32 can be overlayed showing that rows 1-4
in all figures are the same com binatory illustration of a herm eneutic of
herm eneutic—that is, existential representation as the eidetic and em piri-
cal essence of com m unication as hum an (a Logos of Logos·, see chap. 17
below).
M EA N IN G -C O N TEX T: T H E T H E M A T IC O F C O M M U N IC A T IO N
M eaning-context and com m unication are m utual entailm ents in the phe-
nomenology of lived-experience according to Schutz. In this section of my
analysis, what I first propose is an exam ination of the notion of meaning-
context as Schutz them atically characterizes it in his Postulate o f
M eaning-Adequacy (Figure 31). Second, I look at the specific entailm ent
of communication by this postulate. The entailm ent, thus, comes to be
the im portant them atic dim ension of the m eaning-context— nam ely, the
Postulate o f the Coherence o f Experience (Figure 32).
The postulate of m eaning-adequacy, according to Schutz (1967,
p. 206), “ states that, given a social relationship betw een contem poraries,
the personal ideal types of partners and their typical conscious experi-
ences m ust be congruent with one another and com patible with the
ideal-typical relationship itself.” The postulate relies on a view of tem po-
rality that is existential rather than transcendental, thereby anticipating
the later developm ent of em bodim ent as tem porality by M erleau-Ponty
(1981).
As illustrated in Figure 31, Schutz suggests the status of conscious
experience as that which is present (note the tem poral-spatial ambiguity
in English!). There is a positive ambiguity in the use of the word “N ow ”
to m ark the tem porality of existence, because “ now ” contains sim ulta-
neously the m eaning-context of the “present” as a boundary place on the
diachronic scale of history. The present is the boundary betw een past and
future; it is the “historicality” (to use F oucault’s [1972] term ) fro m which
ALFRED SCHUTZ 215
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the person exists— in C icero’s rhetoric it is speech as the term inus a quo
(Schutz 1973, 2:11). O n the synchronic scale of personal existence,
“ presentation” is the boundary place betw een conditions of tem poral
absence such as birth and death. Presentation is the now of “ historicity”
(Foucault’s term ) toward which the person is existing— again, in C icero’s
rhetoric it is speech as the term inus ad quem (Schutz 1973, 2:11). H ence,
the binary concepts now/then are fixed by Schutz within an analogue logic
in such a way that now is a floating boundary condition on the infinite
scale of then. In this sense, conscious experience is an existential condi-
tion of the person that stands as the ideal-typical relationship itself.
“ Activity is an experience which is constituted in the phases in the
transition from one Now to the next” (Schutz 1967, p. 56). Unlike
positive science and unlike H usserl’s eidetic m odel, time for Schutz is not
the m easure of space. R ather, as we shall come to understand, tem poral-
ity is the condition of spatiality.
Recall now another condition for the postulate of meaning-ade-
quacy— namely, that the personal ideal types of partners and their typical
conscious experiences must be congruent with one another. Schutz speci-
fies this condition for persons in his famous division of tem poral hum an
relationships. First, there is the life-world of predecessors (Figure 31, row
1). They are persons with whom I share no experience of tim e or location,
although I live in the shadow of their discourse— I share their symbolic
universe (M erleau-Ponty’s [1962] langage). They have lived and died
prior to my living. The absence of their conscious experience is a testi-
mony to the presence of my own conscious experience. I can be an analyst
(see Figure 30). Secondly, there are consociates— or associates as Schutz
occasionally calls them — who are persons with whom I share both time
and location. W e share the conscious experience of interpersonal com m u-
nication in the face-to-face situation of shared activity (Figure 31, row 2).
O ur m utual sense of Now constitutes an intersubjective present. I can be
a witness (see Figure 30). It is a discursive present that constitutes
experience as lived— in M erleau-Ponty’s phrase, it is speech speaking
(parole parlante) as a refinem ent of Saussure’s parole.
A third type of person is the contemporary (Figure 31, row 3). This
person shares time by living when I do, but is displaced from me. A t best,
our discourse is merely symbolic and sedim ented, speech spoken (parole
parlée), as M erleau-Ponty describes it in contradistinction to Saussure’s
langue. Locality is not shared; we have never m et or shared our experi-
ences. We are merely ideal types of partners and our consciousness
displays a typicality. I can be the insider (see Figure 30). Successors are
the fourth category of persons (Figure 31, row 4). Successors, like
predecessors, are persons with whom I do not share time and space. Y et
they are uniquely m arked by the fact that I could share tim e and location
with them . I can be the com m entator (see Figure 30). The ideality of our
ALFRED SCHUTZ 217
relationship has the potential to becom e actual as “pow er” in the same
way th at I share the discourse of predecessors as “ desire” (Foucault’s
[1972] langage).
W hat is truly unique in the lived-taxonom y (Foucault’s genealogy,
Jakobson’s paradigmatic axis) of persons that Schutz creates is the fact
that he offers the first m odern notion of “ qualitative d a ta ,” or if I may use
the historically correct qualitative term , capta— nam ely, that which is
taken (as opposed to given) in discovery (Foucault’s archaeology, Jakob-
son’s syntagmatic axis). Only now are the hum an sciences becoming
aware of the fact th at the pejorative rhetoric of the positive sciences hides
the person as the real and ideal “ unit” of analysis and synthesis. The
person as captum offers an unlim ited source of research that is quite apart
from the equally restrictive view of the pure arts and hum anities. Schutz’s
modest four-part action-classification of persons is the beginning, and
there are signs of significant work in this context, especially in the
discipline of communicology. I have already m entioned the innovative
work by M cFeat (1974), which specifies the human group as the cultural
medium of com m unication, hence another type of capta to be used. A nd
there is my own em pirical application of eidetic practice as capta to
discourse and rhetoric (Lanigan 1984; see chap. 8 above).
Building on the classification of persons, Schutz constructs a m odel of
intersubjectivity in- which the “w e-relation” derives from my knowledge
that I have of predecessors. Thus, my experience of consociates first
emerges as I notice th at the other person and I have differences in our
conscious experiences. As Schutz (1967, p. 168) explains the “ concrete
w e-relation,” the “ p artner, for instance, may be experienced with differ-
ent degrees of immediacy, different degrees of intensity, or different
degrees of intim acy.” N atanson (1965) provides an excellent discussion of
the communicative consequence that consociates m ake in the “ claim to
im m ediacy.”
But just as tem poral absence suggests presence, differences in con-
scious experience are balanced by similarities in the “ pure w e-relation” :
“The face-to-face relationship in which the partners are aware of each
other and sympathetically participate in each o th er’s lives for however
short a tim e” (Schutz, 1967, p. 164). In the world of contem poraries, I
first discover the “ thou-orientation” and with it the problem of the other.
I am confronted with other persons who are not in face-to-face contact
with m e, but could be. I have the expectation of encounter. I sense the
ideal typicality in which the other person rem oved in space can come to
share my location, can enter into the we-relationship. The full range of
communicative elem ents that contextualize the Schutzian w e-relationship
are discussed in Von E ckartsberg’s classic article, “ E ncounter as the
Basic U nit of Social Interaction” (1965).
W here the occasion of encounter rem ains im possible, we discover the
218 SEMIOLOGY
realm of the “ they-orientation,” which is either reciprocal or one-sided.

W hen it is reciprocal, the other person and I are aw are of one another.
B ut when the orientation is one-sided, I alone am aw are of the other. A t
this juncture, I am entering the world of successors: they are that class of
distant others whom I can come to know, but do not know in the H ere
and Now.
The lived-world and the construction of hum an spatiality— that is, the
existential elem ent of conscious experience, can now be sum m arized.
First, the world of predecessors (Vorwelt) is our usual conception of
historicality, of those persons who came before us, yet with whom we
have only a discursive relationship. The influence of the world of p re-
decessors functions in the m eaning-context as the “ because-m otive” .
Schutz suggests that we can discursively understand this m otivation by
looking at the pluperfect tense in language {langage). Language records
the existential condition of predecessors, of their speech activity, which
had been and which we share as an ideal typicality of language and action
because we can speak and act as they did! The because-motive directly
grounds our spatial sense of here. It is now, here th at we share in
consciousness our m utually experienced social reality {Umwelt). As con-
sociates living in the midst of w e-relations, we live the subjectivity of
intersubjectivity in H usserl’s sense.
By contrast, our spatial sense of there grounds the world of contem po-
raries {Mitwelt). O ur sense of the other is located. A nd we begin to derive
from it a sense of the future that is absent from us, but shall have been.
Thus, Schutz records the world of successors {Folgewelt) with the use of
the future perfect tense in language. The in-order-to motive is for Schutz
the activity that is grounded in the spatial consciousness of there. W hat we
have, then, in the postulate of m eaning-adequacy, is a philosophical
conception of hum an activity as a source of both eidetic and empirical
research derived from contexts of meaning as a “ sign-system” (see Figure
32). In other words, Schutz gives us the criteria by which to judge
context—conscious experience in the social world. W e have a m easure of
adequacy for hum an reality. W hat rem ains, therefore, is the problem atic
of meaning per se in “ sign-vehicles.”
Before undertaking a specific discussion of the postulate of the coher-
ence of experience, it is helpful to review both the form al and m aterial
definitions that Schutz gives for the philosophical idea of coherence. In
m ore precise philosophical thinking, we have the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a coherence theory of truth— that is, the criteria by which
to judge the modalities of m eaning in conscious experience as hum an
activity. Contexts of m eaning in the sem iotic form of schemes of experi-
ence are formally defined “by identifying the m ode of their constitution
as a synthesis of a higher stage out of polythetic Acts of once-lived-
through experience” (1967, p. 82).
ALFRED SCHUTZ 219
This formal definition entails the function of the sign-vehicle as a

necessary condition for m eaning. By com parison, the sufficient condition
for meaning— its m aterial definition— entails the sign-system. Schemes or
patterns o f experience acquire a m aterial definition “ by referring to the
total object which comes into view when such syntheses are viewed
m onothetically” (Schutz, 1967, p. 82). In short, the sem iotic phenom e-
nology consists of sign-vehicles in sign-systems th at constitute a coher-
ence of experience. “ By this we m ean (a) their m utual conditioning of
one another, (b) their synthetic construction into higher-level patterns,
and finally (c) the meaning-configuration of these patterns themselves,
namely, the ‘total configuration of our experience in the actual H ere and
Now’” (p. 82; see chap. 8 above).
In order to avoid confusion at this point, note that I am equating the
notion of sign-vehicle(s) with the Husserl/Schutz notion of polythetic acts,
whereas the idea of a sign-system is treated as a monothetic act. This
reading is consistent with the entailm ent suggested by Schutz whereby
“ m etaschem es” and sign-systems are reversible tem poralities.
W e also need to be cautious, again, in the case of hum an com m unica-
tion to recall that we are not just in a m onothetic action where a one-level
herm eneutic operates— that is, “ the appresenting and appresented m em -
bers of the pair and the interpreter pertain to the same level of reality,
namely, the param ount reality of everyday life.” R ather, we are in a
polythetic action that requires us to “ redefine the symbolic relationship as
an appresentational relationship betw een entities belonging to at least
two finite provinces of m eaning so that the appresenting symbol is an
elem ent of the param ount reality of everyday life” (1973, 1:343). Now,
we can turn directly to the postulate of the coherence of experience
(Figure 32).
The eidetic nature and function of the “ sign-vehicle” as both a coordi-
nating scheme and a metascheme is indicated by Schutz’s definition of a
semiotic scheme: “ A scheme of our experience is a m eaning-context
which is a configuration of our past experiences em bracing conceptually
the experiential objects to be found in the latter but not the process by
which they were constituted” (1967, p. 82). T he process of constitution is,
of course, the sign-system. The sign-vehicle as a coordinating scheme
involves the com bination of the “ sign” per se (actio; Handeln-, action) as
an enactm ent {A kt) leading to a signatum (actum ; Handlung-, act/
project). W e can express this static process (term inus a quo) simply by
saying that activity is an acting th at results in an action, but “ action” in
this usage is not a dynamic process (term inus ad quern) in com m unica-
tion. W hen we consider the sign-vehicle as a m etaschem e, a meaning-
endowing act (Sinngebung; see chap. 4 above) com bines with the “ sign-
act” or object-act (appresenting) with an “ artifact” (appresented). T hat
is, the sign-act as the universe of discourse always com bines with its own
220 SEMIOLOGY
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artifact— a symbol (= sign-system). As Schutz (1967, p. 120) com m ents,

“the boundary betw een the two is absolutely fluid.”
This distinction between sign-act and artifact is a com binatory differen-
tiation in which the interpretation (typology) of signs and significations is
a product of previous interpretations (typifications). H ence, the distinc-
tion is a m etaschem e of which the obvious example is discourse in its
combinatory modality as a dynam ic, fluid boundary (term inus ad quem )
between phonology and orthography in the act of articulation— a thesis
suggested, but not proved, by Husserl in Investigation III of the Logical
Investigations (1970a; see chap. 8 above). Indeed, on this point, Schutz
has unwittingly characterized the ground of the long debate on discourse
as betw een, first, the phenom enologists and structuralists, and now, as
between the herm eneuticists and poststructuralists (see chap. 11 above).
Turning to the empirical nature and function of the “ sign-system ,”
Schutz distinguishes interpretive schemes and expressive schemes (Figure
32). The interpretive scheme is the social worldview. It is the receptive
world of the beholder (Figure 30) w here “ socially approved” com m unica-
tion occurs for readers, listeners, and so on. As a receptive activity, the
interpretive scheme accounts for the significative function in com m unica-
tion situations. The interpreting addressee as beholder contends with
activity as a process of sense-m aking (Sinn-) where the intent of the
com m unicator as creator is to establish m eaning in the character of the act
(-gebung) by contrasting that act with its context— that is, with Objective
Meaning (Bedeutung)— with “ that which is m eant”— nam ely, a discur-
sive function of expression. Reversing the situation of activity— that is,
focusing on the creator (see Figure 30) —we have the expressive scheme
in the sign-system. H ere the expressive function operates to specify the
subjective meaning (Bedeuten) used by writers, com poser, speakers, and
so on, and the occasional reference of m eaning interpretation (Bezeich-
nung) th at the act constitutes as a function of perceptual expression for
the perform er, executant, actor, teacher, and so on.
Last, we should recall that sign-vehicles always occur in sign-systems so
that the analytic scheme represented by Figure 32 should itself be consid-
ered a scheme in Schutz’s sense. This realization then perm its our under-
standing th at Figure 31 and Figure 32 are, respectively, eidetic and
empirical schemes (polythetic) of a unitary (m onothetic) hum an activity.
Conscious experience becom es coterm inus with social reality; com m uni-
cation guarantees subjectivity as intersubjectivity. Expressed in term s of
the Schutzian postulates, m eaning-adequacy becom es the coherence of
experience, yet experience constructs a coherence of consciousness as
meaningful (1967, pp. 233-34).
Schutz gives his own sum m ary in his characterization of the discipline
and m ethodology of interpretive sociology, which we can read as a
222 SEMIOLOGY
generalization about all the disciplines of the H um an Sciences and which

