Article 2-25

Cosca v. Palaypayon, A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B.
Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server).
Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B.
Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite
of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco
Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga;
Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte.

As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and
did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after
the marriage ceremony.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of
the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage
contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order
to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed
with the civil registrar.

The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign
their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included.

It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant
Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga,
Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the
absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid
embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon was valid.

RULING: No. Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license
along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the
photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their
marriage.

Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the
solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living
together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite.
With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of
marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of
the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court
held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between
Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage
license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint
affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years
already.

However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months
and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got
married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old
when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been
aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have
executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.

Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal
requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

—-
Navarro v. Domagtoy, AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996
Facts
Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Navarro, filed an administrative case against MCTC Judge
Domagtoy for gross misconduct and inefficiency in office and ignorance of law on grounds of
solemnizing the wedding of Tagadan and Borga while the groom is merely separated from his
first wife; and the wedding between Sumaylo and del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction.

Judge Domagtoy sought exculpation for the marriage of Tagadan for his reliance on the affidavit
stating that Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost 7 years. For the
marriage of Sumaylo, Judge Tagadan averred that the exceptions enumerated in Article 8 apply
to the same.

Issue: Whether Judge Tagadan is administratively liable for solemnizing the two
aforementioned marriages (YES)

Ruling
For the wedding of Tagadan:
The court held that even if the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is a
mandatory requirement in order to contract a subsequent marriage.

In the case at bar, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, Tagadan remains married
to his first wife. Hence, Tagadan’s subsequent marriage is bigamous and therefore void as per
Article 35 of the Family Code because of Tagadan’s subsisting marriage with his first wife.
For the marriage of Sumaylo:
The court held that as per Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent member of
the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction. Article 8 is a directory provision that refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing
officer. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his
residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away

An appellate court Justice or a Justice of the SC has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites are complied with.
Judges appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond.

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is irregularity in the
formal requisite under Article 3 which may not affect the validity of the marriage but may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability.

A marriage can be held outside the Judge’s chambers only in the following
circumstances:
1. At the point of death
2. In remote places in accordance with Article 29
3. Upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect

In the case at bar, Judge Domagtoy’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he is not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

Judge Domagtoy is suspended for 6 mos.

—-

Beso v. Daguman, A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint wherein the respondent Judge stands charged with
Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a complaint affidavit, Beso charged Judge Daguman
with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and neglecting not retaining a copy and not
registering the marriage contract with the Office of Local Registrar. The solemnizing of marriage
happened in the Judge's residence in Calbayog City, Samar.

Beso was abandoned by her husband without any reason at all so she inquired about her
marriage contract at the office of Civil registrar and discovered that their marriage was not
registered. She wrote a letter to the respondent Judge and she was informed that all the copies
of their marriage contract were all taken by Bernardito, her husband.

In his Comment, the civil marriage was held outside his territory as municipal Judge because he
was indisposed and unable to report to his station, that without prior appointment, Beso and Mr.
Yman unexpectedly came to his residence, urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage
right then and there, first because Beso was scheduled to fly abroad on the same day; second,
marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems; third, Beso would be out of the
country for too long and their marriage license would lapse; fourth, it would complicate her work
abroad, if the parties beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage.
The respondent Judge averred that after a few days following the wedding, respondent
gathered all the papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the
premises and private files, all the three last copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly,
respondent invited by subpoena Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents and he said
he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the
wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact complainant for a confirmation of Mr.
Yman’s claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Judge may solemnize marriage outside the area of his jurisdiction.

RULING: No. The presiding Judge has the authority to solemnize marriage limited only to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.
There are only three instances as provided by Article 8 of Family Code wherein marriage may
be solemnized outside his chamber, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers
or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was
prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant
was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official
attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in
solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was
leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated
for citizens to get married."

A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also be conscientious and thorough
in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office, should be more
circumspect in the performance of their duties.

A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or
jurisdiction of his court. Thus the respondent Judge should be reminded that a priest
who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to
do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate
in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.

—-
ARANES VS OCCIANO
FACTS:

Respondent Judge was requested by a certain Arroyo to solemnize the marriage of petitioner
Arañes and Dominador Orobia, who was a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Respondent Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the MTC of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. Judge Occiano was later asked if he could solemnize the marriage in Nabua,
Camarines Sur, as Orobia had difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of traveling from
to Balatan which is 25 km away from Orobia’s residence. Judge Occiano accepted the request.
However, on the day of the wedding, he discovered that the parties did not possess the required
marriage license and requested the parties to reset the wedding date. But he also feared the
resetting might aggravate the condition of Orobia who just suffered a stroke. Due to the earnest
pleas of the parties and the arrival of the visitors, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. But he did warn the parties that their failure to provide him the required
marriage license would render the marriage void.

So, on the strength of this marriage, Arañes and Orobia lived as husband and wife until
Orobia passed away. Since the marriage was null and void, the petitioner was not able to inherit
the properties left by Orobia and was deprived of receiving his pensions. Arañes claims that
the Judge’s illegal acts and misrepresentations allegedly caused her so many
hardships, sufferings and embarrassment.

ISSUE:

W/N the Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing the Arañes’ marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and conducting marriage outside his jurisdiction. (YES)

RULING:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and
Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by
law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage
of the petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
—-
People v. Bustamante, G.R. No. L-11598, January 27, 1959

FACTS
Charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Federico Bustamante appealed to this Court on points of law. The records disclose that
defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria Perez on August 9, 1954,
before the Justice of the Peace of Binalonan, Pangasinan. A little over a year later, or on
September 16, 1955, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria Tibayan, solemnized before
Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as Mayor of the
said Municipality, while the first marriage was still subsisting. Defendant dwelt with Demetria
and her parents for about a month, after which a time he returned to Calasiao, Pangasinan to live
with the first wife, Maria Perez. In the course of her search for him, Demetria discovered from
the Binalonan municipal authorities the previous marriage of defendant Bustamante. Hence, this
accusation. It appears that Enrique Aquino and Francisco Nato were the duly elected mayor and
vice-mayor, respectively, of the municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan in the elections of 1951.
On September16, 1955, Aquino went on leave of absence for one month. In view of this, the
vice-mayor was designed by the mayor to take over the rein of municipal government during his
absence; and Nato was acting in this capacity when he performed the second marriage of
Bustamante with Demetria Tibayan Appellant, relying upon article 56 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines
Bustamante Contends that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was
merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do
so. He lays stress on the distinction made by this court in the case
Salaysay vs. Hon. Fred Ruiz Castro, et al., between "Acting Mayor" and "Vice-Mayor acting as
Mayor", urging that while the former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the solemnization of marriage performed by Francisco Nato was valid?
(2) Whether or not the Vice Mayor Nato has the authority to solemnize marriages.
RULING:

(1) Yes, the marriage was valid.

The information charges that the appellant contracted the second marriage before the
Justice of the Peace of Mapandan, Pangasinan, while the (2nd marriage between him and
Demetia) marriage certificate, Exh. "B", and the testimonies of witnesses indicate clearly that it
was performed by Francisco Nato. The wrong averment, if at all, was unsubstantial and
immaterial that need not even be alleged, for it matters not who solemnized the marriage, it being
sufficient that the information charging bigamy alleges that a second marriage was contracted
while the first still remained undissolved (so the information charging Bustamante with
Bigamy was proper). The information filed in this case which properly states the time and place
of the second wedding, was sufficient to apprise the defendant of the crime imputed. Neither
procedural prejudice nor error was committed by the lower court in finding appellant guilty.

(2) Yes. When the issue involves the assumption of powers and duties of the office of the mayor
by the vice-mayor, when proper, it is immaterial whether it because the latter(Nato) is the Acting
Mayor or merely acting as Mayor, for in both instances, he discharges all the duties and wields
the power appurtenant to said office (Laxamana vs. Baltazar,1 48 Off. Gaz., No. 9, 3869; Sec.
2195, Revised Administrative Code). As correctly observed by the lower court, that case even
concedes and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice-Mayor
whenever the
latter is in an acting capacity. The word "acting" as held in the case of Austria vs. Amante,2 45
Off. Gaz., 2809, when preceding the title of an office connotes merely the temporary character or
nature of the same.

—-
Vda De Chua V CA, GR. No. 116835, March5, 1998
FACTS:
Roberto Chua and Florita Vallejo lived out of wedlock from 1970 to 1981 and bore two
illegitimate sons, namely Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo. On 1992,
Chua died intestate in Davao City.
Thereafter, respondent Vallejo filed in a RTC Cotabato City a petition for declaration of
heirship and guardianship of persons and properties to their minor sons. On July 1992,
petitioner Antonietta Chua represented herself as the surviving spouse of deceased Chua
and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at
the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City is the proper forum.
Vallejo opposed the motion and argued that deceased Chua died as a bachelor, and was
only to the abovementioned children; that petitioner is a mere pretender to the estate, a
not the surviving spouse of deceased Chua as the latter did not contract any marriage
with any woman. However, petitioner submitted a photocopy of their alleged marriage
contract, certificate of titles, resident certificate and income tax return as a proof of their
alleged marriage.
The trial court however, rendered a decision appointing respondent Florita Vallejo as the
guardian of the persons and properties of the two minor children. Petitioner Chua filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Chua was the wife of deceased Chua?

HELD: NO. Petitioner Chua was not able to prove her status as the wife of the
decedent.

[Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is
material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.]

The best proof of marriage is an authenticated marriage contract where petitioner

failed to produce. A certificate of title and other similar documents does not hold water.
Moreover, a photocopy of the marriage certificate which petitioner Chua presented is a
violation of the “best evidence rule.”
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is
not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or
otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:
Section 4. Opposition to petition for administration – Any interested person, may by
filing a written opposition, contest the petition on .the ground of incompetency of the
person for whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the
contestant’s own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself,
or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is
material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.

—-
Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998

FACTS:
On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint for partition and damages
against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of
First Instance of Aklan, Branch I. On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page
decision in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed the trial court’s decision on the ground that
petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to
each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. Patricio Trinidad and
Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix.
When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of
land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan. Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943,
claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Sometime after the
marriage, he demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three equal shares and to
give him the (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused. Arturio Trinidad
filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son
of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he
died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with
them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in
the produce of the land. Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardo
testified that Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and
Lourdes as the uncle and aunt of Arturio; and also identified pictures where the respondents
were with Arturio and his family.(At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and
he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad.) Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72
years old and a widow testified that she knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio
Trinidad; that she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the parents of Arturio and
that she was present when they were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant
pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was
presented as a witness. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism, and a certificate of loss issued by the LCR that
his birth certificate was burned during World War 2. He also testified that he lived with Felix and
Lourdes and provided for his needs.
On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that Inocentes was not
married when he died in the 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she was not aware that
his brother married anybody and denied that Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also
testified that Inocentes died in 1941, and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to
Inocentes. The trial court rendered a twenty page decision in favor of Arturio. The CA reversed
the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parent’s marriage and his
filation. YES
RULING: The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio's real properties
requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's estate. His
right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a
valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father
(Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and,
thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
Filiation may be proven by the following:
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.
The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a
co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on
whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his
mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes).
When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would
constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public
and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the CivilRegistrar of
Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned or destroyed
during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. Although the marriage contract is
considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not
proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In
place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren
and Jovita Gerardo. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and
Felicidad were named as the child’s father and mother, and family pictures.
The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondent’s
self- serving negations.
Disposition:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision is REINSTATED.

—-
Sy v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127263, April 12, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22
years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who
were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware
business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses
lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However,
their son Frederick transferred to his father’s residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on
May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father.

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to— a petition for separation of property.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of
their children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by
him when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was
talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal
separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then
filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological
incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she
assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage . It
appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; (YES)
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity. (YES)

Ruling:
 The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974
 The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish,
on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent
 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the
marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. (it was only 1 year after the
marriage when marriage license and certificate have been issued.)
 A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void
ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent
ever resided in Carmona.
  From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on
September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November
15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these
dates on record.
 The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no
longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.

—-
Delgado Vda. De la Rosa v. Heirs of Mariciana Rustia Vda. De Damian
G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006
FACTS:

Josefa Delgado was one of the five children of Felisa Delgado with one Lucio Campo. Felisa
and Lucio lived without the benefit of marriage. Felisa also had a child with one Ramon Osorio,
named Luis Delgado. This time, their relationship was in dispute. Josefa died intestate and was
survived by Guillermo Rustia, her husband, and petitioners who are her nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces. Guillermo and Josefa had no children, so they took home
Guillermina Rustia and Nanie Rustia, their children who were never legally adopted (ampun
ampunan). Guillermo was able to file a petition for their adoption. However, Guillermo managed
to father an illegitimate child, Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. Guillerma alleged
that Guillermo treated her as his daughter and his own flesh and blood. Like Josefa, Guillermo
died without a will and was survived by respondents who are his sisters and the children of
his predeceased brother. The petitioners contend that Josefa and Guillermo lived together as
husband and wife but were never married. Respondents, however, contend that the absence
of a marriage certificate did not necessarily mean that no marriage existed. Respondents
also contend that Guillerma had no interest in the estate of Guillermo since she was
never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.

