Brown 1987

Jesuit Wealth and Economic Activity within the Peruvian Economy: The Case of Colonial
Southern Peru
Author(s): Kendall W. Brown
Source: The Americas, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jul., 1987), pp. 23-43
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1006847
Accessed: 26-06-2016 23:22 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Americas
This content downloaded from 128.163.2.206 on Sun, 26 Jun 2016 23:22:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
JESUIT WEALTH AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
WITHIN THE PERUVIAN ECONOMY:
THE CASE OF COLONIAL SOUTHERN PERU
Muffled by the night and sobered by their unexpectedly serious

task, Corregidor Jose Manrique y Guzmain and two squads of
N militia quietly approached the Jesuit college of Arequipa at four
o'clock on the morning of September 17, 1767. Manrique had secretly
gathered his scribe and the troops during the night after receiving an as-
tounding royal decree from Viceroy Amat in Lima. The top-secret dispatch
ordered Manrique to detain all Jesuits within the province of Arequipa in
preparation for their expulsion from the Spanish empire. Similar orders had
gone out to royal officials throughout Charles III's domains. In Arequipa
Manrique found all but three of the local Jesuits housed within the college.
He read them the royal edict, placed them under house arrest until provi-
sions could be made for transporting them to Lima, ordered the detention of
the three padres absent from the college, and confiscated all the Jesuits'
properties.'
These nocturnal raids brought an end to the Jesuits' wealth and indepen-
dence in the colonies, but they did not end rumors and stories about the
economic power and tremendous riches of the order. Latin American histo-
riography emphasizes the vast landholdings of the Catholic Church and
consistently pictures the Society of Jesus as the greatest landowner and
most economically active of all the ecclesiastical groups. Concerning the
Society, for example, Franqois Chevalier wrote in his seminal study of the
great estate in New Spain: "The Jesuits were undoubtedly the greatest
farmers of all. ... The Society's colleges owned the best-operated, most
* The author is associate professor of history at Hillsdale College. He wishes to thank J. Ignacio
Mendez for his comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this study and the American Philosoph-
ical Society and the Tinker Foundation for financial support for the research.
'For Manrique's report of the night's events, see "Inventario del Colegio de la Compafifa de Are-
quipa, en que se halla la ejecuci6n del Real Decreto," Arequipa, 17 Sept. 1967, Biblioteca Nacional del
Perti (hereafter BNP), C224.
23
24 JESUrr WEALTH IN PERUVIAN ECONOMY
thriving estates in the viceroyalty.'"2 Some modern historians picture the

Jesuits as perhaps the most powerful economic force in the colonies prior to
their expulsion. In a survey of Latin American history, Donald E.
Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer asserted:
In both the Iberian countries and their colonies the Jesuits had come into
possession of enormous areas of the most productive land. As entrepreneurs
in many fields of acivity they controlled the manufacture of various commodi-
ties, driving lay competition out of existence. . . . Their wealth increased
steadily as devout followers lavished benefits upon them.3
Some not only believed the stories about Jesuit wealth and economic power
but ascribed less than lofty motives to the padres for their worldly activities.
Bernard Moses, for instance, provided an anti-clerical assessment of the
Jesuits' methods:
In Peru as well as elsewhere the Jesuits pursued the worldly path in accumu-
lating riches. They sought gifts and inheritances; used means of persuasion
that only religious guides are in a position to apply; acquired vast estates, and
made their products the material of mercantile operations.4
The sinister Jesuit confessor, pressuring the dying hacendado to will his
lands to the order in return for eternal salvation, remains a popular image of
the colonial period.
Even historians sympathetic to the Society of Jesus agree that the order
amassed a formidable economic empire. They are quick to point out, how-
ever, that the Jesuits did this for specific religious reasons. In order to create
a secure, stable financial base to support their schools, missions, charities,
and other labors, the Jesuits acquired and operated agricultural and com-
mercial properties. Often their enterprises excelled in terms of efficiency
and profitability, yet the Jesuits' temporal success made them the object of
jealous criticism from lay persons and other religious orders who had to
compete with them. To the Society's apologists, the stories of rapacious
Jesuits are more myth than fact, concocted by envious competitors of the
Society.5
While the Jesuits' economic motivations probably lay somewhere be-

tween the purity which the apologists have ascribed to them and the vision
2 Franqois Chevalier, Land and Society in Colonial Mexico, trans. by Lesley Byrd Simpson (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1970), 239.
3 Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer, The Growth and Culture of Latin America (New
York, 1956).
4 Bernard Moses, Spain's Declining Power in South America 1730-1806 (New York, 1965), 128.
s For an example of this type of interpretation, see Luis Martin, The Kingdom of the Sun; A Short
History of Peru (New York, 1974), 146-149.
KENDALL W. BROWN 25
of darkest greed painted by their critics, recent research into the economic
bases of their Spanish-American colleges has shown that the Jesuits did
indeed have widespread economic holdings.6 But these studies generally
have focused on the Jesuit properties and enterprises outside the context of
the regional economies. As a result, they are unable to compare or contrast
the production and profitability of the Jesuit estates with those belonging to
other orders and lay persons. They leave open the question of whether the
Jesuits really dominated the colonial economy to the extent their critics
alleged. What percentage of agricultural production, for example, came
from Jesuit estates? Was it large enough for them to manipulate market
conditions? Were they powerful enough to drive competitors out of busi-
ness? Answers to these and similar questions require familiarity not only
with the Jesuit economic bases but with the regional economy also.
Analysis of the economic holdings and activities of the Jesuit colleges of

Arequipa and Moquegua in relation to the economy of southern Peru shows
that the economic importance of the Society of Jesus has been overesti-
mated. While the colleges of Arequipa and Moquegua were wealthy and
prosperous, their overall impact on the regional economy was negligible.
They certainly lacked the resources to dominate the regional economy, to
6 Among the recent economic studies of Jesuit holdings in Spanish America, see Estebain Fontana,
"La expulsi6n de los Jesuitas de Mendoza y sus repercusiones econ6micas," Revista Chilena de His-
toria y Geografia, 130 (1962), 47-99; Pablo Macera dall'Orso, "Instrucciones para el manejo de las
haciendas jesuitas del Peni (ss. XVII-XVIII)," Nueva Cor6nica, 2 (1966); Fernando de Armas Medina,
"Las propiedades de las 6rdenes religiosas y el problema de los diezmos en el virreinato peruano en la
primera mitad del siglo XVII," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 23 (1966), 681-721; German Col-
menares, Haciendas de los Jesuitas en el Nuevo Reino de Granada: Siglo XVIII (Bogotai, 1969); Luis
Martin, S.J., "The College of San Pablo in Lima: 1568-1767. History of a Colonial Institution" (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Columbia University, 1966); Charles Joseph Fleener, "The Expulsion of the Jesuits from
the Viceroyalty of New Granada" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1969); Harold Bradley
Benedict, "The Distribution of the Expropriated Jesuit Properties in Mexico, with Special Reference to
Chihuahua (1767-1790)" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1970); Charles William
Polzer, "The Evolution of the Jesuit Mission System in Northwestern New Spain, 1600-1767" (Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Arizona, 1972); James Denson Riley, "The Management of the Estates of
the Jesuit Colegio Mdximo de San Pedro y San Pablo of Mexico City in the Eighteenth Century" (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Tulane University, 1972); Brian R. Hamnett, "Church Wealth in Peru: Estates and Loans
in the Archdiocese of Lima in the Seventeenth Century," Jahrbuchfiir Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft
und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, Band 10 (1973), 111-132; James D. Riley, "The Wealth of the Jesuits
in Mexico, 1670-1767," The Americas, 33:2 (Oct., 1976), 226-266; Carmelo Sa6nz de Santamaria, "La
vida econ6mica del colegio de Jesuitas en Santiago de Guatemala," Revista de Indias, 37 (1977),
543-584; and Herman W. Konrad, A Jesuit Hacienda in Colonial Mexico: Santa Lucia, 1576-1767
(Stanford, 1980). Especially valuable with respect to the Jesuits in viceregal Peru are the three studies of
Nicholas P. Cushner, although these also show far more familiarity with Jesuit economic enterprises
than with the Peruvian economy and the Jesuit role in it: Lords of the Land; Sugar, Wine, and Jesuit
Estates of Coastal Peru, 1600-1767 (Albany, 1980); Farm and Factory: The Jesuits and the Develop-
ment of Agrarian Capitalism in Colonial Quito, 1600-1767 (Albany, 1982); and Jesuit Ranches and the
Agrarian Development of Colonial Argentina, 1650-1767 (Albany, 1983).
26 JESUIT WEALTH IN PERUVIAN ECONOMY
drive out competition, or to manipulate supply and demand of basic com-

