Anti Aircraft Book

Kennein P.
Hen
A Short operailDnal Hlsttrpy or
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: A Short Operational History of 5b. GRANT NUMBER
Ground-Based Air Defense
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

Kenneth P. Werrell 5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
Air Univ, Maxwell AFB, AL
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
ISBN 1-58566-026-4
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS

Air defenses, Military - History - 20th century; Antiaircraft guns - History - 20th century; Antiaircraft
missiles - History - 20th century
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
SAR 219
unclassified unclassified unclassified
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
s
cad
' ts
I
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,

A'XDX.P%-,.HIE, FLAK, AAA,
AND SAM
AND SAM
A
A Short
Short Operational
Operational History
History of
of
Ground-Based
Ground-Based Air
Air Defense
Defense
by
by
KENNETH P. WERRELL
KENNETH P. WERRELL
Senior
Senior Research
Research Fellow
Fellow
Airpower
Airpower Research
Research Institute
Institute
Air
Air University
University Press
Press
Maxwell
Maxwell Air
Air Force
Force Base,
Base, Alabama
Alabama 36112-5532
36112-5532
December
December 1988
1988
Libraiy of
Library of Congress
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Cataloging-in-Ptiblication Data
Data
Werrell,
Werrell, Kenneth
Kenneth P.P.
Archie,
Archie, Flak,
Flak, AAA,
AAA, and
and SAM.
SAM.
"December
"December 1988 ."
1988."
Includes
Includes Index.
Index.
Bibliography
Bibliography:: p.
p.
1 . Air defenses, Military-History-20th
I. Air defenses. Military—History—20th century. 2. Antiaircraft
century. 2. Antiaircraft guns-History-
guns—Hlstory-
20th century.
20th century. 3.
3. Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft missiles-History-20th century. I.I. Title.
missiles—History—20th century. Title.
UG730.W47
UG730.W47 1985 1985 358.4'145
358.4'145 88-7596
88-7596
ISBN
ISBN 1-58566-026-4
1-58566-026-4
First
First Printing
Printing December
December 1988
1988
Second
Second Printing
Printing March
March 1996
1996
Third
Third Printing
Printing August
August 1998
1998
Fourth
Fourth Printing
Printing October
October 2000
2000
Fifth
Fifth Printing
Printing September
September 2002
2002
Disclaimer
Disclaimer
Opinions,
Opinions, conclusions,
conciusions, and
and recommendations
recommendations expressed
expressed or
or implied
implied within
within are
are solely
soiely those
those of
of the
the
editors
editors and
and do
do not
not necessarily
necessariiy represent
represent the
the views
views of
of Air
Air University,
University, the
the United
United States
States Air
Air Force,
Force,
the
the Department
Department ofof Defense,
Defense, or
or any
any other
other US
US government
government agency
agency.. Cleared
Cleared for
for public
public release:
release:
distribution
distribution unlimited.
unlimited.
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS
Chapter
Chapter page
Page
DISCLAIMER
DISCLAIMER .. . . . ... . . . .. . . .. . . '.. . . . . ... . . ... . . . .. . . .... . . .. . . . . . iiii
FOREWORD
FOREWORD .. . . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . ... . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .... . xi
XI
ABOUT
ABOUT THE
THE AUTHOR.
AUTHOR . . .. . . . .. . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . ... xiii
Xlll
PREFACE
PREFACE . ... . . . .. .. . . ... . . ... . . ... . ... . . . .. . . .... . . . .. . . ... . . . .. . . . xv
XV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ... . . ... . . . . . . . ... . . ... . . . .. . . . . .. . xix
xix
11 THE
THE EARLY
EARLY YEARS YEARS TO TO 1945 1945 . . . .. . . .... . . .. . . . .... . . . 11
British
British Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Artillery Artillery . .. . . . ... . . ... . . ... . . . .. . . . 44
The V-1 Campaign
The V-1 Campaign . . . . . . . .. . . .... . ... . . . .. . . .... . . . . . . . . . .. . 10
10
American
American Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Artillery Artillery . . .... . . .. . . . ... . . . ... 21
21
German
German Flak Flak Defenses
Defenses . . . .. . . .. . . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . ... 23
23
Allied
Allied Countermeasures
Countermeasures . .. . . .... . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . . ... . . . . 43
43
Fratricide
Fratricide .... . . . ... . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . ... . . .... . .... . . . .. . . . 46
46
The US
The US Navy Navy in in the the Pacific
Pacific . .... . . .. . . . ... . .... . . . ... . . 51
51
Japanese
Japanese Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Artillery Artillery . . . . ... . . ... . . .... . . . ... 53
53
The
The Lessons
Lessons of of World
World War War II II ... . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . ... 57
57
Notes . . . . . .... . . .... . . . .. . . ... . .. . . . .. . . .... . . .. . . . ... . . ... . . .... . . . .
Notes 59
59
22 THE
THE POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS, YEARS, 1945-65 1945-65 . . . ... . .... . . .... . . 71
71
The
The Korean
Korean War War . . .. . . .... ... . . . .. . . . .. . . ... . . . ... . . .... . . ... . 73
73
Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Missiles Missiles . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .... . . .. . . . ... . . . .. . . . ... 82
82
Notes
Notes .. . . . ... . . . .... . . ... . . ... . .. . . .. . . . ... . . . .. . . ... . . . .. . . . .... . . .. 91
91
33 VIETNAM
VIETNAM . . . . .. . .... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . ... . . ... . . ... . . .... . ... . . . .... . . 95
95
French
French Operations
Operations . . . ... . . ... . . . . . . . .. . . .... . . ... . . ... . . . .... 95
95
American
American Operations Operations through through 1968 1968 .. .. . . . .. . . . . .. 96
96
American
American Operations Operations through through Linebacker Linebacker I.I..... 112
112
Linebacker
Linebacker II II ... . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . ... . . ... . . . . . . . ... . . ... . . . ... . . . 119
119
Conclusions
Conclusions . . . . ... . . . .. . ... . ... . .... . . ... . . ... . . .... . . . . . . . ... . . 126
126
Notes
Notes . . . . .. . . . ... . . . ... . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .... . ... . . . ... . .... . . . ... . 127
127
44 RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE . . .. . . . ... . .... . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. 137
137
Arab-Israeli
Arab-Israeli Wars
Wars . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .... . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ... . . .. 137
137
1948, 1956, and
1948, 1956, 1967 . . ... . . ... . . .. . . . ... . . . .. . . .... . . .
and 1967 137
137
Chapter Page
P^Se
Chapter
1967-73
1967-73 . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .... . . . .. . . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. 138
138
1973 . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .
1973 139
139
1982 . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .... . . . ... . . . ... . . ... . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . ..
1982 146
146
American Air
American Air StrikesStrikes in in the the Middle Middle East, East,
1983-86 . . ... . . . ... . . . ... . . . ... . . . . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
1983-86 147
147
Indian-Pakistani Wars
Indian-Pakistani Wars . .. . . . ... . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. .. .. . . . . 150
150
The
The Falklands,
Falklands, 1982 1982 . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... .. . . . . . . 151
151
Ongoing and Recent Aspects
Ongoing and Recent Aspects . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... .. . . . . . . 162
162
Summary . . .. . . . . . . . . . .... . . ... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .
Summary 167
167
Notes . . . .. . . . ... . . . ... . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . ... . .. . . . . . .
Notes 168
168
55 SUMMARY, TRENDS,
SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND AND
CONCLUSIONS .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ... . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSIONS 177
177
Summary . . .. . . . . . . . . . .... . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . ... . .. . . . . . .
Summary 177
177
Trends (Speculations)
Trends (Speculations) . . ... . . . .. . . . .. . . .... . ... . . . .. . ... . .. . 181
181
Conclusions .. . . . . . . . .... . . ... . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . ... . .. . . . . . .
Conclusions 182
182
INDEX . ... . . . .... . . . . .. . . ... . . .... . . . ... . . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . ... . . . . . .. . . .

INDEX 185
185
ILLUSTRATIONS
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
Figure
1
1 German 7.7-cm antiaircraft
German 7.7-cm antiaircraft gun,
gun, 1916
1916 .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. 22
22 Improvised antiaircraft
Improvised antiaircraft weapons
weapons .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. 33
33 Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft battery training . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . ..
battery training 44
44 British women receiving

British women receiving antiaircraft
antiaircraft training . ..
training... 77
55 British
British experimenting
experimenting with with rocketsrockets during during
World War II . . ... . . . .. . . . .... .
World War II . .... . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . ... . .. . 88
66 British
British 40-mm gun and
40-mm gun and crew
crew . .. . . .... . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . ... 99
77 V-1
V-1 buzz
buzz bomb
bomb over
over London.
London . . . . .... . . .. . . . . . . . .. . ... . .. . 11
11
88 Initial
Initial British defensive deployment
British defensive deployment . . . . . . . . .. . ... . .. . 12
12
99 Preparing Pile mattress