ISSUES:

1. May the petitioners and Guillermo Rustia inherit from Josefa Delgado?

2. May Luis Delgado, Josefa Delgado’s half-brother, inherit from her?

3. May Guillerma Rustia inherit from Guillermo Rustia?

4. May Guillermina and Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan, inherit from Guillermo Rustia?

HELD:

1. YES, the petitioners( nephews and nieces) and Guillermo Rustia may inherit from Josefa
Delgado. Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes
place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently,
it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Also, under Article 1001 of the same
code, should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other one-half. The petitioners are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who
are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who
were still alive at the time of her death. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.
The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the
surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance
with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code. Hence, the petitioners and Guillermo Rustia may inherit
from Josefa Delgado.

2. YES, Luis Delgado, Josefa Delgado’s half-brother, may inherit from her. The law prohibits
reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent,
even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent
different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should be allowed,
even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling
the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not
apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in
category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the
children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons.
They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of halfblood
relation. Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may
inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
Therefore, Luis Delgado, Josefa Delgado’s half-brother, may inherit from her.

3. NO, Guillerma Rustia may not inherit from Guillermo Rustia . Under the old Civil Code (which
was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This
draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain
successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized
or acknowledged by the parent. Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases: (1) in cases of rape,
abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the
conception; (2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family; (3) when the child was
conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; (4) when the
child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. On the other hand,
voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing. There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status
of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.
However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the
putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be
filed. In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment was
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia. Therefore, Guillerma Rustia may not
inherit from Guillermo Rustia.

4. NO, Guillermina and Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan, may not inherit from Guillermo
Rustia. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which created between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption
made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely
artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must
be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence. The same misfortune befalls the
ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law.
Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and
was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to
inherit from them ab intestato. Therefore, Guillermina and Nanie Rustia, the ampun-ampunan,
may inherit from Guillermo Rustia. *Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are
the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.

—-

Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006

Facts:
Jaime Sevilla filed a petition for certiorari against the decision of the Court of Appeals
which set aside order issued by Regional Trial Court in declaring their marriage of
Cardenas as void ab initio in the absence of marriage license.

Sevilla contends that his marriage with Cardenas does not have marriage license.
Hence, shall be void ab initio.

However, Cardenas avers that she and Sevilla are married, twice married. She also
presented witnesses which attest her claim of valid marriage.

The Regional Trial Court ruled the marriage of Sevilla and Cardenas is void ab initio in
the absence of marriage license. However, Court of Appeal reversed the earlier decision
on the ground that they cannot presume that marriage license was not issued for the
failure of the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of
marriage certificate, because it failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 is registered.

Hence, this present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion of absolute nullity of
marriage in the absence of marriage license.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that pursuant to Article 4 of Family Code, in the
absence of marriage license shall render marriage void ab initio. In the case at
bar, it cannot be said that the marriage is void ab initio as the office of the Local
Civil Registrar could not exert its best effort to locate and determine the
existence of Marriage License. Further, the absence of logbook is not conclusive
proof of non-issuance of Marriage License. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the
Constitution protects and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favour of the validity of the marriage.

—-

Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

Facts:
Raquel and Veronica got married. The marriage took place at midnight around 3:00 am.

Raquel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Veronica for celebrating their
marriage without the necessary marriage license.

Raquel argues that they never applied for a marriage license much less sign any paper to that
effect. The civil registrar testified that the office of the local civil registrar has neither record nor
copy of a marriage license issued to Raquel and Veronica insofar as their marriage is
concerned.

Veronica argues that there is no evidence to the effect which shows that their marriage was
celebrated sans the necessary marriage license and that they personally went to the local civil
registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented prior to the commencement of
solemnization of their marriage.

RTC ruled in favor of Raquel holding that the marriage was celebrated without the necessary
marriage license. However, the same was reversed by the CA.

Hence, the petition before the court.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Peralta, ruled that, YES, the marriage is void ab
initio for lack of marriage license.

Because, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning and the same is echoed in the case of Abbas vs Abbas.

In the case at bar, civil registrar attested that it does not have a record much less a copy of the
marriage license of Raquel and Veroncia.

Therefore, the marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license.

Nota Bene:
Article 58 of the Civil that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
to be considered void, the absence of marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract or corroborated by a certification from the civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued.

(1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in
remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages.
PetitionerÊs and respondentÊs marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.

—-
Vitangcol v. People G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016
Norberto Vitangcol was convicted by the RTC Manila for Bigamy. CA
affirmed and the prosecution avers that it has proven the existence of
Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by the marriage
contract they entered into. Prosecution also found that his [first] marriage with
Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage was subsisting, he
contracted second marriage with Alice, who later filed the criminal complaint
for Bigamy upon discovering that he had a previous marriage with Gina.
Norberto counters that the 1 st element of bigamy, that offender has been
legally married, is absent. He presents the Certification of the Office of the
Civil Registrar that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly
issued in his favor and his 1stwife Gina, hence, prosecution failed to establish
legality of his 1st marriage.

ISSUE

W/N no record from Civil Registrar of the marriage license issued to

petitioner Norberto and his first wife Gina proves nullity of petitioner’s first
marriage and exculpates him from the Bigamy charge.

RULING

He is guilty of Bigamy. The prosecution was able to provide the elements on

the case. While it is true that the civil registrar issued such certification, that
the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not
have been issued. The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519
in the marriage contract. The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is
a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of the petitioner’s first marriage
which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to
the absence of any record of the marriage.

—-
Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, September 5, 2016*
FACTS: On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and
Gerard Salgado (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya and Gaston Maya
(Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis. Luis claimed that he is
the surviving spouse of the late Severina. He alleged they were married in a civil ceremony on
December 1966. Prior to this, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa while Jo-
Ann(illegitimate child of Luis) is Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship. During
their marital union, they acquired real properties in San Juan, Manila. Luis claims that since
there was no marriage settlement between them, and the properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. However, without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed Unilateral
Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann. When Severina died, Maria
Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Severina, adjudicating herself
as Severina’s sole heir. Luis claimed that because of this, he was divested of his share in the
conjugal properties, and inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. Jo-Ann countered that
she did not know about the marriage between her mother and Luis, and that all they had was a
common-law relationship. This was terminated through a Partition Agreement executed in
November 1980. Luis then already received the properties apportioned to him. Maria Luisa also
claimed that she was not aware of any marriage. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina
were described as single and they acknowledged that they were living together as common-law
spouses. Luis presented a marriage contract with Severina during trial. The Spouses Salgado
disputed the validity of the marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license. Luis also
admitted the existence and execution of the Partition Agreement. The RTC ruled in favor of
Luis, upholding the validity of marriage despite the lack of the marriage license number. The CA
affirmed this.

ISSUES: Whether there was a valid marriage between Luis and Severina.
Whether Luis is entitled to properties from Severina’s estate under Articles 147 or 148.

RULING: The marriage of Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, hence the applicable law is the Old Civil Code. The reason cited by Luis as to why
there was no marriage license is the exception under Article 77 of the Old Civil Code, stating
that “In case two persons married n accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity
with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be
necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made
shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.” However, it is clear that they were
not married to each other prior to the civil ceremony, and this was affirmed by Luis in his
testimony. On the issue of the co-ownership, the Court held that in a void marriage, regardless
of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148. As there is no showing that the parties
were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that
their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 in
relation to Article 147 of the Family Code are the pertinent provisions of law governing their
property relations. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. And since Luis has
admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement, it remains
uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As
such, the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or annulled,
in the absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least, voidable.
—-
Article 26
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent Recio became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.
Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." Starting October 22, 1995, (A year after
marriage) petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May
16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On March 3,
1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married
her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997. In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993,
he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended
that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. On
July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the respondent. The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. Thereafter, the trial court
rendered the assailed Decision and Order. The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on
the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It
deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the
marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its
Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annual.

Issue(s): (1) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven,
and (2) whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

Ruling:
(1) No. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws. A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that
"aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law." Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The divorce decree between
respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the
divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not
to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry
of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.

(2) Yes. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes
and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited
by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may
be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that
the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage. Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under
Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court
to receive evidence, if any, which shows petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in
that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

—-
Republic v. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114, October 5, 2005
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American Citizen. Cipriano learned
from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then married
a certain innocent Stanley and lived in California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. There was no opposition filed. Finding the merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein the petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration But it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of
certiorari on the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The court's unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino Citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law. (It serve as a remedy for
filipino spouse who was left by their spouse and obtained a foreign divorce decree)
The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino Citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of solemnization of the marriage.
However, since Orbecido was not able to prove his wife's naturalization, he was still barred from
remarrying.
—-

San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743 | February 6, 2007
FACTS:

Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit. The couple had 6 children: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.
Virginia died and five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin and had Tobias. Merry
Lee, an American citizen, therafter obtained a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce against
Felicisimo from the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America.

Consequently, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. After 18 years, Felicisimo died. Felicidad San Luis then sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
Felicidad San Luis filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.

Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo
claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death;; Felicisimo being
then the Laguna Governor. He further claimed that respondent Felicidad San Luis has no
legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

Felicidad San Luis submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity
to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. They asserted that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256 of the Family Code considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

ISSUES:

Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code

RULING:

YES. In resolving this issue, the Court need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing them to rule in the affirmative.

Art. 26 of Civil Code provides:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein
that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse.
—-

Republic v. Manalo G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

Facts: In January 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan by virtue of judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, RTC set the case for initial hearing.
The petition and notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in newspaper of general circulation.
For OSG/RP, Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise,
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning title and/or caption of petition considering based
on allegations therein, proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.
Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which court granted. Amended petition alleged:
Manalo is previously married in Philippines to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro as
shown in Marriage Contract. That a case for divorce was filed by Manalo in Japan and after
proceedings, a divorce decree was rendered by Japanese Court. Manalo and her divorce
Japanese husband are no longer living together and she and her daughter are living separately
from former husband. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil
Registry of San Juan to be cancelled so that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still
married to the said Japanese national.
Petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage
between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree
and Manalo prays she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, Manalo.
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. She offered and admitted several documents. While OSG did not present any
controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
In October 2012, RTC denied her petition. In ruling they based it on Article 15 of the NCC. On
appeal, CA overturned RTC’s decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
OSG filed for MR, but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating
a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse
who is capacitated to remarry.

Ruling: Yes, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse
who is capacitated to remarry.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Law have
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instances, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to
their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation
on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature only if they are constitutional.

—-

Galapon v. Republic, G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020

FACTS:

Cynthia, a Filipina, and Park, a South Korean national, got married in the City of Manila,
Philippines on February 27, 2012. Unfortunately, their relationship turned sour and ended with a
divorce by mutual agreement in South Korea. After the divorce was confirmed on July 16, 2012
by the Cheongju Local Court, Cynthia filed before the RTC (Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija) a
Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce.

The RTC, finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an Order setting the case
for hearing. Meanwhile, the OSG filed a Notice of Appearance as counsel for the Republic of the
Philippines. Abigail Galapon, Cynthia’s sister and attorney-in-fact, testified in court. Abigail
averred that Cynthia could not personally testify because the latter's Korean visa expired upon
her divorce with Park. Abigail alleged that she has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in
the Petition and claimed that Park intended to marry his former girlfriend and Cynthia was
forced to agree to the divorce because Park made a threat to her life.

RTC Ruling: (July 3, 2015) grants the Recognition Petition and declared that Cynthia is now
legally capacitated to remarry under Philippine Laws pursuant to Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
 OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration and argues that:

1. foreign divorce judgments may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the venue of such
proceedings is laid on the appropriate RTC where the civil registry is located which its supposed
to be filed in the RTC of Manila because the marriage was celebrated and was recorded in the
City Civil Registry of Manila

2. Absolute divorce is not allowed in this jurisdiction. Thus, Cynthia is not qualified to avail of the
benefits provided by Article 26 of the Family Code.

CA Ruling: The CA found no merit in the OSG's contention that the RTC erred when it acted on
the Recognition Petition since venue was improperly laid.

ISSUE:

whether or not the CA erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree obtained by
Cynthia and her foreign spouse, Park

RULING:

The Petition is granted.

The Court states the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein
the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual agreement under
the laws of South Korea. The sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the
issuance of said divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband Park was not put
in issue.

—-
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014*
Facts:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where
they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and Jena T. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David
was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco,
California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA.
One of which is their property in Sampaloc,Ph.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In
December 2002, Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell
the Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003,
David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province, and she
claimed that David agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of
David's father, Atty. Isaias Noveras. Aside from the partition of the sale from the Sampaloc
property,that David shall David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the
conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA, which was granted on 29 June 2005
and granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in
the USA.

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before
the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure
to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all
conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling
the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in
favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the
sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation
expenses.

