SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 42258. January 15, 1936.]

In re Will of the deceased Leoncia Tolentino, VICTORIO

PAYAD, petitioner-appellant, vs. AQUILINA TOLENTINO,
oppositor-appellant.

Vicente Foz, Marciano Almario and Leonardo Abola for petitioner-

appellant.
Leodegario Azarraga for oppositor-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE. — It was

not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the
testatrix requested Attorney A to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix
signed the will in question in accordance with law.
2. ID.; ID.; TESTATOR'S MARK. — "A statute requiring a will to be
'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark." (Quoted
by this court from 28 R. C. L., p. 117; De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil.,
104, 108.)

DECISION

GODDARD, J : p

Both parties in this case appeal from an order of the trial court denying
the probate of the alleged will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased. That court
found that the will in question was executed by the deceased on the date
appearing thereon, September 7, 1933, one day before the death of the
testatrix, contrary to the contention of the oppositor that it was executed
after her death. The court, however, denied probate on the ground that the
attestation clause was not in conformity with the requirements of law in that
it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused Attorney Almario to write her
name at her express direction.

The appeal of the oppositor-appellant is based upon the alleged failure

of the trial court in not finding that the will in question was executed after
the death of Leoncia Tolentino, or that she was mentally and physically
incapable of executing said will one day before her death. After a careful
examination of the evidence on these points we find no reason for setting
aside the conclusion of the trial court as set forth above. The assignments of
the oppositor-appellant are therefore overruled.
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 As to the contention of the petitioner-appellant, as stated above, the
trial court denied probate of the will on the sole ground that the attestation
clause does not state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to write
her name. The last paragraph of the questioned will reads in part as follows:
"En prueba de todo la cual, firmo el presente testamento con mi marca
digital, porque no puedo estampar mi firma a causa de mi debilidad,
rogando al abogado M. Almario que ponga mi nombre en el sitio donde he
de estampar mi marca digital . . ."
The evidence of record establishes the fact the Leoncia Tolentino,
assisted by Attorney Almario, placed her thumb mark on each and every
page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her name to
indicate the place where she placed said thumb mark. In other words
Attorney Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed by placing her
thumb mark on each and every page thereof. "A statute requiring a will to be
'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark." (Quoted
by this court from 28 R. C. L., p. 117; De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil.,
104, 108.) It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the attestation
clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario
to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in
accordance with law.
The appealed order of the trial court is reversed and the questioned
will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased, is hereby admitted to probate with the
costs of this appeal against the oppositor-appellant.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

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