Preparing Pile mattress . . . ... . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . ... . .. . 14
14
vi
Vi
Figure Page
10
10 33.7-inch
.7-inch gun
gun mounted on aa Pile
mounted on Pile mattress
mattress . . . .. . . . .. 15
15
11
11 Final
Final British
British defensive
defensive deployment
deployment . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. 16
16
12
12 Defense
Defense of
of Antwerp,
Antwerp, Belgium
Belgium . . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . 20
20
13
13 US
US 90-mm
90-mm M-1
M-1 AAA
AAA gun
gun . .. . . . .. . . .. . . ... . . . .. . ... . . .. . . .. 21
21
14
14 German
German 88-mm
88-mm gun
gun . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . ... . . .. . . . 25
25
15
15 German
German 88-mm
88-mm gun
gun was
was versatile
versatile . .. . . ... . .. . . . .. . ... . 26
26
16
16 88-mm
88-mm gun
gun on
on the
the march
march . ... . ... . . . . . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . .. . . ... 27
27
17
17 German
German 128-mm
128-mm gun
gun . . ... . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . ... . . . .. . ... . ... . . .. 28
28
18
18 Ploesti
Ploesti mission
mission was
was dramatic
dramatic and
and costly
costly . .. . . . .. . . . 30
30
19
19 German
German radar
radar in
in Romania
Romania . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . ... . . 31
31
20
20 Ploesti
Ploesti was
was protected
protected by
by smoke
smoke and
and guns
guns ... . . ... . 32
32
21
21 German
German light
light flak
flak was
was very
very effective
effective . ... . .. . . . .. . . ... 33
33
22
22 German
German 20-mm
20-mm guns
guns aboard
aboard train
train .. . . ... . .... . . .. . . .. 34
34
23
23 German
German lightlight flak flak piecespieces mounted mounted on on motor motor
vehicles
vehicles . . . .... . . .... . . . ... . . . .. . . .... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ... . . 35
35
24
24 40-mm
40-mm Bofors
Bofors on
on truck
truck chassis
chassis .. . . ... . ... . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . 35
35
25
25 50-mm
50-mm gun
gun on
on five-ton
five-ton towing
towing vehicle
vehicle . . .. . . .... . ... 36
36
26
26 128-mm
128-mm railway
railway guns
guns were
were largest
largest in
in Ploesti ....
Ploesti.... 36
36
27
27 German
German Taifun
Taifun rocket
rocket . . ... . . .. . . . .. . . ... . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . . 38
38
28
28 Enzian
Enzian rocket
rocket . ... . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . ... . .. . . ... . . . .. . .... . . .. . . 39
39
29
29 Rheintochter
Rheintochter rocket
rocket .. . . ... . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .... . .. . . .... . ... 40
40
30
30 German
German Schmetterling
Schmetterling . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . ... . .... . ... . . ... . . .. 41
41
31
31 Wasserfall
Wasserfall . . . . . ... . . . .... . . ... . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . ... . . . 42
42
vii
Figure
Figure Page
P'^S^
32
32 Chaff . . .. . . . . .... . . . . .. . . . .... . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . ... . . ... . . . .. . ... . . . . . ...
Chaff. 44
44
33
33 Liberator over Italy.
Liberator over Italy . . . ... . . . ... . . ... . . .. . . . .. . . .... .... . . . .... . 47
47
34
34 B-17
B-17 nose
nose shot
shot away
away by flak over
by flak over Cologne
Cologne . . . .... . 48
48
35
35 German
German flak
flak was
was impressive
impressive . .. . . .. . . . .. . . ... . .. .. . . . .... . 48
48
36
36 Douglas
Douglas A-20s
A-20s attack attack Japanese Japanese positions positions at at
Karos . . .... . . . . .... . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .
Karos 55
55
37
37 B-29
B-29 hit
hit by
by Japanese
Japanese flak
flak on
on bombing
bombing run
run . . . .... . 56
56
38
38 75-mm
75-mm Sky Sweeper . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . ... . ... . .... . . . . . .. .
Sky Sweeper 73
73
39
39 F-51
F-51 Mustang
Mustang fighters
fighters at
at air
air base
base in
in Korea
Korea . . . . .. . 75
75
40
40 F-80 Shooting
F-80 Star jets
Shooting Star destined for
jets destined for Communist
Communist
transportation targets . .... . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . .... . . . . . ...
transportation targets 76
76
41
41 B-26 light
B-26 light bombers
bombers . ... . . . .. . . . ... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .. 77
77
42
42 C-119S . . . .... . . .... . . . ... . . . ... . . . .. . . . .. . . ... . . . .. . ... . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . ..
C-119s 79
79
43
43 T-6
T-6 . . ... . . . .... . . .... . . . ... . . . ... . . . .. . . . ... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . .. 81
81
44
44 Nike Ajax . . . . ... . . . ... . . . . ... . . .. . . . .. . . ... . . ... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .
Nike Ajax 83
83
45
45 Nike Hercules .. . . . .. . . . ... . . ... . . .. . . . ... . ... . . . . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . .
Nike Hercules 84
84
46
46 Hawk
Hawk . . . . .... . . . ... . . . ... . . . ... . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . .. 85
85
47
47 Redeye .. . . . . .. . . . . ... . . ... . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .
Redeye 86
86
48
48 Talos missile . . . ... . . . ... . . . .. . . . .. . . ... . .... . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . .
Talos missile... 88
88
49
49 Tartar missile .. . . ... . . . .. . . . . . .. . ... . . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . .
Tartar missile 88
88
50
50 Boeing
Boeing IM-99
IM-99 Bomarc
Bomarc guided
guided missile
missile . . . . . . .. .. . . . ... 90
90
51
51 Bomarc
Bomarc interceptor
interceptor missile...
missile . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .. . 91
91
52
52 American
American adviser adviser instructinginstructing South South Vietnamese Vietnamese
troops
troops . . . . . ... . . . .... . . ... . . . . . . . . .... . ... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . .. .... . . . . 97
97
via
Viii
Figure
Figure Page
Page
53
53 C-123K
C-123K delivers
delivers needed
needed supplies
supplies . . . .... . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. 98
98
54
54 North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese scramble
scramble for
for their guns . . ... . . .
their guns 98
98
55
55 A-6A
A-6A Intruder
Intruder attack attack aircraft aircraft over over the the Gulf Gulf of of
Tonkin . ... . . . ... . . ... . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . ... . . ... .
Tonkin 100
100
56
56 F-105 Thunderchief pilots
F-105 Thunderchief pilots head head for for NorthNorth
Vietnam
Vietnam target
target . . .. . . . ... . . . . ... . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. 101
101
57
57 Phantom
Phantom attacks
attacks ... . . . ... . . . .. . . ... . . ... . .... . ... . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . . 103
103
58
58 RF-4C
RF-4C reconnaissance
reconnaissance aircraft
aircraft . . . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . .. . . ... . . 104
104
59
59 Abandoned
Abandoned surface-to-air
surface-to-air missile missile site site in in
North
North Vietnam
Vietnam . ... . . .... . . . ... . . ... . . .. . . .. . . ... . . ... . .. . . ... . . ... 104
104
60
60 North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese SA-2
SA-2 position
position .. . . ... . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . 105
105
61
61 Soviet
Soviet SA-2
SA-2 . . . . ... . . . .... . . .... . ... . . . .. . ... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . ... . . . 106
106
62
62 SA-2
SA-2 launch
launch against
against US
US aircraft
aircraft .. . ... . .... . .. . . ... . .... . 106
106
63
63 EB-66
EB-66 . . . . .... . . .... . . . ... . . ... .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ... . .. . . .. . . . ... 109
109
64
64 A-4
A-4 Skyhawk
Skyhawk aircraft
aircraft fires
fires Shrike
Shrike missile
missile .. . ... . . . . 110
110
65
65 F-105G
F-105G Wild
Wild Weasel
Weasel on
on the
the wing
wing of
of aa tanker ...
tanker... 111
111
66
66 CH-53
CH-53 helicopter
helicopter . . ... . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . ... 113
113
67
67 VNAF
VNAF Choctaws
Choctaws .. . . . . ... . . .... . ... . ... . . ... . . .. . . ... . . .. . ... . . . . 114
114
68
68 Regional forces scramble
Regional forces scramble out
out of
of an
an H-34
H-34 ... . .... . . 114
114
69
69 Soviet
Soviet SA-7
SA-7 Grail
Grail surface-to-air
surface-to-air missile
missile . . . . . .. . . .. . . 115
115
70
70 AQM-34V
AQM-34V in in flightflight with with an an AN/ALE-38
AN/ALE-38 chaff chaff
pod . . . . ... . . . .. . . . ... . . . .... . . .... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . .. . . ..
pod 118
118
71
71 Marine
Marine EA-6B
EA-6B Prowler
Prowler aircraft
aircraft .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . ... . . 119
119
72
72 B-52
B-52 dropping
dropping bombs
bombs . . .... . ... . .... . ... . ... . . . .. . ... . .. . . .... 120
120
IX
Figure
Figure Page
""^^^
73
73 B-52
B-52 aircraft
aircraft damaged by SAM
damaged by SAM missile
missile . . . . . .. . . . ... 121
121
74
74 Standard
Standard arm missile (AGM-78)
arm missile (AGM-78) igniting
igniting . . .. . . . ... 124
124
75
75 Soviet SA-6 . . . . . .... . . .... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . .. . . . .. . .
Soviet SA-6.. 141
141
76
76 Soviet ZSU-23-4 . . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . ... . . . .. . .. . . ... . . .
Soviet ZSU-23-4 142
142
77
77 Soviet SA-9 . . . . . .... . . . ... . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . ... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .
Soviet SA-9 148
148
78
78 Canberra . . .. . . . . ... . . . .... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
Canberra. 152
152
79
79 Avro Vulcan . .. .. . . . . ... . . ... . . .. . . ... . ... . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .
Avro Vulcan 152
152
80
80 Hawker Siddeley Harrier
Hawker Siddeley Harrier . . ... . . ... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . .. .... . . . . 153
153
81
81 Blowpipe launcher
Blowpipe launcher ashore ashore on on the the Falkland
Falkland
Islands . . . . ... . . . .... . . .... . . . ... . ... . ... . . ... . ... . . ... . . .. . . . .. .... . . . .
Islands 156
156
82
82 Stinger . . . . . .. . . .... . . . ... . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . ... . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . .
Stinger 157
157
83
83 Rapier
Rapier surface-to-air antiaircraft missile
surface-to-air antiaircraft missile .. . ... . . .. . 158
158
84
84 Rapier
Rapier system under aa camouflage
system under camouflage net
net . . . .. . ... . . . . . 158
158
85
85 7.62-mm GPMG deployed
7.62-mm GPMG deployed ashore ashore on on
Falklands . . . . .... . . . ... . . . ... . . . .. . ... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . ...
Falklands 159
159
86
86 Seacat . . . ... . . . .... . . .... . . . ... . . ... . ... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . ...
Seacat 160
160
87
87 British antiaircraft weapons
British antiaircraft weapons ... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . ... . ... . . . ... 161
161
88
88 Bofors
Bofors antiaircraft
antiaircraft gun gun served served in in the the
Falklands . . . . .... . . .... . . . ... . . .. . . .. . . ... . . .. . .... . . .. . . ... . ... . . . ...
Falklands 162
162
89
89 Seaslug . . . . . . . . .... . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . ... . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . ...
Seaslug 163
163
90
90 Sea Dart
Sea Dart launch
launch during
during peacetime
peacetime .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ... 164
164
91
91 Afghanistan
Afghanistan rebels down Soviet
rebels down Soviet helicopter
helicopter .. . . . ... 165
165
FOREWORD
FOREWORD
Dr
Dr Kenneth
Kenneth Werrell's
Werrell's history
history of of ground-based
ground-based air air defense
defense
performs
performs an an important
important service
service bothboth to to scholarship
scholarship and, and,
more
more important,
important, to to the
the defense
defense of of our
our nation's
nation's freedom.
freedom. It It
is
is perhaps
perhaps human
human naturenature thatthat wewe tend
tend over
over time
time to to lose
lose
sight
sight of
of the
the lessons
lessons of of the
the past,
past, especially
especially when they do
when they do not
not
conform
conform to to certain cherished preconceptions
certain cherished preconceptions of of ours.
ours. That
That
such myopia can
such myopia can be dangerous, if
be dangerous, if not
not downright
downright disastrous,
disastrous.
Doctor Werrell's
Doctor Werrell's studystudy richly
richly illustrates
illustrates.. Without senti-
Without senti-
mentalism, he chronicles a pattern of lessons learned and
mentalism, he chronicles a pattern of lessons learned and
too
too quickly
quickly forgotten,
forgotten, as as the
the marvel
marvel of of air
air power
power waswas re-re-
minded
minded again
again and
and again
again ofof its
its limitations
limitations and and vulnerability
vulnerability..
In
In Korea
Korea and and in in Vietnam,
Vietnam, the the American
American people people werewere
stripped
stripped of of their
their illusions
illusions of of national
national andand technical
technical omnip-
omnip-
otence.
otence. The
The unhappy
unhappy outcome
outcome of of those
those twotwo conflicts
conflicts were
were
doubly lamentable because the lessons of World War II
doubly lamentable because the lessons of World War II
were-or
were—or shouldshould have been—fresh in
have been-fresh our minds
in our minds.. InIn that
that
world
world war,
war, as Doctor Werrell
as Doctor shows, relatively
Werrell shows, relatively cheap
cheap
ground-based
defense diddid make
make aa difference
difference:: at at Ploesti,
Ploesti,
at
at Antwerp,
Antwerp, and and at at the
the Rhine
Rhine bridges.
bridges.
And
And itit will
will make
make aa difference tomorrow.. The
difference tomorrow The greatest
greatest
value
value of
of Doctor
Doctor Werrell's
Werrell's workwork is is that
that it
it provides
provides guideposts
guideposts
and
and guidance
guidance for for usus as
as professional
professional soldiers
soldiers andand aviators
aviators
charged
charged withwith upholding
upholding American
American security.
security. We We have
have taken
taken
history's lessons
history's lessons to to heart
heart as as wewe plan
plan andand program
program our our
ground-based
ground-based air air defenses
defenses intointo the
the next
next decade
decade andand beyond.
beyond.
In
In both
both the
the forward
forward and and the
the rear
rear areas,
areas, wewe have
have emphasized
emphasized
the
the time-honored
time-honored principles
principles of of mass,
mass, mix,
mix, andand mobility.
mobility. No No
one
one weapon,
weapon, not not even
even today's
today's modern
modem aircraft,
aircraft, can
can dodo the
the
job
job alone.
alone. That
That truism
truism applies
applies withwith particular
particular force
force toto an-
an-
tiaircraft
tiaircraft defense
defense.. And And at at least
least one
one other
other truism
truism emerges
emerges
from
from Doctor
Doctor Werrell's
Werrell's and and our our own
own studies:
studies: effective
effective air air
defense
defense requires
requires aa joint
joint and
and combined
combined effort.
effort. Our
Our planning
planning
has
has been
been predicated
predicated on on the
the assumption
assumption that that counterair
counterair willwill
XI
XI
play aa central
play central role
role in
in safeguarding
safeguarding ourour ground
ground forces
forces from
from
air
air attack.
attack. On
On the
the ground, the Air
ground, the Air Defense
Defense Artillery
Artillery will
will
count on
count on the
the cooperation
cooperation andand assistance
assistance of of our
our colleagues
colleagues
in
in the
the infantry,
infantry, armor,
armor, and
and field
field artillery.
artillery. On
On our
our success
success
or
or failure
failure in
in working
working together
together toto meet
meet thethe challenges
challenges ofof
tomorrow will
tomorrow rest our
will rest our nation's
nation's future.
future.
DONALD
DONALD R. R. INFALNTE
INFJQNTE
Major General,
Major US Army
General, US Army
Chief
Chief of
of Air
Air Defense
Defense Artillery
Artillery
Xll
ABOUT
ABOUT THE
THE
AUTHOR
AUTHOR
Dr
Dr Kenneth
Kenneth P. P. Werrell
Werrell conducted
conducted this
this study
study while
while serving
serving
as
as aa visiting
visiting professor
professor at at the
the Air
Air University
University Center
Center for
for Aero-
Aero-
space Doctrine,
space Doctrine, Research,
Research, and and Education
Education (AUCADRE),
(AUCADRE),
Maxwell
Maxwell AFB,AFB, Alabama.
Alabama.
A
A graduate
graduate of the United
of the States Air
United States Air Force
Force Academy,
Academy, Doc-Doc-
tor
tor Werrell
Werrell holds
holds master
master and
and doctorate
doctorate degrees
degrees from
from Duke
Duke
University.
University.
Doctor
Doctor Werrell
Werrell was
was commissioned
commissioned upon upon graduation
graduation from
from
the
the United States Air
Force Academy
Academy in in 1960
1960 and
and received
received
his pilot wings
his pilot wings inin 1961
1961.. Assigned
Assigned toto the
the 56th
56th Weather
Weather Re- Re-
connaissance Squadron in
connaissance Squadron in Yokota,
Yokota, Japan,
Japan, from
from 1962
1962 until
until
1965,
1965, Doctor
Doctor Werrell
Werrell served
served first
first as
as aa pilot
pilot and
and later
later as
as
aircraft
aircraft commander
commander of of the
the WB-50.
WB-50. He He resigned
resigned hishis com-
com-
mission
mission with
with the
the rank
rank of
of captain
captain in
in 1965
1965..
Doctor Werrell
Doctor Werrell is is professor
professor ofof History
History at at Radford
Radford Uni-Uni-
versity,
versity, Virginia.
Virginia. HisHis background
background includes
includes aa visiting
visiting asso-
asso-
ciate professor assignment
ciate professor assignment at at Command
Command and and General
General Staff
Staff
College
College andand historian
historian assignments
assignments for for both
both Operations
Operations Re-Re-
search,
search, Inc.,
Inc., and
and the
the War
War Department
Department Historical
Historical Fund.
Fund.
A
A frequent
frequent participant
participant in in military
military history
history workshops
workshops and and
conferences,
conferences. Doctor
Doctor Werrell
Werrell has
has authored
authored several
several articles
articles
and two
and two books
books on on military history: Eighth
military history: Eighth Air
Air Force
Force Bibli-
Bibli-
ography
ography (Manhattan,
(Manhattan, Kans.Kans.:: Aerospace
Aerospace Historian,
Historian, Kansas
Kansas
State University, 1981), and The Evolution of the Cruise
State University, 1981), and The Evolution of the Cruise
Missile
Missile (Maxwell
(Maxwell AFB,AFB, Ala.:
Ala. : Air
Air University
University Press,
Press, Septem-
Septem-
ber
ber 1985).
1985).
Xlll
PREFACE
PREFACE
Archie'
Archie, Flak,
Flak, AAA,
AAA, andand SAM
SAM is is an
an operational
operational history
history of of
ground-based
defense systems
systems from
from the the beginning
beginning of of air
air
warfare
warfare up up through
through 19881988.. The
The title refers to
title refers to the
the name
name that that
airmen
airmen use,
use, and
and have
have used,
used, toto describe
describe groundground fire:
fire: Archie
Archie
in
in World
World War War II (from
(from thethe British),
British), flak
flak in in World
World War War II II
and
and Korea
Korea (from
(from thethe Germans),
Germans), AAA AAA throughout,
throughout, but but es- es-
pecially
pecially inin Vietnam
Vietnam (from(from thethe American
American abbreviation
abbreviation for for
antiaircraft
antiaircraft artillery),
artillery), and
and most
most recently
recently SAMs SAMs (from(from the the
US
US abbreviation
abbreviation for for surface-to-air
surface-to-air missiles)
missiles).. This
This study
study con-con-
centrates on
centrates on how
how these
these weapons
weapons developed
developed and and how
how they they
impacted
impacted on on both
both USUS and
and non-US
non-US air air operations.
operations.
The
The subject
subject of of ground-based
defense systems
systems is is ne-
ne-
glected
glected forfor aa number
number of of reasons
reasons.. First
First of of all,
all, research
research is is
difficult
difficult because
because source
source material
material is is fragmented.
fragmented. Even Even moremore
significant
significant is is the
the fact
fact that
that the
the topic
topic doesdoes notnot have
have "sex"sex
appeal
appeal." ." Readers
Readers are are more
more interested
interested in the aircraft
in the aircraft thanthan
the
the weapons
weapons that that bring
bring them
them down.
down. Whereas
Whereas the the airplane
airplane
appears
appears as as aa dynamic,
dynamic, advanced,
advanced, exciting,
exciting, and and offensive
offensive
weapon,
weapon, ground-based
defense systems
systems are are seen
seen in in thethe
opposite
opposite light.
light. Further,
Further, US US experience
experience has has been
been almost
almost ex- ex-
clusively
clusively withwith the
the offensive
offensive useuse of of aircraft,
aircraft, not not with
with the the
defensive
defensive use use of
of flak
flak and
and SAMs;
SAMs; Americans
Americans have have seldom
seldom
fought
fought without
without air air superiority.
superiority. Too,
Too, there
there is is the
the World
World War War
II
II example
example thatthat many,
many, if if not
not most,
most, people
people holdhold asas the
the ar- ar-
chetypical
chetypical war-during
war—during which which aircraft
aircraft defeated
defeated all all comers
comers
on
on all
all fronts
fronts.. Another
Another factor
factor isis that
that thethe air
air defense
defense com- com-
munity
munity has has been
been overwhelmed
overwhelmed by by the
the airair offensive
offensive com- com-
munity.
munity. Not Not thatthat the
the former
former is is any
any lessless able
able or or lessless
professional
professional thanthan the
the latter,
latter, only
only that
that the
the air
air offensive
offensive com-com-
munity
munity hashas the
the attention
attention and and support
support of of both
both industry
industry and and
Congress
Congress.. Little
Little wonder
wonder then then that
that thethe subject
subject of of flak
flak andand
SAMs
SAMs has has been
been neglected
neglected..
XV
Despite
Despite this this neglect
neglect and and the aforementioned reasons,
the aforementioned reasons,
ground-based
ground-based air air defense systems are
defense systems are important
important.. They They have have
been
been involved
involved and have impacted
and have impacted on most air
on most air conflicts
conflicts and and
have
have achieved
achieved notable successes in
notable successes in some
some.. These
These weaponsweapons
have
have downed
downed and and damaged
damaged large large numbers
numbers of of aircraft
aircraft and and
consequently
consequently have forced aviators
have forced aviators to to make
make changes
changes and and pay pay
higher costs
higher costs forfor operations
operations.. Clearly ground-based air
Clearly ground-based air de-
de-
fenses
fenses have
have been
been ever
ever present
present and and have
have always
always been been aa factor
factor
in
in air
air wars
wars.. There
There is is no
no indication
indication that this influence
that this influence will will
diminish
diminish in in the
the future.
future.
The
The neglect
neglect of of the
the subject
subject of ground-based air
of ground-based air defense
defense
systems
systems on on thethe one
one hand,hand, contrasted
contrasted with with its its importance
importance
on
on the other, prompted
the other, prompted this this study.
study. In In it, have traced
it, II have traced the the
historical record
historical record from from World
World War War II up through aa number
up through number
of
of smaller
smaller conflicts
conflicts in in the 1980s.. Although
the 1980s Although primarily
primarily aa nar- nar-
rative,
rative, II have
have tried
tried to to analyze
analyze the the story
story and draw from
and draw from it it
some
some generalizations,
generalizations, however however tentative
tentative they they maymay be. be. II pre-
pre-
fer
fer "generalizations"
"generalizations" to the often
to the often misused
misused term term "lessons."
"lessons."
The acknowledgments
The acknowledgments indicate indicate where conducted my
where II conducted my
research
research and and the the footnotes
footnotes document
document the the material
material upon upon
which
which II based
based this study. Research
this study. Research was was overwhelmingly
overwhelmingly con- con-
fined
fined to language sources,
English language
to English sources, the the basis
basis of of which
which was was
US
US AirAir Force,
Force, Army,
Army, and and Navy
Navy documents
documents and studies. In
and studies. In
addition,
addition, II found primary materials
found primary materials dealing
dealing with with both both the the
Royal
Royal Air Air Force
Force and and Luftwaffe.
Luftwaffe. II made made considerable
considerable use use ofof
secondary
secondary sources,
sources, and employed aa few
and II employed few interviews.
interviews. Ad- Ad-
mittedly, the
mittedly, the major
major difficulty
difficulty of of this
this study
study is is that,
that, while
while II
found materials from both sides covering the World Wars
found materials from both sides covering the World Wars
and
and toto aa lesser
lesser extent
extent somesome of of the
the more
more recent
recent smaller
smaller wars, wars,
my
my coverage
coverage of of the Korean, Vietnam,
the Korean, Vietnam, and and Middle
Middle East East Wars
Wars
is
is drawn
drawn primarily
primarily from from one one side.
side. Finally,
Finally, II diddid notnot use use the
the
rich,
rich, although
although spotty, classified materials
spotty, classified materials for for obvious
obvious
reasons.
reasons.
Without
Without preempting
preempting the the conclusions,
conclusions, aa numbernumber of of themes
themes
are
are present
present.. A A study
study of of the evolution of
the evolution of ground-based
ground-based air air
defense weapons
defense weapons provides
provides aa classic
classic viewview of of the
the perennial
perennial
contest
contest between
between offense
offense and and defense,
defense, as as well
well as as ofof the
the im-
im-
pact of
pact of technology
technology on on warfare
warfare.. MoreMore than just technology
than just technology
is involved,
is involved, however;
however; coverage
coverage includes
includes such topics as
such topics as tac-
tac-
XVII
XV
tics,
tics, leadership,
leadership, change,
change, andand innovation
innovation.. Perhaps
Perhaps most
most im-
im-
portant,
portant, this subject cannot
this subject cannot be be even
even casually
casually studied
studied
without
without the distinct impression
the distinct impression that that many
many of of the
the main
main fea-
fea-
tures
tures of
of aircraft
aircraft versus
versus ground-based
defense battles
battles are
are
repeated
repeated over
over and
and over
over again
again.. Clearly,
Clearly, lessons
lessons and
and gener-
gener-
alizations
ahzations abound
abound in in this
this story.
story. II trust
trust my
my treatment
treatment will
will
do
do justice
justice to
to the topic; that
the topic; that is,
is, II hope
hope that
that the
the result
result makes
makes
up
up for
for some
some ofof the
the previous
previous neglect
neglect of this subject
of this subject and
and is
is
commensurate
commensurate with with its past and
its past and continuing
continuing importance.
importance.
KENNETH P.
^NNETH P. WERRELL
WERRELL
Senior
Senior Research
Research Fellow
Fellow
Airpower
Airpower Research
Research Institute
Institute
x\n
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many
Many individuals
individuals and and organizations
organizations helped
helped make
make thisthis
book
book possible
possible.. First,
First, II wish
wish toto thank
thank those
those atat my home
my home
institution,
institution, Radford
Radford University,
University, whowho encouraged
encouraged andand made
made
possible
possible my my work
work with
with thethe Air
Air University
University:: the
the Board
Board of of
Visitors
Visitors;; Dr
Dr Donald
Donald Dedmon,
Dedmon, president
president;; DrDr David
David Moore,
Moore,
vice
vice president
president for Academic Affairs
for Academic Affairs;; Dr
Dr W.
W. D.
D. Stump,
Stump, dean
dean
of
of the School of
the School of Arts
Arts and
and Sciences;
Sciences; and
and DrDr W.
W. K.
K. Roberts,
Roberts,
chairman
chairman of of the
the Department
Department of of History.
History. Lt Lt Gen
Gen Charles
Charles
Cleveland,
Cleveland, former
former commander
commander of of the
the Air
Air University;
University; MajMaj
Gen
Gen David
David GrayGray (USAF,
(USAF, Retired);
Retired); andand MajMaj Gen
Gen Paul
Paul
Hodges,
Hodges, former
former commandant
commandant of of the
the Air
Air War
War College,
College, were
were
unsparing
unsparing in in their
their support
support throughout
throughout this project. Col
this project. Col
Thomas
Thomas Fabyanic
Fabyanic (USAF,
(USAF, Retired),
Retired), the
the founder
founder and
and first
first
director
director of
of the
the Airpower
Airpower Research
Research Institute
Institute (ARI),
(ARI), and
and ColCol
Kenneth
Kenneth Alnwick
Alnwick (USAF,
(USAF, Retired),
Retired), his
his successor,
successor, deserve
deserve
much
much of of the credit for
the credit for helping conceive the
helping conceive concept, en-
the concept, en-
courage
courage thethe project,
project, and
and remove
remove many
many of of the
the barriers
barriers en-
en-
countered.. Also,
countered Also, special
special thanks
thanks to Col Neil
to Col Neil Jones
Jones (USAF,
(USAF,
Retired)
Retired) who
who provided
provided photos
photos forfor this
this book
book.. Later
Later CADRE
CADRE
commanders
commanders Col Col Donald
Donald D. D. Stevens
Stevens (USAF,
(USAF, Retired),
Retired), Brig
Brig
Gen
Gen John
John C. C. Fryer,
Fryer, Jr.,
Jr., and
and ColCol Sidney
Sidney J. J. Wise
Wise provided
provided
vital
vital publication
publication assistance.
assistance. Others
Others at at the
the Air
Air University
University
helped
helped in in many
many important
important ways,ways, especially
especially ColCol Dennis
Dennis
Drew,
Drew, Preston
Preston Bryant,
Bryant, Dianne
Dianne Parrish,
Parrish, John
John Westcott,
Westcott, andand
Dorothy McCluskie.
Dorothy McCluskie. Many Many individuals
individuals helped
helped inin document
document
processing:: Lula
processing Lula Barnes,
Barnes, Sue Sue Carr,
Carr, Carolyn
Carolyn Ward,
Ward, Marcia
Marcia
Williams,
Williams, and and Cynthia
Cynthia Hall.
Hall. For
For logistical
logistical support
support II am am
thankful
thankful to Capt Harbert
to Capt Harbert Jones,
Jones, Betty
Betty Brown,
Brown, andand Marilyn
Marilyn
Tyus
Tyus.. The
The USUS Air
Air Force
Force History
History Program
Program helped
helped inin aa num-
num-
ber
ber of ways.. These
of ways These individuals
individuals include
include DrDr Richard
Richard Morse,
Morse,
Lynn
Lynn Gamma,
Gamma, Judy Judy Endicott,
Endicott, Pressley
Pressley Bickerstaff,
Bickerstaff, andand
Margaret Claibom of
Margaret Claiborn of the US Air
the US Air Force
Force Historical
Historical Research
Research
Center.
Center. The
The Air Air University
University Library played aa key
Library played key role
role in
in
X1
XIXX
making this
making this book possible, with
book possible, with special
special thanks
thanks due
due Tomma
Tomma
Pastorett, Ruth Griffin,
Pastorett, Ruth Griffin, and
and Kathleen
Kathleen GolsonGolson.. The
The US US
Army
Army also
also lent
lent considerable
considerable support
support to to this
this project.
project. Espe-
Espe-
cially
cially helpful were the
helpful were the officers
officers and staff at
and staff Fort Bliss
at Fort Bliss:: Air
Air
Defense School, Air Defense Museum, and Directorate of
Defense School, Air Defense Museum, and Directorate of
Combat
Combat Development Special thanks
Development.. Special thanks areare due
due Jesse
Jesse Stiller,
Stiller,
the
the Air
Air Defense
Defense Artillery Command Historian
Artillery Command Historian.. Overseas,
Overseas,
Air Commodore H.
Air Commodore H. A.
A. Probert,
Probert, Humphrey
Humphrey Wynn, Wynn, andand J. J.
P.
P. McDonald,
McDonald, at at the
the Air
Air Historical
Historical Branch,
Branch, London;
London; the the
staff
staff at
at the Royal Artillery
the Royal Artillery Institute,
Institute, Woolwick,
Woolwick, United
United
Kingdom;; and
Kingdom and E.
E. Hines
Hines and
and Paul
Paul JJ.. Kemp
Kemp of of the
the Imperial
Imperial
War
War Museum,
Museum, London,
London, mademade research
research of of the
the British
British and
and
German
German side side of
of the
the story
story possible
possible..
Finally,
Finally, II must
must thank
thank my
my entire
entire family,
family, especially
especially my
my wife
wife
Jeanne,
Jeanne, who
who endured
endured much
much toto make
make this
this project
project possible
possible..
XX
CHAPTER
CHAPTER 11
THE
THE EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
The
The genesis
genesis of of antiaircraft
antiaircraft defense
defense appeared
appeared soon soon after
after
man
man took
took toto the
the air.
air. There
There are are reports
reports of of balloon
balloon and and an-
an-
tiballoon
tiballoon artillery
artillery in in the
the American
American Civil Civil WarWar and and thethe
Franco-Prussian
Franco-Prussian War, War, andand in in 1890
1890 thethe Russians
Russians testedtested aa
field-gun
field-gun battery
battery against
against aa balloon
balloon moored
moored threethree kilometers
kilometers
away. The first aircraft downed in combat fell to
away. The first aircraft downed in combat fell to ground
ground
fire
fire in
in the
the Italo-Turkish
Italo-Turkish War War of of 1912;
1912; so so when
when World
World War War
II began,
began, there
there were precedents for
were precedents for ground-based
defense
systems .
systems.
During
During thethe war,
war, both
both sides
sides bombed
bombed theirtheir opponent's
opponent's cit- cit-
ies
ies.. The
The bombing
bombing of of London
London and and Paris
Paris by by the
the Germans
Germans tied tied
down
down considerable
considerable AlliedAllied resources,
resources, estimated
estimated in in the
the British
British
case
case toto be
be eight
eight times
times the
the resources
resources expended
expended by by the
the Ger-
Ger-
mans.
mans. British
British defenses
defenses claimed
claimed 21 21 airships
airships (of(of 201
201 airship
airship
sorties)
sorties) and
and 27 27 aircraft
aircraft (of(of 424
424 aircraft
aircraft sorties),
sorties), of of which
which
ground
ground fire fire accounted
accounted for for three
three Zeppelins
Zeppelins and and 11 11 toto 1313
aircraft
aircraft.. InIn November
November 1918 1918 the
the British
British used
used 480480 antiaircraft
antiaircraft
guns
guns and and 376
376 aircraft
aircraft inin the
the defense
defense of of Great
Great Britain
Britain.'.'
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, aircraft
aircraft flew
flew primarily
primarily in in support
support of of ground
ground
forces
forces.. OnOn the
the Western
Western Front,
Front, German
German antiaircraft
antiaircraft gunners
gunners
(fig.
(fig. 1)1) claimed
claimed 1,5881,588 Allied
Allied aircraft,
aircraft, while
while French
French gunners
gunners
claimed
claimed 500 500 German
German aircraft;
aircraft; Italian
Italian gunners
gunners claimed
claimed 129; 129;
British
British Expeditionary
Expeditionary Force Force gunners,
gunners, 341 341;; and
and USUS gunners,
gunners,
58
58.. The guns grew
The guns increasingly effective
grew increasingly effective as as hastily
hastily impro-
impro-
vised
vised equipment
equipment gave gave way
way toto specially
specially designed
designed equipment,
equipment,
while,
while, relatively
relatively speaking,
speaking, aircraft
aircraft showed
showed only only modest
modest im- im-
provements
provements in in performance
performance (fig. (fig. 2)
2).. The
The number
number of German
of German
antiaircraft
antiaircraft rounds
rounds for for each
each claim
claim fell
fell from
from 11,588
11,588 in in 1915
1915
to
to 5,040
5,040 in in 1918
1918.. Similarly,
Similarly, French
French rounds
rounds per per claim
claim de-de-
creased
creased fromfrom 11,000
11,000 in in 1916
1916 to to 7,000
7,000 in in 1918,
1918, andand British
British
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
(Photo
(Photo Credit.
Credit: USAF
USAF Historical
Historical Research
Researci) Center)
Center)
Figure
Figure 1.
1. German
German 7.7-cm
7.7-cm antiaircraft
antiaircraft gun,
gun, 1916
1916..
rounds
rounds per
per claim fell from
claim fell 8,000 in
from 8,000 in 1917
1917 to to 4,550
4,550 in in 1918
1918..
American
American antiaircraft
antiaircraft artillery downed 17
artillery downed 17 German
German aircraftaircraft
in
in three
three months,
months, averaging
averaging 605 605 rounds
rounds per per kill
kill.^. 2
In
In contrast
contrast toto World
World WarWar I,I, the
the air defenders made
air defenders made little
little
progress between
progress between the the wars.
wars. The
The three-inch
three-inch gun gun of of World
World
War II dominated
War dominated what what little antiaircraft artillery
little antiaircraft artillery there
there was,
was,
and acoustical
and acoustical devices provided the
devices provided best location
the best location equip-equip-
ment. In
ment. In 1928
1928 the
the United
United States
States adopted
adopted as standard equip-
as standard equip-
the three-inch
ment the
ment three-inch M3 M3 gun
gun with
with aa muzzle
muzzle velocity
velocity of of 2,600
2,600
to
to 2,800
2,800 feet per second
feet per (fps) (fig.
second (fps) (fig. 3)
3).. It
It had
had an
an effective
effective
ceiling
ceiling of
of 21,000
21,000 feet, just exceeding
feet, just exceeding the
the 17,000-foot
17,000-foot aircraft
aircraft
ceiling
ceiling of
of the day. Meanwhile,
the day. Meanwhile, new new technology-such
technology—such as as
removable
removable barrel liners, automatic
barrel liners, automatic breech
breech mechanisms,
mechanisms, and and
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:. Imperial
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 2.
2. During
During World
World War
War 1I many
many of
of the
the antiaircraft
antiaircraft weapons
weapons were
were
improvised
improvised..
continuous
continuous fuzefuze setters-improved
setters—improved the the antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns
guns..
But
But the
the revolution
revolution inin aviation
aviation technology
technology ofof the
the 1930s,
1930s, per-
per-
mitting
mitting much
much greater
greater aircraft
aircraft speeds
speeds and
and altitudes,
altitudes, rendered
rendered
three-inch
three-inch guns
guns and
and acoustical-location
acoustical-location gear
gear obsolete
obsolete..
In
In the
the latter
latter half
half of
of the
the 1930s,
1930s, new
new equipment
equipment began
began toto
appear
appear in in antiaircraft
antiaircraft units
units around
around the
the world
world.. The
The major
major
powers
powers adopted
adopted slightly
slightly larger
larger but
but much
much more
more powerful
powerful
guns,
guns, settling
settling on
on about
about aa 90-millimeter
90-millimeter (mm)
(mm) gun gun with
with aa
muzzle
muzzle velocity
velocity ofof 850
850 to
to 900
900 meters
meters per
per second
second andand aa rate
rate
of
of fire
fire of
of 30 rounds per
30 rounds per minute
minute (rpm).
(rpm). The
The Germans
Germans chosechose
the
the 88-mm
88-mm triple-purpose
triple-purpose gun,
gun, the
the British
British built
built aa prototype
prototype
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Figure
Figure 3.
3. Three-inch
Three-inch antiaircraft
antiaircraft battery
battery of the 62d
of the 62d Coast
Coast Artillery
Artillery
trained at approaching
trained at approaching plane
plane of
of the
the 33d
33d Pursuit
Pursuit Squadron,
Squadron,
Mitchel Field, New
Mitchel Field, New York,
Yorl(, August
August 1941
1941..
33.7-inch
.7-inch gun
gun in
in 1936,
1936, and
and the
the Americans
Americans began
began toto replace
replace
their
their three-inch
three-inch gun
gun with
with aa 90-mm
90-mm gun
gun in
in 1940
1940.. All
All major
major
powers
powers experimented
experimented with
with new
new detection
detection devices,
devices, but
but it
it was
was
the
the British
British who
who forged
forged aa lead
lead in
in the
the field
field of
of radar.'
radar. ^
British
British Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Artillery
Artillery
The
The British
British had
had the
the most
most acute
acute air
air defense
defense problem
problem.. Of Of
all
all the
the European
European capitals,
capitals, London
London was was easiest to find
easiest to find and
and
closest to the
closest to the border.
border. In
In Winston
Winston Churchill's
Churchill's colorful
colorful words,
words,
the
the British
British capital
capital was
was "a
"a tremendous
tremendous fat fat cow
cow .. .. .. tied
tied up
up
to
to attract
attract the
the beasts
beasts of
of prey. "4
prey.'"^ The
The British
British convinced
convinced themthem-
selves
selves of the decisiveness
of the decisiveness of
of air
air power,
power, fearing
fearing what
what they they
called
called the "knockout blow."
the "knockout blow." They
They accepted
accepted thethe dismal
dismal
prophecies
prophecies of of theorists such as
theorists such as the
the Italian
Italian Giulio Douhet,
Giulio Douhet,
the
the Briton
Briton Sir
Sir Hugh
Hugh Trenchard,
Trenchard, andand the
the American
American William
William
"Billy"
"Billy" Mitchell
Mitchell who
who predicted
predicted that
that the
the employment
employment of of air
air
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
power
power wouldwould resultresult in in devastated
devastated cities,
cities, pulverized
pulverized indus-indus-
tries,
tries, and
and panic-stricken
panic-stricken civilians.
civilians. TheseThese airmen
airmen believed
believed
that
that there
there was was no no direct
direct defense
defense against
against the the bombers
bombers and and
that,
that, in in Prime
Prime Minister
Minister Stanley
Stanley Baldwin's
Baldwin's words, words, "the "the
bomber
bomber will will always
always getget through
through." ." Therefore,
Therefore, the the British
British putput
their
their faith
faith and and effort
effort into
into aa strategic
strategic bomber
bomber force,
force, neglect-
neglect-
ing
ing most
most defensive
defensive air air efforts.
efforts. Not until 1937
Not until 1937 diddid the
the Royal
Royal
Air
Air Force
Force (RAF) (RAF) shiftshift its
its emphasis
emphasis from from bombers
bombers to to fight-
fight-
ers.
ers. On
On 11 January
January 1938 1938 thethe British
British had had only
only 180180 antiaircraft
antiaircraft
guns
guns larger
larger than than 50 50 mm.
mm. ThisThis number
number slowlyslowly increased
increased to to
341
341 byby September
September 1938 1938 (Munich),
(Munich), to to 540
540 in in September
September
1939
1939 (declaration
(declaration of of war),
war), andand to to 1,140
1,140 during
during the the Battle
Battle
of
of Britain.
Britain.^
During
During the the decisive
decisive Battle
Battle of of Britain,
Britain, antiaircraft
antiaircraft artillery
artillery
played
played aa secondary
secondary role role to to RAFRAF fighters.
fighters. The The gunners
gunners
claimed
claimed 357 357 of of the
the 1,733
1,733 German
German aircraft
aircraft thethe British
British be-be-
lieved
lieved theythey destroyed,
destroyed, even even though
though aa more more recent
recent source
source
puts
puts the
the gunners'
gunners' scores
scores at at less
less than
than 300.
300. But
But thethe measure
measure
of
of efficiency
efficiency must must include
include moremore than than simply
simply claims
claims.. ByBy the
the
end
end ofof September
September 1940, 1940, thethe British
British estimated
estimated that that 4848 per-
per-
cent ofthe
cent of the German
German bombers
bombers turned turned back
back from
from thethe defended
defended
areas.
areas. Even
Even if if that
that is
is an
an overestimation,
overestimation, flak flak unquestionably
unquestionably
forced
forced the the bombers
bombers higher, higher, unnerved
unnerved the the crews,
crews, andand re- re-
sulted
sulted in in reduced
reduced bombing
bombing accuracy
accuracy.. In In addition,
addition, antiair-
antiair-
craft
craft guns
guns were were the the principal
principal defense
defense weapon
weapon against
against night
night
attacks
attacks as as night
night fighters
fighters were
were in in their
their infancy.
infancy. By By the
the end
end
of 1940 antiaircraft
of 1940 antiaircraft artillery
artillery defenses
defenses claimed
claimed 8855 percent
percent
of
of the
the British
British night night kills.
kills.
British
British antiaircraft
artillery defenses
defenses had had aa number
number of of
'problems,
problems, for for example,
example, their their first
first kill-three
kill—three days days after
after the
the
declaration
declaration of of war-was
war—was unfortunately
unfortunately aa friendly friendly aircraft
aircraft
that
that had
had eveneven given
given thethe correct
correct recognition
recognition signal.
signal. (The
(The first
first
German
German aircraft aircraft claimed
claimed by by antiaircraft
artillery did did not
not
come
come untiluntil overover aa month
month later,
later, on on .19
19 October
October 1939.)1939.) TheThe
defenses
defenses consisted
consisted of of aa mixture
mixture of of older
older three-inch
three-inch guns,guns,
which
which the the British
British employed
employed until until 1943,
1943, andand thethe new
new 3.7-
3.7-
inch
inch guns
guns.. Sighting
Sighting was was visual
visual until
until October
October 1940, 1940, when
when
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
the
the British
British began
began to equip their
to equip forces with
their forces with gun-laying
gun-laying radar.radar.
Radar
Radar mademade aa big difference—the number
big difference-the number of rounds fired
of rounds fired
per claim
per claim atat night
night fell
fell from
from 30,000
30,000 in in September
September (when (when
German
German nightnight bombing
bombing began),began), to 11,000 in
to 11,000 in October,
October, and and
to
to 4,087
4,087 inin January
January 1941 1941.^ .6
A
A problem
problem that that hampered
hampered British British antiaircraft
antiaircraft defenses
defenses
throughout
throughout the the war
war was
was that
that of of personnel.
personnel. The The British
British sentsent
their regular antiaircraft
their regular antiaircraft unitsunits overseas
overseas and and relied
relied on on ter-
ter-
ritorial forces, similar
ritorial forces, similar to to the
the American
American National
National Guard,Guard, for for
home
home defense.
defense. At the beginning
At the beginning of the war,
of the war, thethe territorial
territorial
forces
forces were
were of of top
top quality.
quality. But But as as the
the warwar continued,
continued, ex- ex-
perienced
perienced men men were were reassigned
reassigned to to other
other duties,
duties, and and thethe
overall
overall quality
quality of of the
the forces
forces declined.
declined. The The first
first group
group of of 25
25
militiamen
militiamen to to arrive
arrive at at one
one battery,
battery, after
after passing
passing through
through
aa medical
medical examination
examination at at aa recruiting
recruiting center,
center, included
included two two
individuals
individuals withwith advanced
advanced cases cases of of venereal
venereal disease,
disease, one one
person with
person with aa withered
withered right right arm,
arm, one one mentally
mentally deficient,
deficient,
one
one with
with nono thumbs,
thumbs, and and aa sixth
sixth whose
whose glassglass eye
eye fell
fell out
out
when
when he he ran.'
ran.^
The
The drain
drain on on antiaircraft
antiaircraft personnel
personnel forced forced thethe British
British to to
take
take drastic
drastic measures-they
measures—they incorporatedincorporated women women into into what
what
they
they called
called mixed
mixed batteries.
batteries. The The first
first such
such unit
unit became
became op- op-
erational
erational in in August
August 1941 1941;; in in it
it women
women filledfilled allall positions
positions
except those
except those involving
involving heavyheavy loading
loading and and firing.
firing. The
The women
women
served well
served well in
in many
many capacities,
capacities, the the principal
principal problems
problems re- re-
sulting
sulting notnot from
from themthem but but from
from their
their parents,
parents, friends,
friends, and and
British culture.. In
British culture In all,
all, about 68,000 women
about 68,000 women servedserved in in British
British
antiaircraft
antiaircraft units
units during
during the the warwar (fig.
(fig. 4).
4).
Another
Another approach
approach to to the
the manpower
manpower shortage shortage was was to to use
use
the
the Home
Home Guard
Guard.. These
These men men were,
were, for for the
the most
most part,
part, will-
will-
ing
ing enough
enough butbut were
were either
either overover age
age oror physically
physically restricted.
restricted.
In
In addition,
addition, they
they could
could only
only serve
serve 48 48 hours
hours every
every 28 28 days.
days.
The
The peakpeak strength
strength of of the
the Home
Home Guard Guard serving
serving guns guns ex-ex-
ceeded
ceeded 145,000
145,000 in in January
January 1944 1944.. OneOne antiaircraft
antiaircraft weapon
weapon
employed
employed by by the
the Home
Home Guard Guard earlyearly in in October
October 1941 1941 waswas
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
(Photo
(Photo Credit.
Credit: Imperial
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 4.
4. British
British women
women training
training on
on antiaircraft
antiaircraft gun
gun director.
director.
the
the terrifying
terrifying butbut ineffective
ineffective unguided
unguided rocket
rocket (fig.
(fig. 5) .* De-
5).* De-
spite
spite these
these measures
measures to to compensate
compensate for for shortages
shortages in in man-
man-
power,
power, the the number
number of of personnel
personnel assigned
assigned to to antiaircraft
antiaircraft
duties declined from
duties declined from 330,000
330,000 in in 1941
1941 toto 264,000
264,000 in in mid-
mid-
1942.
1942. Britain
Britain just
just did
did not
not have
have sufficient
sufficient personnel
personnel for for all
all
its
its needs,
needs, and the number
and the number of of personnel
personnel available
available for
for anti-
anti-
aircraft
aircraft duties
duties determined
determined how how many
many guns
guns the
the British
British could
could
operate .'
operate.^
The
The Germans
Germans also also faced
faced stiff
stiff opposition
opposition fromfrom Allied an-
Allied an-
tiaircraft
tiaircraft artillery
artillery onon the
the battlefield
battlefield.. Initially,
Initially, mobile
mobile war-war-
fare
fare and
and an an inadequate
inadequate number number of of guns
guns reduced
reduced the the
effectiveness
effectiveness of of Allied
Allied flak;
flak; but
but after
after the
the first
first few
few years
years of
of
the
the war,
war, especially
especially in in static
static positions,
positions, the
the situation
situation changed
changed
to the
to the detriment
detriment of of the
the German
German air air force
force (GAF).
(GAF).
At
At the
the siege
siege ofof Tobruk,
Tobruk, for for example,
example, thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe made
made
*In
*In July
July 1941
1941 the
the British
British deployed
deployed 1,000
1,000 rocket
rocket barrels
barrels.. Almost
Almost 6,000
6,000 were
were deployed
deployed
by
by July
July 1943,
1943, most
most of
of which
which were
were twin-barrel
twin-barrel devices
devices.. But
But rocket
rocket units
units registered
registered few
few
claims
claims..
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
jg^pPf
<s. /% ^: <K^
-i-fr
Credit: Imperial
(Photo Credit:
(Photo Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 5.
5. The
The British experimented with
British experimented with rockets during World
roclcets during World
War II.
War li.
aa determined
determined effort to silence
effort to silence British
British antiaircraft guns and
antiaircraft guns and
shut
shut down
down the harbor.. From
the harbor From April
April 1941 (when the
1941 (when the garrison
garrison
was cut
was cut off)
off) until November 1941
until November 1941 (when
(when itit was
was relieved),
relieved),
British flak
British flak units
units engaged 4,105 aircraft
engaged 4,105 aircraft with
with 28
28 heavy
heavy guns,
guns,
18 40-mm Bofors
18 40-mm Bofors (fig.
(fig. 6), and 42
6), and 42 captured
captured Italian
Italian 20-mm
20-mm
Bredas. The
Bredas. The gunners
gunners claimed
claimed 374 aircraft destroyed,
374 aircraft destroyed, prob-
prob-
ably
ably destroyed,
destroyed, and damaged.. More
and damaged More important,
important, thethe Ger-
Ger-
mans sank only
mans sank only seven
seven ships
ships during
during the siege and
the siege and failed
failed to
to
close the harbor.
close the harbor.
In
In 1941 the vital
1941 the vital British
British defense
defense facilities on Malta
facilities on Malta came
came
under
under aerial siege. The
aerial siege. The island,
island, only 60 miles
only 60 miles from
from Sicily,
Sicily,
was critical in
was critical the battle
in the battle for
for the Mediterranean and
the Mediterranean and North
North
Africa.
Africa. InIn early
early 1942 the German
1942 the German airair force
force won
won air
air supe-
supe-
riority
riority over Malta and
over Malta and pounded ferociously.. For
pounded itit ferociously For two
two
months
months the British antiaircraft
the British antiaircraft gunners
gunners defended
defended Malta
Malta
alone.
alone. The
The critical
critical month
month was was April
April when
when Axis airmen flew
Axis airmen flew
10,323 sorties and
10,323 sorties and dropped
dropped about 7,000 tons
about 7,000 tons of
of bombs,
bombs,
8
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:. Imperial
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure 6. British
Figure 6. British 40-mm
40-mm gun
gun and crew.. The
and crew Swedish Bofors
The Swedish Bofors 40-mm
40-mm
saw
saw extensive
extensive action
action throughout
throughout the
the world,
world, serving
serving both
both
sides.
sides.
about
about halfhalf the
the total
total tonnage
tonnage unloaded
unloaded on on the
the island.
island. The
The
British
British claimed
claimed 102102 aircraft
aircraft destroyed
destroyed that
that month;
month; however,
however,
the correct figure
the correct figure is
is probably
probably closer
closer to 37.. During
to 37 During thethe entire
entire
campaign
campaign the the defenders
defenders (airmen
(airmen and
and gunners)
gunners) claimed
claimed be-be-
tween
tween 860 860 and
and 1,000
1,000 aircraft
aircraft destroyed
destroyed on 1,199 air
on 1,199 air raids,
raids,
while the Axis
while the Axis admit
admit to to the
the loss
loss of 567.. Whatever
of 567 Whatever the the actual
actual
number,
number, the the stout
stout and
and successful
successful defense
defense of of Malta
Malta contrib-
contrib-