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on
29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the
conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all
expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal
partnership

RTC rendered judgment as follows:

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their
legal and personal status are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties
are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24 June 2005. Under their law, the
parties' marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed
by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the
determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action for
judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as
absolute community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before
the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial
court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law
should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did
not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does
not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the
absolute community properties cannot be forfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover,
the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant
evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by directing the equal
division of the Philippine properties between the spouses.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the divorce decree should be judicially recognized
2. Whether or not the petition for judicial separation of property is proper

Ruling:

1. No, the divorce decree should not be judicially recognized for the requisites were not
complied with.
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner
must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not
presented. Even if the Court applies the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts
did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a
different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still
legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
2. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted. Separation
in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the
trial court's decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the
absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated
for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately
since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez,
who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital
where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of
David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce
and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.

—-

Bayot v. CA, GR No. 163979/Bayot v. Bayot

GR No. 163979, Nov. 7, 2008
Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on 4/20/1979 in Mandaluyong. The marriage certificate
identified Rebecca as an American citizen. Rebecca then gave birth to Alix. From then on, the
marriage soured causing Rebecca to initiate a divorce proceeding in the Dominican Republic
which was later approved, thus ordering the dissolution of marriage and ‘leaving them to
remarry’.

Rebecca later filed with the RTC of Makati for declaration of nullity of marriage which she later
withdrew. Rebecca then filed another petition with the RTC of Mandaluyong for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity, as well as
sought for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, and application for support pendente lite
for her and Alix.

Vicente filed a Motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action and petition barred by
prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed insisting on her Filipino citizenship, thus there is
no valid divorce to speak of. Vicente, in the interim, contracted another marriage, and thus
Rebecca filed concubinage and bigamy against Vicente and Vicente filed adultery and perjury
against Rebecca.

Before the RTC, Vicente’s motion to dismiss was denied and Rebecca’s application for support
pendent lite was granted. Vicente appealed before the CA, which was affirmed. Hence, these
petitions.

Issues: Whether Rebecca was a Filipino at the time the divorce decree was rendered (NO)
Whether the divorce decree was valid (YES)

Ruling
The court held that:
1. A foreign divorce decree can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as
a fact and valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
2. The reckoning point of the citizenship of the divorcing parties is their citizenship at the time
the valid divorce decree was obtained.
3. A divorce decree obtained by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to public
policy and thereby not recognized.

In the case at bar, Rebecca was an American citizen when she obtained her divorce decree for
her marriage with Vicente since she was born in Guam, USA and as per jus soli, a person born
in American territory is an American, and she is a holder of an American passport. Rebecca
also professed herself as American in her marriage certificate, in the birth certificate of Alix, and
when she obtained her divorce decree.
Rebecca was issued an ID and a Philippine passport by the Bureau of Immigration but this was
only recognized in June 2000, after she obtained her divorce decree. Hence, Rebecca was not
yet a Filipino citizen when she obtained the same.

Rebecca was an American citizen when she obtained the divorce decree, thus she and Vicente
are bound by it and the national law of the issuing court which is American law. The
presentation of a copy of the divorce decree was duly authenticated by the foreign court.
Rebecca’s subsequent recognition as a Filipino citizen does not invalidate the foreign
divorce decree.

Hence, being divorced, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente has been severed
and they are allowed to remarry. Vicente is no longer subject to a husband’s obligations under
the Civil Code such as to live with Rebecca, observe respect and fidelity and to provide support
to Rebecca.

As per paragraph 2 of Article 26, when a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter vailidly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

In the case at bar, Rebecca, an American citizen obtained a divorce decree for her marriage
with Vicente who is a Filipino, hence Vicente has the capacity to remarry.

Requisites of par. 2:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner
2. A valid divorce decree was obtained abroad by the alien spouse

Re: Cause of Action

Since the divorce is valid, Rebecca has no cause of action because there is no marriage to
nullify. The issue of back support is best litigated in a different civil action. Petitions were both
denied/dismissed.

—-

Corpus v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Gebert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. In 2005, Corpuz married respondent
Daisylyn Tirol, a Filipina. Corpuz got preoccupied with (Because of work) so he left the PH soon
after the wedding. When he decided to return in April to surprise Daisylyn, he found out that she
was having an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.

Corpuz has moved on and found a new Filipina to love two years after the divorce. Gerbert went
to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office to file the Canadian divorce judgment on his and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate since he wanted to wed his new Filipina fiancée there. The
marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn still exists under Philippine law despite the registration
of the divorce decree, according to a representative of the National Statistics Office (NSO). For
the foreign divorce decree to be enforceable, it must first be judicially recognized by a capable
Philippine court.

Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved with the RTC. Daislyn did not file any responsive pleading but supported Corpuz and
said that she wanted to file the same petition for herself but does not have the financial means
to do so.

The RTC rejected Gerbert's petition in a ruling dated October 30, 2008. Given that Gerbert is a
naturalized Canadian citizen, the RTC came to the conclusion that he was not the proper party
to bring the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce order. It was decided that in
order for the Filipino spouse to be entitled to remarry under Philippine law, only the Filipino
spouse could make use of the remedy under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic
v. Orbecido III; the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.

ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens–with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert (being canadian citizen, has no
right) of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. (Article 26 2nd par. Is only a remedy for Filipino spouse )

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

Republic v. Mimori, G.R. No. 234487, July 8, 2020

FACTS: Case review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking reversal of the
Decision which affirmed the Order of RTC of Bacoor City recognizing the divorce
obtained by herein respondent, Virginia Parreno and her husband Koji Mimori.

They were married for 7 years and blessed with a child. Later, they want to obtain
divorce by agreement under Japanese Law. Respondent filed for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce before the RTC.

RTC granted the petition. The Divorce certificate was recognized as valid and
effective under Philippines Laws. NSO was ordered to annotate the said Divorce
Certificate with payment of legal fees.

Petitioner Virginia Parreno has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Art. 26 of the
Family Code.

OSG filed MOR assailing that Order but was denied. OSG appealed before the
CA, stating that the petitioner failed to prove the Japanese Law on divorce. Again, CA
denied the appeal for lack of merit. CA still ruled that respondent complied with the rules
as records of the case showed that respondent was able to present an Authentication
validating the authenticity of the Report of Divorce and Certificate of all Matters relative
to her divorce with Koji Mimori.

Unsatisfied, OSG filed a MOR but still denied.

ISSUE: Whether or Not par 2 Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable to case of
consensual divorce and that such can be recognized in our jurisdiction.

RULING: YES. Foreign Divorce by mutual consent or by agreement of the parties is not
violative of the national law of the Filipino Spouse.

In the case of Morana v Republic, the Court held that a divorce decree initiated
and obtained by a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines.
 ARTICLE 26. PAR 2. Which capacitates the foreign spouse to remarry, only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one initiating the proceeding wherein the
divorce was granted.

INTENT OF PAR 2 ART 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. Unfair to say that the Filipino spouse is still tied and the alien spouse can marry
freely to another country.

As to the second issue, the respondents petition in the trial court below was
clearly for the recognition of divorce and not for cancellation or correction of entry in the
civil registrar. The intention was clear and that is to recognize the divorce they have
obtained abroad. So, the trial court did not err in ordering the annotation of the
recognized foreign divorce as such incident of the recognition.

—-

In Re: Petition for Judicial Recognition of Divorce between Minuro

Takahashi and Juliet Rendora
[ G.R. No. 227605, December 05, 2019 ]

FACTS: Juliet and Minoru Takahashi were married in Manila in 2002. After 10 years and the
relationship between them having turned sour, the mayor of Fukuyama City granted Juliet
and Minoru a Divorce Report.
Thus, Juliet filed a petition for recognition of the Divorce Report. Among the documents offered
by the petitioner were the Divorce Report dated May 22, 2012, and the Certificate of All Matters
and its English translation. The RTC however denied her petition. According to the RTC, Juliet
was the one who secured the Divorce Decree, a fact not allowed by Philippine laws; she was
not able to present the Divorce Decree, and the Divorce Report cannot take the place of the
divorce decree itself; she also failed to present proof of Japanese law on divorce. The CA
agreed with the RTC and dismissed Juliet’s appeal.
In her petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, she maintains that contrary to
the RTC stand that she alone secured the divorce, she and her husband filed the divorce report,
as she herself has difficulty understanding the Japanese language. The Divorce Report and
Certificate of All Matters were duly authenticated by the Japanese embassy, hence it complied
with the Rules of Court requirement on proving foreign documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Filipino wife who filed for divorce abroad may file a petition for
recognition of divorce decree in the Philippines.

RULING: YES. The Court granted the petition but remanded the case to the lower court to
conduct a hearing on whether or not Japanese law was adequately proved. It ruled that even
assuming that petitioner was the one who secured the divorce decree, the same does not
militate against her, as denying her petition would run counter to the spirit of Art. 26 of the
Family Code, which is to prevent a situation where the Filipino spouse of a foreign
national who was granted divorce would remain married under Philippine law. It also
ruled as sufficient compliance with the rules on authentication of foreign documents the
authentication by the Japanese embassy of the Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters.
“While Philippine law does not allow absolute divorce, Article 26 of the Family Code allows a
Filipino married to a foreign national to contract a subsequent marriage if a divorce decree is
validly obtained by the alien spouse abroad.
Republic v. Manalo emphasized that even if it was the Filipino spouse who initiated and
obtained the divorce decree, the same may be recognized in the Philippines, viz.:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein
the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is
the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. x x x
Petition granted, decision of RTC and CA set aside and reversed.

—-

Keppel v. Keppel, G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019

1. In 1972, Angelita Keppel left for Germany to work as a nurse. She met Reynaldo Macaraig, a fellow Filipino
nurse who had become a naturalized German. The two got married 1976 and produced a son.
2. Angelita became attracted to Georg Keppel, who was also married to a Filipina nurse. The
two had an affair which was discovered b Reynaldo, leading them to separate.
1. In 1986, Angelita became a naturalized German. Along with her son, she left for the Philippines to start over.
2. Angelita continued communicating with Georg through letters and telephone calls. In July
1987, Georg’s wife divorced him, and so Georg felt free to come to the Philippines to meet Angelita's family in
September 1987.
b. Angelita returned to Germany to get a divorce in December, 1987. The next year, she married Georg. They had a
daughter, Liselotte.
6. Angelita and George agreed for the complete separation of properties in 1991. Georg resigned from his job and got
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis disabling him to work. Since then, they decided to move to the Philippines to settle
down.
7. Angelita bought a lot in Muntinlupa on which they had a house built in 1993. She also put up a commercial building
4 which earned rentals 4 on another lot in Muntinlupa, which she and Reynaldo previously bought together. The rest
of Angelita's savings from Germany went into putting up a school with her other family members and relatives.
8. Angelita earned a considerable income from her business ventures. which she shared with Georg. However,
Angelita stopped giving Georg money in 1994 when she discovered that Georg was having extramarital affairs.
9, Claiming that Georg was beating her up, Angelita and her two children left their home in March 1996. Being the
registered owner of their family home, Angelita sold the same to her sister. Despite said sale, Georg refused to
vacate the house.
10. In 1996, Angelita filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Georg
opposed the petition, insisting that the court should only issue a decree of legal separation with the consequent
division of their properties and determination of Liselottes custody. Angelita countered that there were no properties
to divide between them because all the real properties that she acquired in the Philippines belong solely to her as a
consequence of the agreement for complete separation of property that they previously executed in Germany in
1991.
1. During trial, Angelita presented evidence of Georg's psychological incapacity through medical reports and
the like, as well as the contract for separation of property. On the other hand, Georg presented evidence of
the properties that they acquired during their marriage that he thinks should be divided equally between
them.
2. RTC judgment: granted the petition and declared the marriage void.
CA judgment: reversed RTC. Angelita did not prove the allegations in her complaint because she did not present the
original of her divorce decree from Reynaldo Macaraig, her first spouse; that she did not also prove the German law
that capacitated her to marry Georg; that in the eyes of the court, therefore, there could be no annulment of the
marriage between Angelita and Georg to speak of because under Philippine law, Angelita had remained married to
Reynaldo; that Angelita's evidence was insufficient to prove that either of the parties herein had been psychologically
incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations inasmuch as anti-social behavior did not equate to
psychological incapacity; and that the properties of the couple exclusively belonged to Angelita because Georg could
not own lands in the Philippines.

A. Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Angelita and Reynaldo was still valid- YES.

