War and Peace in South A Revisionist View of India and Pakistan

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War and peace in South

Asia: A revisionist view of
India-Pakistan relations
Subrata K. Mitra
Published online: 01 Jul 2010.
To cite this article: Subrata K. Mitra (2001) War and peace in South Asia: A
revisionist view of India-Pakistan relations, Contemporary South Asia, 10:3,
361-379, DOI: 10.1080/09584930120109568
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Contemporary South Asia (2001), 10(3), 361–379
War and peace in South Asia: a

revisionist view of India–Pakistan
relations1
SUBRATA K. MITRA
ABSTRACT Although India’s relations with all her neighbours have been marked by
occasional tension, it is her con ict with Pakistan that gives the speci c character to the state
of war and peace in South Asia. The two neighbours have fought in 1948, 1965, 1971 and
1999. Nuclear weapons and delivery systems that both India and Pakistan possess have
enhanced the danger of war in the region. The standard view of India–Pakistan relations
presents the two nation-states as natural adversaries whose antipathy towards one another is
the essential consequence of Hindu–Muslim con ict. The revisionist view presented here,
which draws on the construction of regional politics by the protagonists, questions the
structural-realist model that underpins the standard view. The article concludes that
democratisation and taking cognisance of the role of China would contribute to a comprehen-
sive explanatory model of war and peace in South Asia.
Since their inception as free-standing actors following the end of British colonial
rule, India and Pakistan have come to large scale armed confrontation s in 1948,
1965, 1971 and 1999. India alleges active and regular involvement of Pakistan
in a proxy war in Kashmir, although Pakistan indignantl y denies this. The image
of relentless hostility is reinforced by the torrent of military rhetoric and build-up
towards war and persistent recrimination in all possible international forums.
Tit-for-tat nuclear tests, a missile race, allegations of spying, the expulsion of
diplomats and the beating up of embassy staff contribute to the ‘standard view’
of India–Pakistan relations that describes them in terms of natural antipathy. This
view is supported by a formidable community of specialists consisting of
generals, diplomats, scholars of international relations, arms merchants and their
political mentors from South Asia as well as western states. The standard view
tracks the hostile relations down to the unresolved issue of Kashmir, the
un nished agenda of the Partition of British India on religious lines, and the
growth of Hindu and Islamic fundamentalism in South Asia. These are presumed
Correspondence : Professor Subrata K. Mitra, Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute University of
Heidelberg, Im Neuenheime r Feld 330, 69120 Heidelberg, Germany. E-mail: js3@ix.urz.uni-heidelberg.d e
ISSN 0958-493 5 print/ISSN 1469-364X online/01/030361-19 Ó 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/0958493012010956 8
SUBRATA K. MITRA
to originate from ‘a bellicose history, religious rivalry and a general sense of

antipathy towards each other’.2
The main objective of this essay is to question the dichotomous3 implications
of the standard view that casts India and Pakistan as natural adversaries. It
argues that the standard view is based on awed logic and inadequate evidence.
In contrast to the language of structural-realism with which the standard view
expresses itself, the revisionist view presented here argues in favour of an
actor-oriented, non-dichotomous perspective, which explains why neighbours
sometimes come to con ict but are also capable of co-operation. It questions
both the accuracy and completeness of the perception of the process of South
Asian politics by the structural-realists and their motives, which itself might be
a contributory factor to war in South Asia. It suggests a broader research agenda
that locates foreign policy options within the political process of South Asia, and
the perception of their options by the key actors. In terms of its methodology,
the revisionist view makes no case for a departure from methodologica l individ-
ualism, privileging of norms over interests, or the basic assumption that
countries necessarily pursue what they consider to be good for them. Nor does
it make a case for a nostalgic return to classical idealism of Jawaharlae Nehru
in his Panchasheela doctrine, nor his attempts to set up the Non-Alignment
Movement (NAM) as an alternative to super-power rivalry in the post-war
context. It criticises the structural-realism informed standard view on the ground
that the latter, instead of postulatin g the structure of India–Pakistan relations as
a part of the process of their interaction, treats it as if it were independent of it.
Furthermore, its vaunted realism is not robust enough to construct South Asian
politics in terms of its intricacies that are visible to its endogenous actors but not
necessarily to exogenous observers.
The toolkit on which the alternative view is based has been enriched by the
methodology of the constructivis t4 approach and the ‘normative turn’ in inter-
national relations.5 The former alerts us not to lose sight of the propensity of
actors to use all means at their disposal to pursue their interests and, as such, to
use the actors’ perspective as a heuristic device to look from inside out rather
than approach reality through the pre-conceived categories of the observer.6 The
normative turn in international relations postulates dialogue across cultural
divides as a precondition for peaceful accommodation of interests. Richard
Shapcott, who makes this argument, cites Hans-Georg Gadamer to illustrate the
power of conversation to devise a common language:
Every conversation presupposes a common language, or better, creates a common lan-
guage … reaching an understanding on the subject matter of a conversation necessarily
means that a common language must rst be worked out in the conversation … in a
successful conversation they (the partners) both come under the in uence of the truth of
the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community.7
Those with a taste for controversie s in international studies might detect the
ghost of a current debate between realists and contructivists hovering over the
discussion of South Asian events and personalities in this article.8 The essay
362
INDIA–PAKISTAN RELATIONS
makes a well grounded contribution to this debate through a comprehensive

analysis of the speci c issue of war and peace in South Asia. The method that
this article is based on draws on both paradigms. This middle position is adopted
deliberately. The article assumes that actors pursue their interests, which they
rank in terms of their preferences. The process of ranking requires considerable
knowledge of the political context, preferences of other actors, ability to predict
the moves of adversaries, tendency to take risks and, above all, their beliefs
about good and evil. People recognise their interests on the strength of their
ideas, and change their ideas in the light of their experience with regard to their
interests. Instead of reinventing the chicken-and-egg debate over the order of
precedence between ideas and interests, the essay recommends democratisation,
which provides ordinary people with the political and intellectual apparatus to
bring ideas and interests together.