uted
uted immensely
immensely to to the
the Axis
Axis defeat
defeat in
in North
North Africa.9
Africa.^
Developments
Developments in in technology
technology aided
aided thethe defenders.
defenders. By By
1943
1943 the
the British
British converted
converted fromfrom powder
powder to to mechanical
mechanical
fuzes.
fuzes. Flashless
Flashless propellants
propellants alsoalso increased
increased the the efficiency
efficiency ofof
their
their guns,
guns, as as did
did automatic
automatic fuzefuze setters
setters that
that improved
improved ac- ac-
curacy and
curacy increased the
and increased the rate
rate of
of fire
fire two
two andand one-half
one-half to to
three
three times.
times. By By this
this time,
time, electric
electric predictors
predictors werewere also
also
used. '°
used.'°
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
German bombing
German bombing attacks
attacks onon Britain
Britain trailed
trailed off
off in
in 1941,
1941,
as
as the Soviet campaign
the Soviet campaign beganbegan to to dominate
dominate the the European
European
war.
war. OnOn 27 27 March
March 19421942 the
the Germans
Germans openedopened aa new
new phase
phase
in
in the
the air
air war
war against
against Britain
Britain with
with attacks
attacks onon southern
southern
coastal
coastal towns
towns by by small
small numbers
numbers of of low-flying
low-flying fighter-bomb-
fighter-bomb-
ers.
ers. A lack of
A lack of early
early warning
warning devices,
devices, aa wide
wide range
range ofof targets,
targets,
and
and an inadequate number
an inadequate number of of light
light antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns
guns created
created
problems for the defenders. The British could do nothing
problems for the defenders. The British could do nothing
about
about the
the first
first two
two factors, but they
factors, but they did
did increase
increase the
the number
number
of 40-mm guns from 43 in May 1942 to 267 by the end
of 40-mm guns from 43 in May 1942 to 267 by the end ofof
September.
September. By By April
April 1943
1943 the
the British
British had
had deployed
deployed 917917 40-
40-
mm
mm guns,
guns, 424
424 20-mm
20-mm guns, guns, and
and 506506 two-pounders
two-pounders (one- (one-
third
third of their available
of their available 40 40 mms
mms andand two-fifths
two-fifths ofof their
their light
light
flak units) along
flak units) along the
the southern
southern coast
coast.. The
The increased
increased alertness
alertness
of
of the gunners and
the gunners and increased
increased number
number of of guns
guns brought
brought about
about
impressive
impressive results. The gunners
results. The gunners downed
downed fourfour of
of 42
42 sorties
sorties
on
on 2323 May,
May, four
four ofof 24
24 sorties
sorties onon 25
25 May,
May, and
and 10 10 of
of 3535
sorties on
sorties on 3030 May.
May. In In this
this phase
phase of of the
the air
air war-hit-and-
war—hit-and-
run
run attacks
attacks on on fringe
fringe targets-the
targets—the British
British claimed
claimed 56 56 air-
air-
craft
craft destroyed
destroyed of of 1,250
1,250 sorties,
sorties, anan attrition
attrition rate
rate ofof 4.5
4.5
percent."
percent."
The
The V-1
V-1 Campaign
Campaign
The
The last
last major
major opponent
opponent of of British
British home-based
home-based antiair-
antiair-
craft
craft artillery
artillery was
was the
the German
German V V-11 (fig.
(fig. 7),
7), the
the flying
flying bomb
bomb
also
also known
known as as the
the buzz
buzz bomb,
bomb, which
which carried
carried aa two-ton
two-ton
warhead
warhead about
about 160 160 miles
miles atat approximately
approximately 400 400 miles
miles perper
hour
hour (mph)
(mph).. Allied
Allied defenses
defenses consisted
consisted of of offensive
offensive bombing
bombing
raids
raids of
of V-1
V-1 targets
targets (launching
(launching sites,
sites, fabrication
fabrication plants,
plants, andand
supply
supply depots),
depots), fighter
fighter patrols,
patrols, balloon
balloon barrages,
barrages, and
and an-
an-
tiaircraft
tiaircraft artillery.
artillery. Initially, the defenders
Initially, the defenders assumed that the
assumed that the
pilotless bomb would
pilotless bomb would flyfly at
at about
about 400400 mph
mph and
and at
at aa height
height
of
of 7,500
7,500 feet.
feet. Later,
Later, they
they revised
revised their
their assumptions
assumptions to to 350
350
mph
mph at at 7,000
7,000 feet
feet and,
and, finally,
finally, to
to 330
330 mph
mph atat 6,000
6,000 feet.
feet.
The
The British
British completed
completed aa detailed
detailed plan
plan onon the
the defense
defense of of
10
10
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
Figure
Figure 7.
7. V-1
V-1 buzz
buzz bomb
bomb over
over London.
London.
their
their homeland
homeland in in January
January 1944 1944.. The plan established
The plan established
fighter
fighter patrol
patrol lines
lines and
and an an artillery
artillery line
line ofof 400
400 heavy
heavy pieces
pieces
and
and 346
346 light pieces immediately
light pieces immediately south south of London (fig.
of London (fig. 8)8)..
But
But the
the demands
demands of of supporting
supporting the the D-day
D-day invasion
invasion and and
optimism
optimism resulting
resulting from
from thethe bombing
bombing ofthe of the German
German launch
launch
sites
sites led
led to
to aa revision
revision in March.. The
in March The revised
revised plan
plan called
called forfor
aa reduction
reduction in in the
the number
number of guns defending
of guns defending London
London to to
192
192 heavy
heavy pieces
pieces and
and 246246 light
light pieces,
pieces, andand aa total
total reduction
reduction
from
from 528
528 to to 288
288 heavy
heavy pieces
pieces andand from
from 804804 toto 282
282 light
light
pieces.
pieces. Air
Air Chief
Chief Marshal
Marshal RodericRoderic Hill,Hill, the
the defense
defense com-com-
mander,
mander, pointed
pointed out out that
that thethe antiaircraft
artillery would
would
have
have difficulties
difficulties if the Vl
if the V-lss operated
operated at at 2,000
2,000 toto 3,000
3,000 feet
feet
and
and not at the
not at the predicted
predicted 6,000 feet.'^ Events
6,000 feet. 12 Events validated
validated Hill's
Hill's
warning.
warning.
After
After the
the Allied
Allied invasion
invasion of of Europe
Europe on June 1944,
on 66 June 1944,
Adolph
Adolph Hitler
Hitler pushed
pushed for for the
the V-1
V-1 campaign
campaign as as aa means
means of of
relief for his
relief for his troops.
troops. The The Germans
Germans hoped hoped to to begin
begin opera-
opera-
tions
tions onon 1111 June,
June, butbut they
they were
were forced
forced to to postpone
postpone oper- oper-
ations
ations until
until the
the next
next night.
night. EvenEven then,
then, they
they could
could fire
fire only
only
two
two small
small salvos;
salvos; butbut byby 1818 June
June thethe Germans
Germans launched
launched the the
500th
500th V-1,
V-1, byby 21
21 June
June thethe 1,000th,
1,000th, by by 29
29 June
June the
the 2,000th,
2,000th,
and
and byby 2222 July
July the
the 5,000th.
5,000th. TheseThese V-1 V-1 attacks
attacks continued
continued
11
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA, SAM
FLAK, AAA, SAM
111111111111111
,nPVER
EOLKESIONE
ÊASTBOURNE
Figure 8. Initial
Figure 8. Initial British
British defensive
defensive deployment.
deployment.
until
until September,
September, whenwhen thethe Germans
Germans withdrew
withdrew from from their
their
French
French bases
bases before
before the Allied advance.'
the Allied advance.'^3
The
The V-ls
V-ls traveled
traveled fast
fast for
for the day, crossing
the day, crossing the the English
English
coast at an
coast at an average
average speed
speed of 340 mph
of 340 mph andand accelerating
accelerating to to
about 400 mph.
about 400 mph. Thus
Thus thethe fighters
fighters hadhad but
but six
six minutes
minutes to to
sight
sight and
and down
down thethe V
V-Is l s before they reached
before they reached their
their target
target..
Because
Because ofof their
their small
small size, the V
size, the V-lsl s were
were difficult
difficult toto spot
spot..
This problem
This problem waswas exacerbated
exacerbated by by the low-altitude approach
the low-altitude approach
averaging between 2,100
averaging between 2,100 and and 2,500
2,500 feet. Not only
feet. Not only waswas the
the
V
V-11 tough to spot
tough to spot and
and intercept,
intercept, it it was also tough
was also tough to to down.
down.
One
One source estimated that
source estimated that aa V-1
V-1 was
was eight
eight times
times as as difficult
difficult
to down
to down asas aa manned
manned aircraft, even though
aircraft, even though itit flew
flew straight
straight
and
and level.
level. That estimate was
That estimate was probably
probably an exaggeration, but
an exaggeration, but
the
the V-1
V-1 was certainly aa difficult
was certainly difficult target
target to to destroy.
destroy.'"*14
12
12
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
The
The Allies
Allies steadily
steadily increased
increased their fighter units
their fighter units to to 15
15 day
day
and
and eight
eight night
night fighter
fighter squadrons
squadrons (two (two part-time)
part-time).. Rules Rules ofof
engagement
engagement gave gave thethe fighters
fighters fullfull rein
rein in in good
good weather
weather and and
gave
gave antiaircraft
artillery gunners
gunners complete
complete freedomfreedom in in bad
bad
weather.
weather. During
During in-between
in-between weather, weather, the the most frequent sit-
most frequent sit-
uation,
uation, the
the antiaircraft
artillery gunners
gunners had had complete
complete freefree-
dom
dom up up toto 8,000
8,000 feet feet.. OnOn 10 10 July
July thethe British modified aa
British modified
26
26 June
June order
order allowing
allowing fighters
fighters to to enter
enter the the gun
gun beltbelt inin hot
hot
pursuit
pursuit of of V Is. Consequently,
V-ls. Consequently, fighter fighter pilots
pilots entered
entered active
active
antiaircraft
antiaircraft gun gun areas
areas at at their
their ownown risk.
risk.'^15
England's
England's thirdthird line
line of of defense,
defense, afterafter thethe offensive
offensive bombbomb-
ing
ing and
and the the fighter patrols, was
fighter patrols, was its antiaircraft artillery.
its antiaircraft artillery.
When
When the the campaign
campaign began, began, the the Allies
AlHes rapidly
rapidly got got 192192 heavy
heavy
guns
guns into
into position
position with with the the support
support of of 200
200 light
light guns
guns;; and
and
by
by the
the end
end of of June,
June, increased
increased this this number
number to to 376
376 heavy
heavy
guns,
guns, 594
594 light
light guns,
guns, and and 362362 rocket
rocket launchers.
launchers.'^16 But But despite
despite
these
these numbers,
numbers, V V-ls 1 s were
were getting
getting through
through as as British
British de- de-
fenses
fenses were
were notnot working
working at at optimum
optimum efficiency.
efficiency. The The V -I's
V-l's
operating altitude of 2,000 to 3,000 feet was the worst-
operating altitude of 2,000 to 3,000 feet was the worst-
possible
possible altitude
altitude forfor thethe defense-too
defense—too high high for
for the
the light
light guns
guns
and
and too
too low
low forfor the
the heavy
heavy guns guns.. Heavy
Heavy mobile
mobile pieces
pieces proved
proved
unsatisfactory
unsatisfactory because
because they they could
could not not traverse
traverse smoothly
smoothly and and
rapidly.
rapidly. Radar,
Radar, positioned
positioned in in hollows
hollows and and folds
folds in in the
the ter-
ter-
rain
rain to
to protect
protect it it from
from GermanGerman countermeasures
countermeasures that that did
did
not
not materialize,
materialize, operated
operated at at aa disadvantage
disadvantage.. The The proximity
proximity
of
of the
the gun
gun belt
belt toto London
London created created another
another problem
problem.. The The
British
British hit
hit aa number
number of of VV-ls1 s that
that later
later crashed
crashed intointo London,
London,
even
even though
though the the defenders
defenders had had done
done their
their job
job.. Finally,
Finally, there
there
was
was considerable
considerable interference
interference between between the the gunners
gunners and and the
the
fighter
fighter pilots-fighters
pilots—fighters chasing chasing the the fast,
fast, low-flying
low-flying missiles
missiles
sometimes
sometimes strayed
strayed into into thethe gun
gun belt,
belt, inhibiting
inhibiting the the gunners
gunners
who
who sometimes
sometimes fired fired on on thethe fighters
fighters as as well
well asas the
the missiles
missiles..
The
The defenders
defenders made made aa fast, fast, effective,
effective, and and flexible
flexible adjust-
adjust-
ment
ment to to the
the situation,
situation, which which was was muchmuch to to their credit and
their credit and
to
to aa large
large degree
degree responsible
responsible for for their
their ultimate
ultimate success."
success.'^
The
The defenders
defenders easily
easily came came to to grips
grips with
with some
some of of the
the prob-
prob-
lems-on
lems—on 18 18 June
June 1944 1944 they they ordered
ordered guns guns within
within London
London
113
3
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
silenced and
silenced and by by the
the end
end of of June
June resited
resited their
their radar
radar onto
onto
higher ground. The
higher ground. defenders built
The defenders built permanent
permanent structures
structures
for
for their
their portable
portable guns.
guns. Constructed
Constructed of 28 railway
of 28 railway sleepers
sleepers
and
and 1212 ties,
ties, these
these structures
structures were first called
were first called Pile
Pile portable
portable
platforms;
platforms; but but theythey quickly became known
quickly became known as as Pile
Pile mat-
mat-
tresses,
tresses, named
named for for Gen
Gen Frederick
Frederick A. A. Pile,
Pile, the
the antiaircraft
antiaircraft
artillery
artillery commander
commander (fig. (fig. 9)
9).. In
In late
late June
June the
the British
British began
began
to
to replace
replace their
their static
static guns
guns (fig.
(fig. 10)10) with
with mobile
mobile guns;
guns; and
and
they
they put better gun
put better gun predictors
predictors into into action
action inin early
early July.
July. The
The
most
most difficult
difficult problems
problems remaining
remaining involved
involved damaged
damaged V 1s
V-ls
falling on London
falling on London and and interference
interference between
between fighter
fighter pilots
pilots
and
and gunners
gunners.'^. II
Hill
Hill and
and Pile
Pile concluded
concluded that they should
that they should designate
designate anan all-
all-
(Photo
(Photo Credit.
Credit: Imperial
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 9.
9. Preparing
Preparing Pile
Pile mattress.
mattress.
114
4
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
(Photo Credit.
(Photo Credit: Imperial
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 10.
10. 3.7-inch
3.7-inch gun
gun mounted
mounted on a Pile
on a mattress..
Pile mattress
gun
gun belt
belt from
from which
which all
all aircraft
aircraft should
should bebe excluded
excluded.. AsAs this
this
idea emerged,
idea emerged, aa staff
staff officer
officer suggested
suggested moving
moving the the guns
guns and
and
radar
radar toto the
the coast.
coast. Such
Such aa relocation would eliminate
relocation would eliminate thethe
problem
problem of of damaged
damaged missiles
missiles falling
falling on
on London
London and and would
would
provide
provide radar
radar operators
operators andand gunners
gunners optimum
optimum visibility.
visibility.
This
This scheme
scheme would
would also
also give
give the
the fighter
fighter pilots
pilots aa clear
clear bound-
bound-
ary
ary (the
(the coastline)
coastline) between
between thethe gun
gun and
and aircraft
aircraft zones
zones (fig.
(fig.
11).
11). Almost
Almost simultaneously,
simultaneously, Robert
Robert A. A. Watson-Watt,
Watson-Watt, the the
eminent scientist and
eminent scientist and developer
developer of of radar,
radar, independently
independently
came
came up up with
with the
the same
same concept,
concept, giving
giving itit even
even more
more
weight.'9
weight.'^
The
The plan
plan had
had aa number
number of of dangers
dangers.. First,
First, there was the
there was the
question
question of of effectiveness.
effectiveness. Would
Would thethe new
new concept
concept actually
actually
improve
improve the the defenses?
defenses? The
The fighter
fighter pilots,
pilots, who
who claimed
claimed 883883
of
of the
the 1,192
1,192 V-1
V-1 kills
kills as
as of
of 13
13 July,
July, would
would be be inhibited
inhibited by by
aa split
spht zone. Second, how
zone. Second, how long
long would
would such
such aa redeploy-
redeploy-
ment-entailing
ment—entailing hundreds
hundreds of of heavy
heavy guns,
guns, thousands
thousands of of per-
per-
sonnel,
sonnel, and tens of
and tens of thousands
thousands of of tons
tons ofof supplies
supplies and
and
equipment-take?
equipment—take? What What would
would happen
happen to to the
the defenses
defenses in in
115
5
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
f1C :1Uf: f$
FOLKFST(iîi
Figure
Figure 11
11.. Final
Final British
Britishi defensive
defensive deployment
deployment..
the
the meantime?
meantime? Finally,
Finally, how
how long
long would
would itit take
take to
to get
get aa clear
clear
decision
decision on on this
this proposal?
proposal? As As each
each day
day passed,
passed, redeploy-
redeploy-
ment became increasingly difficult as more of the mobile
ment became increasingly difficult as more of the mobile
guns were
guns were fitted
fitted with
with Pile
Pile mattresses
mattresses and
and more
more guns
guns were
were
added
added to to the
the gun
gun belt.
belt. 2°
On 13
On 13 July
July Hill
Hill made
made the the decision
decision toto create
create an an all-gun
all-gun
belt on
belt on the
the coast.
coast. This
This bold, quick exercise
bold, quick exercise of authority was
of authority was
remarkable,
remarkable, as as was
was the speed with
the speed with which
which the decision was
the decision was
implemented. By
implemented. By 17 July the
17 July the heavy
heavy guns,
guns, radar,
radar, andand sup-
sup-
porting equipment
porting equipment and and supplies
supplies were
were in
in place,
place, followed
followed in in
two days
two days by
by the
the light guns. This
light guns. This action,
action, which
which involved
involved the the
movement of
movement of 23,000
23,000 people
people and about 60,000
and about 60,000 tons
tons ofof sup-
sup-
plies,
plies, was
was nono small
small feat.
feat. The
The British
British deployed
deployed the the guns
guns onon
the
the coast
coast between
between Dover
Dover and and Beachy
Beachy Head,
Head, creating
creating aa zone
zone
extending 10,000
extending 10,000 yards
yards over the water
over the water and
and 5,000 yards in-
5,000 yards in-
1166
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
land.
land. Aircraft
Aircraft werewere restricted
restricted to to altitudes
altitudes aboveabove 8,0008,000 feetfeet
in
in this
this area,
area, but
but the the fighter
fighter pilots
pilots were
were freefree toto roam
roam overover
the
the English
English Channel
Channel and and over
over England
England between
between the the gun
gun belt
belt
and
and thethe balloon
balloon lineline.2'." Most
Most important,
important, the the decision
decision turned
turned
out
out to to bebe anan effective
effective solution
solution..
Although
Although the the redeployment
redeployment and and separation
separation of of the
the aircraft
aircraft
and
and gunsguns waswas aa major
major factor
factor in in the
the increased
increased effectiveness
effectiveness
of
of the
the defenses,
defenses, therethere were
were other
other factors
factors as as well.
well. The
The number
number
of
of heavy
heavy guns guns in in the
the coastal
coastal beltbelt increased
increased from from 376 376 on on 11
July,
July, to to 416
416 onon 23 23 July,
July, toto 512
512 on on 3030 July,
July, andand to to 592
592 on on
77 August.
August. In In addition
addition there there were
were 892 892 40-mm
40-mm guns guns andand 504504
20-mm
20-mm guns guns plus
plus 254 254 rocket
rocket tubes.
tubes. TheThe addition
addition of of new
new
American
American radar radar (SCR-584)
(SCR-584) and and predictors
predictors for for the
the British
British
33.7-inch
.7-inch guns guns andand the the American
American 90-mm 90-mm guns guns also
also helped
helped
the
the defenses.
defenses.-^ -2 Another
Another technical
technical improvement
improvement was was the the use
use
of
of proximity
proximity fuzes fuzes thatthat detonated
detonated at at aa preset
preset distance
distance from from
the
the target.
target. TheThe newnew fuzefuze proved
proved to to be
be about
about fivefive times
times moremore
effective
effective than than either
either timetime or or contact
contact fuzes.z3
fuzes.^^ Finally,
Finally, the the
gunners
gunners became became more more accurate
accurate as as they
they gotgot more
more practice
practice..
These
These defensive
defensive improvements,
improvements, coupled coupled with with thethe known
known
direction,
direction, altitude,
altitude, and and speed
speed of of the
the V 1 s, enabled
V-ls, enabled the the de-
de-
fenders
fenders to to dramatically
dramatically improve improve their their effectiveness
effectiveness.. Before Before
the
the redeployment,
redeployment, the the defenses
defenses downeddowned 42.3 42.3 percent
percent of of the
the
V-1
V-lss observed
observed;; after after thethe redeployment,
redeployment, that that figure
figure roserose toto
58
58.6 .6 percent.
percent. Another
Another set set ofof data,
data, similar
similar but but not
not exactly
exactly
coinciding,
coinciding, indicated
indicated that that the
the defenses
defenses downed
downed 48 48.4.4 percent
percent
of
of those
those missiles
missiles spotted
spotted overover land
land before
before the the redeployment
redeployment
and
and 84 84.1.1 percent
percent of of those
those spotted
spotted afterafter the
the redeployment
redeployment..
The
The high high point
point occurred
occurred on on the
the night
night ofof 27/28
27/28 August
August when when
the
the defenders
defenders destroyed
destroyed 90 90 ofof 97 97 missiles
missiles reported;
reported; only only
four
four V V-ls1 s got
got through
through to to London.
London.^^
The
The increased
increased power power of of the
the defenses
defenses resulted
resulted largely
largely from
from
the
the tremendous
tremendous improvement
improvement in in the
the effectiveness
effectiveness of of anti-
anti-
aircraft
aircraft artillery.
artillery. The The gunners
gunners got 21 .5 percent
got 21.5 percent of of the
the de-
de-
stroyed
stroyed creditscredits before
redeployment and and 53 53.9.9 percent
percent
afterwards
afterwards.. They They downed
downed 17 percent of
17 percent of their
their targets
targets in in the
the
first
first weekweek afterafter redeployment
redeployment and and 74 74 percent
percent in in the
the last
last
117
7
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
four days
four days of action (29
of action August through
(29 August through 11 September)
September)." .
During the summer campaign, the Germans began to
During the summer campaign, the Germans began to
launch V
launch V-lsl s from
from bombers.
bombers. The The first
first air
air launch
launch known
known to to
the
the British
British occurred
occurred on on 66 April
April 1944
1944 at at Peenemunde,
Peenemunde, with with
the
the first
first recognizable
recognizable use use ofof an
an air-launched
air-launched weapon weapon against
against
England
England on on 99 July
July 1944
1944.. The
The German
force air
air launched
launched
about
about 90 90 V V-ls1 s before
redeployment and and 310
310 V V-ls1 s from
from
then
then toto 55 September.
September. With With thethe withdrawal
withdrawal of of German
German forces forces
from
from thethe French
French launching
launching sites,sites, these
these air-launched
air-launched weap- weap-
ons
ons became
became the chief air
the chief air threat
threat to to Britain
Britain in in the
the closing
closing
months
months of of the
the war.
war. Between
Between 55 September
September and and thethe last
last air
air
launching
launching on on 1414 January
January 1945, 1945, the
the Germans
Germans hurledhurled aboutabout
1,200
1,200 of of these
these V-1s against Britain,
V-ls against Britain, butbut only
only 66 66 reached
reached
London..
London 26 Not
Not only did few
only did few ofof the
the weapons
weapons reach reach London,
London,
but the
but the accuracy
accuracy was was very
very poor.
poor. The final act
The final act inin the
the V- V-11
campaign
campaign against against Britain
Britain camecame in in March
March 1945 1945 when
when the the
Germans
Germans introduced
introduced aa long-range
long-range version
version of of the
the VV-1.1 . Fitted
Fitted
with
with aa lighter
lighter wingwing andand warhead,
warhead, this this VV-11 variant
variant could
could fly fly
220
220 miles
miles compared
compared to to the
the standard
standard missile's
missile's range
range of of about
about
150
150 toto 160
160 miles.
miles. The
The Germans
Germans launched
launched the the first
first modified
modified
V
V-11 from
from DutchDutch ramps
ramps on on 33 March.
March. From From 33 March
March to to 29
29
March,
March, the the Germans
Germans fired fired aa total.of
total.of 275275 Vls
V-ls against
against Brit-
Brit-
ain,
ain, only
only 13 13 ofof which
which reached London.. The
reached London The Allies
AUies had had been
been
tipped off
tipped off by by photoreconnaissance
photoreconnaissance and and intelligence
intelligence reports
reports
about
about thisthis newnew weapon,
weapon, and and they
they ordered
ordered the the northern
northern de- de-
fenses
fenses bolstered
bolstered on on 2727 February
February with with reinforcements
reinforcements con- con-
sisting
sisting of of seven
seven squadrons
squadrons of of dayday fighters
fighters and and threethree
squadrons
squadrons of of night
night fighters
fighters.. But
But thethe antiaircraft
artillery
gunners
gunners performed
performed so so well
well that
that the
the British
British relieved
relieved all all but
but
one of the day squadrons . The defenders downed 72 .8 per-
one of the day squadrons. The defenders downed 72.8 per-
cent
cent of of the
the 125 125 missiles
missiles observed.
observed.^^
The Germans
The Germans fired fired aa total
total of about 10,492
of about 10,492 Vls V-ls against
against
Britain,
Britain, of of which
which about
about 2,000
2,000 crashed shortly after
crashed shortly takeoff..
after takeoff
The
The defenders
defenders observed
observed 7,488 7,488 missiles
missiles and and downed
downed 3,957 3,957
(52
(52.8.8 percent);
percent); they they credited
credited fighter
fighter pilots
pilots with 1,847 kills,
with 1,847 kills,
the
the gunners
gunners with with 1,878,
1,878, and and the
the balloons
balloons withwith 232232.^8.28 Effi-
Effi-
ciency
ciency improved
improved from from downing
downing 42.3 42.3 percent
percent of of the
the V V-lsls
1188
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
observed
observed before before the the redeployment
redeployment (12 (12 June
June to
to 15 15 July)
July) to to
8 .6 percent
558.6 percent afterafter the
the redeployment
redeployment (16 (16 July
July to
to 55 Septem-
Septem-
ber).
ber). TheThe gunsguns downed
downed 63 .2 percent
63.2 percent of the air-launched
of the air-launched
missiles
missiles after
after this
this period
period (16(16 September
September 1944 1944 to
to 1414 January
January
1945)
1945) and and 33.1
33.1 percent
percent of of the
the ground-launched
ground-launched V-ls V-ls from
from
Holland
Holland.. Put Put another
another way, way, thethe percentage
percentage of of V l s that
V-ls that
reached
reached London,
London, relative
relative to those launched,
to those launched, declined
declined in in
these
these same
same periods
periods (29 .1, 23,
(29.1, 23, 55.5,
.5, 4.7)
4.7) for
for an
an overall figure
overall figure
of23.1
of 23.1 percent.
percent. Thus,
Thus, about 2,419 V-1
about 2,419 V-lss reached
reached thethe London
London
Civil
Civil Defence
Defence Region,Region, killing
killing 6,184
6,184 civilians
civilians and
and seriously
seriously
injuring
injuring another
another 17,98117,981 withwith about
about another
another 55 percent
percent of of
the
the total
total casualties
casualties consisting
consisting of of service
service personnel.
personnel. Ap- Ap-
proximately
proximately 92 92 percent
percent of of the
the casualties
casualties werewere in
in the
the London
London
area."
area. 2^
To
To putput the
the V-1
V-lss into
into perspective,
perspective, they they must
must bebe compared
compared
with other German
with other weapons that
German weapons that killed
killed and
and maimed
maimed BritishBritish
civilians during
civilians during WorldWorld War War II. IL German
German bombings
bombings killed killed
51,509,
51,509, V-2s V-2s killed
killed 2,754,
2,754, andand long-range
long-range guns guns 148
148.. OfOf thethe
146,777
146,777 British
British civilian casualties (killed
civilian casualties (killed andand injured)
injured) in in
World
World War War II II:: 112,932
112,932 werewere caused
caused by by bombings,
bombings, 24,16524,165
by
by the
the V1 V-ls, s, 9,277
9,277 by by the
the V-2s,
V-2s, andand 403 403 byby long-range
long-range
guns . 3o
guns.^°
Another
Another aspect aspect of the V1
of the V-1 operational
operational story story is
is frequently
frequently
overlooked.
overlooked. The The Germans
Germans also also launched
launched aboutabout 7,4007,400 to to
9,000
9,000 V-lsV-ls against
against targets
targets on on the
the continent,
continent, mostly
mostly (4,900)
(4,900)
against
against the the port
port of of Antwerp,
Antwerp, Belgium
Belgium.. In In the
the city's
city's defense
defense
the
the Allies
Mies deployed
deployed 18,00018,000 troops
troops manning
manning 208 208 90-mm
90-mm
guns,
guns, 128 128 3.7-inch
3.7-inch guns,
guns, and
and 188188 40-mm
40-mm guns.guns. InIn addition,
addition,
they
they used
used 280 280 balloons
balloons later augmented to
later augmented to 1,400.
1,400. No No fight-
fight-
ers
ers were employed in
were employed in the
the defense
defense of Antwerp (fig.
of Antwerp 12),^'3
(fig. 12). 1
In
In thethe attack
attack on on Antwerp,
Antwerp, the the Germans
Germans deployed
deployed their their
first
first missiles
missiles from from the the southeast.
southeast. In In mid-December,
mid-December, they they
shifted
shifted to to the
the northeast
northeast and and finally,
finally, byby the
the end
end ofof January,
January,
to
to the
the north.
north. The The last
last direction
direction of of attack
attack created
created aa particular
particular
problem
problem for for the
the defense
defense because
because aa large
large airfield
airfield in
in that
that sec-
sec-
tor
tor was
was not not closed
closed until
until 2121 February
February 1945 1945.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless,
the
the defenders
defenders downed downed 2,183 2,183 (91 .2 percent)
(91.2 percent) of of the
the 2,394
2,394
19
19
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
^^J
TURNHOUT
(Photo Credit.
(Photo Credit: US
US Army
Army Air
Air Defense
Defense Artillery
Artillery Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 12.
12. Defense
Defense ofof Antwerp.
Antwerp. Although
Although the Germans had
the Germans had lost con-
lost con-
trol
trol of
of the
the skies,
skies, they
they were
were able to bombard
able to bombard area
area targets
targets
such
such asas the
the port
port of
of Antwerp
Antwerp with
with V-1 s.
V-1s.
missiles plotted.
missiles plotted. More
More toto the
the point,
point, only
only 211
211 V 1 s reached
V-ls reached
aa 7,000-yard
7,000-yard radius
radius area
area around
around thethe docks
docks that
that the
the defend-
defend-
ers
ers designated
designated as as the
the vital
vital area . 32
area.^^
The
The Germans
Germans also also attacked
attacked Liege,
Liege, Belgium,
Belgium, with
with about
about
3,000 V1
3,000 V-ls.s. It
It was
was defended
defended between
between 23 23 November
November and and 11
11
December 1944,
December 1944, when
when the
the urgent
urgent needs
needs of
of the
the Battle
Battle of
of the
the
Bulge
Bulge pulled
pulled thethe defenders
defenders out.
out.
20
20
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
V is killed
V-ls killed aa total
total of
of 947
947 military
military and
and 3,736
3,736 civilians
civilians and
and
wounded
wounded 1,9091,909 military
military and 8,166 civilians
and 8,166 civilians on
on the
the conti-
conti-
nent. Antwerp
nent. Antwerp suffered
suffered 1,812
1,812 military and 8,333
military and 8,333 civilian
civilian
casualties,
casualties, oror 10,145
10,145 ofof the
the 14,758
14,758 V-1
V-1 casualties
casualties on
on the
the
continent.
continent."
American
American Antiaircraft
Artillery
American
American flakflak also
also made
made an
an impressive
impressive showing
showing in in com-
com-
bat (fig.
bat (fig. 13).
13). During
During the
the Normandy
Normandy campaign
campaign (7 (7 through
through
30
30 June
June 1944),
1944), First
First Army
Army antiaircraft
gunners claimed
claimed 96 96
aircraft
aircraft destroyed
destroyed of of 682
682 enemy
enemy sorties.
sorties. Following
Following the the
breakout
breakout from
from the
the invasion
invasion beachhead,
beachhead, between
between 3131 July and
July and
66 August,
August, the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe hurled
hurled 1,312
1,312 aircraft
aircraft at
at American
American
(Photo
(Photo Credit.
Credit: US
US Army
Army Air
Air Defense
Defense Artillery
Artillery Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 13.
13. US
US 90-mm
90-mm M-1
M-1 AAA
AAA gun.
gun.
2211
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
forces
forces passing
passing through
through difficult
difficult terrain
terrain at at the
the Avranches
Avranches
bottleneck.
bottleneck. AlthoughAlthough the the USUS gunners
gunners downed
downed only only 58 58 air-air-
craft, the
craft, Germans did
the Germans did not
not hit
hit aa single
single bridge,
bridge, dam,
dam, or or vital
vital
target
target.. 11^4
On
On 33 December
December 1944 1944 the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe launched
launched 80 80 toto 100
100
aircraft
aircraft against
against thethe First
First Army
Army and and lost
lost 3030 to
to 41
41 aircraft
aircraft in in
aa 45-minute
45-minute engagement.
engagement. During During the the Battle
Battle ofof the
the Bulge
Bulge
(16
(16 December
December 1944 1944 through
through 11 January
January 1945),
1945), the the First
First
Army antiaircraft
Army antiaircraft units units claimed
claimed 366 366 German
German aircraft
aircraft de- de-
stroyed or probably destroyed of 1,178 sorties. 35
stroyed or probably destroyed of 1,178 sorties.^^
The
The most spectacular one-day
most spectacular one-day Allied
Allied air defense effort
air defense effort
took place
took place on on New
New Year's
Year's Day Day 1945
1945.. The
The GAFGAF planplan called
called
for
for about
about 900 German fighters,
900 German fighters, ledled by
by Ju-88
Ju-88 night
night fighters,
fighters,
to
to attack
attack 16 Anglo-American airfields
16 Anglo-American airfields.. Coordination
Coordination broke broke
down badly
down badly as German flak
as German flak downed
downed about about 100 100 of
of their
their own
own
aircraft
aircraft beforebefore they
they reached
reached Allied
Allied lines.
lines. Poor
Poor weather,
weather, lack lack
of
of training,
training, confusion,
confusion. Allied Allied flak,
flak, and
and Allied
Allied fighters
fighters fur- fur-
ther
ther diluted
diluted the the impact
impact of of the
the raid.
raid. Allied
Allied losses were much
losses were much
lower
lower than
than might might havehave beenbeen expected,
expected, and German losses
and German losses
were
were much
much higher. higher. The The German
German air force claimed
air force claimed to to have
have
destroyed
destroyed 402 402 Allied
Allied aircraft
aircraft on on the
the ground
ground and and 65 65 in in the
the
air;
air; but
but the the Allies
Allies put
put their
their own
own losses
losses atat 236
236 destroyed
destroyed and and
badly
badly damaged
damaged on on thethe ground
ground and and 2323 inin air-to-air
air-to-air combat
combat..
The
The Germans
Germans put put their
their ownown losses
losses at at 304
304 aircraft
aircraft destroyed
destroyed
and 232
and 232 pilots lost.. Anglo-American
pilots lost Anglo-American pilots pilots claimed
claimed 102 102 aer-
aer-
ial
ial victories,
victories, and and Allied
Allied gunners
gunners claimed
claimed 185 185 toto 394
394 (the(the
former
former figure,figure, confirmed
confirmed kills kills;; the
the latter,
latter, confirmed
confirmed kills kills
plus
plus those
those awaiting
awaiting confirmation).
confirmation). The The Allies
Allies recovered
recovered 137 137
German
German aircraft aircraft wrecks
wrecks in in their
their area
area ofof control
control and,and, from
from
their
their remains,
remains, creditedcredited the the fighters
fighters withwith 57 57 kills and flak
kills and flak
with
with 80.
80.36 36
A clearer view
A clearer view of of the
the confused
confused battlebattle is perhaps possible
is perhaps possible
by focusing
by focusing on on thethe attack
attack of of oneone airfield
airfield.. The
The German
German
fighter
fighter unit unit JG11
JGll launched
launched about about 65 65 fighters
fighters against
against the the
Anglo-American
Anglo-American airfield airfield (Y-29)
(Y-29) at at Asch,
Asch, Belgium,
Belgium, where where
four RAF
four RAF SpitfireSpitfire squadrons
squadrons (41st, (41st, 130th,
130th, 350th,
350th, and and
610th)
610th) and and twotwo US US fighter groups (352d
fighter groups (3 52d andand 366th)
366th) werewere
22
22
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO 1945
TO 1945
stationed
Stationed.. When
When the the Germans
Germans struckstruck Asch,
Asch, one one Spitfire
Spitfire
squadron
squadron and and oneone Thunderbolt
Thunderbolt squadron
squadron were were airborne,
airborne,
and
and aa dozen
dozen P-51s
P-5Is of of the
the 352d
352d Fighter
Fighter Group
Group were were taking
taking
off.
off. The
The latter's
latter's group
group commander,
commander, Col Col JohnJohn Meyer,
Meyer,
claimed
claimed one
one FWFW 190 190 before
before hehe had
had raised
raised hishis landing
landing gear.
gear.
In
In the
the ensuing
ensuing melee,
melee, American
American pilots
pilots claimed
claimed 32 32 kills
kills;;
British
British pilots,
pilots, one
one.. In
In all,
all, the
the Allied
Allied pilots
pilots andand gunners
gunners at at
Asch
Asch claimed
claimed 35 to 41
35 to 41 German
German aircraft
aircraft out
out ofof 50
50 attackers.
attackers.
The
The Allies
Allies lost
lost no
no P-51 and only
P-5 Iss and one P-47
only one P-47 in in the
the air;
air; they
they
lost
lost seven
seven Spitfires
Spitfires and
and several
several C-47s
C-47s onon thethe ground
ground.. TheThe
Germans
Germans admitted
admitted losing
losing 2727 aircraft
aircraft in
in the
the attack.
attack. ^^
A
A few
few months
months later,
later, US
US flak
flak gunners
gunners scored
scored another
another im-im-
pressive
pressive victory.
victory. After
After American
American forcesforces unexpectedly
unexpectedly cap- cap-
tured
tured the
the railway
railway bridge
bridge across
across the
the Rhine
Rhine River
River at at Remagen,
Remagen,
Germany,
Germany, on on 77 March
March 1945,
1945, German
German forces
forces mademade consid-
consid-
erable
erable and
and desperate
desperate efforts
efforts to
to destroy
destroy itit.. By
By 1414 March
March the the
American
gunners massed
massed 64 64 90-mm,
90-mm, 216 216 40-
40-
mm,
mm, 24 24 37-mm
37-mm guns,guns, andand 228
228 quad
quad andand 140 140 single
single .50-
.50-
caliber
caliber machine
machine guns guns in
in their
their defensive
defensive effort.
effort. They
They claimed
claimed
142
142 German
German aircraft
aircraft destroyed
destroyed of of 442
442 attacking.
attacking. More More im- im-
portant,
portant, German
German aircraft
aircraft did
did not
not damage
damage the the bridge."
bridge.^*
During
During thethe European
European campaign,
campaign, American
American forcesforces ofof the
the
12th
12th Army
Army Group
Group (First,
(First, Third,
Third, andand Ninth
Ninth US US Armies)
Armies)
recorded
recorded 14,776
14,776 sorties
sorties byby the
the German
German air air force.
force. US
US gungun-
ners
ners claimed
claimed thethe destruction
destruction of of 2,070
2,070 Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe aircraft
aircraft..
The
The German
force recorded 29,953 aircraft
recorded 29,953 aircraft lostlost to
to en-
en-
emy
emy action
action or missing in
or missing in the
the entire
entire war.
war. Of Of the
the 14,938
14,938
downed
downed overover Germany,
Germany, the the Germans
Germans credited
credited antiaircraft
antiaircraft
artillery
artillery with
with the
the destruction
destruction of of 2,598
2,598 aircraft
aircraft.^^ ."
German
German Flak
Flak Defenses
Defenses
Of
Of all
all combatants
combatants in
in World
World War
War II,
II, the
the Germans
Germans had
had the
the
most
most experience
experience with
with antiaircraft
antiaircraft defense
defense.. They
They had
had come
come
aa long
long way
way from
from the
the Versailles
Versailles peace
peace treaty
treaty that
that essentially
essentially
banned
banned German
German antiaircraft
antiaircraft weapons
weapons.. Although
Although the
the Ger-
Ger-
23
23
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
mans
mans evadedevaded the the provision
provision of of the
the treaty
treaty to to aa degree,
degree, it it
clearly
clearly inhibited
inhibited them
them from building any
from building any military
military force
force until
until
Hitler
Hitler camecame to to power
power in in 1933
1933.. InIn April
April 1934 1934 the
the Germans
Germans
assigned
assigned the the antiaircraft
antiaircraft arm arm to to the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. At At first,
first, they
they
considered
considered antiaircraft
artillery as as the
the primary
primary defense
defense of of
the
the homeland
homeland from from enemy
enemy aircraft.
aircraft. TheThe Germans
Germans expanded
expanded
the
the role
role of of flak
flak asas they
they assessed
assessed the the lessons
lessons of of the
the Spanish
Spanish
Civil
Civil War,
War, where
where antiaircraft
artillery also
also served
served as as an
an in-
in-
fantry
fantry support weapon.. On
support weapon On the
the basis
basis of of that
that war,
war, thethe Ger-
Ger-
mans
mans doubled
doubled the the number
number of their flak
of their flak units.
units. So So when
when
World
World War War II II began,
began, the the Germans
Germans had had 2,600
2,600 heavy
heavy and and
6,700 light
6,700 light flak
flak guns.
guns.'ô
Germany's
Germany's best-known
best-known artillery
artillery piece
piece waswas the
the 88-mm
88-mm gun gun
(fig.
(fig. 14).
14). Although a gun of that caliber was used in World
Although a gun of that caliber was used in World
War I, Krupp designers
War I, Krupp designers at at Bofors
Bofors in in Sweden
Sweden worked
worked out out
the
the details
details of of aa new
new 88-mm
88-mm gun gun in in the
the interwar
interwar years
years andand
returned
returned to to Germany
Germany with with thethe new
new model
model in in 1931
1931.. The
The
resulting
resulting 88.8-centimeter
.8-centimeter (cm) (cm) FlakFlak 18/36/37
18/36/37 comprised
comprised
about
about 60 60 percent
percent of of Germany's
Germany's heavy heavy flak guns during
flak guns during
World War
World War II. The gun
11. The gun fired
fired aa 20.3-pound
20.3-pound shell shell atat aa muzzle
muzzle
velocity
2,690 fpsfps toto an
an effective
effective ceiling
ceiling of of 26,000
26,000 feet.*
feet.*
The
The famefame of of the
the 88.8.8 stems
stems mainly
mainly fromfrom its its versatility
versatility as as
aa triple-purpose
triple-purpose weapon weapon (antiaircraft,
(antiaircraft, antitank,
antitank, and and stan-
stan-
dard artillery
dard artillery piece)
piece) andand its ubiquity (fig.
its ubiquity (fig. 15).
15). The
The Germans
Germans
began
began to to work
work onon aa more
more advanced
advanced model-the
model—the 8.8-cm 8.8-cm Flak
Flak
41-in
41—in 1939, 1939, but
but diddid notnot get
get this
this gun
gun intointo service
service until
until
1943
1943.. InIn spite
spite of
of early
early mechanical
mechanical problems,
problems, this this flak
flak gun
gun
had
had greater
greater performance**
performance** as as well
well asas aa lower
lower silhouette
silhouette on on
its
its turntable
turntable mounting
mounting than than diddid the
the 88.8-cm
.8-cm FlakFlak 18/36/37
18/36/37
on its
on its pedestal
pedestal mounting
mounting (fig. (fig. 16)
16).. Because
Because of of its
its high
high cost
cost
*Compare
*Compare these
these figures
figures with
with the
the standard
standard British
British heavy
heavy antiaircraft
antiaircraft gun,
gun, the
the 3.7-inch
3.7-inch
Mark
Mark 3, 3, and
and the
the American
American 90-mm Mark 11.. The
90-mm Mark The former
former fired
fired aa 28-pound
28-pound projectile
projectile atat
aa muzzle
muzzle velocity
velocity ofof 2,600
2,600 fps
fps to
to an effective ceiling
an effective ceiling of
of 32,000
32,000 feet,
feet, whereas
whereas thethe latter
latter
hurled
hurled aa 23-pound
23-pound shellshell at
at 2,700
2,700 fps to an
fps to an effective
effective ceiling
ceiling of
of 32,000
32,000 feet.
feet. The
The two
two
Allied guns
Allied guns weighed
weighed moremore than
than the
the German
German gun gun and
and had
had aa higher
higher rate
rate of
of fire,
fire, 20
20 rpm
rpm
compared
compared withwith the
the German
German 15-rpm
15-rpm gun .41
gun.*'
**It fired a 20.7-pound shell at a muzzle velocity
**It fired a 20.7-pound shell at a muzzle velocity of
of 3,280
3,280 fps
fps to
to an
an effective
effective ceiling
ceiling
of 37,000
of 37,000 feet.
feet.
24
24
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
(Photo
(Photo Credit:
Credit: Imperial
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 14.
14. The
The German
German 88-mm
88-mm gungun was
was probably
probably the
the most
most famous
famous
and feared artillery piece of World War II.
and feared artillery piece of World War II.
and
and complexity,
complexity, the
the Germans
Germans manufactured
manufactured relatively
relatively few
few
of this model
of this and, in
model and, February 1944,
in February 1944, fielded
fielded only
only 279 .42
279.''2
In 1933 the Germans established the specifications for aa
In 1933 the Germans established the specifications for
105-mm
105-mm antiaircraft
antiaircraft gun,
gun, and
and three
three years
years later
later selected
selected
Rheinmetall's
Rheinmetall's proposal
proposal over Knipp's. The
over Krupp's. The 10.5-cm
10.5-cm Flak
Flak
2
255
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
(Photo Credit:
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure 15.
Figure 15. One
One reason
reason for
for the
the 88's fame was
88's fame its versatility;
was its versatility; itit served
served
well in conventional artillery, antitank, and
well in conventional artillery, antitank, and antiaircraft
antiaircraft
roles.
roles.
8/39 fired
338/39 fired aa 333.2-pound
3 .2-pound shell
shell at
at aa muzzle
muzzle velocity
velocity of of 2,8 85
2,885
fps
fps to
to anan effective
effective ceiling
ceiling of
of 31,000 feet. In
31,000 feet. In 1936
1936 Rhein-
Rhein-
metall
metall also
also won contract for
won aa contract for aa 12 .8-cm gun
12.8-cm gun designated
designated as as
the
the 12.8-cm
12.8-cm FlakFlak 40. It fired
40. It fired aa 57 .2-pound shell
57.2-pound shell at
at 2,890
2,890
fps to aa maximum
fps to maximum ceiling
ceiling of
of 35,000 feet. Compared
35,000 feet. Compared with with
the 88-mm gun,
the 88-mm gun, the
the 128-mm
128-mm gun gun (fig.
(fig. 17)
17) used
used aa powder
powder
charge
charge four
four times
times asas great
great and
and thus
thus itsits shell's
shell's flight
flight time
time
was only
was only one-third
one-third as as long.
long. In
In late
late 1944
1944 there were 116
there were 116 105-
105-
mm flak
mm flak guns
guns mounted
mounted on on railroad mounts, 827
railroad mounts, 827 onon fixed
fixed
mounts,
mounts, and and 1,025
1,025 on
on mobile
mobile mounts.
mounts. For For increased
increased mo- mo-
bility the Germans
bility the Germans mounted
mounted about
about 55 percent
percent of of their
their 105-
105-
mm
mm andand 128-mm
128-mm flakflak guns
guns onon railroad
railroad cars.
cars. These potent
These potent
guns
guns were
were manned
manned by by Germany's
Germany's best best flak
flak gunners
gunners and and were
were
correctly
correctly considered
considered to to be
be the
the cream
cream of of the
the flak
flak arm .
arm.'^^
2266
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
(Photo
(Photo Credit:
Credit: USAF
USAF Historical
Historical Research
Researcti Center)
Center)
Figure
Figure 16.
16. 88-mm
88-mm gun
gun on
on the
the march.
march.
In
In the
the early
early years
years ofof the
the war
war (1939-41),
(1939-41), flakflak protected
protected
German
German troops
troops from
from the
the few
few Allied
Allied aircraft
aircraft that
that the
the Ger-
Ger-
man
man airair force
force had
had notnot destroyed
destroyed andand supported
supported the the ad-
ad-
vancing
vancing armies
armies asas an antitank and
an antitank and direct
direct support weapon..
support weapon
In
In the
the Western
Western European
European campaign
campaign of of 1940,
1940, flakflak units
units
claimed
claimed 854 854 of
of 2,379
2,379 aircraft
aircraft destroyed
destroyed andand over
over 300300 ar-
ar-
mored
mored vehicles
vehicles.. By
By October
October 19411941 German
German flak flak gunners
gunners
claimed aa score
claimed score of
of 5,381
5,381 aircraft
aircraft and
and 1,930
1,930 armored
armored
vehicles.
vehicles.
Another
Another victory,
victory, partially
partially due
due toto German
German flak,flak, was
was the
the
evacuation of
evacuation of Axis
Axis forces
forces over
over the
the Strait
Strait of
of Messina
Messina fromfrom
Sicily
Sicily in
in August
August 1943
1943.. Despite Allied air
Despite Allied air and
and sea
sea superiority,
superiority,
almost
almost 40,000
40,000 German
German and and 62,000
62,000 Italian
Italian troops
troops left
left the
the
island
island with
with much
much ofof their
their equipment,
equipment, nearly
nearly 10,000 vehi-
10,000 vehi-
27
27
ARCHIE,
FLAK, AAA, SAM
(Photo Credit.
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 17.
17. German
German 128-mm
128-mm gun
gun..
cles,
cles, and
and even
even with
with their
their rear
rear guard.
guard. This
This Axis
Axis victory
victory re-
re-
sulted
sulted because
because of
of Allied
Allied preoccupation
preoccupation with
with the
the upcoming
upcoming
Italian
Italian invasion
invasion and
and completion
completion of
of the
the conquest
conquest ofof Sicily,
Sicily,
as
as well
well as
as the
the Axis
Axis employment
employment of of 500
500 heavy
heavy and
and light
light flak
flak
28
28
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
pieces.44
pieces.'*'* ButBut thethe Messina
Messina evacuation
evacuation was was as
as much
much an an Axis
Axis
accomplishment
accompHshment as as it
it was
was anan Allied
AUied failure
failure..
During
During the the early
early years,
years, German
German home home defenses
defenses faced
faced light
light
opposition
opposition as as the
the British
British night
night raiders
raiders were
were fewfew inin number,
number,
ill
ill equipped,
equipped, and and poorly
poorly trained
trained (a (a bomber
bomber couldcould rarely
rarely find
find
its
its target,
target, muchmuch less less destroy
destroy it).it). But
But British
British airmen
airmen began
began
to
to strike
strike telling
telling blows,
blows, as as dramatically
dramatically seen seen in the first
in the first raid
raid
of 1,000
of 1,000 bombers
bombers on on Cologne
Cologne in in May
May 1942 1942.. Shortly
Shortly after-
after-
wards,
wards, American
American heavy heavy bombers
bombers joinedjoined thethe fray
fray with
with day-
day-
light
light attacks,
attacks, but but theythey diddid not not launch
launch largelarge raids
raids on on
Germany
Germany until until the the spring
spring 1943.
1943.
One
One key key target
target waswas thethe oil
oil complex
complex at at Ploesti,
Ploesti, Romania.
Romania.
After
After an an ineffective
ineffective attack attack by by 13 American B-24s
13 American B-24s on on 12 12
June 1942,
June 1942, the the Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces (AAF) dispatched 178
(AAF) dispatched 178
bombers
bombers on on aa low-level attack on
low-level attack on 11 August
August 19431943 (fig.
(fig. 18)
18)..
American
American airmen airmen estimated
estimated Axis Axis flak
flak defenses
defenses at at about
about 100 100
heavy
heavy guns guns andand several
several hundred
hundred lightlight guns but encountered
guns but encountered
twice
twice thatthat number.
number. These These guns,
guns, combined
combined with with thethe vulner-
vulner-
ability
ability of of the
the Liberators
Liberators at at low
low altitude,
altitude, confusion
confusion of of the
the
battle,
battle, and and thethe long
long range
range (over
(over 2,300
2,300 milemile round-trip)
round-trip) of of
the
the mission,
mission, causedcaused heavy heavy bomber
bomber losses.
losses. A A total
total ofof 5454
bombers failed to return ; the airmen attributed the bulk of
bombers failed to return; the airmen attributed the bulk of
these
these losses
losses to to flak
flak (fig. 19) .
(fig. 19).
The Allies conducted 19
The Allies conducted 19 high-level
high-level raids
raids on on Ploesti
Ploesti be-be-
tween 55 April
tween April and and 19 19 August
August 1944 1944 (fig.
(fig. 20)
20).. OnOn 5,479
5,479 ef- ef-
fective
fective sorties,
sorties, American
American bombers bombers dropped
dropped 13,46913,469 tons
tons of of
bombs
bombs and and lostlost 223223 bombers.
bombers. Flak Flak downed
downed 131 131 bombers
bombers
and
and 56 56 fighters
fighters.'*^.
Besides
Besides the the 2121 heavy
heavy bomber
bomber raids raids by by the
the AAF,
AAF, there
there
were
were four four other
other bombing
bombing attacks
attacks on on Ploesti
Ploesti.. The
The RAF
RAF flewflew
three
three nightnight missions, dropped 313
missions, dropped 313 tons
tons ofof bombs
bombs on on 186
186
effective
effective sorties
sorties and and lost
lost 1515 bombers
bombers to to unknown
unknown causes causes..
In
In contrast,
contrast, on on 10 June 1944,
10 June 1944, thethe Americans
Americans dispatched
dispatched 46 46
P-38s,
P-38s, each each carrying
carrying aa 1,000-pound
1,000-pound bomb bomb and and aa 300-gallon
300-gallon
fuel tank,
fuel tank, escorted
escorted by by 4848 Lightnings,
Lightnings, againstagainst thethe oil
oil target.
target.
The
The airmen
airmen credited
credited 38 38 P-38s
P-38s withwith effective
effective bombing
bombing sor- sor-
ties
ties and
and withwith getting
getting 19 19 bombs
bombs on on target
target with
with good
good results.
results.
29
29
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
Figure 18.. The

