OPINION: The Issue of Prescription

on Cyberlibel
June 19, 2020

FIRST POINT OF VIEW:

There are lawyers saying that Maria Ressa should have been acquitted because
the filing of the case has already prescribed. According to them, it was a non-
case from the very beginning. They support their argument with the case of
Disini et. al. versus Secretary of Justice et. al., G.R. No. 203335 – 203518,
February 11, 2014, wherein the Supreme Court states that, to wit:

“The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally
protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private
individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since
Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In
effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
“similar means” for committing libel.”

They argued that since cyberlibel is not a new crime, then the one-year
prescriptive period, provided under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, applies
to it. There was also a lawyer whose view is that R.A. 10175 serves as a
qualifying circumstance hence, persons committing cyberlibel should be charged
and prosecuted under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.

SECOND POINT OF VIEW:

On the other hand, there are lawyers, including the RTC judge who sentenced
Maria Ressa of being guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, for the crime of
cyberlibel, opine that it has not yet prescribed and Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code should not be the basis of prescription for cyberlibel. In the Rappler
case, the court said that, to wit:

“As above-discussed, republication is present in this case, thus, the reckoning

period for the determination whether the offense already prescribed or not is on
the date of the republication which is 19 February 2014.
The Supreme Court already ruled in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department
of Justice that Act No. 3326 applies to offenses punishable by special laws which
do not provide for their own prescriptive periods, to wit:

“There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to

Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses
under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods.”

A painstaking review of R.A. 10175 reveals that it does not provide for its own
prescriptive period, thus the provisions of Act No. 3326 is controlling. Section 1
of the same provides that:

“SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise

provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after
a year for offences punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more
than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight
years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than
six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offence punished by
imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall
prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribe after two months.”

Since R.A. 10175 did not specifically provide for a penalty for cyberlibel, the
penalty under Section 6 of said act must be referred to which is one degree
higher than that prescribed under the Revised Penal Code for ordinary libel as
provided under the above-mentioned provision which states, to wit:

“SECTION 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant
provisions of this Act. Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, as the case may be.”

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the imposable penalty for
libel.

“Art. 355. Libel by means of writing or similar means. — xxx”

As validated by the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 10175, the
penalty for cyberlibel is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, as quoted hereunder:

“Libel — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel, as defined xxx”

Considering that prision correccional in its maximum period and prision mayor
in its minimum period is 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years, the offense
shall prescribe after TWELVE (12) YEARS following the provision of section 1 of
Act No. 3326.

The instant case (Rappler Case) was filed in Court on 5 February 2019, which is
well within the period of twelve (12) years and clearly, prescription has not yet
set in.

It is worth stressing that this case is one for Cyberlibel punished under Section
4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175, an offense separate and distinct from the ordinary libel
punished under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. R.A. 10175 provides for
a higher and distinct penalty as well. And precisely because a higher penalty is
prescribed, cyberlibel is considered a more serious offense than ordinary libel.
Thus the one-year prescriptive period for ordinary libel does not apply. The only
reference made by R.A. 10175 to the Revised Penal Code is insofar as the
elements of libel are concerned.”

MY TAKE ON THE MATTER:

I have to respect both views. I cannot say that the first point of view is wrong
since it is true that the Supreme Court has stated in the case of Disini et. al.
versus Secretary of Justice et. al. that cyberlibel is actually not a new crime
since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes
it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation
constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. However, it also a reality that
the decisions of the Supreme Court also change in the course of time. While I
respect the first point of view, the ruling of the judge in the Rappler case must
also be given credence. This is how I will argue in favor of the second point of
view.

Given that cyberlibel, under R.A. 10175, is not a new crime, can we squarely
say that it has no difference with libel under the Revised Penal Code? Definitely
not. I respectfully disagree that Section 4(c)(4) merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel because it actually
provided a “different means” of committing cyberlibel. If we say that it affirms,
it means that cyberlibel under R.A. 10175 and libel under RPC would exactly be
the same. Apparently, they are not the same. There are similarities, insofar as
the elements of the crime are concerned, except for the way the two crimes are
committed. Otherwise, Section 4(c)(4) would have been useless. One of the
reasons why Section 4(c)(4) was included in R.A. 10175 is to provide the means
for charging or prosecuting libelous acts committed through the use of
computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the
future.

There is a need for Section 4(c)(4) because prior to it, we cannot charge
libelous acts committed through the use of internet, social media and the likes.
Prior to R.A. 10175, Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code is inadequate to
charge or prosecute libelous acts committed by means of the internet or the
cyberspace because the said means is not among those enumerated under
Article 355 of the RPC. Again, while cyberlibel, under R.A. 10175, is not a new
crime, what law governs cyberlibel? Is it the Revised Penal Code or R.A. 10175?
It is R.A. 10175 because it is the law that states that cyberlibel is committed
through the use of computer system or any other similar means which may be
devised in the future, and not the Revised Penal Code. Are the penalties of
cyberlibel and libel the same? The answer is no because cyberlibel is one degree
higher than ordinary libel.

What law governs the penalty of cyberlibel, is it the Revised Penal Code or R.A.
10175? It is R.A. 10175 because if we use the Revised Penal Code, then the
penalty for cyberlibel and libel would be the same. Cyberlibel may not be a new
crime but it is clear that the two offenses are governed by different laws. The
means of committing libel and its penalty are governed by the Revised Penal
Code. On the other hand, the means of committing cyberlibel and its penalty
are governed by R.A. 10175. Now, since cyberlibel is governed by R.A. 10175,
and said law being a special penal law, without providing prescription, therefore,
Section 1 of Act No. 3326 is controlling and applicable. The RTC judge who
sentenced Maria Ressa may also be correct. To reiterate, cyberlibel may not be
a new crime but still, it is governed by the special law, R.A. 10175, and not by
the Revised Penal Code.

I am not saying that my view is perfectly correct, but this is my stand on the
matter, and at least I made a stand, as a lawyer. I am sure that this article will
be criticized by opposing views, especially from the supporters of Rappler. I
welcome opposing legal points of view. I welcome any contra-opinion from my
brother-lawyers. Let me just clarify that I wrote this article not to share my
political point of view. I do not hate Maria Ressa or Rappler. I am also not a
staunch supporter of the government. This is only for intelligent discussion and
to impart knowledge to non-lawyers.