DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen. (Piping General Requirements) - Informative

DEP INFORMATIVE
PIPING - GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

Copyright Shell Group of Companies. No reproduction or networking permitted without license from Shell. Not for resale
DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen.
February 2014
DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE
© 2014 Shell Group of companies

All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, published or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior
written permission of the copyright owner or Shell Global Solutions International BV.
This document has been supplied under license by Shell to:

Shell alex.magtibay@shell.com 08/09/2014 09:09:27
INFORMATIVE DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen.
February 2014
Page 2
PREFACE
DEP (Design and Engineering Practice) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication, of Shell Global Solutions
International B.V. (Shell GSI) and, in some cases, of other Shell Companies.
DEP-Informatives provide the main rationale for certain requirements and recommendations in the companion
DEP-Specification with the same number. DEP-Informatives are intended for internal use by the Principal only.
The right to obtain and to use DEPs is restricted, and is typically granted by Shell GSI (and in some cases by other Shell
Companies) under a Service Agreement or a License Agreement. This right is granted primarily to Shell companies and
other companies receiving technical advice and services from Shell GSI or another Shell Company. Consequently, and
because DEP-Informatives are only intended to be used by representatives of the Principal, two categories of users of
DEP-Informatives can be distinguished:
1) Operating Units having a Service Agreement with Shell GSI or another Shell Company. The use of DEPs by these
Operating Units is subject in all respects to the terms and conditions of the relevant Service Agreement.
2) Other parties who are authorised to use DEPs, subject to appropriate contractual arrangements (whether as part
of a Service Agreement or otherwise).
Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements with users, Shell GSI disclaims
any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage (including injury or death) suffered by any company or person
whomsoever as a result of or in connection with the use, application or implementation of any DEP, combination of DEPs
or any part thereof, even if it is wholly or partly caused by negligence on the part of Shell GSI or other Shell Company. The
benefit of this disclaimer shall inure in all respects to Shell GSI and/or any Shell Company, or companies affiliated to these
companies, that may issue DEPs or advise or require the use of DEPs.
Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual arrangements, DEPs shall
not, without the prior written consent of Shell GSI, be disclosed by users to any company or person whomsoever and the
DEPs shall be used exclusively for the purpose for which they have been provided to the user. They shall be returned after
use, including any copies which shall only be made by users with the express prior written consent of Shell GSI. The
copyright of DEPs vests in Shell Group of companies. Users shall arrange for DEPs to be held in safe custody and Shell
GSI may at any time require information satisfactory to them in order to ascertain how users implement this requirement.
All administrative queries should be directed to the DEP Administrator in Shell GSI.

February 2014
Page 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATIVE .............................................................................................. 4
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO COMPANION DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen. ..................................... 5
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 5
1.3 DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................. 5
1.7 DUAL UNITS ............................................................................................................. 11
2. PIPE SIZING ............................................................................................................. 12
2.3 FINAL PIPE SIZING .................................................................................................. 12
3. PIPING BASICS ....................................................................................................... 14
3.5 PIPING STRESS ANALYSIS AND PIPE SUPPORTING ......................................... 14
3.10 INSTALLATION OF FLANGES................................................................................. 18
3.26 PIPING SYSTEMS IN FREEZING CLIMATES......................................................... 18
4. PIPING ADJACENT TO EQUIPMENT ..................................................................... 18
4.9 PACKAGED EQUIPMENT PIPING .......................................................................... 18
8. PIPING COMPONENTS ........................................................................................... 18
8.1 GENERAL ................................................................................................................. 18
8.3 PIPE JOINTS ............................................................................................................ 18
8.7 ISOLATION ............................................................................................................... 19
8.8 VALVES .................................................................................................................... 19
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A SOCKET WELD PINHOLE/CRACK ............................................................... 20

February 2014
Page 4
INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATIVE
This DEP Informative is the companion to DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen., and provides the
rationale for certain requirements and recommendations in that document.
For clarity, the section and paragraph numbering of DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen. is used in this
document. Where there are no comments regarding a particular paragraph or section,
these have been omitted.
The information in this document is maintained by the custodian responsible for the DEP,
primarily for the following purposes:
• Documentation of the reason or background for certain requirements, particularly
where those requirements have raised questions in the past;
• Inclusion of a PS Table, if applicable, to explain the reasons and give the risk ratings
for requirements if they have been designated as process safety related.
This information can be used as guidance when considering deviation requests.
This is a revision of the DEP Informative of the same number dated September 2013.