Figure 18 The 11 August
August 1943 Ploesti mission
1943 Ploesti mission was
was both
both dramatic
dramatic
and
and costly.
costly.
But
But thethe Americans
Americans metmet stiff
stiff resistance,
resistance, including
including 100100 enemy
enemy
aircraft;
aircraft; as as aa result,
result, they
they lost
lost nine
nine dive-bombers
dive-bombers (seven (seven to
to
flak)
flak) and and 14 of the
14 of the escorting
escorting P-38s.
P-38s. American
American fighters
fighters
claimed 28
claimed 28 enemy
enemy aircraft destroyed in
aircraft destroyed in the
the air.46
air.'*^
In
In early
early April
April 1944
1944 German
German heavyheavy guns
guns at
at Ploesti
Ploesti num-num-
bered 178,
bered 178, light
light guns
guns 203
203.. The
The Germans
Germans bolstered
bolstered thisthis num-
num-
ber
ber toto 278
278 heavy
heavy guns
guns and
and 280
280 light
light guns
guns by
by the
the time
time of
of
the
the final
final attack
attack on
on 1919 August
August (figs. 21-25). The
(figs. 21-25). The heavy
heavy gunsguns
(fig.
(fig. 26)
26) consisted
consisted ofof 128-mm
128-mm gunsguns (10
(10 percent),
percent), 105-mm
105-mm
mobile
mobile gunsguns (15
(15 percent),
percent), 88-mm
88-mm mobile
mobile guns
guns (60
(60 percent),
percent),
and
and Romanian
Romanian 75-mm75-mm gunsguns and
and captured
captured Soviet
Soviet 76 .5-mm
76.5-mm
guns
guns (15(15 percent).
percent). Flak
Flak took
took anan increasing
increasing toll
toll of
of American
American
bombers,
bombers, rising
rising from
from 11.2.2 percent
percent of of sorties in April
sorties in April to to 2.4
2.4
30
30
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
Figure
Figure 19.
19. German
German radar
radar in
in Romania.
Romania.
percent in
percent in August,
August, as as losses
losses toto enemy
enemy aircraft
aircraft declined
declined from
from
22 percent
percent ofof sorties
sorties toto zero
zero/' . 4'
The
The Germans
Germans fiercely
fiercely defended
defended other
other oil
oil facilities
facilities asas well.
well.
At
At Politz,
Politz, they
they deployed
deployed 600 600 heavy
heavy antiartillery
antiartillery weapons
weapons
and
and atat Leuna,
Leuna, 700.700. AtAt the
the latter,
latter, about
about 4040 percent
percent of of the
the
heavy
heavy weapons
weapons were were larger
larger thanthan 88-mm
88-mm guns.
guns. The The cam-
cam-
paign
paign against
against Leuna,
Leuna, Germany's
Germany's second second largest
largest synthetic
synthetic
oil
oil and
and chemical
chemical plant,
plant, lasted
lasted fromfrom 12
12 May
May 1944
1944 to to 44 April
April
1945
1945.. The
The AAF
AAF sent sent 5,236
5,236 bomber
bomber sorties
sorties and
and thethe RAF
RAF
sent
sent 1,394
1,394 sorties,
sorties, which
which dropped
dropped 18,092 tons of
18,092 tons of bombs
bombs
on
on the
the target
target.. But
But because
because of of weather and enemy
weather and enemy opposi-
opposi-
tion,
tion, only
only 10
10 percent
percent of of those
those bombs
bombs fell
fell on
on the plant com-
the plant com-
plex.
plex. Bombing
Bombing accuracy
accuracy as as measured
measured in in bombs
bombs on on target
target
declined
declined from
from 3535 percent
percent in May 1944,
in May 1944, to
to 55 percent
percent in in July,
July,
and finally
and finally to 1 .5 percent
to 1.5 percent in in September.
September. On On three
three missions
missions
in
in October,
October, the
the Germans
Germans reported
reported thatthat no
no bombs
bombs fell fell on
on
the
the plant
plant.. The
The Americans
Americans lost lost 119119 bombers
bombers (2 (2.3.3 percent
percent of of
3311
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
Figure
Figure 20.
20. Ploesti
Ploesti was
was protected
protected byby smoke
smoke asas well
well as
as by
by guns
guns..
Smoke
Smoke screen
screen is
is shown
shown developing
developing on on 17 August 1944
17 August 1944..
Romana
Romana Americana
Americana Oil
Oil Refinery
Refinery is
is at
at center
center right.
right. White
White
dots
dots are
are bomb
bomb craters.
craters.
sorties),
sorties), while
while the
the British
British lost
lost eight
eight (.57
(.57 percent),
percent), mostly
mostly to to
German flak.48
German flak.^^
The Germans stoutly
The Germans stoutly defended
defended otherother targets
targets as
as well.
well.
Hamburg's
Hamburg's defenses
defenses included
included 400 400 heavy
heavy guns,
guns, while
while Mu-
Mu-
nich's
nich's had
had almost
almost 300,
300, and
and Vienna's
Vienna's had had 327
327.. The
The Allies
Allies
hit
hit the Austrian capital
the Austrian capital onon 47 47 raids
raids and
and lost
lost 361
361 heavy
heavy
bombers,
bombers, 229 229 (63.4
(63.4 percent)
percent) to to flak.
flak. On
On 77 February
February 1945
1945
the
the Fifteenth
Fifteenth Air
Air Force
Force lost
lost 2525 ofof the
the 689
689 aircraft
aircraft sent
sent
against
against Vienna
Vienna (19(19 to
to flak)
flak).. The
The Fifteenth
Fifteenth Air
Air Force
Force hit
hit the
the
city again
city again the
the next
next day,
day, but
but this
this time
time itit lost
lost none
none of its 470
of its 470
32
32
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Imperial
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 21.
21. German
German light
light flak
flak was
was also
also very
very effective.
effective. German
German single
single
20-mm mount. Note German soldier in background op-
20-mm mount. Note German soldier in background op-
erating
erating aa range
range finder.
finder.
bombers.
bombers. TheThe losses
losses onon the
the first
first raid
raid were
were due
due to to the
the clear
clear
weather
weather that
that helped
helped thethe gunners
gunners and and toto the
the Americans'
Americans' lack lack
of
of airborne
airborne coordination
coordination and and electronic countermeasures
electronic countermeasures
(ECM).
(ECM). The
The success
success on on the
the following
following day day was
was attributed
attributed to to
poorer
poorer weather
weather (7/10
(7/10 to 10/10 overcast)
to 10/10 overcast) andand better
better Amer-
Amer-
ican
ican coordination
coordination and and ECM
ECM.^^ .49
The
The Germans
Germans introduced
introduced technological
technological improvements
improvements to to
increase
increase flak
flak efficiency.
efficiency. InIn 1941
1941 flak
flak units
units began
began to to get
get gun-
gun-
laying
laying radar
radar andand grooved
grooved projectiles.
projectiles. These
These shells
shells frag-
frag-
mented
mented into
into 80-
80- to
to 100-gram
100-gram pieces
pieces instead
instead ofof the
the usual
usual 1- 1-
to
to 7-gram
7-gram pieces, therefore causing much greater damage.
pieces, therefore causing much greater damage.
Incendiary
Incendiary shells
shells also
also increased
increased flak flak efficiency
efficiency by by three
three
times,
times, according
according to to German
German estimates.
estimates.
Another
Another important
important advancement
advancement dealt dealt with
with fuzes.
fuzes. Hav-
Hav-
ing
ing requested
requested double
double fuzes
fuzes (contact
(contact andand timed)
timed) in in 1943,
1943, thethe
Germans
Germans introduced
introduced them them in in late
late 1944.
1944. These
These fuzesfuzes in-in-
creased
creased the
the effectiveness
effectiveness of of 88-mm
88-mm guns guns five
five times,
times, 105-105-
mm
mm guns
guns three
three times,
times, andand 128-mm
128-mm guns guns two
two times.
times. ButBut the
the
3333
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
(Photo Credit:. Imperial