modities, as critics of the order have alleged.
THE COLLEGE OF AREQUIPA
As the conquistadores spread throughout the Inca empire after the fall of
Cuzco, they discovered rich agricultural oases in the moutain valleys of the
southern coast. In 1540 they founded the city of Arequipa along the banks
of the Chili River, with the towering volcanic peak Misti looming over the
city to the north. On the pampa or lands around the city, the Spaniards soon
grew rich harvests of wheat, corn, alfalfa, fruit, and other foodstuffs. More
importantly, they imported grape vines from the Canary Islands and discov-
ered that the vines thrived on the valley floors. Wine became the principal
cash crop of the region, providing it with a product to sell in the mining
zones of Upper Peru. Before long Arequipans had divided up the lands in
the Vitor valley, located 25 miles west of Arequipa, and had planted vine-
yards. From there they spread north to the Siguas and Mages river valleys
and south to Moquegua and Locumba, each of which became a viticultural
center. The prosperous vineyards and farms made southern Peru one of the
richest agricultural regions in the viceroyalty. By the eighteenth century,
Arequipa not only fed itself from its own farms but sold surpluses in neigh-
boring regions. Its wine and brandy, when shipped to Potosi, La Paz,
Cuzco, and other altiplano markets, gave Arequipa a tremendously favor-
able balance of trade with the sierra.7
When a resident of Arequipa, Diego Hernfindez Hidalgo, left several

urban buildings plus an annuity of 2000 pesos to the Society of Jesus in
1578 if it would found a college in the city in his name, the first Jesuits
immediately moved into Arequipa to fulfill the terms of the bequest. The
Company founded the college that same year, to the consternation of
Viceroy Francisco de Toledo, who as vice-patron of the church had not
given the Jesuits permission to establish themselves in Arequipa. He conse-
quently ordered them to disband until they secured his approval. This they
finally obtained in 1580, and the padres quickly reestablished their house in
7 On the early history of Arequipa, see Germain Legula y Martinez, Historia de Arequipa, 2 tomos
(Lima, 1917); and Victor Manuel Barriga, ed., Documentos para la historia de Arequipa, 3 vols.
(Arequipa, 1939-1955), both of which deal primarily with the sixteenth century. Keith Arfon Davies has
studied Arequipan land tenure in "Landowners in Colonial Peru" (Austin, 1984). On the evolution of
Arequipan viticulture, see Kendall W. Brown, "A Evoluqio da Vinicultura em Arequipa, 1550-1800;
um Aspecto da Agricultura Colonial," Estudos Ibero-Americanos, 6:1 (julho, 1980), 39-52.
KENDALL W. BROWN 27
Arequipa. Using the Hernandez Hidalgo bequest and donations from other
faithful, the Jesuits then began to build an economic base capable of se-
curing the college's temporal welfare while at the same time providing it
with a stable source of income to meet the operating demands of the house,
school, charitable works, and other endeavors.8 Unlike most religious
orders, the Jesuits invested very little of their money in censos, or mort-
gages and loans. While many of the other convents and monasteries typi-
cally loaned out funds and lived off the interest, the Jesuits preferred to buy
agricultural lands which the college then operated itself. Over the folowing
centuries, the Arequipan college acquired vineyards, farms, stores, inns,
and other real estate.
Shortly after the 1767 expulsion, officials of the Office of Temporalities