February 2014
Page 5
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO COMPANION DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.3 DEFINITIONS
1.3.1 General definitions
Certain requirements in the DEP are considered to be process safety related and are
indicated by the term “SHALL [PS]”. The reasons and risk ratings for those requirements
are summarised below.
PROCESS SAFETY TABLE

Risk Ranking: 5C
Case Description:
Various piping system failures throughout industry have resulted in process safety incidents. One such
incident occurred in the Phillips Chemical Company in Pasadena, Texas in 1989 (due to inappropriate
design of valved equipment isolation, killing 23 and injuring 130 people). Another incident occurred at
Texaco Milford Haven in the UK, where in 1994, a pipe in the flare system broke at an elbow due to
hydraulic surge, injuring 26 people).
Risk Rating
Severity (0 through 5)
Number Section/Clause Process Safety Risk Likelihood (A through E)
P A E R
1. 2.3.4 3 To ensure the integrity of piping systems by avoiding
pressure surges / proper design to avoid failure of 5C 5C
piping systems in pressure surge condition
2.3.4 16 To ensure the integrity of piping systems by avoiding
3. pressure surges / proper design to avoid failure of 5C 5C
6. 3.1 9 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service 5C 5C
12. 3.3 10 To ensure the integrity of piping materials in service. 5C 5C
13. 3.3 12 LoPC 5C 5C
14. 3.3 12 LoPC 5C 5C

February 2014
Page 6
15. 3.3.1.2 1 To ensure safe egress around piping systems in the

5C 5C
event of process safety incidents
16. 3.4.1 11 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
17. 3.4.1 12 To ensure the integrity of electrical and

5C 5C
instrumentation systems in service.
20. 3.4.2 4 To avoid failure of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
21. 3.4.2 5 To avoid failure of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
22. 3.5.1.2 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
25. 3.5.1.2 7 To ensure the integrity of expansion joints in service

5C 5C
and prevent their failure. See LFI GRP-AW-201207.
29. 3.5.1.3.1 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
30. 3.5.1.3.2 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
31. 3.5.1.3.3 c) 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
32. 3.5.1.3.3 c) 3 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
34. 3.5.1.5.1 c)1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
35. 3.6.1 2 To avoid failure of piping systems through

5C 5C
penetrations
36. 3.6.1 2 To avoid failure of piping systems through
5C 5C
penetrations
37. 3.7 2 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C
38. 3.9 h) To avoid the failure of welds and also to ensure the
5C 5C
integrity of piping systems in service.
41. 3.10 5 To avoid consequence due to leakage of flanges. 5C 5C
43. 3.12.6 a) 1 To ensure the integrity of valves of piping systems in

5C 5C
service.
44. 3.13.1 4 To ensure integrity of vent & drains and prevent leaks. 5C 5C
45. 3.13.2 1 To ensure integrity of vent & drains. 5C 5C

February 2014
Page 7
48. 3.14 13 To avoid loss of containment 5C 5C
49. 3.14 13 To avoid loss of containment 5C 5C
51. 3.16 9 To avoid the failure of thermo well connections in

5C 5C
service due to improper design.
54. 3.20 1 To avoid LoPC due to improper relief system design. 5C 5C
59. 4.2.1 2 To avoid failure of piping system due to transmission

5C 5C
of vibrations
60. 4.2.1 3 To avoid failure of piping system due to transmission
5C 5C
of vibrations
66. 4.2.2.4 2 To ensure integrity of vent & drains. 5C 5C
70. 4.2.3 3 To ensure integrity of piping systems in service 5C 5C
75. 4.2.4 1 To avoid consequence due to improper relief system

5C 5C
design.
5C 5C
design.

February 2014
Page 8

5C 5C
design.
79. 4.3 11 To ensure integrity of piping systems in service 5C 5C
86. 4.5 8 To avoid consequence due to accumulation of

5C 5C
hydrocarbons in a confined space
87. 4.7.1 3 To ensure integrity by the selection of proper level
gauges in order to avoid loss of containment due to 5C 5C
wrong selection of level gauges
88. 4.7.2.2.1 3 To ensure integrity by the selection of proper level
89. 4.7.2.2.1 3 To ensure integrity by the selection of proper level
90. 4.7.3.2 2 To ensure integrity of piping systems in service and
prevent loss of hydrocarbons due to level gauge 5C 5C
failure
92. 4.7.3.3 4 To ensure the integrity of level gauges in service. 5C 5C
95. 5.4 3 To avoid contamination of potable water with

hydrocarbons and its consequences of fire hazards in 5C 5C
service
96. 5.4 3 To avoid contamination of potable water with
service
97. 5.4 4 To avoid contamination of industrial water with
service
100. 5.7 2 To avoid consequences due to failure of instrument air