1. Under the Nationality Principle, the petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of the Family Code unless there is a German
law that allows her to do so
2. A fundamental and obvious defect of Angelita's petition for annulment of marriage is that it seeks a relief improper
under Philippine law in light of both Georg and Angelita being German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time of the filing
thereof. Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed in this jurisdiction. and pursuant to which laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad, it was the pertinent German law that governed. In short, Philippine law finds
no application herein as far as the family rights and obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals are
concerned.
3. The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine laws do not
provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 15 and 17
of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two filipino citzens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple who are both aliens may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
4. Firstly, what governs the marriage of the parties is German, not Philippine, law, and this
rendered it incumbent upon Angelita to allege and prove the applicable German law. We reiterate that our courts do
not take iudicial notice of foreign laws: hence the existence and contents of such laws are regarded as questions ot
fact, and, as such, must be alleged and proved like any other disputed fact. 9 Proof of the relevant German law may
consist of any of the following, namely: (1) official publications of the law; or (2) copy attested to by the officer having
legal custody of the foreign law. If the official record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Angelita did not comply with
the requirements for pleading and proof of the relevant German law.
5. And, secondly, Angelita overlooked that German and Philippine laws on annulment of marriage might not be the
same. In other words, the remedy of annulment of the marriage due to psychological incapacity afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code might not be available for her. In the absence of a showing of her right to this
remedy in accordance with German law, therefore, the petition should be dismissed
B. Issue: Assuming that the remedy was proper, was psychological incapacity duly proven?
NO.
1. Even if we were now to adhere to the concept of processual presumption, and assuming that the German
law was similar to the Philippine law as to allow the action under Article 36 of the Family Code to be brought
by one against the other party herein, we would still affirm the CA's dismissal of the petition brought under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
2. Notable from the RT's disquisition is the fact that the psychiatrists found that both parties had suffered from
anti-social behavior that became the basis for the trial court's conclusion that they had been both
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential martial obligations. Therein lay the reason why we
must affirm the CA.
3. Jurisprudentially speaking, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. The disorder consists of: (a) a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage: (b the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help,
and the procreation and education of oftspring; and c the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse did not meet his or her responsibility and
dutv as a married verson is not enough: it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so
because of some psychological illness.
3. Psychological incapacity is unlike any other disorder that would invalidate a marriage. It should refer to a mental
incapacity that causes a party to be incognitive of the basic marital
covenants such as those antmerated in Article 68 of the ramily Code and must be
characterized D praviv. tridical antecedence and incurability.
4. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court issued the following guidelines for the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resoved in tavor of the existence and continuation of the marrlage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes tell permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) Theroot cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identi@ed, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological 4 not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the persor could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereot. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle or ejusdem geners, nevertheless such root cause must be
identited as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto
1. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
evervone of the same sex Furthermore. such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologicall capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
2. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a retusal, neglect or diaculty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal 01 supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
3. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligations) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
5. Here, however, the petitioner presented no evidence to show that the anti-social behavior manifested by both
parties had been grave, and had existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage as to render the parties
incapable of pertorming all the essential marital obligations provided by law. As the records bear out, the medical
experts merely concluded that the behavior was grave enough as to incapacitate the parties from the performance o
their essential marital relationship because the parties exhibited symptoms of an anti-social personality disorder.
Also, the incapacity was not established to have existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In short, the
conclusion about the parties being psychologically incapacitated was not founded on sufficient evidence.

—-

Articles 27 to 34
Ninal v. Bayadog, GR No. 133778, March 14, 2000

FACTS: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
 and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing
a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's
death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

a) Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement of a
Marriage license?

b) Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s
marriage void after his death?

Ruling:

The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of
a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract.

In this case, Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito
had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage
even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution,and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On
the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment is legitimate.

—--

Manzano v. Sanchez, A.M. No. MTJ 00-1329, March 8, 2001

Facts: Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage.

On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda
Payao before Judge Roque-Sanchez.

When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated.”

However, the judge claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.

What he knew was that the (Payao and David) had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the
latter not to marry again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

In 2 separate affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they
were married before; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have
an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under
Article 34 of Family Code.

Ruling: No. The supreme court held that In Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

“No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.

Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were “separated.”

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. respondent Judge
cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry.

Thus, SC held that neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.

—-

Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

On November 24, 1986 Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them are legally
capacitated and that they cohabited for atleast five years when in fact they only barely known
each other since February 1986. On 1993, Jose filed a complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage contending that their marriage was sham, as to no ceremony
was celebrated between them; that he did not execute the sworn statement that he and
Felisa had cohabited for atleast five years; and that his consent was secured through fraud.
His sister, however, testified as witness that Jose voluntarily gave his consent during their
marriage. The complaint was dismissed on Regional Trial Court stating that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of marriage license. It is claimed that
Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before
he sought the declaration of nullity; The RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribe. It cited Art
87 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment must be commenced by
the injured party within four years after the discovery of fraud. Jose appealed to the Court of
Appeals which rendered a decision declaring their marriage void ab initio for absence of
marriage license. Felisa sought a petition for review praying that the Court of Appeal’s Amended
decision be reversed and set aside

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement., effectively renders the marriage voib an initio
for lack of marriage.

(2) Whether or not the action for nullity prescribes as the case here where Jose filed a complaint
after seven years from contracting marriage.

RULING:

(1) Yes. The intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage, will not salvage the
parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The Court protects
the fabric of the institution of marriage and at the same time wary of deceptive schemes that
violate the legal measures set forth in the law. The case cannot fall under irregularity of the
marriage license, what happens here is an absence of marriage license which makes their
marriage void for lack of one of the essential requirements of a valid marriage.

(2) No. An action for nullity is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated san a
marriage license. The right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe.

—-

Topic: Article 27-34; No license shall be necessary for man and woman who
lived together for at least five years together as husband and wife

De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, Feb. 13, 2008

Facts:
Annabelle and Reinel applied for a marriage license. However, when they went back to the Office of
the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to get married as soon as
possible, they executed an Affidavit dated 13 March 1995 to show that they had been living together
as husband and wife for the last five years, hence, exempt from the marriage license requirement.
They got married on the same date before a judge. After the ceremony, however, they did not live
together as husband and wife.

In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia.

In 1998, Annabelle filed a petition for support against Reinel, claiming that he had not given support
to her and their child.

In his answer, Reinel denied that he is married to Annabelle, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit. He alleged that they never cohabited with
each other five years before their marriage, hence they were not exempted from the requirement of a
marriage license. He also denied being the father of Tricia.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Annabelle and Reinel is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared Reinel as the natural father of the
Tricia, and thus obliged to give her support. Reinel appealed.

The CA ruled that since the case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare
the marriage of Annabelle and Reinel as null and void in the very same case. There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no
collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. It also ruled that Tricia, having born during the subsistence of a marriage, is the legitimate
child of Reinel.

Issues:

1. Has the trial court jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between Reinel and
Annabelle even though the case before it is for support? In other words, may the marriage be
attacked collaterally?

2. Is the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle valid?

3. Is Reinna Tricia a legitimate child of Reinel?

Held:

1.) Yes. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. In Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This
is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
2.) No. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites
of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous
cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all . The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it
is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their
failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
3.) Reianna Tricia is an illegitimate daughter of Reinel, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.

The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
child.

—-

Office of the Court Administrator v. Necessario *

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013

Facts:
The audit team of OCA conducted an investigation about the irregularities in the solemnization
of marriages before the MTC and RTC in Cebu.

Under covered as a couple, the female lawyer inquired about the marriage application
process and was approached by a certain “Helen” assuring that the marriage could be
solemnized the next day but the marriage certificate dated after the marriage license becomes
available for a fee of P3000.

Thereafter, an administrative case was filed against Judge Necessario, Judge Acosta, Judge
Tormis, Judge Rosales for gross ignorance of the law.

For their part, they argue that: (1) they relied on the presumption of regularity of the documents
presented; (2) those solemnized under article 34 had the required affidavit of cohabitation; (3)
the investigation was an entrapment; (4) and that what the law only requires is that there be
a marriage license, it does not require that the place it was issued by the place where the
contracting parties reside.

OCA recommends that Judge Necessario, Judge Acosta, Judge Tormis, and Judge Rosales,
Helen Monggaya, Rhona Rodriguez are guilty of gross ignorance of the law or neglect of duty.

Issue:
Whether or not the Judges may be held administratively liable.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court, per curiam, ruled that, YES, the Judges may be held administratively
liable.
Because, ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is
elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity.

In the case at bar, the said Judges solemnized marriages without the necessary marriage
license, lacking in documents, with legal impediment, solemnized marriage under Article 34
where one of the contracting parties is a minor and that the place where the marriage license is
different from the actual residence of the contracting parties.

Therefore, the Judges are dismissed from service.

Nota Bene:
Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary,
ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity

The Supreme Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy
burden and responsibility of keeping the faith of the public

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty

The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal
impediments such as minority of a party.

It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage
and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

—-

Tupal v. Rojo, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014(CONFLICT OF

INTEREST)

FACTS
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint
against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and
for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo, an MTC judge in Bacolod City,
allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license.

For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he

solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26,
1990. Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries
public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official
functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not
connected with a judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.
 Judge Rojo also allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice for
having notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on
the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present their competent
pieces of evidence of identity as required by law. These omissions allegedly
constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple and
elementary to ignore."

Judge Rojo argued that notarizing affidavits of cohabitation was

connected with his official functions and duties as a judge. The Guidelines on
the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not
prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage they will solemnize.

Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90. He also argued that
he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a
notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the
affidavits he notarized.

He also need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their
competent pieces of evidence of identity since he interviewed the parties as to
the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same
persons who executed the affidavit. The parties’ identities are "unquestionable."

ISSUE

Whether or not Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing the
affidavits of cohabitation.

Whether or not Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice for
notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him or have
not otherwise required the signatory to present a competent evidence of
identity

RULING

(FIRST ANSWER) YES. Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit
trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the function of notaries
public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended
(otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following
qualifications on the scope of this power:

MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the
notarization of documents connected only with the exercise of their
official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as notaries public ex officio,
undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,
contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the
performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial
Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in
order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also
prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law

(SECOND ANSWER) YES. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents
if the signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public
must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity

A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing

before the notary public is the signatory to the instrument or document to be
notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the signatory, he must
require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.

In the instant case, in all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo
notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their
affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were
personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent
pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.

—--

Article 35
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998*

FACTS: Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The
decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had
predeceased his mother Cristina. The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been
declared by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging
based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as
she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this
petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the
decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld.

ISSUE: In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof,
which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or
voidable marriage? Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

RULING: Petition dismissed Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the
interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment.
While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be “declared null and
void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in
effect at the time.
Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict
between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by
the Supreme Court.
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to
property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children
born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of
whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil
effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had
never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is
governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of
voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of
Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which
provides that “ children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment
shall be considered legitimate.
Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment,
she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.)
—-

Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006*

Facts: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended,
otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the
petition in a decision dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking." The appeal filed with the
Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution dated June 11, 1998 for failure of
petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. After the
decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging
that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without
a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss dated
August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and
forum shopping. In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent’s motion to
dismiss. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order dated January 21,
2000.

Issue(s): (1) whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s petition for the
declaration of his marriage as null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license
because of (the) dismissal of an earlier petition for declaration of nullity of the same marriage on
the ground of his wife’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, and had
decided a question of substance which has probably not heretofore been determined squarely
and definitively by this court, or had decided it in a way not in accord with law; and
(2) whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage for lack of the requisite marriage license, and had confused, distorted and
misapplied the fundamental rules and concepts on res judicata, splitting of a cause of action and
forum shopping.

Ruling: No. Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the
same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action
is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the
pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of
petitioner and respondent’s marriage.

Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void
because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage
license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage
had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this
admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have
been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only
as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as
to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other
matters that could have been adjudged in that case. It must be emphasized that a party
cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his
action or adopting a different method of presenting his case . It bears stressing that a party
cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading,
all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is
bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon
which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to
recover for the same wrong or injury. A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must
present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to
expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by
piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and
leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to
litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed. In sum, litigants are provided with the
options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been
taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues
therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be
needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from
litigating the same controversy all over again. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly
conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived
any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision
dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP
4341-95.

—-

Domingo v. CA, G.R.No. 104818 September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572
Facts:
Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed the petition On May 29, 1991, entitled
“Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property” against Roberto Domingo. The
petition, which was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following:
1) Delia and Domingo married on November 29, 1976;
2) Later on found out, without the knowledge of Delia, Domingo had a previous marriage with
Emerina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;
3) She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerina sued them for
bigamy;
4) Since 1979, respondent Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only able to stay in
the Philippines when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her
employer;
5) Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence;
6) Her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the possession of Roberto, who
disposed some of the said properties without her knowledge and consent;
7) While Delia was on her vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the declaration of their marriage, which is
void ab initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further suggested that private respondent
should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been
acquired by their union.
RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.

Issue:
1) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. (If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.)
2) Whether or not the petition entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property” is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal
properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Ruling:
1) Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is
defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and
would rest on a very shaky foundation.
On the other hand, the clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage
void” in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void is not only for the purpose of remarriage. One can conceive of other instances where a party
might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and
the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes.
2) Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the
other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the
separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall
provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings."
Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA’s decision is affirmed.

—-

Garcia-Quizon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121 | July 31,2013*

FACTS:

Petitioner Elise Quizon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen, who are
common-law partners. When Eliseo died instestate, Elise through her mother filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration before the RTC, claiming that she is a natural child of Eliseo having
conceived at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
Filiation was proven by her Birth Certificate signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia Garcia-
Quiazon by claiming it was bigamous.

Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of administration asserting that the
venue of the petition was improperly laid. However, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of
Elise. On appeal, the deicison was affirmed. Hence, the petition was filed before the SC raising
the argument that Elise has not shown any interest in the petition for letters of administration
and that the CA erred in declaring that Eliseo and Amelia were no legally married because Elise
has no cause of action on it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Elise has a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage despite the
death of his father, hence cannot be deemed as an interested party.

RULING:

Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court ruled that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of right, such that any interested party may attach the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage. Having successional rights that would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, Elise may without a doubt impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned by
filing an action attaching its validity, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse. As a compulsory
heir, Elise has a cause of action for the declaration of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia.
Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate is deemed
to be an interested part. An interested part is one who would be benefited in the estate.
Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party.

——-

Article 36 / Articles 68 to 72 / Articles 220, 221 and 225 / A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC [OCA Circular No. 63-2019]
—
Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos, G.R.
112019, January 4, 1995, 58 SCAD 17
Facts: Present petition for review on certiorari was filed by Leouel Santos. Undaunted by
decisions of court a quo and CA, Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to
have his marriage with Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel (1st Lieutenant of Philippine Army), first met Julia. In
September 1986, two exchanged vows before MTC Judge Cornelio Lazaro, followed by a
church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents. In July 1987, Julia gave birth to
a baby boy, Leouel Santos, Jr. Love did not last long because of frequent interference by Julia's
parents into young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, couple would also start a "quarrel" over
a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending days with his parents.
In May 1988, Julia left for USA to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure, Julia called up Leouel for the first time she promised to
return home upon expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to
visit US because of training program of AFP, he tried to locate Julia but all his efforts were of no
avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with RTC, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code". Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
In May 1991, Julia through counsel, opposed complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, that
it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
In October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
In November 1991, court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Leouel
appealed to CA. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate
with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
Issue: W/N the marriage of Julia and Leouel can be declared null and void on the grounds of
Psychological Incapacity of Article 36 of the Family Code

Ruling: No.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate.

Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1),
who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself
can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997,
266 SCRA 325

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi got married in Manila Cathedral sometime in May 22, 1988.In
an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with Gina’s
family. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. She claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag.
Gina said that Chi Ming Tsoi impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed Chi Ming Tsoi using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain
the appearance of a normal man.

On the other hand, Chi Ming Tsoi claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. But he said that he does not want his
marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that
he has no defect on his part (3) since the relationship is still very young their differences can still
be reconciled. Chi Ming Tsoi admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them because his
wife always avoided him.

The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

whether or not the is Chi Ming Tsoi psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation

RULING:

Yes.

Chi Ming Tsoi admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten
months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code

Petitioner further contends that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties
is suffering from psychological incapacity.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.

The petition is DENIED.

—-
Republic v. Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997
FACTS:

 Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at San Agustin Church in Manila
and begot a son, Andre Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since

1) he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered
his money;
2) he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and
3) he was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them.

 When Reynaldo was relieved from his job, Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the
family.
 In October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged.
 In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City. A few weeks later,
 Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them
 Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served
 Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and
wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to

(1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage;

(2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and

(3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
"1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born
on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife."

 On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her
friends, Rosemarie Ventura and Padilla, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center.
  Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
 trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision
 The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals.the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as
provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to
the facts of the case,"

 The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
Hence, this petition. CA Court relied5 5a heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities."

The SG on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent
to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."

ISSUE: W/N psychological incapacity on the part of Reynaldo has been established
W/N Their personalities be basis

HELD: NO

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.

What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities.

It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness.

Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would
comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.

The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with
each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability.

In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

8 Guidelines (Psychological Incapacity)

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be

 (a) medically or clinically identified,
 (b) alleged in the complaint
 , (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
  (d) clearly explained in the decision.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.

4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.

6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.

7. Interpretations given by theNAMT - National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.

8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.

—-

Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. 166357, September 19, 2011 and January 14,
2015 (2 Decisions)

Facts
Tyrone and Malyn were married in Hong Kong in November, 1976. The couple had 4 children
but after the birth of the youngest, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn who gave birth
to a son. Malyn left the conjugal home and her 4 children. Tyrone lived with Jocelyn and they
had 3 more children.

In 1990, Tyrone went to the US and left the children under the custody of a househelp and a
driver. Malyn took care of the children when they were sick and stayed with her on weekends.

9 years since their de facto(in fact, whether by right or not) separation, Tyrone filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Malyn’s alleged psychological
incapacity. Tyrone alleged that Malyn manifested immaturity and irresponsibility towards him
and their children. Malyn allegedly left their house to party with male friends, frequently played
mahjong thus neglecting their children, and committed adultery which Tyrone and Malyn’s
brother caught in flagrante delicto.

Tyrone presented a psychologist that explained Malyn’s sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong
playing and frequent night-outs with friends as narcissistic personality disorder that may have
been evident even prior to the marriage. Tyrone also presented Fr. Healy who corroborated the
psychologist’s assessment based on his interview with Tyrone.

Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated. She likewise denied(all allegations against
her) frequently playing mahjong, and even when she did, she brought the children with her,
never neglected them and she had the permission of Tyrone. She also averred that she only left
their conjugal home because of fear of physical abuse from Tyrone. She likewise denied
allegation of adultery as she was fully clothed when Tyrone and her brother met her at the hotel
room. She maintained that it was actually Tyrone who was psychologically incapacitated.

Before the RTC, both parties were concluded to be psychologically incapacitated thus failed to
commit themselves to the essential obligations:
1. The conjugal act
2. The community of life and love
3. The rendering of mutual help
4. The procreation and education of children to be responsible adults
The incapacity was found to be clinically established, pervasive, gave and incurable. The
marriage was declared void ab initio. Before the CA, the ruling was reversed. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether Malyn is psychologically incapacitated (NO)

Ruling
The court held that psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligation. The burden of proving the same is on the plaintiff. It
must be characterized by gravity, existence at the time of marriage and incurability.

In the case at bar, the conclusions of the witnesses were based on the acts and behaviors of
Malyn which have not been proven. Malyn admitted playing mahjong but not so frequently that
she neglected her duties. Her constant visits to friends and obsessive need for attention from
other men are likewise unproven.

Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity. Even assuming that Malyn had an extramarital affair with another
man, one instance thereof cannot be equated with obsessive need for attention.

What transpired between Vicente and Malyn is acrimony and perhaps infidelity, but these are
ground for legal separation and not psychological incapacity that voids marriages. Petition is
denied.

Continuation: Same Title, Same G.R., January 14, 2015(psychological

incapacitated si malyn)
Ruling
The court held that psychological incapacity refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party’s
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of matrimonial bond.

The members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning
of psychological incapacity thus decided to adopt the provision with less ‘specificity than
expected’ to ‘allow some resiliency in [the law’s] application.’

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.

In ascertaining psychological incapacity, the courts must rely on the opinions of experts to
inform themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment.

The (there must be) totality of evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
and the psychological disorder itself. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person need not be
resorted to.

An expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered to have to probative value

in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. Thus, the findings of the expert and the
evidence presented whould be weighed side-by-side.

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent. In her Psychological Evaluation
Report, Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and dependent tendencies" to
24

the extent of being "relationship dependent."

She values her relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may
be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for
rejection.

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She
became relationship-dependent (NARCISSIST)

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc."

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not
only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them
to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on
every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating
their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.

Although Vicente carried the burden to prove the nullity of marriage, Marlyn, could also establish
the psychological incapacity of Vicente and the court may declare a marriage null and void
regardless if it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes such psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity may exist in one or both parties, and if the same is established,
the marriage is deemed null and void.
In the case at bar, marriage never existed from the beginning because Marlyn was
psychiligically incapacitated at and prior to the marriage.

The fulfillment of the constitutional mandate of the state to protect marriage as an

inviolable social institution only pertains to valid marriages.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our
society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote
family life,"

Previous ruling was overturned. The ruling of the RTC was upheld. Marlyn and Vicente’s
marriage was considered void ab initio.

—-

Rosanna L. Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal

G.R. No.196359, May 11, 2021
FACTS:
In December 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal got married.
The couple had a daughter named Ma. Samantha. In 2000, they separated, and Rosanna had
sole custody of their daughter. In December 2001, Mario filed a petition for the custody of their
daughter.

In August 2003, Rosanna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage, claiming that
Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. She
also claimed that Mario was emotionally immature, irresponsible, extremely irritable, moody,
and psychologically imbalanced. She also claimed that Mario was using illegal drugs and was
brought into a drug rehabilitation center twice. He even exposed their daughter to his drug use.
Finally, she claimed that because of Mario's irresponsibility, their family business suffered
financial losses and ultimately led to its closure.

In order to prove her case, she presented a psychologist in order to testify before the court. The
psychologist, after interviewing Rosanna and her daughter Ma. Samantha, as well as Rosanna's
sister, concluded that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital
obligations.

The psychologist, however, was not able to interview Mario because despite several invitations,
he did not appear for the interview. Mario was diagnosed to be suffering from Narcissistic
Antisocial Personality Disorder and such disorder was found to be grave, with juridical
antecedence, incurable and rendered him psychologically incapacitated.

The trial court ruled that Rosanna was able to prove her case and declare her marriage with
Mario null and void, and awarded her custody of their daughter. Mario filed a motion for
reconsideration which was subsequently denied.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court and declared the marriage
valid and subsisting. The Court of Appeals ruled on the ground that the findings of the
psychologist was unscientific and unreliable because Mario was diagnosed without being
interviewed, thus the psychologist was working on suppositions and second-hand information
related to her by one side only. Rosanna then filed a motion for reconsideration and was
subsequently denied.

The case was then brought before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna and Mario is void due to the latter's
psychological incapacity

RULING
The Supreme Court declared the marriage of Rosanna and Mario void ab initio. The Court
held that Rosanna was able to prove with clear and convincing evidence that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

The Court modified the interpretation of the requirements of psychological incapacity as a

ground for declaration of nullity of marriage found as previously laid down in the case of
Republic vs CA and Molina.

The Court held that psychological incapacity is not a medical but a legal concept. It
refers to a personal condition that prevents a spouse from complying with fundamental
marital obligations.
Psychological incapacity is neither (not) a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder
that must be proven through expert opinion. It does not need to be a permanent and
incurable condition; it is incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense. Therefore,
the testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist is not mandatory.

The Court emphasized that psychological incapacity consists of "clear acts of dysfunctionality
that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital
obligations due to psychic causes."

—-

BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127358; 31 March 2005

FACTS: This case was instituted by Petitioner Noel Buenaventura where he stated that he and
his wife, Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura, were both psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.

The lower court found that the petitioner was merely under heavy parental pressure to marry,
and deceived Private Respondent Isabel Singh to marry. Buenaventura was unable to relate to
his wife, as a husband, and their son, Javy, as a father.

Moreso, he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he’d
rather choose to leave his family than reconcile with his wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not, based on the findings of the lower court, the marriage between
Buenaventura and Singh may be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
due to the psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner
after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his
incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Psychological
incapacity has been defined, as no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.

—-

Article 38

Intestate Estate of Monolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong

G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010

FACTS:On or about November 24, 1992, William Sato, son-in-law of Manolita Carungcong
who was 79 yrs old and blind, was accused of estafa through fraudulent misrepresentations by
telling the latter (to Manolita) that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes,
was able to secure her signature and thumbmark on a Special Power of Attorney whereby so his
daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4)
valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City.j

William Sato claimed that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to
the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, (he was
exempt from criminal liability) was an exempting circumstance.

“ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil
liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by the following persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the

same line;

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living

together.
 The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.”

The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the
relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of
protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the blood
relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband)
dissolved by the death of one spouse.

HELD:

RELATIONSHIP BY AFFINITY BETWEEN THE SURVIVING SPOUSE AND THE

KINDRED OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE CONTINUES EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF
THE DECEASED SPOUSE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE MARRIAGE PRODUCED
CHILDREN OR NOT.

Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the
three parcels of land could have arisen only after her mother's death. Since
Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the
mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed .

For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property
right of a family relation but a paramount public interest .

When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however,

the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the
respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves.
Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in
the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a
family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory
cause under Article 332.

In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting
views.

The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates
with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship
of affinity between the parties. Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive
and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily
determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage
subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the
surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood relatives.
 The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after
the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship is
preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is
commingled.

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the
death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under
this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that
produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers
that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of
affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated
upon the death of one of the married parties.

After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we
hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1)
of the Revised Penal Code.

First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury

disqualification and incest. On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has
been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-
laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be
beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said
provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.

Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the
same line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no
distinction between the spouse of one’s living child and the surviving spouse of
one’s deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his
or her parents-in-law) can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code
without doing violence to its language.

Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family
as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the
duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family. Congress has also
affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of
the family. In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family
harmony and obviate scandal. The view that relationship by affinity is not affected
by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord
with family solidarity and harmony.

Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is

to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule
for the accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the
accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt.
 Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies
when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial
to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic
purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an
absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should
adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that
interpretation is the continuing affinity view.

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity.

The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s relatives
under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of grave offense committed against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same
Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the
same Code.