(Photo Credit War Museum)
Imperial War Museum)
Figure
Figure 22.
22. German 20-mm guns
German 20-mm guns aboard train..
aboard train
Germans
Germans diddid not
not make
make the
the big
big change
change in
in fuzes
fuzes;; instead,
instead, the
the
Allies
Alhes introduced
introduced proximity
proximity fuzes.
fuzes. After
After the
the war,
war, an
an Amer-
Amer-
ican
ican study
study calculated
calculated that
that had
had the
the Germans
Germans usedused proximity
proximity
fuzes, they
fuzes, they could
could have
have increased
increased their
their flak
flak efficiency
efficiency byby aa
factor of
factor of 3.4,
3.4, making
making B-17 operations very
B-17 operations very hazardous
hazardous and and
B-24
B-24 operations
operations impractical .5o
impractical.^°
The
The Germans
Germans also
also experimented
experimented withwith aa number
number of of novel
novel
approaches
approaches to to ground-based
ground-based antiaircraft
antiaircraft systems.
systems. They
They
tested
tested squeeze
squeeze bore
bore and
and sabot
sabot devices*
devices* but
but got
got neither
neither into
into
service.
service.
The
The Germans
Germans examined
examined yet
yet another
another concept,
concept, flak
flak rockets,
rockets,
*In
*In both
both systems
systems aa gun
gun fires
fires aa shell
shell of
of smaller
smaller size,
size, for
for example,
example, aa 88-mm
88-mm shell
shell from
from
aa 105-mm
105-mm gun.
gun. Because
Because more
more powder
powder pushes
pushes aa smaller
smaller projectile,
projectile, much
much greater
greater velocity
velocity
is
is achieved.
achieved.
34
34
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
ijrinmtm c n.tMt p r v;;;
(Photo
(Photo Credit.
Credit: USAF
USAF Historical
Historical Research
Research Center)
Center)
Figure
Figure 23.
23. German
German light
light flak
flak pieces
pieces were
were also
also mounted
mounted on
on motor
motor
vehicles
vehicles.. Here
Here aa 20-mm
20-mm gun
gun is
is seen
seen with
with a
a makeshift
makeshift
mount
mount on
on anan Opel
Opel truck.
truck.
(Photo
(Photo Credit.
Credit: USAF
USAF Historical
Historical Research
Research Center)
Center)
Figure
Figure 24.
24. 40-mm
40-mm Bofors
Bofors on
on truck
truck chassis.
chassis.
3355
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, AAA, SAM
FLAK, AAA, SAM
dggg:
(Photo
(Photo Credit: USAF Historical
Credit: USAF Historical Research
Research Center)
Center)
Figure
Figure 25.
25. 50-mm
50-mm gun
gun on
on five-ton
five-ton towing
towing vehicle.
vehicle.
Figure
Figure 26.
26. 128-mm
128-mm railway
railway guns
guns were
were largest
largest in
in Ploesti,
Ploesti, Romania.
Romania.
There
There were
were 24 of these,
24 of these, each of which
each of which could
could fire
fire one
one
shell every
shell every five
five seconds.
seconds.
3366
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
but
but barely
barely employed
employed them them in in World
World War War II II.. Since
Since the
the Ger-
Ger-
mans
mans realized
realized little
little positive
positive results
results with
with thethe program
program in in the
the
1930s,
1930s, Hitler
Hitler halted
halted all all long-range
long-range development
development projects projects in in
September
September 1941 1941.. The
The Germans
Germans liftedlifted the
the stop
stop order
order on on the
the
program,
program, and and inin April
April 1942
1942 they
they drew
drew upup thethe specifications
specifications
for
for aa variety
variety of of flak
flak rockets,
rockets, bothboth guided
guided and and unguided.
unguided. In In
September
September 1942 1942 Hermann
Hermann Goering Goering authorized
authorized work work on on
AAA
AAA rockets.
rockets. In In response,
response, Wernher
Wemher von von Braun
Braun forwarded
forwarded
aa study
study in in November
November 1942 1942 that
that mentioned
mentioned three three types
types of of
guided
guided flak
flak rockets
rockets:: aa 28-foot,
28-foot, single-stage
single-stage solid-fuel
solid-fuel missile
missile;;
aa 33-foot,
33-foot, two-stage
two-stage solid-fuel
solid-fuel missile;
missile; and
and aa 20-foot,
20-foot, single-
single-
stage
stage liquid-fuel
Hquid-fuel missile.''
missile.^'
Subsequently,
Subsequently, the the Germans
Germans developed
developed aa number number of of
guided flak
guided flak missiles
missiles and and twotwo small
small unguided
unguided groundground-
launched rockets,
launched rockets, the the Foehn
Foehn and and Taifun.
Taifun. The The Foehn
Foehn
weighed
weighed 33.3 .3 pounds
pounds and and measured
measured two two feet
feet inin length.
length. First
First
fired in
fired in 1943,
1943, the the rocket
rocket had had aa 3,600-foot
3,600-foot range range and and waswas
intended to
intended to bebe fired
fired inin ripples
ripples from
from aa 35-barrel
35-barrel launcher.
launcher.
The
The Germans
Germans put put three
three batteries
batteries into
into service
service and and credited
credited
them
them with
with downing
downing three three Allied
Allied aircraft
aircraft.. The
The rocket's
rocket's pri-pri-
mary
mary impact
impact was, was, however,
however, psychological
psychological.^^ .
The
The other
other unguided
unguided flak flak rocket,
rocket, thethe Taifun
Taifun (fig. (fig. 27), mea-
27), mea-
sured 75 .6 inches in length, weighed 65 pounds, and carried
sured 75.6 inches in length, weighed 65 pounds, and carried
aa 11.4-pound
.4-pound warheadwarhead.. The The Germans
Germans fired fired the the liquid-fuel
liquid-fuel
rockets
rockets in in ripples
ripples fromfrom either
either aa 30-barrel
30-barrel launcher
launcher or or aa 50-
50-
barrel
barrel launcher
launcher mountedmounted on on aa 88-mm
88-mm gun gun carriage
carriage.. The The
Taifun
Taifun had had an an altitude
altitude capability
capability of of 46,000
46,000 to to 52,000
52,000 feet."
feet."
In
In addition,
addition, the the Germans
Germans developed
developed four four guided
guided rockets:
rockets:
Enzian,
Enzian, Rheintochter,
Rheintochter, Schmetterling,
Schmetterling, and and Wasserfall.
Wasserfall. The The
Enzian (fig. 28) also could have passed for an aircraft, albeit
Enzian (fig. 28) also could have passed for an aircraft, albeit
aa radio
radio controlled
controlled and and tailless
tailless one
one.. (It
(It was
was an an unmanned
unmanned
version
version of of the
the rocket-powered
rocket-powered Me Me 163 163.).) Almost
Almost 12 12 feet
feet inin
length,
length, the the missile's
missile's sweptback
sweptback wing wing spanned
spanned 13 13.5.5 feet.
feet. ItIt
weighed
weighed 4,350 4,350 pounds
pounds and and waswas launched
launched by by four
four solid-fuel
solid-fuel
boosters from
boosters from aa 88-mm88-mm gun gun carriage The Enzian
carriage.. The Enzian carried
carried
660-pound warhead
aa 660-pound warhead to to anan altitude
altitude ofof 53,000
53,000 feet feet and
and aa
slant
slant range
range of of 16
16 miles
miles at at 560
560 mph
mph.. The
The Germans
Germans tested tested
337
7
ARCHIE,
FLAK, AAA, SAM
(Photo
(Photo Credit.
Credit: Smithsonian Institution Photo
Smithsonian Institution Photo No.
No. 41183)
41183)
Figure 27.
Figure 27. German
German Taifun
Taifun rocket,
rocket, an unguided, liquid-propelled
an unguided, liquid-propelled
antiaircraft
antiaircraft rocket.
rocket.
possibly
possibly 3388 Enzians But only
Enzians.. But only aa few
few were
were successes
successes;; and
and inin
January
January 1945 the Germans
1945 the Germans canceled
canceled thethe project .
project.^"*
Rheintochter II (fig.
Rheintochter 29), aa solid-fuel,
(fig. 29), solid-fuel, two-stage
two-stage rocket,
rocket,
measured 20
measured .1 feet
20.1 feet and
and weighed
weighed 3,8603,860 pounds.
pounds. The The second
second
stage had
stage had four
four canard and six
fins and
canard fins six wings
wings (which
(which spanned
spanned
9.8 feet) and
9.8 feet) and carried
carried aa 220-
220- to 330-pound warhead
to 330-pound warhead to to aa
slant range
slant of 18,000
range of 18,000 yards
yards and
and an an altitude
altitude ofof 23,000 feet..
23,000 feet
The Germans first
The Germans first tested
tested the
the radio-controlled device in
radio-controlled device in Au-
Au-
gust 1943 ; and
gust 1943; and by by the
the time
time it it was canceled in
was canceled in February
February
1945,
1945, they had fired
they had 88 flak
fired 88 flak rockets
rockets.. Rheintochter
Rheintochter I's Fs un-
un-
satisfactory performance
satisfactory performance led led to Rheintochter II,
to Rheintochter II, which
which had
had
four jettisonable
four jettisonable booster
booster rockets
rockets between
between itsits wings
wings.. Rhein-
Rhein-
tochter III
tochter used the
III used the same
same first
first stage,
stage, but
but its
its second
second stage
stage
was about 33.5
was about feet longer.
.5 feet Powered by
longer. Powered by aa liquid-fuel
liquid-fuel engine,
engine,
it
it used
used two booster units
two booster units.. The
The Germans
Germans tested
tested about
about 40
40 of
of
3388
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
(Photo Credit.
(Photo Credit: Imperial War Museum)
Imperial War Museum)
Figure 28. The

Figure 28. The Germans
Germans tested
tested the
the Enzian
Enzian but
but dropped
dropped itit in
in favor
favor
of other German flak rockets. Note the solid-fuel boost-
of other German flal( rockets. Note the solid-fuel boost-
ers
ers mounted
mounted on
on the missile's fuselage
the missile's fuselage..
these before
these canceling Rheintochter
before canceling Rheintochter in in favor
favor of of the
the
Schmetterling
Schmetterling." .ss
The Schmetterling (fig.
The Schmetterling (fig. 30)
30) looked
looked likelike aa sweptwing
sweptwing airair-
craft measuring
craft measuring 11 .8 feet
11.8 feet in length and
in length and 66.6.6 feet
feet in
in span
span.. At
At
an all-up weight
an all-up weight of of 970
970 pounds,
pounds, it was launched
it was launched by by two
two
solid-fuel boosters from
solid-fuel boosters from aa 37-mm
37-mm gun gun carriage.
carriage. TheThe radio-
radio-
controlled
controlled missile carried aa 51-pound
missile carried 51-pound warhead
warhead out out to
to aa max-
max-
imum
imum slant
slant range
range of 17,500 yards
of 17,500 yards and
and anan altitude
altitude of of 29,000
29,000
feet
feet at
at aa maximum
maximum speed speed of of 537
537 mph.
mph. The The Germans
Germans first first
fired
fired it in January
it in January 1944 1944 andand tested
tested perhaps
perhaps 80 despite en-
80 despite en-
gine
gine (fuel regulation) problems.
(fuel regulation) problems.^^
Wasserfall (fig. 31),
Wasserfall (fig. the largest
31), the largest German
German flak flak rocket,
rocket, was
was
scaled-down V-2,
aa scaled-down V-2, from
from which
which itit was
was derived.
derived." Unlike
Unlike thethe
V-2,
V-2, however, Wasserfall had
however, Wasserfall had aa set
set of
of four
four fins
fins mounted
mounted
about one-third
about one-third downdown its its 25 .6-foot length,
25.6-foot length, andand larger
larger tail
tail
fins. Wasserfall
fins. Wasserfall had had aa lift-off
lift-off weight
weight of of 8,400
8,400 pounds
pounds and and
39
39
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
(Photo Credit.
Imperial War
War Museum)
Museum)
Figure 29. Another

