(10)Hazop Analysis.

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CHAPTER

10
HAZOP ANALYSIS

The technique of Hazard and Operability Studies, or in more common terms

HAZOPS, has been used and developed over approximately four decades for 'identifying
potential hazards and operability problems' caused by 'deviations from the design intent' of
both new and existing process plants.

10.0 Potential Hazard and Operability Problems

You will note the capitalized 'AND' in the heading above. Because of the high
profile of production plant accidents, emphasis is too often placed upon the identification of
hazards to the neglect of potential operability problems. Yet it is in the latter area that
benefits of a Hazop Study are usually the greatest. To quote an example, a study was
commissioned for a new plant. Some two years previously, and for the first time, a similar
study had been carried out on different plant at the same site which was then in the process
of being designed. Before the latest review commenced, the Production Manager
expressed the hope that the same benefits would accrue as before, stating that "in his twenty
years of experience, never had a new plant been commissioned with so few problems, and
no other plant had ever achieved its production targets and break-even position in so short a
time".

10.1 Deviation from Design Intent

To deal firstly with 'design intent', all industrial plant is designed with an overall
purpose in mind. It may be to produce a certain tonnage per year of a particular chemical,
to manufacture a specified number of cars, to process and dispose of a certain volume of
effluent per annum, etc. That could be said to be the main design intent of the plant, but in
the vast majority of cases it would also be understood that an important subsidiary intent
would be to conduct the operation in the safest and most efficient manner possible.
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10.2 The Basic Concept

Essentially the Hazops procedure involves taking a full description of a process and
systematically questioning every part of it to establish how deviations from the design
intent can arise. Once identified, an assessment is made as to whether such deviations and
their consequences can have a negative effect upon the safe and efficient operation of the
plant. If considered necessary, action is then taken to remedy the situation.
This critical analysis is applied in a structured way by the Hazop team, and it relies upon
them releasing their imagination in an effort to discover credible causes of deviations. In
practice, many of the causes will be fairly obvious, such as pump failure causing a loss of
circulation in the cooling water facility mentioned above. However, the great advantage of
the technique is that it encourages the team to consider other less obvious ways in which a
deviation may occur, however unlikely they may seem at first consideration. In this way
the study becomes much more than a mechanistic check-list type of review. The result is
that there is a good chance that potential failures and problems will be identified which had
not previously been experienced in the type of plant being studied.

10.3 The HAZOP Team

The team who will conduct the Hazop study should consist of personnel with a
good understanding of the process and plant to be reviewed. The group should ideally
contain about six members, with perhaps an absolute upper limit being set at nine. In a
study in which both contractor and client are participating, it is desirable to maintain a
balance between the two in terms of team membership so that neither side feels
outnumbered.
The participants should consist of people from a range of disciplines, and this aspect
is one of the strengths of the Hazop methodology:
 With a team of people, each with differing backgrounds and experience, potential
problems are likely to be identified which would be missed by one or two people
working on their own.
 It is often the case that one person's solution can become a problem to another
department within the project. For example, a Process Engineer conducting his own
review in isolation may identify a potential problem for which he considers that
another instrument and alarm would be desirable. When this requirement is passed
to the Control & Instrumentation Engineer, it transpires that no suitable channels are
available within the appropriate section of the electronic control system, which has
already been ordered and is currently being manufactured by the vendor. A
protracted inter-departmental discussion and correspondence then ensues as to
possible alternative remedies, and the potential cost penalty of re-specifying the
control system. All of this could have been settled within a few minutes had both
departments participated in the study.
 A spirit of co-operation and common purpose is engendered which crosses
departmental boundaries, and this will persist even after the Hazop Study has been
completed. Personnel will understand better the views, concerns and constraints
within which other disciplines have to work, and will take these into account when
making decisions affecting the project.
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The actual composition of the Hazop team will vary according to the type of plant
being reviewed. One person who should always be included is a representative from
Operations. He or she should have first hand experience of day-to-day operations on either
the plant being reviewed, or one that is very similar in nature. The contribution of this team
member to the discussion can be invaluable, as it introduces an operational perspective to
other participants who may have never, for example, had to climb down into a vessel
wearing breathing apparatus to carry out repairs or an inspection.
To summarise, a team should be selected so that a balanced approach to the study is
ensured. In addition, the intention should be that questions raised during the meeting can
be answered immediately, rather than having to resort to the time consuming process of
referring to outside expertise. It is not of course necessary for the same people to
participate in the study from beginning to end. If the "core" of the group consisted of five
people, for example, additional members could be called in from session to session as and
when their particular expertise was needed.
As with all group activities, there needs to be a person appointed who will be in
overall charge; with Hazop Studies this person is usually called the Chairman or Study
Leader. Ideally, he should not have been too closely associated with the project under
review as there might be a risk of him not being sufficiently objective in his direction of the
team. As the Chairman's role is of vital importance in the smooth and efficient progress of
the study, he should be carefully chosen and be fully conversant with the Hazop
methodology.
Another important member of the team will be the Secretary. His contribution to
the discussion may well be minimal, as his main function during the sessions will be to
record the study as it proceeds. He will therefore need to have sufficient technical
knowledge to be able to understand what is being discussed.