calculated that the Arequipan college owned real estate valued at more than
600,000 pesos.9 Three haciendas comprised over two-thirds of that amount.
Most valuable was Sacay la Grande, a vineyard in the Mages valley. The
college had acquired Sacay in 1670 when Ygnes Chirinos de Loayza, a
former owner of the vineyard, left her estate to the Jesuits. Although she
had sold Sacay in 1647 for 50,480 pesos, Juan del Castillo, the new owner,
still had more than 18,000 pesos of the mortgage left to pay when she died
in 1670. Inheriting the 18,000 pesos from Chirinos de Loayza, the college
decided to buy Sacay back from Castillo. The hacienda was the largest in
the Mages valley, measuring better than eightfanegadas (about 60 acres) of
land.10 When the Jesuits bought it, Sacay had approximately 60,000 sepas
(vines) and eight slaves.11 Six leagues inland Sacay also had a farm called
Pacaichacra, where the Jesuits grew wheat, corn, alfalfa, fruit, and other
foodstuffs for use at the vineyard.12 By the time of the expulsion, the Jesuits
had expanded the vineyards at Sacay to include twice as many sepas, and
the slave gang had grown to 72 chattels.13 For the period 1762-1766, it
8 See Ruben Vargas Ugarte, Historia de la Compafiia de Jesus en el Peru, 4 vols. (Burgos,
1963-1965), I, 125-126.
9 See, for example, the data in Macera, "Instrucciones," between pp. 8 and 9.
10 Alejandro Milaga Medina, ed., Fuentes documentales para la historia de Arequipa: Propriedades
jesuitas (Arequipa, 1978), 29.
" On the early status of Sacay, see, for example, "Libro de gastos del colegio de Arequipa,"
1679-1688, Archivo Nacional del Peri (hereafter ANP), Compafiia de Jesus 29, folio 11. The visita of
31 May 1674 reported, however, that Sacay had 130,000 sepas (Libro de gastos del colegio de Are-
quipa, 1653-1679, ANP, Compafifa de Jesus 29, folio 252v.) If that is true, many of the vines must have
been old and unproductive enough to make the Jesuits decide to destroy them and replant. Later visitas
definitely show that Jesuit operations at Sacay started with about 60,000 sepas.
12 "Gastos del colegio de Arequipa," 1679-1688, ANP, Compafiia de Jesus 29, folios 97-98.
13 "Tasaci6n e inventario de la hacienda Sacay la Grande hecho al tiempo de la entrega hecha por D.
Domingo Cavero y Espinosa," 1768, ANP, Temporalidades 49, folios 11-12. According to Viceroy
Amat's report, there were 69 slaves. Manuel de Amat y Junient, Memoria de gobierno, ed. by Vicente
Rodriguez Casado and Florentino Perez Embid (Sevilla, 1947), 149.
produced an average of 6960 botijas (large clay jugs) of wine each year,
more than double the production of any other vineyard in the canyon.14
The second most valuable property of the college was another vineyard,
San Javier, located in the Vitor valley. Many prominent Arequipan families
owned vineyards in Vitor, and in fact, the wine haciendas there had tradi-
tionally signalled wealth and status among the local population. The origins
of San Javier are obscure, but the Jesuits definitely owned it as early as
1633, when it generated far more income than any of their other holdings.15
In 1652 they enlarged it by purchasing neighboring lands,16 and by the late
1600s San Javier had expanded to over 100,000 vines and 43 slaves. 17 The
Jesuits continued to augment the work force, purchasing additional slaves
as late as January, 1758.18 On the eve of expropriation, San Javier had 68
slaves and produced an average of about 4,400 botijas of wine per year.19
This placed it among the largest producers in the valley although several lay
persons owned vineyards of roughly comparable, if not larger, size.20
The third principal estate was Guasacache, a grain farm on the pampa
outside Arequipa, near the village of Paucarpata. The padres purchased
14 These were 75-pound jugs. "Relaci6n sumaria de lo que ha producido la Hacienda titulada Sacay la
Grande," 1762-1766, ANP, Temporalidades 150. To compare production at Sacay with other vineyards
in the Mages canyon, see the tithe accounts for 1789 in ANP, Real Hacienda, Caja de Arequipa 66.
15 From 24 June 1633 to 30 June 1636, for example, San Javier produced 28,507 out of the college's
total income of 94,710 pesos. See "Obligaciones del Colegio de Arequipa," 1627-1679, ANP, Com-
paiifa de Jesus 28, folio 68v. At that time the college had 29 slaves in the Vitor valley (ibid., folio 71 v).
16 Milaga Medina, Fuentes documentales, xi and 28, mistakenly implies that the Arequipan college
had no vineyards in the Vitor valley until 1652, but the lands purchased by the Jesuits in that year simply
added to their already existing Vitor vineyard. The accounts compiled immediately after 1652 refer to
two vineyards in the valley: the vifia nueba, which produced 15,820 pesos from 28 Feb. 1652 to 30
April 1660; and the vii~a vieja, which generated 62,732 pesos during the same period. See "Obliga-
ciones del Colegio de Arequipa," 1627-1679, ANP, Compaiifa de Jesus 28, folio 165v. Later, the
accounts combine the two properties and call them Vitor or San Javier.
17 "Gastos del Colegio de Arequipa," 1679-1688, ANP, Compafifa de Jesus 29, folios 97-98.
18 In that month the college bought four slaves, two males and two females, for 1610 pesos. "Libro
de gasto de la Compafifa de Jesus," 1755-1767, ANP, Compaiifa de Jesus, Cuentas de Colegios 30,
folio 61.
19 The Vitor and Moquegua botija was 55 pounds and thus smaller than the jug used by the Mages
vintners. "Relaci6n sumaria de lo que ha producido la haza titulada Vitor," ANP, Temporalidades,
Cuentas de Haciendas 150.
20 It is impossible to know exactly how San Javier's production compared with other vineyards in the
valley in 1767, when the expropriation took place. Data from later years, however, lead to the conclu-
sion that San Javier was large but several other haciendas probably equalled or exceeded it in size. In
1781, for instance, San Javier produced 2789 botijas, down somewhat from its yield during the final
years the Jesuits owned it. In that same year Domingo Benavides' vineyard gave 3940 botijas and
Nicolis de Barreda tithed a harvest of 7,637. See "Diezmo de Vino del Valle de Vitor," 1 June 1781,
ANP, Real Hacienda, Caja de Arequipa 116. Tithe documents for later years show similar relationships
between the former Jesuit hacienda and the other principal Vitor vineyards.
KENDALL W. BROWN 29
Guasacache in 1586, later adding several smaller tracts to it, until the prop-
erty totaled approximately 480 acres (67 fanegadas).21 Guasacache pro-
duced many of the basic foodstuffs consumed by the Jesuits or distributed
as alms by the college. In 1723 the padres planted about 50 acres of wheat,
10 of corn, and more than 20 of alfalfa.22 They also held cattle and sheep
there before slaughtering them for the college's refectory, although Guasa-
cache was not primarily a livestock ranch. The farm's corn and wheat har-
vests for 1762-1766 were as follows:
TABLE 1: GRAIN HARVESTS OF THE JESUIT FARM GUASACACHE, 1762-1766
1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 Average
fanegas* of corn 81 605 197 377 550 362

value in pesos 289 2109 789 1437 2093 1343
fanegas of wheat 558 574 481 471 443 505
value in pesos 2881 2958 2402 3660 2215 2823
combined value 3170 5067 3191 5097 4308 4167
* Afanega was equal to approximately 1.5 bushels.

Source: "Relaci6n sumaria del Producto y gasto de la Hazienda de Panllevar nombrada Guasacache,"
ANP, Temporalidades, Cuentas de Haciendas 150.
In terms of wheat, Guasacache harvested roughly as much as another of

the college's farms, San Ger6nimo, which yielded an average of 557
fanegas per year from 1762 to 1766. Compared to Guasacache, however,
San Ger6nimo was much smaller, measuring only l0fanegadas (72 acres).
The padres grew no corn at San Ger6nimo, reserving it exclusively for
wheat. 23
In addition to the foregoing estates, the Arequipan college owned several

other properties. These included Lluta and Matara, olive plantations near
Ilay donated to the college in 1625; Yanarico, a livestock ranch in Lampa
where the padres raised sheep and cattle which they either sold on the open
market or butchered for use at the various properties of the college; two
flour mills; a small, 30-acre vineyard and olive plantation in the pago de
Tacar, in the Vitor valley; 27 stores located on Mercaderes Street in Are-
quipa, 13 of which had been part of the donation of Hernandez Hidalgo, the
founder of the college; and a tambo (inn) located in Arequipa which the
21 Malaga Medina, Fuentes documentales, 22-23.

22 "Libro de Gasto del Colegio de Arequipa," 1723-1735, folio 3, ANP, Compaiifa de Jesus 30.
23 See "Relaci6n sumaria. . .de Hazienda de Panllevar nombrada San Ger6nimo," ANP, Temporali-
dades, Cuentas de Haciendas 150; and Milaga Medina, Fuentes documentales, 24.
college purchased in 1755. The Jesuits normally rented out the mills and
stores but usually operated the other propeties themselves. Shortly after the
crown expropriated the properties, royal officials appraised their worth as
shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2: APPRAISED VALUE OF CONFISCATED JESUIT PROPERTIES OF THE

AREQUIPA COLLEGE, 1767, IN PESOS
Appraised Value
Name of Property Type Macera* Mdlaga Medina
Sacay la Grande vineyard 179,699 179,699

San Ger6nimo grain farm 52,227 50,227
Guasacache grain farm 92,272 92,975
Lluta and Matara olive plantations 9,834 9,834
Yanarico livestock ranch 40,617 40,617
San Javier vineyard 144,803 144,863
Chacra de Tacar vineyard, olives 16,373 16,373
Molino de Ronda mill 14,239 14,239
Molino de Pucachacra mill 9,606 9,606
Chacra de Chichas grain farm 5,340
Chacra del Palomar grain farm 11,451
Tambo inn 12,646
27 stores stores - 36705
576,461 607,784
* Macera's study dealt only with Jesuit agricultural properties and thus did not include the inn and
stores among the Arequipan college's overall property.
Source: Compare Macera, "Instrucciones," between 8 and 9, with Milaga Medina, Fuentes docu-
mentales, 54-67.
THE COLLEGE OF MOQUEGUA
A bequest from Licenciado Jose Hurtado Zapata Echegoyen afforded the