The essay explains why an arms race goes on in South Asia. It analyses why
the assertion of the primacy of norms and laws over material interest in Nehru’s
classical idealism was not acceptable to India’s neighbours. The essay never-
theless comes back to the theme of accommodation and peaceful con ict
resolution—not through the denial of self-interest, but as a means towards its
maximisation through security, welfare and peace.
Finally, it is necessary to show the Orientalism inherent in the structural realist
perception of India and Pakistan, popular among western powers and specialists
who treat the two neighbour s rather like errant children whose nuclear enthusi-
asm needs to be restrained through sanctions. Instead, it considers both nation-
states as adults trying to get on in a dif cult and dangerous world as well as they
can, and draws on their perception and construction of reality as the building
block of a theory to account for their security dilemma. It examines the
intentions and perceptions of the two countries rather than concentrating on the
mere accoutrements of power. Fuller knowledge of the process might provide
new insights into con ict resolution and a theoretical basis for con dence
building measures in South Asia.
Indian public opinion and its implications for regional security: results of an
opinion survey9
At the level of popular perception, South Asia does not show signi cant
evidence of a primordial urge to ght religious adversaries. An analysis of Indian
public opinion, for example, shows a tendency to accommodate differences.
India’s domestic politics, about which we gain get some insight through data
from three survey questions discussed here, is an important source of the
momentum towards peace in South Asia. On the basis of the opinion of the
electorate as a whole but, more crucially, the sentiments expressed by key
opinion ‘leaders’ such as the highly educated, one can see a strong support for
the accommodation of the aspirations of people in Kashmir and of Pakistan.
Thanks to the vigorous and vibrant process of democratic articulation and
aggregation of these opinions, the Indian political process has shown a tendency
363
SUBRATA K. MITRA
Table 1. India should make more

efforts to develop friendly relations
with Pakistan. Do you agree or dis-
agree with this?
Agree 44.6%
Don’t know/no opinion 37.8%
Disagree 17.6%
for these views to trickle upwards and become an enduring in uence on
decision-makers, in spite of the change of government.
The rst of the three questions deals with relations with Pakistan, as presented
in Table 1. As we can see, more Indians (44.6%) favour a development of
friendly relations with Pakistan than those who oppose it (17.6%). Detailed
analysis shows interesting patterns. High support for friendly relations with
Pakistan show the effect of education (67.7% of those with college education
and above) and religion (57.7% of Muslims). But support for friendly relations
with Pakistan is a widely held sentiment; even among the illiterate, support for
(30.6%) is higher than oppositio n to this policy. The high level of support for
policies resembling those advocated by the Gujral doctrine among highly
educated Indians is most signi cant. Related with that question is the next
question, which covers the perception of the people on the Kashmir problem, the
most contentious issue between India and Pakistan (see Table 2). It is very
interesting to see that only a minority (11.1%) take a position in favour of
suppression of militancy in Kashmir, while a far greater number (33.5%) opt for
negotiations . Again, there is a connection between the level of education,
religion and the willingness to negotiate: 62.3% of college-educated and above,
and 45.4% of Muslims are for negotiation .
A more hawkish position, however, is taken regarding nuclear weapons: those
advocating that India needs nuclear weapons are more numerous than those who
argue to the contrary (see Table 3). The ‘peace-mongers’ are likely to be more
than average educated (29.5% of college-educated and above) and Muslims
(29.5%). As for the advocates of nuclear weapons, the college-educated come
Table 2. People’s opinions are divided on the issue of Kashmir

problem. Some people say that the government should suppress
the agitation by any means, while others say that this problem
should be resolved by negotiation. What would you say: should
the agitation be suppressed or resolved by negotiation?
Should be suppressed 11.1%

Resolved through negotiation 33.5%
Have not heard about the Kashmir problem at all 21.6%
Cannot say 31.9%
Other 1.9%
364
Table 3. There is no need for India to

make the atomic bomb. Do you agree
or disagree?
Agree 25.9%
Don’t know/no opinion 38.0%
Disagree 36.1%
across as strong supporters of the bomb (63.9%), signi cantly above the national
average of 36.1%.
Competing genealogies: the standard view and the revisionist challenge

The India–Pakistan con ict cannot be attributed to atavistic hatred between the
two populations. Pakistan was carved out of the British Empire to create a
homeland for Muslims.10 The rivalry between the Muslim League, which
championed the ‘two-nation theory’ that advocated the creation of a safe haven
for India’s Muslims, and the Indian National Congress, which opposed it, has
given easy credence to the hostility that marked the relation of India and Pakistan
after independence. Further reinforcement for this view comes from the fact that
Muslim-majority Kashmir, particularly the coveted Valley, is still under Indian
occupation. Pakistan views it as the un nished business of Partition. For the
advocates of the standard view, the series of severe border con icts leading to
war as well as serious outbreaks of mass insurgency, riots and communal violence
are indicative of the political expression of an emotional divide.
But there are the counter-factual that contest this view. A glaring example of
co-operation between India and Pakistan is the Indus Water Treaty of the 1950s,
which has survived all the wars. The state of Pakistan, locked against a more
powerful strategic adversary, has done what nation-states normally do, which is
to look for alliances both internationall y and within the region and prepare itself
for war at best as it could to protect its sovereignty. Pakistan’s motive, therefore,
is not unmitigated hostility to India, but an effort to protect its national interest.
There are other anomalies that challenge the standard view. The most recent of
these is the attempt by the Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
government of India to undertake an initiative in the form of the spectacular ‘bus
diplomacy’, which brought Prime Minister Vajpayee to Lahore to sign the Lahore
Accord for the peaceful resolution of con icts with Pakistan. The attempt
collapsed, giving a temporary victory to the standard view and its structural-
realist advocates when mujahiddin backed by Pakistan subsequentl y in ltrated
into Indian territory in Kargil, against which India retaliated with massive force.
The coup that then brought General Musharaf to power caused a rupture in
relations. More recently, a cautious and reciprocal scaling down of tension has
started between the two neighbours. When India announced a unilateral cease- re
in Kashmir, putatively in honour of Muharram but actually to test the water, some
militant groups went on a rampage of violence to provoke India into retraction.
365
SUBRATA K. MITRA
India held rm and the most recent reports from Pakistan suggest that Pakistan
might have started a cautious reciprocation.11 There is strong support for this line
in India. This can be seen from the fact that, in India’s fractious Parliament,
where members of the oppositio n rarely agree with the ruling Hindu Nationalist
BJP-led coalition, all political parties nevertheless extended their support to the
government. The of cial line holds that ‘the cease re in Kahmir should be
extended and that the government should start talks with political groups in the
state, including the [separatist] Hurriyat’.12
A formal model of the standard view of India–Pakistan relations