10.4 HAZOP Analysis of ULSD Plant1

Keeping in view our limitations regarding the HAZOP analysis, what we are
describing in the subsequent text is a very brief overview of potential hazards and
operability problems of our process, their consequences along with additional implications
of these consequences. Then in the end the HAZOP studies for three equipments is
tabulated in table 10.1.
Now, starting from the feed pump which is required to maintain a constant pressure
head of 1100 psia at a constant discharge flow rate, any abnormality in normal operating
conditions of flow, pressure or temperature can cause damage to the impeller of the pump,
which would then result in disturbed head and discharge flow rate. This will directly affect
the reactor operation where there is a process requirement of maintaining the specified
pressure in order to ensure required degree of hydrodesulphurization. Also the low
discharge rates would result in drop of liquid levels in the downstream vessels. If the
discharge valve of pump falls close, the pressure will increase in the pump discharge line
and this would result in damaging the impeller and other pump internals initially but
prevailing this situation for some time would result in explosion and complete pump
failure. If the valve at the inlet of the pump fails close then this will result in the cavitation
of pump. These consequences along with other consequences are given in table 10.1 at the
end of this article.
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Compressor is required to maintain the pressure of treat gas inside the reactor. The
positioning of discharge valve is very critical in case of compressor. If the instrument air of
discharge valve fails and the valve shuts down, this would result in hammering inside the
compressor and since the pressure developed is very high, it would result in compressor
failure which might result in an explosion as well. Also, if the flow rate of coolant in inter-
stage cooler cuts off, the heat generated in single stage of compressor will not be removed,
as a consequence of this the volume of gas entering the next stage will increase and hence,
the compression will decrease. So, not only the discharge pressure will decrease but also
the seals and impellers will be worn out due to excessive heating. This disturbed pressure
will also disturb overall plant operation, due to which the final product composition will
also change. If the inlet valve of the compressor is closed by any means or the flow rate of
make-up gas decreases this will result in low hydrogen partial pressure inside the reactor,
ultimately this can result in destruction of catalyst beds inside the reactor.
The direct fired heater or furnace is the major source of energy in our process. Any
abnormal operation of this unit may have some serious implications to our process. If the
flow rate of fuel increases due to sudden opening of valve, the flame temperature may
drastically increase which could cause an excessive heating and would result in higher
process stream temperature. Higher feed temperature would not only damage our catalyst in
the reactor, which is quite valuable to us, but also disturb product specifications. If the fuel
line ruptures, this will cause leakage of gas which would pose a serious threat of external
fire and less heating of process fluid would disturb reactor conditions. Also, the excessive
heating of furnace tubes may result in excessively high tube skin temperatures and rising of
temperature above a particular value would result in rupturing of tubes. This is a very
serious threat because our process fluid is highly combustible and any possible internal
leakages could result in huge explosion.
Reactor is heart of any process. Since, reactor in our process is a trickle bed reactor;
a uniform flow distribution is required to ensure specified hydrotreating. If the discharge
line of reactor ruptures, this would adversely affect the operation of subsequent separators
because required level of liquid cannot then be maintained. This would result in poor
separation in separators. Any negative change in the flow rate of quench gas will result in
temperature increase in inter-bed spaces, which will result in cintering of catalyst beds.
In hot high pressure separator, a certain level of liquid is required to ensure
equilibrium establishment and separation of gas from liquid. If the discharge line ruptures,
the level of liquid will fall rapidly and not only the separation will disturb because of
difficulty in the establishment of equilibrium but also the next separator will run dry. If the
outlet valve in the liquid discharge line closes, the level of liquid starts to rise inside the
vessel and after some time whole volume will be occupied by liquid leaving no space for
vapors and hence ceases the flow throughout the process. Similarly, if the vapor discharge
valve shuts off, the pressure inside the vessel will increase and would result in vessel
rupturing. If the gas discharge valve fails open, this will result in the drop of pressure inside
the vessel will result in disturbance of equilibrium inside the vessel.
Further separation of vapors from liquid is achieved in cold high pressure separator.
Over head vapors coming from HHPS are condensed and water is added into this stream
before it enters into CHPS. If water supply cuts off, the temperature of vapor liquid stream
entering the separator will increase which will disturb the conditions in CHPS. This would
in turn affect the degree separation. Water is actually added to dissolve NH3 and some H2S
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present in the inlet stream in the form of ammonium sulphide precipitates which could
cause severe corrosion problems. So, the decreased flowrate of water will increase the
corrosion rate in the separator. Here, if the discharge line ruptures or valve malfunctions,
the required level of liquid which should be maintained at certain level to ensure required
separation will drop down posing serious threats to normal operation.
If flow rate of MDEA in absorber is disturbed, this will decrease the H2S removal
and its high concentration in the recycle gas will accelerate the rate of corrosion and will
adversely affect the catalyst inside reactor. Also the low MDEA flow rate may cause the
flooding condition to prevail in the column. If the pressure of MDEA decreases due to any
failure of amine pump, the H2S removal will be largely affected because absorption is
favored at high pressure. If the flowrate if MDEA increases, this can result in weeping of
column.
As already mentioned in the beginning of this article, this is just the bird’s eye view
of HAZOP. Since the complete analysis requires the complete Instrumentation and Control
diagrams, Cause & Effect Charts setting out how control and trip systems operate, Details
of vendor packages if available and Plant layout diagrams. So, all the information given
above may render errors. In the following table HAZOP analysis of feed pump P-100,
make-up gas compressor K-100 and separation vessel V-100 is given.