Jesuits an opportunity to expand to Moquegua during the years 1711-1713.
His will left them 70,000 pesos plus a vineyard, Yarabico, on the condition
that the Society erect a college in his name in Moquegua. The petition met
some resistance from royal advisers who increasingly saw the religious
orders, and especially the Jesuits, as a threat to royal power and the concen-
tration of land and manpower in the Church as a drain on the imperial
economy. But Philip V authorized foundation of the college in a cddula of
October 5, 1711. The Jesuits established their house in 1713. In succeeding
KENDALL W. BROWN 31
years they added two other agricultural properties to the college's holdings.
Pedro Pefialosa donated a second vineyard, Santo Domingo, and they
bought Santa Loreto, a sugar plantation in the Ilo valley.24
Due in part to its relatively late establishment, the economic base of the
Moquegua college was far less impressive than what the Jesuits had
amassed in Arequipa. Appraisers working for the Office of Temporalities
calculated that Yarabico, with its 40 acres and 58,000 vines, had a value of
76,718 pesos. Santo Domingo included 37,000 vines on 26 acres plus nine
slaves, which the appraisers valued at 52,498 pesos. The sugar plantation,
Santa Loreto, contained 150 acres of land but rated an appraisal of only
17,559 pesos. In addition to these estates, the Moquegua college owned
four urban lots in Moquegua, worth 10,184 pesos, and censos which gener-
ated 831 pesos each year. That brought the total worth of the college to
157,790 pesos, only a quarter of that enjoyed by the Jesuits stationed in
Arequipa.
TABLE 3: APPRAISED VALUE OF THE CONFISCATED JESUIT PROPERTIES OF

THE MOQUEGUA COLLEGE, 1767
Name of Property Type Appraisal
Yarabico Vineyard 76,718 pesos

Santo Domingo Vineyard 52,498
Santa Loreto Sugar Plantation 17,559
4 solares, Moquegua urban lots 0,184
156,959
Source: "Estado general del Colegio de San Josef ... de Moquegua," ANP, Temporalidades, Co-
legios 166, folios 2-5, 29, 30.
ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE JESUIT COLLEGES
Regardless of the investment capital represented by the Jesuit holdings,

in no case did the colleges come close to dominating the regional economy.
This generalization holds true for viticulture, for corn and wheat farming,
and for commerce. As already mentioned, the Arequipan college's most
valuable possessions were the vineyards Sacay la Grande and San Javier.
24 Compare "Estado general del Colegio de San Josef que fue de la Compafiia del nombre de Jhs. de
la Villa de Moquegua," ANP, Temporalidades, Colegios 166, folios 1-30; and Rub6n Vargas Ugarte,
Historia de la Compafiia de Jesus, IV, 10-12.
Although considerably larger than any other vineyard in the Mages canyon,
Sacay la Grande's annual average harvest of 6,960 botijas of wine from
1762 to 1766 amounted to only 6.8 per cent of the total wine produced in
the valley. San Javier's portion of the Vitor total for the same years was
even smaller, a mere 5.0 per cent.25 Certainly neither percentage was high
enough to allow the Jesuits to control the wine-and-brandy market in Vitor
and Mages. The same situation held true for the Moquegua college. Its two
wine haciendas, Yarabico and Santo Domingo, together yielded approxi-
mately 3,750 botijas of wine per year in the early 1750s. This compared
with the 172,000 botijas the Moquegua valley produced at that time and
meant that the Jesuit haciendas generated a trivial 2.2 per cent of the Mo-
quegua wine.26
Neither did Guasacache nor San Ger6nimo harvest enough corn and
wheat to control the Arequipan market.27 In a normal year around mid-cen-
tury, the Arequipan pampa yielded 45,000 fanegas of wheat and 52,500
fanegas of corn.28 The Jesuit farms contributed only 2.0 per cent of the
wheat and 0.7 per cent of the maize.
Data from the other major wine-producing area of the viceroyalty, around
Ica, Pisco, and Nasca, also support the hypothesis that the Jesuits did not
dominate local agriculture as has sometimes been alleged. If the friars had
controlled viticulture anywhere in Peru, it certainly would have been around
Ica, where most of their vineyards were concentrated. The colleges of Ica,
Pisco, Huamanga, Cuzco, and San Pablo, the Procuracidn de Provincia,
and the Mission of the Moxos had vineyards there. In all the Jesuits owned
nine wine haciendas in the region, which the Office of Temporalities valued
at 1,385,000 pesos.29 Available documentation on the harvest and brandy
25 In 1762, for example, the royal novenos on Mages wine was 752 botijas and 644 on Vitor wine.
The novenos were equal to one-ninth of the tithe, which in turn was 1/15 of the total harvest. Thus Vitor
tithed 86,940 botijas that year and Mages 101,520. See the novenos data in the treasury accounts for this
period in Archivo General de Indias (hereafter AGI), Lima 1281.
26 On Yarabico and Santo Domingo, see "Hacienda de Yaravico," 1733-1753, ANP, Compafifa de
Jesus, Haciendas 96, folios 203-206; and "Libro de Gasto y Recibo de la Hazienda de Santo Do-
mingo," 1733-1767, ibid., folios 174-176. Production levels for the Moquegua valley are calculated
from novenos and tithe data. See, for example, "Testimonio de los autos seguidos por los jueces
visitadores da la Caxa RI de Arequipa," 7 April 1755, BNP, C2197, folios 43-49, 51-55; and the
novenos figures in the treasury accounts in ANP, Real Hacienda, Caja de Arequipa 23-25.
27 Guasacache averaged 505 fanegas of wheat and 362 of corn and San Ger6nimo added 557 of
wheat. See "Relaci6n sumaria del Producto y gasto de la Hazienda de Panllevar nombrada Guasa-
cache," ANP, Temporalidades 150; and "Relaci6n sumaria. . .de Hazienda de Panllevar nombrada
San Ger6nimo," ibid.
28 On grain production, see Ventura Travada y C6rdova, Historia general de Arequipa (Arequipa,
1923), 133 and 135.
29 Macera, "Instrucciones," between 8 and 9.
KENDALL W. BROWN 33
production for five of these vineyards shows that together they yielded a
yearly average of 5,437 peruleras of aguardiente in the 1760s. If the other
four produced a similar amount of brandy in relation to the assessed value
of the hacienda, then the nine Jesuit vineyards would have distilled around
8,517 peruleras during those years.30 How did this compare with overall
brandy production in the Ica region? In 1774, as Viceroy Amat prepared to
levy the nuevo impuesto, a 12.5 per cent tax on brandy, his advisers calcu-
lated that the Ica-Pisco-Nasca region produced roughly 80,000 peruleras of
brandy each year.31 Although the data for the Jesuits are from several years
earlier, they indicate that the friars generated only 10 per cent of the aguar-
diente from the region. This is somewhat higher than their proportion in
southern Peru, but it is still a long way from giving them control of the
brandy market. And if they did not dominate viticulture around Ica, where
their vineyards were most numerous, the Jesuits did not dominate it any-
where else in the viceroyalty.
TABLE 4: APPRAISED VALUE AND ANNUAL BRANDY PRODUCTION OF JESUIT

VINEYARDS IN THE ICA REGION, CA. 1763, IN PESOS
AND PERULEROS
Vineyard Location Value Production Period
San Jose de la Nasca Ica 247,730 ?