I have read as a specification of the discipline of Communicology:
the primary task of this science is to describe the process of meaning-

establishment and meaning-interpretation as they are carried out by indi-
viduals living in the social world. This description can be empirical or
eidetic; it can take as its subject matter the individual or the typical; it can
be performed in concrete situations of everyday life or with a high degree of
generality. But, over and above this, interpretive sociology approaches
such cultural objects and seeks to understand their meaning by applying
them to the interpretive scheme thus obtained [1967, p. 248].
The Law of Typicality with its postulates of relevance, adequacy,

consistency, and compatibility are a phenom enological description of the
human sciences. The phenom enological reduction that Schutz conducts
on this description yields the two postulates of meaning-adequacy and the
coherence o f experience that m ake sciences hum an, the reality of every-
day living. The phenom enological interpretation of this reduction speci-
fies communication as the science of m eaning for persons whose very act
of living is the reflexivity of consciousness and experience— that is, time.
From the treasure house of preconstituted types, A lfred Schutz has taken
the coin of hum an exchange, of hum an speech. T hat coin is the person in
the lived-world of com m unication whose symbol is time.
Chapter Seventeen
Semiotic Phenomenology in
Plato’s S o p h i s t
The dialogue Sophist is often regarded as the m ost difficult of P lato’s

writings. In p art, it is ambiguous in taking up the problem of the Being of
Not-Being. A lso, it attem pts an explanation of the O ne and the M any
that is an enduring philosophical and em pirical paradox. Last, the dia-
logue is an oral illustration of Platonic m ethod (m aieutic) as p urported in
the Seventh L etter. The presence of these varying threads in the one
dialogue suggests a m ajor shift from the conversational tone of inquiry
present in the early dialogues to the argum entative m ode of analysis in
Plato’s later thinking. The chief result is the creation of an object of
consciousness within interpersonal experience th at is open to analytic
justification as an em pirical experience.
My argum ent in this chapter attem pts to explicate the main features of
the Platonic thesis in order to establish that the m odel of discourse
analysis is semiotic in nature and phenom enological in function. I am
using the term m odel in its technical theory construction sense as an
“ exem plar” (com bined “paradigm ” and “ prototype” ) in a theory.8 Thus
in a H eideggerian (1972, p. 51) view, “ W hat a m odel as such is and how
8. H eidegger (1972, p. 51): ‘A thinking which thinks in m odels m ust not im m ediately be
characterized as technological thinking, because the w ord “m odel” is not to be understood
in the technological sense as the repetition o r project of som ething in sm aller proportions.
R ather, a m odel is th at from w hich thinking m ust necessarily take off in such a way th at that
from which it takes off is w hat gives it im petus. T he necessity for thinking to use thinking is
related to language. T he language of thinking can only start from com m on speech. A nd
speech is fundam entally historico-m etaphysical. A n interpretation is already built into it.
Viewed from this perspective, thinking has only the possibility of searching for m odels in
order to dispense with them eventually, thus m aking the transition to the speculative.’
223
224 SEMIOLOGY
its function for thinking is to be understood can only be thought from an

essential interpretation of language.” The dialogue Sophist relies on a
binary code that is cast within a rhetorical situation grounded in an
analogue logic. The binary coding is m ade clear with the illustrative use of
a modified version of the B arthes m odel of discourse. T hat m odel is
grounded in H jelm slev’s (1961; 1970a, b; G arvin 1954) theory in which he
describes the structure of language and similar systems with the following
theorem s:
(1) A language consists of a content and an expression. (2) A language

consists of a succession, or a text, and a system. (3) C ontent and expression
are bound up with each other through com m utation. (4) T here are certain
definite relations within the succession and within the system. (5) T here is
not a one-to-one correspondence betw een content and expression, but the
signs are decom posable in m inor com ponents. Such sign com ponents are,
e.g., the so-called phonem es, which I should prefer to call taxem es of
expression, and which in themselves have no content, but which can build
up units provided with a content, e.g., words [1970b, p. 35],
B arthes’s m odel of Hjelm slevian theory allows a direct com parison

betw een the stages of Platonic m ethod and B arthes’s concepts of conno-
tation, denotation, and reality as set in a signifier or rhetoric system and
signified or ideology system (Lyons 1963). The analogue logic is equally
applicable in the respective correlation to M erleau-Ponty’s (1962) p h e-
nomenological m odel of description, reduction, and interpretation. In
short, the logic for a semiotic phenom enology is provided in the dialogue
Sophist and it points the way for viewing the speaking subject as an agent
provocateur in the sociocultural context w here em pirical reference must
give way to the production of analytic signification. As H eidegger (1972,
p. 51) specifies: “ Speaking about ontic m odels presupposes that language
in principle has an ontic character, so that thinking finds itself in the
situation of having to use ontic m odels for what it wishes to say ontologi-
cally, since it can only m ake som ething evident through w ords.”
My analysis does not represent an effort to claim that Plato is either a
semiologist or a phenom enologist. R ather, I argue that the dialogue
Sophist offers a long-neglected textual m odel of binary analogue thinking
that is foundational to m any of the issues current in the discipline of
communicology, especially in the study of the philosophy of com m unica-
tion where semiology and phenom enology intersect as the problem atic of
analysis. Indeed, m any of the basic elem ents in the Platonic investigation
are being unnecessarily reinvented by contem porary theorists. By ad-
dressing the fundam ental problem of the being of not-being, Plato pro-
vides a semiotic phenom enology of discourse in which he dem onstrates
the acceptability of analytic proofs as the concrete analysis of empirical
PLATO ’S Sophist 225
communication acts. Thus, the dialogue Sophist represents a critical, but

often ignored, theoretical foundation for an em pirical exam ination of the
sign relationship betw een the ontology of the speaking subject and the
epistemology of the discourse system.
A s a dialectic exam ination, my analysis has four steps. First, I review
the exem plar of m aieutic th at Plato provides in L etter V II. Then I
indicate the parallel betw een the Platonic m odel and the one that B arthes
(1968) offers. The point of this com parison is to dem onstrate that B arthes
adopts a view of “ rhetoric” and “ideology” (and the subsequent view of
“text” ) th at is dysfunctional if we concede the force of P lato’s analysis.
T hird, I exam ine the Platonic m odel as it is applied in substance to the
productive art of discourse in the dialogue Sophist. Last, I suggest the
way in which M erleau-Ponty’s (1962) existential phenom enology offers a
praxis m odel of philosophic discourse that m eets the Platonic standard for
theory construction and grounds rhetoric in a dialectic logic consistent
with m odern Hjelm slevian (1961) notions in com m unication theory. T hat
is, I am concerned to argue that Plato gives us a coherent logic of
discourse as a grounding that we readily perceive as inform ation theory.
B arthes utilizes this theory and is trapped by its structure— nam ely,
that context always provides for choice, but concrete choice is system ati-
cally ambiguous. By com parison, Plato helps us discover that the inclu-
sion of the hum an agent in the use of inform ation theory sets the criteria
for com m unication theory, in which a person m akes a choice that systemi-
cally constitutes a context. B ut in specifying the problem in order to
locate the solution, Plato stops short of disclosing the condition for choice
in context. F or such an illustration of com pleted theory, I turn to
M erleau-Ponty’s (1962) philosophy of com m unication and my own exten-
sions of his basic m odel (Lanigan 1970; 1972; 1979a, b).
One other feature of these various com parisons needs to be m entioned
before proceeding. In Plato, B arthes, and M erleau-Ponty the basic philo-
sophic pair of concepts at issue is “rhetoric” and “ ideology.” In this
regard, it is im portant to recognize the signification th at attaches to these
concepts as they are used in dialectic analysis. In brief, ideology should be
viewed as a condition of discourse that constitutes the context o f choice—
namely, “ inform ation.” By com parison, rhetoric is the practice of dis-
course th at constitutes a choice o f context—nam ely, “ com m unication.”
Indeed, it is the very irony of the dialogue Sophist that in seeking out the
axiological characteristics of sophistry, we apparently locate the philoso-
ph er’s condition and thereby discover the logic of hum an discourse with
its full ontological im port (K erferd 1954; 1981).
226 SEMIOLOGY
TH E SEVENTH LETTER
Plato addresses his letter to the com panions and friends of Dion. The
letter is occasioned by P lato’s attem pt to m aintain his neutrality in the
struggle for pow er at Syracuse betw een the exiled Dion and the ruling
Dionysius I. W e need not encum ber ourselves with the history of Syra-
cuse, but it is of consequence to recall that in the dialogue Sophist the
discussion begins epistemologically with the problem of distinguishing
among the sophist, the statesm an, and the philosopher. P lato’s intellec-
tual problem in the dialogue has its vivid practical illustration in L etter
VII, which recalls the threat to his personal existence during the boat
trips between the G reek m ainland and Sicily. To be sure, the existential
flavor of P lato’s thinking is all too clear in the repeated m ention of his
recurrent, urgent need to get a boat out of town!
With less facetiousness, I also need to recall that Socrates pursued the
question “W hat is knowledge?” in the dialogue Theaetetus, which ends
with a promise to complete the discussion the following day (Klein 1977).
But the next day Socrates is arrested and brought to trial. The conse-
quence is that the discussion of knowledge resumes while Socrates is in
prison awaiting execution (cf. chap. 7). The resum ed dialogue is the
Sophist (Sallis 1975, p. 457).
In the key passage of L etter V II, Plato announces the exem plar that
informs the Socratic m ethod of m aieutic:9
For everything that exists there are three classes of objects through which
knowledge about it m ust com e; the know ledge itself is a fourth, and we
must put as a fifth entity the actual object of know ledge which is the true
reality. W e have then, first, a nam e, second, a description, third an image,
and fourth, a knowledge of the object [342b-343c].
L ater he adds:
F urtherm ore these four [nam es, descriptions, bodily form s, concepts] do as
much to illustrate the particular quality of any object as they do to illustrate
its essential reality because of the inadequacy of language. H ence no
intelligent m an will ever be so bold as to p ut into language those things
which his reason has contem plated, especially not into a form th at is
unalterable—which m ust be the case with w hat is expressed in w ritten
symbols.
9. W hile I follow the standard codex practice of using Stephanus num bers for textual
citation, the edition of translations I am using is H am ilton and Cairns (Plato 1961). It should
be further noted that I am using L etter V II for convenience of explication; I realize that the
authenticity of authorship for this letter is in dispute. It simply offers a concise statem ent of
issues with which to begin m y analysis o f the dialogue Sophist, which is the text o f concern.
The fact th at this m odel is com m unicated in a w ritten letter points to a

m om entary paradox. Y et, we recall th at in the Sophist the contem plated
m odel is in fact articulated according to P lato’s criteria for production
(Isenberg 1951).
Plato offers us an illustration to dem onstrate the m odel’s utility. The
example is the concept “ circle.” First, the articulate use of “ circle” is a
word that nam es. Second, we use nouns and verbal expression to describe
the circle and thereby suggest its logos: “ The thing th at has everywhere
equal distances betw een its extrem ities and its ce n te r.” Third, we dis-
cover a class of objects— for exam ple, the graphic object that we can draw
and erase or the w ooden object we can turn on a lathe and then destroy.
Fourth, we come upon another thing that is not found in sounds or in the
shape of bodies, but in the m ind. This concept has a degree ranging from
knowledge to understanding to current opinion, each displaying a “ p ar-
ticular quality.” Fifth, there is the real circle, w hat Plato in his idealism
calls the “ essential reality.”
We im mediately perceive th at the clear, but epigram m atic, presenta-
tion of the exem plar in L etter V II is an assertion in w ant of proof. The
desired dem onstration of the m odel occurs in the Sophist, where Plato
addresses the question of knowledge and its m ethod— th at is, the logos of
logos (Sallis 1975, p. 456; K erferd 1954). B ut before examining this
detailed argum ent, I should like to com pare the Platonic m odel to that of
B arthes (1968).
T H E B A R T H E S M O D E L O F D IS C O U R S E
The B arthes (1968) m odel consists in a developm ental approach to the

question of knowledge that is in spirit like the Platonic quest. In particu-
lar, both Plato and B arthes are concerned to form ulate a m ethod for
discovering and utilizing knowledge that is produced and comes to us in
the form of discourse. Also, both theorists provide for a m odification in
their m ethod when discourse proves to be an inadequate guide. This
modification is, of course, the use of m yth. As I subsequently suggest, it is
the B arthes (1972) m odel for m yth analysis that points to a serious defect
in the structuralist theory of rhetoric in general and of text in particular. It
is a defect that is exposed initially by using the Platonic m odel for
epistemology (see chap. 5 above).
In chapter 4 of B arthes’s Elements o f Semiology (1968) we have the
now classic presentation of the semiotic m odel of discourse. The model is
constructed to account for the production of signification. By com pari-
son, Eco (1976, pp. 54-56, 268-69) presents a less flawed process model
of the Hjelmslevian theory and subsequent diagram m atic presentation.
Following Hjelm slev, B arthes calls the first elem ent in the system the
228 SEMIOLOGY
plane o f expression. The second elem ent is the plane o f content and the
connection betw een the two planes is simply the relation. H e proceeds to
argue that the expression/relation/content or E R C condition exists on the
two levels of “ connotation” and “ d enotation,” this latter being a m eta-
language function. B arthes offers two illustrative expressions of this
model: one is a symbolic calculus and the other is a pictorial diagram .
Finally, there is a third diagram m atic illustration of the m odel that shows
the com bined m odels of connotation and denotation as based in the R eal
System. It will be useful to com pare the symbolic and diagram m atic
versions (m utatis m utandis, existential graphs) of the m odels to indicate
the logical lim itations built into B arthes’s approach.
The symbolic version of the m odel in a propositional calculus is quite
simple and straightforw ard (Figure 33). The first system (noted in “ 1” in
Figure 33) E R C becom es the plane of expression of the second system
(noted as “2” in Figure 33), so the form ulation now reads (E R C )R C . In
this case we have the connotation, because the place of expression in the
first system (E R C ) becom es the signifier (Sr) of the second system— that
is, (ERC) substitutes for E in the second E RC . This structure is reversed
in the case of denotation, thereby becoming a metalinguistic function.
H ere (Figure 34) we have the plane of expression in the first system by
com m utation for the plane of content in the second system. T hat is, the
form ulation reads E R (E R C ), in which the signified (ERC ) replaces the C
in the first system of E R C . B oth connotation as a signifier and denotation
as a signified are apparent in the existential graphs (Figures 35 and 36).
A t this point a problem atic issue arises. If we take B arthes’s (1968)
symbolic presentation of connotation (E R C )R C and denotation E R
(ERC) as com binatory, it should be possible to express the form ulation as
(E R C )R (E R C ). Why is this form ulation not presented by B arthes? If we
graphically present the com binatory form ula (Figure 37), it becomes
quite apparent. B arthes gives us only one com m utation set (Figure 37),
although there is at least one other necessary set (Figure 38), and m ultiple
sufficient sets (Figures 39 and 40). In fact, B arthes suggests the possibility
of an answer when he distinguishes “ rhetoric” (Figure 37) from “ideol-
ogy” (Figure 38). Y et there is no discussion of the production of ideology;
it is simply asserted.
The best explanation for the use of the linear ratio (E R C )R C .E R -
(ERC) (see Figure 41) rath er than my entailm ent m odel (E R C )R (E R C )
(or m ore elegantly [ERC]2) is that such an entailm ent (see Figure 42)
discloses that discourse is dialectic (ontologically reversible) and should
be grounded in a theory of the speaking subject (K risteva 1975, p. 5;
M erleau-Ponty 1962, p. 174; Eco 1976; Hikins 1977). In contrast, B arthes
solves the problem of the ontological status of discourse by m aking
language (langue) the ground for Being. For Plato, language is the ground
PL ATO ’S Sophist 229
R C
1 ERC
Figure 33. Barthes’s ‘connotation’ expressed in his propositional
calculus
1 ERC
Figure 34. Barthes’s ‘denotation!metalanguage’ expressed in his
propositional calculus
Sr Sd
Sr Sd
Figure 35. Barthes’s ‘connotation’ graphically produced
Sr Sd
Sr Sd
Figure 36. Barthes’s ‘denotation!metalanguage’ graphically produced
C onnotation E R
cC ~ R
D enotation 1 /E R ΛC '
Figure 37. Combinatory overlay o f Barthes’s propositional calculus fo r
‘connotation’ and ‘denotation’ where the metalanguage function is
produced: Rhetoric
Connotation E R C
-A .
2 /E ~ R
D enotation 1, tè ~ R
1E C ·
Figure 38. Combinatory overlay o f Barthes’s propositional calculus fo r
‘connotation’ and ‘denotation’ where the metalanguage function is
produced: Ideology
230 SEMIOLOGY
Information-1 Information-2 Redundancy
Connotation 2 E R C E R C E R C
1 2 E R C E R C E R C
D enotation 1 rE R C' "E R C E R C