5C 5C
piping systems in service
101. 5.8 4 To avoid contamination of instrument air with
service

February 2014
Page 9
102. 5.9 1 To avoid consequences due to improper opening of

5C 5C
utilities.
103. 6.1 6 To ensure integrity of drains and preventing loss of
5C 5C
containment.
104. 6.1 6 To ensure integrity of drains and preventing loss of
5C 5C
containment.
106. 7.1 2 To avoid consequences due to accumulation of liquid

5C 5C
hydrocarbons in piping systems
107. 7.1 7 Preventing the spread of fires 5C 5C
108. 8.1 1 To ensure integrity of piping components selected for

5C 5C
piping systems
109. 8.1 1 To ensure integrity of piping components selected for
5C 5C
piping systems
110. 8.3.1.2.1 3 Prevent failure resulting in LoPC 5C 5C
111. 8.3.1.2.2 3 To avoid failure of welds and also to ensure the

5C 5C
integrity of piping systems in service
112. 8.3.1.3 b) 1 To ensure the integrity of gaskets in flanged joints
5C 5C
preventing leaks
113. 8.3.1.3 b) 3 To ensure the integrity of gaskets in flanged joints
5C 5C
preventing leaks
114. 8.3.1.3 h) 1 To ensure the integrity of gaskets in flanged joints
5C 5C
preventing leaks
115. 8.3.1.4 5 To ensure integrity of piping components selected for
5C 5C
piping systems
116. 8.3.1.4 9 To ensure integrity of piping components selected for
5C 5C
piping systems
117. 8.3.1.6 1 To avoid the improper usage of piping joints in process
5C 5C
service piping to prevent failures resulting in LoPC
118. 8.4 3 To ensure proper selection and integrity of piping
5C 5C
components in piping systems
119. 8.5 6 To ensure proper selection and integrity of piping
5C 5C
components in piping systems
120. 8.5 9 To ensure integrity and process safety of piping
5C 5C
systems in service
121. 8.7.2.1 1 To ensure integrity and process safety of piping
5C 5C
systems in service
5C 5C
systems in service
5C 5C
systems in service
5C 5C
bullet 1) systems in service
5C 5C
5C 5C

February 2014
Page 10

5C 5C
systems in service
128. 8.7.3.1 3 Exposure to process fluids resulting in harm to
5C 5C
personnel
5C 5C
systems in service
130. 8.8.4.2 10 Exposure to process fluids resulting in harm to
5C 5C
personnel
131. 8.8.4.2 13 Ignition source 5C 5C
132. 8.8.11.1 2 To ensure integrity of valves in service preventing

5C 5C
LoPC
133. 8.8.11.3 1 To ensure integrity of piping systems in hydrogen
5C 5C
service preventing fires and explosions
134. 8.8.11.7 1 To ensure integrity of valves of piping systems in
5C 5C
oxygen service
5C 5C
oxygen service
5C 5C
oxygen service
5C 5C
oxygen service
138. 8.8.11.8 1 To ensure integrity of valves of piping systems in dry
5C 5C
chlorine service
5C 5C
chlorine service
5C 5C
chlorine service
5C 5C
chlorine service
5C 5C
ethylene oxide service
143. 8.8.14.1 1 To ensure integrity of valves in the event of fire
5C 5C
conditions
144. 10.1 3 To avoid the consequences due to leaks under the
insulation and also to detect the leaks in hydrogen 5C 5C
service resulting in fires
145. Appendix 10, 2 To avoid the failure of weld joints in caustic service
5C 5C
10.1.1 piping systems
146. Appendix 10, 2 To avoid the failure of weld joints in caustic service
5C 5C
147. Appendix 10, 1a) To ensure the integrity of piping systems in sulphuric
5C 5C
10.2.1 acid service to avoid failures
5C 5C
5C 5C
5C 5C
151. Appendix 10, 1e)
10.2.1

February 2014
Page 11
152. Appendix 10, 1e)

10.2.1
5C 5C
154. Appendix 10, 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in Chlorine
5C 5C
10.3.1 service to avoid failures resulting in LoPC
5C 5C
5C 5C
5C 5C
158. Appendix 10, 2 To avoid the failure of weld joints in Chlorine service
5C 5C
159. Appendix 10, 3 To avoid the failure of piping systems during start-up
5C 5C
10.3.3
160. Appendix 10, 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in HF service
5C 5C
10.4.1 to avoid failures
161. Appendix 10, 1e) To ensure the integrity of piping systems in HF service
5C 5C
5C 5C
5C 5C
5C 5C
5C 5C
5C 5C
5C 5C
168. Appendix 10, 1 To avoid the failure of weld joints in HF service piping
5C 5C
10.4.2 systems
169. Appendix 10, 1 To ensure integrity of piping components in wet H2S
5C 5C
10.6.2 service
170. Appendix 16, Step-2, To ensure integrity of piping systems in service
5C 5C
16.2 Para-4
171. Appendix 16, 1 To ensure integrity of piping systems in service
5C 5C
16.3
1.7 DUAL UNITS