Once one accepts the basic assumption of the standard view of natural hostility
between India and Pakistan, the further explanation of war in South Asia easily
follows. ‘Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them’.13 Wars, border
incursions, training camps for mujahiddin, smuggling of drugs and guns across
the border occur in South Asia without let or hindrance because there are no
institutiona l mechanisms to prevent them.14 The policy implication that outside
observers of the South Asian scene draw from this is that India and Pakistan are
unable to police themselves and, as such, sanctions are the only way to prevent
war and an arms race in South Asia.
Since this view is widely shared, in order to examine its logical and empirical
construction we need to specify India Pakistan relations in terms of a two-person
non-co-operative game, where each player has the choice of two tactics:
1. Stockpile arms
2. Reduce arms.
Both players make their choices independentl y (i.e. without any prior knowledge
of what the other does). The ‘pay-off’ to the players simply re ects the
calculations with regard to the cost and bene ts of the tactic to the actor. We
thus obtain four possible scenarios, representing the combination of tactical
moves by India and Pakistan (see Table 4).
The rst situation is one where both sides make deep cuts of their arms
budget. This is an attractive option for both India and Pakistan for, if simulta-
neous arms reduction was possible, then there would be more funds available for
developmental activities.15 Assuming that countries prefer more cash in their
Table 4. Tactical choices of India and Pakistan
Indian Pakistani Pay-off to Pay-off to

Scenario tactics tactics India Pakistan
1 Reduce arms Reduce arms A A

2 Stockpile Reduce arms B D
3 Stockpile Stockpile C C
4 Reduce arms Stockpile D B
366
treasuries to less, one can deem this outcome to be the most preferred for both
players.
The next best scenario from the Indian point of view is situation 2, where
India continues to stockpile arms and thus foregoes the ‘peace dividend ’ while
Pakistan puts a stop to her arms procurement, thus making herself vulnerable to
a crippling blow from India. Pakistani memories of such an attack go back to the
Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 where the Indian Army in a matter
of 6 days successfully split Pakistan, causing Bangladesh to be born out of the
eastern ank of Pakistan. This is an outcome that Pakistan dreads. It can be
termed the least preferred outcome D for Pakistan and the second best preference
B for India.
The third best Indian scenario is situation 3 where India continues to build up
while Pakistan also continues on the same path of a regional arms race. Better
safe than sorry is the dominant logic of this mode, and it is represented by the
pay-off C.
The least preferred scenario from the Indian perspective is situation 4, where
the peace-party has prevailed over the war party among Indian policy-makers
and Pakistan takes advantage of this situation by a surprise attack. This
represents the Indian paranoia about a deadly blow to the thin neck of Indian soil
that connects Kashmir to the rest of India. The Indian view of this pay-off is D.
For Pakistan, it represents the second best pay-off, B.16 The preference ordering
that the four situations generate are thus, for both players, but for their own
reasons (so that there is no inter-personal comparison of utility), A . B . C . D.
The advocates of the standard view, in the tradition of structural-realism,
assume worst-case scenarios. Since India and Pakistan have control only over
their own tactics, they must calculate the worst that could happen in terms of
maximum loss. So, for India, keeping the status quo guarantees at least C, and
risk adverse strategists, given the choice between C and D, will opt to stockpile
arms (Table 5). The thinking on the Pakistani side would be similar. So, with
both players trying to play it safe (i.e., minimise maximum loss), they end up
with an arms race. From this follows the stern warning by the advocates of the
standard view to idealists: any attempt to be peace-like by reducing arms runs
the risk of being punished, for the other player is bound to take advantage of the
window of opportunity and strike the fatal blow. As such, both will be weary of
Table 5. Pay-off matrix for India and Pakistan in a two-person, non-co-operative game
Pakistani tactics
Minimum gain
Stockpile Reduce arms to India
Indian tactics Stockpile C, C B, D C

Reduce arms D, B A, A D
Minimum gain C D
to Pakistan
Key: The rst entry in each cell represents the ‘pay-off’ to the player on the left.
367
SUBRATA K. MITRA
one another and neither will move away from the status quo, leading to an arms
race.
The India–Pakistan arms race and the ‘lost’ peace dividend

