Solution Manual For Business Law 17th Edition Arlen Langvardt A James Barnes Jamie Darin Prenkert Martin A Mccrory Joshua Perry L Thomas Bowers Jane Mallor 13 9781

Solution Manual for Business Law, 17th Edition,
Arlen Langvardt, A. James Barnes, Jamie Darin

Prenkert, Martin A. McCrory, Joshua Perry, L.
Thomas Bowers, Jane Mallor
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Solution Manual for Business Law, 17th Edition, Arlen Langvardt, A. James Barnes, Jamie Dari
Chapter 11 - The Agreement: Acceptance
CHAPTER 11
THE AGREEMENT: ACCEPTANCE
I. LEARNING OBJECTIVES:
This chapter is intended to familiarize students with the legal issues relating to the second
fundamental step in the contracting process: acceptance of an offer by the offeree. After reading
the chapter and attending class, a student should be able to:
A. Explain the elements of an acceptance under both the UCC and common law
B. Determine how acceptance can be communicated in a given scenario and analyze the time at
which acceptance is likely to be effective.
C. Identify the circumstances under which silence is acceptance.
D. Determine whether an oral acceptance is effective in a situation in which the parties
anticipate putting their contract in writing.
II. ANSWER TO INTRODUCTORY PROBLEM

A. This problem requires students to apply the criteria for a valid acceptance, the rules about
revocability of offers, and the mailbox rule. It comes from First Texas Sav. Ass'n v. Jergins,
705 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). In response to First Savings’s offer, Jergins deposited
her entry form with First Texas. The elements of intent, acceptance on the offeror’s terms,
and communication are satisfied.
B. First Texas suggested or required a particular method of acceptance—completing the entry
form and depositing it with First Texas. Jergins used the authorized method of acceptance.
Under the mailbox rule, her acceptance was effective when she deposited it with First Texas.
C. First Texas’s attempted revocation occurred after Jergins’s acceptance was effective, so it did
not have the right to revoke the offer.
D. Given that the contract was formed before the change in the contest rules, Jergins did have
the right to collect the $5,000 money market certificate.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR LECTURE PREPARATION:

A. What is an Acceptance?
Stress the fact that courts trying to decide whether an offeree accepted an offeror's offer look
for the same present intent to contract on the part of the offeree that they look for on the part
of the offeror. Note also that the courts are looking for the offeree's objective intent, not his
subjective intent.
Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc.: Long filed a class action lawsuit against Provide Commerce
(owner and operator of the ProFlowers.com website). Provide Commerce asked the court to
compel arbitration based on a mandatory arbitration clause in the Terms of Use for
ProFlowers.com. Those Terms of Use were presented in the form of a classic “browsewrap.”
This case will allow instructors to revisit and expand upon the notion of clickwrap and
browsewrap, first presented in Cordas v. Uber Technologies, included in the text of Chapter
10. In this case, the issue explored by the court is whether an offeree (i.e., Long, the
consumer) can be said to have manifested an intent to assent to the Terms of Use. Because
the parties agreed that Long had no actual knowledge of the Terms of Use and its arbitration
clause, the question was whether he could be said to have constructive notice. If not, there
could be not intent to commit to those terms and no acceptance. The answer comes down to
11-1
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the conspicuousness and availability of the hyperlinked Terms of Use. The court refers to two
seminal cases (i.e., Specht, which was formerly a text case in prior editions of this textbook,
and Nguyen). The court finds that the placement and conspicuousness (color, size, etc.) of the
hyperlinked Terms was insufficient to put a reasonable consumer on notice of the Terms.
Points for Discussion: The facts provided in the preamble to the case provide a detailed—but,
admittedly, dense—description of the ProFlowers.com site and the location of the linked
terms. Instructors might want to pull up an older version of the ProFlowers.com site on the
Internet Archive Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org) and contrast it to the current
site. Query the students whether the current design of the site and placement of the hyperlink
for the Terms of Use addresses the Long court’s concerns, which led it to find against Provide
Commerce on this issue of intent to accept. As of the writing of this Instructor’s Manual, the
color scheme of the site had changed, but the Terms of Use hyperlink was still not as
conspicuous as one might expect (gray on gray versus the green on green the court
described). Ask students how they would advise Provide Commerce to design the
ProFlowers.com website to ensure that the Terms of Use were sufficiently conspicuous to
bind users. Instructors might also engage in a discussion with students about whether the
following selection from the court’s opinion rings true to them, especially if the class consists
mostly or entirely of “digital natives”: “Though it may be that an especially observant
Internet consumer could spot the Terms of Use hyperlinks on some check-out flow pages
without scrolling, that quality alone cannot be all that is required to establish the existence of
an enforceable browsewrap agreement.” Inquire of them if they think the court is really
focusing on the correct considerations. You might ask if they agree with the following
statement: Every (even casual) user of the Internet realizes that almost all commercial
websites have terms of use, even if most never look for or read them. If that’s the case, then
might the proper standard, instead of the “conspicuous notice” that the Long court requires,
be that the terms cannot be hidden or otherwise unduly difficult to locate? If we all know
they exist in almost every circumstance, then could it be reasonable to say we are all on
notice and the only concern would arise if the site makes it too difficult for us to find them,
even if we have to scroll down or even if the hyperlink is one among many pro forma links on
the site? What’s the counterargument that the Long, Specht, and Nguyen courts have it right?
1. Point out that the idea that an offeror is "the master of his offer" means that the offeror
has the power to determine the conditions under which he can be bound to a contract.
This means that he can impose any conditions on acceptance that he chooses, even those
that may make acceptance unduly burdensome or difficult. Once his offer is accepted,
however, the offeror cannot change any of its terms.
2. Point out why offeree attempts to change the offer's terms in their acceptances are treated