The conversion of values from the SI system to the corresponding USC values has been
made using an adaptive process (i.e., not an exact mathematical conversion). In some
cases, size substitutions have been made in order to align with available products or
methods customarily used in the US.

February 2014
Page 12
2. PIPE SIZING
2.3 FINAL PIPE SIZING

2.3.2 Reynolds number
The Reynolds number is calculated as follows:
𝜌𝑣𝑑
𝑅𝑒 =
𝜂
(1)
in which: Re = Reynolds number (dimensionless)
3
ρ = density (kg/m3) (lb/ft )
v = average linear flow velocity (m/s) (ft/s)
d = inside diameter of pipe (m) (ft)
∙
η = dynamic viscosity (Pa.s) (lb /ft s)
For pipe with a circular cross section, equation (1) can be written as:
(1a)
in which: qm = mass flow (kg/s) (lb/s)
In terms of kinematic viscosity, equation (1) for Re becomes:
(2)
2
in which kinematic viscosity υ = ƞ / ρ (m2/s) [ft /s]
2.3.4 Pressure surge analysis

Example: On a jetty, an ESD ball valve is installed in a class 150 DN 100 (NPS 4) piping
system at 250 m (820 ft) from the discharge of a shore-based pump - which has a stalling
3
pressure of 5 barg (72.5 psig). The hydrocarbon fluid has a density of 700 kg/m
3
(43.7 lb/ft ). The velocity in the line is 5 m/s (16.4 ft/s).
The surge pressure is estimated at 0.02*250/100*700*0.1 = 17.5 barg, or
0.0052*820/4*43.7*16.4*0.33 = 252 psig.
Maximum possible surge pressure is 10-5*1100*700*5 = 38.5 barg, or
21.6*10-5*3600*43.7*16.4 = 557 psig. This value is not exceeded, hence the system is
responsive to valve closing time.
The limit of a class 150 piping system is 19.2 barg (278 psig). Operating pressure plus
surge pressure is 22.5 barg (357.5 psig).
Surge pressure is also higher than operating pressure and in the negative pressure wave
cavitation is expected.
Also, the expected surge pressure exceeds that of the class rating and a detailed surge
pressure analysis has to be performed.

February 2014
Page 13
Derivation for:
2L
Psurge = × ρv fluid × v effective valve closure
D
Rewritten as:
2𝐿
𝑃𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒 = × 𝜌 × 𝑣0 × 𝑣𝑣
𝐷
Joukowski equation:
𝑃𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒 = 𝑐 × 𝜌 × ∆𝑣
Wave return period:
2𝐿
𝑡=
𝑐
2𝐿
𝑐=
𝑡
If the valve closes within the wave return period, the velocity change equals the flow
velocity and surge is at maximum.
If, on the other hand, the valve is still travelling when the wave returns, the velocity change
is less.
Combining top two equations:
2𝐿
𝑃𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒 = × 𝜌 × ∆𝑣
𝑡
Velocity change at time t:
∆𝑣 = 𝑣0 − 𝑣𝑡
Fluid velocity at time t is a function of the valve opening fraction (taking linearized response
characteristic at final closing stage:
𝑣𝑡 = 𝑣0 × %𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛
Valve opening fraction is a function of valve travel S after t seconds:
𝑆𝑡
%𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 1 −
𝐷
Valve travel S after t seconds is a function of valve closing speed and elapsed time:
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣 × 𝑡
Combining above equations:
𝑣𝑣 × 𝑡
∆𝑣 = 𝑣0 − 𝑣0 × �1 − �
𝐷
𝑣𝑣 × 𝑡
∆𝑣 = 𝑣0 ×
𝐷
Substituting velocity change in the wave return period in the equation for surge pressure
above:
2𝐿
𝑃𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒 = × 𝜌 × 𝑣0 × 𝑣𝑣
𝐷