The already presented logic is used by the advocates of the standard view to
explain the impressive arsenal of conventional weapons, in addition to the
recently acquired nuclear and missile capacity that India and Pakistan possess.17
With her relatively smaller economic base and population compared with India
(in terms of 1991 gures, 126.3 million for Pakistan compared with 913.6
million for India), the cost of the arms race has been relatively higher for
Pakistan (see Figure 1). This has led to an increase of 30% in terms of military
expenditure between 1987 and 1994 for Pakistan, whereas for India the corre-
sponding gure has been 4.2%. However, both are on the high side when we
compare them with the world as a whole which, during the corresponding
period, has seen military expenditure decline by 36.7% (the industrialise d
countries as a whole who have managed to reduce their military expenditure by
41.2%).18
The advocates of the standard view point to the military spending of India and
Pakistan as evidence of the validity of this model. However, the logic that
underpins this argument is contested by the ndings of Axelrod who, citing
the implicit co-operation between entrenched German soldiers and their
Anglo-French adversaries in the First World War, shows that in recursive,
non-co-operative games, rational players are likely to develop a system of
Figure 1. Military expenditure of India and Pakistan, 1987–1996. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1997,
online.
368
implicit co-operation. It may be logical for two players, facing each other in a
one-off, end-game situation, to prefer a conservative , armaments policy with no
chance of co-operation. In the context of a recursive game where the two players
exist in close proximity and possess shared knowledge of one another, a process
of reciprocal scaling down of armaments is likely to emerge.19 This is the
underlying logic of the process of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty
negotiation s that led to the end of the Cold War and ceteris paribus, the same
logic should apply to South Asia. Since neighbouring countries share a geo-
graphic proximity and temporal continuity , it would only be realistic to expect
India and Pakistan to understand the logic of reciprocal disarmament, unless, of
course, one assumes that no rational behaviour can be expected from these
non-western countries.
In South Asia, as possibly in other con ict-ridden regions of the world, the
path to armed con ict between neighbour s is often paved with good intentions
because, at the ontological level, people are driven by their concepts of good,
truth and beauty. True, the exigencies of diplomacy might sometimes oblige
honest men to lie for the good of their country and, in the cut and thrust of
international politics, politicians might not always say what they mean or mean
what they say; but the fact remains that actors pursue their interests as they see
them. Still the majority of neighbours, most of the time, do not come to armed
con ict. States, complex coalitions of interests and ideologies, are aware that as
neighbours they have to live cheek-by-jowl for an inde nite period, and do not
necessarily act out of antipathy or in bad faith towards one another. If they slide
in the direction of war, then one needs to look for the missing variables that
hinder communication and precipitate the con ict.
Process is crucial. In politics, as in life, people communicate through signals.
Normal life and institutiona l politics are possible when actors share the cate-
gories that underpin their communications. There is, of course, the possibilit y
that one might send the wrong signal or misread the right one. But that is why
families, just like political institutions , have recourse to impartial arbitrators.
Normal relations break down when the parties talk past one another because of
the ontologica l and epistemologica l hiatus that makes meaningful dialogue
impossible . Normal relations are not possible when the interaction between two
countries is constructed by the observers of the con ict as a dyadic relationship
whereas, unknown to the observer or unrecognised by him, the relationship
forms part of a triad. Nor does it help when the impartial arbitrator turns out to
be not so disinterested after all. The superior power of observers might cause
them to substitute , unwittingly , but in international politics more often than not
with deliberate design, their ontological categories for those of the actors. The
tragic consequence of this form of agenda-setting by the observer is that the
discourse of the actors, along with the potential meeting points of the divergent
perceptions, vanishes. Seen in this light, all wars, but most of all fratricidal
con icts, are a history of broken, stolen or missed dialogues.
The structural-realist view is, of course, precisely the kind of argument that
underpins the policy of economic and military sanctions that have been applied
369
SUBRATA K. MITRA
against India and Pakistan following their recent nuclear tests. The sanctions
have not been successful in stopping the arms race, as one can see from the
competitive announcements of new missile developments on both sides, and
reports of the efforts of Pakistan to acquire a sea-based nuclear weapons system.
The process that leads to the South Asian arms race is more complex than what
the standard view suggests. The perception of the two key players of South Asia,
and the extra-regional linkages and alliances that these have given rise to,
suggest more compelling factors than ‘natural antipathy ’ that gives rise to the
arms race.
The China factor

The role of China is the missing variable that puts South Asian and western
understandings at variance. While outside observers see war and peace in South
Asia basically as a function of the hostility between India and Pakistan, the two
neighbours, for their own reasons, see China as a key player whose presence
changes strategic calculations and makes reciprocal disarmament dif cult. India
perceives China as a threat to her security since the disastrous border con ict of
1962, the subsequent Chinese support to Indian Maoists, and the continued
occupation by China of territory India claims to be hers.20 The result is a
three-person game within which the two-person India–Pakistan game is embed-
ded. Even if India and Pakistan were to identify an acceptable ratio between
them that guarantees their minimum security, it would still not be possible for
them to maintain this equilibrium in the long run. To see this point, we need to
simulate the triadic version of India–Pakistan–China relations.
Suppose that, at the start of play, India and Pakistan work out a ratio of 3: 1,
which ful ls their need for minimum security. (This is favourable to Pakistan
because this is higher than the ratio of their population s but, being the smaller
power, Pakistan would expect insurance on the top of what she is entitled to in
terms of strict proportionality. ) However, since India perceives China as a threat,
at the next step of the game India would demand an additional unit of power,
k, to meet the Chinese threat. Since Pakistan cannot be sure that India would not
divert the k units in an end game against Pakistan, for her security needs
Pakistan would next want an additional increase of k/3. The fact that Pakistan
and China have good relations does not nevertheless amount to a treaty and, in
both the wars of 1965 and 1971, besides verbal support, China has not done
much in concrete terms to help Pakistan. Pakistan knows she has to count on
herself, and hence the demand from Pakistan in our simulation for additional
resources to meet the increased capability of India. At this point, India, to keep
the proportionality , would demand (k/3) 3 3 (i.e. an additiona l k) leading to a
total of 3 1 2k units (sequence 3), which will send Pakistan on another round of
arms procurement (see Table 6).
Those with memories of South Asian politics during the Cold War years
would perhaps recall that gaining Pakistan as an ally to balance the Indo-Soviet
alliance was a great Chinese coup, and one that has served China very well
370
Table 6. Simulation of the Likely Effect of the China factor on India–Pakistan Relations
Pakistan’s security needs India’s perceived security needs
Sequence 1 1 3
Sequence 2 1 3 1 k ( 1 k being an Indian security against China)
Sequence 3 1 1 k/3 (k/3 is the additional [(1 1 k/3) 3 3] 1 k 5 3 1 2k ( 1 k being an Indian security
security that Pakistan against China, to be added to k. As before, India needs three
demands as proportional times the Pakistani holdings to guarantee her sense of
increase, since India can relative security)
redeploy her forces)
Sequence 4 (3 1 2k)/3 5 1 1 2k/3 (3 1 2k) 1 k 5 3 1 3k (India seeks to match the Pakistani
additional capacity through a proportional increase, while
retaining the minimum security against China)
Sequence 5 (3 1 3k)/3 5 11 k [(1 1 k) 3 3] 1 k 5 3 1 4k
Sequence 6 … …
371
SUBRATA K. MITRA
since. The Chinese use their pivotal role wisely, not pushing either India or
Pakistan too far. China keeps her claims to territory in India’s northeast alive,
and restricts India’s room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis the Dalai Lama, the spiritual
leader of Tibet, who has been given sanctuary in India. Pakistan, dependent on
China for her role as a balancing factor against India, support on Kashmir and
supply of nuclear technology, refrains from exporting the more militant brand of
Islam to the Muslim minorities of China.
The evolution of India–Pakistan–China relations