as counteroffers: by trying to change the offer's terms the offeree is impliedly rejecting
them rather than indicating the required intent to be bound by them.
3. Discuss the common law "mirror image" rule and the courts’ tendency to apply it more
liberally in recent years to avoid finding a counteroffer in the following situations:
a. Inquiries regarding terms.
b. "Grumbling acceptances".
Example: See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. Sup.
Ct. 1981).
c. Non-material variances in an acceptance.
Example: Problem Case #8.
11-2
Pena v. Fox: This case is included in the text to denote that, despite the liberalization of the
common law mirror image rule as described above, it still has bite. The case involves the
negotiation of a settlement of claims resulting from an automobile accident. Pena offered to settle
her claims against Fox for a particular amount, but she explicitly indicated that she would only
release her claims against Fox and not others (including USAA Casualty Insurance, Fox’s
insurance company which was negotiating on Fox’s behalf). USAA responded to Pena’s offer
purporting to accept the settlement, but included a statement that Pena and her attorney
interpreted to release USAA among others (i.e., “Releasee(s), its agents, and employees”). Pena,
thus, treated Fox’s purported acceptance as a counteroffer/rejection, and she sued Fox.
Points for Discussion: Why was the difference between Pena’s offer and the response from Fox
not treated as a non-material variance? Why did the appeals court dismiss the trial court’s notion
that USAA did not try to slip one past Pena (i.e., that there was no “nefarious inclusion” of
USAA in the release)? This is a good opportunity to reinforce that, to the extent intent is relevant
in contract law, it is measured by objective indications rather than subjective ones. And in this
case, objectively, the words used are the end of the matter for the appellate court. Lastly, Pena’s
attorney had been very clear—indeed the excerpt from the offer reads a little over the top—
insisting that Pena would only release Fox and no one else. Had the language been clear (e.g.,
Pena would “only release Fox”) but not as insistent, do you think the result would have been the
same?
4. Discuss section 2-207, the Code "Battle of the Forms" section, and its attempt to
recognize reality in the age of the form contract by dispensing with the common law
"mirror image" rule in some circumstances. Since 2-207 is complicated and somewhat
confusing (one court described it as "a mystery clothed in an enigma"), you may want to
limit discussion to a brief general statement of its nature and intent. If you choose to treat
2-207 in detail, the following procedure is suggested:
a. The first step in applying 2-207 is to see if the parties had a contract under 2-207(1).
Was the offeree's communication a "definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance?" If not, no contract results under 2-207(1)--the Code still recognizes the
concept of rejection. For an example of an offeree response too at variance with the
offer to amount to an "expression of acceptance," see Howard Construction Co. v.
Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc., 669 S.W. 2d 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) [seller alters price
terms in buyer's purchase order: no contract under 2-207(1)]. Even if the offeree's
communication meets the above test, was it made "expressly conditional" on the
offeror's assent to the new or different terms? If so, no contract results under
2-207(1).
b. If the offeree's communication was a definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance and wasn't made expressly conditional on assent to the new or different
terms, a contract results under 2-207(1).
If a contract results under 2-207(1), proceed to 2-207(2) to determine its terms. If the
parties are both "merchants" the additional terms became part of their agreement
unless: the offer expressly limited acceptance to its own terms; the additional terms
would "materially alter" the offer; or the offeror objects to their inclusion within a
reasonable time. By negative inference, if one or both of the parties are not
merchants, the additional terms can never become part of the contract unless the
other party expressly agrees to them. The language of 2-207 does not clearly indicate
what happens to "different" terms. If no contract results under 2-207(1), turn to
2-207(3). Is there conduct by both parties that "recognizes the existence of a
contract?" If so, a contract results and its terms are those upon which the writings of
the parties agree, supplemented by the "gap-filling" terms provided by the Code.
11-3