Figure 39. Examples o f combinatory sufficient condition sets that can
be demonstrated in communication theory
Myth-1 Myth-2
C onnotation 2 E R C E R
f
1 2 E R c E R
D enotation 1 E R C' E R
Figure 40. Examples o f combinatory sufficient condition sets that can
be interpolated in com munication theory
for Not-Being. As one might guess, B arthes’s view is that of the classical
sophist, to whom Plato points his many objections.
As a limited dem onstration of my argum ent, I suggest a com parison
between B arthes’s (1972, p. 115; 1982) use of his m odel for myth analysis
(Figure 43) and one of the sufficient variations of my entailm ent model
(see Figure 40: M yth-1), which reveals an identity of form ulation. I am
confident about the accuracy of my interpretation: B arthes (1972, p. 109)
specifically argues that “ m yth is a type of speech,” to which he adds the
operational definition: “ Innum erable other meanings of the word ‘m yth’
can be cited against this. B ut I have tried to define things, not w ords.” If
we follow B arthes’s intent in providing this definition of “ m yth” and
“ speech” as deriving from a “ thing,” we instead should expect the
form ulation presented in Figure 40, M yth-2, which indicates such content
signification. The fact that Myth-2 is asserted— that is, “ to define things,
not w ords,” when Myth-1 is used (Figures 41 and 43), m erely confirms
the erro r by omission found in the original m odel in the Elements o f
Semiology (see the “ ideology” system in Figure 42). H ow ever, for im m e-
diate purposes of com parison with P lato’s analysis, I use the com plete
m odel (Figure 41) that B arthes presents in the Elements o f Semiology
(1968). I think the Platonic argum ent is clearest if simply form ulated
according to B arthes’s construction principles, for the com parison thus
illustrates the concrete differences involved betw een the two theorists.
For Plato, the “ plane of expression” consists of w hat I shall call the
verbal fo rm (Sr) in relation to w hat Plato calls the object or bodily fo rm
PLATO’S Sophist 231
3 C onnotation Sr: rhetoric Sd: ideology

2 D enotation: Sr Sd
M etalanguage
1 Real System Sr Sd
Figure 41. Barthes’s complete m odel in Elem ents of Semiology

(1968: 93)
3 C onnotation Sr : R hetoric Sd: Ideology

2 D enotation: Sr Sd Sr Sd
M etalanguage
1 Real System Sr Sd Sr Sd
Figure 42. Lanigan extrapolation o f Barthes’s model
III SIGN
Myth
I S IG N IF IE R II SIG N IFIE D
Language 3. Sign
1. Signifier 2. Signified
Figure 43. Barthes’s interpolation m odel in M ythologies (1972: 115;

graph inverted)
(Sd). W e have now the simple E R C form ulation. F or Platonic connota-

tion, the name stands in relation to description, and this pair becomes the
signifier in place of the “verbal form ” (Figure 44; cf. Figures 35 and 33) or
(ER C )R C . For denotation and the m etalanguage function we have the
signifier/signified relationship of “ nam e” and “ description” where “ de-
scription” is produced by the relationship of knowledge and essential
reality (Figure 45; cf. Figures 36 and 34) of the form ulation E R (E R C ). A t
this point, we can com pare the two possible sets represented by the
form ula (E R C )R (E R C ) or (E R C )2. The com m utation set hypostatized by
B arthes (1968) as “ rhetoric” is apparent in Figure 46. The key factor to
be recognized, as Plato argues, is the signifier function, the verbal fo rm
that is always a characteristic (Figure 47), that is, a “ particular quality.”
Before proceeding, it is helpful to look at my construction of the set
that B arthes (1968) suggests is “ ideology” (Figure 48). O r, it m ay be
useful to visualize the arrangem ent of sets as specified by my form ula
(E R C )2 in Figures 42 and 49. I believe that it is apparent that the
diacritical sign production process of this form ulation is consistent with
232 SEMIOLOGY
Sr Sd
V erbal Form Bodily Form
(particular quality)
Sr Sd
Name D escription
Figure 44. Platonic categories form ulated according to. Barthes’s m odel
o f connotation
Sr Sd
N ame D escription
Sr Sd
Knowledge Essential Reality
Figure 45. Platonic categories form ulated according to Barthes’s m odel

o f denotation
Sr: D iscourse; Sd: W riting;

m aieutic; sophistic eristic; mimetic
Sr Sd
Connotation V erbal Form Bodily Form
Sr Sd
D enotation Name D escription
Sr Sd
Real System Knowledge Essential
Reality
Figure 46. Platonic categories form ulated according to Barthes’s model
the logical and phenom enological principles of paradigm atic/synchronic

and syntagmatic/diachronic production established by Saussure and elab-
orated by Jakobson in the context of com m unication theory (Lanigan
1979b; H olenstein 1976; A lperson 1975).
Plato’s model for knowledge, used as a test of B arthes’s m odel,
therefore, allows us to recognize with Plato that an ambiguity exists when
dealing with words, actions, or thoughts. This is the Platonic problem of
distinguishing sophists, statesm en, and philosophers. O r m ore to the
point, we have the problem atic am biguity of speaking, writing, and
thinking as the labor of sign production (Eco 1976). H ere is the philo-
CLASS C H A R A C T E R IS T IC
SU B D IV ISIO N
Figure 47. Plato’s method o f definition by genus (c l ass ) a n d d iffe r e n tia

(CH ARACTERISTIC)
Sd: W riting (Text)
Sr Sd
Sr Sd
N am e D escription
Sr Sd
Knowledge Essential
Reality
Figure 48. Lanigan extrapolation o f Barthes’s m odel applied to the

Platonic categories
Sr: Discourse Sd: W riting

(consciousness) (experience)
Sr Sd
Sr Sd Sr Sd
Name D escription N am e D escription
Sr Sd Sr Sd
Know- Essential Know- Essential
ledge Reality ledge Reality
Figure 49. Lanigan m odel fo r Platonic categories: Discourse and

writing
234 SEMIOLOGY
sophic issue. B arthes (1968) resolves the ambiguity by choosing writing as

a context that punctuates both speaking and writing as choice procedures
(Lem ert 1979). Plato, on the other hand, suggests, as a communication
theorist might, that we probably should choose thinking to contextualize
speaking and writing (the philosopher’s m ethod of m aieutic). O r perhaps
a second Platonic choice would be to select speaking as a context for
writing and thinking (the sophist’s m ethod in rhetoric).
Let me digress slightly to indicate that in the Sophist Plato suggests that
speaking can produce many differential qualities, so th at just as we might
perceive that the speech of philosophers is like the speech of the gods
(which for Plato is a correct assessm ent), we may mistake the pedagogical
speech of sophists for those speakers (ideologues) who engage in eristic.
As distinguished from philosophers and sophists, Plato has no label to
m ark the eristic practitioners (see Figure 48), who are m ere bodily forms
for whom there is no verbal form— that is, they have no name, because
the description of their acts is not produced by any knowledge of essential
reality. These “ ideologues,” as I call them , are em bodim ents of eristic.
They are speakers (particular quality) who are m arked by their skill at
deception (a denial of essential reality). Y et philosophers, sophists, and
statesm en (K erferd 1981) are speakers (essential reality) who are to a
degree skilled at knowing (particular quality). B arthes’s notion of “m yth”
seems to be an exem plar of P lato’s notion of eristic where “ III SIG N ”
(Figure 43) is identical to “ bodily form ” (Figure 48). In the present
context, however, to m ake the extension that the concept of “text”
becomes the “verbal form ” attached to the “ bodily form ” is an error
(Figure 49). It is to confuse the very production of ideology with rhetoric
(Sallis 1975, pp. 110-17).
We might speculate that we now also have an explanation for why
B arthes’s (1967) “writing degree zero” or “third m eaning” is so difficult
to detect as an explicit object of production (an “ essential reality” ); or
why Lévi-Strauss avoids contem porary social analysis (C harbonnier 1969;
Lévi-Strauss 1967, p. 49).
With this com parison betw een B arthes and Plato and with my assertion
that Plato’s dialectic should be the received logical interpretation, I now
turn to the argum ent th at Plato offers for the justification of maieutic.
T H E S O P H IS T
The Sophist stands as a ready illustration of B urnyeat’s (1979, p. 56)

com m ent th at “ P lato’s dialogues are a m iraculous blend of philosophical
imagination and logic.” On the one hand, the Sophist entices us to
contem plate how we know things by looking to our experience with those
persons who articulately profess im agination— that is, the sophist, states-
man, and philosopher. T here is a hint of argum ent by degree in this

approach w hereby Plato uses the personae of the dialogue to display a
scale (of distinctions) of knowable experience. T he dialogue opens with
Theodorus, a m athem atician, introducing the Eleatic Stranger (a philoso-
pher who knows the sophistic m ethod) to Socrates, who spontaneously
mistakes the Stranger for a god in playful recognition of the dem eanor
that a philosopher should have.
A rt in its fundam ental sense is the practice of knowledge that begins
with the gods and has its first reflection in num ber, the art of m athem at-
ics. So philosophers, who are like gods in the practice of knowing, must
be skilled in the logos of logos— th at is, the understanding of collection
and division. H ence from the perspective of the dialogue personae, we
know that the analysis of knowledge (Figure 47) will proceed by the
philosopher’s ability (the art of distinction) to com bine and divide the
characteristics of the sophist (representing the acquisitive arts) from those
of the statesm an (representing the productive arts). In short, the perso-
nae represent an analogue logic of degree in which the choice of the
philosopher prescribes a context belonging differentially to the sophist or
the statesm an. This binary analogue m odel of choice/context construction
is, strictly speaking, our contem porary understanding of com m unication
theory (Runcim an 1973, pp. 200-201; Lanigan 1979b; M arcus 1974).
On the other hand, the Sophist shows a concern with logic as separate
from philosophical im agination. In P lato’s phrase, there is “ the art of
discerning or discrim inating” (226c). It is clear that Plato assigns the art o f
controversy to the sophist (232b) and the art o f imitation to the philoso-
pher (235b). The logical approach indicates one kind of knowledge that
can be distinguished from another, so the kind of dialectic used by the
sophist can be contrasted with th at used by the philosopher. W ithin the
context of dialectic possibilities (Sallis, 1975, p. 478), speakers m ake
choices in discourse that display “controversy” (that which is over against, in
opposition to, logos) or “im itation” (that which is identical). As opposed
to “ controversy,” which is digital (Prior 1979), “ im itation” is binary by
degree in either “ likeness” (235d) or “ sem blance” (236b).
In contem porary term inology, Plato is asserting the conditions re-
quired by inform ation theory, in which digital choices ascribe a context of
choice. T hat is, the form ulation reads: either x or y is true in context z.
One m akes a particular choice in a preestablished context; a context of
choice predicates a choice in context (Lanigan 1979b). Thus, P lato’s
notion of “ controversial” choice is parallel to the technical concept of
inform ation “ b it,” w hereas the idea of “ im itation” is akin to “ redun-
dancy” (see Figure 39).
Plato undertakes to explore the differences betw een Being and Not-
Being, philosopher and sophist, by exploring the binary oppositions that
are discovered in the image (bodily form ) that the sophist projects
236 SEMIOLOGY
through discourse (see Figure 46). P lato’s goal is to dem onstrate that the
Being (bodily form ) of the sophist can be discovered in his discourse
(verbal form ), which is produced by the “ nam e” and “ description” that
can be the “ know ledge” we have of the “ essential reality” in question.
This procedure (H unt 1921) is the fam ous academ ic m ethod (derived
from Plato’s use of Socratic m aieutic in the A cadem y) of definition by
genus and difference (Figure 47). Taylor provides a concise sum m ary of
the method:
In principle the procedure is this. If we wish to define a species x, we begin

by taking some w ider and familiar class a of which x is clearly one
subdivision. W e th en devise a division of the w hole class a into two
mutually exclusive sub-classes b and c , distinguished by the fact that b
possesses, while c lacks, some characteristic ß which we know to be found
in x. W e call b the right-hand, c the left-hand, division of a . W e now leave
the left-hand division c out of consideration, and proceed to subdivide the
right-hand division b on the same principle as before, and this process is
repeated until we come to a right-hand “ division” which we see on inspec-
tion to coincide with x. If we now assign the original w ider class a and
enum erate in order the successive characters by which each of the succes-
sive right-hand divisions has been m arked off, we have a com plete charac-
terization of x; x has been defined [1956, p. 377].
Plato begins his m aieutic analysis by saying of the sophist, “ H e is