A reinterpretaion of India–Pakistan relations, nested within a larger triad consist-
ing of China, provides new insights. The standard view of natural hostility
between India and Pakistan has gained currency over the past ve decades partly
by default, just as the idealism of Nehru, promoter of non-alignment, has lost
credibility because of India’s inconsisten t and opportunisti c use of the doctrine.
In 1962, when the Chinese forces marched onto India practically unopposed, the
idealistic defence of norms over interests embedded in the NAM went into a
terminal decline. Pakistani strategic thinking, never much enamoured of Nehru’s
idealistic vision of South Asia as a zone free of super-power rivalry but within
the conditions laid down by India, came up with its own answer in the 1965
India–Pakistan war, when it attempted to take Kashmir by force. Indian strategic
planning, which barely survived this shock, nally conceded to the power of the
structural-realist-inspired standard view in the 1971 India–Pakistan war, when
India intervened in East Pakistan.
Since some of these aforementioned events may not be known widely outside
the narrow circle of South Asian area specialists, the following section will
provide a brief resume of events by dividing the post-war period into four
periods:
1. Classic non-alignment of Nehru (1947–1962).
2. War, alliance with the USSR and attempts at regional dominance (1963–
1989).
3. Contained dominance based on negotiation (1989–1999).
4. The return to con ict and the limits of the ‘two-track’ strategy (1999–
present).
The rst phase started with the war over Kashmir (1947–1948) and ended with
the border war with China in 1962. During this period, under Nehur’s leadership,
India followed the policy of non-alignment as a method of securing its borders,
preventing the spread of super-power rivalry into South Asia, and keeping down
military expenditure. Unfortunately for Nehru (and India), the Kashmir drama
was unfolding just about the time that Nehru was seeking to nd a just and
honourable place for India in the world system.21
Nehru’s view on Kashmir was based on his rm conviction that, thanks to a
lawful and legitimate Instrument of Accession, the status of Kashmir, like the
other regions of India, was that of an integral part of the Union. This view was
372
not shared by Pakistan, which saw India’s occupation of part of Kashmir (the rest
was already under Pakistani occupation after the 1947–1948 war) as illegitimate.
The resulting con ict of interests, perceptions and principles would, in the years
to come, give an appearance of contradiction and opportunis m to Nehru’s
position. At various points, and to different actors, the Nehru ‘doctrine ’ would
appear inconsistent , indecisive and vulnerable to pressure. Nehru would, by turns,
be perceived both in India as well as abroad as a half-hearted bully and a naive
internationalist . Nehru clearly wanted the world to condemn Pakistan for trying
to undo the integration of Kashmir by brute force.22 When it became clear to
Nehru that the world did not accept India’s case as categorically as Nehru had
hoped, he became bitter and disillusioned .
The 1962 border con ict with China drove home the point that China was a
major reference point for India’s strategic planning. Despite reports of Chinese
incursions into Indian territory from 1959, Nehru was not willing to believe that
his vision of ‘Hindi–Chini bhai bhai’ (Indians and Chinese brothers) was not
shared by China and that a war, or at least an armed con ict, was imminent. It
has been argued that had Nehru been more realistic and less idealistic (or simply
less naive), this war probably could have been avoided.23 As a direct result of
this war, India went on an international shopping spree to acquire— nally—all
those sophisticate d weapons the Indian armed forces had been lobbying for years.
For Pakistan, the pace of India’s rearmament gave cause for alarm. As Sumit
Ganguly argues,24 the Pakistani Government saw a window of opportunit y for the
capture of the whole of Kashmir, created through the humiliation and the
weakness of the Indian armed forces, closing rapidly. In this very crucial moment.
Nehru died, causing a perception of vulnerabilit y on the part of India.
On the Pakistani side, the replacement of Nehru by Lal Bahadur Shastri as
Prime Minister, perceived as less assertive, reinforced the perception of Indian
vulnerability . On the Indian side, the military-strategic initiative passed into the
hands of a different group of decision-makers who saw in Kashmir not so much
the symbol of India’s commitments to democracy and secularism, but instead, as
territory, power, national self-interest and security. The new men in charge of
India’s security were different from those under Nehru. They were simultaneousl y
less doctrinaire and more pragmatic. While lowering the intensity of the political
rhetoric, they were willing and able to increase the stakes in military terms.
Shastri’s succession took place against a background of ominous developments
in the international arena. The famous threat of Pakistan Foreign Minister Zul kar
Ali Bhutto’s ‘thousand year war’ against India on the oor of the Security Council
found support in the statement of the British delegate Sir Patrick Dean. Shastri
suggested a package of policies that held out the possibilit y of a dialogue with
Pakistan. 25 On the basis of these policy statements of Shastri and the impression
gathered by Ayub Khan, the military ruler of Pakistan, after their rst meeting,
the strategists of Pakistan came to the conclusion that the ‘new Indian Prime
Minister was unlikely to loosen India’s links with Kashmir and that it was time
for Pakistan to take some overt action for “reviving” the Kashmir issue and
“defreezing the Kashmir situation”’.26
373
SUBRATA K. MITRA
Shastri’s handling of the situation was entirely in keeping with his character,
which marked a signi cant departure from Nehru. He quickly established a
personal rapport with the defence chiefs, on the one hand, and the leaders of the
Opposition in the Indian Parliament, on the other. In place of the combination
of Nehru’s personal aloofness and the conspiratorial style of Defence Minister
Krishna Menon (Nehru’s main link with the party and the country at the height
of the Indo-China con ict), Shastri’s method was to build up a strong national
consensus to meet the Pakistani challenge in Kashmir. As his biographer puts it,
‘On the political side, Shastri was in control of the situation and never allowed
it to get out of hand. He had shown rmness, self-con dence, self-restraint,
wisdom and exibility. He was in favour of peace, but not peace at any cost’.27
Shastri was able to take the initiative in political as well as military matters.
During the 1965 India–Pakistan war, he ordered the Indian Army to cross the
international frontier and to march in the direction of Lahore so as to relieve
pressure on the Chhamb sector in Kashmir, which was facing a massive
armoured attack. Shastri also sent the airforce into battle right at the outset of the
war, despite the risk of the superior Pakistani aircraft. As in the Rann of Kutch
where there was a pre-war trial of strength between the Indian and Pakistani
forces, Shastri showed exibility, trading land against security.
During the subsequent authoritarian rule of Indira Gandhi, India went on
vigorously using Kashmir to generate power internally, as well as entering into
an external alliance with the Soviet Union (in radical contrast to the tenor of
domestic politics in Nehru’s lifetime).28 India’s efforts were matched by Pakistan
through border provocation and war and diplomacy aimed at the international i-
sation of the Kashmir issue, particularly in the United Nations. The period
following the 1971 India–Pakistan war was a high point for India in terms of her
standing in internationa l politics: Pakistan was split in two; the Kashmir issue
was solved, at least militarily, in India’s favour; and the USSR had been won as
a powerful ally against the USA and China.29 It is not surprising, therefore, to
see a triumphant Indira Gandhi formulating a kind of ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for
India. Like its famous predecessor, the ‘Indira Doctrine’ tried, on the one hand,
to keep ‘foreign hands’ off South Asia, while on the other to persuade the
smaller states of South Asia that this was being done in their own interest. After
her assassination by her bodyguards in the wake of the much detested Operation
Bluestar, 30 her son, Rajiv Gandhi, became Prime Minister and carried on with
the same set of international aspirations. He too, however, became a victim of
his policies as he was assassinated in 1991 by Tamil extremists after he presided
over the ill-fated Indian peace-keeping effort in Sri Lanka.31 With him, the
‘Gandhi Dynasty’, as well as India’s attempts to dominate the region through a
coercive application of the Indira Doctrine, came to an end.
The successive Indian governments after the demise of the Gandhi Dynasty all
had one thing in common; the weakness of their domestic power base, which
necessitated complicated political manoeuvres to keep fragile ruling coalitions
together. The weakness of various coalition governments occurred at a time of
radical domestic changes. Communal riots of unparalleled violence swept
374
through several parts of India, highlighte d in December 1992 by the destruction