February 2014
Page 14
3. PIPING BASICS
3.5 PIPING STRESS ANALYSIS AND PIPE SUPPORTING

3.5.1 Piping stress analysis

February 2014
Page 15
3.5.1.4 Stress analysis critical line list

The critical line list/lines to be analysed using computer techniques/ manual method derived based on Figure-1.
>600 >315
550 290
500 260
450 230
400 200
350 175
300 150
250 120
200 93
150 65
100 40
50 10
0 ‐18
‐20 ‐29
‐50 ‐45
DN 50 DN 80 DN 100 DN 150 DN 200 DN 250 DN 300 DN 350 DN 400 DN 450 DN 500 DN 600 > DN 600
°F °C NPS 2 NPS 3 NPS 4 NPS 6 NPS 8 NPS 10 NPS 12 NPS 14 NPS 16 NPS 18 NPS 20 NPS 24 > NPS 24
Figure-1
Legend:
- Formal analysis (Computerised)
- Formal analysis (manual method)
- By inspection

February 2014
Page 16
3.5.1.5 Analysis
General
Guidelines are provided for the partitioning and closure of computer models in the
execution of rigorous stress analyses of critical piping systems.
Partitioning (or de-coupling) of computer models may be necessary because:
1. The piping system has to be split-up in subsections for analysis purposes, i.e.,
part of the piping system in subject to 'authority' approval.
2. The system contains a scope division that is not at a full anchor.
Accurate description of the end conditions (model-closure) is an important part of system
modelling and may be necessary because:
• The piping model requires the introduction of thermal anchor displacements.
• There are several assessment node-points in the end connection piping model.
The overlapping and modelling criteria specified are based on established engineering
experience, and advanced discernments of available modelling techniques. Criteria should
be considered to yield acceptable and moreover realistic results.
Overlapping
Truncation (or de-coupling) of a piping system for computer purposes is a simplification of
the actual situation and results in a loss of accuracy in the calculated results, unless the
cut-off or split-up boundaries coincide with full anchors or rigid end connections.
Therefore, pipe stress analysis de-coupling problems can be very complicated. It is,
therefore, recommended to anticipate de-coupling in the design phase. The support
location and function arrangement is to be chosen in such a way that a support function can
easily be added or deleted for de-coupling purpose.
Criteria are formulated to check whether the truncated and/or split-up boundaries for
various parts of a partitioned piping model have been selected properly, also a group of
simple modelling examples of typical end connections are included to illustrate a number of
boundary condition applications and their proper modelling. This is to avoid unconservative
results.
In particular, the overlapping techniques for rigorous piping analysis (run-pipe - run pipe/run
pipe - branch) are emphasized for the split-ups given in Figure 2.
Rigorous versus Rigorous Piping Analysis split up guidelines

Dl/D2 ≈ 1.0: Rigorous pipe with diameter D1 in Line with rigorous pipe with diameter D2
Boundaries: for both pipe run (D1 and D2) models
The overlap split-point is selected at a rigid axial restraint and the overlapping pipe sections
in each model should extend over at least 3 rigid restraints in the adjacent pipe sections
(preferably not equally spaced). This should cover at least 3 translations and 2 rotational
degrees of freedom for free body movements of the overlap region.

February 2014
Page 17
Figure 2
NOTE:
Statically (as well as dynamically), the mechanical quantities (displacements, forces,
stresses) in the neighbourhood of an overlap in general are poorly predicted, since the
model is not a good representation of the physical reality.
Therefore, cut-offs and overlaps are to be avoided in areas where critical conditions are
expected.
Moreover, if possible, overlaps and cuts should be shifted along the piping system and the
results of the various computations should be compared carefully (sensitivity analysis).
d/D > 0.25: Rigorous Branch with diameter d branches off Rigorous Run pipe with
diameter D
Boundaries: in pipe run model (D)
• Include into pipe run model (D) an overlap with the branch pipe (d)
(displacements and applicable Stress Intensification Factors (SlFs) at the branch
connection to be calculated correctly by the computer program) and a sufficient
number of rigid restraints in each of the three orthogonal directions (two rigid
restraints in three orthogonal directions should be considered as a minimum).
Boundaries: in branch line model (d)
• Include into branch line model (d) sufficient overlap with run pipe model D
including all supports up to and including the first axial stop (or 3-way stop). The
other side of the branch-connection of pipe run model (d) should include the first
axial guide (or rest support) as a minimum.
d/D < 0.25: Rigorous Branch with diameter d branches off Rigorous run pipe with
diameter D
Boundaries: in pipe run model (D)
• Do not model any portion of branch line.
• Include SIF at location of branch connection.
• Locate lateral support (rigid) near the branch connection.
Boundaries: in the branch line model (d)
• Model anchor at branch connection.