Figure 29. German flak
Another German flak rocket
rocket experiment
experiment was
was this
tliis
Rheintochter.
Rheintochter.
carried
carried aa 200-pound
200-pound warhead.
warhead. The The Germans
Germans desired
desired aa mis-
mis-
sile
sile that
that could
could down
down an an aircraft
aircraft flying
flying 540
540 mphmph atat an
an al-al-
titude
titude of of 1212 miles
miles andand at at aa distance
distance of of 30 30 miles
miles.. The
The
Wasserfall
Wasserfall fell short of
fell short of these
these requirements
requirements by by only
only reaching
reaching
an altitude
an altitude ofof 66 miles
miles at
at aa distance
distance ofof 3030 miles,
miles, anan altitude
altitude
of
of 99 miles
miles atat 25
25 miles,
miles, and
and anan altitude
altitude ofof 11 .4 miles
11.4 miles atat 16
16.5.5
miles. But American bomber formations in 1945 were
miles. But American bomber formations in 1945 were
flying less than
flying less than 200200 mph
mph at at about
about an an altitude
altitude ofof 55 miles
miles..
The
The Germans
Germans intended
intended to to use
use beam-rider
beam-rider guidance,
guidance, in in
which
which thethe missile
missile rides
rides along
along anan electronic
electronic beam
beam to to its tar-
its tar-
get. But telemetry difficulties created problems. The Ger-
get. But telemetry difficulties created problems. The Ger-
mans
mans hadhad two
two schemes
schemes forfor detonating
detonating the the warhead:
warhead: ground-
ground-
activated
activated signals
signals and
and aa proximity
proximity fuze.
fuze. Design
Design work
work for
for the
the
Wasserfall
Wasserfall was was completed
completed in in early
early 1943,
1943, andand the
the missile
missile
was
was first
first flown
flown in in February
February 1944.
1944. The
The Germans
Germans tested
tested at at
least
least 50
50 before
before canceling
canceling the the project
project inin February
February 19451945.^^.58
Some authors speculate on what might have been if the
Some authors speculate on what might have been if the
40
40
EARLY YEARS
EARLY YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
(Photo Credit:
(Photo Credit: USAF
USAF Historical
Historical Research
Research Center)
Center)
Figure
Figure 30
30.. German
German Schmetterling.
Schmetterling.
Wasserfall,
Wasserfall, the most promising
the most promising flak flak rocket,
rocket, rather
rather than the
than the
V-2,
V-2, had
had been built in
been built quantity. They
in quantity. They overlook
overlook somesome basic
basic
factors
factors.. The
The antiaircraft
antiaircraft problem
problem is much more
is much more difficult
difficult
than
than that
that of
of ground
ground bombardment
bombardment;; the the target is small,
target is small, pos-
pos-
sibly
sibly maneuvering,
maneuvering, and and fast
fast moving.
moving. The The Germans
Germans lacked
lacked
an
an operational
operational proximity
proximity fuze;
fuze; and
and thethe Allies
Allies had lead in
had aa lead in
electronics that
electronics that probably
probably could
could have
have nullified,
nullified, certainly
certainly de-
de-
graded, the
graded, the German's
German's radio-controlled
radio-controlled guidance
guidance system.
system.
A
A number
number of of problems
problems inhibited
inhibited German
German flak.
flak. Flak
Flak per-
per-
sonnel
sonnel declined
declined in in quality,
quality, especially
especially after
after 1943
1943 as
as Germany
Germany
combed out
combed out its
its forces
forces to
to make
make good
good thethe war's
war's heavy
heavy attri-
attri-
tion.
tion. The
The Germans
Germans employed
employed women,
women, old old men,
men, young
young boys,
boys,
factory workers, foreigners,
factory workers, foreigners, and even prisoners
and even prisoners of of war
war in in
flak
flak units
units.. In
In November
November 1944,1944, 2929 percent
percent ofof flak
flak personnel
personnel
were
were civilians
civilians and auxiliaries; in
and auxiliaries; in April 1945, 44
April 1945, 44 percent.
percent.
Understandably these
Understandably these individuals
individuals werewere less
less than
than satisfac-
satisfac-
411
4
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
(Photo
(Photo Credit. USAF Historical
Crsdit: USAF Historical Research
Researc/i Center)
Center)
Figure 31.. Wasserfall

Figure 31 Wasserfall test
test at Peenemijnde, fall
at Peenemunde, fall 1944.
1944.
tory. The
tory. The increasing
increasing number
number of of guns
guns deployed
deployed by by the
the Ger-
Ger-
mans consumed
mans tremendous amounts
consumed tremendous amounts of materials, causing
of materials, causing
another difficulty-the
another difficulty—the shortage
shortage ofof ammunition, which, in
ammunition, which, in
early 1944,
early 1944, forced
forced thethe Germans
Germans to to restrict
restrict their
their firing.
firing. ByBy
the
the end
end of the war,
of the war, flak
flak units
units could deliver only
could deliver only half
half of
of their
their
firepower potential because
firepower potential because of of these
these shortages ."
shortages.^'
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, German
German flak flak was
was effective
effective in World War
in World War
II and
II and grew
grew increasingly effective as
increasingly effective as the
the war
war continued.
continued.
Through
Through 1944 1944 German gunners inflicted
German gunners inflicted about
about one-third
one-third
of Allied aircraft
of Allied losses and
aircraft losses and two-thirds
two-thirds of of the damage;; and
the damage and
after that,
after that, about
about two-thirds
two-thirds of of the losses and
the losses and almost
almost allall the
the
damage
damage.. To To bebe precise,
precise, notnot only
only did
did German
German flakflak become
become
more
more effective
effective through
through thethe course
course ofof the
the war
war but, as German
but, as German
aircraft became
aircraft became lessless effective,
effective, the flak gunners
the flak gunners picked
picked up up
the increasing burden.
the increasing burden. The The AAF
AAF lost 18,418 aircraft
lost 18,418 aircraft in
in com-
com-
bat against
bat against Germany
Germany in World War
in World War 11 II.. The American air-
The American air-
men credited
men credited antiaircraft artillery with
antiaircraft artillery with downing
downing 7,821
7,821 of of
these,
these, enemy aircraft with
enemy aircraft with 6,800 .60
6,800.^°
42
42
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
In
In addition
addition toto downing
downing andand damaging
damaging Allied
Allied aircraft,
aircraft, flak
flak
also
also degraded
degraded bombing
bombing accuracy.
accuracy. A A 1941
1941 British report said
British report said
the accuracy had
the accuracy had been
been degraded
degraded by by aa figure
figure of
of one-third.
one-third.
A
A similar
similar study
study ofof Eighth
Eighth Air
Air Force
Force bombing
bombing errors
errors between
between
May
May 1944
1944 and
and February
February 1945
1945 credits
credits almost
almost 40
40 percent
percent ofof
these
these errors
errors to
to enemy
enemy gunsguns.. The
The Mediterranean
Mediterranean Air Air Forces
Forces
put
put the
the same
same message
message across
across in
in another
another way-with
way—with little
little or
or
no flak
no flak opposition,
opposition, thethe fighters
fighters required
required 30 30 bombs
bombs to to hit
hit aa
bridge
bridge;; but
but against
against intense
intense flak
flak it
it took
took 150
150 bombs
bombs perper hit.
hit.
Medium
Medium bombers
bombers not not encountering
encountering flak flak destroyed
destroyed 2121 per-
per-
cent
cent of
of the
the bridges attacked and
bridges attacked and completely
completely missed
missed only
only 33
percent,
percent, but
but against
against flak
flak the bombers destroyed
the bombers destroyed only
only 22 per-
per-
cent
cent and
and completely
completely missed
missed 28 28 percent
percent.^'.
Allied
Allied Countermeasures
Countermeasures
Allied
Allied airmen
airmen used
used aa number
number of measures to
of measures to reduce
reduce thethe
effectiveness
effectiveness ofof enemy
enemy flak.
flak. Planners
Planners picked
picked routes
routes around
around
known
known flakflak positions,
positions, used
used higher
higher bombing
bombing altitudes,
altitudes, em-
em-
ployed
ployed saturation
saturation tactics,
tactics, and
and devised
devised tighter
tighter formations
formations..
Two
Two other
other measures
measures deserve
deserve detailed
detailed treatment
treatment..
The
The importance
importance of of radar
radar asas both
both an an early
early warning
warning and
and
gun-laying
gun-laying device
device grew
grew as as Allied
Allied bombers
bombers increasingly
increasingly op-op-
erated
erated at at night
night and
and inin poor
poor weather
weather.. Fortunately
Fortunately for for the
the
Allies,
Allies, the
the British
British held
held aa marked
marked advantage
advantage over over the
the Ger-
Ger-
mans
mans in in electronic
electronic warfare
warfare;; some
some saysay aa two-year
two-year lead.
lead. One
One
countermeasure
countermeasure used used against
against German
German radar radar waswas called
called
either window
either window (by (by the
the British)
British) oror chaff
chaff (by(by the
the Americans)
Americans)
(fig.
(fig. 32).
32). Aircraft
Aircraft dropped strips of
dropped strips of foil,
foil, similar
similar toto Christmas
Christmas
tree
tree tinsel,
tinsel, which
which caused
caused false
false signals
signals on on German
German radar-radar-
scopes.
scopes. TheThe RAF
RAF first
first used
used this
this electronic
electronic countermeasure
countermeasure
in
in the
the July
July 1943
1943 Hamburg
Hamburg raids,
raids, following
following aa command
command de- de-
cision
cision that
that cleared
cleared its
its use after being
use after being withheld
withheld for for almost
almost
18
18 months.
months. TheThe second
second major
major ECM
ECM device,
device, called
called carpet,
carpet,
electronically
electronically jammed
jammed German
German radar.
radar. In In October
October 1943
1943 the
the
Allies first
Allies first employed
employed the the device
device inin bomber
bomber formations
formations as as
43
43
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
(Photo
(Photo Credit: US Army
Credit: US Army Air
Air Defense
Defense Artillery
Artillery Museum)
Museum)
Figure
Figure 32.
32. Chaff.
Chaff.
both
both aa broad
broad band
band and
and spot jammer.. Estimates
spot jammer Estimates vary
vary onon the
the
impact
impact of of ECM;
ECM; andand ECM
ECM impact
impact changed
changed asas specific
specific con-
con-
ditions
ditions changed,
changed, especially weather.. Although
especially weather Although thethe ECM
ECM de-de-
vice may
vice may have
have decreased
decreased the
the effectiveness
effectiveness of
of flak
flak by
by as
as much
much
as two-thirds,
as two-thirds, anan overall
overall estimate
estimate ofof one-fourth
one-fourth is is probably
probably
closer to
closer to the
the truth .
truth.^^
The AAF used more direct
The AAF used more direct tactics
tactics as
as well.
well. On
On thethe first
first
day of
day of the
the Market-Garden
Market-Garden operation,
operation, 1717 September
September 1944, 1944,
the
the AAF
AAF attacked
attacked 112112 flak
flak positions
positions.. In
In addition
addition to to over
over
3,000
3,000 tons
tons of bombs dropped
of bombs dropped by by B-17s,
B-17s, P-47s
P-47s dropped
dropped 36 36
tons of
tons of fragmentation
fragmentation bombs
bombs andand expended
expended almost
almost 123,000
123,000
rounds
rounds of 50-caliber machine-gun
of 50-caliber machine-gun ammunition.
ammunition. The The rela-
rela-
tively light
tively light losses suffered by
losses suffered the attackers,
by the attackers, the
the troop
troop car-
car-
riers,
riers, and
and gliders
gliders indicate
indicate that
that the
the effort
effort worked
worked." .63 This was
This was
44
44
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
not
not the
the case
case the the next
next day.day. On On 18 September 1944,
18 September 1944, 38 38 P-P-
47s
47s ofof the
the crack
crack 56th
56th Fighter
Fighter Group
Group attacked
attacked GermanGerman flak flak
positions in the Turnhout area with .50s and parachute
positions in the Turnhout area with .50s and parachute
fragmentation
fragmentation bombs. bombs. Disaster
Disaster ensued.ensued. Low Low overcast,
overcast, haze,
haze,
and
and orders
orders requiring
requiring pilotspilots toto hold
hold their
their fire
fire until
until fired
fired upon
upon
inhibited
inhibited the the American
American pilotspilots and and put put them
them at at aa disadvan-
disadvan-
tage.
tage. The
The unit
unit lost
lost 15 15 aircraft
aircraft to to German
German flak flak and
and one
one air-
air-
craft
craft to Allied antiaircraft
to Allied antiaircraft fire;fire; inin addition,
addition, of of the
the 22
22 aircraft
aircraft
that
that returned
returned home, home, 13 13 were
were damaged
damaged by by flak.*
flak.* That
That day,
day,
the AAF flew
the AAF flew 104 104 sorties
sorties against
against antiaircraft
antiaircrafl; gunsguns and
and lost
lost
21 aircraft with another 17 damaged. These missions
21 aircraft with another 17 damaged. These missions
claimed 18
claimed 18 flak
flak guns
guns destroyed
destroyed.^'* .
In the
In the entire
entire Market-Garden
Market-Garden operation, operation. Allied
Allied airmen
airmen
claimed
claimed destruction
destruction of of 118
118 flak
flak positions
positions and and damage
damage to to
127
127 others.
others. But But the
the Anglo-Americans
Anglo-Americans lost lost 104104 aircraft
aircraft on on
4,320
4,320 sorties
sorties (excluding
(excluding trooptroop carriers
carriers andand gliders),
gliders), ofwhich
of which
37
37 were
were lost
lost on on 646
646 sorties
sorties to to suppress
suppress flak.flak. Analysis
Analysis of of the
the
entire
entire operation
operation indicated
indicated that that flakflak suppression
suppression succeeded
succeeded
only
only on on the
the first
first day
day of of the
the operation
operation.^^ .6 s
Not
Not surprisingly
surprisingly then, then, thethe next
next month,
month, US US Strategic
Strategic AirAir
Forces
Forces in in Europe
Europe recommended
recommended against against attacking
attacking heavyheavy
flak
flak positions
positions with with low-flying
low-flying aircraft.
aircraft. TheThe writer
writer based
based hishis
report
report on on the opinions of
the opinions of the
the three
three American
American numbered
numbered air air
forces
forces in in Europe
Europe (the (the Eighth,
Eighth, Ninth, Ninth, and and Fifteenth
Fifteenth Air Air
Forces),
Forces), which
which agreed
agreed thatthat such
such attacks
attacks would
would be be ineffective
ineffective
and
and costly.
costly. TheThe report
report concluded
concluded that that alternative
alternative measures
measures
(ECM,
(ECM, formations,
formations, evasive evasive maneuvers,
maneuvers, and and fragmentation
fragmentation
bombing)
bombing) were were moremore practical
practical.^^ . 66 American
American airmen airmen foundfound
little
little profit
profit in in attacking
attacking flak flak positions
positions in in World
World War War II.II. As
As
Maj
Maj GenGen Elwood
Elwood "Pete" "Pete" Quesada,
Quesada, commander
commander of of the
the 9th
9th
Tactical
Tactical Air Air Command,
Command, put put it:
it: "It was like
"It was like aa man
man biting
biting aa
dog.'
dog."6^967
The Americans
The Americans also also employed
employed artillery
artillery to to fight
fight flak
flak.. Ar-
Ar-
*Eleven
*Eleven pilots,
pilots, three
three injured,
injured, got
got back
back to
to Allied
Allied lines
lines while
while three
three others
others were
were killed
killed
and two
and two captured
captured.. Of
Of 338
338 Eighth Air Force
Eighth Air Force fighters
fighters lost
lost to
to flak
flak during the war,
during the war, 77
77
percent
percent were lost while
were lost while strafing.
strafing.
4455
ARCHIE,
FLAK, AAA, SAM
tillery
tillery was
was used
used to blanket known
to blanket known flak flak positions
positions as as the
the fight-
fight-
ers
ers approached.
approached. The The American
American gunnersgunners attempted
attempted to to pin
pin
down
down the the flak
flak gunners
gunners soso that
that the
the fighters
fighters could
could launch
launch their
their
initial
initial attack
attack against
against minimal
minimal resistance
resistance.. These
These tactics
tactics were
were
employed
employed with with mixed
mixed results
results during
during the the June
June 19441944 siege
siege ofof
Cherbourg,
Cherbourg, France."
France. ^^
Another Allied
Another Allied effort
effort atat flak
flak suppression
suppression occurred
occurred during
during
the
the Anglo-American
Anglo-American airborneairborne assaultassault across
across the the Rhine
Rhine
River
River at at Wesel
Wesel on on 24
24 March
March 1945 1945 in in Operation
Operation Varsity.
Varsity.
Allied aircraft
Allied aircraft andand artillery attempted to
artillery attempted to silence
silence or or neu-
neu-
tralize
tralize the the 922
922 German
German flak flak barrels
barrels in in the
the area.
area. Allied
Allied
bombers
bombers flying 3,741 sorties
flying 3,741 dropped over
sorties dropped 8,100 tons
over 8,100 tons ofof
bombs
bombs on on flak
flak positions
positions during
during the the three
three days
days before
before thethe
airdrop.
airdrop. The The Ninth
Ninth Air
Air Force
Force medium
medium bombers bombers dropped
dropped
517
517 tonstons ofof bombs
bombs on on 265
265 sorties,
sorties, while
while RAF RAF bombers
bombers
dropped
dropped 88 88 tons
tons ofof bombs
bombs on on 71 71 sorties.
sorties. RAFRAF Typhoons
Typhoons
used bullets, bombs,
used bullets, bombs, andand rockets
rockets.. In In addition,
addition, Allied
AlHed artil-
artil-
lery
lery fired
fired 24,000
24,000 rounds
rounds (440
(440 tons)
tons) at at 95
95 German
German positions
positions..
Despite
Despite this this awesome firepower, the
awesome firepower, the Allies
Allies accomplished
accomplished
little. Allied
little. Allied airmen
airmen andand artillery
artillery men scored few
men scored few hits
hits and,
and,
at best,
at best, temporarily
temporarily lowered
lowered thethe morale
morale of of the
the German
German gungun-
ners.
ners. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, German
German flak flak inflicted
inflicted considerable
considerable cascas-
ualties
ualties on on Allied
Aflied forces
forces (figs.
(figs. 33-35).
33-35). In In addition
addition to to
destroying
destroying 5533 tow tow and
and 16 16 supply
supply aircraft,
aircraft, the the Germans
Germans
damaged
damaged 381 381 of of 853
853 American
American gliders
gliders and and 160160 ofof 272 Brit-
272 Brit-
ish gliders,
ish gliders, ofof which
which 142142 had
had major
major damage.
damage.^' 69
Fratricide
Fratricide
One problem
One problem that that antiaircraft
gunners would
would rather
rather not
not
talk about
talk about is is firing
firing on
on and hitting friendly
and hitting friendly aircraft.
aircraft. Fratri-
Fratri-
cide
cide in
in the
the speed
speed and
and confusion
confusion of
of battle
battle is
is as
as understand-
understand-
able
able as
as itit is
is regrettable.
regrettable. Ground
Ground troops
troops and
and antiaircraft
antiaircraft
gunners
gunners had
had fired
fired on
on friendly
friendly aircraft
aircraft in
in World
World WarWar II and
and
formed
formed the
the attitude
attitude:: "There
"There ain't
ain't no
no such
such thing
thing as
as a'friendly
a 'friendly
airplane' ."'° That
airplane'."^° That attitude
attitude and
and that
that problem
problem continued.
continued.
4
466
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO 1945
TO 1945
''^ 'V't
Figure
Figure 33
33.. Liberator
Liberator over
over Italy.
Italy. After
After bombing
bombing in in support
support ofof the
the
Eighth
Eighth Army
Army drive
drive in
in northern
northern Italy,
Italy, this
this B-24
B-24 Liberator
Liberator
of the
of the US
US Army
Army Fifteenth
Fifteenth Air
Air Force
Force has
has been
been hit
hit by
by flak.
flak.
Two
Two men
men bailed
bailed out
out of
of the
the burning
burning plane.
plane.
The
The most
most costly
costly Allied
Allied fratricide
fratricide incident
incident in in World
World WarWar
II
II occurred
occurred on on the
the night
night ofof 11/12
11/12 July
July 1943,
1943, when
when thethe Allies
Allies
attempted
attempted to reinforce the
to reinforce the Sicily
Sicily invasion
invasion with
with elements
elements ofof
the
the 82d
82d Airborne
Airborne Division
Division.. Gen Gen Matthew
Matthew BB.. Ridgway,
Ridgway, thethe
division's
division's commander,
commander, anticipating
anticipating difficulties,
difficulties, attempted
attempted
to
to get
get aa protected
protected aerial
aerial corridor
corridor for
for his
his forces
forces andand got
got
assurances
assurances fromfrom both
both thethe US
US Navy
Navy and
and the
the USUS Army
Army an-an-
tiaircraft
tiaircraft gunners
gunners.. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, Ridgway's
Ridgway's worstworst fears
fears
were
were realized
realized.. The
The troop-filled
troop-filled C-47s
C-47s and
and the
the gliders
gliders arrived
arrived
over
over the
the invasion
invasion fleet
fleet shortly
shortly after
after an
an Axis
Axis bombing
bombing raid.raid.
The
The first
first flight
flight passed
passed without
without incident,
incident, but
but then
then one
one gun
gun
opened
opened fire
fire and
and acted
acted as as aa signal
signal for
for Allied
Allied gunners
gunners bothboth
ashore
ashore and
and afloat
afloat to
to cut
cut loose
loose at at the
the rest
rest of
of the
the aerial
aerial ar-
ar-
mada.
mada. Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft firefire destroyed
destroyed 23 23 of
of the
the 144
144 aircraft
aircraft that
that
departed
departed Africa
Africa that
that night
night andand badly
badly damaged
damaged 37 37 others.
others.
47
47
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
Figure 34.
Figure 34. Some
Some survived
survived ....
. . somehow.
somehow. The
The pilot
pilot landed
landed this
this B-17
B-17
safely
safely after
after its
its nose
nose was
was literally
literally shot
shot away by flak
away by flak over
over
Cologne,
Cologne, Germany.
Germany.
Figure
Figure 35.
35. German
German flak
flak was
was impressive
impressive.. B-17
B-17 Flying
Flying Fortresses
Fortresses
over
over Bremen,
Bremen, Germany.
Germany.
4488
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
Losses
Losses in in personnel
personnel amounted
amounted to to 9797 paratroopers
paratroopers killed killed or or
missing
missing andand 132132 wounded
wounded and and 60
60 airmen
airmen killedkilled oror missing
missing
and
and 3030 wounded
wounded.^' ."
Two nights
Two nights later,
later, aa similar
similar incident
incident occurred
occurred with with slightly
slightly
less disastrous results.
less disastrous results. American
American and and British troop carriers
British troop carriers
attempted
attempted to to drop
drop British
British paratroopers
paratroopers to to seize
seize aa bridge
bridge
and
and establish
establish aa bridgehead
bridgehead on on thethe easteast coast
coast of of Sicily.
Sicily.
Friendly
Friendly naval
naval andand ground
ground fire fire engaged
engaged the the transports,
transports, de- de-
stroyed
stroyed 11,11, damaged
damaged 50, 50, and
and forced
forced 27 27 others
others to to abort
abort thethe
mission
mission.. Of Of the
the 8787 aircraft
aircraft thatthat pressed
pressed on, on, only
only 3939 gotgot
their
their troops
troops within
within aa mile mile of of the
the designated
designated drop drop zone.
zone.
Thus,
Thus, only
only 300
300 of the 1,900-man
of the 1,900-man force force reached
reached theirtheir ob-
ob-
jectives;
jectives; nevertheless,
nevertheless, they carried it.
they carried it.^^
72
Fratricidal
Fratricidal problems
problems continued
continued throughout
throughout the the war.
war. For-
For-
tunately
tunately forfor the
the Allies,
Allies, they
they proved
proved lessless costly
costly than
than the
the Sicily
Sicily
debacles.
debacles. On On D-day,
D-day, forfor example,
example, despite
despite special
special invasion
invasion
markings
markings (white(white stripes),
stripes), "friendly
"friendly fire" fire" hithit aa number
number of of
Allied
Allied aircraft
aircraft.. AtAt 2025,
2025, guns guns aboard
aboard aa landing landing craftcraft
downed
downed two P-51 s flying
two P-51s flying atat 500
500 toto 1,000
1,000 feetfeet.. Ten
Ten minutes
minutes
later,
later, Allied
Allied flak
flak destroyed
destroyed two two more
more alliedallied aircraft
aircraft.. AtAt
2050,
2050, gunners
gunners fired
fired on
on four
four Spitfires
Spitfires but but apparently
apparently did did not
not
score
score any
any decisive
decisive hits
hits.. At
At 2130,
2130, however,
however, Allied Allied flak
flak holed
holed
one
one Spitfire
Spitfire that
that was
was last
last seen
seen smoking
smoking and and losing
losing altitude
altitude..
At
At 2200,
2200, gunners
gunners engaged
engaged two two Typhoons
Typhoons and and appeared
appeared to to
hit
hit both.
both. These
These areare the
the recorded
recorded cases;
cases; we we can
can assume
assume other
other
incidents
incidents escaped
escaped without
without reporting
reporting..
The
The Allies
Allies instituted
instituted measures
measures to to prevent
prevent fratricide-em-
fratricide—em-
ploying
ploying electronic
electronic identification
identification devices devices (identification,
(identification,
friend
friend or or foe-IFF),
foe—IFF), recognition
recognition signals,
signals, and and restricted
restricted
areas
areas;; but
but the
the problem
problem continued
continued.. Between
Between 22 22 June
June andand 25 25
July,
July, Allied
Allied gunners
gunners engaged
engaged 25 25 friendly
friendly aircraft
aircraft and and de-de-
stroyed
stroyed eight
eight.. Five
Five ofof these
these aircraft,
aircraft, two two Spitfires
Spitfires on on 2222
June
June andand three
three P-51
P-51ss on
on 2626 June
June were
were destroyed
destroyed after after they
they
attacked
attacked friendly
friendly forces.
forces. (In(In fact,
fact, there
there were were atat least
least 13
13 in-
in-
cidents
cidents of of Allied
Allied aircraft
aircraft attacking
attacking Allied
Allied forces
forces between
between 20 20
June
June andand 17 17 July
July 1944,
1944, killing
killing at at least
least twotwo soldiers
soldiers and and
wounding
wounding three three others.)
others.) Fragmentary
Fragmentary records records indicate
indicate thatthat
49
49
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
Anglo-American flak
Anglo-American crews downed
flak crews downed six six Allied
Allied aircraft
aircraft in in
August,
August, two two in in October,
October, and and at at least
least three
three in in November.
November.
Even
Even thethe brass
brass could
could notnot avoid
avoid thethe problem
problem.. On On 11 January
January
1945
1945 US AAA units
US AAA units fired
fired on
on an aircraft carrying
an aircraft carrying AAFAAF Gen- Gen-
erals
erals Spaatz
Spaatz and and Doolittle.
Doolittle. Spaatz
Spaatz informed
informed General
General Patton
Patton
of his
of his gunners'
gunners' poor
poor aircraft
aircraft recognition
recognition and and shooting
shooting skills.
skills.
The
The 8th
8th Fighter
Fighter Command
Command lost lost seven
seven fighters
fighters to to Allied
Alhed flak.
flak.
US gunners
US gunners admitted
admitted engaging
engaging 15 15 friendly
friendly aircraft
aircraft and
and de-de-
stroying
stroying 12, 12, all
all of
of which
which thethe gunners asserted were
gunners asserted were either
either
committing
committing aa hostilehostile actact or
or flying
flying in in aa restricted
restricted zonezone.. USUS
gunners
gunners complained
complained that that lack
lack of of identification
identification restricted
restricted
them
them from from engaging
engaging one-third
one-third of of 6,000
6,000 targets. *73
targets.*^^
Following
Following the the 2626 June
June incident
incident with with the the three
three US US P-51
P-51s,s,
the 9th Tactical Air Command restricted free-lance strafing
the 9th Tactical Air Command restricted free-lance strafing
within
within 10 10 miles
miles ofthe
of the bomb
bomb line;
line; only
only prearranged
prearranged missions
missions
were
were to to be
be flown
flown in in that
that area.
area. TheThe armies
armies established
established re- re-
stricted
stricted areas
areas that
that byby 77 September
September 1944 1944 constituted
constituted an an al-
al-
most continuous
most continuous belt belt from
from Antwerp,
Antwerp, Belgium,Belgium, to to Nancy,
Nancy,
France.
France. British
British Bomber
Bomber Command
Command protested protested that this re-
that this re-
striction
striction inhibited
inhibited their
their operations,
operations, and and so so the
the Allies
Allies limited
limited
the
the zones
zones without
without satisfying
satisfying either
either party.
party. "^"^
The
The problem
problem of of fratricide
fratricide was,
was, of of course,
course, not not limited
limited to to
the
the Allies
Allies or or to
to the
the European
European theater.
theater. All All warring
warring powers
powers
had
had the
the problem-for
problem—for example, example, the the German
German fighterfighter attack
attack
on Allied
on Allied airfields
airfields onon 11 January
January 19451945.. In In the
the Pacific
Pacific between
between
December
December 1943 1943 andand June
June 1944,
1944, the the US US NavyNavy downed
downed at at
least six
least six of
of its
its own
own aircraft
aircraft and
and twotwo or or three
three AAFAAF B-25 S.75
B-25s.^5
The
The worst
worst case
case was
was probably
probably at at the
the Cape
Cape Gloucester,
Gloucester, Bis- Bis-
marck Archipelago
marck Archipelago assaultassault that
that began
began on on 26
26 December
December
1943
1943.. American
American naval naval antiaircraft
antiaircraft fire fire downed
downed two two B-25s
B-25s
and one
and one P-47
P-47 andand damaged
damaged two two other
other B-25s.
B-25s. US US ground
ground
gunners
gunners also also destroyed
destroyed an an American
American night night fighter.
fighter. Appar-
Appar-
ently,
ently, naval
naval gunners
gunners firedfired on
on "anything
"anything that that was
was notnot aa P-P-
*Just as
*Just as the
the subject
subject ofof fratricide
fratricide is
is neglected,
neglected, so
so is
is the
the issue
issue of
of enemy
enemy aircraft
aircraft not
not
engaged. Only one example should be required to make the point; American radar
engaged. Only one example should be required to make the point; American radar
detected aircraft
detected aircraft flying
flying toward
toward Pearl Harbor prior
Pearl Harbor prior to
to the
the attack
attack but
but could
could not
not identify
identify
them.
them.
5500
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
38,"
38," the
the readily
readily identifiable
identifiable twin-boom
twin-boom American
American fighter.
fighter.
The
The Marines
Marines credit
credit friendly
fi-iendly antiaircraft
antiaircraft fire
fire with
with downing
downing
three
three of
of their
their aircraft
aircraft during
during the
the war.
war.^^
16
The
The US
US Navy
Navy in
in the
the Pacific
Pacific
The
The USUS Navy
Navy mademade strenuous efforts to
strenuous efforts to defend
defend its its ships
ships
against
against enemy
enemy aircraft.
aircraft. During
During WorldWorld WarWar 11, it spent
II, it spent over
over
$4
$4 billion
billion onon this
this problem,
problem, almost
almost half half of
of this
this amount
amount on on
ammunition
ammunition.. As As aa result,
result, the
the Navy
Navy estimated
estimated that
that although
although
the
the USUS naval
naval effort
effort really
really did
did not begin until
not begin until the
the spring
spring ofof
1940,
1940, its
its antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns
guns increased
increased their
their effectiveness
effectiveness 100 100
times
times from
from the
the start
start to
to the
the finish
finish of of the war. Mid-
the war. Mid- and and short-
short-
range,
range, light
light antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns
guns presented
presented the the major
major problem
problem
because
because existing
existing armament
armament (50-caliber
(.50-caliber machine
machine guns guns andand
11.1-inch
.1-inch guns)
guns) proved
proved inadequate
inadequate.. The The USUS Navy
Navy turned
turned to to
foreign
foreign guns,
guns, the
the 20-mm
20-mm SwissSwiss Oerlikon
Oerlikon and and the the 40-mm
40-mm
Swedish
Swedish Bofors.
Bofors.
The
The Navy
Navy estimated
estimated that that the
the 20-mm
20-mm cannon
cannon was was eight
eight
to
to 1010 times
times asas effective
effective asas aa .50-caliber
.50-caliber machine
machine gun gun and
and
in
in 1935
1935 bought
bought somesome of of the
the Swiss
Swiss Oerlikons,
Oerlikons, eveneven though
though
Army
Army and and Navy
Navy aircraft
aircraft used
used thethe French
French Hispano
Hispano Suiza Suiza 20-
20-
mm
mm gunsguns.. By
By war's
war's end,
end, the
the Navy
Navy hadhad 12,561
12,561 of of the
the 20
20
mms
mms shipboard
shipboard and and had
had spent
spent $787$787 million
million for
for oneone billion
billion
rounds
rounds of of 20-mm ammunition. The
20-mm ammunition. The investment
investment paid paid off.
off.
Between Pearl
Between Pearl Harbor
Harbor and and September
September 1944, 1944, thethe 20-mm
20-mm
guns
guns downed
downed 32 32 percent
percent of of all
all Japanese
Japanese aircraft
aircraft claimed
claimed by by
Navy
Navy gunsguns and
and 2525 percent
percent after
after that
that date
date.. Although
Although the the 20-
20-
mm
mm gun gun diddid have
have certain
certain advantages
advantages over over heavier
heavier guns,
guns, the
the
40
40 mmmm began
began to to replace
replace itit toward
toward the the end
end ofof the
the war."
war."
The
The Bofors
Bofors 40-mm
40-mm gun gun was
was thethe most
most widely
widely usedused anti-
anti-
aircraft
aircraft piece
piece ofof World
World WarWar II.II. ByBy 1939
1939 the
the Swedes
Swedes deliv-deliv-
ered
ered the
the Bofors
Bofors toto 1818 countries
countries and and concluded
concluded production
production
licenses
licenses withwith 1010 other
other countries
countries.. Thus,
Thus, bothboth sides
sides used,
used,
manufactured,
manufactured, and and captured
captured Bofors
Bofors during
during the
the war.
war.
The Navy's
The Navy's interest
interest inin the
the Bofors
Bofors 40-mm
40-mm gun gun began
began in in
51
51
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
the
the fall of 1939
fall of and in
1939;; and in late
late August
August 1940, 1940, guns
guns and and equip-
equip-
ment arrived in
ment arrived in the
the United
United States.
States. Tested
Tested in in September,
September,
the
the Bofors
Bofors guns guns proved
proved superior
superior to to both
both thethe USUS 37 37 mm mm and and
the
the British
British two pound (pom
two pound (pom pom).pom). The The US US government
government
signed
signed aa contract
contract in in June
June 19411941 and and installed
installed the the first
first 40-
40-
mm
mm Bofors
Bofors gun gun aboard
aboard ship ship early
early the
the next
next year.
year. ButBut there
there
were
were problems
problems in in manufacturing
manufacturing the the Bofors
Bofors.. First,
First, the the orig-
orig-
inal metric drawings
inal metric drawings had had to to be
be converted
converted to to English
English mea- mea-
surements
surements;; then then itit was
was found
found thatthat two
two manufacturers
manufacturers used used
different
different systems-York
systems—York decimals decimals and and Chrysler
Chrysler fractions
fractions..
As
As aa result,
result, parts
parts forfor the
the American-made
American-made guns guns werewere not not
completely interchangeable
completely interchangeable.. At At first
first 200
200 parts
parts differed,
differed, but but
this number
this number was was eventually
eventually reduced
reduced to to 1010.. By
By June
June 19451945
the US Navy had 5,140 40-mm guns in dual and quad
the US Navy had 5,140 40-mm guns in dual and quad
mounts
mounts.. TheseThese guns guns claimed
claimed about about 18 18 percent
percent of of the
the Jap-
Jap-
anese aircraft
anese destroyed through
aircraft destroyed through June June 1944
1944 and and about
about 50 50
percent
percent between
between October
October 1944 1944 and and March
March 1945 1945.^^ .'8
The
The United
United States
States experimented
experimented with with dual-purpose
dual-purpose (an- (an-
tiship
tiship andand antiaircraft)
antiaircraft) guns guns in in the
the 1920s,
1920s, produced
produced the the 5- 5-
inch/38-caliber
inch/38-caliber gun gun in the early
in the early 1930s,
1930s, andand installed
installed itit on on
aa destroyer
destroyer in in 1934.
1934. The The gungun hadhad aa horizontal
horizontal range range of of 1010
miles,
miles, aa vertical
vertical range
range of of 66 miles,
miles, and and could
could fire fire 1212 toto 1515
rounds
rounds per per minute.
minute. The The Navy
Navy increased
increased the the number
number oftheseof these
guns
guns fromfrom 611 611 in in July
July 1940
1940 to 2,868 in
to 2,868 June 1945
in June 1945..
A
A major
major advance
advance in in the
the increased
increased effectiveness
effectiveness of of thethe
heavy
heavy caliber
caliber gun gun came
came with with the
the introduction
introduction of of proximity
proximity
fuzes.
fuzes. The The Navy
Navy firstfirst fired the proximity
fired the proximity fuze fuze in in January
January
1942,
1942, and and in in its
its first
first simulated
simulated combat combat test test that
that August
August
downed
downed three three drones
drones with with four
four shells.
shells. In In the
the proximity
proximity
fuze's
fuze's first
first combat
combat engagement
engagement on on 55 January
January 1943,1943, the the USS
USS
Helena
Helena downeddowned aa Japanese
Japanese bomberbomber with with itsits second
second salvo.
salvo.
The
The Navy
Navy estimated
estimated that that the
the proximity
proximity fuzes fuzes increased
increased anan-
tiaircraft
tiaircraft artillery
artillery effectiveness
effectiveness three three toto four
four times.
times. The The fuzefuze
helped
helped account
account for for the
the high percentage of
high percentage of Japanese
Japanese aircraft
aircraft
claimed
claimed by by the
the 5-inch/38-caliber
5-inch/38-caliber guns, guns, 31 percent through
31 percent through
the first
the first half
half of of 1944.
1944.^9 79
5522
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
Japanese Antiaircraft Artillery
Artillery
Japanese antiaircraft artillery
Japanese antiaircraft artillery lagged
lagged behind
behind that that ofof the
the
other
other major
major powers
powers from from thethe beginning
beginning to to the
the endend ofof the
the
war. The
war. The Japanese
Japanese lacked lacked the the technological
technological and and manufac-
manufac-
turing
turing base
base toto deal
deal with their air
with their air defense
defense problems
problems and and to to
make
make good
good their
their deficiencies.
deficiencies. In In addition
addition the the Japanese
Japanese re- re-
ceived
ceived only
only limited
limited assistance
assistance from from thethe Germans
Germans and and also
also
to fully
fully mobilize
mobilize their their civilian
civilian scientists s°
scientists.. ^°
failed to
failed
The
The most
most widely
widely used used Japanese
Japanese heavy heavy flak
flak piece
piece was the
was the
75-mm
75-mm typetype 88 88 that
that entered
entered service
service in in 1928.
1928. It It fired
fired aa 14.5-
14.5-
pound shell
pound shell at
at aa muzzle
muzzle velocity
2,360 fps
fps toto 23,550
23,550 feet
feet
but
but was inaccurate above
was inaccurate above 16,000
16,000 feet feet.. The
The Japanese
Japanese stuck stuck
with
with this
this gun throughout the
gun throughout the war,war, while
while thethe Americans,
Americans,
British,
British, and
and Germans
Germans went went to to larger
larger and better performing
and better performing
weapons.
weapons. Not that the
Not that the Japanese
Japanese did did not
not try
try to upgrade their
to upgrade their
weapons-they
weapons—they produced produced an an improved
improved 75-mm75-mm gun gun (75-mm
(75-mm
type
type 4)4) in
in 1944
1944 but but built only 65
built only 65 and
and got
got few
few intointo action
action..
Likewise,
Likewise, the the Japanese
Japanese put put aa 120-mm
120-mm gun into production
gun into production
in
in 1943
1943 butbut built
built onlyonly 154.154. OnlyOnly twotwo 150-mm
150-mm guns guns sawsaw
service
service.. The
The Japanese
Japanese also also used
used aa fewfew 88-mm
88-mm naval naval guns.
guns.
Associated
Associated equipment,
equipment, especially especially radar radar andand firefire control
control
equipment,
equipment, also also proved inadequate in
proved inadequate in numbers
numbers and and out-
out-
dated
dated inin performance."
performance.^'
In
In 1941
1941 thethe Japanese
Japanese deployed
deployed 300 300 antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns guns in in
defense
defense of of the
the home
home islands
islands.. By By March
March 19451945 they
they deployed
deployed
1,250,
1,250, and
and byby thethe endend of of the
the warwar over 2,000. The
over 2,000. The bulk
bulk of of
their
their heavy
heavy gunsguns (509 (509 to to 551)
551) guarded
guarded Tokyo-in
Tokyo—in August August
1945,
1945, 150 150 naval
naval 88-mm,88-mm, 72 72 120-mm,
120-mm, and and two two 150-mm
150-mm
guns. Thus
guns. Thus compared
compared with with thethe Germans,
Germans, the the Japanese
Japanese de- de-
ployed fewer
ployed fewer and less-capable guns.
and less-capable guns.
Little wonder
Little wonder that that Japanese
Japanese flak flak proved
proved less
less effective
effective than
than
that
that of the other
of the other combatants.
combatants. On On the
the basis
basis of
of overall
overall losses
losses
and
and losses
losses per
per sortie,
sortie, the the air
air war
war against Germany was
against Germany was much
much
more
more costly
costly to to the
the AAFAAF (18,418 aircraft and
(18,418 aircraft and 11.26 .26 percent
percent
of
of sorties)
sorties) than
than the the airair war
war against
against Japan (4,530 aircraft
Japan (4,530 aircraft
and
and .77
.77 percent
percent of of sorties)
sorties).^^. 12 In
In the
the entire
entire war,
war, the the AAF
AAF
53
53
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
credited
credited Japanese
Japanese flak flak with
with destroying
destroying 1,524 1,524 AAF
AAF aircraft,
aircraft,
Japanese
Japanese fighters
fighters withwith 1,037
1,037 (fig.
(fig. 36).*
36).*
In
In the strategic bombing
the strategic bombing campaigncampaign against against Japan,
Japan, the the
AAF
AAF used
used their
their best bomber, the
best bomber, the Boeing
Boeing B-29,B-29, which
which was was
faster,
faster, higher
higher flying,
flying, andand heavier
heavier armedarmed than either the
than either the B- B-
17
17 oror B-24
B-24 usedused against
against Germany.
Germany." 13 The
The AAFAAF lostlost 414
414 B- B-
29s
29s inin combat
combat againstagainst Japan.
Japan. They They calculated
calculated that that 7474 fell
fell
to enemy
to enemy aircraft,
aircraft, 54 54 toto flak, and 19
flak, and 19 toto both
both flak
flak and
and fight-
fight-
ers.
ers. The
The ineffectiveness
ineffectiveness of of Japanese
Japanese flak flak isis highlighted
highlighted by by
the American decision to change from their prewar bomb-
the American decision to change from their prewar bomb-
ing doctrine and
ing doctrine and European
European strategic
strategic bombing
bombing practice
practice of of
high-altitude
high-altitude day day attacks
attacks to to night
night attacks
attacks below
below 10,000
10,000 feet.
feet.
This
This decision
decision resulted
resulted fromfrom poorpoor bombing
bombing results,
results, notnot be-be-
cause
cause of of aircraft
aircraft losses,
losses, although
although 35 35 bombers
bombers had had been
been lost
lost
on
on 814814 sorties
sorties (4.3(4.3 percent)
percent) on on daylight
daylight high-altitude
high-altitude atat-
tacks.
tacks. Consequently,
Consequently, the the B-29s
B-29s attacked
attacked TokyoTokyo at at low
low al- al-
titudes
titudes at at night
night and and suffered
suffered slightly
slightly fewer
fewer casualties
casualties (39 (39
aircraft
aircraft on on 1,199
1,199 sorties,
sorties, 33.2 .2 percent);
percent); at at the same time
the same time
bombing
bombing effectiveness
effectiveness greatly
greatly increased
increased.. The The American
American airair-
men
men wentwent on on to to burn
burn outout Japanese
Japanese cities cities and
and towns
towns withwith
conventional
conventional weapons weapons.. The The reduced
reduced and and bearable
bearable attrition
attrition
resulted
resulted from
from Japanese
Japanese flak flak deficiencies
deficiencies and employment
and employment
of
of such
such American
American measuresmeasures as as saturating
saturating the the searchlight
searchlight
defenses,
defenses, ECM, ECM, desynchronizing
desynchronizing the the propellers
propellers of of the
the
bombers
bombers to to inhibit
inhibit Japanese
Japanese sound-controlled
sound-controlled searchlights,
searchlights,
and use
and of high-gloss
use of high-gloss black black paint.
paint. TheThe rate rate of
of B-29
B-29 losses
losses
to
to flak
flak and
and flak
flak plus
plus fighters
fighters decreased
decreased steadily
steadily after
after peaking
peaking
in
in January
January 1945 1945 at at 11.06
.06 percent
percent of of sorties (fig. 37).
sorties (fig. 37). InIn num-
num-
bers
bers ofof aircraft
aircraft lost,lost, April
April 19451945 waswas the the worst
worst month
month with with
22
22 B-29s
B-29s lost.
lost. Tokyo
Tokyo was the most
was the most bombed
bombed (4,300 (4,300 of of 26,000
26,000
sorties)
sorties) and
and the the best
best defended
defended of of the
the Japanese
Japanese targets
targets.. To-
To-
kyo's
kyo's defenses
defenses accounted
accounted for for 25
25 ofof the
the 55 55 flak
flak losses
losses ofof the
the
Twentieth
Twentieth Air Air Force
Force and and for
for 1414 ofof its
its 28
28 losses
losses toto flak
flak plus
plus
fighters
fighters.. American
American losses losses were
were muchmuch lighter
lighter atat the
the other
other
*Japanese
*Japanese antiaircraft
artillery did
did better
better proportionally
proportionally against
against the
the US
US Navy
Navy than
than
against
against the US Marine
the US Marine Corps,
Corps, claiming
claiming 1,545 of 2,166
1,545 of 2,166 Navy
Navy aircraft lost in
aircraft lost in combat
combat as
as
compared
compared with
with 437
437 of
of 723
723 Marine
Marine aircraft
aircraft..
554
4
EARLY YEARS TO 1945
liâLv^-ji-.Z"'*' -tf'i*..>*v'^-'
;?f/u-;-^*-:<>*,T-
Figure 36. Douglas A-20s attack Japanese positions at Karos,

