STATCON

In addition to your assigned readings, please read the following cases for our 29 June 2013
meeting.

1. Araneta vs. Dinglasan [G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949]

2. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]

3. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, [G.R. No. 196271, 18 October 2011. ]

4. Arroyo vs. De Venecia [G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997]

5. U.S. vs. Pons [G.R. No. 11530, August 12, 1916]

6. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963]

7. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993]

8. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]

9. Alvarez vs. Guingona [G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996]

10. Garcia vs. Mata [G.R. No. L-33713, July 30, 1975]

11. Philconsa vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965]

12. Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board [G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987]

13. Tan vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994]

14. Tobias vs. Abalos [G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994]

15. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005]

16. Gonzales vs. Macaraig [G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990]

17. Bengzon vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992]

18. Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

19. Pelaez v. Auditor General, [G.R. No. 23825, December 25, 1965]

20. Grego v. COMELEC [274 SCRA 481, 1997]

21. First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA [237 SCRA 519, 1994]

22. Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil., 139 (1936)]

23. Tatad v. Secretary of Energy [281 SCRA 330, 1997]

24. Tañada v. Tuvera [G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]

Antonio Araneta vs Judge Rafael Dinglasan
on November 10, 2011

Political Law – First Emergency Powers Cases

Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots
for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to
prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was
issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this
one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which
controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit.  L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to
prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by
Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is
otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT
OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the
Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
hence all EOs passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on
May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special
session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
“consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts
were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of
the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war
continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the
EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
on July 19, 2011

Supremacy of the Constitution – Filipino First Policy – National Patrimony – Qualified Filipinos
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the
Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad.
MPH’s bid was at P41.58/per share while RB’s bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest
bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so.
Pending declaration, MPH matches RB’s bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined
under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS refused to accept. In turn
MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.

RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:

1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is
merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed
as the legit buyer of shares.
HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in
light of the Filipino First Policy.
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains
to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in
arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and
other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for more
than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but
to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term “qualified Filipinos”
simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable
contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly
does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would
be counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the
former.”

**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines

I.      THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November
26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday
of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August
8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.  But on June 30, 2011, RA No.
10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II.   THE ISSUES:

1.    Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2.    Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3.    Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?  

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.

10153 in toto.]

1.    YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.

2.    NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-

days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when
the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the
following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with
the three separate readings requirement. 

3.    YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM
to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to
expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize
the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013
synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1.    1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of

the incumbent ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.  This
provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year
term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
                                                                      
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress,
the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new
term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would
effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term
and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of
appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis
for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that  the
rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative
intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to
make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
3.2.    2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its
own, has no authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be
held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and
local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or
officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or
fill in the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011
elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections.  By so doing, Congress itself has made a
policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as
an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by
ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC.  This Court, particularly, cannot
make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating.  To
be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests
on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to
supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the
exercise of its legislative powers. 

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3)
years that the Constitution itself commands.  This is what will happen – a term of less than two
years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 
  
3.3.    3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim
is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and
the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization
period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can
make.  This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. 

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political
units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed
law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. 

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged  constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a
law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions.  RA No. 10153,
however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance.  What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.”  This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054.  RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail.  And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written
and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely
and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires. 
United States vs Juan Pons
on January 4, 2012

Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals

Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez
arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were
delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand,
the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not
delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted
an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium.
Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for
illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines.
Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine
Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law
was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was
adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act
2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused
to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the
Court  and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they
are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of
the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against
the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
 
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of theNational Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, chargedthat there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments.
A  bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the H
ouse andSenate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to
the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after aroll call, the Chair declared the presence of a
quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano mov
ed for theapproval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to themotion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same
time the Chair was sayingthis, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?”
The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courtsordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure toconform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.

Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body, thequestion presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case  where private rights are involved

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the
Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House

with which the Courtshould not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence
of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjournfor lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. Thequestion of quorum cannot
be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for thepurpose of
delaying the business of the House.
CASCO Philippines vs Gimenez
on January 9, 2012

Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill               

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues
used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and
formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95,
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the
circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications
for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco
paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and
formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant
to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the bank’s auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he
maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides:
“The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof
shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and
for the exclusive use of end-users.”

The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBP’s auditor. Casco maintains that the
term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde” He further contends that  the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde”.
HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in
water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use
in the manufacture of plywood. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is
patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde” The opinions of any member
of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the
enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which
uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial de
Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary Pete Prado et al
on November 6, 2010

“Equal Protection” – Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from
January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00, of this
amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service
of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the
Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to
P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of
P60,991,431.00. The postmaster’s conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of
mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado
implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law complaining
that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the
sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the
franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as
the executive, former executives and their widows among others.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs
the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high
expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in
contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut
expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing
the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at
once from all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues
from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where,
for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the
morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

on November 10, 2011

Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by Substitution

Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the
Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in
the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1 st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB
11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill
remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”.
Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that
the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where
Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing
that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

 
Garcia vs. Mata
Facts: 

Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an
action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and
readjust his rank and pay emoluments. 

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the
reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service. 

On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no
relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600
was an appropriation law for 1956-57). 

Issue: 

Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill? 

Held: 

The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the
relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of
government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active
duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. 

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION

MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general
appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. 

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be
expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not
embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void,
inoperative and without effect. 

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him. 

Alvarez vs Guingona
on June 23, 2011

Municipal Corporation – LGU Requirement – Income – Inclusion of IRAs

In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR.

In May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was
introduced in the Senate.

In January 1994, the HB  8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate
conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same
with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).

Now Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill
creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that the Santiago was not able to
comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the
computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97 included the IRA which should
not be.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income.

HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further,
the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1 st, 2nd and
3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1 st hearing on the said SB one month
after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual income as
was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross
accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue
to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. 
They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source
of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the
same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its
own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special
funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the national
government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

 
BENGZON VS DRILON

Veto Power of the President

FACTS: 
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower
Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court
providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for
the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
HELD: 
The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item.
NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed
Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e.,
disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto
of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the
bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto
messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new
laws are in force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the
President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill.
The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
3 ways how a bill becomes a law.
1.When the President signs it
2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of
each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been
presented to him.
Philippine Constitution Association vs Gimenez

on January 2, 2012

Political Law – Salaries of the Members of Congress – Other Emolument 

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as
the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on
retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of
the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because
it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives
them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not
refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and
employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are
given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in
any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at
the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of
the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or pension benefits under
Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute “forbidden
compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The
law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and
sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the
gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their
salary.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.

HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads:

“The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling
expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of
Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.”

When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of
Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special
proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to
approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding
the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would
take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected
subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to
whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the
term “other emoluments.”
“Emolument” as “the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees
and perquisites.”

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a

part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such
increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.

 
Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill

Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the National
Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to
sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it
has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly
lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross
receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is
a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject.

HELD: 
The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough
to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title
express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied
if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the
title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.  An
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general object.”  The rule also is that the constitutional
requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede
the power of legislation.  It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. In the
case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor
foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory
and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to
include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled
distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the
motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD, which is the creation of
the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and
reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title
or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.
Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig
on November 12, 2011

Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section
55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section
16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the
President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and
Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the
item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that
would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of
augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law
and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the
exercise of that power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: 
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions
inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of
his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that
“provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16
(FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate
provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
Philippine Constitution Association vs Enriquez
on November 13, 2011

Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the Legislative Process

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president
involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994. This case also involves the power of
Congress as far as the “pork barrel’ fund is concerned. Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress
can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be
applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In another case, after the vetoing
by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to
override the veto. Instead, Senators Tañada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition,
petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items
in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.

HELD: 
In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power. In the Tañada
petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs
Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994
commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more
properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot
validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president
herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found
that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the
legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special
provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds
allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy”
– it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual
obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC
ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and 30% by
contract.  The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions,
conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to
which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is
then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment
deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts
must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate”
provisions.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds

According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered
by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in
the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the
veto per reasons provided by the president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation
benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special
Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to
P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the
president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing
laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc

In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction
prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation
unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said
offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on
compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President
violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the
COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by
petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message
merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only
be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the
disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may,
at worse, be treated as superfluities.

 
Pelaez vs Auditor General
on December 18, 2011

Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities – this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides that  the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal
district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein,
may divide any province into one or more subprovinces…The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a
taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He
said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides
that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by
Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the
voters in the areas affected” and the “recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated.” Pelaez argues, accordingly: “If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which
is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?” The Auditor General
countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing
barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main
import of Pelaez’ argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of
which consists of several barrios.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although   Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate   —
and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.  Indeed, without a
statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond
the scope of his authority.
In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not
administrative.
GREGO vs. COMELEC

Facts: 

On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, private
respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than
the Supreme Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. 

Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila
in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He won and assumed office. He was successfully re-
elected in 1992 and 1995. 

It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition on the ground that he is
disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under said section, those removed from
office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified to run for any elective local position. 

Issue: 

Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply retroactively to those removed
from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992? 

Held: 

The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section
40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reason for the Court to depart
therefrom. That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s
removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from
applying the law prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage.
First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA
FACTS:

1.    Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-
91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases
decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

2.   BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate
of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to
"ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision
while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal
therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with
CA.

4.   CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its
own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary
injunction.

5.    Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does
not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

6.    Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-
91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of
Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs
contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the
BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.

7.    While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P.
129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved
by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4)
years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as
the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be
filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
Jose Angara vs Electoral Commission
on December 6, 2011

Political Law – Separation of Powers

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for
the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua,
filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back
by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC can not be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES: 
 Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
 Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
election protest.

HELD: 
(a). The government established by the Constitution follows the theory of separation of powers
of the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b)           The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c)           That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d)           That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e)           That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.

(f)            That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g)           That under the organic law prevailing before the (1935) Constitution went into effect,
each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.

(h)           That the (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.

(i)            That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe
the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

(j)            That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the
power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k)           That section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not only section 18 of
the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of
the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No.
3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests
against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and
bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l)            That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member,
irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-
elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(m)          That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against
whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the
Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against
the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

 
Tatad vs Secretary of Energy
on November 12, 2011

Political Law – One Title One Subject Rule – Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has
always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that “any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source,
lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude
oil or use the same for his own requirement,” subject only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims that section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
8180 violates the one title one rule of Sec 26, Art 6 of the Constitution. Section 5 (b) provides:

“b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty
shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and
imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG,
the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on
January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the
same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.”

The inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article
VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in
its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is
foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 not because it violated the one title
one subject rule but rather because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated
that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. The
SC emphasized that the provision of Sec 5 (b) of RA 8180 does not violate the one title one
subject rule. The SC, as a policy, has adopted a liberal construction of the one title – one
subject rule.  The SC also emphasized that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all
contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The SC
held that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which
is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective
investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Facts: 

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first
complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss
it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year." 

Issue:

Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Held: 

The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine
the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in
Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of
powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of
powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But
it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to
include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. 

Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole
power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The
people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment
to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB
Effects of Constitutionality

FACTS:

 Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years
later.

 15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM.

 Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that
she obtained an injunction against the sheriff.

 PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of
EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted.

o E0 32 was issued in 1945 – providing for debt moratorium

o RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium

 The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise
nullified.

 Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts
by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice
Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates
the non-impairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution).

 PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during
this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has
not yet prescribed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action has been prescribed.

HELD:

NO.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a
source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in
force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case
declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in
operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being
nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness
that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the
power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of
its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to
such adjudication.
The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE).
The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached.

During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus,
the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.