of the Babri mosque by a Hindu mob. The rise of Hindu nationalism , supported
by parties like the BJP, went hand in hand with an upsurge of terrorism in
Punjab, Kashmir and Assam. This forced Indian policy-makers to concentrate on
domestic politics, which led to an introspectiv e policy that tried to take
international events in its stride.
Ironically, the new Indian policy of accommodation extended to Pakistan was
the result of the internal weakness of the coalition governments from 1989
onwards. The political manoeuvres to keep coalitions intact led to a process of
accommodation between various interest groups. Getting used to the politics of
accommodation at home led to de-emphasising con ictual, dominance-based
behaviour towards Pakistan. The resumption of talks between the foreign
secretaries of India and Pakistan and the talks between Prime Ministers I.K.
Gujral of India and Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, respectively, in the Maldives
in May 1997 was illustrativ e of the beginning of this phase. This tendency,
despite a subsequent change of government in India, nally led to the Lahore
Declaration.
A second factor conducive to peace was the process of liberalisation and
globalisatio n of the Indian economy that started gathering momentum in 1992,
and a similar policy in Pakistan where the industrial and entrepreneurial class
formed the power base of Prime Minister Sharif. Both India and Pakistan
became more interested in furthering trade. Prime Minister L.K. Gujral, sworn
in April 1997, even went so far as to talk about unilateral and non-reciprocal
concessions from India to her neighbours. His ‘carrot without stick-approach’
came to be known as the ‘Gujral Doctrine’.32
A third factor conducive to the potential for a regional security arrangement
was a shift in the interests of the USA in the region. With the decline of the
Soviet Union, American interest shifted from propping up Afghanistan and
Pakistan against India and the Soviets, to trade with the region. Therefore, the
government in Washington was very keen to sponsor peace initiatives and to
encourage both India and Pakistan to follow up on their rst steps. While some
of these developments created a case for optimism with regard to peace in South
Asia, the interest of China to take over the space vacated by the USA continued
to be one major obstacle. The appearance of Chinese warships in the Indian
Ocean did not help to alleviate Indian fears. We do not yet have any reliable
information on the strategic thinking on the part of the Pakistani elite. On the
Indian side, predictably, great recrimination between advocates of negotiated
settlement of outstandin g con ict with Pakistan and those who could see violent
con ict with Pakistan as both natural and necessary continues in earnest.
Conclusion: democracy and the security in South Asia

Both in domestic and international politics, con ict resolution is critically
contingent on the perception of the actor being integrated with the model of
negotiation . But actor is not all. One must not lose sight of the fact that an
375
SUBRATA K. MITRA
exclusive concentration on the given set of actors is not always conducive to

peace. We have already seen how the 1965 and 1971 India–Pakistan wars were
the results of the misperception of the strategists on the Pakistani side, and how
the 1962 Indian debacle against China was the result of Nehru’s strong belief in
the power of ideas; in this case, that of non-alignment. Actors might get it
wrong, and intransigent actors might use a bit of mediation, to use the
aforementioned language of Gadamer, to ‘engage in conversation.’
One crucial question that has remained implicit so far but should be asked at
this stage is, who is an actor, and how might people whose interests are affected
by a given decision be elevated to the status of citizenship that entitles them to
be make choices in their own right? This is where the role of democracy, both
as a process of making citizens out of subjects (giving them the means with
which to articulate their interests), and democracy as an institutio n of elections

and party competition (that makes the results of the aggregation of popular
interests trickle upwards) becomes crucial in maintaining regional peace. It is
important to remember that the chances of peace in South Asia have been at their
highest when both India and Pakistan have had a measure of democracy.
Survey data shows that the power of democracy in India causes the process
of accommodation to nd its way from the electorate to governmental policy-
making. On the Pakistan side, however, there is a weary perception of the
enormous cost of the arms race and the awareness of the lost opportunit y of the
bene ts of trade and economic co-operation with India. But the uncertain power
equations between the civil and military authority in Pakistan and the institu-
tional weakness of democracy make it dif cult to develop a consensus behind
the peace initiative.
An inability to take the intricacies of South Asian politics on board, and the
conviction of ‘equal guilt ’, causes western analysts to be solicitous about being
even-handed between India and Pakistan in the matters of cutting off aid,
imposing sanctions, and extending invitation s to key positions in the inter-
national arena. This western attempt to be ‘fair’ is an anathema to Indian
policy-makers, who are more prone to speak about India–China rivalry and are
at a loss to understand as to why the world cannot understand their state’s
legitimate security needs. The Indian inability to abide by the terms laid down
by the West is seen as Indian equivocation . Against this, the West’s preferred
solution has been to cut-off aid on the assumption that nation-states can be
prevented from going to war merely because they do not have the cash to start
a con ict. Sanctions do not work in the way they are intended to. More than
sanctions, peace in South Asia demands an understandin g of the need for
dialogue among and between the peoples of South Asia and an institutiona l
structure that could facilitate this.
The nuclear tests of South Asia have radically altered the security perception
of the region. Yet although India and Pakistan are locked in combat across the
Line-of-Control in Kashmir and both have their armed forces in a state of alert
all along their frontier, the two sides appear to have devised some new rules of
engagement. India, while undertaking a maximum mobilisatio n of forces, has
376
nevertheless so far desisted from crossing the Line-of-Control. Pakistan, on her