Duro Textiles, LLC v. Sunbelt Corporation: Duro sued Sunbelt in Massachusetts for
breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
negligent misrepresentation after the blue dye Duro purchased from Sunbelt damaged
Duro’s product. Sunbelt moved to dismiss the suit based on the forum selection
clause included in its invoice, which it sent to Duro. The forum selection clause
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on South Carolina courts. Duro argued that the
forum selection clause should be excluded from the contract under UCC 2-207(2).
Points for Discussion: Do the parties here have a contract? Ask the students why it
matters that the parties agreed to their status as merchants? What is the standard for
determining whether a term is “material”? Why does the forum selection clause meet
that standard? What happens now between the parties?
Additional Example: Problem Case #4.
5. Discuss the requirement that acceptances must be communicated to the offeror. Why is
communication necessary?
B. When is Acceptance Communicated?
1. Discuss the concept that offerors are free to stipulate the time or manner of acceptance
under both the common law and the Code. Discuss the outcome of a purported
acceptance sent by some means other than the stipulated means. Discuss Problem Case
#9. Even under the Code's liberal rules concerning the manner in which offers can be
accepted the idea that the offeror is "the master of his offer" still holds sway: the offeror
still has the power under 2-206(1) to specify the manner in which the offeree must accept
and the means the offeree must use to communicate acceptance. Only when the offeror
fails to exercise this power does 2-206(1)(a) authorizing acceptance by any "reasonable"
manner and medium come into play.
2. Discuss the rules relating to when an acceptance is effective to create a contract. Note
that the "implied agency" or "mailbox rules" mean that, in some cases, an acceptance
may be effective when dispatched, even if never received by the offeror. Point out,
however, that offerors can protect themselves from such a result by providing that they
must actually receive an acceptance before they are bound by it.
3. Discuss the concept of an authorized means of communication and the various ways in
which a given means could become an authorized means at common law: express
authorization by the offeror; implied authorization (the means the offeror used to
communicate the offer); and trade usage. Note that the acceptance must be properly
dispatched (e.g., correctly addressed, accompanied by adequate postage) for the mailbox
rule to apply. Remind students that revocations are not effective until they are received.
The United States Life Insurance Company in the City of New York v. Wilson: The facts
of this case, tragically, present like a law school exam hypothetical. Dr. Griffith had a
life insurance policy through US Life and AMAIA, which required semi-yearly premium
payments. If the insured missed a payment, he or she could reinstate the policy by
payment within the grace period or by payment, along with written permission and proof
of insurability. Dr. Griffith missed a premium payment and received a “Reminder
Notice” (which extended his grace period to 60 days). Eventually, he arranged for
payment from his online Bank of America account, which sent payment from his account
to between July 25 and August 2. AMAIA rejected the payment on August 2 and
returned the check concluding that the policy had lapsed. In the meantime, on July 28,
11-4
Dr. Griffith died in a bicycle accident. Dr. Griffth’s wife, Elizabeth Wilson, filed a claim
on the policy. AMAIA rejected the claim, so Wilson sued US Life and AMAIA for
breach of contract. Although the timeline is complex, the important issue boils down to
whether Dr. Griffith made payment prior to his death on July 28, because obviously the
policy could not be reinstated after his death.
Points for Discussion: What is the contract at issue here? (Help students to understand
that the Reinstatement clause is an offer for a unilateral contract to reinstate the policy by
making a timely payment as performance.) What role does the mailbox rule play? (Given
that the issue is whether Dr. Griffith’s policy was reinstated prior to his death, the timing
of the acceptance—if there was one—is the central issue and whether the mailbox rule
applies determines that timing.) Discuss the particulars of the application of the mailbox
rule. (The case does a systematic job of walking through the basics.) Ask the students to
explain how the court applied the mailbox rule to the facts. (Make particular note of the
fact that the sending of the check—even though directed electronically—is treated as a
“dispatch” for the purposes of the mailbox rule.)
Additional Example: Problem Case #9. Compare Gibbs v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
266 Cal. Rptr. 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (acceptance must be placed out of one's control
for mailbox rule to apply, so acceptance was not effective when plaintiff handed envelope
to mail clerk in her office).
b. Note how the Code [in 2-206(1) (a)] and the Restatement Second have broadened the
notion of an impliedly authorized means to include any means "reasonable" under the
circumstances.
1) Discuss those factors a court is likely to consider in determining whether a given
means is "reasonable": the nature of the goods (are they perishable or subject to
rapid fluctuations in value?); the parties' prior dealings (has any normal pattern of
dealing arisen?); and the reliability of the means selected.
c. Discuss the traditional rule on the effectiveness of attempts to accept by a
nonauthorized means: they are only effective when actually received by the offeror
within the time they would have been received had the offeree used the authorized
means. Note how the Code [in 1-201(38)] and the Restatement Second have
modified this rule.
Example: Put the following example on the board and walk students through it to
illustrate the above concepts:
On October 1, 2012, Thomas mails Stephens a letter offering to sell a beach-front
condominium for $120,000.
October 5, 2012, at 10:00 a.m. Thomas telegraphs Stephens and attempts to revoke
his offer.
October 5, 2012, at 10:10 a.m. Stephens telegraphs his acceptance of Thomas's offer.
October 5, 2012 at 11:00 a.m. Stephens receives Thomas's revocation. October 5,
2012 at 11:10 a.m. Thomas receives Stephens's acceptance.
1) Under traditional rules: No contract. Stephens has attempted to accept by a
nonauthorized means (authorized means on these facts is mail). His acceptance
will only be effective when actually received by Thomas. Since Stephens
received Thomas's revocation before Thomas received his acceptance, the offer
was effectively revoked prior to acceptance. If Thomas's letter had said: "You
may accept by telegram?" Contract (telegram now an expressly authorized
means). If Stephens had mailed his acceptance? Contract (he has accepted by the
11-5
impliedly authorized means). If by some fluke Thomas received Stephens's