San Xavier de Nasca Nasca 198,993 1,219 1758-66
Condor Pisco 160,526 830 1759-67
San Jer6nimo Ica 199,244 1,182 1760-63
Macacona Ica 73,875 ?
Santa Cruz de Lancha Ica 47,736 ?
Belen Ica 192,707 1,496 1761-65
S. Jose de Chunchanga Ica 131,482 ?
Humay Pisco 132,560 710 1755-64
1,384,853
Appraised value of five vineyards for which annual production is known: 884,030 pesos, with a
combined production of 5,437 peruleras
Extrapolated production for all nine vineyards: 8,517
Source: "Libro de Cuenta de raq6n de las cosechas de vifia de la hacienda de San Xavier," ANP,
Compafifa de Jesus 42; "Libro de Cuenta de Condor," ibid., legajo 85, folios 181v, 182v, 185, 186v,
192, 195, 197, 201v, 205; "Libro de Gasto de la Hacienda de Bethlen," 1726-1767, ibid., legajo 82,
folios 198-198v, 205v, 214; "Libro de Recibo de Aguardiente de San Ger6nimo y Vidrios de Yca,"
1744-1766, ibid., legajo 93; "Libro de Cuenta de Humay, ibid., legajo 86, folios 172v, 176v, 181v,
182, 185v. For the appraised values, see Mancera, "Instrucciones," between 8 and 9.
30 This is, of course, an extrapolated figure.

31 "Representaci6n de la Ciudad de Arequipa," 22 Jan. 1791, AGI, Lima 939, expediente 63, folio
39. This compared with 60,000 from southern Peru.
34 JESUrr WEALTH IN PERUVIAN ECONOMY
Unlike other religious orders, the Jesuits customarily invested their cap-
ital in properties which they then operated rather than simply lending the
money out at interest. But the two colleges in southern Peru did not reap
substantially greater profits by doing this. In Arequipa in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, the interest rate on censos usually ran 5 per cent
per year, and in fact the same rate seems to have been common in Lima.32
Convents and monsteries had to be very careful, however, to lend to reli-
able borrowers only.33 The largest convent in Arequipa, Santa Catalina de
Sena, enjoyed an income of about 30,000 pesos per year in 1789, most of
which came from censos. But its borrowers owed more than 76,000 pesos
in overdue interest.34 After droughts, earthquakes, floods, and other dis-
asters, borrowers usually petitioned the crown to lower the interest rate on
censos temporarily, sometimes with success.35 This added to the danger of
lending money. Because some borrowers never repaid their loans, profits
on censos probably ran 4.0-4.5 per cent instead of the 5 per cent interest
rate.
Operation of their own vineyards and farms spared the Jesuits from be-
coming dependent on borrowers. But the society's estates obviously faced
the same dangers as other properties: natural disasters, poor management,
insufficient markets, labor shortages, and primitive technology. Under
these circumstances, were the Jesuit enterprises productive enough to gen-
erate more profits for the college than it could have earned through censos?
At times they were, but not always. As Table 5 shows, the college of
Arequipa had difficulty meeting expenses during most of the seventeenth
century. But around 1730 the college apparently paid off the mortgages on
most of its vineyards, farms, and other properties and thereafter its net
profits began to mount. According to Jesuit accounts, the college of Are-
quipa earned a net income of 26,540 pesos per year from November 1760 to
April 1766.36 If royal officials correctly appraised the college's agricultural
32 See Brian R. Hamnett, "Church Wealth in Peru: Estates and Loans in the Archdiocese of Lima in
the Seventeenth Century," Jahrbuch fiir Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateina-
merikas, Band 10, (1973), 118-125. Hamnett also notes an instance of 4.5% interest.
33 The case of Sgt.-Maj. Luis de Tobar, who owed censo money to the Hospicio de la Buenamuerte in
Arequipa, is not unusual. An earthquake in 1784, he claimed, destroyed his house and upset production
on his hacienda, making it impossible for him to repay his loan. For five years he managed to avoid
paying anything. Thereupon the Hospicio sued to gain control of his property. See the unlabeled autos
on this case in Archivo Hist6rico Departamental de Arequipa (hereafter AHDA), Intendencia, 1789-I.
34 "Raz6n de los sugetos que se hallan deviendo de corridos a este nuestro Monasterio de Sta Catha-
lina de Sena por los censos," 8 May 1789, AHDA, Intendencia 1789-II.
35 For example, the crown lowered the censo rates after the Lima earthquake of 1746. "Poder del
MYC para pedir mercedes: al Sefior Marques de Monterreal," Arequipa, 28 June 1784, Archivo Munic-
ipal de Arequipa, LCA .01.
36 See Table 6.
KENDALL W. BROWN 35
TABLE 5: INCOME AND EXPENDITURES OF THE JESUIT COLLEGE OF

AREQUIPA, 1633-1766
Average
Gross Annual
Data Income Expenditures Net Income
June 1633-June 1636 94710 96966 -752

June 1636-Aug. 1640 98609 84330 3427
Aug. 1640-Aug. 1643 63828 63300 - 157
Aug. 1643-Sept. 1646 66012 59367 2155
Sept. 1646-Oct. 1648 41591 42630 - 499
Oct. 1648-Feb. 1652 83421 84577 - 347
Feb. 1652-Apr. 1660 190472 194899 - 542
Apr. 1660-Oct. 1662 54087 61596 - 3004
Oct. 1662-Nov. 1664 61688 61146 260
Nov. 1664-Oct. 1667 98629 96882 599
Oct. 1667-May 1674 192939 192939 128
May 1674-May 1679 135280 118969 3262
June 1679-June 1683 116679 90040 6524
July 1683-June 1686 66703 69976 - 1091
Feb. 1725-May 1730 101703 101730 - 5
Oct. 1735-Sept. 1739 89143 31389 14439
July 1739-Nov. 1743 107689 36603 16404
Nov. 1743-June 1747 131667 42920 24767
Nov. 1754-Nov. 1756 75135 39430 17853
Nov. 1756-Oct. 1760 137179 44564 23646
Nov. 1760-July 1763 94118 39000 20669
June 1764-Apr. 1766 114489 39055 41146
Source: Taken from the "Libros de Cargo" and "Libros de Gasto" of college, found in ANP,
Compafifa de Jesus 28-30.
and commercial properties at 622,000 pesos, the Arequipan Jesuits gar-

nered a return of 4.3 per cent on their capital.
This is, at best, only a tentative, rough measure. When the Office of
Temporalities sold the properties, it rarely received the full appraised
value.37 Several factors may have caused this shortfall. Perhaps the ap-
praisers overvalued some properties. If the true value were 75 per cent of
what the appraisers said, the 26,540 pesos would represent a return of 5 per
cent. By dumping more than 600,000 pesos worth of property on the market
37 Macera, "Instrucciones," between 8 and 9.
36 JESUITrr WEALTH IN PERUVIAN ECONOMY
all at once, the crown undoubtedly overwhelmed the demand that existed.
Prospective buyers simply lacked the capital to absorb such a large amount
of property at full price. The crown disposed of moderate and low-priced
estates more easily than it did the most expensive ones such as Guasacache,
San Javier and Sacay la Grande.38 Undoubtedly a number of the estates
degenerated under royal control because the crown did not maintain them
through new investment as the Jesuits had done.39 It is also difficult to
assess the profitability of the estates because the annual average of 26,540
pesos for the November 1760-April 1766 period may not reflect typical
profits. The college may have incurred unusual expenses during those years
which adversely affected income. Or the college may have foregone needed
maintenance in order to maximize profits temporarily.
The profitability of the estates varied significantly, as Table 4 shows.