side, has made continuous efforts to involve other powers in this bilateral
con ict, looking for the equaliser in international mediation. All along, unlike in
the previous four wars, there have been continuous exchanges through the
normal diplomatic channels. India has taken the initiative to start a normalisation
of relations with China in terms of state visits at the highest level. This two-track
strategy of defending the borders combined with tri-lateral negotiation is
probably the best strategy for peace in the region.
The standard view of India–Pakistan relations, being exogenous to the
political process of South Asia, conceptualises this complex phenomenon in
terms of a two-person, non-co-operative game where external sanctions provide
the only possibilit y of peace. It is beyond the remit of this paper to investigate
the relationship between the political agenda of the arms merchants, their
political mentors and South Asian clients and the characterisation of India–
Pakistan relations in terms of their natural antipathy or inability to recognise the
triadic relation of India, Pakistan and China as one of the main causes of the
arms spiral in South Asia. The fact that domestic politics in South Asia offer
evidence of tolerance, accommodation and dialogue across cultural divisions
needs to be recognised by the structural realists, and integrated with an
institutiona l mechanism for peaceful con ict resolution. Democracy rather than
sanctions is the path to regional peace in South Asia.
Notes and references

1. A previous version of this paper was presented at a conference on ‘Pakistan: Nuclear Tests and Beyond’,
St Antony’s College, Oxford, 28–29 May 1999. The author is grateful to Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Caroline
Hughes, Donna Lee and Mohammad Waseem for their comments.
2. Amalendu Mishra, ‘The centrality of Kashmir in India–Pakistan security dynamics ’, International Politics,
Vol 38, 2001, p 103. For an effective presentation of the standard view, see Sumit Ganguly, The Origins
of War in South Asia: The Indo-Pakistani Con icts since 1947 (Boulder: Westview, 1994); and Ganguly ’s
more recent The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997).
3. Although South Asian policy-makers often use the concept of dichotomous relations, its origin as a
category of their discourse is obscure. I have taken the concept and its operational meanings from the title
of the conference on India–Pakistan relations where the paper was rst presented. The zero-sum
connotation s of the dichotomou s approach carry a whiff of the realist and neo-realist approaches —enough
for Alexander Wendt to argue that ‘Strong liberals should be troubled by the dichotonou s privileging of
structure over process, since transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations
of structuer’. See Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power
politics (1992)’, International Organization, Vol 46, No 2, p 131.
4. Wendt, ibid, is the key article that provides the theoretical reasoning relevant to this article. The detailed
arguments and references to recent literature on constructivism can be found in Alexander Wendt, Social
Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
5. See Richard Shapcott, ‘Solidarism and after: global governance, international society and the normative
“turn” in international relations’, Paci ca Review, Vol 12, No 2, 2000 for the methodologica l basis for the
empirical identi cation of ‘consensus and consent ’ that underpins the interaction among actors in
international politics.
6. Wendt reminds us that ‘self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy
and that if today we nd ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure. Theser is no
“logic” of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and
interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal power apart from process. Self-help and
377
SUBRATA K. MITRA
power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it’. See
Wendt, op cit, Ref 3, p 132.
7. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. J. Weinshemer & D. Marshall (London: Sheed&Ward,
1989), p 379; cited in Shapcott, op cit, Ref 5, p 163. Gadamer’s postulate forms the basis of our argument
that democracy that facilitates conversation , comprehensio n and the communication of the resultant
accommodation upwards towards decision-maker s as a better institutional solution to war and peace in
South Asia than sanctions imposed by western powers. This point would be discussed more fully in the
conclusion.
8. See Ronen Palan, ‘A world of their making: an evaluation of the constructivist critique in International
Relations’, Review of International Studies, Vol 26, 2000, pp. 575–598 for a critical analysis of both the
‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ versions of constructivism.
9. The complete results of the survey, based on a national sample of 10,000 interviews, are available in
Subrata K. Mitra & Vijay Bahadur Singh, Elections and Social Change in India (Delhi: Sage, 1999).
10. See Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936–1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1987) for a succinct analysis of the conditions leading to the partition of British India. Some of the
implications for India and Pakistan, respectively, can be found in Christophe Jaffrellot, The Hindu
Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity Building, Implanation
and Mobilisation (Delhi: Viking, 1993); and Seyyed Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1994).
11. ‘Pakistan announced it had completed a partial troop pullback from a military control line in the disputed
Himalayan region of Kahshmir aimed at easing tensions with arch-rival India’. See ‘Pakistan begins pull
back: General Musharraf orders partial withdrawal from Kashmir to foster better relations with India’,
Eastern Eye (London), 12 January 2001, p 20.
12. ‘Kashmir truce extended: all-party meeting gives Centre go-ahead on path of peace’, The Statesman
Weekly, 24 February, 2001, p 3.
13. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 232.
14. The SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Charter does not provide for the
discussion of domestic issues of member states, which makes its institutional forum unavailabl e for the
discussion of India–Pakistan relations, focused as they are, on Kashmir.
15. This is not mere speculation. The prestigious Mehboob-ul-Ha q Centre for Human Developmen t (Islama-
bad) has provided some precise gures on the extent of the peace dividend that both countries could
expect. A freeze on military expenses at the 1996 level in real terms would ‘gain’ Pakistan Rs762 billion
and India Rs2111 billion in the year 2010. With a reduction of 2%, the respective gures for Pakistan and
India will be Rs980 billion and Rs2603 billion; with 5% reduction, the peace dividends will go up to
Rs1248 billion and Rs3198 billion rupees. See Mahbub ul Haq, Human Development in South Asia 1997
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p 86 (Table 4.4).