Article 39 [EO 227 - July 17, 1987 / RA 8533 - February 23, 1998]
Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007

————

David et al v. Calilung, G.R. No. 241036, January 26, 2021

FACTS:
Lucila married Rene on November 24, 1981 in Mabalacat, Pampanga. They begot five children,
the Aguas heirs. In 2003, Rene filed a petition to declare his marriage with Lucila null and void
on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. In the said petition, Rene declared as
conjugal properties a parcel of land located in Sunset Valley Estate, Angeles City in the names
of Rene and Lucila, and the merchandise inventory in Rene's pawnshop and ready-to-wear
sales business. In 2005, the same was granted and the RTC ordered for the division of the
conjugal properties consisting of the lot covered by TCT No. 90811 and the house standing
thereon (Sunset Valley Estate), as well as for the support and delivery of presumptive legitimes
of their common children. However, the 2005 Nullity Decision, as well as its certificate of finality
was not registered with the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, thus, no annotation
of the said Decision on TCT No. 90811 was ever made. Also, actual partition of the Sunset
Valley Estate had not been undertaken and the presumptive legitimes of the Aguas heirs were
not delivered. On October 7, 2006, Rene contracted a second marriage with Cherry. On
November 17, 2015, Rene died intestate. Cherry filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Rene but it was opposed by the petitioners on the grounds that they are the
legitimate children of the late Rene with Lucila; that the marriage of Rene and Lucila was
dissolved, but there was no liquidation or separation of the properties acquired during their
marriage; and that when Rene married Cherry, the properties of Rene acquired during the
previous marriage should not have been included in their property regime pursuant to Article 92
of the Family Code.

Lucila and the Aguas heirs (petitioners) also filed with the RTC of Angeles City Branch 59 a
petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Rene and Cherry (RTC petition) on the ground
that the said subsequent marriage was entered into without complying the provisions in Articles
52 and 53 of the Family Code. Branch 59 issued an Order directing the transmittal of the case
record to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle among courts of general jurisdiction.
Branch 59 held that the RTC petition involves a collateral attack on the validity of marriage of
Rene and Cherry which does not fall within the jurisdiction of a Family Court. Then, it was re-
raffled to Branch 60. But Branch 60issued an Order which dismissed the re-raffled RTC petition
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Branch 60 held that the RTC petition is hinged upon the
issue of validity of marriage emanating from Articles 52 and 53 of the Family Code. Pursuant to
Section 5 of Family Courts Act of 1997, it is the Family Court which has jurisdiction over the
case and not Branch 60 which is no longer a Family Court. Branch 60 also ruled that the
petitioners have no cause of action to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since
it is the sole right of the husband or the wife to file the said petition involving marriages under
the Family Code.

Aggrieved, petitioners seek direct recourse with the Court through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on pure questions of law.

ISSUES and RULINGS:

1. Whether it is Branch 59 or Branch 60 which has jurisdiction over the RTC petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
It is Branch 59 which has jurisdiction. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
under the jurisdiction of the RTC branch designated as Family Court pursuant to R.A. No.
8369 when there is one in the area. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a
tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law and that the same is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Pursuant to R.A. No.
8369, it created Family Courts and grant unto them exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The said law mandated the Supreme Court to designate from
among the branches of the RTC, in the cities mentioned therein, at least one Family Court
"pending the establishment of Family Courts." In an En Banc Resolution, Branch 59 was
designated as Family Court to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over family cases. In the
instant case, the RTC petition was captioned as Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Obviously, the
subject petition is a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage referred to in Section 5 (d) of
R.A. No. 8369, which, pursuant to Section 17 of R.A. No. 8369 in relation to A.M. No. 99-11-07-
SC and A.M. No. 08-08-460-RTC, falls under the jurisdiction of Branch 59.

2. Whether Branch 59 properly ordered for the re-raffle of the RTC petition to the regular
courts on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the petition was a collateral attack.
No. Branch 59 ruled in its Transmittal Order that it has no jurisdiction over the RTC petition
because the same was not filed by an aggrieved or injured spouse, who are the only parties
who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of void marriages pursuant to A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. It added that the petition was filed by the heirs of Rene which constitutes a collateral attack
on the validity of his marriage with Cherry. If, on its face, the RTC petition was not filed by real
partyin-interest, as Branch 59 wanted to point out, the proper ground for dismissal should be
failure to state a cause of action and not lack of jurisdiction. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is
not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action or
of failure to state a cause of action, as the case may be. Further, there is no collateral attack
here because petitioners did not assail the validity of marriage of Rene and Cherry as an
incident to an action to obtain a relief other than the declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC
petition was precisely filed by the petitioners to nullify the marriage of Rene and Cherry, hence,
a direct action impugning the validity of marriage.

3. Whether Branch 60 erred in dismissing the RTC petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
No. Jurisdiction over complaints for declaration of nullity of marriage and other family cases fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts when there is one in the area.
Considering that Branch 59, a designated Family Court, exists in Angeles City, Branch 60,
therefore, does not have jurisdiction over the subject RTC petition. Accordingly, without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, Branch 60 has no other recourse, but to dismiss the RTC
petition. It is worthy to note that when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the only power it has is to dismiss the action, as any act it performs without jurisdiction
is null and void, and without any binding legal effects. Consequently, Branch 60 cannot
order the transfer of the RTC petition to Branch 59 as it lacks authority to act on the re-raffled
RTC petition nor on the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners subsequent to the
dismissal thereof. On this score, the Court affirms the dismissal order of Branch 60.

4. Whether the petitioners are the real parties-in-interest to file the subject RTC petition
for nullity of marriage.
No. The Court issued A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, in order to
govern direct actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage. As ruled in Enrico ,
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The Aguas heirs are the
children of the deceased spouse whose marriage is sought to be annulled. And as ruled in the
aforecited case, they have no legal personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage of their father with Cherry. They can only question the validity of the marriage of the
said spouses in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their deceased father filed in the
regular courts. Lucila, on the other hand, is not the wife in the marriage that she and her
children sought to annul. Be it noted that she is not a spouse of Rene, their marriage having
been declared null and void from the very beginning on the ground of psychological incapacity
in the 2005 Nullity Decision. Accordingly, Lucila, could not be the aggrieved or injured spouse
referred to by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC who has the legal standing to file the complaint for nullity of
marriage of the spouses Rene and Cherry.

5. Whether petitioners are without remedy.

No. The Aguas heirs can collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry's marriage in
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rene. And, Lucila can file a separate
civil action for partition against the administrator of Rene's estate. In the instant case,
Rene and Lucila’s marriage were already declared null and void but neither Rene nor
petitioners herein moved for the execution of the 2005 Nullity Decision. Also, neither Rene nor
petitioners attempted to execute the 2005 Nullity Decision by instituting an independent action
for its revival. Hence, the subject property remained under the state of co-ownership among
Rene, Lucila and the Aguas heirs. Moreover, Rene's death supervened the enforcement of the
2005 Nullity Decision and the partition of the Sunset Valley Estate. Thus, succession set in and
triggered the application of the Civil Code provisions governing succession and the procedural
rules governing the settlement of deceased persons. Consequently, the Aguas heirs' right to the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes had been superseded by their statutory right to succeed
Rene as compulsory heirs. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not
mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law.
They can still protect their successional right. Compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
The Aguas heirs can certainly amply protect their successional rights by collaterally raising the
issue on the validity of Rene and Cherry's marriage in the settlement proceedings since the
same is for purposes of succession and not of remarriage.

Lucila, on the other hand, is considered as a stranger in the estate proceedings with no right to
succeed as an heir of Rene, because her marriage with Rene has been declared null and void
in 2005, thus, she has no standing to participate in the Settlement Proceeding. Lucila, being a
stranger to the Settlement Proceeding, should file a separate civil action for partition before the
regular courts against the administrator of Rene's estate. This course of action is not only
consistent with the aforesaid jurisprudential pronouncements, but is likewise in accord with
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, which provides that an action to recover real property
or an interest therein from the estate may be commenced against administrator.

—-

Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay

G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Facts:
 Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
 Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in Quezon City. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara.
She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
 Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship.
Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan declaring her
marriage in Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
 Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment before the RTC (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).
 However, the trial court dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality
file the petition. The RTC cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. RTC took the view that only "the
husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4
 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the
Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized
Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

MAIN ISSUE:
*2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:
I. No. The Rule on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. The Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply
if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies
to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would defeat the purpose of recognizing
foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." For
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy,
as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II. YES. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact. Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

In this case, there is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. The Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.
The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests
that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse
to maintain the integrity of his marriage.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality
to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
It does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose,
he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines.

III. Yes. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an

action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.

—--

Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced. On November 23, 1994, private respondents
Haja Putri Zorayda A.Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their
own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos Legitimate children with Zorayda,filed a
complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and
Sen.Tamano for being bigamous.The complaint alleged,inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married
Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.

Summons were served to Estrellita but she failed to file an Answer. Instead of submitting her
answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 20, 1995, argued that the RTC
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and
issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia
courts.The RTC denied, leaving Estrellita to file a petition for certiorari, referred to the CA.
Regarding the nullity case filed by Zorayda in the RTC, hearings there were repeatedly
postponed at the instance of Estrellita. The CA then denied Zoraydas Motion to Dismiss,
prompting her to file a petition of certiorari with the SC, which still upheld the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Meanwhile, the RTC declared the marriage between Estrellita And Sen. Tamano void.
The CA affirmed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Estrellita was denied her right to due process

2. Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano is void
3. Whether or not Zorayda had standing to file the nullity case

RULING:

The petition is denied.

REMEDIAL LAW: Certiorari petition.

First issue: Estrellita argues that the RTC prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have
waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before
this Court. However, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."

CIVIL LAW: Void marriages; standing.

Second issue: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
For Estrellita, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce
under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.However, PD 1083 cannot benefit
Estrellita.As ruled in Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Moreover, the Muslim
Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil
Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.In
view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as voidab initio.

THIRD ISSUE:

Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, "Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages." This
refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse," as in bigamy cases.If Estrellitas interpretation is
employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action.Surely, this is not what the
Rule contemplated. Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas
marriage in November 1994.While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who
can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior toA.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been
held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of
rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription,
which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

DENIED.

—-

Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27,2006

Facts:
Elmar Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the decision of the
Court of Appeals in setting aside the decision of Regional Trial Court and declaring
null and void the motion for leave to file intervention and admitting the Complaint -in-
Intervention.

Tristan and Lily Catindig married each other here in the Philippines, which produced
four children. Years later, they got separated and decided to obtain divorce from the
Dominican Republic. In 1984, Tristan married Elmar in the State of Virginia.

Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily.
Subsequently, Elmar filed a petition a motion for leave to file intervention claiming
that she has legal interest in the matter of litigation as the wife of Tristan, which was
denied.

Elmar argues that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests
her with the requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules
of Court.

Issue:
Whether Elmar Perez has a legal interest to file for a motion to intervene.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the requirements for intervention are: [a] legal
interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether
the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether
the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. In the
case at bar, the marriage of Elmar and Tristan is void ab initio as it was contracted,
while the first marriage of Tristan to Lily still subsist. Hence, Elmar does not have
legal interest for her intervention.

—-

Article 40
Gomez v. Lipana, G.R. No. L-23214 June 30, 1970

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

FACTS
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked the Family Court for the declaration of Nullity of his first
marriage on 1978 with petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing
marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion on 1972. Lilia, however, claimed that such previous
marriage was null and void for having been vitiated by force upon both her and the first husband
and that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone
else.
ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage of Lilia Olivia and Karl Heinz Wiegel is void

RULING
YES. Petitioner’s first marriage which was allegedly vitiated by force committed against both
parties, if true, will make the marriage voidable, not void.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is dear that when she married respondent she was
still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art.
80, Civil Code).

Jarillo v. People, G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010

FACTS: Victoria Jarillo, petitioner, and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
in Taguig, Rizal in 1974. Both newlyweds celebrated a second wedding, this time a church
ceremony, in 1975 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of the union, the spouses bore a
daughter. Jarillo, however, contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy
celebrated through a civil ceremony. Thereafter, Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital vows in a
church wedding in Manila. In 1999, Uy filed a civil case for annulment against Jarillo. On the
basis of the foregoing, Jarillo was charged with Bigamy before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo
filed a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage against Alocillo in 2000. The trial court
rendered the assailed decision, holding Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy. Jarillo posits, as defenses, that her marriage to Alocillo were null and void because
Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, that her marriages to Alocillo and Uy were both null and void for lack of a
marriage license, and that the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA confirmed the ruling of the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC
where Jarillo filed a civil case against Alocillo rendered judgement declaring Jarillo’s marriage to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Jarillo, in her
motion for reconsideration, invoked the ruling of the trial court as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. In a Resolution by the CA, the latter denied reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jarillo can be convicted of the crime of bigamy

RULING: Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without
the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void
by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage tojurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any
difference. As held in Tenebro, “[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.”

Mercado v. Mercado, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000

Facts: From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent
Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-
Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly
executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was
‘single’. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with
complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma.
Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B.
Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which
matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites
at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between
accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by
Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were
consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children,
while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan. On
October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with
the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present
case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an
Information dated January 22, 1993. "On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the
bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision
dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
declared null and void. "Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo
Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally
dissolved. Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated: "Under Article 40 of the
Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But
here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before
the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused
was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person
who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally
dissolved."