clearly a man of art” (219a). The investigation is rather long and in-
volved, and I shall not trace it out, because Sallis (1975) provides an
excellent schematic illustration (Figure 50), and because this analysis by
division is abandoned as merely a discovery of logos instead of the sought
definition of knowledge— that is, a logos of logos. B ut it is im portant to
list the defining characteristics of the sophist that Plato discovers. First,
the sophist uses flattery. Second, he is a m erchant of knowledge regarding
virtue. Third, he uses the knowledge of others as a m erchant. F ourth, he
makes use of one’s own knowledge of virtue. Fifth, the sophist m akes
money by teaching argum entation. A nd sixth, the sophist is skilled in the
educational practice of cross-questioning.
U nfortunately, as I indicated, this analysis proves inadequate. It is
apparent that Plato, in the person of the Eleatic Stranger who conducts us
through this long division, is thinking as an inform ation theorist. His
digital choices of names and descriptions turn out to be only a context o f
choice, rather than choice per se. Thus it is painfully obvious to Plato that
the six characteristics belong to the philosopher as well as to the sophist.
T here is no difference in contextual kind betw een the philosopher and the
sophist. A s Plato argues, there is only a difference of degree— for in-
stance, let us take the fifth characteristic w hereby the sophist m akes
money by argum entation and the philosopher is seen to lose m oney in the
same way!
Plato’s judgm ent is that the analysis has gone astray because it started
with the division of characteristics from the perspective of “contro-
versy”—th at is, a digital division. Instead, we should start again with the
perspective of “ im itation” as the basis for a new series of divisions th at in
fact are “ collections.” In short, Plato shifts the dialectic into a binary
analogue form of com binatory logic in which a choice o f context is
made— th at is, the com m unication theory perspective: both x and y are
true o f context z. This is to say, a choice of context gives context in choice
(Lanigan 1979b). Thus, certain pairs of defining characteristics will be
both present (a collection) and separate from each other (a division). For
example, Plato suggests the typical dilem m a of the inform ation theorist:
things must be said to be either hot or cold. This is not a paradox for the
com m unication theorist, who realizes th at the Being of things can possess
both hot and cold in any given situation, that is, differentiation by
com bination (243b).
It is clear to Plato that one should not m istake a difference of kind for a
distinction by degree. This is to say, a collection is a difference by
contiguity (a distinction and com bination) that entails a difference by
division (a distinction by disjunction and separation), because the reverse
implication disallows a process presence—that is, a separation cannot lead
to a concrete com bination. Foucault writes:
In this sense, the diagnosis does n o t establish the fact of our identity by the
play of distinctions. It establishes th a t we are difference, th a t our reason is
the difference of discourses, our history the difference of tim es, ourselves
the difference of masks. T hat difference, far from being the forgotten and
recovered origin, is this disperson th a t we are and m ake [1972, p. 131; see
1977, pp. 35-36],
The same point is m ade by Peirce (Savan 1976, p. 16) who says, “ a sign
is som ething by knowing which we know som ething m o re.” 10
Plato confirms the basis for his new choice of division grounded in
collection by taking up the problem of distinguishing am ong Being, One,
and Whole (244d). H e discovers that the collection “ B eing-O ne-W hole”
is found in the division of both “B eing-W hole” and “ O n e ,” w here the
collection “ B eing-W hole” is a division of both “ B eing” and “ W hole.”
Plato is quite explicit (253-58) in suggesting that the binary analogue logic
of com m unication theory is the dialectic discourse that identifies both the
sophist and the philosopher as opposed to those who practice eristic—
10. I am indebted to Professor Luis Perez, U niversity of Saskatchew an, for bringing this
point to my attention.
238 SEMIOLOGY
A rt
T
Γ 1?
Productive Distinguishing
1
1 1
By exchange
Like from like W orse from better:
purification 1
1 ..... η1
1
1 By gift By sale
1 1
O f bodies O f soul
1 Π
Selling of Exchange of works
o n e ’s own of others
1
1 1
Of evil O f ignorance
Ί
“ * Retailing Merchandizing
(in city) (betw een cities)
1
1 1
Instruction in Education
handicraft
1 1
Things of body Things of soul
1
1 1 1
Adm onition Cross-questioning
(ελεγχος):
Π
Music Knowledge
Sophist # 6
1
Γ 1
A rt M erchant M erchant of knowledge
regarding virtue:
Sophist # 2
4
R etailer of oth ers’
knowledge regarding
virtue: Sophist # 3
R etailer of one’s own

knowledge regarding
virtue: Sophist # 4
Figure 50. The preliminary divisions fro m Sallis (1975: 470-471)

Acquisitive
1
By conquest
Fighting Flunting
Com petitive Pugnacious O f lifeless Animal hunting

things
Violence Controversy L and animal W ater animal

hunting hunting
Forensic D isputation O f wild O f tam e Fowling Fishing

animals animals
Dealing with
1 Γ
Argum entation By force By persuasion By enclosures By striking
business
contracts
\ I-----------
Wastes money: M akes money: Public Private Fire hunting B arb hunting
loquacity Sophist # 5
L
1
Bringing gifts For pay Spearing Angling
(erotic art)
Flattery Sophist #1
240 SEMIOLOGY
that is, “ ideologues” who rely on the use of inform ation theory to invent
their knowledge (K erferd 1981, pp. 59ff.).
Plato proceeds to an elaborate proof of his thinking by showing how
the conditions of Being, M ovem ent, Rest, Same, and Other com bine and
divide. In brief, he argues that being and not-being becom e m utual proofs
of each other by their status as binary boundaries that punctuate knowl-
edge (Figure 51). The proof recognizes two oppositional pairs: M ove-
ment and Rest', and Same and Other. E ither one or the other in each pair
is recognized as the Being against which the N ot-Being is contrasted when
one m em ber of the pair is initially selected as a defining characteristic.
For example, in the pair M ovem ent/R est we could select M ovem ent as
characteristic of Being. In turn, R est is thereby equally characteristic of
Not-Being (i.e., not being in m otion). Thus, we discover that the Being
and Not-Being of M ovem ent is the Same, and that the Being and
Not-Being of R est is Other than M ovem ent (Sallis, 1975, pp. 514ff.).
Plato’s basic illustration for his argum ent is language, w here he reviews
many of these logical features in term s of language at both the phonologi-
cal and syntactical levels. A nd he offers a review of language in term s of
paradigm atic and syntagmatic shifts— that is, the analogue function of the
One and the M any (253d-e). It is plain that the com petence of the
philosopher m atches the perform ance of the sophist (253b). The speaking
subject is the source of Being (263a-e). As proof, Plato offers a com pari-
son between the following sentences:
(1) “T heaetetus sits.”
(2) “ T heaetetus, whom I am talking to at this m om ent, flies.”
Plato tells us that several judgm ents are possible. First, as T heaetetus
rem arks about both utterances: “ They are about me and belong to m e.”
H ence, (1) is true and (2) is false. A nd we know that the second utterance
is one of the shortest that conform s to the definition of a sentence. The
first contains both name and description in Being, w hereas the second
prescribes Being in the person of T heaetetus (“ whom I am talking to at
this m om ent” ), not-being in his name, “ T heaetetus,” which is true, and
Not-Being in his description (“ flies” ), which is false.
It may be helpful to review this example with the aid of Figure 49. The
first sentence divides discourse (Sr: verbal form ) and the person of
Theaetetus (Sd: bodily form ); Not-Being (Sr) is com bined with Being
(Sd). By contrast, the second sentence combines discourse and the person
(Sr: verbal form and bodily form ); Being (Sr) is distinguished from
Not-Being (Sd: “ flies” ). The word “ flies” becomes the bodily form of
Not-Being. Recall B arthes’s com m ent about myth as things that are
speech! Thus, Plato establishes the dialectic of collection and division as
conditions of Being and Not-Being that are m ediated by the speaking
N O T -B E IN G
E ither m o v e m e n t or r e s t
Binary c o n t e x t _____
A rticulates of (digital: either/or)
A rticulates in (analogue: both/and)
— Binary c o n t e x t —
E ither s a m e or o t h e r
N O T -B E IN G
Figure 51. Plato’s entailment o f com munication theory and

information theory in the categories o f Being!Not-Being,
Movement!Rest, and Same!Other
subject, not by language. M ediation by language is myth. As Taylor

remarks:
The satisfaction of these conditions depends on our native acum en and our
acquaintance with the subject-m atter, and no rules can be given for it,
precisely as no rules can be given for the discovery of a prom ising explana-
tory hypothesis. The m ethod, like all scientific m ethods, will n o t w ork in
vacuo [1956, p. 377],
Thus does Plato rem ark that “ to rob us of discourse would be to rob us of
philosophy” (260a).
T here is m ore to note here. W e have an illustration of how the
philosopher and the sophist use thinking to produce discourse. The
242 SEMIOLOGY
reverse, using discourse for thinking, is eristic—that is, bad philosophy

and bad sophistry. Indeed, eristic is the crime for which Socrates stands
falsely condem ned. The Sophist explains the philosopher’s m ethod and
hence the innocence of Socrates. In accord with the quest for a logos of
logos, the explanation comes through the last-m inute speaking of a
sophistic philosopher, the Eleatic Stranger!
Thus far in this chapter, I com pared P lato’s m odel of discourse analysis
to that of B arthes (1968). Second, I indicated certain errors in structural-
ist thinking in B arthes’s analysis by reexam ining the detailed argum ent
that Plato gives in the Sophist with respect to the m ethod of discursive
analysis. I should now like briefly to suggest the way in which M erleau-
Ponty (1962) builds on the Platonic argum ent by utilizing the speaking
subject as the source of sign production to com bine the m ethods of
semiology and phenom enology.
M ER LEA U -PO N TY A N D SEM IO TIC PH E N O M E N O L O G Y
Discourse, according to B arthes (1968), exists on the levels of connota-

tion, denotation (m etalanguage), and the real system. The object of his
structural analysis is language (langue) or its artifacts: text and myth. By
comparison, M erleau-Ponty’s (1962) phenom enological analysis takes the
consciousness of the person as the object of analysis (see chap. 7 above).
The result is the developm ent of a model of analysis consisting of (1)
description, (2) reduction, and (3) interpretation (Lanigan 1972; see
chap. 1 above).
Utilizing this m ethod, I now want to construct a m odel of discourse that
is a semiotic phenom enology. By describing the key features that Plato
offers to us and reducing them to essential characteristics in the com pari-
son betw een B arthes and Plato, I generate a herm eneutic of discourse for
the speaking subject. In this m odel (Figure 52), there are two reversible
com m utation systems: (1) the reflective system of the signifier (Sr) and (2)
the prereflective system of the signified (Sd). Each system has three levels
(boundaries): the punctuation of expression (com parable to B arthes’s
“ connotation” ), the punctuation of perception (com parable to “ denota-
tion” ), and the punctuation of meaning (com parable to “ real system ” ).
These three paradigm atic levels exist in both the Sr and Sd systems.
The signifier system of reflection illustrates the phenom enological p er-
spective th at discourse is a production of the speaking subject. In this
system, expression is the self-experience that is constituted by conscious-
ness o f self or, in Platonic term s, expression is the “particular quality” of
verbal form that is named in the description of self (see Figures 49 and
52). Thus, expression is constituted by perception. In turn, perception
derives from a meaning infrastructure that is the preconscious. Again in
Sr: Reflection Sd: Prereflection
Sr Sd
Expression Self Experience E xperience of O ther
Sr Sd Sr Sd
Perception Consciousness Self Consciousness O ther
(of) (of)
Sr Sd Sr Sd
Meaning Preconscious Unconscious
Figure 52. Semiotic phenom enology o f human communication.

Vertical relationships display communication theory: analogue choice,
binary coding, metaphor, symbol, and paradigmatic!synchronic
condition. Horizontal relationships display information theory: digital
choice, binary coding, m etonym y, sign, and syntagmatic!diachronic
condition
Platonic term s, the preconscious is equivalent to the knowledge I have of

an essential reality. W e can see th at the phenom enological m ethod of
M erleau-Ponty (1962) has the same logical structure as the Platonic
dialectic. T hat is, the m ethodological description of self-experience is
reduced to consciousness of self, which allows the interpretation of what
has m eaning in the preconscious. Recall P lato’s m ethod of analysis for
oral sentences (1) and (2) above.
W here Plato and M erleau-Ponty differ is the ontological status of the
maieutic. For M erleau-Ponty (1962) discourse is a proof of the person,
the speaking subject, as the incarnation of consciousness. For Plato the
analysis shows that the person is an image [bodily form] of an ideal form
(“essential reality” ) th at is tru e .11 F or Plato this image can be known
through discourse that is oral (knowledge)— th at is, an oral report of what
was said (understanding), or w ritten (opinion). B ut writing converts the
“ essential reality” into a “particular quality”— th at is, writing as an
instrument replaces the “person as instrum ent” just as mimicry of another
uses the voice as an instrument to replace my discourse (266d-267e).
Opinion is m istaken for knowledge in writing.
Eco (1976, p. 171) illustrates the sem antic sense in which propositional
meaning requires a perceptum from the com m unicative point of view of
an addressee, which is precisely the point of P lato’s view that writing
11. E dm und H usserl’s phenom enology, with its em phasis on the transcendental Ego,
would be com patible with the Platonic ontology in a way th at M erleau-Ponty’s existential
phenom enology clearly is not. It is also im portant to recall th at the G reeks did not have our
ontological tendency to separate signifiers and signifieds: ‘E ven a non-hum an object can, in
the archaic period, take on a life of its own— as w hen an inscription on a pot reads “ I greet
you” ’ (Havelock 1978, p. 99).
244 SEMIOLOGY
requires (erroneously) the reader to invent, rather than discover, a

perceptum. Sebeok and R osenthal (1981) ingeniously point to this same
principle (historically found in magic acts of the theater) as the “ clever
H ans” fallacy in scientific research procedures. Thus although Plato and
M erleau-Ponty differ on the ontological status of persons and discourse,
they are agreed that discourse, not language, is a dialectic knowledge of
the person.
The signified system of prereflection illustrates the phenom enological
view that subjectivity in discourse m ust be viewed as intersubjectivity.
That is, in the Sr system, expression comes from the speaking subject
(experience of self), which entails that expression in the Sd system is the
speaking subject (experience of other). F or Plato this is simply another
way of suggesting that Being is founded in Not-Being. O r from the
linguistic point of view, it is Saussure’s distinction betw een parole (speak-
ing subject) and langue (speaking subject). The Sd system of prereflection
is thereby the experience of the other, which is constituted by the
consciousness I have of the other. O r in Platonic term s (Figure 49),
experience of an other (bodily form ) is nam ed by my conscious descrip-
tion of the other. Expression of the other is constituted by my perception.
In turn, consciousness derives from the grounding of the unconscious. In
Platonic term s (265b-266d) the unconscious is equivalent to the knowl-
edge we have of an object’s absence in essential reality. O r m ore pre-
cisely, we have the Not-Being of Being as Same or O ther (Figure 51). In a
phenomenological perspective the unconscious is the Not-Being of my
consciousness or Being. In turn, this knowledge of my being at the
meaning level of the Sd system allows me to constitute the perception
level in which my consciousness (Being) constitutes the other (Not-Being
[of me]).
Foucault provides a concrete illustration of the present analysis in his
discussion of the therapeutic force of im itation in “ theatrical representa-
tions” :
T he fulfillment of delirium ’s non-being in being is able to suppress it as