16. For the sake of simplicity, one can present the situation as symmetric. Pakistani strategists would reason
exactly in the same manner as India, although there are variations on the theme of the exact impact of the
rst strike and the differential capacity for a second strike. The second mode of reasoning is the number
of days that the bigger India could sustain a war against Pakistan as opposed to the latter who would prefer
a more intense war of shorter duration and must therefore equip herself differently from her physically
larger neighbour .
17. Following the gures from 1994–1995, India with 1,265,000 of active men at arms, Pakistan with 587,000
appears somewhat out of proportion if we take the underlying populations as an index. The same picture
holds true for other weapons such as main battle tanks (India’s 3739 to Pakistan’s 1950), armoured
personnel carriers (1057 to 820), artillery pieces (3585 to 1849), helicopters (36 to 36), combat aircraft
(864 to 434), war ships (25 to 9) and submarines (15 to 6). See IISS, The Military Balance 1994–1995
(London: Brassey’s, 1994).
18. ul Haq, op cit, Ref 15, p 81 (Table 4.2). Particularly striking is the increase of the military expenditure
as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product between 1985 and 1994, from 2.6 to 3.6 in India and from
5.2 to 7.0 in Pakistan.
19. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (London: Penguin, 1990).
20. Recent reports of Chinese incursions into Arunachal Pradesh and reactivation of the disputed 650 mile
border in India’s northeast known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) denotes what Indian policy-makers
regard as the hostile presence of the Chinese. Luke Harding, reporting from New Delhi, comments ‘If
super cially polite, relations between New Delhi and Beijing are best characterised as mistrustful. India
accuses China of helping Pakistan to stockpile a nuclear and missile arsenal much larger than its own –
a claim backed by US intelligence’. See Luke Harding, ‘China accused of in ltrating into India’, The
Guardian Weekly, 18 October 2000, p 17.
378
21. For a detailed analysis of this point, see Subrata K. Mitra, ‘Nehru’s policy towards Kashmir: bringing
politics back in again’, Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol 35, No 2, 1997, pp 55–74.
22. Nehru even went as far as comparing Pakistan with Nazi Germany: ‘It is extraordinary how these
development s remind one of the technique adopted by Hitler. Indeed, the whole policy of the Muslim
League during the past few years has been singularly reminiscent of the Nazi tactic … Another feature of
Pakistan’s attack on Kashmir, which also reminds one of Nazi Germany, is the erce, blatant and false
Propaganda that has been carried on by their radio and press’. See G. Parthasarathi (ed), Jawaharlal
Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, vol. l, 1947–1964 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp 6–7.
23. D.K. Palit, War in High Himalaya, The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962 (London: Hurst & Company 1991)
gives a very convincing analysis of the war.
24. See Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia. Indo-Pakistani Con icts Since 1947 (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1986), p 78. According to this line of reasoning, the 1965 war with Pakistan was a direct
result of the 1962 war with China.
25. Srivastava, Shastri’s biographer, sums them up as follows: (1) India had no desire whatsoever to acquire
even one square inch of Pakistani territory; (2) India genuinely wished Pakistan well and would be
delighted to see Pakistan progress and prosper; (3) India would never allow any interference by Pakistan
in Kashmir which was an integral part of India; and (4) India and Pakistan had to live together in peace
and harmony, as they were constituted without either side trying to do anything to destabilise the other.
See C.P. Srivastava, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, 1964–1966: A Life of Truth in Politics
(Delhi: OUP, 1995), p 186.
26. Ibid, p 186.
27. Ibid, p 198.
28. Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966–1982 (Delhi: Sage,
1984). See Bharat Wariavwala, ‘Security issues in domestic politics’, in Subrata K. Mitra & James
Chiriyankandat h (eds), Electoral Politics in India: A Changing Landscape (Delhi: Segment, 1992) for an
analysis of the use of security as an issue in domestic politics in what he calls the ‘plebiscitary politics’
of Indira Gandhi.
29. See Ramesh Thakur, ‘India in the World. Neither rich, powerful, nor principled’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 76,
No 4, 1997, p 20.
30. For a coverage of Operation Bluestar, see Kuldip Nayar & Khushwant Singh, Tragedy of Punjab:
Operation Bluestar and After (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1984); and Man Singh Deora (ed), Aftermath of
Operation Bluestar (New Delhi: Anmol, 1992).
31. For a story of the IPKF in Sri Lanka, see Depinder Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka (Noida: Trishul
Publishing, 1991).
32. The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party publicly denounce s the Gujral Doctrine as appeasement .
Gujral himself does not have an independen t political base. The ruling coalition, dependen t on the suppor t
of the Congress Party, has recently received a severe jolt to its stability. See Harish Khare, ‘Cong. (l)
decides to give U.F. another Chance’, The Hindu, 27 September 1997, p 1.
379

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Contemporary South Asia

War and peace in South

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09584930120109568

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

War and peace in South Asia: a

to originate from ‘a bellicose history, religious rivalry and a general sense of

makes a well grounded contribution to this debate through a comprehensive

bring ideas and interests together.

Table 1. India should make more

Table 2. People’s opinions are divided on the issue of Kashmir

Should be suppressed 11.1%

Table 3. There is no need for India to

Competing genealogies: the standard view and the revisionist challenge

A formal model of the standard view of India–Pakistan relations

Table 4. Tactical choices of India and Pakistan

Indian Pakistani Pay-off to Pay-off to

1 Reduce arms Reduce arms A A

Indian tactics Stockpile C, C B, D C

The India–Pakistan arms race and the ‘lost’ peace dividend

The China factor

Pakistan’s security needs India’s perceived security needs

The evolution of India–Pakistan–China relations

through several parts of India, highlighte d in December 1992 by the destruction

Conclusion: democracy and the security in South Asia

exclusive concentration on the given set of actors is not always conducive to

which to articulate their interests), and democracy as an institutio n of elections

nevertheless so far desisted from crossing the Line-of-Control. Pakistan, on her

Notes and references

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