Issue(s): (A) Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict
petitioner; (B) whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code,
negates the guilt of petitioner; and (C) whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the
basis of reasonable doubt."

Ruling: (A) Yes. Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides: "The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings." The elements of this crime are as follows: "1.
That the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; 4. That the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity."

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It
is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma.
Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy. To be sure, jurisprudence
regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
characterized as "conflicting."

In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still
necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Unlike
Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration
of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into
effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon. In Mendoza and Aragon,
the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided: "Illegal
marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (a) The first marriage was
annulled or dissolved; (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being
valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court."

The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annulable marriages." The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article
83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family
Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage, as follows:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."

In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void
was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a
Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Committee has observed: "[Article
40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person
may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person
can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug.
19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the
old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033)."

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by
Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract
a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and
convicted of bigamy.

(B) The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, which involved an
administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument
that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the
Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the
Family Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."

Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by
petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in
1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before
contracting a subsequent marriage:

"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense
in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code
states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x
x."

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had
already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the
prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question
in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. Under the circumstances of the present case,
he is guilty of the charge against him.

(C) Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she
cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court. In any event, we find no reason to reverse or
set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder: "We are
convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the
innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous
marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense
witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies. x x x xxx xx
x "Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not
inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We
are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no
longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another man. Consuelo Tan
can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the
consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event
the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If
there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making."

Luisito G. Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021

Facts:
Pulido and Arcon were married on September 5, 1983 in a civil wedding at the Municipal Hall of
Rosario Cavite. In 2007, Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. Upon
confrontation, Arcon found out that Pulido has an affair with Baleda and they were married on
July 31, 1995.
In December 2007, Arcon filed bigamy case against Pulido and Baleda.
Pulido defended that both of his marriage were void ab initio. His marriage with Arcon is void
due to lack of marriage license, and his marriage to Baleda is also void due to lack of marriage
ceremony.
Baleda on the other hand claimed that she only knew Pulido's prior marriage sometime in April
2007 and that she filed a Petition to Annul their marriage before the filing of the bigamy case.
The court even declared their marriage null and void for being bigamous on October 25, 2007.
The trial court convicted Pulido of bigamy but acquitted Baleda.
Appeals and motions of Pulido were likewise denied. The court ruled in reliance with the
provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code.
Meanwhile in 2015, the court in a civil case declared Arcon and Pulido's marriage null and void.
A decree of absolute nullity of their marriage was issued in 2016.
Issue:
Whether Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void ab initio marriage in a bigamy case.
Ruling:
No. The court in this case abandons its earlier rulings and hold that a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a
bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second
marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense,
irrespective of the time within which they are secured.
The court based the foregoing conclusion and justification on the following:
Retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage in criminal prosecutions for bigamy.
The court stressed out that the nullity of a void ab initio marriage, being inexistent under the
eyes of the law can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between parties at any time, whether before
of after death of either or both the spouses. A void marriage is ipso facto void without need of
any judicial declaration of nullity. This requirement is necessary under Art. 40, where the law
treated a void ab initio marriage as valid for purposes of remarriage.
Thus, being inexistent from the beginning, the void first marriage does not qualifies nor satisfies
one of the essential elements of bigamy which requires the existence of a prior valid marriage.
Logically, there is no first marriage to begin with. As for the retroactive effect of a void ab
initio marriage, there is nothing to annul nor dissolve as the judicial declaration of nullity merely
confirms the inexistence of such marriage. This also explains why the second element of
bigamy which requires that the former marriage has not been legally dissolved or annulled is
wanting in the case of void ab initio prior marriage. The RPC provision regarding bigamy
pertains to contracting a subsequent marriage when a voidable or valid first marriage is still
subsisting.
In the same vein, when the accused contracted a subsequent void ab initio marriage, which is
void other than it being bigamous, it has the effect of not having entered into a subsequent
marriage at all because the same is inexistent from the beginning. Thus, negates existence of
one of the elements of bigamy which requires that the accused contracts a second or
subsequent marriage. A subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the second
marriage merely confirms its inexistence.
In both instances, the accused may validly raised the defense of a void ab initio marriage
without a judicial declaration of nullity.
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of absolute nullity for
purposes of remarriage but not as a defense in bigamy.
The Court clarifies that the requirement under Art. 40 (Final judgment requiring the previous
marriage void) need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. The word "solely" under
Art. 40 qualifies the "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" and not "for
purposes of remarriage".
In effect, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity may be invoked in other instances for
purposes other than remarriage. Nonetheless, other evidence, testimonial or documentary, may
also prove the absolute nullity of the previous marriage in the said instances. Hence, such
previous void marriage need not be proved solely by an earlier judgment of court declaring it
void. For purposes of remarriage, the only evidence to prove a void marriage is the final
judgment declaring its absolute nullity. In other cases, the absolute nullity of a marriage may be
proved by evidence other than such judicial declaration.

—-
Article 41-42
Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005

FACTS:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was
never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996
when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married
through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first
marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo
was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy
against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his
marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against
him sentencing him to imprisonment of 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f
P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s
decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for
moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code.

HELD:

The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or
evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only
after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the
good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime.

The court ruled against the petitioner.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.

—-

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005

Facts: In March 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed petition in RTC for declaration of presumptive death
of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. In an order, court set petition for hearing and directed that
a copy of said order be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in Samar Reporter and
a copy be posted in court’s bulletin board for at least three weeks before next hearing. Court
also directed copies be served on Solicitor General, Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, Alan’s
counsel, and to Lea through mail. Alan complied.

In May 2001, OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss which was denied. At hearing, Alan adduced
evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995. He testified, Lea arrived home late
in evening and he berated her for being always out. He told her if she enjoyed life of a single
person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated
when he reported for work next day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later
Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought Lea merely went to her parents’ house. However,
Lea did not return anymore.
Further, Alan went to the house of Lea’s parents to see if she was there, but he was told that
she was not there. He also went to the house of Lea’s friend, Janeth Bautista, but he was
informed that Janeth had left for Manila. When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-
law, he learned Lea had been to their house but that she left without notice. Alan sought the
help of Barangay Captain who promised to help him. He also inquired from his friends of Lea’s
whereabouts but to no avail.

In June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after
town fiesta, hoping Lea would come home. Alan agreed but Lea did not show up. Alan then left
for Manila. He went to a house where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked Janeth
told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite repeated
talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look
for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for
his wife but failed.

In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the NBI and local police station. The police
authorities issued an Alarm Notice. Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of
Alan.

After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor
General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.

In RTC and CA, they rendered decision in favor of Alan. Hence, this petition for review of OSG.
OSG contends respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is
already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing
wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court
and the Honorable Court of Appeals.

Issue: W/N petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by RTC and
CA

Ruling: Yes.
The spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded
belief.

In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan
Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other
person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the
other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on
February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left
without notice.

The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her for
coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for
her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their
conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she communicate with the respondent after
leaving the conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from
him barely a month after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to
make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in
the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from
his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner of
Radio DYMS.

The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate
Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his
petition in the RTC

In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-
founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was
already dead

—-

Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016

FACTS:

Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975 in
Cordova Cebu. Three days thereafter, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), left Nilda and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children.
Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts
proved futile.

Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead
for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any
kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.

She testified on the allegations in her petition, affirming that she exerted efforts to find Dante by
requiring from parents, relatives, and neighbors, who, unfortunately, were also not aware of his
whereabouts. She averred that she intends to remarry and move on with her life.

RTC Ruling: RTC granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as presumptively dead for all
legal purposes, without prejudice to the effect of his reappearance. RTC found that the absence
of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to presumption of death.

CA Ruling: affirmed the RTC Decision declaring Dante as presumptively dead Moreover, the CA
opined that if Dante were still alive after many years, it would have been easy for him to
communicate with Nilda.

ISSUE:

whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision declaring Dante as presumptively
dead

RULING:
Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, there are four (4) essential requisites for
the declaration of presumptive death:

(1) That the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2)
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;

(2) That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

(3) That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

(4) That the present spouse files summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee.

The "well-founded belief" in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable effort to locate the absent spouse and
that base on this efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they
also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no
further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters
to request information about her husband. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively
look for her missing husband.

Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives or neighbors as witness who could
have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource
persons were not even named.

Finally, other that Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to
support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him bus was unsuccessful.

Hence, Dante cannot be declared presumptively dead.

—-

Republic v. Catubag, G.R. No. 210580, April 18, 2018

Facts:

Prior to the celebration of their marriage in 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv had been
cohabiting with each other as husband and wife. Their union begot two (2) children named Mark
Bryan A. Catubag and Rose Mae A. Catubag, both of whom were born on May 18, 2000 and
May 21, 2001, respectively.

In 2001, in order to meet the needs of his family, Ludyson took work overseas. Meanwhile,
Shanaviv stayed behind in the Philippines to tend to the needs of their children.
On June 26, 2003, Ludyson and Shanaviv tied the knot in Rizal, Cagayan. The marriage was
solemnized by Honorable Judge Tomas D. Lasam at the Office of the Municipal Judge, Rizal,
Cagayan.

Sometime in April 2006, Ludysont and his family were able to acquire a housing unit located at
Rio del Grande Subdivision, Enrile Cagayan. Thereafter, Ludyson returned overseas to continue
his work. While abroad, he maintained constant communication with his family.

On July 12, 2006, while working abroad ,Ludyson was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv
left their house and never returned. In the meantime,,Ludyson' relatives took care of the
children.

,Ludyson took an emergency vacation and flew back home because of his wife's disappearance
and welfare of his children. He looked for his wife in Enrile Cagayan, but to no avail. He then
proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends and relatives, but
they too could offer no help. He also traveled to Bicol where his wife was born and raised, but
still cannot locate her.

Ludyson subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo Philippines, one of the more well-
known radio networks in the Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's disappearance.
Moreover, Ludyson searched various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in Bicol,
with no avail.

On May 4, 2012, after almost seven (7) years of waiting, private respondent filed with the RTC a
petition to have his wife declared presumptively dead.

On May 23, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the Petition.

On August 5, 2013, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the
judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Petitioner's main contention is that private respondent failed to establish a "well-
founded belief" that his missing wife was already dead.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Petitioner's resort to an appeal to the CA under Rule 65 is proper.

2. Whether the Private Respondent has complied with the requisites of a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Art. 41 of the Famil Code.

HELD:

1. Whether Petitioner's resort to an appeal to the CA under Rule 65 is proper.

YES. The nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies
avallable. Under Art. 41 ot the ramilv Code. a petition for declaration ot presumptive
death is a summary proceeding. Art 253 of the same Code likewise characterizes proceedings
under Art. 41 as summary proceedings.
As a consequence of this summary nature, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal
decision in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because these judgments are
immediately final and executory by express mandate ot law.

However, parties may challenge the decision in such proceedings through a petition for
certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack o jurisdiction.
As previously held by the Court in Republic vs. Sareñogon, Jr., in a summary proceeding for the
declaration for presumptive death, if a party is aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, then a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed with the CA. any subsequent decision by the
CA may be elevated to the SC via Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

2. Whether the Private Respondent has complied with the requisites of a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Art. 41 of the Famil Code.

NO. There are 4 requisites under Art. 41 that must be complied with for the
declaration ot presumptive death to prosper:
The absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 it such spouse was in
danger of death when the disappearance occurred;

The present spouse wants to remarry; The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death ot the absentee

In this case, Ludyson has complied with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th requisites. nut has not
satisfied the 3rd requisite as he has not established a wellfounded belief that the absentee is
dead. Such belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse. Ludyson failed to
establish his allegations. He did not present the friends and family he claims to have made
inquiries to. While he did have a certification from Bombo Radyo's manager, he did not seek
help from government agencies like the police or NBI. Ludyson's assertion, uncorroborated by
evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead.

—-

Republic v. Ponce-Pilapil, G.R. No. 219185, November 25, 2020

—-

Social Security System v. Jarque Vda. de Bailon

485 SCRA 376, March 24, 2006

FACTS: Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. Some 15 years later,
Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice, she being an absentee. The
petition was granted in 1970. In 1983, Clemente married Teresita Jarque. The two lived together
until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the
same were granted to her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she
is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given
the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial
expenses of Clemente. They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with
Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and
kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the
declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of
Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parents’ place. She was in Sorsogon all
along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-
marital affairs. SSS then directed Jarque to reimburse what had been granted her and to return
the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to
Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further,
SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous.
Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Commission and the SSC
affirmed SSS. Jarque appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter ruled in her favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively
dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.
RULING: No. There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s
death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon
Clemente’s death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her
reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not
correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no
judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to
who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of
disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to review a court decision or
declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is
still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice
reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit;
in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised – the marriage
herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally – it is however
impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be attacked for the same
has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.

—-

Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner assails the Decision of CA Resolutions and she filed a petition for
annulment of judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. CA
however dismissed the petition declaring her presumptively dead.