The two great vineyards, Sacay and San Javier, produced the most income.
But as a percentage of capital invested, the olive plantations of Lluta and
Matara were more profitable. Guasacache, the largest farm on the Are-
quipan pampa, gave the college surprisingly little income, considering its
size and value. Income figures for the stores and tambo are misleading. The
college spent over 9,000 pesos to fix up several of the stores, an unusual
expense. The padres only acquired the inn in 1755 and had not turned it into
a financial success before their exile.
On the whole the Moquegua college's holdings proved more profitable

than those of the Jesuits in Arequipa. Its annual income of 8,316 pesos for
1762-1766 equaled a 5.3 per cent profit on appraised capital, substantially
higher than the Arequipan college's 4.3 per cent (see Table 6). Further-
more, Yarabico, Santo Domingo, and Santa Loreto all met or surpassed the
profit level of censos. The Moqueguan Jesuits had no marginal, unprofit-
able estates as was true of the Arequipan college.
If the profitability of the Jesuits' properties was not much different from
that available through censos, neither were the Jesuits vastly richer than all
the other religious orders, although they prospered far more than some of
their competitors. When exiled in 1767, the Arequipan college had an an-
38 The Office of Temporalities only succeeded in selling Guasacache in 1777 ("Estado general de la
Hazienda nombrada Guasacache que pertenecia al Colegio de Jesuitas de Arequipa," 6 April 1779,
ANP, Temporalidades 153); Sacay la Grande in 1779 ("Compulsa de la Certificaci6n del Remate de la
Hazienda de vifia nombrada Sacay la Grande," 1779-1782, ibid., legajo 50); and San Javier in 1785
("Expediente promovido sobre poner en poseci6n a dn Juan Ant2 Pi6lago y Herrera de la Hacienda de
Vifia nombrada San Xavier," 1785-1786, ibid., legajo 60).
39 Occasionally the government did give the administrators permission to undertake much needed
maintenance of the haciendas, as shown in "Oficios dirigidos al Sup Gob por la RI Junta de Temporali-
dades de Arequipa," 1775, ANP, Superior Gobiemo 17, cuademillo 441.
KENDALL W. BROWN 37
TABLE 6: RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL OF THE JESUIT COLLEGES OF

AREQUIPA AND MOQUEGUA, 1762-1766
% of
Annual Appraised % of
Property Net Income Value Sale Price
Arequipa:
Sacay la Grande 8685 4.8 7.9
San Javier 5299 3.7 6.4
Guasacache 1950 2.1 2.8
San Ger6nimo 1982 3.8 5.3
Lluta and Matara 715 7.3 14.3
Yanarico 1106 2.7 2.7
Molino de Ronda* 622 4.4 4.4
Molino de Pacaichacra 450 4.7 6.0
Tambo 26 0.2 ?
27 Stores - 24 0.0 0.0
College Total 26540 3.9 ?
Moquegua:
Yarabico 3938 5.1 6.1
Santo Domingo 3622 6.9 9.1
Santa Loreto 757 4.3 ?
College Total 8316 5.3 ?
* average is for 1752-1766
Source: See Tables 2 and 3; Macera, "Instrucciones," between 8 and 9; the 1762-1766 reports on
income and expenses for the various properties in ANP, Temporalidades 150 and 166; "Extracto del
Ynventario de Pacaychacra," ANP, Temporalidades 44; and "Estado general de las 27 tiendas," ANP,
Temporalidades 153.
nual income of 26,540 pesos to support 20 padres and the college of Mo-
quegua 8316 for eight brothers.40 This worked out to 1327 pesos per Jesuit
in Arequipa and 1040 in Moquegua. Yet Nicholas Cushner estimates that in
the eighteenth century, a typical college in Peru budgeted about 350 pesos
per year for maintenance of each Jesuit.41 Both colleges thus had substantial
money left for schools, missions, alms, and reinvestment.
Among the other orders, only the Dominican convent of Santa Catalina
de Sena rivaled the Jesuits in total income. By 1789 Santa Catalina earned
30,000 pesos per year, primarily from censos. It probably held about forty
nuns, however, making its per capita income somewhat lower than the Je-
40 Rub6n Vargas Ugarte, Jesuitas peruanos desterrados a Italia (Lima, 1935), 177-178, 191.
41 Cushner, Lords of the Land, 6.
suits' had been. The Dominican and Franciscan monasteries and the con-
vents of Santa Teresa and Santa Rosa, all located in Arequipa, each enjoyed
over 10,000 pesos per year by 1800, while the richest house in Moquegua
belonged to the Dominicans, with an annual income of 5586 pesos for its
six fathers. For the entire bishopric of Arequipa in 1804, the 20 convents
and monasteries, with 332 religious, earned 125,858 pesos, or 379 pesos
per cleric. Thus, the Jesuits were substantially wealthier than the average
religious order in southern Peru, although not necessarily better off than the
Dominican nuns and a few other houses. In contrast, some houses fared
very poorly. The 36 Mercedarians of Arequipa had an income of only 8060
pesos, while their co-religionists in Camanai lived on alms because a vol-
canic eruption had destroyed their vineyard. In Moquegua four Bethlehe-
mite nuns struggled along on a yearly income of only 603 pesos.42
According to the common wisdom, Jesuit managers superbly directed the

colleges' enterprises. As Cushner has pointed out, they enjoyed "wide ac-
cess to credit," had vertically integrated their economic empire, and orga-
nized it "to withstand occasional high losses."43 He also argues that to a
certain extent, the Jesuit colleges throughout South America comprised a
commercial network, which facilitated the padres' access to goods pro-
duced by their co-resligionists elsewhere in the continent. The Peruvian
colleges sold sugar and wine as far afield as Chile, Buenos Aires and Upper
Peru.44
To improve management of their properties, the colleges generally ro-

tated their overseers at irregular intervals. Besides removing poor or dissat-
isfied managers, the Society tried to avoid leaving a padre in the isolated,
independent role of overseer so long that he could no longer return to the
communal life of the college.45 To encourage better administration, the
provincial of the order or one of his assistants visited the colleges and au-
dited the books, although these visitations came irregularly with anywhere
from two to six years between them. Yet not all the estates operated effi-
ciently, not all managers were effective. At times provincial auditors criti-
cized the college for keeping inadequate accounts.46 Some haciendas
42 For information on the income of the other convents and monasteries in the diocese of Arequipa,
see Francisco Xavier Echeverria y Morales, "Memoria de la santa iglesia de Arequipa, 1804," in Victor
M. Barriga, ed., Memorias para la historia de Arequipa, 4 tomos (Arequipa, 1940-1952), IV, 77-78,
104, 114, 125, 142, 159, and 167. Also see "Relaci6n de las Provincias y Combentos de la Orden de
Nrs Sra de la Merced" (undated, but probably about 1644), Newberry Library, Ayer Manuscripts
1106M2.