non-being itself; and this by the pure mechanism of its internal contradic-
tion— a mechanism that is both a play on w ords and a play of illusion,
games of language and of the image; the delirium , in effect, is suppressed as
non-being since it becom es perceived as a form of being; but since the being
of delirium is entirely in its non-being, it is suppressed as delirium. A nd its
confirmation in theatrical fantasy restores it to a tru th which, by holding it
captive in reality, derives it out of reality itself, and m akes it disappear in
the non-delirious discourse of reason [1965, p. 191].
Foucault’s analysis, interestingly enough, draws on a previous explora-

tion (see chap. 5 above) by M erleau-Ponty (1962, pp. 291, 334) of the
place of the rationality of the speaking subject in the problem atic of

hallucination and delirium (Levin 1979; Lanigan 1979c).
I trust th at it is apparent at this point that M erleau-Ponty adopts
Saussure’s concept of, and Jakobson’s elaboration of (H olenstein 1976),
paradigmatic/synchronic and syntagm atic/diachronic shifts to illustrate
the reversibility of analysis that occurs at each level of the system. T hat is,
expression, perception, and meaning in the Sr or Sd system are paradig-
matic/synchronic shifts, and there is a sim ultaneous syntagmatic/
diachronic shift between Sr and Sd expression, Sr and Sd perception, and
Sr and Sd meaning. I illustrate this process in Figure 53 by citing
Sr: Consciousness Sd: Experience
Sr Sd
D E S C R IP T IO N Parole Langue
[Expression] (speaking) (social language)
Sr Sd Sn Sd
R E D U C T IO N Parole Parlante Parole Parlée
[Perception] (speech) (speaking) (speech) (spoken)
Sr Sd Sr Sd
IN T E R P R E T A T IO N Corps P ropre G este
[Meaning] (person: lived- (gesture: body-
body) lived)
Figure 53. Merleau-Ponty’s m odel o f hum an discourse. A ll

relationships are combinatory; this is critical to recall with reference to
‘parole parlante’ and ‘p arole parlée’.
M erleau-Ponty’s categories as they constitute a sem iotic phenom enology

of discourse— th at is, a com m unicology. I have detailed M erleau-Ponty’s
philosophy of com m unication in chapter 3, above. It inform s the content
of the schematic in Figure 53 (Lanigan 1970; 1972; 1977; 1979).
In brief sum m ary, let me say that the Sophist provides a maieutic
analysis of philosophical im agination th at in large part we m ethodologi-
cally recognize as the contem porary school of existential phenom enology.
A t the same tim e, how ever, the dialogue also gives us a discussion of the
logic in hum an conscious experience th at we may readily call the hum an
science of semiology. Indeed, the very argum ent that I am m aking for the
existence of a semiotic phenom enology o f discourse in the speaking subject
(corps propre) comes from the m outh of the E leatic Stranger, who tells
us: “ Knowledge is also surely one, but each part of it th at com m ands a
certain field is m arked off and given a special nam e proper to itself.
Hence language [discourse] recognizes m any arts and forms of knowl-
edge” (257d).
Chapter Eighteen
The Convention o f “Conventions”

A Phenomenological Reflection on the Ideological Practice
o f Discourse in Professional Mass Communication
Hum an communication, both as a concept and as practiced, is arbitrary

and conventional. Com munication is arbitrary at the personal and social
level because the currently used concepts and behavior displays could be
different. Although concept and behavior are not individually deter-
mined, they do arise through some personal choice process. Concept and
behavior are conventional because they are commonly understood and
preserved in society with sufficient uniformity to be available to the next
generation as theory and praxis (M cFeat 1974). This uniform ity is pre-
cisely what Znaniecki (1969, p. 137) calls the “hum anistic coefficient.”
Exactly because of this arbitrary and conventional nature, com m unica-
tion both as a concept and behavior is inherently ideological. B oth the
idea and action develop at a particular point in tim e, in a particular
culture, and within particular theories, and are retained to the exclusion
of potential competing concepts and behaviors, as discussed in chapter 6,
above. B oth the concept and behavior interconnect with beliefs and
values that m ake up our particular social milieu. The particular ideologi-
cal com m itm ents implied in our everyday action and interaction are
usually taken for granted as the standard background practices from
which we constitute our engagem ents with other persons (Bourdieu
1977).
To follow Karl M annheim , the term “ ideology” is the m ost appropriate
for describing this constituted com m unication background (Brown 1978,
p. 16). As he indicates: “T here is implicit in the word ‘ideology’ the
insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain
246
MASS COMMUNICATION 247
groups obscures the real conditions of the society both to itself and to
others and thereby stabilizes it.” (See chaps. 9 and 16).
Speech com m unication conference/conventions, though being special
contexts for mass com m unication, are like everyday interaction in their
conventionality and implied ideological com m itm ents. This convention-
ality, like that of everyday life, assures a reasonable am ount of u n re-
flected orderly discourse, but systematically distorts experience in favor
of certain kinds of ideas and activities over others (Johnson et al. 1982).
In this chapter I wish to characterize this type of discourse as the
convention (discourse; practice) that takes place at a convention
(meeting)— a phenom enological description. In oth er words, my analysis
seeks to display the conventionality of convention discourse. In so doing,
I critically deconstruct the ideological com m itm ents of speech com m uni-
cation conventions (meetings) and look at the particular type of experi-
ences these commitments self-select for the participants— a phenom eno-
logical reduction. Last, I discuss a m ore appropriate ideological basis for
professional meetings as a critical form for mass com m unication— a
phenomenological interpretation (i.e., the “ m ass” critically considered as
the “communicative com m unity” that it is [Apel 1981]). In order to
explicate my thesis, I begin with a discussion of ideology, conventionality,
and conventions.
ID E O L O G Y A N D C O N V E N T IO N A L IT Y
In a general sense, ideology is a system atic body of concepts arising within

culture, which describe or explain culture or, m ore particularly, hum an
life. In the particular sense in which I am interested, ideology is a set of
behavioral practices reflexively used to describe or explain them selves
(O ’Sullivan et al. 1983, p. 107; see R itter 1979). As H aberm as (1979)
explains, “ In filling out the double structure of speech, participants in
dialogue com m unicate on two levels sim ultaneously. They com bine com -
munication of a content with com m unication about a role in which the
com m unicated content is used” (p. 42).
N ote that H aberm as is not describing the relationship betw een a
m etalanguage and an object-language (Lyons 1977). R ath er his concern
is for the creative or productive elem ent in com m unication that is perfor-
mance (M erleau-Ponty 1962, p. 383; see Nelson 1986). W hen a person
communicates with another person, there is a perform ance such that the
act of saying som ething both says som ething and produces the context
(audience, situation) in which it can be said.
The double structure of action and conception is based on, but con-
ceals, ideological com m itm ents. Ideology represents the unexplicated
normative behavior of individuals whose com m unication is constituting
248 SEMIOLOGY
their society as a culture (see chap. 6 above). O r, to be particular to my

immediate concerns, a person who reads a paper at a professional
m eeting helps to constitute a select society whose values include being
learned. For the professoriat, a less anxiety-provoking exam ple is the
rhetoric of town meetings (P otter 1957).
In an unsophisticated sense, convention is thought of as a rule of
conduct. A s a historical criterion, in the study of convention, a distinction
is m ade betw een conduct that is (1) constituted and/or (2) regulated by
rules (Lanigan 1977). B ut in understanding conventions, this consti-
tutive/regulative distinction falls victim to the sam e type of analysis that
H aberm as warns against in the object-language/m etalanguage distinc-
tion. M ore accurately, personal behavior becom es a social perform ance
(by constitutive rules) that is sim ultaneously controlled by cultural expec-
tations (in regulative rules). Thus, the focal concern is once again the
double structure of com m unication. I shall use the term conventionality to
refer to an adherence to rules of conduct by participants.
Conventionality displays a double structure inasm uch as any com m uni-
cation that occurs sim ultaneously confirms its legitim ate value by com -
parison to past behaviors of a similar nature and function (V erón 1971).
H ence, a precedent is confirmed. “ Indeed, precedent is merely the source
of one im portant kind of salience: conspicuous uniqueness of an equili-
brium because we reached it last tim e” (Lewis 1969, p. 36). To put it
m ore simply, a state of conventionality occurs where and when a regular-
ity in perform ances is m anifest. Such a regularity is the creative or
productive process that links the individual act (constitutive rules) to the
social—that is, intersubjective— conception (regulative rules).
Having laid out the grounds for understanding ideology and conven-
tionality, I can now turn to conventional ideologies. This is to say, I can
expose the salient features of the annual professional conference com -
monly known as the convention. To a certain extent, my goal is to
demythologize the com m unicative behaviors that are produced and con-
sumed as the process of creating m eaning betw een communicology pro-
fessionals in such ecosystems as the annual (or b etter yet, the
international fifth-year) m eeting of the International Com munication
Association, or similar “ professional” and “ academ ic” associations.
Inasmuch as convention (m eeting) forms are generally assumed rather
than m ade explicit, it should be useful to spend a m om ent com paring
some alternative ecosystems (W ilden 1980), principally to be found in the
history of E uropean practice. A lternative m odels are im portant because
they display ideological conventionality that offers some context for
looking at convention forms by negative definition (Foucault 1972). That
is, we may find out what we do and why, by looking at w hat could be done
(but is not—Foucault’s concept of exclusion) and the reasons for it. To be
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Figure 54. The Structure of research reporting. The structure is followed closely by European scholars, largely because of the paradigmatic
organization of the University of Paris in the 13th Century and its German successors in the 14th and 15th Centuries. The structure is relatively unknown to
American (USA) scholars and is seldom followed with any understanding of its intent as a communication channel. (See Overfield 1984 and Ferruolo 1985)
specific, let us com pare professional gatherings that are variously called a
sym posium , a conference, and a congress (see Figure 54).
In developing a sense of ideological conventionality, I begin with the
symposium and culm inate with the congress for reasons that will become
apparent. Because I am dealing with an ideological conventionality, I am
in the peculiar position of attem pting to describe w hat we do by doing it,
a sort of perform ing perform ance (Peterson 1980). H ow ever, for the
conceptually oriented in our ecosystem, I refer you to the O .E .D . for
docum entation of the relevant terms.
A sym posium is a specially called m eeting for the purpose of discussing
a common subject. In particular, it is a m eeting, organized around a
special topic, which attem pts to locate some com m on ground among
diverse participants. In short, the symposium is a problem -centered
gathering, rather than the product of a special interest group as typically
found within a discipline. If you like, a symposium is usually an attem pt to
get conflicting interests resolved for the com m on good.
As a frequent practice, the symposium is as much a social as profes-
sional event, often facilitated by the abundant drinking of special
beverages— if you rem em ber your Platonic dialogues. In the typical
convention, drinks tend to signal the switch from problem — to social-
centered talk. The conventional success m odel follows the practice of the
“business cocktail” where m aking contacts for some future discussion is
facilitated by the drink rath er than an enhancem ent of the present
experience.12
A conference is a m ore form al version of the symposium. It is still a
problem -centered m eeting, but one cast within the limits of a given
discipline. The basic idea of a conference is consultation and discussion
by persons who have a special interest in form ulating the boundaries of a
particular problem atic. Once the problem has been stated, w ork on a
solution can begin.
O ne possible approach to the conference is a dialectic one. In this
m odel the attem pt is to put aside the particular characteristics of the
participants in an effort to reach a com m on understanding. Thus, the
problem can be stated in such a m anner th at a solution can be found or at
least criteria for a solution can be stated. The hope is that a group can
reason through reality to reach some certainty as to which solution is
correct.
12. A n interesting illustration is the dilem m a of the City Council in C arbondale, Illinois
that voted to change the nam e of its proposed “ convention center” to “ conference cen ter”
since the facility was not intended for large, national groups who w ould require extensive
hotel, drinking, and eating accom m odations. H ow ever, the “ conference cen ter” was duly
re-renam ed the “ convention cen ter” when it was discovered th at federal tax legislation does
not perm it the public funding of anything except a “ convention cen ter” (Tax R ule, 1984).
In the convention (as opposed to the symposium or conference) discus-

sion is prim arily rhetorical, rather than dialectical (Rosenfield et al. 1976,
pp. 234-38). A t conventions, solution upon solution is offered for an
ill-stated and often obscured or forgotten problem . The speaker’s pres-
ence, academic credentials, past research, and research design are m ar-
shaled together to m ake a case for the acceptance of one of the solutions.
B oth the content and process differ in (1) a dialectic process aim ed at
understanding (in symposia and conferences) or (2) in a rhetorical p ro -
cess aim ed at agreem ent (in conventions). Ideology is clear in this
differentiation (H aberm as 1984).
Finally, a congress is a form al assembly of specialists to settle some
outstanding question. Congresses are not annual affairs, they are fre-
quently held in four-year cycles— like the W orld Congress of Philos-
ophy—so that breakthroughs in special disciplines can be announced.
The main purpose of the congress is to detail the m anner in which the
specific solution can be applied to concrete, secondary problem s. E u ro -
peans who attend congresses expect to come away with new technical
inform ation that will enable them to finally resolve practical problem s.
The popular press occasionally prints findings reported at the last
“ convention,” but they are rarely conclusions or breakthroughs. Usually
it has to do with an isolated study using a m ethod or m aking an unusual
statem ent about an old subject that the rep o rter found interesting or at
least thought the reader or listening audience would. R ather than blame
the reporter, it would appear that the reporter is true to conventionality
behavior.
To sum up, the m odels of the symposium, the conference, and the
congress differ from the convention in th at the participants in these first
three types of meetings are interested in producing concrete experience,
whereas convention-goers are interested in consuming it. A convention is
an association, a m eeting place of persons rather than ideas, and it is the
interaction of persons, not ideas, th at stands out as interesting. The
association is with “fam ous” persons with the hope that there is magic in
knowing them by nam e, rather than an encounter with great ideas where
we first rem em ber w hat was said, and then who said it (see chap. 17,
above).
All this is not to suggest that every professional association should have
a “ congress.” I only wish to m ake clearer what a convention is by
contrasting it with other forms of professional meetings. W e choose to
have conventions for practical-social-cultural-historical reasons. Those
who attended the first (and as yet only) IC A W orld Congress on C om m u-
nication Science in Berlin might recall reporters waiting outside for a
session to end. A t the conclusion, they would ask a panelist w hat had
been concluded. W hen the A m erican panelist answ ered th at there had
been papers on this topic and th at topic, neither the panelist nor the
252 SEMIOLOGY
reporter had any idea of what to say next. W hat I am arguing is that the
choice of a m eeting form at is an ideological one (see Figure 38). Now let
me turn to the nature of these ideological commitments.
By negative dialectic, the conventional ideology of the A m erican
convention (m eeting) is precisely convention defined as an ideology.
W hat is the “convention” as an ideology? By a fortunate turn of thinking,
the answer is provided in the very context of perform ing perform ance—
that is, in this case the researching of research:
Beyond its social and ritualistic functions, the annual convention is im por-
tant both to the organization which sponsors it and to the m em bers who
attend. Ideally, the annual convention provides a rhetorical situation in
which the needs of individual m em bers and the needs of the organization
m eet on com mon ground. For an organization, the convention offers a
mechanism for conducting its business, an opportunity for increasing its
m em bership, and an index of its vitality and strength. F or individual
m em bers, the convention affords a chance to present their views, enhance
their professional expertise, and m aintain friendships with colleagues of
similar interests [Larson and H ensley 1978, p. 206].
Thus, Larson and Hensley characterize systematically the values p re-