February 2014
Page 18
• Include stress intensification factor (SIF) at branch-header interface (obtained by

manual calculation).
• Apply displacements at branch connection from run (D) analysis.
3.10 INSTALLATION OF FLANGES

3.10.1 Flange joints in severe operating conditions
Under these circumstances, it is possible that flanges start leaking after some time, and
often within 1000 hours after start up. This may be caused by bolt relaxation or creep.
Other possible causes of flange leakage may be pipe stress problems, improper flange
alignment, incorrect torquing, wrong tightening procedure, wrong type of gasket or
damaged flange facings.
3.26 PIPING SYSTEMS IN FREEZING CLIMATES

Equipment and piping systems that are idle, temporarily or permanently, can form a ‘dead
leg’ if not positively isolated from the operational portions of the process. Water may
accumulate in dead legs due to separation and settling of water from a wet hydrocarbon
stream, or from process upsets which result in excessive water.
4. PIPING ADJACENT TO EQUIPMENT
4.9 PACKAGED EQUIPMENT PIPING

The Principal should ensure derogation to DEM1 requirements (that are made) follow all
requirements of HSSE and SP Control Framework for using alternative standards, including
completion of and documenting the risk analysis showing the project specification meets
ALARP.
8. PIPING COMPONENTS
8.1 GENERAL
Surveillance requirements
Use of Pipe, Fitting, flange and fastener (PFF) Manufacturers listed in Technically Accepted
Manufacturers and Products (TAMAP) should be the first choice for purchase of PFF
components.
A quality assurance (QA) process is required to ensure procurement of special piping
components. The piping engineer shall include additional surveillance requirements from
any additional key items of the design, fabrication and testing to ensure the final product
meets the purchase order requirements.
Additional information may also be found in DEP 82.00.10.10-Gen.
8.3 PIPE JOINTS

8.3.1 Metallic piping
8.3.1.2 Socket welding
8.3.1.2.1 Selection
The lack of practical volumetric NDE techniques for the inspection of socket welds leaves
an increased risk to porosity and pinholes or lack of fusion and cracks. To assess the
consequences of cracks and pinholes in sour service, a 1 mm (0.04 in) hole is considered
credible.
A choked flow rate is calculated which is subsequently used in an advection diffusion model
to determine the tolerable distance to source. The tolerable consequence class is

February 2014
Page 19
considered as “minor injury”, which corresponds to a tolerable H2S exposure of 100 ppm or
0.15 g/s.
The conclusion is that for a personnel exposure distance of 1.5 m (5 ft) to a leak source of
1 mm, the H2S partial pressure needs to remain below 5 bar (70 psi) not to exceed the
tolerable H2S concentration of 100 ppm and avoid minor injury.
Reference is made to (Appendix A) of this document for details.
8.7 ISOLATION
8.7.2 Standard isolation
8.7.2.2 Double valve isolation
In case the faulty relief valve cannot be successfully isolated, the spare relief valve can be
lined up with the faulty RV blocked in.
In case the spare RV starts passing, its block valves may allow successful isolation and
replacement.
When the spare relief valve cannot be successfully isolated, the plant has to shutdown and
depressurise.
8.8 VALVES
8.8.11 Additional service related requirements
8.8.11.7 Oxygen service
Valves selected in piping classes for oxygen service are “Butterfly valves, swing check
valves, wedge gate valves and globe valves”, these valves have robust thickness’s for each
component to provide for adequate heat sink and cavities that are easy to oxygen clean.
Trunion mounted ball valves and dual plate check valves contain thin wall components
(e.g., springs) that are not made of exempt materials.

February 2014
Page 20
APPENDIX A SOCKET WELD PINHOLE/CRACK
A.1 SUMMARY
The lack of practical volumetric NDE techniques for the inspection of socket welds leaves
an increased risk to porosity and pinholes or lack of fusion and cracks. To assess the
consequences of cracks and pinholes in sour service, a 1 mm (0.04 in) hole is considered
credible.
A choked flow rate is calculated which is subsequently used in an advection diffusion model
to determine the tolerable distance to source. The tolerable consequence class is
considered as “minor injury”, which corresponds to a tolerable H2S exposure of 100 ppm or
0.15 g/s.
The conclusion is that for a personnel exposure distance of 1.5 m (5 ft) to a leak source of 1
mm, the H2S partial pressure needs to remain below 5 bar (70 psi) not to exceed the
tolerable H2S concentration of 100 ppm and avoid minor injury.
A.2 CHOKED FLOW