44 That the Jesuits had such a far-flung commercial network is one of the chief points of Cushner,
Lords of the Land. It finds support in Riley, "Wealth of the Jesuits," 243.
46 Riley, "Wealth of the Jesuits," 235, 248-249.
KENDALL W. BROWN 39
proved relatively unprofitable, and occasionally a college tottered on the

brink of insolvency.47
The Jesuit investment strategy was cautious, designed to generate a

steady, secure income rather than large profits. The Society avoided risky
ventures such as mining that demanded large capital investments, even
though the potential return on its money was much larger than that obtained
from agriculture. While the padres might strike a bonanza in the mines,
they were well aware that they also might lose their entire investment. To
protect the financial bases of their colleges and missions, they therefore
tended to employ their capital in lower-profit, but also lower-risk, ven-
tures.48
Furthermore, as Cushner points out in Lords of the Land, the Jesuits

exerted less influence over the economy than their wealth suggests because
their most valuable properties produced goods for a comparatively small
part of the population.49 The Spanish ate the wheat and sugar, drank the
brandy and wine, and cooked in the olive oil, all of which the Jesuits pro-
duced. But these were not staples of the indigenous diet. Instead, the lower
classes consumed maize, potatoes, and chicha (maize beer). Jesuit produc-
tion thus had relatively little influence on the indigenous population. In
addition, their estates had little impact on overall employment in the region
because they depended so heavily on slave labor.50 They generally hired
free laborers only temporarily, for short periods of peak demand such as at
harvest time. Otherwise, the resident slave gang did the work on the ha-
cienda.51
Ironically the Jesuits' advantages sometimes worked against them, hin-

dering the padres from abandoning traditional procedures when newer ones
might have been more profitable. An excellent example occurred when
southern Peru underwent a transition from slave to wage labor. Wine ha-
cendados had turned to slave labor in the early 1600s.52 This was not be-
cause permanent slave gangs were particularly desirable for a vineyard but
because of the precipitous decline in the indigenous population.53 A wine
47 See, for example, "Obligaciones del Colegio de Arequipa," 1627-1679, ANP, Compaiifa de
Jesus, folio 134.
48 For this argument, see Konrad, Jesuit Hacienda, 315.
51 See the testimony of Juan de Zambrana regarding the operation of Sacay la Grande in ANP,
Temporalidades, Titulos de Haciendas, Cuadernillo 1022.
52 See Brown, "Evolugqo da Vinicultura," 41, 46-48. On Jesuit slaveholding in Peru, refer to Ni-
cholas P. Cushner, "Slave Mortality and Reproduction on Jesuit Haciendas in Colonial Peru," Hispanic
American Historical Review, 55:2 (May, 1975), 177-199.
53 Few subjects are more poorly understood in Peruvian historiography than the demographic trends
hacienda required a large labor force at several times during the year, such
as the pruning, picking, and pressing seasons. But these periods were rela-
tively short when compared to the remainder of the year when far less labor
was needed. Thus, the vineyard owners invested in slave gangs primarily
because they were unsure that they would be able to hire temporary workers
when needed because of the high Indian mortality. This obviously placed
the Jesuits in an advantageous position: they potentially had far more capital
at their disposal than their lay competitors and thus could more easily ac-
quire the costly chattels. But by the mid-1700s regional population had
apparently recovered to some extent, creating a larger labor supply and
stagnant wages.54 As a result, by the 1760s many vintners stopped using
slave labor and began hiring temporary workers from the swelling regional
labor pool.
But the Jesuits, who had large slaves gangs at San Javier and Sacay la
Grande, did not. As previously noted, they continued to buy slaves as late
as 1758. Prior to the royal confiscation of the Society's property in 1767,
the Jesuit administrators underwent a change of heart, however, and tried to
sell the slaves from their San Javier vineyard. No one would buy them.
After the expropriation the royal administrator of San Javier, Francisco Ja-
vier de Silva, also tried to dispose of them in 1769. He reported that the San
Javier gang was so rebellious that the previous administrator had "feared
for his life.55" Silva also added that the slaves refused to work more than
six hours per day and were the worst thieves and drunks in the valley.56 To
add further weight to his argument, Silva submitted sworn testimonies from
four of the principal Vitor hacendados. Each of them was acquainted with
of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. N. David Cook, Demographic Collapse: Indian Peru,
1520-1620 (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 165-166, does show, however, that toward the end of the sixteenth
century the decline in Indian population was most severe along the southern coast of the viceroyalty. A
further demographic catastrophe hit the region in 1717-1718, when an influenza epidemic reportedly
killed off as much as two-thirds of the Indian and one-half of the white population. Henry F. Dobyns,
"An Outline of Andean Epidemic History to 1720," Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 37 (1963),
512.
54According to the relaci6n of the Conde de Superunda, the Indian population of the bishopric of
Arequipa around mid-century amounted to only 14,483. Manuel A. Fuentes, ed., Memorias de los
virreyes que han gobernado el Peru, 6 vols. (Lima, 1859), IV, 12 and 15 of appendix. This probably
understates the size of the indigenous population, but whatever the case, by the 1790s it had risen to
66,609, according to George Kubler, The Indian Caste of Peru (Washington, D.C., 1952), 31. In the
province of Arequipa, the total population rose from approximately 30,000 in 1752 (Travada y C6rdova,
Historia, 128) to 37,241 by 1795 (Kubler, Indian Caste, 31). Wages for agricultural laborers held
steady during the second half of the century at four reales per day.
55 "Autos hechos sobre la Venta de Negros operarios de la Hacienda de Vifia nombrada San Xavier
del Valle de Vitor, 1769," ANP, Temporalidades 58, folio 1.
56 Ibid., folio 2.
KENDALL W. BROWN 41
the labor problems in the valley and the ex-Jesuit hacienda in particular.
They all recommended selling the slaves, arguing that day laborers were
cheaper, easily available, and less trouble than slaves. The slaves were too
costly, unruly and unproductive. But even the government had trouble di-
vesting itself of the chattels and in 1771 finally sent half of them to work on
a sugar plantation in Nazca which had also been owned by the Jesuits.57
On the other hand, Jesuit administrators sometimes made substantial pro-