Dutch New Guinea. Note sequence of attaclc.
55
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Figure
Figure 36.
36. Douglas A-20s attack
Douglas A-20s attack Japanese
Japanese positions
positions at
at Karos,
Karos, Dutch
Dutch
New Guinea . Note sequence of attack (continued).
New Guinea. Note sequence of attack (continued).
Figure 37.. Although

Figure 37 Although notnot as
as effective
effective as
as German
German flak,
flak, Japanese
Japanese flak
flak
did
did inflict
inflict losses
losses on
on US
US aircraft
aircraft.. Boeing
Boeing B-29
B-29 hit
hit on
on bomb-
bomb-
ing
ing run
run over
over Japan,
Japan, 2626 June
June 1945
1945..
56
56
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
targets that
targets that were
were notnot as
as well
well defended
defended.. For
For example,
example, in in
flying
flying 4,776
4,776 night sorties at
night sorties at low
low and
and medium
medium altitudes
altitudes
against major
against major Japanese
Japanese cities,
cities, the
the Twentieth
Twentieth Air
Air Force
Force lost
lost
83
83 bombers
bombers (1 (1.8.8 percent)
percent) as
as compared
compared with
with seven
seven lost
lost on
on
7,550
7,550 sorties
sorties (.1
(.1 percent)
percent) under
under similar
similar conditions
conditions against
against
secondary
secondary cities.14
cities.^"^
The
The Lessons
Lessons of
of World
World War
War 11
II
Like
Like all
all major wars. World
major wars, World War War II II provided
provided manymany lessons
lessons..
As the first
As the true air
first true air war,
war, this
this conflict
conflict was
was especially
especially valuable
valuable
for
for the
the airmen.
airmen. But But thethe airmen
airmen of of all countries tended
all countries tended to to
overlook
overlook or or disregard
disregard flak.flak. Although
Although the the war
war indicated
indicated the the
value
value andand lethality
lethality of of flak, the airmen
flak, the airmen looked
looked instead
instead to to
lessons
lessons that
that better
better fitfit their
their designs.
designs. TheThe airmen's
airmen's attitude
attitude
changed
changed little
little from
from thethe interwar
interwar years
years when
when they
they considered
considered
flak
flak to
to be
be ofof little
little use
use andand notnot worth
worth the the effort.
effort. The
The result
result
of
of this
this disdain
disdain would
would be be evident
evident in in the wars that
the wars that would
would
follow.
follow.
In
In retrospect,
retrospect, at least six
at least six flak
flak lessons
lessons emerge
emerge from
from World
World
War II.
War II. First,
First, flak
flak proved
proved to to be
be lethal
lethal and
and effective-down-
effective—down-
ing
ing more
more US US aircraft than any
aircraft than other enemy
any other enemy weapon
weapon.. Clearly,
Clearly,
it
it was
was the big killer
the big killer from
from early
early 1944
1944 on on.. Concentrations
Concentrations of of
guns
guns demonstrated
demonstrated the the ability
ability toto seriously
seriously inhibit
inhibit oror nullify
nullify
aerial
aerial operations
operations such such as the case
as the case of
of the
the VV-11 campaign,
campaign, the the
fall-winter
fall-winter 19441944 oiloil campaign,
campaign, and and operations
operations against
against thethe
Remagen
Remagen Bridge.
Bridge.
Second, flak
Second, flak made
made low-level
low-level operations
operations very costly.. Flak
very costly Flak
downed
downed most most of of the
the American
American fighters lost during
fighters lost during thethe war,
war,
the
the bulk
bulk ofof these
these in in strafing attacks. ^^ A
strafing attacks." A number
number of of missions
missions
emphasized
emphasized the the dangers
dangers of of low-level
low-level operations;
operations; the the most
most
notable
notable werewere the the Ploesti
Ploesti mission
mission of of August
August 1943,1943, flak
flak
suppression
suppression at at Arnhem,
Arnhem, the the Netherlands,
Netherlands, in in September
September
1944,
1944, and
and the
the German
German attack attack on on Allied
Allied airfields
airfields in
in January
January
1945
1945..
A
A third
third lesson
lesson thatthat cancan bebe gleaned
gleaned fromfrom thethe war
war isis that
that
57
57
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
the
the airmen
airmen came came up up with
with countermeasures
countermeasures to to antiaircraft
antiaircraft
artillery
artillery that
that would
would be be standard
standard for for the
the future
future.. The
The airmen
airmen
attempted
attempted to to avoid
avoid areasareas of of flak
flak concentrations
concentrations by by flying
flying
irregular
irregular courses
courses in in the
the face
face ofof ground
ground fire,
fire, by
by flying
flying only
only
one
one pass
pass over
over thethe target,
target, and and by by using
using bothboth the
the sunsun andand
terrain
terrain forfor maximum
maximum protection.
protection. TheyThey alsoalso employed
employed chaff chaff
and
and jammers
jammers to to degrade
degrade radarradar equipment,
equipment, especially
especially during
during
the
the night
night or or in poor weather
in poor weather.. Finally,
Finally, thethe airmen
airmen attacked
attacked
the
the guns
guns directly.
directly. ButBut in in most
most aircraft-versus-gun
aircraft-versus-gun duels, duels, thethe
gunners
gunners had had thethe advantage
advantage.. CombatCombat experience
experience indicated
indicated
that
that pitting
pitting aa highly
highly trained
trained pilot
pilot and
and an an expensive
expensive aircraft
aircraft
against aa less-trained
against less-trained crew crew andand less-valuable
less-valuable gun gun made
made little
little
sense.
sense.
Fourth, rapidly evolving
Fourth, rapidly evolving technology
technology tiltedtilted the
the offensive-
offensive-
defensive
defensive balance
balance in in favor
favor of of the
the defense.
defense. Radar
Radar was was thethe
first
first and
and most
most important
important piece piece ofof equipment.
equipment. It It overturned
overturned
the carefully
the carefully constructed
constructed theoriestheories of of Douhet
Douhet and and others
others
(such as
(such as instructors
instructors and and students
students at at the
the Air
Air Corps
Corps Tactical
Tactical
School),
School), who who believed
believed that that the
the bomber
bomber would would always
always get get
through
through.. Electronic countermeasures nullified
Electronic countermeasures nullified somewhat
somewhat
the
the benefit
benefit of of radar
radar to to the
the defense,
defense, but but radar
radar still
still gave
gave thethe
defenders
defenders early early warning
warning and and more
more accurate aiming infor-
accurate aiming infor-
mation
mation than than waswas previously
previously available.
available. The The proximity
proximity fuze fuze
gave another
gave another big big boost
boost to to the
the defenders,
defenders, increasing
increasing the the ef-ef-
fectiveness
fectiveness of of the
the guns
guns by by aa multiple
multiple of of five
five or
or more
more.. OneOne
technological
technological advancement
advancement that that was
was in in the
the development
development
stages but
stages but did
did not
not see
see service
service during
during thethe war
war was
was flak
flak rockets
rockets
or,
or, as they would
as they would laterlater bebe known,
known, surface-to-air
surface-to-air missiles
missiles
(SAMs). These
(SAMS). devices were
These devices were capable
capable of of reaching
reaching altitudes
altitudes
well above that
well above that ofof the
the highest-flying
highest-flying World World War War II II bombers
bombers
and fitted with
and fitted with proximity
proximity fuzes fuzes would
would havehave inflicted
inflicted heavy
heavy
casualties
casualties on on the
the border
border formations.
formations.
Fifth,
Fifth, flak
flak proved
proved very very cost-effective,
cost-effective, downing
downing hostile
hostile air-air-
craft
craft at at aa relatively
relatively low low cost.
cost. But
But flak
flak effectiveness
effectiveness cannot
cannot
be
be measured
measured by by kills
kills alone
alone.. Ground
Ground fire fire complicated
complicated the the
airman's
airman's task, task, forcing
forcing him him to to carry
carry additional
additional equipment
equipment
and
and adopt
adopt additional
additional procedures,
procedures, all all ofof which
which detracted
detracted
58
58
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
from
from his
his primary job. Flak
primary job. Flak defenses
defenses also
also decreased
decreased bombing
bombing
accuracy.
accuracy.
A
A final
final lesson
lesson of
of the
the war
war concerned
concerned thethe difficulty
difficulty of
of cor-
cor-
rectly identifying
rectly identifying aircraft
aircraft.. In
In short,
short, the
the gunners
gunners were
were never
never
able
able to
to adequately
adequately sort
sort out the friendlies
out the friendlies from
from the foes.. Not
the foes Not
only
only did
did friendly
friendly fire
fire down
down friendly
friendly aircraft-most
aircraft—most dra- dra-
matically
matically demonstrated
demonstrated by by Allied
Allied troop
troop carriers
carriers over
over Sicily
Sicily
in
in July
July 1943
1943 and
and German
German fighters
fighters on
on 11 January
January 1945-but
1945—but
frequently friendly fire
frequently friendly fire did
did not
not engage
engage hostile
hostile aircraft.
aircraft. De-
De-
spite electronic equipment,
spite electronic equipment, codes,
codes, procedures,
procedures, briefings,
briefings,
and restricted zones,
and restricted zones, the
the problem
problem persisted
persisted and
and accidents
accidents
happened
happened..
NOTES
NOTES
In
In this
this note
note system,
system, information
information within
within the
the brackets
brackets indicates
indicates
the location
the location of
of the
the material
material and,
and, in
in the
the case
case of
of Air
Air Defense
Defense School
School
Library, Air University Library, US Air Force Historical Research
Library, Air University Library, US Air Force Historical Research
Center,
Center, Directorate
Directorate of Combat Development,
of Combat Development, and and Royal
Royal Artillery
Artillery
Institute, their call numbers. The following abbreviations are used
Institute, their call numbers. The following abbreviations are used::
Air
Air University
University Library,
Library, Maxwell
Maxwell AFB,
AFB, Alabama
Alabama [AUL]
[AUL];; Air
Air Force
Force
Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama (AFHRC]; Na-
Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama [AFHRC]; Na-
val
val Historical
Historical Center,
Center, Washington,
Washington, D.C D.C.. [NHC]
[NHC];; Royal
Royal Artillery
Artillery
Institute, Woolwick, United
Institute, Woolwick, United Kingdom
Kingdom [W];
[W]; US
US Army
Army Air
Air Defense
Defense
School, Fort Bliss,
School, Fort Bhss, Texas
Texas [ADS]
[ADS];; US
US Army
Army Command
General
Staff
Staff College,
College, Fort
Fort Leavenworth,
Leavenworth, Kansas
Kansas [L];
[L]; US
US Army,
Army, Directorate
Directorate
of Combat
of Combat Developments,
Developments, Fort Fort Bliss,
Bliss, Texas
Texas [DCD]
[DCD]..
R T.
11.. P. T. Cullen,
Cullen, "Air
"Air Defense
Defense ofof London,
London, Paris,
Paris, andand Western
Western Ger-
Ger-
many"
many" (Paper,
(Paper, Air
Air Corps
Corps Tactical
Tactical School,
School, n.d.),
n.d.), 7,7, 9,
9, 28,
28, 99,
99, table
table 55
[AFHRC-167.404-11] ;
[AFHRC-167.404-11]; "Antiaircraft
"Antiaircraft Defences
Defences of
of Great
Great Britain:
Britain: 1914
1914
to
to 1946," appendix A
1946," appendix [W-552];; US
A [W-552] US Army
Army Air
Air Defense School, "Air
Defense School, "Air
Defense: An Historical Analysis" (U),
Defense: An Historical Analysis" (U), 1965,
1965, vol.
vol. 1 :8
1:8 [AUL-M39991-
[AUL-M39991-
59
59
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
4]
4] (SECRET-Information
(SECRET—Information extracted extracted is is unclassified)
unclassified);; "Antiaircraft
"Antiaircraft
Gun Trends
Gun Trends and and Scientific
Scientific and and Technical
Technical Projection
Projection:: Eurasian
Eurasian Com-Com-
munist Countries," July 1981,
munist Countries," July 1981, 1-1
1-1..
2.
2. US Army Air
US Army Air Defense School, "Air
Defense School, Defense," 21,
"Air Defense," 21, 29,
29, 30;
30; Cullen,
Cullen,
"Air Defense of London," 94; Extracts
"Air Defense of London," 94; Extracts from
from Conference
Conference on
on Anti-
Anti-
Aircraft
Aircraft Defense,
Defense, Military
Military Intelligence Division, France,
Intelligence Division, France, no. no. 8312,
8312, 2626
December 1923 [AFHRC-145 .91-534] ; A. F. Englehart, "Antiaircraft
December 1923 [AFHRC-145.91-534]; A. F. Englehart, "Antiaircraft
Defenses : Their
Defenses: Their Development
Development During During the the World
World War" War" (Paper,
(Paper, AirAir
Corps Tactical School, circa 1934), 6, 9 [AFHRC-248 .101-20] . Amer-
Corps Tactical School, circa 1934), 6, 9 [AFHRC-248.101-20]. Amer-
ican
ican machine
machine guns guns got another 41
got another 41 German
German aircraft.
aircraft. Charles
Charles E. E. Kirk-
Kirk-
patrick,
patrick, Archie Archie in in the
the A.E.F.
A.E.F.:: The The Creation
Creation of of the
the Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Service
Service
of
of thethe United
United States
States Army,
Army, 1917-1918
1917-1918 (Fort (Fort Bliss,
Bliss, Tex.:
Tex.: Air
Air Defense
Defense
Artillery
Artillery Museum,Museum, 1984), 1984), 85-86
85-86..
33.. Maj
Maj GenGen B. B. P.
P. Hughes
Hughes and and Brigadier
Brigadier N N.. W.
W. Routledge,
Routledge, Woolwick,
Woolwick,
United
United Kingdom,Kingdom, interview
interview with with author,
author, October
October 1982; 1982; Air
Air Corps
Corps
Tactical School, "Antiaircraft Artillery," text, 1 November 1932
Tactical School, "Antiaircraft Artillery," text, 1 November 1932
[AFHRC-168
[AFHRC-168.69-9]; .69-9] ; Louis
Louis P. P. Smithey
Smithey and and Charles
Charles K. K. Atkinson,
Atkinson, "De- "De-
velopment of Antiaircraft Artillery," The Coast Artillery Journal, Jan-
velopment of Antiaircraft Artillery," The Coast Artillery Journal, Jan-
uary-February
uary-February 1946, 1946, 70-71
70-71;; William
William JJ.. Wuest,Wuest, "The"The Development
Development of of
Heavy Antiaircraft Artillery,"
Heavy Antiaircraft Artillery," Antiaircraft Journal, May-June
Antiaircraft Journal, May-June 1954, 1954,
23
23..
4.
4. Theodore
Theodore Ropp, Ropp, War War in in the
the Modern
Modern World (Durha.m, N
World (Durham, .C.: Duke
N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1959), 289.
University Press, 1959), 289.
55.. "Antiaircraft
Defences of of Great
Great Britain"
Britain";; Frederick
Frederick A. A. Pile,
Pile, Ack-
Ack-
Ack
Ack (London
(London: : Harrap, 1949), 73. One American wrote in his 1929 Air
Harrap, 1949), 73. One American wrote in his 1929 Air
Corps
Corps TacticalTactical School
School thesis that flak
thesis that flak waswas notnot worth
worth thethe effort,
effort, which
which
was
was the view of
the view of bomber
bomber proponents
proponents on on both
both sides
sides of of the
the Atlantic.
Atlantic.
Kenneth
Kenneth Walker, Walker, "Is "Is the
the Defense
Defense of of New
New York York CityCity from
from AirAir Attack
Attack
Possible?"
Possible?" research research report,
report. Air Air Corps
Corps Tactical
Tactical School,
School, MayMay 1929,
1929, 3030
[AFHRC-248 .211-28A] .
[AFHRC-248.211-28A].
66.. Pile,
Pile, Ack-Ack,
Ack-Ack, 100, 100, 157,
157, 181,
181, 183;
183; "Antiaircraft
Defences of of Great
Great
Britain" ; Maj Gen B. P. Hughes interview ; US Army Air Defense
Britain"; Maj Gen B. P. Hughes interview; US Army Air Defense
School,
School, "Air "Air Defense,"
Defense," 2:122-24;
2:122-24; Frederick
Frederick Pile, Pile, "The
"The Anti-Aircraft
Anti-Aircraft
Defence of the United Kingdom from 28th July, 1939 to 15th
Defence of the United Kingdom from 28th July, 1939 to 15th April,
April,
1945,"
1945," supplement
supplement to to the
the London
London Gazette,
Gazette, 16 16 December
December 1947, 1947, 5978
5978
[AUL-940
[AUL-940.54 .54 G7861
G7861 #38149] ; "History
#38149]; "History of
of A.
A. A.
A. Command,"
Command," n.d.,
n.d., 14
14
[WC3/53]
[W-C3/53]..
7.
7. Pile,
Pile, Ack-Ack,
Ack-Ack, 115; 115; Pile,
Pile, London
London Gazette,
Gazette, 5975; 5975; "History
"History of of A.
A. A.
A.
Command," 14-15 .
Command," 14-15.
88.. Pile,
Pile, Ack-Ack,
Ack-Ack, 186-93,
186-93, 155-56,
155-56, 379 379;; Pile,
Pile, "Anti-Aircraft
"Anti-Aircraft Defence
Defence
of the United Kingdom from 28th July, 1939 to 15th April, 1945,"
of the United Kingdom from 28th July, 1939 to 15th April, 1945,"
5982;
5982; "History
"History of of A.
A. A.A. Command,"
Command," 123-24, 123-24, platesplates XLV,
XLV, LXIX;
LXIX; "An-
"An-
tiaircraft Defences of Great Britain," appendix B.
tiaircraft Defences of Great Britain," appendix B.
60
60
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
99.. US
US Army
Army Air Air Defense
Defense School,
School, "Air
"Air Defense,"
Defense," 2:127-28,
2:127-28, 131-32;
131-32;
H. E. C. Weldon, "The Artillery Defence of Malta," Antiaircraft Jour-
H. E. C. Weldon, "The Artillery Defence of Malta," Antiaircraft Jour-
nal,
nal, May-June
May-June 1954, 1954, 24,24, 26,
26, 27,
27, 29;
29; Charles
Charles Jellison,
Jellison, Besieged:
Besieged: The The
World War II Ordeal ofMalta, 1940-1942 (Hanover, N.H . : University
World War II Ordeal of Malta, 1940-1942 (Hanover, N.H.: University
Press
Press of of New
New England,
England, 1984),
1984), 166-67,
166-67, 170,170, 205,
205, 258
258;; Christopher
Christopher
Shores, Duel for the Sky (London : Blandford, 1985), 88, 90,
Shores, Duel for the Sky (London: Blandford, 1985), 88, 90, 92
92..
10.
10. Pile,
Pile, Ack-Ack,
Ack-Ack, 266, 266, 301,
301, 303,
303, 305;
305; Pile,
Pile, London
London Gazette,
Gazette, 5984 5984;;
"Survey of Antiaircraft Defenses of the United Kingdom," vol. 1,
"Survey of Antiaircraft Defenses of the United Kingdom," vol. 1, pt
pt..
33:52,
:52, 53, 53, 118
118 [WMD
[W-MD1397].1397].
11 . Pile, Ack-Ack, 323-44; "Fringe
11. Pile, Ack-Ack, 323-44; "Fringe Targets"
Targets" [W-MD 1397] .
[W-MD1397].
12
12.. For
For aa more
more detailed
detailed discussion
discussion of of the
the V-1
V-1 andand its
its operations
operations in in
World
World War War II, II, see
see Kenneth
Kenneth P. P. Werrell,
Werrell, TheThe Evolution
Evolution of of the
the Cruise
Cruise
Missile
M/i'S'z/e (Maxwell
(Maxwell AFB, AFB, Ala.
Ala.:: Air
Air University
University Press,
Press, 1985),
1985), chap
chap.. 33.. Basil
Basil
Collier,
Collier, The The Battle
Battle ofthe
of the V- Weapons, 1944-1945
V-Weapons, (London:: Hudder
1944-1945 (London Hudder and and
Stoughton, 1964), 56-59 ; Roderic Hill, "Air Operations by Air De-
Stoughton, 1964), 56-59; Roderic Hill, "Air Operations by Air De-
fence
fence of of Great
Great Britain
Britain andand Fighter
Fighter Command
Command in in Connection
Connection with with thethe
German Flying Bomb and Rocket Offensives, 1944-45," supplement
German Flying Bomb and Rocket Offensives, 1944-45," supplement
to
to the
the London
London Gazette,
Gazette, 19 19 October
October 1948,
1948, 5587-89;
5587-89; BasilBasil Collier,
Collier, The The
Defence of the United Kingdom (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Defence of the United Kingdom (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office,
Office, 1957),
1957), 361,361, 365;
365; British
British AirAir Ministry,
Ministry, "Air"Air Defence
Defence of of Great
Great
Britain,
Britain, The Flying Bomb
The Flying Bomb and and Rocket
Rocket Campaign:
Campaign: 1944 1944 to 1945," first
to 1945," first
draft
draft of of report,
report, vol.vol. 7:42-43
7:42-43 [AFHRC-512
[AFHRC-512.431 .431 A]
A]..
13.
13. Collier,
Collier, V- Weapons, 69,
V-Weapons, 69, 71-75,
71-75, 79; Hill, "Air Operations
79; Hill, "Air Operations by by Air
Air
Defense,"
Defense," 5591-92 5591-92;; Rowland
Rowland F. F. Pocock,
Pocock, German
German GuidedGuided Missiles
Missiles of of
the
the Second
Second World World War War (New
(New York:
York: Arco
Arco Publishing,
Publishing, Inc Inc.,., 1967),
1967), 48 48;;
Jozef
Jozef Garlinski,
Garlinski, Hitler's
Hitler's Last
Last Weapons
Weapons (London:
(London: Times Times Book,
Book, 1978),
1978),
168;
168; David
David Irving,
Irving, TheThe Mares
Mares NestNest (London:
(London: Kimber,
Kimber, 1969),
1969), 233,
233, 236,
236,
240; M. C. Helfers, The Employment of V- Weapons by the Germans
240; M. C. Heifers, The Employment of V-Weapons by the Germans
During
During World World War War II,II, monograph
monograph (Washington,
(Washington, D .C.: Office
D.C.: Office of of the
the
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 18-30
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 18-30
[AFHRC-Film
[AFHRC-Film 31731, 31731, Frame
Frame 323].
323].
14.
14. Hill,
Hill, London
London Gazette,
Gazette, 5594;
5594; Collier,
Collier, UK,
UK, 374;
?>1A; Mary
Mary C. C. Welborn,
Welborn,
"V-1
"V-1 and and V2 V-2 Attacks
Attacks Against
Against the the United
United Kingdom
Kingdom DuringDuring World World
War
War Il," II," technical
technical report
report ORO-T-45
ORO-T-45 (Washington,
(Washington, D .C .: Johns Hop-
D.C.: Johns Hop-
kins University
kins University Press,Press, 1616 May 1950), 9 [AFHRC-170
May 1950),9 [AFHRC-170.81-45];.81-45] ; "Minutes
"Minutes
and Related
and Related DataData Scientific
Scientific Sub-Committee
Sub-Committee of of Crossbow
Crossbow Committee,
Committee,
V-1,
V-1, vol. vol. 2,"
2," Operations
Operations Research
Research Section
Section (ADGB)
(ADGB) ReportReport 88, 88, n.d.
n.d.
[AFHRC-142
[AFHRC-142.0423-9]; .0423-9] ; Report
Report of of the
the British Air Ministry,
British Air Ministry, "Points
"Points of of
Impact and Accuracy of Flying Bombs: 22 June-28 July," 29 July
Impact and Accuracy of Flying Bombs: 22 June-28 July," 29 July
1944
1944 [AFHRC-512
[AFHRC-512.6522-9]; .6522-9] ; "The
"The Speed
Speed of of Air-Launched
Air-Launched Divers"; Divers";
Report
Report of of the
the General
General Board,
Board, US US Forces,
Forces, European
European Theater,
Theater, "Tactical
"Tactical
Employment
Employment ofAntiaircraft
of Antiaircraft Artillery
Artillery Units
Units Including
Including Defense
Defense Against
Against
Pilotless
Pilotless Aircraft
Aircraft (V-1),"
(V-1)," study
study no.
no. 38,
38, 39
39 [AFHRC-502
[AFHRC-502.101-38];.101-38]; "Min-
"Min-
6611
ARCHIE,
FLAK, AAA, SAM
utes and
utes and Related
Related Data Data Scientific
Scientific Sub-Committee
Sub-Committee of of Crossbow
Crossbow Com- Com-
mittee,
mittee, V-1,
V-1, vol
vol.. 2,"
2," S.B.
S.B. 60093,
60093, 77 August
August 19441944;; Report
Report of of British
British Air
Air
Ministry, "Air Defence of Great Britain Tactical Memoranda I .G. no.
Ministry, "Air Defence of Great Britain Tactical Memoranda I.G. no.
9675,"
9675," 24 24 November
November 1944 1944 [AFHRC-512
[AFHRC-512.6522-9];.6522-9] ; British
British Air
Air Minis-
Minis-
try, "Air Defence of Great Britain," 126; Hillery St. G. Saunders, Royal
try, "Air Defence of Great Britain," 126; Hillery St. G. Saunders, Royal
Air Force, 1939,
Air Force, 1945, vol.
1939,1945, vol. 3,
3, The
The Fight
Fight IsIs Won
lô« (London
(London:: HerHer Majesty's
Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1954), 165 .
Stationery Office, 1954), 165.
15.
15. Hill,
Hill, "Air
"Air Operations
Operations by by Air
Air Defense,"
Defense," 5592,
5592, 5594; British Air
5594; British Air
Ministry,
Ministry, "Air "Air Defence
Defence of of Great
Great Britain,"
Britain," 121,
121, 151,
151, 179;
179; Saunders,
Saunders,
Royal
Royal Air Air Force,
Force, 165165;; Collier,
Collier, UK, UK, 380.
380.
16.
16. AC/AS,
AC/AS, Intelligence,
Intelligence, "Flying
"Flying Bomb,"
Bomb," 88;; MaryMary C. C. Welborn,
Welborn,
"Over-all Effectiveness of First US Army Antiaircraft Guns Against
"Over-all Effectiveness of First US Army Antiaircraft Guns Against
Tactical
Tactical Aircraft"
Aircraft" (Working
(Working paper,
paper, Johns
Johns Hopkins
Hopkins University,
University, Wash-
Wash-
ington, D .C., 18 January 1950), 6 [AUL-M35044-2#42] ; Report of
ington, D.C., 18 January 1950), 6 [AUL-M35044-2#42]; Report of
Supreme
Supreme Headquarters
Headquarters Allied Allied Expeditionary
Expeditionary Forces
Forces (SHAEF),
(SHAEF), Air Air De-
De-
fense Division, "Notes on German Flying Bomb," 22 August 1944
fense Division, "Notes on German Flying Bomb," 22 August 1944
[AFHRC-506
[AFHRC-506.6522C]. .6522C] .
17.
17. Pile,
File, Ack-Ack,
Ack-Ack, 330-33
330-33..
18. Hill,
18. Hill, "Air
"Air Operations
Air Defense,"
Defense," 5592, 5594;; SHAEF
5592, 5594 SHAEF
notes,
notes, 26 26 July
July 1944
1944 [AFHRC-506.6522C]
[AFHRC-506.6522C];; Collier, CoUier, UK,
UK, 375375..
19. Hill,
19. Hill, "Air
"Air Operations
Air Defense," 5596-97;; British
Defense," 5596-97 British Air
Air
Ministry,
Defence of of Great
Great Britain,"
Britain," 133-35.
133-35. ForFor another
another sug-
sug-
gestion
gestion for for aa coastal
coastal belt,
belt, see
see Lt Lt Gen
Gen Carl
Carl Spaatz
Spaatz to to supreme
supreme com- com-
mander,
mander, SHAEF,SHAEF, letter,
letter, subject:
subject: The The UseUse ofof Heavy
Heavy Anti-Aircraft
Anti-Aircraft
Against Diver, 11 July 1944 [AFHRC-519 .161-7] .
Against Diver, 11 July 1944 [AFHRC-519.161-7].
20. Collier,
20. Collier, UK, 381-83; Collier,
UK, 381-83; Collier, V-Weapons,
V-Weapons, 91-9591-95..
21 . Pile, Ack-Ack, 334-35; Hill, London Gazette, 5597;
21. Pile, Ack-Ack, 334-35; Hill, London Gazette, 5597; Collier,
Collier, UK,
UK,
523
523..
22
22.. British
British AirAir Ministry,
Defence of of Great
Great Britain,"
Britain," 130;130;
AC/AS, InteUigence, "Flying
AC/AS, Intelligence, Bomb," 8;
"Flying Bomb," 8; SHAEF
SHAEF notes,
notes, 1515 August
August 1944
1944
[AFHRC-506
[AFHRC-506.6522C]. .6522C] .
23.
23. British
British Air Ministry, "Air
Air Ministry, "Air Defence
Defence of of Great
Great Britain,"
Britain," 106;
106; Ralph
Ralph
B.
B. Baldwin,
Baldwin, The The Deadly
Deadly Fuze
Fuze (San
{ân Rafael,
Rafael, Calif.
CaUf.:: Presidio
Presidio Press,
Press, 1980),
1980),
261-66.
261-66.
24.
24. Collier,
Collier, UK,
UK, 523523;; Welborn,
Welborn, "V-1 "V-1 and V-2 Attacks,"
and V-2 Attacks," table 2; Hill,
table 2; Hill,
London Gazette, 5599.
London Gazette, 5599.
25
25.. Collier,
CoUier, UK,UK, 523;
523; Welborn,
Welborn, "V-1 "V-1 andand V-2
V-2 Attacks,"
Attacks," 10.10.
26
26.. Hill, London Gazette,
Hill, London Gazette, 5599,
5599, 5601
5601;; "Air
"Air Launched
Launched `Divers'
'Divers' Sep-
Sep-
tember
tember and October 1944";
and October British Air
1944"; British Air Ministry,
Ministry, "Air
"Air Defence
Defence of of
Great
Great Britain,"
Britain," 113 113;; Collier,
Collier, UK,UK, 389,
389, 391, 522;; Saunders,
391, 522 Royal Air
Saunders, Royal Air
Force,
Force, 167-68;
167-68; Seventeenth
Seventeenth report report by by assistant
assistant chief
chief air staff (Intel-
air staff (Intel-
ligence),
ligence), "War
"War Cabinet
Cabinet Chiefs
Chiefs of of Staff
Staff Committee Crossbow," 22
Committee Crossbow," 22 July
July
1944 [AFHRC-142
1944 .0432-32] ; Collier,
[AFHRC-142.0432-32]; Collier, V-Weapons,
V-Weapons, 119, 131..
119, 131
62
62
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
27. Air
27. Air Ministry
Ministry Weekly
Weekly Intelligence
Intelligence SummarySummary 289 289 [AFHRC-
[AFHRC-
142.423-15].
142.423-15].
28. The
28. The antiaircraft
artillery cost
cost aa third
third of of what
what fighters
fighters cost
cost and
and
about
about 25 25 percent
percent more
more than
than thethe balloons
balloons.. Collier,
Collier, UK,UK, 523
523;; Hill,
Hill, Lon-
Lon-
don Gazette, 5603; British Air Ministry, "The Economic Balance of
don Gazette, 5603; British Air Ministry, "The Economic Balance of
the Fly-Bomb
the Fly-Bomb Campaign,"
Campaign," summary summary report, report, 44 November
November 1944 1944
[AFHRC-512.675-3].
[AFHRC-512.675-3].
29.
29. Memorandum
Memorandum 5-7B 5-7B by by US
US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Forces,
Forces, Armament
Armament and and
Ordnance, "An Analysis of the Accuracy of the German Flying Bomb
Ordnance, "An Analysis of the Accuracy of the German Flying Bomb
(V-1) 12
(V-1) 12 June
June toto 55 October
October 1944,"
1944," 144 144 [AFHRC-519
[AFHRC-519.6522-1];.6522-1 ]; British
British
Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, "Air"Air Defence
Defence of of Great
Great Britain,"
Britain," 123; 123; Collier,
CoUier, UK,UK, 523.
523.
30.
30. Collier,
Collier, UK,
UK, appendix
appendix L. L.
31
31.. European
European Theater
Theater report
report no. no. 38,
38, 40-41,
40-41, 45 45;; Operations
Operations Report
Report
of Headquarters Antwerp X Forward, no. 2J, 1 May 1945, annex A
of Headquarters Antwerp X Forward, no. 2J, 1 May 1945, annex A
[AFHRC-539 .667-12]; SHAEF,
[AFHRC-539.667-12]; SHAEF, "Report
"Report of of'V`V' Section
Section on on Continental
Continental
Crossbow (September 1944-March 1945)," 28; United States Strategic
Crossbow (September 1944-March 1945)," 28; United States Strategic
Bombing Survey
Bombing Survey (USSBS),
(USSBS), V- V- Weapons
Weapons (Crossbow)
(Crossbow) Campaign,
Campaign, January
January
1947, 2d ed., 15 .
1947, 2d ed., 15.
32.
32. Report
Report of of Headquarters
Headquarters Antwerp Antwerp X X Forward,
Forward, no. no. 2H,
2H, 44 March
March
1945 [AFHRC-539 .667-12] ; Antwerp X report no. 2J, annex A; Eu-
1945 [AFHRC-539.667-12]; Antwerp X report no. 2J, annex A; Eu-
ropean
ropean Theater
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38, 40-45
40-45..
33 . Peter G . Cooksley, Flying Bomb
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185
185.. For
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Backus, "The "The Defense
Defense
of
of Antwerp
Antwerp Against
Against the V-1 Missile" (Masters of military arts and
the V-1 Missile" (Masters of military arts and
sciences
sciences thesis,
thesis, US
US Army
Army Command
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Staff College, 1971).
34.
34. USUS Army
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Defense," 22:36; :36; Welborn,
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Effectiveness," table table 8. 8.
35
35.. US
US Army
Army AirAir Defense School, "Air
Defense School, "Air Defense,"
Defense," 2:37 2:37;; US
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36.
36. "The
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GAF I1 January
January Attack,"
Attack," United
United States
States Strategic
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Air Forces
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in
in Europe,
Europe, Air Air Intelligence
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Summary 62 62 (week
(week ending
ending 14 14 January
January
1945),
1945), 55 [AFHRC-519
[AFHRC-519.607A]; .607A] ; "Airfield
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Attack of of 11 January"
January";; SHAEF
SHAEF
Intelligence
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Action Summary,
Summary, OfficeOffice
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of Assistant
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Chief of of Staff,
Staff, Intelligence
Intelligence Headquarters,
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January 1945 1945 [AFHRC-142
[AFHRC-142.0323]; .0323]; Duty
Duty
Group
Group Captain's
Captain's Daily
Daily Resume
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no. 1843,
1843,
Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, Whitehall,
Whitehall, 22 January
January 1944 1944 [AFHRC-512
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A]; Saun-
Saun-
ders, Royal Air
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Jane's Publishing
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1981), 412-13
412-13;; History
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1945, 80;
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Oblivion (London:
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Allan,
1973),
1973), 74,
74, 76-79, 110,
76-79, 110, 112
112;; USAF Credits for the Destruction of
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Aircraft,
Aircraft, World
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11, USAF
USAF Historical
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85 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:
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63
63
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
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Air University, 1978), 286;
286; Air
Air Staff
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erational Summary
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1503, 1504,
1504, Air
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[AFHRC-512.306A].. The The most
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not
necessarily
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the
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37. Gerbig, Oblivion, 99-103, 116;
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USAF Historical
Historical Study
Study 85,85, 286;
286;
IX
IX Air Defense Command,
Air Defense Command, 78-79 78-79;; History,
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Group, Jan-Jan-
uary 1945
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[AFHRC-Gp-352-Hi]; ; History,
History, 366th
366th Fighter
Fighter Group,
Group, Jan-
Jan-
uary
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1945 [AFHRC-Gp-366-Hi]
38
38.. US
US Army
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39. Note nos.
39. Note nos. 3030 andand 33,33, US US Army,
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US
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ments
ments on on German
German Air Air Defenses,"
Defenses," report, report, vol. sec. 4,
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40.
40. Walter
Walter Grabman,
Grabman, "German "German Air Force Air
Air Force Air Operations
Operations Defense
Defense::
1933-1945,"
1933-1945," circa
circa 1957,
1957, 3,
3, 18, 40a, 81, 83-84 [AFHRC-K113 .107-
18, 40a, 81, 83-84 [AFHRC-K113.107-
164];; D.
1641 D. von
von Renz,
Renz, "The
"The Development
Development of of German
German Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Weap-
Weap-
ons
ons andand Equipment
Equipment of of all
all Types
Types up up to 1945," study,
to 1945," study, 1958,
1958, 102 102
[AFHRC-K
[AFHRC-K 113.107-194]
113.107-194]..
41
41.. Ian
Ian VV. Hogg,
Hogg, German
German Artillery
Artillery of World War
of World War II II (London:
(London: Arms Arms
and Armour, 1975), 162, 167; R. A. Devereux, "German Experience
and Armour, 1975), 162, 167; R. A. Devereux, "German Experience
with
with Antiaircraft
Artillery Guns Guns in in WWII,"
WWII," study,study, 19 19 July
July 1946
1946 [AUL-
[AUL-
M36686U] ; US Air Forces in Europe, "Post Hostilities Investigation,"
M36686U]; US Air Forces in Europe, "Post Hostilities Investigation,"
11:3
:3 [AFHRC-519.
[AFHRC-519.601A-1]. 601 A-1 ] .
42. Hogg, German Artillery,
42. Hogg, German Artillery, 170, 170, 172;
172; USUS AirAir Forces
Forces in in Europe,
Europe,
"Post
"Post Hostilities Investigation," 11:5;
Hostilities Investigation," Peter Chamberlain
:5; Peter Chamberlain and and Terry
Terry
Gander, Antiaircraft
Gander, Antiaircraft Guns
Guns (New
(New York:
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Arco Publishing,
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22.
22.
43.
43. Hogg,
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German Artillery,
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173-78; Chamberlain
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tiaircraft Guns, 23-24 ; US Air Forces in Europe, "Post Hostilities
tiaircraft Guns, 23-24; US Air Forces in Europe, "Post Hostilities
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44. Matthew Cooper, The
44. Matthew Cooper, The German
German Air Air Force,
Force, 1933-1945
1933-1945 (London
(London::
Jane's
Jane's Publishing
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Samuel E. E. Morrison,
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of US Naval Operations in World War
War II, vol . 9, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio:
II, vol. 9, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio:
January
January 1943-June
1943-June 1944 1944 (Boston,
(Boston, Mass. Mass.:: Little,
Little, Brown
Brown and and Co.,
Co., 1954),
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215-16 ; Albert
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The US
US Army
Army in
in
World
World War War II:
II: The
The Mediterranean
Mediterranean Theater Theater of of Operations,
Operations, Sicily
Sicily and
and the
the
Surrender
Surrender of of Italy
Italy (Washington,
(Washington, D.C.: D.C.: Office
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the Chief
Chief ofof Military
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History,
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1965), 375,
375, 379,
379, 412;
412; John John Terraine,
Terraine, A A Time
Time ForFor Courage
Courage::
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The Royal
Royal AirAir Force
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the European
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45
45.. Assistant
Assistant Chief
Chief of of Air
Air Staff,
Staff, Intelligence
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Division,
64
64
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
The
The Ploesti
Ploesti Mission
Mission of of 11 August
August 1943,
1943, USAF
USAF Historical
Historical Study
Study 103103
(Maxwell
(Maxwell Field,
Field, Ala.
Ala.:: Historical
Division, June June 1944),
1944), 16,
16, 50,
50, 99
99
[AFHRC-101-103]
[AFHRC-101-103];; Report Report of of Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces Evaluation
Evaluation Board
Board
"Ploesti,"
"Ploesti," 15 December 1944,
15 December 1944, vol.
vol. 6:7-8
6:7-8 [AFHRC-138
[AFHRC-138.5-12 .5-12 VI]; Re-
VI]; Re-
port of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), "Ploesti: Summary
port of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), "Ploesti: Summary
of
of Operations
Operations Results
Results andand Tactical
Tactical Problems
Problems Involved
Involved in in 24
24 Attacks
Attacks
Between 5 April-19 August 1944," 13 January 1945, 1-3 [AFHRC-
Between 5 April-19 August 1944," 13 January 1945, 1-3 [AFHRC-
628.424-1]
628.424-1]..
46.. AAF
46 AAF Evaluation
Evaluation Board,
Board, "Ploesti,"
"Ploesti," 2, 2, 4,
4, appendix
appendix E; E; MAAF,
MAAF,
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History, 1st
1st Fighter
Fighter Group,
Group, June June 1944,
1944, 22 [AFHRC-Gp-
[AFHRC-Gp-
1-Hi];
1-Hi]; History,
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82d Fighter
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June 1944,
1944, 22 [AFHRC-Gp-82-Hi]
[AFHRC-Gp-82-Hi]..
47.
47. MAAF,
MAAF, "Ploesti,"
"Ploesti," 1-31-3;; AAF
AAF Evaluation
Evaluation Board,Board, "Ploesti,"
"Ploesti," iiii;;
Fifteenth
Fifteenth Air Air Force,
Force, "The
"The AirAir Battle
Battle of of Ploesti,"
Ploesti," report,
report, nn.d.,
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83
[AFHRC-628 .424-2] .
[AFHRC-628.424-2].
48.
48. Von
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German Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Weapons,"
Weapons,"
380; US Air Forces in Europe, "Post Hostilities Investigation," 88:11;
380; US Air Forces in Europe, "Post Hostilities Investigation," :11 ;
USSBS
USSBS report,
report, European
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no. 115,
115, "Ammoniakwerke
"Ammoniakwerke Merseburg, Merseburg,
G .m.b.H ., Leuna,
G.m.b.H., Leuna, Germany,"
Germany," March March 1947, 1947, 7-16,7-16, 21 21 [AUL-
[AUL-
940.53U58re
940.53U58re #115]; #115]; Frank
Frank W. W. Anderson,
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49.
49. USUS Air
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Report
Report of Army Air
of Army Air Forces
Forces Evaluation
Evaluation BoardBoard European
European Theater
Theater of of
Operations,
Operations, "Flak "Flak Defenses
Defenses of Strategic Targets
of Strategic Targets in in Southern
Southern Ger-Ger-
many,"
many," 20 20 January
January 1945,
1945, 2525 [AFHRC-138
[AFHRC-138.4-74]; .4-74] ; Report
Report of of Mediter-
Mediter-
ranean
ranean Allied
Allied Air
Air Forces,
Forces, "Flak
"Flak and
and MAAF,"
MAAF," 77 May May 1945,
1945, 99 [AFHRC-
[AFHRC-
622.3813-1] ; Report of Fifteenth Air Force, "Comparative Analysis
622.3813-1]; Report of Fifteenth Air Force, "Comparative Analysis
of
of Altitudes
Altitudes andand Flak
Flak Experienced
Experienced During
During the the Attacks
Attacks on on Vienna
Vienna 77
and
and 88 February
February 1945,"
1945," 3-4
3-4 [AFHRC-670
[AFHRC-670.813-5]..813-5] .
50.
50. Von
Von Renz,
Renz, "Development
German Antiaircraft
Weapons,"
257
257;; US
US Air
Air Forces
Forces in
in Europe,
Europe, "Post
"Post Hostilities
Hostihties Investigation,"
Investigation," 7:7, 7:7,
37;
37; USSBS,
USSBS, The The German
German FlakFlak Effort
Effort Throughout
Throughout the the War,
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19 [AFHRC-137.310-4]
[AFHRC-137.310-4];; JohannesJohannes Mix, Mix, "The
"The Significance
Significance
of
of Anti-Aircraft
Anti-Aircraft Artillery
Artillery and
and the
the Fighter
Fighter ArmArm at at the
the End
End ofof the
the War,"
War,"
Flugwehr
Flugwehr und and Technik,
Technik, February-March
February-March 1950, 1950, 5, 5, 10;
10; Thomas
Thomas I.I. Ed-
Ed-
wards
wards and and Murray
Murray A. A. Geisler,
Geisler, "Estimate
"Estimate of of Effect
Effect on on Eighth
Eighth Air
Air Force
Force
Operations
Operations if if German
German Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Defenses
Defenses Had Had Used Used Proximity-
Proximity-
Fuzed
Fuzed (VT)(VT) Ammunition,"
Ammunition," report report no.
no. 1,1, Operations
Operations Analysis,
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AC/AS-
3, Headquarters Army
3, Headquarters Army AirAir Forces,
Forces, Washington,
Washington, D.C., D.C., 15 15 February
February
1947
1947 [AFHRC-143 .504-1]; US
[AFHRC-143.504-1]; US Air
Air Forces
Europe, Walter
Walter von
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Ax-
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51
51.. Von
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Weapons,"
65
65
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
340-43,
340-43, 353 353;; Ernst
Ernst Klee
Klee and Otto Merk,
and Otto Merk, TheThe Birth
Birth ofthe
of the Missile
Missile:: The
The
Secret
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Peenemunde (New (New York:
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52.
52. Von
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Renz, "Development
German Antiaircraft
Weapons,"
355; von Axthelm, 24; US Air Forces in Europe, "Post Hostilities
355; von Axthelm, 24; US Air Forces in Europe, "Post Hostilities
Investigation,"
Investigation," 3:43-44 3:43-44..
53 . Von Renz, "Development
53. Von Renz, "Development of of German
German Antiaircraft
Weapons,"
357
357;; US US AirAir Forces
Europe, "Post
"Post Hostilities
Investigation," vol. vol.
12, fig. 61, 8, 9, vol. 1 :23 ; Willy Ley, Rockets, Missiles & Space Travel
12, fig. 61, 8, 9, vol. 1:23; Willy Ley, Rockets, Missiles & Space Travel
(New
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393.
54.
54. Von
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Renz, "Development
German Antiaircraft
Weapons,"
362;
362; US US Air Air Forces
Europe, "Post
"Post Hostilities
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12:7,
fig.
fig. 60;60; Military
Military Intelligence
Intelligence Division,
Division, "Handbook
"Handbook on Guided Mis-
on Guided Mis-
siles:
siles: Germany
Germany and and Japan,"
Japan," no. no. 461,
461, 1946
1946 (hereafter
(hereafter cited
cited as as MID
MID
461);
461); KleeKlee and and Merk,Merk, 68, 68, 86;
86; Ley,
Ley, 395
395..
55 . MID 461 ; US Air Forces in Europe,
55. MID 461; US Air Forces in Europe, "Post
"Post Hostilities
Hostilities Investi-
Investi-
gation,"
gation," 12 :8, fig.
12:8, fig. 61
61;; Ley,
Ley, 223, 394..
223, 394
56 . Von Renz, "Development of
56. Von Renz, "Development of German
German Antiaircraft
Weapons,"
362
362;; US US AirAir Forces
Europe, "Post"Post Hostilities
Investigation," 8:10, 8:10,
12 :7,
12:7, fig
fig. ;
. 61 MID 461 ; Ley, 395 ; Klee and Merk, 68 .
61; MID 461; Ley, 395; Klee and Merk, 68.
57.. The
57 The V-1V-1 was was almost
almost 47 47 feet
feet long
long and
and hadhad aa takeoff
takeoff weight
weight ofof
28,229
28,229 poundspounds.. Ley, Ley, 390,
390, 393393..
1 58.
58. Ibid.;
Ibid.; US US Air Air Forces
Europe, "Post
"Post Hostilities
Investigation,"
12:6
12:6;; Klee
Klee andand Merk, 66-68, 125
Merk, 66-68, 125..
59. USSBS,
59. USSBS, German German Flak, Flak, 2, 2, 5,
5, 19;
19; von
von Axthelm,
Axthelm, Interrogation
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port,
port, 44; 44; Mix,
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60
60.. Army
Army Air Air Forces
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Statistical Digest:
Digest: World
World WarWar IIII (Washington,
(Washington,
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D.C.: Office of of Statistical
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255-56..
61 . Thomas Edwards and Murray Gelster, "The Causes of
61. Thomas Edwards and Murray Gelster, "The Causes of Bombing
Bombing
Errors
Errors as as Determined
Determined From From Analysis
Analysis of of Eighth
Eighth AirAir Force
Force Combat
Combat
Operations," report no. 3, Operations Analysis, AC/AS-3, Headquar-
Operations," report no. 3, Operations Analysis, AC/AS-3, Headquar-
ters
ters Army
Army Air Air Forces,
Forces, 15 15 July
July 1947,
1947, 3, 3, 19
19 [AFHRC-143 .504-3] ; "Re-
[AFHRC-143.504-3]; "Re-
port by Mr Butt to Bomber Command on His Examination of Night
port by Mr Butt to Bomber Command on His Examination of Night
Photographs,
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August 1941,"
1941," in in Charles
Charles Webster
Webster andand Noble
Noble Frank-
Frank-
land, The Strategic Air War Against Germany, 1939-1945, vol . 4,
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An-
nexes
nexes andAppendices
and Appendices (London: (London : Her Her Majesty's
Majesty's Stationery
Stationery Office,
Office, 1961);
1961);
Minutes of the Flak Conference
Minutes of the Flak Conference conducted
conducted at
at Headquarters
Headquarters United
United
States
States Strategic
Strategic Air Air Forces
Forces in in Europe
Europe (A-2),
(A-2), London,
London, 1-1 1-11I June
June 1945
1945
[AFHRC-519.646-2]
[AFHRC-519.646-2]..
62.
62. USSBS,
USSBS, "German "German Flak," Flak," 19;19; Harry Smith, "Flak
Harry Smith, "Flak Evasion," Elec-
Evasion," Elec-
tronic Warfare, April-May
tronic Warfare, April-May 1970, 1970, 18-19,
18-19, 36; Eighth Air
36; Eighth Force, "Re-
Air Force, "Re-
duction of Losses and Battle Damage," operational research report,
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12
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63. Eighth
63. Eighth Air
Air Force, "Special Report
Force, "Special Report of of Operations
Operations in in Support
Support of of
66
66
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
First
First Allied
Allied Airborne
Airborne ArmyArmy:: 17-26 September 1944,"
17-26 September 1944," 9-13
9-13 [AFHRC-
[AFHRC-
520.310
520.310 VII].
VII].
64. Albert H.
64. Albert H. Davis
Davis et et al., 56th Fighter
al., 56th Fighter Group
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in World War IIII
(Washington,
(Washington, D.C. D.C.:: Infantry
Infantry Journal
Journal Press,
Press, 1948),
1948), 79-81
79-81;; History,
History,
56th Fighter Group, summary report, 18 September 1944 [AFHRC-
56th Fighter Group, summary report, 18 September 1944 [AFHRC-
Gp-56-Hi]
Gp-56-Hi];; JohnJohn BB.. BB.. Tussell,
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65.
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66.
66. Headquarters
Headquarters US US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Forces
Europe, Office
Office ofof the
the
Director of Operations, "Neutralizing German Anti-Aircraft De-
Director of Operations, "Neutralizing German Anti-Aircraft De-
fenses,"
fenses," study,
study, 14 14 November
November 1944, 1944, 1-3 1-3 [AFHRC-519
[AFHRC-519.525-1]..525-1].
67. Elwood R. Quesada, "Effect of Antiaircraft Artillery on
67. Elwood R. Quesada, "Effect of Antiaircraft Artillery on IX
IX Tac-
Tac-
tical
tical Air
Air Command
Corhmand Operations,"
Operations," The 77?^ Coast
Coast Artillery
Artillery Journal,
Journal, Septem-
Septem-
ber-October 1946,
ber-October 1946, 29 29..
68. Ibid.;
68. Ibid.; Historical
Division, Department
Department ofthe of the Army,
Army, Utah
Utah Beach
Beach
to
to Cherbourg
Cherbourg (6 (6 June-27
June-27 June June 1944)
1944) (Washington,
(Washington, D.C. D.C.:: Government
Government
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Printing Office,
Office, 1947),
1947), 171-73.
171-73.
69.
69. Joint
Joint report
report no no.. 4,
4, "German
"German Flak Flak and
and Allied
Allied Counter-Flak
Counter-Flak Mea- Mea-
sures in Operation Varsity" [W-Operational Research in Northwest
sures in Operation Varsity" [W-Operational Research in Northwest
Europe,
Europe, MID MID 479];
479]; "History
"History of of Air
Air Defense,"
Defense," Air Defense Magazine,
Air Defense Magazine,
April-June 1977, 22 . Little information is available on Soviet flak
April-June 1977, 22. Little information is available on Soviet flak
defenses . James
defenses. Hansen writes
James Hansen writes in in "The
"The Development
Development of of Soviet
Soviet Tac-
Tac-
tical
tical Air
Air Defenses,"
Defenses," International
International DefenseDefense Review,
Review, MayMay 1981,
1981, 53,
53, that
that
the
the Soviets
Soviets increased
increased theirtheir antiaircraft
antiaircraft weapon
weapon by by aa factor
factor of of eight
eight
between
between 1941 1941 andand 1945
1945.. He He asserts
asserts that
that the
the Soviets
Soviets credit
credit flak
flak with
with
40 percent of their 7,000 aircraft claims .
40 percent of their 7,000 aircraft claims.
70. Kirkpatrick, Archie
70. Kirkpatrick, Archie in in the
the AEF,
AEF, 179,179, 93,
93, 100.
100.
71 . Garland and Smyth, The US Army in World War
71. Garland and Smyth, The US Army in World II, 175-82;
War II, 175-82;
Charles
Charles R. R. Shrader,
Shrader, "Amicicide:
"Amicicide: The Problems of
The Problems of Friendly
Friendly Fire Fire in
in
Modern War" (Paper, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth,
Modern War" (Paper, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth,
Kans., 1982), 67-68
Kans., 1982), 67-68..
72. Shrader, "Amicicide,"
72. Shrader, "Amicicide," 69 69..
73
73.. Aircraft
Aircraft Identifiers
Identifiers Gree,Gree, 2757,
2757, andand Brentrall,
Brentrall, 2759,
2759, to to com-
com-
mandant, subject : "Aircraft Identifiers Aboard Merchant Ships, 99
mandant, subject: "Aircraft Identifiers Aboard Merchant Ships,
June
June 1944"
1944";; "Analysis
"Analysis of of Reports
Reports Concerning
Concerning the the Engagement
Engagement of of
Friendly Aircraft by Our Own Ground or Shipborne Forces and Also
Friendly Aircraft by Our Own Ground or Shipborne Forces and Also
All Reports Covering
All Reports Covering the the Engagement
Engagement of of Our
Our OwnOwn Ground
Ground Forces
Forces byby
Friendly
Friendly Aircraft,"
Aircraft," Item
Item No. No. 4, 4, "Attacks
"Attacks on on Friendly
Friendly Aircraft
Aircraft by by
Ground
Ground and and Naval
Naval Forces,"
Forces," Annex
Annex A A to
to 21
21 Army
Army Group/225/Ops,
Group/225/Ops, 29 29
July 1944;; History,
July 1944 65th Fighter
History, 65th Fighter Wing,Wing, "Light,
"Light, Intense
Intense andand Accurate:
Accurate:
US Eighth
US -Air Force
Eighth-Air Strategic Fighters
Force Strategic Fighters vs. vs. German
German Flak Flak inin the
the ETO,"
ETO,"
67
67
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
89 [AFHRC-Wg-65-Su-Re];
89 [AFHRC-Wg-65-Su-Re]; US US Army
Defense School,
School, "Air"Air De-
De-
fense," 2:38, 169 ; War Diary of Brig Gen Richard E. Nugent, No-
fense," 2:38, 169; War Diary of Brig Gen Richard E. Nugent, No-
vember
vember 1944, 1944, 12 12 [AFHRC-533
[AFHRC-533.13-2]; .13-2] ; Shrader, "Amicicide," 34,
Shrader, "Amicicide," 34, 45,
45,
66, 70; DavidMets, Master ofAirpower (Novato, Calif. : Presidio Press,
66, 70; David Mets, Master of Airpower (Novaio, Calif.: Presidio Press,
n. d.), 268.
n.d.), 268.
74.
74. Report
Report of of General
General Board,
Board, US US Forces, European Theater,
Forces, European "An-
Theater, "An-
tiaircraft
tiaircraft Artillery
Artillery Techniques,"
Techniques," 10 10..
75
75.. US
US Fleet,
Fleet, Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Action
Action Summary-October
Summary—October 1944, 1944, Infor-
Infor-
mation
mation Bulletin
Bulletin no.no. 27,
27, 9-2
9-2 [AFHRC-180
[AFHRC-180.102-27]. .102-27] .
76. Shrader, "Amicicide," 70-71 .
76. Shrader, "Amicicide," 70-71.
77.. Buford
77 Buford Rowland
Rowland and William B
and William B.. Boyd,
Boyd, US US Navy
Navy Bureau
Bureau ofOrd-
of Ord-
nance in World War II (Washington, D .C .: Government Printing Of-
nance in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of-
fice, n.d.),
fice, n.d.), 219-20,
219-20, 231,231, 235,
235, 238,
238, 245-47,
245-47, 258, 258, 266;
266; Robert
Robert Sherrod,
Sherrod,
History ofMarine Corps Aviation in World
History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War
War II (Washington, D.C
II (Washington, D.C.:. :
Combat
Combat Forces,
Forces, 1952),
1952), 401
401..
78.
78. Rowland
Rowland and
and Boyd,
Boyd, US Navy
US Navy Bureau,
Bureau, 221-34,
221-34,266; 266; Chamberlain
Chamberlain
and Gander, Antiaircraft Guns, 40; Information Bulletin no.
and Gander, Antiaircraft Guns, 40; Information Bulletin no. 27,
27, 1-5
1-5..
79
79.. Rowland
Rowland and and Boyd,
Boyd, US US Navy
Navy Bureau,
Bureau, 220,220, 266,
266, 283,
283, 286;
286; USUS
Fleet, Information Bulletin no. 27, 1-5 .
Fleet, Information Bulletin no. 27, 1-5.
80.
80. USUS Army
Defense School,
School, "Air "Air Defense,"
Defense," 2:192.
2:192.
81 . Ibid ., 197-98; Chamberlain and Gander, Antiaircraft Guns,
81. Ibid., 197-98; Chamberlain and Gander, Antiaircraft Guns, 3434;;
Report
Report of of General
General Headquarters,
Headquarters, United States Army
United States Forces Pacific,
Army Forces Pacific,
Antiaircraft Research Board, "Survey of
Antiaircraft Research Board, "Survey of Japanese
Antiaircraft Artil-
Artil-
lery,"
lery," 3-5,
3-5, 59,
59, 65,
65, 66,
66, 72
72 [L];
[L]; United States Pacific
United States Pacific Fleet
Fleet and
and Pacific
Pacific
Ocean
Ocean Areas Areas Flak
Flak Intelligence
Intelligence Memorandum
Memorandum Number Number 4, 4, "Japanese
"Japanese
Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft Materiel,"
Materiel," 11 11 April
April 1945
1945 [NHC].
[NHC].
82. AAF
82. AAF Statistical
Statistical Digest,
Digest, 221-27,
221-27, 255-61255-61;; A. A. H. Peterson, R.
H. Peterson, R. G.
G.
Tuck, and D. P. Wilkinson, "Aircraft Vulnerability in World War II"
Tuck, and D. P. Wilkinson, "Aircraft Vulnerability in World War 11"
(Working paper,
(Working paper, Rand Corporation, Santa
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica,
Monica, Calif.,
Calif., rev.
rev. 12
12 July
July
1950), table 8 [AUL-M30352-9] ; Office of Information, Document 33
1950), table 8 [AUL-M30352-9]; Office of Information, Document
May
May 1967 1967 inin "Korean
"Korean Combat
Combat Statistics
Statistics for for Three-Year
Three-Year Period,"
Period," 19 19
June 1953 [NHC] .
June 1953 [NHC].
83
83.. US
US Army
Defense School,
School, "Air"Air Defense,"
Defense," 22:293;
:293 ; AAA
AAA Re-Re-
search Board, "Survey of Japanese AAA," 192; Chief of Naval Op-
search Board, "Survey of Japanese AAA," 192; Chief of Naval Op-
erations,
erations, Air Air Intelligence
Intelligence Group,
Group, FlakFlak Information Bulletin no.
Information Bulletin no. 10,
10,
June
June 1945,
1945, 28 [AFHRC-180 .104-10].
28 [AFHRC-180.104-10].
84.. AAF
84 AAF Statistical
Statistical Digest,
Digest, 226, 261;; Air
226, 261 Air Intelligence
Intelligence Report
Report no. no. 8,
8,
15-17;; Twentieth
15-17 Twentieth Air Air Force,
Force, "Flak
"Flak Damage
Damage on on Various
Various Types
Types of of Mis-
Mis-
sions,"
sions," and and "Final
"Final Analysis
Analysis of of Flak Loss and
Flak Loss and Damage
Damage for for Operations
Operations
Against
Against Japan,"
Japan," AirAir Intelligence
Intelligence Report,
Report, vol. vol. 1,1, nos.
nos. 26-27,
26-27, Novem-
Novem-
ber-December
ber-December 1945, 1945, 3-7
3-7 [AFHRC-760
[AFHRC-760.607]. .607].
85
85.. Flak
Flak downed
downed aa number
number of of the
the top
top aces.
aces. InIn World
World War
War I,I, ground
ground
fire downed the top ace, the Red Baron, Manfred von Richthofen (80
fire downed the top ace, the Red Baron, Manfred von Richthofen (80
6688
EARLY
EARLY YEARS
YEARS TO
TO 1945
1945
credits).
credits). In
In World
World WarWar 11, the leading
II, the leading American
American aceace in
in Europe,
Europe, IFrancis
S.
S. Gabreski
Gabreski (28
(28 credits), crashed while
credits), crashed while attacking
attacking anan airfield;
airfield; tUS flak
killed George E. Preddy, Jr
killed George E. Preddy, .
Jr. (26 .8 credits) ;
(26.8 credits); while
while German
German flak
flak ddowned
others
others such
such asas Hubert
Hubert Zemke
Zemke (17.8 credits) and
(17.8 credits) and Duane
Duane W. W. lBeeson
(17.3 credits) . Japanese AAA killed Robert Hanson (25 credit the
(17.3 credits). Japanese AAA killed Robert Hanson (25 credits),
third-ranking
third-ranking Marine
Marine ace.
ace. Flak
Flak also got two
also got two of
of the
the top
top Britisl
British aces,
Brendan Finucane (32 credits) and Robert Tuck (29 credits).
Brendan Finucane (32 credits) and Robert Tuck (29 credits).
6699
CHAPTER
CHAPTER 22
THE
THE POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
Rapid
Rapid demobilization
demobilization of of the
the American
American military
military followed
followed
the
the war's
war's end.
end. As the magnificent,
As the magnificent, if if not
not lavish,
lavish, US US warwar
machine
machine disappeared,
disappeared, not not much
much was left in
was left in its
its place
place.. Amer-
Amer-
icans
icans thought
thought little
little of either war
of either war or the military
or the military as as they
they
engaged
engaged in in their
their peacetime pursuits, thereby
peacetime pursuits, thereby leaving
leaving thethe US
US
armed
armed forces
forces with
with minimal tangible strength
minimal tangible strength.. TheThe twotwo driv-
driv-
ing
ing forces
forces of of national
national policy
policy during
during this
this period
period were
were tight
tight
budgets and
budgets and trust
trust in
in the
the atomic
atomic bomb.
bomb. America
America based based its its
defense
defense on on confidence
confidence in in overall
overall American
American superiority
superiority and and
distance,
distance, but most of
but most of all,
all, on
on faith
faith in
in the
the bomb
bomb.. Specifically,
Specifically,
the
the United
United States
States had the atomic
had the atomic bomb
bomb and and aa means
means to to
deliver
deliver it;
it; the Soviet Union
the Soviet Union had had neither.
neither.
The
The offensive
offensive problem
problem seemed
seemed relatively
relatively simple
simple to to Amer-
Amer-
ican airmen, compared
ican airmen, compared with with what
what they
they hadhad just
just faced
faced in in
World
World WarWar II. 11. Instead
Instead of vast formations
of vast formations of aircraft, now
of aircraft, now
only
only one
one aircraft
aircraft (with
(with the
the equivalent
equivalent bomb bomb load load ofof thou-
thou-
sands
sands ofof World
World War War II II bombers)
bombers) needed
needed to to be
be employed
employed..
The
The penetration
penetration problem
problem also appeared easier
also appeared easier;; for
for in
in con-
con-
to dense
trast to
trast dense German
German defenses
defenses covering
covering aa targettarget area
area of of
hundreds of
hundreds of miles,
miles, the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union had had relatively
relatively sparse
sparse
defenses to
defenses to cover
cover thousands
thousands of of miles.
miles. Another
Another factor
factor fa-fa-
voring
voring thethe offensive
offensive waswas that
that jet
jet aircraft offered perfor-
aircraft offered perfor-
mance superior to
mance superior to that
that of
of World
World WarWar II II aircraft.
aircraft. Probably
Probably
most important, instead
most important, instead of of opposing
opposing aa foe foe with
with essentially
essentially
equivalent
equivalent technology
technology and the potential
and the potential to to develop
develop superior
superior
technology,
technology, the the United States now
United States now faced
faced aa nation
nation consid-
consid-
ered
ered to
to bebe years
years andand years
years behind
behind thethe United
United States.
States. The
The
most
most serious problems for
serious problems the American
for the American airmen airmen appeared
appeared
to
to be
be those
those of of range
range and basing..
and basing
7711
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
American
American technological
technological superiority
superiority alsoalso provided
provided the the key
key
to the
to the airmen's
airmen's defensive
defensive problems.
problems. Few Few airmen
airmen thought
thought
the
the Soviets
Soviets would
would get get nuclear
nuclear weapons
weapons in in short
short order.
order. In In
addition,
addition, theythey believed
believed the the Soviets
Soviets could
could not
not quickly
quickly master
master
the
the problem
problem of of weapons
weapons deliverydelivery over
over intercontinental
intercontinental
distances.
distances.
American
antiaircraft (AA)(AA) defenses
defenses shrank
shrank alongalong with
with
the
the entire
entire American
American military.
military. By By late
late 1947
1947 thethe USUS Army
Army
had
had onlyonly two
two battalions
battalions of of antiaircraft
antiaircraft artillery.
artillery. Active
Active
American
American air air defense
defense took
took three
three directions
directions in in the
the late
late 1940s.
1940s.
The
The most
most expensive
expensive of of these,
these, aircraft,
aircraft, falls
falls beyond
beyond the the scope
scope
of this
of this study.
study. The
The other
other twotwo directions
directions were were antiaircraft
antiaircraft
guns
guns andand missiles
missiles..
The
The postwar
postwar story
story ofof antiaircraft
antiaircraft gunsguns is is primarily
primarily that that
of
of phaseout.
phaseout. At At first,
first, postwar
postwar budget cuts and
budget cuts and thethe existence
existence
of
of World
World War War IIII equipment
equipment disguised
disguised the the gun's
gun's fate
fate.. The
The
United
United States
States did
did develop
develop one one new
new antiaircraft
artillery
piece
piece in in this
this period,
period, the
the 75-mm
75-mm Sky Sky Sweeper
Sweeper (fig.(fig. 38).*
38).* The
The
pilot
pilot model
model appeared
appeared in in 1948,
1948, and
and the
the weapon
weapon went went intointo
service
service in in March
March 19531953.'. 1
Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft guns
guns proved
proved useful
useful inin the
the Korean
Korean War, War, de- de-
spite
spite the
the almost
almost utter
utter lack
lack ofof air
air opposition,
opposition, primarily
primarily as as
ground-support
ground-support arms. arms. In In the
the military
military buildup
buildup prompted
prompted by by
the
the Korean
Korean War,War, thethe Army
Army deployed
deployed 66 66 battalions
battalions of of AAAA
guns for
guns for continental defense.. Nevertheless,
continental defense Nevertheless, following
following teststests
in 1955, the
in 1955, the Army
Army dropped
dropped its its quadruple
quadruple .50-caliber
.50-caliber guns.
guns.
The
The dual
dual 40-mm
40-mm gunsguns lingered
lingered on on in
in service
service intointo the
the early
early
1960s before being
1960s before being transferred
transferred from from the
the Regular
Regular ArmyArmy into into
the
the National
National Guard.
Guard. TheThe HawkHawk (homing
(homing all-the-way
all-the-way killer)
killer)
missile
missile took
took over
over the
the job
job of of the
the 40-mms
40-mms and and thethe 75-mm
75-mm
Sky
Sky Sweeper
Sweeper..22
*It
*It could
could fire
fire at
at aa rate
rate of
of 45
45 to
to 55
55 rounds
rounds per minute (rpm)
per minute (rpm) with
with aa muzzle
muzzle velocity
velocity
of
of 2,825
2,825 feet
feet per
per second
second (fps)
(fps) and
and could
could reach
reach aa vertical
vertical altitude
altitude of
of 18,600
18,600 feet.
feet.
72
72
POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artiilery IVIuseum)
Figure 38. 75-mm Sky Sweeper.
The Korean
The Korean War
War
The Korean War
The Korean War was
was far different from
far different from what
what the
the planners
planners
anticipated—unlike their
anticipated-unlike their experience
experience of of World
World War
War IIII or
or
their
their forecasts of World
forecasts of World War
War III.
III. In
In the Korean War,
the Korean War, Amer-
Amer-
ican airmen did
ican airmen did not
not face dense, technically
face dense, technically advanced,
advanced,
ground-based antiaircraft
ground-based antiaircraft defenses
defenses oror anan extensive
extensive air-to-
air-to-
air
air threat
threat;; nor
nor did they conduct
did they conduct strategic nuclear operations
strategic nuclear operations
against
against aa major
major power. Instead, both
power. Instead, both sides
sides limited the Ko-
limited the Ko-
rean War
rean War politically and militarily.
politically and militarily. The United States
The United States
(through
(through the United Nations)
the United Nations) fought second-rate and
fought aa second-rate and
third-rate power,
third-rate power, albeit
albeit with major power
with major power backing,
backing, without
without
nuclear weapons
nuclear weapons and without strategic
and without strategic targets.
targets. American
American
airmen waged
airmen waged an an air war primarily
air war primarily of of close
close air
air support
support
(CAS) and
(CAS) and interdiction
interdiction against weak and
against weak and obsolete
obsolete ground
ground
defenses.. American
defenses American flyers
flyers engaged modern fighters,
engaged modern fighters, but
but in
in
action geographically
action remote from
geographically remote from the
the main
main theater
theater ofof
operations
operations..
73
73
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Compared
Compared with with the the defenses
defenses the the Allies
Allies encountered
encountered in in
World
World WarWar II, II, Communist
Communist ground-based
ground-based defenses defenses in in Korea
Korea
proved
proved weakweak in in numbers
numbers and and technology.
technology. American
American intel-intel-
ligence
ligence estimated
estimated their their foes
foes possessed
possessed only only 252
252 heavy
heavy flak
flak
pieces
pieces andand 673 673 light
light pieces
pieces in in May
May 1951, 1951, increasing
increasing and and
peaking
peaking at at 786786 heavy
heavy and and 1,672
1,672 lightlight guns
guns in in January
January
through February
through February 1953 1953.. These
These totals
totals barely
barely exceeded
exceeded the the
numbers
numbers that that the
the Germans
Germans deployed
deployed around around somesome ofof their
their
key
key targets
targets late
late inin World
World War War II II.. The
The equipment
equipment itselfitself was
was
vintage
vintage World
World War War II. II. Although
Although the the airmen
airmen faced
faced aa few
few 76-
76-
mm
mm guns,
guns, thethe principal Communist heavy
principal Communist heavy flak
flak weapon
weapon was was
the Soviet
the Soviet 85-mm
85-mm Model Model 1939 1939 gungun capable
capable of of firing
firing 1515 to
to
20
20 20.1-pound
20.1-pound shells shells perper minute
minute at at 2,625
2,625 fpsfps to
to an
an effective
effective
ceiling
ceiling ofof 27,000
27,000 feet.feet. Later,
Later, the
the Communists
Communists supplemented
supplemented
these
these guns
guns withwith 85-mm
85-mm Model Model 1944 1944 guns guns that
that had
had anan ad-
ad-
ditional
ditional muzzle
muzzle velocity
velocity of of 325
325 fps
fps andand an an increased
increased altitude
altitude
capability
capability of 4,000 feet
of 4,000 feet.. In
In the
the later stages of
later stages the war,
of the war, some
some
of
of these guns were
these guns were controlled
controlled by by radar.
radar. TheThe main light flak
main light flak
piece
piece was
was thethe 37-mm
37-mm automatic
automatic weapon weapon.. The The Communists
Communists
also
also used
used large
large numbers
numbers of of 12 .7-mm machine
12.7-mm machine guns.guns. Begin-
Begin-
ning
ning inin October
October 1951 1951 Allied
Allied airmen
airmen reported
reported unguided
unguided flak flak
rockets
rockets that
that reached
reached 10,560 feet. But
10,560 feet. But there
there are
are nono indica-
indica-
tions
tions ofof any
any successes
successes with with this
this weapon,
weapon, and and reports
reports ofof their
their
firing
firing faded
faded out out byby December
December 1952. 1952.^3
How effective
How effective was was Communist
Communist flak flak in in the Korean War?
the Korean War?
It did
It did not
not prevent
prevent air air operations
operations but but it it did
did make
make themthem more
more
expensive
expensive.. Hostile
Hostile fire fire and
and operations
operations at at increased
increased altitudes
altitudes
to
to counter
counter flak flak reduced
reduced bombingbombing accuracy.
accuracy. The The US US AirAir
Force
Force estimated
estimated that that dive-bombing
dive-bombing accuracy accuracy declined
declined fromfrom
75-foot CEP*
aa 75-foot CEP* in in 1951
1951 to to 219
219 feet
feet in 1953,^ which
in 1953,4 which meant
meant
that
that more
more sorties
sorties werewere required
required to to destroy
destroy aa target.
target. Amer-
Amer-
ican
ican losses
losses to to enemy
enemy actionaction totaled
totaled 1,2301,230 AirAir Force,
Force, Marine
Marine
Corps,
Corps, and and NavyNavy aircraft,
aircraft, allall but
but 143 143 were
were claimed
claimed by by
ground
ground fire.'
fire.^ USUS Air Air Force
Force losses
losses to to flak
flak on
on aa sortie
sortie basis
basis
*Circular
*Circular error
error probable-An
probable—An indicator
indicator of
of the
the delivery
delivery accuracy
accuracy of of aa weapon
weapon system,
system,
used
used as
as aa factor
factor in
in determining
determining probable
probable damage
damage toto aa target
target.. It
It is
is the
the radius
radius of
of aa circle
circle
within which half of a missile's projectiles are expected to fall.
within which half of a missile's projectiles are expected to fall.
74
74
POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
declined
declined during
during the
the course
course ofof the
the war
war from
from aa rate
rate of
of .18
. 18
percent
percent inin 1950
1950 toto .07
.07 percent
percent in in 1953
1953.. Overall
Overall American
American
(Air
(Air Force,
Force, Marine
Marine Corps,
Corps, and
and Navy)
Navy) combat
combat losses
losses of
of 1,230
1,230
aircraft
aircraft onon 736,439
736,439 sorties
sorties amounted
amounted to to aa rate of .17
rate of .17
percent.6
percent.^**
AA further
further breakdown
breakdown reveals
reveals that
that USUS Air
Air Force
Force losses
losses
were
were not
not evenly
evenly spread-fighter-bombers
spread—fighter-bombers sustained sustained 5858 per-
per-
cent of aircraft losses, although they logged only 36 percent
cent of aircraft losses, although they logged only 36 percent
of
of sorties,
sorties, and
and jets suffered less
jets suffered less than
than did
did propeller-powered
propeller-powered
aircraft.
aircraft. The
The jets
jets took
took fewer
fewer hits
hits because
because they
they operated
operated at at
higher
higher speeds
speeds and
and altitudes
altitudes than
than diddid the
the propeller
propeller aircraft
aircraft..
The
The Navy's
Navy's gull-wing
gull-wing F4U F4U Corsair
Corsair of of World
World WarWar IIII took
took
hits
hits at
at twice
twice the
the rate
rate as did the
as did the straight-wing
straight-wing jetjet F9F
F9F andand
thus
thus was
was considered
considered 75 75 percent
percent more
more vulnerable.
vulnerable. Similarly,
Similarly,
the
the US
US Air
Air Force's
Force's famous
famous propeller-powered
propeller-powered F-51 F-51 Mustang
Mustang
(fig.
(fig. 39)
39) was
was much
much moremore vulnerable
vulnerable than than the
the jet-powered
jet-powered
Figure 39. An air base in Korea. A typicat scene at this Fifth Air
Force's 18th Fighter Bomber Wing is the crew chief guid-
ing the F-51 IVIustang fighters to the desired parl(ing
area, after the completion of the mission in 1951.
*In
*In addition
addition toto the
the 689
689 Air Force and
Air Force and 541
541 Marine
Marine Corps/Navy
Corps/Navy combat
combat losses
losses to
to
enemy
enemy action,
action, there
there were
were 776
776 Air
Air Force
Force and
and 588
588 Marine
Marine Corps/Navy
Corps/Navy losses
losses on
on oper-
oper-
ations
ations not
not due
due to
to enemy
enemy action
action..
7755
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
F-80
F-80 Shooting
Shooting StarStar (fig
(fig.. 40).
40). InIn the period July
the period July through
through
November
November 1950, 1950, the
the Mustang
Mustang had had aa loss
loss rate
rate of
of 11.9.9 percent*
percent*
compared with
compared with the
the Shooting
Shooting Star's
Star's loss
loss rate
rate of
of .74
.74 percent.'
percent.^
The
The Air
Air Force
Force assessed
assessed thethe loss
loss rate
rate of prop aircraft
of prop aircraft toto be
be
triple
triple that
that of
of jet
jet aircraft
aircraft.. A A breakdown
breakdown of of losses
losses in in the
the
month
month ofAugust
of August 1952
1952 indicated
indicated thatthat light
light flak
flak was
was thethe main
main
problem
problem.. In In that
that month
month flak flak destroyed
destroyed 14 14 Fifth
Fifth AirAir Force
Force
aircraft
aircraft and
and damaged
others. TheThe Air
Air Force
Force credited
credited
light
light flak
flak with
with 79
79 percent
percent of of the
the downed
downed aircraft
aircraft and and 45
45
percent
percent of of the
the damaged
damaged aircraft,
aircraft, small
small arms
arms with
with 77 andand 52
52
percent,
percent, andand heavy
heavy flak
flak with
with 1414 and
and 33 percent
percent.^. 9
In
In early
early 1952
1952 American
American losseslosses toto ground
ground fire
fire prompted
prompted
remedial action.. One
remedial action One factor
factor in in the
the equation
equation involved
involved how how
close
close the
the aircraft
aircraft flew
flew to
to the
the ground
ground;; but
but despite
despite thethe wealth
wealth
>*/f *,* .1." '4S
Figure 40. Fifth Air Force, Korea. Two US Air Force F-80 Shooting
Star jets use jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) tubes to speed
them into the air in 1952 with a heavy armament load
destined for Communist transportation targets.
*The
*The US Air Force
US Air Force knew
knew the
the F-51
F-51 was
was vulnerable
vulnerable toto ground
ground fire
fire because
because ofof its
its liquid-
liquid-
cooled engine
cooled engine and
and air
air scoop
scoop beneath
beneath the
the fuselage
fuselage.. One
One World
World War
War IIII study of fighters
study of fighters
in
in the
the European
European theater
theater indicated
indicated that
that the
the P-51
P-51 (as
(as it
it was
was then
then designated)
designated) was
was three
three
times
times as
as vulnerable
vulnerable to to the
the flak
flak as
as was
was the
the P-47.'
P-47.' The
The author
author was
was told that the
told that the decision
decision
to
to employ
employ the
the F-51,
F-51, not
not the
the more
more rugged P-47, in
rugged P-47, Korea was
in Korea was based
based primarily
primarily on on the
the
availability of
availability of parts
parts..
76
76
POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
of
of data
data from
from World
World WarWar II,II, itit apparently
apparently took took anan operations
operations
analysis
analysis study
study inin early
early 1952
1952 to to bring
bring this
this fact
fact toto the
the atten-
atten-
tion
tion of
of the
the decisionmakers
decisionmakers.. One One study
study indicated
indicated that that in
in the
the
first
first four
four months
months of of 1952,
1952, Fifth
Fifth AirAir Force
Force aircraft
aircraft sustained
sustained
half
half of
of their
their ground-fire
ground-fire hits hits below
below 2,500
2,500 feet.
feet.'°10 Following
Following
aa Communist
Communist flak flak success
success on on 10 10 July 1952 the
July 1952 the Fifth
Fifth Air
Air
Force
Force ordered
ordered aa minimum
minimum recovery
recovery altitude
altitude ofof 3,000
3,000 feet.
feet.
Similarly,
Similarly, in in reaction
reaction to to B-26
B-26 (fig.(fig. 41)
41) losses
losses north
north of of the
the
battle
battle lines,
lines, the
the Fifth
Fifth Air
Air Force
Force established
established aa 4,000-foot
4,000-foot
attack
attack altitude
altitude for for light
light bombers
bombers with with only
only selected
selected crewscrews
permitted
permitted to to operate
operate lower.
lower. In In August,
August, the the Navy
Navy adopted
adopted
aa 3,000-foot
3,000-foot minimum
minimum pulloutpullout altitude.
altitude. This
This policy
policy resulted
resulted
in
in aa decrease
decrease in American aircraft
in American aircraft losses
losses."." In
In the
the first
first four
four
months
months of of 1952,
1952, Fifth
Fifth AirAir Force
Force studies
studies concluded
concluded that that
ground
ground fire fire destroyed
destroyed or or damaged
damaged 21 .6 aircraft
21.6 aircraft per per 1,000
1,000
sorties
sorties;; whereas
whereas in in the
the period
period 11 September
September 1952 1952 through
through
30
30 April
April 1953,
1953, the
the rate decreased to
rate decreased to 11 .1 aircraft
11.1 aircraft per per 1,000
1,000
sorties.
sorties. Analysts
Analysts attributed
attributed 19 19 percent
percent of of the
the decrease
decrease to to
Figure 41. A tight formation of B-26 light bombers of the Fifth Air
Force's 452d Bomb Wing do some cloud hopping as they
head home to their base in Japan. They have just com-
pleted a devastating low-level sweep on enemy Com-
munist targets with bomb rockets, napalm, and .50-
caliber fire in early 1951.
777
7
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
the
the altitude
altitude policy
policy and and aa further
further 32 32 percent
percent to to target
target di- di-
versification.
versification. As As aa counterpoint,
counterpoint, the the Fifth
Fifth AirAir Force
Force re- re-
moved
moved the altitude restriction
the altitude restriction for for twotwo weeks
weeks in in June
June 1953 1953
and
and suffered
suffered the the consequences.
consequences. During During that that month
month the the unit
unit
suffered its
suffered its highest
highest 1953 1953 monthly
monthly losses-18
losses—18 aircraft aircraft to to
ground
ground fire,
fire, including
including 12 12 of
of its
its newest
newest fighter-bombers,
fighter-bombers, the the
F-86F.'
F-86F.'22
Another
Another policypolicy adopted
adopted by by the
the Fifth
Fifth Air Force in
Air Force in June
June
1952
1952 limited
limited the the time
time over
over the the target.
target. It It mandated
mandated that, that,
with
with the
the exception
exception of of air
air defense
defense and and F4U F4U aircraft,
aircraft, pilots
pilots
were
were to to make
make only only oneone run
run over
over aa target
target for for each
each type type of of
external
external ordnance
ordnance carried;
carried; andand it it forbade
forbade strafing.
strafing. In In August
August
1952
1952 the
the Fifth
Fifth Air Force modified
Air Force modified the the policy
policy by by restricting
restricting
general
general support
support and and interdiction
interdiction mission mission to to one
one passpass and and
close
close air
air support
support to to two passes .
two passes.'^ '3
American
American airmen airmen also also employed
employed more more direct
direct methods
methods
against enemy
against antiaircraft artillery.
enemy antiaircraft artillery. Apparently,
Apparently, the the Ma- Ma-
rines
rines tried
tried flakflak suppression
suppression tactics tactics in in late
late 1951
1951 or or early
early
1952-Marine
1952—Marine spotter spotter aircraft
aircraft could could temporarily
temporarily divert divert
strike
strike aircraft
aircraft to to hit
hit flak
flak positions
positions.. In In June
June 19521952 thethe Marines
Marines
published
published aa procedure
procedure that that put
put suppressive
suppress!ve fire fire onon flak
flak po-po-
sitions
sitions 30 30 seconds
seconds before
before their
their aircraft
aircraft beganbegan theirtheir dive-
dive-
bombing runs.
bombing runs. Thereafter,
Thereafter, Marine
Marine aircraft
aircraft losses
losses dropped.
dropped.'"*14
At about
At about the the same
same time,
time, the
the Army
Army and and AirAir Force
Force adopted
adopted
similar
similar tactics,
tactics, although
although there there is is nono indication
indication that that there
there
was any
was any coordination
coordination among among the the threethree services
services.. Prior
Prior to to
July 1952
July 1952 the the Army
Army and and Air
Air Force
Force operated
operated under under proce-proce-
dures established
dures established in in plan
plan NEGAT,
NEGAT, which which curtailed
curtailed friendly
friendly
artillery fire
artillery fire during
during an an air
air strike
strike and and restricted
restricted almost
almost all all
artillery
artillery firefire within
within aa 2,500-yard
2,500-yard radius radius of the target.
of the target.
Friendly guns
Friendly guns would
would mark mark targets
targets with with smoke
smoke or or white
white
phosphorous
phosphorous shells shells and,
and, between
between the the time
time thethe spotter
spotter airair-
craft
craft left
left thethe area
area andand thethe fighter-bombers
fighter-bombers arrived, arrived, fire fire
against
against known
known antiaircraft
antiaircraft positions
positions.. Prompted
Prompted by by the
the loss
loss
of
of two
two C-119s
C-119s (fig.(fig. 42)
42) to
to American
American artillery artillery fire fire inin June
June
1951,
1951, thethe policy
policy emphasized
emphasized safety safety from from "friendly"
"friendly" fire fire..
But
But the
the policy
pohcy satisfied
satisfied neither
neither airmen airmen nor nor soldiers
soldiers and and
78
78
POSTWAR YEARS,
POSTWAR YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
Figure 42. US Air Force C-119s were one of the logistical