Choked mass flow is expressed as:
𝜅+1
𝜋 2 𝜅−1
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝐷2 �𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡 ∙ 𝜌 ∙ 𝜅 � �
4 𝜅+1
𝑘𝑔
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 [ �𝑠]
𝐷 = 𝑝𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 [𝑚]
𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 [𝑃𝑎]
𝑘𝑔
𝜌 = 𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 [ �𝑚3 ]
𝜅 = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 [−]
-3
With D = 10 m and κ = 1.4:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 5.375 × 10−7 �𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡 ∙ 𝜌
A.3 IDEAL GAS LAW

The ideal gas law is expressed as:
𝑅
𝑃=𝜌 𝑇
𝑀
𝑃 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 [𝑃𝑎]
𝑔
𝜌 = 𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 [ �𝑚3 ]

February 2014
Page 21
𝐽
𝑅 = 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 = 8.314 [ �𝑚𝑜𝑙 ∙ 𝐾 ]
𝑇 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 [𝐾]
𝑔
𝑀 = 𝑚𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 � �𝑚𝑜𝑙 �
3
With R = 8.314 J/molK, T = 298 K (room temperature) and M = 24 g/mol and ρ in kg/m :
𝜌 = 9.7 × 10−6 ∙ 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
A.4 IDEAL GAS LAW AND CHOKED FLOW COMBINED

With:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 5.375 × 10−7 �𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡 ∙ 𝜌
And:
𝜌 = 9.7 × 10−6 ∙ 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
Choked flow can be expressed as:

𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 1.67 × 10−9 ∙ 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
Or with mass flow in g/s:

𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 1.67 × 10−6 ∙ 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
A.5 TOXIN EXPOSURE LIMITS

The HSE RAM Matrix defines a Minor Injury as: “Lost time injury. Affecting work
performance, such as restriction to activities or a need to take a few days to fully recover
(maximum one week)”.
For H2S, the following limits cause minor injury:
• 50–100 ppm leads to eye damage.
• At 100–150 ppm the olfactory nerve is paralyzed after a few inhalations, and the
sense of smell disappears, often together with awareness of danger
An exposure to 100 ppm is taken here to likely cause Minor Injury as the maximum
tolerable exposure for a SIL 2 system (double valve isolation).
3
100 ppm H2S is equivalent to a concentration of 0.15 g/m in air 1.
1 3
According www.lenntech.com, it is 0.15 g/m

February 2014
Page 22
A.6 MOLECULAR DIFFUSION

Molecular diffusion is governed by Fick's second law, by which the principle of mass
preservation requires time domain concentration changes to result in spatial concentration
changes:
𝜕𝐶 𝜕2𝐶
=𝐷 2
𝜕𝑡 𝜕𝑥
3
C = Concentration of the toxin in air [g/m ]
t = Time [s]
x = Distance from the point source [m]
2
D = Molecular diffusion coefficient [m /s]
The diffusion coefficient for H2S in air can be estimated using Table 59 of Yaws' Critical
Property Data for Chemical Engineers and Chemists:
-5 2
DH2S = 1.819 10 m /s
For infinite media and a continuous constant point source, Fick's second law is solved as:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑥 𝑟
𝐶= 𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐
4𝜋𝐷𝑟 √4𝐷𝑡
m& g ,tox = mass flux of toxin [g/s]
r = distance from the point source [m]
For the steady state situation at t = ∞ (which, in practice, is reached after a few minutes),
the erfc function becomes unity and the equation simplifies to:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑥
𝐶=
4𝜋𝐷𝑟
Or:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑥
𝑟=
4𝜋𝐷𝐶
A.7 SHEAR AUGMENTED DIFFUSION

Adequate ventilation is a reference condition used extensively, defined in a number of
Codes worldwide and particularly offshore as ‘the achievement of a uniform ventilation rate
of at least 12 air changes/hr, with no stagnant area. From API 505, it can be derived that
adequate ventilation in a 10 ft x 10 ft x 10 ft room is achieved with an air flow or draft of
0.01 m/s.
Advection creates shear flow that increases the effective diffusivity. The effect is called
Taylor Dispersion.
The phenomenon is equivalent to the difference between conductive and convective heat
transfer.
The Taylor dispersion coefficient of a flow with velocity v in a circular cross section cylinder
with diameter d is a function of the molecular diffusion coefficient DM and the Péclet number
(Pe):