Table 10.1: HAZOP study results for ULSD process

Equipment Deviations What Event Consequences of Additional
Reference and from Could this Deviation on Implications of
Operating Operating Cause this Item of this
Conditions Conditions Deviation Equipment Consequence
Under
Consideration
Feed Pump P- Flow
100
Less Inlet valve Pump cavitates Damage to pump
closed
Outlet valve Deadhead pump Damage to pump
closed
Line plugs Pump cavitates Damage to pump
FV-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump
closed
FICA-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump
closing FV-1
Drain valve Diesel released
open
More FV-1 fails Upset in Diesel released
open downstream
process
FICA-1 fails Upset in Diesel released
opening FV- downstream
1 process
Pressure
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More Outlet valve Deadhead pump Damage to pump

closed
FV-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump
closed
FICA-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump
closing FV-1
Inlet and Deadhead pump Overpressure in
outlet valve pump or line
closed
Less Inlet valve Pump cavitates Damage to pump
closed
Drain valve Diesel released
open
Temperature
More Outlet valve Deadhead pump Damage to pump
closed
FV-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump
closed
FICA-1 fails Deadhead pump Damage to pump
closing FV-1
Make up gas Flow
compressor K-
100
Less Inlet valve Compressor Damage to
closed surges compressor
Outlet valve Deadhead Damage to
closed compressor compressor
Line plugs Compressor Damage to
surges compressor
FV-2 fails Deadhead Damage to
closed compressor compressor
FICA-2 fails Deadhead Damage to
closing FV-2 compressor compressor
Safety valve Make-up gas
open released
More FV-2 fails Upset in Diesel released
open downstream
process
FICA-2 fails Upset in Diesel released
opening FV- downstream
2 process
Pressure
More Outlet valve Deadhead Damage to
closed compressor compressor
FV-2 fails Deadhead Damage to
closed compressor compressor
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FICA-2 fails Deadhead Damage to

closing FV-2 compressor compressor
Inlet and Deadhead Overpressure in
outlet valve compressor pump or line
closed
Less Inlet valve Compressor Damage to
closed surges compressor
Safety valve Make-up gas
open released
Temperature
More Outlet valve Deadhead Damage to
closed compressor compressor
FV-2 fails Deadhead Damage to
closed compressor compressor
FICA-2 fails Deadhead Damage to
closing FV-2 compressor compressor
Separation Level
Vessel V-100
Less Liquid Disturbance in outlet vapor and
discharge equilibrium liquid
valve fails establishment compositions
open disturb
discharge
line
ruptures.

discharge Disturbance in outlet vapor and

line equilibrium liquid
ruptures. establishment compositions
disturb
Inlet valve Disturbance in outlet vapor and
closes equilibrium liquid
establishment compositions
disturb
More Outlet valve Disturbance in outlet vapor and
closes equilibrium liquid
establishment compositions
disturb
Inlet flow Disturbance in outlet vapor and
increases equilibrium liquid
establishment compositions
disturb
Pressure
Less Vapor outlet Equilibrium is outlet vapor and
valve fail disturbed liquid
open. compositions
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disturb
More Vapor outlet Equilibrium is outlet vapor and
valve fails disturbed liquid
close compositions
disturb
Temperature
Less Temperature Possible vacuum. Thermal stress
of inlet is on tank.
colder than
normal.

More Temperature Excessive vapor Thermal stress

of inlet is stream on tank.
hotter than
normal
External fire Tank fails Reagent released

1
Peters, Max S., Timmerhaus, Klaus D., and West, Ronald E., "Plant Design and Economics for
Chemical Engineers", Fifth Edition, Ch. 2, McGraw-Hill, 2003.