sent in their study of the C entral State Speech A ssociation held in D etroit
in April 1977. The convention as a com m unication event suggests the
typicality of conventionality. T hat is, we find adherence to rules of
conduct: “ Ideally, the annual convention provides a rhetorical situation
in which the needs of individual m em bers and the needs of the organiza-
tion m eet on comon ground.” In turn, the typicality of ideology is
displayed: “ For an organization the convention offers a m echanism for
conducting its business” “F or individual m em bers the convention affords
a chance to present their views.”
A t this point, the relationship am ong com m unication, ideology, and
conventionality is fairly explicit as it occurs in the annual convention. In
this relationship, we have a coherent picture of mass com munication as
the individual and organizational actions that becom e the m anifest con-
ceptions in such a professional gathering. My concern now is to explore
the extension of ideology and conventionality beyond the convention
event to the discipline of communicology itself. A lthough, it might
appear at least epigram m atic to speak of this extension as the “ spread of
conventional wisdom ,” I shall reserve the term conventionalism for this
mass com m unication function, A pel’s (1981) Verständigung.
C O N V EN TIO N A LISM AS ID E O L O G Y A N D
C O N V EN TIO N A LITY
The use of the term conventionalism is as historically problem atic as it is

practical to my present explication. T he concept is historically “ reserved
for an attitude to the m ethodology of natural science” (Kolakowski 1968,
p. 158). N onetheless, the sam e attitude m akes its appearance in the
human sciences as well. A nd it is this hum an science view that interests
me. In particular, I am concerned with the m ethod by which ideology and
conventionality at a professional convention form the com m unication
values in the discipline generally as an “ interpretive com m unity” (K o m -
munikationsgemeinschaft). As might be anticipated, one m ajor reason for
this line of analysis is the circular and cum ulative nature of professional
behavior th at leads back to the annual convention.
O ur discussion of conventionalism is easier if we examine the standard
view in the physical sciences and then translate it into the hum an science
view. In this transform ation please recall that I am discussing the attitude
(ideology) contained in m ethodology (conventionality):
The fundamental idea of conventionalism may be stated as follows: certain

scientific propositions, erroneously taken for descriptions of the world
based on the recording and generalization of experiments, are in fact
artificial creations, and we regard them as true not because we are com-
pelled to do so for empirical reasons, but because they are convenient,
useful, or even because they have aesthetic appeal. Conventionalists agree
with empiricism on the origin of knowledge but reject empiricism as a norm
that allows us to justify all accepted judgments by appealing to experience,
conceived of as a sufficient criterion of their truth. Or, to put the same point
somewhat more accurately, the data of experience always leave scope for
more than one explanatory hypothesis, and which one is to be chosen
cannot be determined by experience. Rival hypotheses accounting for a
given aggregate of facts may be equally sound from a logical point of view,
and hence our actual choices are accounted for by eidetic (non-empirical)
considerations [Kolakowski 1968, pp. 158-59; see J. Berhstein 1978].
The m ost efficient way to translate this physical science attitude and
m ethod into the communicological view of ideology and conventionality
as a hum an science is to briefly cite the theory construction work by Lewis
(1969). H e offers the following definition (of w hat I am calling conven-
tionalism ), which he confirms analytically using a standard propositional
calculus:
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are

the agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true
254 SEMIOLOGY
that, and it is com mon knowledge in P that, in alm ost any instance of S
am ong m em bers of P,
(1) alm ost everyone conforms to R\

(2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R\
(3) almost everyone has approxim ately the same preferences regarding all
possible com binations of actions;
(4) alm ost everyone prefers that any one m ore conform to R, on condition
that almost everyone conform to R;
(5) alm ost everyone would prefer that any one m ore conform to R ' , on
condition th at alm ost everyone conform to R ', w here R' is some
possible regularity in the behavior of m em bers of P in S, such that
alm ost no one in alm ost any instance of S am ong m em bers of P could
conform both to R' and to R [p. 78],
This rather formal explanation of conventionalism should becom e clear

as we look at the five conditions enum erated in the definition. In particu-
lar, we can take these conditions and exemplify them in a progressive
m ovem ent from the phenom enological description of conventionalism as
(1) a social form, (2) to the phenom enological reduction of that disciplin-
ary description, and (3) the phenom enological interpretation of the
annual convention m eeting as a fundam ental structure of discourse (see
Figure 2).
Co n v e n t io n a l is m a s a So c ia l Fo r m
I have already discussed the cultural differences betw een m odels of the
symposium, conference, and congress as opposed to the convention. In
all cases, however, there is a com m on elem ent and that is for Lewis “ a
regularity R in the behavior of m em bers of a population P w hen they are
agents in a recurrent situation 5 .” The necessary and sufficient conditions
that constitute the professional meetings under their various m ethods of
problem -stating or -solving is that “ (1) almost everyone conform s to R ”
and that “ (2) almost everyone expects alm ost everyone else to conform
to R ”
I can illustrate these two conditions of conventionalism as a phenom e-
nological description by recalling th at attendance at an A m erican conven-
tion is preem inently a social and ritualistic activity.13 A ttendance calls for
a certain style of behavior. Styles are considered here as “ idioms of
knowledge and com m unication. They suffice for com m unication in so far
13. A good hum orous illustration is the com m ent in Ian H ay, Paid with Thanks (1925,
pp. 66-67): “ B ut first let us be clear as to w hat a convention is. In E ngland the conventions
are unw ritten rules and regulations which you defy o r conform to according to your sense of
hum or. B ut a convention in A m erica is a concrete, living, palpitating fact. In E ngland we
should call it a conference, or a B eanfest, or a blend of both. . . . ” I am indebted to John D.
Peters, Stanford University, for this reference.
and for so long as they are understood by convention (sam keta); else-
where or at another tim e, they m ust be learnt before the art can be
deciphered” (Coom arasway 1956, p. 85). C om pare, for exam ple, the
dress, hotel selection, and clim ate of Speech Com m unication Association
conventions as com pared with those of the International C om m unication
Association (or any two disciplinary associations you care to choose).
Com pare the technical specialists in the discipline whose styles of profes-
sionalism are radically different (e.g., the rhetorical critic and behavioral
scientist), yet are at least social equals in one discipline. In sym posium
form , the annual convention creates a com m on ground for com m unica-
tion and o th er social behavior. The specialists are of the same social form ;
they conform and expect conform ity.
In conference fo rm , the annual convention is a rhetorical situation
giving the specialist circle a com m on ground. Y ou m ust be a technical
specialist in this group in order to confer. You m ust have a specific style of
adhering to the subject m atter and the persons who discuss it. A t the
annual convention the boundaries of style are present as the various
divisions of the professional association. O f course, each division has
several program s th at take the style to the level of the congressional fo rm .
Specialists attack a very specific problem , often so th at they can becom e
even m ore methodologically specialized at attacking the problem , rather
than solving it in a concrete, applied m anner. If we can use the social
systems m etaphor, the annual convention represents a m ethod of creating
meaning in organisms that are them selves constituted by cells (pro-
grams), organs (divisions), and systems (regional and national profes-
sional associations).
Co n v e n t io n a l is m a s D is c ip l in a r y
The annual convention also establishes and m aintains a certain control

over participants and subject m atter. T hat is the nature and function of a
discipline. As a phenom enological reduction in term s of the Lewis m odel,
the third and fourth necessary and sufficient conditions are m et. T hat is,
“ (3) almost everyone has approxim ately the sam e preferences regarding
all possible com binations of actions” and “ (4) alm ost everyone prefers
that any one m ore conform to R , on condition that alm ost everyone
conform to R .” O r as we previously noted in the Larson and H ensley
(1978) version: “ For an organization, the convention offers a m echanism
for conducting its business, an opportunity for increasing its m em bership,
and an index of its vitality and strength” (p. 206). A quick m ental review
of the m em bership categories in our professional associations, the proce-
dures for holding adm inistrative positions in the association, and the
history of the connection betw een these and annual conventions, gives
you a clearer picture of disciplinary conventionality.
256 SEMIOLOGY
W hat is often less clear is the ideological com m itm ent to consumerism
(Lanigan 1981; see chap. 6 above). Y ou begin by purchasing your
m em bership, and frequently that is done as a prerequisite for getting into
the annual convention. A nd then there is good value for m oney spent by
attending the convention. As Larson and H ensley naively suggest in their
study, attendance is not random , but is representative of those “ persons
whose professional interests and/or financial resources w arranted their
attendance at D etroit. Thus, while the convention-goers may not have
been a random sample representative of all CSSA m em bers, it is likely
that they did represent a sample of the m ost professional, interested, and
active persons in the organization.” O f course this includes those seeking
em ploym ent or different em ploym ent, recruitm ent of graduate students,
status reports of departm ents and persons, and the selling of T-shirts and
textbooks.
How different this is from a scholarly society whose m em bership is by
invitation or nom ination on the basis of research accom plishm ent and
whose conferences are not conventions arranged on the fraternal m odel
of the “ E lks,” the “ Lions,” or the “ R otary C lub” in A m erican society.
Co n v e n t io n a l is m a s R e c u r r e n t St r u c t u r e
T here is in the annual convention an opportunity to grow and change.

The convention is an open system. Y et, it is a system with very specific
change conditions that are nicely stated in Lewis’s fifth condition for
conventionalism as a phenom enological interpretation. T hat is, “ (5) al-
most everyone would prefer that any one m ore conform to R ' , on
condition th at almost everyone conform to R ' , where R' is some possible
regularity in the behavior of m em bers of P in 5, such th at alm ost no one
in almost any instance of S among m em bers of P could conform both to
R ' and to R .” In m ore familiar language, Lewis explains formally that if
one person is going to do som ething unexpected, it is permissible if we
would all prefer that change to our usual practice. This is the ideology of
the buzz word and the “ latest” research fad in the “m ainstream .”
The best illustration of conventionalism as a recurrent structure is the
process of m aking presentations at conventions. Let us suppose you are
responsible for chairing a program panel. Such a program is R '; it is a new
situation th at m ust have all the structural features of R (the usual
program ) to be acceptable to the m em bership (P) at the annual conven-
tion (5). Typically there is no problem in m ounting such a program ,
because the new subject m atter is plugged into the old structure. The R to
R ' shift represents m ore consum ption of a fam iliar product. W e experi-
ence the same old form at with the sam e old faces. W e com e to hear
Person X “ do his thing” again and we judge this year’s perform ance. The
competitive selection process, even m ore clearly than that of the “ old
boys’ club,” assures that the free m arketplace of ideas will be filled with
“new im proved” varieties of nam e brand products. This type of conven-
tionalism enforces a kind of procedural sublim ation w here having done
something in the right way is seen as an adequate substitute for having
done som ething right.
By way of summarizing conventionalism as ideology and conventional-
ity, three distinct em pirical relationships em erge under phenom enological
analysis. These relationships prescribe the ideological constituents of
conventionalism as an ideology of mass com m unication. First, there m ust
be regularity in behavior. C onvention participants do the same thing in
the same way. Those who do not are devalued by banishm ent to the
nondivisional program . Second, there m ust be a recurrent population.
Those who do not attend regularly are rarely elected to office or appear
on a panel. T hird, there m ust be a recurrent situation. Basically this
situation is the annual gathering but, m ore specifically, it is the traditional
assignment of three panels to this division, and four to th at one, and so
on. If you cannot find a division you like, you m ust look for another
association to join. Given these ideological conditions, How do we go
about legitimizing our continued involvem ent in conventionalism ? A fter
all, there is a presum ption that our activities can be personally and
professionally justified.
R E FL E C T E D A N D U N R E F L E C T E D ID E O L O G IE S
W hether or not we can justify an ideological claim is the precise nature of

the contem porary idea of legitimation. T hat is, conventionality leads to
the establishm ent of an ideology, and conversely. In either case, the
conjunction of an action and a conception are united as a norm ative
condition or value. The m anner in which the union occurs is its justifica-
tion. As a usual practice, it is possible to distinguish justifications as either
reflected or unreflected. Recall th at I cited this difference in the very
beginning of the paper with H aberm as’s com m ent that com m unication
contains the double structure of combining content and function in one
action. Yet such a com m unication act may be reflective in th at I am aware
of the m anner in which I am joining content to function. O r the act
remains unreflected if it is m erely functional o r substantive because I am
unaware of the m ethod of my m anner. O r to put the issue in Hjelm slevian
(1961) term s, the com m unicative action is reflective if it is a function,
whereas it is unreflective if it is a functive.
In their dicussion of “ special audiences,” Perelm an and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1971) point out th at the unreflected conventionality and its
ideological consequences exist because “ there are agreem ents that are
peculiar to the m em bers of a particular discipline, w hether it be of
258 SEMIOLOGY
scientific or technical, juridical or theological nature. Such agreem ents

constitute the body of a science or technique. They may be the result of
certain conventions of adherence to certain texts, and they characterize
certain audiences” (p. 99). In particular, such audiences use a technical
language th at displays “ an aggregate of acquired knowledge, rules, and
conventions.”
The only point at which participation in the discipline is a reflective
process is when a person initially joins the profession. One m ust literally
learn by reflection how to profess the discipline. Perelm an & Olbrechts-
Tyteca provide an excellent illustration:
Entry into a specialized group requires initiation. While a speaker must