Ricardo, his husband filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive

death for the purpose of remarriage. He insisted he exerted full efforts to locate
Celerina, even went to Celerina’s parents and even to her relatives and friends to know
her whereabouts but they couldn't find her. It was almost 12 years since Celerina left
and thereafter when he filed his petition to RTC.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo’s petition sometime in October.
Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She was actually the one which was left by
Ricard in their conjugal dwelling in Congressional Ave. Quezon City. Ricardo left her for
another woman and Ricardo’s misrepresentation deprived her of any notice and of
opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead.

She claimed that all Ricardo’s statements are fraudulent, false allegations and
even their children know about and support her contentions.

CA dismissed her petition. She filed for MOR but still denied.

ISSUE: Whether or Not CA erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground

that the proper remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry
declaring her reappearance as stated in Art. 42 of the Family Code.

RULING: YES. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the RTC’s judgment, order,
or resolution has become final and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available thru no fault of the petitioner.

For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or

actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original
action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. It is
extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commit acts outside of the trial which prevents a
party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case such that there is no
fair submission of the controversy.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage. There is a danger in a second marriage
when the presumptive dead reappears.

ART. 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by

reappearance is subject to several conditions:
(1) The non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring
it void ab initio;
(2) Recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance;
(3) Due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance;
(4) The fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous
subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:
1. The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2. The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead.
3. There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse; and
4. There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Art. 42 of the

Family Code is valid until terminated, the “children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate and the properly relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same
as in valid marriages. If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate. A judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for
bigamy.

However, “a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage may be

filed solely by the husband or wife”. This means that even if Celerina is a real party in
interest who stands to be benefitted or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the
2 marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
nd

—-

Article 45-46
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006
Facts: Orlando Villanueva and Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married in 1988 in Palawan. In
1992, Villanueva filed a petition for annulment of his marriage on the ground of threats of
violence and duress forcing him to marry Lilia who was already pregnant at the time. He alleged
that he did not get her pregnant and that he never cohabited with her after the marriage. The child
had died during delivery. In her answer, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing
that Villanueva freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for
almost a month after their marriage; and that petitioner wrote letters to her after returning to
Manila.

Issue: W/N their marriage can be dissolved on the ground of vitiated consent?

Held: NO. Fernando claims that he did not freely consent to the marriage because was harassed
and forced to marry her: harassing phone calls, unwelcome visits from three men after his classes
at UE, and threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso who is allegedly a member of the NPA.
The SC is not convinced that Fernando’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming that it had deprived him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage.
He worked as a security guard in a bank and as such, he should at least know basic self-defense.
Also, he did not inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
He also alleged fraud because he was made to believe that Lilia was pregnant with his child
when they were married. His excuse is that he could not have impregnated her because he was
not physically prepared during their tryst, but this was negated by the narration of Fernando’s
counsel before the RTC—that the sexual act had been consummated in 1988 before the marriage.

Instead of presenting his own strong evidence, Fernando resorted to undermining the credibility
of Lilia by citing her errors in recalling the date of birth of their child—that she was off by a
year.He also wrote 13 letters of love to Lilia of which he acknowledge 7, but later retracted and
denied having voluntarily written them. If he was really under duress, how could he have denied
his involvement in the other 6 letters?

He cannot claim to annul his marriage because he and Lilia no longer cohabited after the
marriage. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for
annulling the marriage. He failed to justify his failure to cohabit with Lilia, thus the validity of
his marriage should be upheld.

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;

—-

Engle v. Doe, 47 Phil. 753

—-

Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97

Facts:

Plaintiff Aurora Anaya and defendant Fernando Palaroan were married on December 4, 1953.
Fernando thereafter filed an action for annulment of marriage on January 7, 1954 on the ground
that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. A judgment was rendered
dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting
Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando
divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret
constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She thereafter prayed for the annulment of her
marriage with Fernando on such ground.

The trial court found the allegation of fraud to be insufficient to warrant the invalidation of their
marriage. The issue to be resolved before the Supreme Court was whether or not the non-
disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital

relationship with anither woman is a ground for annulment of marriage

RULING:

Non-Disclosure of Pre-marital Relationship Not Ground for Annulment of Marriage

The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that non-disclosure to a wife of pre-
marital relationship with another woman was not a ground for the annulment of marriage.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of
the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph of Article 86. The law does not assuage Aurora’s
grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an
institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested.

Type of Fraud Limited and Exclusive to Those Enumerated in Article 86

For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment,
comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides: "ART. 85. A marriage
may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: xx
xxx xxx (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be."

1. This fraud mentioned above, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those
kinds or species of fraud enumerated in Article 86.
Circumstances Constituting Fraud According to Article 86 of the Family Code
2. Circumstances constituting fraud according to Article 86 of the Family Code
(a) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(b) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more; and

(c) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.

Article 86 further provides that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank,
fortune orchastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment
of marriage. (Family Code)

The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground
for annulment of marriage to enumerated three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of
all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment
in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages.
Second Fraud Charge Not Allowed to be Included in the Reply of Aurora

The second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence
ofintention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of
action."

The allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a
party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action as set forth in his
complaint, there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and additional
cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could
become interminable.

Second Fraud Charge Barred by Prescription

Any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have
beendiscovered by the wife soon after the marriage. Hence, her action for annulment based on
that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since the appellant's
wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it
must be declared already barred.

—-

Aquino v. Delizo, 109 Phil. 21, Case No. L-15853, July 27, 1960

Facts: Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against
Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with Delizo on December 1954, concealed the
fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after
their marriage, gave birth to a child. Delizo claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful
wedlock between her and Fernando Aquino.

During the trial, only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the parties without the birth certificate of the child born after the
marriage. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence. Trial court dismissed the
complaint. CA affirmed the ruling of RTC on the ground that the claim of the Fernando to not
have noticed the pregnancy when he married her was found to be unbelievable. It was not
impossible for the two of them to have nave sexual intercourse during their engagement, so it is
possible the child could be his.
Fernando Aquino filed a motion praying the decision be reconsidered. He attached following
documents:

1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Plaintiff's brother)

• Delizo was living with Cesar at the time she and Fernando Aquino met
• Delizo had two more children with Cesar aside from their firstborn, they are in common-law
relationship
• Cesar admitted he was the father of the defendant's first born, Catherine
• Cesar admitted that he and Delizo hid the pregnancy from the Fernando at the time of their
marriage

2. Affidavit of defendant Conchita Delizo

• Admitted her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino
• Admitted she hid her pregnancy from the petitioner when they got married

3. Affidavit of Albert Powell

• Stating he knew Cesar and Delizo lived together before December 27, 1954, when she
married Fernando

4. Birth certificate of defendant’s first born, Catherine Bess Aquino (born 26 April 1955)
5. Birth certiticate of Carolle Ann Aquino, second child or defendant with Cesar
6. Birth certticate of Chris Charibel Aquino, third child of defendant with Cesar
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to late November
1954 which does not show defendant's four-month pregnancy

Issue: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy by another man can be a ground for
annulment

Ruling: Yes. Under the New Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of
the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is
ground for annulment of marriage.

NCC 85: A marriage may be annulled for any f the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with
full knowledse of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband
or his wile, as the case may be

NCC 86: Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband.

Defendant Delizo was only more than four months pregnant when she married Fernando. Court
is not prepared to say her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally
plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff could hardly be expected to know, merely by
looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she
must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. No support of the statement that
plaintiff and defendant could have had sexual intercourse before marriage. Evidence sought to
be introduced at the new trial can be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff.

In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision
complained is set aside.

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Almelor v. RTC, G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008

DOCTRINE:
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family
Code. It ratiocinated: x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding
circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support
thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).

Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero
sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage
as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when
homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct
the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of
course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is
not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a
time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus
jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.

FACTS:

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were
married on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of
marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage
on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and
father but this was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a
harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way of
imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.

Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for
his mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality.
She caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male
caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And
she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When
she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left
their conjugal abode.

Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso
Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida’s claim. She testified that
she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also
had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed
even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true
cause of Leonida’s hostility against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the
marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. The CA denied the
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.
RULING:

Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not

homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time
of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual
preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s
peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a
homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and
proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been
vitiated by such.

The petition is granted for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The appealed decision is reversed and set aside and the petition in the trial
court to annul the marriage is dismissed

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Topic: Article 45-46

Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441

Facts:

Leonilo Donato filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to suspend the criminal case for Bigamy in view of a civil case for
annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on
the ground of prejudicial question.

Leonilo Donato Contends that his second marriage to Paz Abayan is void as it was
solemnized without marriage license, and there was force, intimidation, violence and
undue influence were employed by Abayan. However, prior to their marriage, Donato
and Abayan deported themselves as husband and wife, and cohabited. Further, the
criminal case and civil case are pending, since there is prejudicial question.

However, Judge Luna denied the petition to suspend the criminal case against Donata
as there is no prejudicial question included in two cases. Further, it is not Donato who
filed the petition for annulment of marriage, it is Abayan as her consent was taken
through deceit.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Luna erred in denying the motion to suspend the criminal
proceedings against Donato on the ground of prejudicial question.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court, through Justice Ynares-Santiago, ruled that pursuant to
Landicho vs Relov provides that prejudicial question can only be applied only if the
Donato’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and
intimidation and in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an
involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. In the case
at bar, Donato and Abayan were living together as husband and wife prior to their
marriage. Hence, Donato cannot state that his consent was obtained through violence.

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Alcazar v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009

——-

Menciano v. Neri San Jose, 89 Phil 63

FACTS

Matilde Menciano, in her behalf and in behalf of the minors Carlo Magno
Neri and Faustino Neri, Jr., filed a motion for declaration of heirs, alleging that
she is the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose to whom she was
married on September 28, 1944, before Rev. Father Isaias Edralin, S. J. She
claims that before the marriage the deceased and she lived together as
husband and wife, there having been no impediment to their marriage.

She further claims that as a result of their cohabitation before the

marriage the child Carlo Magno Neri was born on March 9, 1940 and was later
baptized, said child having enjoyed the status of a recognized natural child and
that their second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 24, 1945; and that
Carlo Magno Neri was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his parents
and Faustino Neri, Jr., is a legitimate child born in lawful wedlock. On an
amended answer, Paz Neri San Jose, the executrix of the estate of the deceased
and Rodolfo Pelaez, the designated universal heir in the will of the deceased
dated December 19, 1940, denied the substantial allegations of the
abovementioned motion for declaration of heirs and further alleged in
substance that the deceased, was suffering from senile dementia from the year
which became worse from September 9, 1944. They also claimed that the
marriage between said deceased and Matilde Menciano, was in violation of the
legal provisions and requisites, for the deceased was deprived of his free will
due to his age, sickness, and bombardment, and Menciano, taking advantage
of the deceased's condition, by intrigue and threat of abandoning him, forced
Neri by means of deceit (dolo) and threat to marry her; and that the deceased
was sterile, unable to procreate, and was impotent and congenitally sterile, the
same as his brothers Anastasio, Filomeno, Pedro, and his sister Conchita, who
had no children. The defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of
P286,000 in cash, and for jewels and certain properties, which, as alleged, were
retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde Menciano.
ISSUE

Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde
Menciano valid?

Are, the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate
children of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano?

RULING

(FIRST ANSWER)Yes. The marriage between the two is evidenced by: the 2
applications for a marriage license, dated September 28, 1944, the first one,
signed by the deceased to marry Menciano and the other one, signed by
Menciano to marry the deceased; the certificate for immediate issuance of
marriage license applied for, signed by the Acting Local Civil Registrar and the
deceased and Menciano; the marriage contract signed by the deceased and
Menciano as contracting parties, Rev. Isaias Edralin as solemnizing officer, and
the witnesses L. B. Castaños and Samson Pañgan.

The 4 documents are official and public; there validity can be

successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and convincing oral testimony. In
this case, the oral evidence presented by the defendants is not convincing so as
to declare the said marriage invalid. A mere glance at the signatures of the
deceased in the aforesaid documents will convince anyone that they could not
have been written by a man who is almost unconscious and physically and
intellectually incapacitated, as the defendants witnesses represent him to have
been. Also, the tests pertaining to testamentary capacity were applied to
show the capacity to contract marriage of the deceased. Although the said
doctrine relates to testamentary capacity, there is no reason why it should not
be applied to the capacity to contract marriage, which requires the same
mental condition. Thus, the court did not err in declaring valid the marriage of
the deceased and Menciano

(SECOND ANSWER) Yes. Faustino Neri, Jr. is a legitimate child of the

deceased and Menciano. The requisite for potency being met, the necessary
conclusion is that the child Faustino Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed to be
the legitimate son of the deceased with Menciano in lawful wedlock. Carlo
Magno Neri was born on March 9, 1940, that is, before the marriage. Both the
deceased Faustino and Matilde Menciano free to marry without any legal
impediment. However, the court declared that Carlo Magno Neri has not been
acknowledged as a natural child and, consequently, cannot be legitimized by
the subsequent marriage of his parents.

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