cedural changes when economic conditions required it. In the seventeenth
century the Arequipan fathers maintained a team of up to 100 mules to carry
wine from the vineyards to the college and to markets in the altiplano.58 For
example, in 1642 their mule team hauled 1000 botijas of wine through the
mountains to Potosi.59 Around 1679, however, they sold the team, having
decided it was cheaper to let Indian and mestizo teamsters take the wine and
brandy on their own account to the markets in the sierra. Generally the
Jesuits let them have the cargo on credit, with several months to return and
pay for the wine and brandy they had taken. That way the college did not
have to keep a large team on hand, nor did it have to engage directly in the
unseemly practice of selling the goods.6?
CONCLUSION
The Jesuit empire rivaled and probably exceeded any of its competitors in
wealth. Pablo Macera calculates that the Society of Jesus owned agricul-
tural properties worth approximately 6,000,000 pesos in viceregal Peru.
57 Ibid., folios 4-14, 77-78. Slavery apparently was much more important to Peruvian sugar planters
than to the vineyard owners. Susan Ramirez-Horton has noted that the price of slaves in northern Peru
around Trujillo continued to increase during the eighteenth century, even though local sugar planters
faced a crisis from Caribbean competition. Susan Ramirez-Horton, "Land Tenure and the Economics of
Power in Colonial Peru" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1977), 398-413.
That the San Javier slaves were finally sold to a sugar plantation in Nazca also suggests that sugar
producers there considered slave labor more attractive the Arequipan vinters did. The need for labor was
probably more consistent throughout the year on a sugar plantation than in a vineyard. Furthermore,
because the wine valleys lay at a higher altitude, there tended to be more Indians available for work than
in the hot coastal sugar regions where Indian mortality had been even higher.
58 For references to the mule team or recua, see "Libro 22 del Gasto deste Colegio de la Compa de
IHS de Arequipa, "1 Agosto 1627-1652, ANP, Compafifa de Jesus 28, folio 175; and "Obligaciones del
Colegio de Arequipa," 1627-1679, ANP, Compafifa de Jesus 28, folio 27.
59 Ibid., folio 101v.
60 "Libro de Gastos del Colegio de Arequipa," 1679-1688, ANP, Compafifa de Jesus 29, folios 2-9.
For an excellent description of how the Jesuits at Sacay la Grande marketed their wine and brandy
during the mid-eighteenth century, see the testimony of Juan de Zaimbrana, filed after the confiscation of
Sacay, 16 November 1767, in ANP, Temporalidades, Tftulos de Haciendas, Cuadernillo 1022.
Estimates for New Spain range from 8,500,000 to 10,000,000 pesos and for
New Granada, nearly a million.61 The size of the Jesuits' temporal re-
sources provoked the envy and criticism of the other orders, the crown, and
later historians. As Macera writes,
If since their expulsion in the eighteenth century they have served as the ex-
clusive symbol for a generalized tendency of all levels of clergy, it has been
because the Society of Jesus perfected the methods of patrimonial administa-
tion followed by individual priests and by other religious corporations; devel-
oping to a previously unknown scale an economic organization of a modem
type.62
Whether the Jesuits were modern entrepreneurs is doubtful: they often clung
to traditional methods, and even Macera admits elsewhere that their
methods were no different from anyone else's by the 1700s.63
Yet the colleges enjoyed substantial economic advantages. They could

call on great reserves of credit, able administrators, and the devotion of
much of the populace in their economic activities. Their easy access to
credit was particularly important because it meant that they could selec-
tively choose land when they wished to buy.64 Had they been willing to
mortgage their properties to buy other estates, the Jesuits probably could
have amassed much more land than they did own. But the Jesuits were not
true capitalists; they saw little need to maximize their profits as long as their
estates produced a secure and substantial income. In addition, they con-
fronted the same market conditions as other producers: slowly rising local
demand for agricultural goods; a small consumer class compared to the total
population because of the poor distribution of wealth in the viceroyalty; and
severe difficulties in transporting their products to overseas markets.
Occasionally the Society wielded tremendous economic and political

power, as was true in the reductions of Paraguay. The Jesuits controlled
virtually the entire life of the province. Their Guarani Indian wards lived in
a state of perpetual childhood under their paternalistic guidance. They pro-
tected the Indians from incursions by the Brazilian bandeirantes, but they
also exploited the native population for labor in building an intricate and
far-reaching economic system in Paraguay.65 Regarding the Paraguayan re-
61 Macera, "Instrucciones," between 8 and 9; Riley, "Wealth of the Jesuits," 247; and Colmenares,
Haciendas de los Jesuitas, 18, 22.
62 Pablo Macera dall'Orso, "Iglesia y economia en el Perui durante el siglo XVIII, " Trabajos de
historia, 4 tomos (Lima, 1977), II, 205.
63 He makes this point in "Instrucciones."
65 Refer to Magnus Mmrner, The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the La Plata
Region: the Hapsburg Era (Stockholm, 1953).
KENDALL W. BROWN 43
ductions, two scholars recently wrote that "rather than 'Christian so-
cialism,' the Jesuit mission system could more correctly be described as
'theocratic capitalism,' "66
But Paraguay and the Jesuit reductions there were a special, atypical
case, not duplicated elsewhere, as the analysis of the colleges in southern
Peru illustrates. In Arequipa and Moquegua the Jesuits were also economi-
cally powerful, owning better than 750,000 pesos worth of property. This
was probably larger than any private, agricultural estate in Arequipa. Yet
their production constituted a small franction of the overall agricultural har-
vest, whether it be wine or grain. While the return on their capital invest-
ments was equal to or slightly better than that derived from censos by the
other orders, it was far less than what a merchant active in the import trade
could make. To a large extent, stories about the Jesuits' wealth and eco-
nomic power exaggerate the historical reality. In southern Peru they cer-
tainly did not dominate the regional economy, and with the exception of
peripheral areas such as Paraguay it is doubtful they did elsewhere.
Hillsdale College
Hillsdale, Michigan KENDALL W. BROWN
66 Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman, A Short History of Latin America, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1984),
97.

Brown 1987

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Brown 1987

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Jesuit Wealth and Economic Activity within the Peruvian Economy: The Case of Colonial

Muffled by the night and sobered by their unexpectedly serious

thriving estates in the viceroyalty.'"2 Some modern historians picture the

While the Jesuits' economic motivations probably lay somewhere be-

Analysis of the economic holdings and activities of the Jesuit colleges of

drive out competition, or to manipulate supply and demand of basic com-

THE COLLEGE OF AREQUIPA

When a resident of Arequipa, Diego Hernfindez Hidalgo, left several

Shortly after the 1767 expulsion, officials of the Office of Temporalities

TABLE 1: GRAIN HARVESTS OF THE JESUIT FARM GUASACACHE, 1762-1766

1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 Average

fanegas* of corn 81 605 197 377 550 362

* Afanega was equal to approximately 1.5 bushels.

In terms of wheat, Guasacache harvested roughly as much as another of

In addition to the foregoing estates, the Arequipan college owned several

21 Malaga Medina, Fuentes documentales, 22-23.

TABLE 2: APPRAISED VALUE OF CONFISCATED JESUIT PROPERTIES OF THE

Name of Property Type Macera* Mdlaga Medina

Sacay la Grande vineyard 179,699 179,699

THE COLLEGE OF MOQUEGUA

A bequest from Licenciado Jose Hurtado Zapata Echegoyen afforded the

TABLE 3: APPRAISED VALUE OF THE CONFISCATED JESUIT PROPERTIES OF

Yarabico Vineyard 76,718 pesos

ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE JESUIT COLLEGES

Regardless of the investment capital represented by the Jesuit holdings,

TABLE 4: APPRAISED VALUE AND ANNUAL BRANDY PRODUCTION OF JESUIT

Vineyard Location Value Production Period

San Jose de la Nasca Ica 247,730 ?

30 This is, of course, an extrapolated figure.

TABLE 5: INCOME AND EXPENDITURES OF THE JESUIT COLLEGE OF

June 1633-June 1636 94710 96966 -752

and commercial properties at 622,000 pesos, the Arequipan Jesuits gar-

37 Macera, "Instrucciones," between 8 and 9.

The profitability of the estates varied significantly, as Table 4 shows.

On the whole the Moquegua college's holdings proved more profitable

TABLE 6: RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL OF THE JESUIT COLLEGES OF

According to the common wisdom, Jesuit managers superbly directed the

To improve management of their properties, the colleges generally ro-

43 Cushner, Lords of the Land, 2.

proved relatively unprofitable, and occasionally a college tottered on the

The Jesuit investment strategy was cautious, designed to generate a

Furthermore, as Cushner points out in Lords of the Land, the Jesuits

Ironically the Jesuits' advantages sometimes worked against them, hin-

On the other hand, Jesuit administrators sometimes made substantial pro-

Yet the colleges enjoyed substantial economic advantages. They could

Occasionally the Society wielded tremendous economic and political

You might also like