normally adapt himself to his audience, this is not true of a teacher
responsible for teaching students what is accepted by the particular group
they wish to join. In this case, persuasion is preliminary to initiation. It
must secure submission to the requirements of the specialized group, for
which the teacher is the spokesman. Initiation into a given discipline
consists of communicating its rules, techniques, specific ideas, and presup-
positions, as well as method of criticizing its results in terms of the disci-
plines own requirements [1971, pp. 99-100].
H ence the annual convention becomes a testing ground for candidates

wishing initiation into the discipline (see chap. 9). Even at the convention
stage, we can distinguish the reflective and unreflective legitim ation
process at work. Those graduate students still caught up in the reflective
process are the tag-on co-authors of papers bearing the nam es of high-
profile conventionalists. The so-called successful initiates, those who are
part of the standard unreflective process, are present to delivery their solo
papers on special “ d ebut” program s.
In the process I am describing there is a legitimation crisis. A symbolic
relationship is created w hereby criticism is transform ed into com mentary,
and explicit values offer not justification but neutrality (Foucault 1972).
A s Perelm an & O lbrechts-Tyteca (1971, p. 335) suggest, “ speech acts on
what it states.” Com m entary is the unreflective process of testing the
regulation of m em bers of a population w hen they are agents in a recurrent
situation (the Lewis m odel). H ere commentary is the ureflected process
of evaluation—literally to fix or determ ine the value of the speech
communication within the boundaries of the technical language and
action of the discipline. By com parison, criticism is the reflective process
of analyzing the constitution of behavior of the m em bers of a population
when they are agents in a recurrent situation (see Grossberg 1978).
In the norm al course of events at an annual convention, we witness
critique turn into com m entary as the initiate turns professional. A nd we
see criticism subverted into com m entary as conventionalism ensures that
only accepted m ethods will be used to explore new subject m atters;

indeed, speech acts on what it states. N orm al science in K uhn’s sense
reigns suprem e, or at least governs such an ideology as dom inant.
W hat is apparent in the dialectic betw een com m entary and criticism is
the value neutrality of conventionalism . T here is an absence of any
system of justification inherent in the subject m atter of the discipline.
Hence, justification is abstracted from the behavior of the m em bers of the
discipline. The resulting legitim ation process is a crisis state because the
annual convention legitimizes the professional, not the profession. The
scholar as famous nam e is valued rather than the discourse of creative
research (M erleau-Ponty 1962, p. 362). The growing use of so-called
blind reviewers in the selection and publication of research products is at
the very least a recognition, if not a confirm ation (because it is just
“ so-called” ), of this legitim ation crisis. N or do we need to explore the
ironic fact that the reviewer m ust be blind in order to see in an ideologi-
cally correct way. Because of this situation, some professional journals
have recognized the academic and scholarly im portance of signed re -
views.
R E C O N ST R U C T IV E L E G IT IM A T IO N
H aberm as (1979, p. 204) suggests a theoretical solution to a legitim a-

tion crisis like the one we are concerned with in conventionalism . H e
argues for a program of “ reconstructive legitim ations.” “The reconstruc-
tion of given legitim ations can consist, first, in discovering the justifica-
tory system, S, that allows for evaluating the given legitimations as valid or
invalid is S .” In other words, we need to discover in a systematic way
exactly why we, as a profession, have an annual convention (see Beale
1978). I have exam ined the many personal reasons that offered justifica-
tion for participation in the discipline, but there is no system of values
that points to the inherent existence of a discipline. Given this situation, a
“justificatory system ” should be created.
T here are at least signs that this is happening: the creation of w ork-
shops, “ m asters’ sessions,” and sem inars preceding conventions, doctoral
honors sem inars in isolation from conventions, and special conferences
that are problem-specific (B itzer and Black 1971; M iller and Simons
1974). The “ bottom line” is that professional associations m ust adopt the
“justificatory system ” that is typical of learned societies. The legitim ation
of the discipline should develop from the profession in the professional,
not from the personalities at the party convention.
The need for an effort at reconstructive legitim ation is fam iliar and
obvious when set in the concrete world of convention-goers and -doers.
In the “publish or perish” atm osphere of institutionalized, corporate
260 SEMIOLOGY
academ ia, the annual convention should be a recognized and positively

valued m ark of professional contribution. It should provide valuable
critique for research, rather than the present tendency to offer com m en-
tary by lack of m ention in this year’s convention directory. The annual
convention should be a practical context for judging a scholar’s readiness
to be prom oted and not a “ m arket” for advertising the latest “products”
of the scholar. The annual convention should consistently address itself to
the concrete social responsibility the discipline has to itself and to the
general public. The convention should m otivate public praise and criti-
cism rather than foster private cynicism. In this context, the convention
should be a testing ground to expose the ram pant ideological neutrality
that sustains the failure of social com m itm ent and lack of political
involvement.
The fantasies of the ivory tow er to the contrary, our discipline of
communicology is in the middle of the contem porary social and political
arena of discourse and we m ust take responsibility for it. It will no longer
do to m ake research claims and sim ultaneously deny responsibility for
their social im portance. As a discipline functioning within the institution
of education, we are part of the reflective process. W e cannot pretend to
unreflected neutrality by hiding o u r objective world in a technical lan-
guage (Perelm an & Olbrechts-Tyteca, p. 212). “ In constrasting the
natural and the hum an sciences, or quantitative with qualitative knowl-
edge, we construct a classification of kinds of knowledge based essentially
on the idea we form of their greater or sm aller independence by reference
to the social conditions in which they have developed” (Perelm an 1963,
p. 154; see Ray 1978).
Communicology is by definition the hum an reflection that separates the
process of hum an life from the events of nature. W e are engaged in and
by that reflection in an ongoing dialectic. The reflection is an ideology
that we perform by conventionality. In the end we cannot escape the
critical dem and for phenom enological justification: to com m unicate is to
be responsible, not merely responsive.
A p p en d ix
Maurice Merleau-Ponty:
A Biographical and Philosophical
Sketch
Jean-Jacques M aurice M erleau-Ponty (1908-1961), French philosopher

and psychologist identified with the existentialist m ovem ent, studied at
the Ecole N orm ale Supérieure in Paris, taking his agrégation in philos-
ophy in 1931. Subsequently, he taught in a num ber of lycées and at the
Ecole N orm ale Superiéure. H e was an army officer in W orld W ar II, after
which he held academ ic appointm ents successively at the University of
Lyons (professor of philosophy, 1945-49), the Sorbonne (C hair of Child
Psychology and Pedagogy at the Institute de Psychologie, 1949-52), and
at the Collège de France (after 1952) w here he held the C hair of Philos-
ophy. H e was co-editor, with Jean-Paul Sartre, of the journal Les Temps
Modernes, which they founded together with Simone de Beauvoir.
Occasionally overshadowed by the public visibility of Sartre, M erleau-
Ponty had a distinguished academ ic career and a popular following in the
intellectual life of Paris. H e was a professional philosopher whose teach-
ing and research focused on phenom enology and psychology. Y et he was
a m an of letters venturing to discuss politics and the arts in contributions
to such publications as L e M onde and L ’Express. His academic and
popular exploration of existential and sem iotic them es in phenom enol-
ogy, a particular exam ple of which is his essay “ L ’oeil et l’espirit”
(1964a), displays an intellectual discipline and elegance that often surpass
Sartre.
M erleau-Ponty’s concern with semiotics is initially present in his first
m ajor work, in 1942, La structure de com portem ent (1963b), which is
261
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Index
A B
abduction, 22, 158, 205 B arthes, R oland, 227

absence, 8, 201 Bateson, G regory, 17
abstractions, 185 Beanfest, 254n
acta, 5 Beauvoir, Simone de, 7, 261
actor, 212 because-m otive, 218
action, com municative, 27, 89, 93; Bedeutung, 170
instrum ental, 27, 89; pure, 76; beholder, 212
purposive-rational, 89 Being, 237; and Not-Being, 240
acts, locutionary, 36; illocutionary, being-in-the-world, 72
35-6; perlocutionary, 36; bind, double, 17
propositional, 36 Black P anter Party, 136
addressee, 35 body-image, 149
adduction, see abduction both/and, 123, 131, 177, 186, 237
affect, 69 bracketing, 24
adherence, 248 breaks, 129
ambiguity, 3, 4, 64, 70, 91, 109 B rentano, Franz, 169
am bivalence, 69 Brown B erets, 136
analogue, 17; binary, 176, 237 B uber, M artin, 182
analysis, conceptual, 19;
phenom enological, 257 C
analyst, 212
Anglo, 137 calculus, 22
answer, 14 capability, 120
anthropology, 157 capta, 5, 91, 149, 177, 179, 217
appresentation, 205 Carm ichael, Stokely, 137
approach, qualitative, 79 centrifugal, centripetal and, 58
archaeology, 217 channel, 166
A rgentina, 77 chiasme, 52, 197
A ristotle, 207 Chícanos, 135
articulation, 161 choice, 95; as com m unication, 143; of
artifacts, 171 context, 26, 73, 122, 131, 225,
ascription, 149 234, 237; of not choosing, 143
association, 69; academic, 259; free, cipher, 119, 127
51, 192 civility, 104
A ttica, A uburn and, 103—4 code, 59, 186; skin, 137
audience, 212; special, 257 codes, theory of, 33, 162-3
auditor, 212 cogito, 49; new , 45; radical, 32, 71,
autism, 69 174, 262
axiology, 18, 83, 159 coherence, 21, 185
axiom, 19 collection, 235
281
282 INDEX
collectivity, 142 culture, 162, 165-6

com m entary, 258 curvilinear, 190
com m entator, 212 cybernetics, 13
com merce, 165
com m itm ent, 76, 111 D
Com m une, Paris, 75
com m unication, 26, 122, 225; data, 5, 91
definition of, 176; distorted, 88; Dasein, 121
elem ents, 53; hum an, 166, 204, deduction, 22, 158
211, 246; interpersonal, 28, 191; defense, 135
mass, 252; norm al, 38, 84; degree, difference of, 140
philosophy of, 260; principles, delirium, 244
207-11; radical, 78; science of, 185; dem ocratic, 81
speech, 211; theorem s of, 41, 54-5, D em ocratic Party, 141
178; theory, 185, 204 description, phenom enological, 9, 61,
communicologist, 59 126, 129, 152, 173, 231, 243, 254;
communicology, 41, 119, 157, 166, propositional, 121
222, 245, 260 deictic, 39
com poser, 212 denotation, 34
conative, 147 deviance, 165
condition, necessary and sufficient, diachronic, 69
20, 254 dialogical, 94
conference, 249 digit, 17
conformity, 254 director, 212
congress, 251 discipline, 260; conforming to group,
connotation, 34 255
com petence, com municative, 84, 93; discontinuity, 25, 197
linguistic, 93, 198 discourse, 147, 223; hum an, 245;
consociates, 119, 216 indirect, 39; universe of, 162
consonants, 119, 123, 127 dispositions, 163
consciousness, 174; object of, 4, 23; distortion, 50
of structure, 48 distribution, 82
constatives, 36 division, 235, 238-9
controversy, 235 docufiction, 105
construct, 6, 49 dom ination, 73
consummerism, 88, 256 dream , 73, 84
contem poraries, 119, 216 durée, 109
content, 34 dyads, 172
context, 186; of choice, 26, 122, 131, D -Y ard, 115
225, 236; of discovery, 158
convention, 23, 248 E
conventionalism , 253
corps propre, 31, 245 écart, 197
correspondence, 21 Eco, U m berto, 33, 227, 243
Council of U rban Affairs, 141 economics, 99
coupling, 205 ecosystem, 11, 184
creator, 212 egocentric, 141
crisis, urban, 134 ego-identity, 84
critic, 212 eidetic, 133, 165
criticism, 258 eidos, 170
critique, 159 eingelöst, 83
INDEX 283
Eisenhower, Dwight D ., 208 Foucault, M ichel, 41, 60, 153, 214,

either/or, 131, 177, 186, 235 244, 248
eristic, 242 France, Collège de, 3
ek-stase, 57, 60 Frankfurt Institute for Social
elite, 137 R esearch, 76
elitism, 140 Freud, Sigmund, 83
em blem , 106 function, 185; H jelm slev’s, 147, 257;
em otive, 147 poetic, 59
empirical, 133, 165 functive, 257
empiricism, radical, 5
encounter, 72, 171, 217 G
enemy, 141
gaze, 15
English, 126
environm ent, 11
Geisteswissenschaft, 6, 28, 92, 99, 166
Gemeinschaft, 116, 162, 187
epidictic, 4n
genealogy, 217
epistemology, 18
G enoa, 104
epoché, 10, 29, 160
essence, 131
Gesellschaft, 162, 187
E stablishm ent, 135
gestalt, 47, 53, 157, 200; radical, 32
ethics, 3; communicative, 37, 97, 104
geste, 120, 174
gesture, 15
être-au-monde, 31, 67, 107
gram m ar, formal or speculative, 173
event, 120
grass-roots, 77
exclusion, 248
executant, 212
exem plar, 6, 79, 223 H
existential, 31
Existenz, 66 habitus, 163, 167
experience, 34, 118, 123, 174 hallucination, 67
experiential, 133 hands, 175
explanation, 5, 19 H arlem Prep, 141
explication, 92 H egel, 169
exploration, 19 herm eneutic, 10, 118, 121
expression, 34, 242; intentional, 40; H eidegger, M artin, 5, 13, 223
pathological, 67; preconscious, Hillbillies, 135
51, 242; prim ordial, 53 histoire, 62, 65, 75, 144
extending, 131 H ISTO M A T, 79
extension, 18 historicality, 214
eyewitness, 212 historicity, 216
history, 61, 63; oral, 146
F H itler, A dolf, 144
H jelm slev, Louis, 41, 112, 127, 164,
facts, empirical and theoretical, 19 176, 184, 203, 224, 227, 257
faculty, 127 hom eogenesis and hom eostasis, 188-9
faith, 116 horizon, 169
Federal W riters P roject, 144 horizontal, 25
firstness, 173 hostages, 112
flesh, 32, 174 H U D , 139
flux, 73 H usserl, E dm und, 5, 41, 119, 122,
focus, 148 126, 159, 169, 179, 203, 243n
force, 36, 139; first and second, 77-8 hypostatization, 5
form, 29, 189; verbal, 231 hypothesis, 5, 158
284 INDEX
I Jaspers, K arl, 5
jeopardy, 111
“ I can” , 120 journalism , new, 105
icon, 172 j u d g e ,110
idea, 104 just, 139
ideology, 34, 77, 225, 246
illocutions, 36 K
illusion, 64
im itation, 235 kind, difference of, 140
imm anence, 47 kinship, 165
immediacy, claim for, 69, 217 knowledge, 231
inclusion, 97 Kom m unikationsgemeinschaft, 40,
index, 172 87-8, 99, 104, 116; communicative
indication, 170 com m unity, 247
individuals, 142 Kristeva, Julia, 228
induction, 22, 158 Kundgabe, 170
industry, consciousness, 82
inform ation, 26, 86, 122, 225; theory L
of, 185
inform ants, 149 labor, 96
in-group, 135 Lacan, Jacques, 182
Ingarden, R om an, 170 langage, 11, 33, 162, 186; ordinary,
inhabiting, 65 35
in-order-to motive, 218 langue, 13, 32, 33, 59, 73, 89, 149,
irony, 210 153, 162, 174, 186, 228
in-sanity, 65 language, 224, 240
Institute, Max Planck, 77 Latin A m ericans’ Defense
institutional, 36 O rganization, 136
intentionality, 22, 23, 29, 41, 49, 170 law, 131; and order, 136
intension, 186 Lebenswelt, 8, 31, 51, 111, 162, 187
interaction, 80; group, 142; symbolic, L'E xpress, 261
152, 258 legitim ation, 23, 27, 257
interchange, creative, 182 lekton , 16
interests, 83 Le M onde, 261
International Com munication letters, 127
Association (IC A ), 248, 251 level, crisis, 135
International Sociological Association Levinas, Em m anuel, 182
(ISA ), 152 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 234
interpersonal, 42 life-event, 147
interpretation, phenom enological, 9, linear, 190
32, 126, 129, 152, 174, 243, 256 linguistics, 197
intersubjectivity, 30, 85, 217 listener, 212
intervention, 73 locus, 148, 165
interview, 144, 180-1 logic, 18; binary analogue, 60; digital,
invention, 69, 96 60; economy of, 162; form al, 173;
rhetorical, 22; symbolic, 22; tropic,
J 207
logos, 16, 74, 236; of logos, 175, 214,
Jakobson, Rom an, 58, 118, 122, 160, 227, 235
203, 245 London, 78
Jam es, William, 5 Louvain, 77
INDEX 285
Μ mythology, 71
maieutic, 223, 236, 245 N