February 2014
Page 23
𝑃𝑒 2
𝐷𝑇 = 𝐷𝑀 �1 + �
192
𝑣∙𝑑
𝑃𝑒 =
𝐷𝑀
The equivalent diameter d of a square cross section L is:
d = 1.093 * L.
For L = 3.05 m, d = 3.33 m.
-5 2
With molecular diffusion coefficient DM = 1,819 10 m /s, characteristic velocity v = 0.01
m/s and characteristic length d = 3.33 m, Pe becomes:
Pe = 1830.7
Hence, DT becomes:
2
DT = 0.32 m /s
In area classification standards, outside (open air) environments are considered better
ventilated.
The target mass flux leaking from a pinhole is expressed as:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑥 = 4𝜋𝑟𝐷𝑇 𝐶
With DT = 0.32 m2/s and C = 0.15 g/s (100 ppm):
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑥 = 0.6 𝑟
For a distance of 1.5 m (5 ft) from source the tolerable toxin mass flux becomes:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑥 = 0.9 𝑔/𝑠

February 2014
Page 24
A.8 CHOKED FLOW AND SHEAR AUGMENTED DIFFUSION COMBINED

The toxin/total mass flow ratio is directly proportional with the ratio of toxin partial pressure
over total pressure:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑥 𝑃𝑝,𝐻2𝑆
=
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑡 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
With:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑥 = 0.9 𝑔/𝑠
And:
𝑚̇𝑔,𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 1.67 × 10−6 ∙ 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
The tolerable toxin pressure becomes:
0.9 𝑃𝑝,𝐻2𝑆
=
1.67 × 10−6 ∙ 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
Or:
𝑃𝑝,𝐻2𝑆 = 5 × 105 [𝑃𝑎]


DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen. (Piping General Requirements) - Informative

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen. (Piping General Requirements) - Informative

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DEP INFORMATIVE

PIPING - GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE

© 2014 Shell Group of companies

This document has been supplied under license by Shell to:

This document has been supplied under license by Shell to:

This document has been supplied under license by Shell to:

This document has been supplied under license by Shell to:

INFORMATION PERTAINING TO COMPANION DEP 31.38.01.11-Gen.

PROCESS SAFETY TABLE

7. 3.2 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service 5C 5C

8. 3.2 4 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service 5C 5C

9. 3.2 4 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service 5C 5C

10. 3.2 9 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service 5C 5C

11. 3.2 10 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service 5C 5C

12. 3.3 10 To ensure the integrity of piping materials in service. 5C 5C

13. 3.3 12 LoPC 5C 5C

14. 3.3 12 LoPC 5C 5C

This document has been supplied under license by Shell to:

15. 3.3.1.2 1 To ensure safe egress around piping systems in the

17. 3.4.1 12 To ensure the integrity of electrical and

19. 3.4.1 13 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

20. 3.4.2 4 To avoid failure of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

21. 3.4.2 5 To avoid failure of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

22. 3.5.1.2 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

23. 3.5.1.2 6 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

24. 3.5.1.2 6 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

25. 3.5.1.2 7 To ensure the integrity of expansion joints in service

27. 3.5.1.2 10 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

28. 3.5.1.2 14 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

29. 3.5.1.3.1 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

30. 3.5.1.3.2 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

31. 3.5.1.3.3 c) 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

32. 3.5.1.3.3 c) 3 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

33. 3.5.1.4 3 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

34. 3.5.1.5.1 c)1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

35. 3.6.1 2 To avoid failure of piping systems through

40. 3.9 8 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

41. 3.10 5 To avoid consequence due to leakage of flanges. 5C 5C

42. 3.12.1 2 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

43. 3.12.6 a) 1 To ensure the integrity of valves of piping systems in

45. 3.13.2 1 To ensure integrity of vent & drains. 5C 5C

This document has been supplied under license by Shell to:

46. 3.13.2 2 To ensure integrity of vent & drains. 5C 5C

47. 3.13.2 2 To ensure integrity of vent & drains. 5C 5C

48. 3.14 13 To avoid loss of containment 5C 5C

49. 3.14 13 To avoid loss of containment 5C 5C

50. 3.14 17 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

51. 3.16 9 To avoid the failure of thermo well connections in

53. 3.19 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

54. 3.20 1 To avoid LoPC due to improper relief system design. 5C 5C

55. 3.23 2 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

56. 3.23 2 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

57. 3.26 2 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

58. 4.1 1 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

59. 4.2.1 2 To avoid failure of piping system due to transmission

62. 4.2.2.1 4 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

63. 4.2.2.1 4 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

64. 4.2.2.2 2 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

65. 4.2.2.2 4 To ensure the integrity of piping systems in service. 5C 5C

66. 4.2.2.4 2 To ensure integrity of vent & drains. 5C 5C

67. 4.2.2.4 4 To ensure integrity of vent & drains. 5C 5C

68. 4.2.2.4 5 To ensure integrity of vent & drains. 5C 5C

69. 4.2.2.4 6 To ensure integrity of vent & drains. 5C 5C