acceptance before Stephens received the revocation? Contract.
2) Same facts as example above, but Thomas's offer is to sell machine parts.
Contract? Yes. Code applies (sale of goods). Section 2-206(1)(a) controls.
Telegram is probably a "reasonable" means by which to accept this offer.
Therefore, a contract was created at 10:10 a.m. when Stephens dispatched his
acceptance. Point out that even if a telegram was for some reason an
unreasonable means of accepting (or if Stephens had used a truly unreasonable
means, e.g., giving his acceptance to a 10 year-old child to deliver across town) a
contract would still result under the Code because Thomas received the
acceptance in a timely fashion. Note also that if a court applied the Restatement
Second to the original facts, it would reach the conclusion that the parties have a
contract on the same reasoning employed under the Code.
C. Special Acceptance Problems
1. Discuss the requirements for acceptance of an offer for a unilateral contract: the offeree
must perform the act requested by the offeror. If you have mentioned "reverse unilateral
contracts" (act for a promise variety) earlier, point out that the offeree must make the
requested promise to accept such an offer.
2. Discuss the requirements for acceptance of an offer for a bilateral contract: the offeree
must make the return promise requested by the offeror. Where this is done expressly, no
problems result, but point out that it is also possible for an offeree to impliedly indicate
an objective intent to be bound by the terms of the offer in a variety of ways:
a. The offeree acts in a manner inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered
property.
b. Even though silence by the offeree generally will not amount to acceptance, there are
some important exceptions to this rule:
1) Customary trade practice or prior dealings between the parties indicate that
silence signals acceptance--discuss example in the text.
2) The offeree indicates that his silence will signal acceptance.
The offeree accepts the offeror's performance, knowing the offeror's terms. This rule,
combined with the common law "mirror image" rule sets up the so-called "last shot"
principle under common law: offerors who accept performance after receiving a
counteroffer are impliedly bound by the counteroffer's terms. As students have
already seen, 2-207(3) changes this rule in Code cases.
3) Ethics in Action: No. The problem of unfair surprise—which Samantha
experienced in the case problem—would be one ethical problem. Another would
be that marketers would essentially be placing the time and expense burden on
buyers—without their consent—to take the initiative to communicate with
sellers. You might wish to discuss the legal analysis of this problem as well as
the ethical analysis.
11-6
3. Discuss the problems courts confront in cases where the parties intend to reduce their
agreement to written form. Did they only intend to be bound when a writing was
executed, or did they intend to be bound at the time agreement was reached, with the
writing intended merely as a memorial of their agreement? Here again, courts attempt to
determine the parties' objective intent from their actions and the surrounding
circumstances.
Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation v. Daugherty Petroleum, Inc.: This case revolves around
whether Cabot and Daughtery based on whether the correspondence between the tow
created a contract or, instead, if they had intended to continue negotiations and
subsequently memorialize the agreement in writing.
Points for Discussion: Describe the general rule that correspondence is preliminary
negotiation rather than a formal written contract. Ask the students what are the six
factors that West Virginia uses to differentiate those writings that deviate from the
general rule. Ask them to discuss how those factors apply to the particular facts between
Cabot and Daugherty. The expected writing was the PSA. Why wasn’t the
correspondence, which covered basically what would have been included in the PSA
enough?
4. Discuss the problem confronting courts when the offer is ambiguous on the question of
whether the offeree can accept by performance (a unilateral contract) or by making a
return promise (a bilateral contract).
a. Point out that both UCC section 2-206(1)(a) and section 32 of the Restatement
Second allow the offeree to accept such an offer in any reasonable manner (i.e., by
performing or making a promise).
b. Note the special variation on this rule contained in UCC section 2-206(1)(b)
pertaining to offers requiring prompt or current shipment. Discuss the Ampex and
Marks example in the text to illustrate how the Code in this section modifies common
law rules in a way designed to protect both parties. Offerees can't ship the wrong
goods to offerors with impunity, relying on the offeror's circumstances to force him
to accept something other than what he ordered. On the other hand, an offeree who
notifies the offeror that he's making an "accommodation" (thereby giving the offeror
the opportunity to seek the needed goods elsewhere) can still try to make a sale,
although he doesn't have the exact goods the offeror needs.
5. Stress the fact that only the offeree has the power to accept an offer. Attempts to accept
by others are merely offers which the offeror can accept or reject.
6. The Global Business Environment (p. 376) outlines important differences between the
CISG and U.S. law, both common law and UCC, regarding a number of these special
issues.
IV. RECOMMENDED REFERENCES:

A. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 2004).
B. Melissa Robertson, Note, Is Assent Still A Prerequisite for Contract Formation in Today's E-
conomy?, 78 WASH. L. REV. 265, 266 (Feb. 2003)
C. James J. White, Contracting under Amended 2-207, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 723 (2004)
(discussing proposed revisions of 2-207).
D. Valerie Witnick, The Electronic Formation of Contracts and the Common Law “Mailbox
Rule,” 2004 BAYLOR L. REV. 175 (2004).
11-7
V. ANSWERS TO PROBLEMS AND PROBLEM CASES:
1. No. In this case Citibank had made an offer to Wilson about a revised agreement. The court
noted that acceptance need not be made by a spoken or written word. It can be accepted by
conduct or failure to act when the offeree knows that services are being rendered on the terms
offered. It found that Wilson accepted the revised agreement by her conduct with regard to her
credit card. Despite the fact that Wilson could have canceled her credit card when she received
the notice of revised terms, she continued using it, thus showing her assent of the revised
agreement. Citibank v. Wilson, 160 S.W.3d 810 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
2. Yes. PGS customers are bound by the TOS, because they manifest their assent when creating
an account. The terms are clear available to the user who must indicate clearly his or her
consent by the click-through process. However, the customers who buy a gift for someone
else would not be bound by the TOS because the supposed browsewrap structure never gives
them sufficient opportunity to read nor requires them to assent. The receiver of the gift would
be bound, but not the purchaser. Thus, gift purchasers would not be subject to mandatory
arbitration. Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88068 (N.D. Calif. June 25,
2014).
3. No. The court decided that the contract was not formed under subsection (1) of 2-207 because
Belden had expressly conditioned acceptance on AEC’s consent to the additional terms, but
that a contract had been formed under (3) by conduct that recognized the existence of a
contract. Under (3), the contract consists of terms on which the parties’ writings agree plus
“supplementary terms” under the UCC. The court held that (3) and not (2) was controlling,
and that, while course of dealing could provide a supplementary term, the course of dealing
between Belden and AEC did not show that AEC had ever agreed to Belden’s attempts to limit
remedies. The court affirmed the case in favor of AEC. Belden v. American Electric
Components, Inc., 885 N.E. 2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
4. Yes. UCC section 2-207 applies to this case. The court stated that, “[b]y using the Glassrobots
standard sales agreement as a template and by authorizing a wire transfer of the down
payment, Standard Bent Glass demonstrated its intent to perform under the essential terms of
Glassrobots’s standard sales agreement. Accordingly, its response was a definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance of Glassrobots’s offer….The parties continued to
perform, with Glassrobots constructing and installing the desired equipment and Standard
Bent Glass timely paying for it. In sum, Standard Bent Glass’s conduct constituted a definite
and seasonable expression of acceptance that evinced the formation of a contract rather than a
counteroffer or rejection. For these reasons, there was a valid contract on the Glassrobots
terms of February 2 that incorporated any nonmaterial additions proposed by Standard Bent
Glass.” Standard Bent Glass Corporation v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440 (3d Cir. 2003).
5. Possibly. The court found that there was sufficient evidence (not just the words, but also the
reactions of the parties) from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Davis objectively
treated Nordlanger’s statement as an acceptance. Trademark Properties, Inc. v. A&E
Television Networks, 422 Fed. Appx. 199 (4th Cir. 2011)
6. No. The ads were offers, but Alexander and her son did not accept them. The plaintiffs’
acceptance must have been received by the defendants by the time prescribed in the offer and
in the place where communications of that sort were requested (through the tipline). While
the plaintiffs may have provided information related to the arrest or indictment, there is no
indication in that they provided the information to the people who were authorized to receive
acceptance on behalf of BRCS and LCS. Alexander v. Lafayette Crime Stoppers, Inc., 28 So.
3d 1253 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
11-8
Solution Manual for Business Law, 17th Edition, Arlen Langvardt, A. James Barnes, Jamie Dari
7. No. The issue in the case was whether, under the mailbox rule, mail was an authorized mode
of acceptance despite the fact that the offer was hand-delivered and did not expressly state
any particular mode of acceptance. The court applied the Restatement standard that
acceptance dispatched by a reasonable method of communication is effective on dispatch, and
held that the use of mail was reasonable in this case and that the contract was indeed formed
on August 20, when the letter of acceptance was posted. Cantu v. Central Education Agency,
884 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
8. No. The court found that Lewis’s inaction could not be an indication of acceptance and, thus,
there was no contract. Pride v. Lewis, 179 S.W. 3d 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
9. No. State Farm’s preaddressed envelope authorized Casto to respond to its offer by mail and
Casto did respond by mail. To be effective upon mailing under the mailbox rule, however, the
acceptance must have been properly dispatched. The envelope did not bear any postage when
it was returned, and Casto did not prove that there was postage on the envelope when she sent
it. Thus, this acceptance was not effective when it was dispatched. Casto v. State Farm
Insurance Co., 594 N.E.2d 1004 (Ct. App. Ohio 1991).
10. No. The court held that an employer’s silence in response to the alteration of a written
employment contract by an employee was not acceptance absent some proof that it knew or
should have known that the contract had been altered. McGurn v. Bell Microproducts, Inc.,
284 F. 3d 86 (1st Cir. 2002).
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Chapter 11 - The Agreement: Acceptance

II. ANSWER TO INTRODUCTORY PROBLEM

III. SUGGESTIONS FOR LECTURE PREPARATION:

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Example: Problem Case #3.

impliedly authorized means). If by some fluke Thomas received Stephens's

IV. RECOMMENDED REFERENCES:

V. ANSWERS TO PROBLEMS AND PROBLEM CASES:

Chapter 11 - The Agreement: Acceptance

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