majority, silent, 138
nam e, 231; no, 234
Malcolm X, 135
narrative, 144
manifestation, 170
National G eographic Society, 108
m anipulation, 80
M annheim , K arl, 246 N ational Public R adio (N PR ), 146
Marxist, 76
Naturwissenschaft, 6, 28, 92
N ecker cube, 179
matrix, 201
neo-M arxian, 80
May M ovem ent, 75
negotiator, 108
mayhem, 103, 112
neighborhood, 136
materialism , 82, 87
M cCarthy, Senator Joseph, 144 news, 104, 107
New School for Social Research, 203
meaning, 125, 131, 170, 242;
condem ned to, 110
noesis, 170
noise, 188
media, 121, 166; mass, 81
medium, 209 norm , 42, 90
norm ality, 110
meeting, 248
memory, 75 novels, 107
m entioning, 35
M erleau-Ponty, M aurice, 31, 41, 173,
O
261 obedience, 165
message, 35, 59, 119, 124, 186 obesity, 149
m etacom m unicative, 15, 247 object, 161; intentional, 119, 199
m etaphor, 188-9, 208 objective, 79
m etajournalism , 106 observation, 88
metalinguistic, 147 offensive, 138
metaphysics, 18 O ne, 237
m etatheory, 6, 184 ontogenetic, 185
m ethod, 118 O peration Cresent, 136
methodology, 6, 21, 179, 205, 253 oral, 149
metonymy, 188-9 orator, 212
Mickunas, Algis, 183 order, of experience and analysis, 179
M inutem en, 139 orthography, 221
Mississippi Freedom Party, 141 ostension, 96
model, 18, 223; logic, 84 other, 212; same and, 240
m oderator, 212 out-group, 135
m onads, 172 outsider, 138
m onochronic, 187
monological, 94 P
m orality, 95
morbidity, 68 pairing, 205
m orphem e, 200 paradigm , 6, 223
morphogenesis and m orphostasis, paradigm atic, 25, 161, 198, 217
188-9 paradox, 223
movem ent, rest and, 240 parole, 33, 59, 73, 149, 162-3, 186,
multifinality, 191 262; parlante, 62, 89, 163, 174;
m ultilinear, 190 parlée, 62, 163, 174
Muslim, 135 participation, law of, 209
myth, 70, 72, 230, 241 pathology, 69
286 INDEX
Peirce, Charles Sanders, 5, 33, 119, production, 80

123, 158, 172, 181, 202, 207 prom ise, 23
perception, 242; primacy of, 45 proposition, 5, 13, 152-3
perceptum, 243 protection, 135
perform ance, 84, 91, 166, 247; protocol, 125, 127, 149-51
linguistic, 198; perform ing, 252 prototype, 6, 223
perform atives, 36 proximity, 69
perform er, 212 psychoanalysis, 83
person, 71, 164, 166, 216 psychologism, 74; against
perspective, 201 introspective, 168
persuasion, 88 psychology, 166; experim ental, 77
phanerscopy, 172 public, 87
phatic, 147 publicality, 81
phenom enalist, 73 punctuation, 25
phenom enologist, semiotic, 60 PUSH, O peration, 113
phenom enology, 168; descriptive, 29;
existential, 29, 245; semiotic, 5, 9, Q
167, 224
Q .E .D ., Q .E .F ., Q .E .I, and, 5, 6, 16
philosophy, 18, 63; clinical, 65 Q uaker, 139
phylogentic, 185
qualities, 185
phrase, 200; revelatory, 147 quality, 133; particular, 231
Piaget, Jean, 160
quantifiable, 133
pieces, 133 questionnaire, 149
Plato, 201, 223
player, 212 R
poetic, 147
poetry, 109 ratio, 4
police, 112 reach, 207
poly chronic, 187 reader, 212
post-m odern, 87 reality, essential, 231
postulate, of adequacy, 209; of Red, B etter D ead Than, 139
coherence of experience, 214; of rectilinear, 190
compatibility, 211; of logical reduction, 169; descriptive, 169;
consistency, 210; of eidetic, 30; phenom enological, 9,
meaning-adequacy, 214 29, 126, 129, 152, 169, 173, 243,
power, 111, 134 255; philosophical, 29; scientific, 29
practice, universe of, 162 relations, 88, 185, 199
pragmatics, 12 rebellion, 103
praxis, 175, 193 reference, 149
preconscious, 174, 242 reflection, 173, 242, 260
predecessors, 119, 216 reflexive, 161
predicate, categorical, 133 regard, 131
predication, 149 relatives, logic of, 172
preflection, 173, 244 religion, 63
presence, 8, 45, 47, 201 reminiscence, 75
presentation, 162 replica, 96
practice, narrative as, 153 reportage, 105
primitives, 64 representation, 64, 66, 162, 244
problem atic, 158 research, 118; application, 20; C enter
process, 129, 153; pragm atic, 35 for Social, 77; cross-cultural, 211;
producer, 212 then-theory, 19
INDEX 287
respondents, 126 separation, 199

rest, m ovem ent and, 240 sign, 9, 161; m eaningful, m ere, and
retroflective, 131 verbal, 171
reversibility, 14, 24, 41, 121, 180, signs, 45, 172, 174
197, 199, 228 sign-production, theory of, 162
rhetoric, 3, 11, 15, 34, 173, 225 sign-vehicle, 34
riot, 103 signification, 50
ritual, 69; see convention signified, 9, 33, 50, 105, 176, 243n
Rockefeller, Nelson, 116 signifier, 9, 50, 105, 176, 243n
Roosevelt, Franklin D ., 144 silence, 143
rules, 92; constitutive, 26, 248; simile, 208
regulative, 26, 248; technical, 27, 90 Sinngebung, 55, 60, 219
rupture, 25, 185, 197; see écart and situation, 61
separation small-group, 209
Russell, B ertrand, 135 society, 188; learned, 259; mosiac of,
152
S sociofugal and sociopetal, 58
sociology, 157; interpretive, 203, 222
same, other and, 240 Socrates, 63
sanity, 63, 73 Sophist, the dialogue, 175, 223
Santa Fe, 103 Southern Illinois University, 126
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 5, 261 space, 65, 68; spatialized and
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 13, 33, 161, spatializing, 71
207, 262 spaces, 127
scheme, coordinating, 219; speaking, 191, 250; speech, 13
contextual, 211; expressive, 171; speech, 52; act, 13; im prom ptu, 51;
interpretive, 172; m eta-, 219; speaking, 13, 52, 163; spoken, 52;
referential, 209 pure, 76
schizophrenia, 67 statem ent, 5, 13
Schutz, A lfred, 41, 119, 152, 171, 203 stars, 127
science, hum an, 6, 42, 119, 145, 157, Stephanus num bers, 226n
159, 222, 253, 260; norm al, 19; strike, student, 76
rigorous, 5, 64 structure, 68, 157; double, 257;
SDS, 138 personality, 90
secondness, 173 structuralism , 157; phenom enological,
Selbstbestsinn ung, 76 166
self, 212 students, 76, 127
self-other-world, 106 style, 57, 62; third person, 108
self-regulation, 160 subject, 161
self-understanding, 117 subjectivity, 30, 70
semantics, 11 submit, 135
semiology, 19, 33, 157, 177; successors, 119, 216
herm eneutic, 166-7 symbol, 172
semeion, 207 symbola, 207
Semiotext(e) , 167 symposium, 249
Semiotik, 170 symptomatology, 67
Semiótica, 167 synchronic, 69
semiotics, 94; phenom enological, 166, syncretic, 111
261-2 synecdoche, 210
sender, 35 synectics, 181
sentence, 13, 35, 200 synergism, 61, 185
© REFERENCE CITATION FORM ©
Richard L. Lanigan,
PHENOMENOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION:
Merleau-Ponty’s Thematics in Communicology and
Semiology.
Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1988.
 
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288 INDEX
syntagmatic, 25, 161, 198, 217 urban, 134

syntax, 12, 126 U rban League, 141
system, 40, 96, 127, 164, 224; real, 34 U S, 136-7
system-code, 164 utterance, 13, 35, 199
systematic, 5, 185
systemic, 5, 185 V
T validity, 87
value, 165
talk, 13 value-free, 79
teacher, 212 variation, imaginative free, 10, 197
techniques, 166 versim ilitude, 5
tensions, 134 Verstand, 5
T error, Reign of, 75 Verständigung, 83, 107, 252
text, 65, 120, 242 Verstehen, 5
T heaetetus, 240; the dialogue, 226 vertical, 25
theater, 105, 109, 244 V ietnam , 75
T H E M , 137 violence, 103, 134
them atic, 158 vocative, 39
them e, 4 voice, see parole parlante and speech
theorem , 19, 41, 54, 178-9 speaking
theory, com m unication, 185, 204; voices, 67; from the Thirties, 146
critical, 79; inform ation, 185; vowels, 119, 123, 127
perform ative, 21; pragm atic, 21;
then-research, 19; G erm an critical, W
19, 37
therapist, social, 116 Weltanschauung, 5, 51, 111, 162, 187
thirdness, 173 w e-relation, 217
thou-orientation, 217 W hole, 237
token, 123, 202 wholeness, 160
tolerance, 61 wholes, parts and, 118
tone, 123, 202 w ork, 80
to rture, 112 W orks Progress A dm inistration
totem , 71 (W PA ), 144
transaction, 41 w riter, 212
transcendent, 53 writing, 191, 234, 250
transform ation, 145, 160
triads, 172 X
truth, 109, 121 xenophobia, see conformity,
type, 123, 202 consummerism, and discipline
typicality, 24, 211; law of, 205, 222
Y
U
youth, see May M ovem ent
unconscious, 244
understanding, 83, 172, 182 Z
unity, 133
universal, 95 Zeitgeist, 8, 162
universals, pragm atic, 40 zoosemiotic, 13

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PA R T ONE: PH ILO SO PH Y O F C O M M U N IC A TIO N 1

1. The Phenom enology of H um an Com m unication 3

[S e c t io n Tw o :Em p ir ic a l Resea r c h ] 101

7. M etajournalism : M erleau-Ponty on Signs, Em blem s, and

9. U rban Crisis: The Phenom enology of Social Polarization

11. Structuralism and the H um an Science C ontext of

15. The Semiotic Phenom enology of Speech and Linguistic

Professor E m eritus o f Philosophy

And, his teacher,

Professor and D irector o f G rad u ate Studies in Speech C om m unication

And, his teacher,

Professor E m eritus and D irecto r o f the School of Speech

1. D em ographics for Test G roups 127

1. M etatheory and M ethodology in H um an Com m unication 6

21. Semiotic E ntailm ents of Com m unication Theory 132

President Dr. A lbert Somit, D r. John G uyon, Acting President and

The following chapters are reprinted (with m odifications and additions)

is from a paper presented in various stages of developm ent at the

Studies, directed by Thom as A. Sebeok (Indiana U niversity), and, with

The Collège de France is a popular, yet respected, French institution.

The philosopher is m arked by the distinguishing trait th at he possesses

In short, the speech com m unication discipline has in “ rhetoric” a

I propose to accomplish a phenom enological analysis of the conscious

I. M ETATHEORY II. M ETHODOLOGY

'o f the H um an Sciences:

Figure 1. Metatheory and methodology in human communication

In general, the hum an sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) study capta

Phenom enological D escription

1. D E SC R IPT IO N (entails): 1. DESCRIPTION: (Thematizing the)

Phenom enological Reduction

2. R E D U C T IO N (entails): 5. R ED U C TIO N : (Abstracting the)

Phenom enological Interpretation

Figure 2. Theory and methodology o f semiotic phenom enology

warned that rhetorical ethics (propositions) cannot be equated with or

formal multiplicity can be avoided by intentionally m aking the descrip-

tion. Semiology is the study of sign systems or codes, so a herm eneutic

A phenom enological definition of com m unication necessarily requires

meaning in language where language is a function of structure (syntax)

We began this essay by noting that the phenomenological method is syner-

experiences. A person com m unicates and generates a lived-world. Such a

By way of drawing to a conclusion, I should like to take up a small portion

In contrast, an ethical rhetoric starts with an assumed value— that is,

Theoretical Models in the Philosophy

H um an science is not an invention. Like its counterpart physical science,

Theory construction in any one discipline is usually so integrated with

are drawn from necessary facts to articulate the paradigm as a

the m ajor divisions of philosophy. E ach division of the study of philo-

Philosophy as a discipline is usually categorized into four main subareas

symbolic logic. Rhetorical logic subdivides into deduction (rule + case =

C O M M U N IC A T IO N T H E O R Y C O N STRU CTS IN PH ILO SO PH Y

All the philosophic models of com m unication share a systematic concern

philosophic models represents a selective description and interpretation

As with all the constructs I shall be discussing, there is both a usual

A consistently problem atic variable in com m unication theory is coding,

Rules that define the transactional boundaries of speech com m unication