workhorses of the Korean War.
became even
became even less
less acceptable
acceptable to to both
both as as the
the Communists
Communists
burrowed
burrowed deeperdeeper intointo the
the ground,
ground, brought
brought up up increasing
increasing
flak
flak pieces,
pieces, and
and learned
learned American
American air air support
support procedures.
procedures.
Not
Not only
only did
did fighter-bomber
fighter-bomber losses losses remain
remain high,
high, butbut the
the
procedures
procedures left left aa large
large area
area along
along the
the front
front without artillery
without artillery
support
support for for eight
eight toto 45
45 minutes
minutes during
during the the air
air strike.
strike. Fol-
Fol-
lowing
lowing aa meeting
meeting between
between the the two
two services
services inin July
July 1952,
1952,
the
the Army
Army easedeased thethe restriction
restriction on on artillery
artillery fire
fire toto aa mini-
mini-
mum
mum time,time, although
although it it retained
retained prohibitions
prohibitions on on the
the use
use of
of
proximity-fuzed
proximity-fuzed fire fire and
and high-angle
high-angle firefire when
when aircraft
aircraft were
were
in the area.
in the The airmen
area. The airmen now now sawsaw that
that the
the danger
danger fromfrom
enemy
enemy guns guns exceeded
exceeded the the danger
danger from
from "friendly"
"friendly" gunsguns..
In their
In next step,
their next step, the
the Americans
Americans actively
actively engaged
engaged the the
flak.
flak. On August 1952
On 66 August 1952 thethe Air
Air Force
Force and and Army
Army produced
produced
plan
plan SUPPRESS,
SUPPRESS, which which set set out
out procedures
procedures to to neutralize
neutralize
suspected
suspected and and known
known antiaircraft
antiaircraft positions
positions.. While
While retaining
retaining
the
the July
July artillery
artillery restrictions,
restrictions, SUPPRESS
SUPPRESS permittedpermitted the the
fighter-bomber
fighter-bomber pilots pilots to
to either
either accept
accept or reject artillery
or reject artillery sup-
sup-
port.
port. The
The gunners
gunners would
would hit hit suspected
suspected positions
positions with
with prox-
prox-
imity-fuzed
imity-fuzed fire fire before
before the the strike
strike and
and then
then signal
signal the
the end
end
7799
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
of
of proximity-fuzed
proximity-fuzed fire fire with
with aa radio
radio callcall and
and aa white
white phos-
phos-
phorous
phorous or or colored
colored smoke smoke round.
round. The The artillery
artillery would
would con- con-
tinue
tinue the bombardment with
the bombardment impact-fuzed ammunition.
with impact-fuzed ammunition.
During
During aa one-month
one-month experimentexperiment with with these
these procedures
procedures in in
IX
IX Corps
Corps (25(25 September
September through through 25 25 October
October 1952),
1952), thethe USUS
Air Force lost
Air Force lost only
only oneone aircraft
aircraft on on 1,816
1,816 CASCAS sorties,
sorties, com-
com-
pared
pared with
with planning
planning figuresfigures of of one
one loss for every
loss for every 380380 CAS
CAS
sorties.
sorties. (Army
(Army artillery
artillery fired
fired 679,000
679,000 roundsrounds in in connection
connection
with the air
with the air strikes.)
strikes.) This This marked
marked decline
decline in in aircraft
aircraft losses
losses
came
came despite
despite the the tripling
tripling of of Communist
Communist flak flak guns
guns in in the
the
area
area facing
facing thethe IX IX Corps.
Corps.
The
The Eighth
Eighth ArmyArmy and and Fifth
Fifth AirAir Force
Force alsoalso adopted
adopted the the
policy, which
policy, which became
became effective
effective on on 22 December
December 1952 1952.. Under
Under
the slightly
the slightly modified
modified procedures,
procedures, aa light light aircraft
aircraft (a(a T-6
T-6 Mos-
Mos-
quito) led
quito) led the
the fighter-bombers
fighter-bombers into into thethe area,
area, marked
marked the the
target, and
target, and after
after thethe fighter-bomber
fighter-bomber pilots pilots identified
identified the the
target,
target, called
called in in artillery fire (fig.
artillery fire (fig. 43)
43).. All
All known
known antiaircraft
antiaircraft
guns
guns within
within 2,500
2,500 yardsyards of of the
the target
target would
would be hit first
be hit first with
with
proximity-fuzed
proximity-fuzed shells shells andand finally
finally with
with aa white
white phosphorous
phosphorous
or
or colored
colored smoke
smoke round round.. The The barrage
barrage continued
continued with with im-im-
pact-fuzed
pact-fuzed shells
shells forfor three
three minutes
minutes as as the
the aircraft
aircraft attacked.
attacked.
Despite
Despite problems
problems such such as as fighter-bomber
fighter-bomber pilots pilots notnot always
always
being
being ready
ready to to exploit
exploit the the suppression
suppression fire, fire, and
and increased
increased
numbers
numbers of of Communist
Communist flak flak guns,
guns, fighter-bomber
fighter-bomber losses losses
remained
remained acceptable.
acceptable. CAS CAS sorties
sorties perper fighter-bomber
fighter-bomber loss loss
rose from
rose from 917917 in in December
December 1952 1952 to to 1,285
1,285 inin January
January 1953,1953,
to 2,981 in late March and early April, then dropped to
to 2,981 in late March and early April, then dropped to
1,281 in
1,281 in June
June and,and, finally,
finally, roserose to about 1,515
to about 1,515 in in July ."
July.'^
Clearly,
Clearly, thethe Americans
Americans had had forgotten
forgotten much much of of their
their ex-
ex-
perience
perience with
with flak
flak inin World
World War War II.II. The
The airmen's
airmen's flakflak coun-
coun-
termeasures
termeasures came came as as aa response
response to to losses
losses andand notnot from
from anyany
study of
study of the
the situation
situation or or from previous experience
from previous experience.. Not Not
until
until late
late in
in the
the war,
war, after
after almost
almost two two years,
years, diddid the
the Army
Army
and
and Air
Air Force
Force establish
establish effective
effective coordinated
coordinated tacticstactics.. NoNo
one
one attempted
attempted to to coordinate,
coordinate, or or to
to compare
compare notes,notes, with
with the
the
Marines
Marines or or Navy.
Navy. But But eveneven having
having done done allall of
of this,
this, the
the
question
question is is how
how muchmuch did did the
the American
American airmen airmen learn.
learn. In In
80
80
POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
Figure 43. After training more pilots than any other plane, the old
North American T-6 has finally gone to war herself.
Needed in Korea was a sturdy, dependable, fairly fast
spotting plane to guide Far Eastern Air Force and Navy
fighter pilots to North Korean targets in minimum time.
aa study
study ofof the
the lessons
lessons from
from the
the air
air war
war inin Korea,
Korea, the
the US
US
Air
Air Force
Force diddid not
not even
even mention
mention enemy
enemy flakflak among
among the
the al-
al-
most
most 100100 items,
items, butbut included
included such
such areas
areas asas heckling
heckling attacks,
attacks,
rescue
rescue operations,
operations, and and Communist
Communist passivepassive defense.
defense. Surely
Surely
flak
flak was
was more
more important
important and more costly
and more costly toto the
the US
US Air
Air
Force
Force than
than that.
that. ItIt is
is this
this attitude
attitude that
that led
led Air
Air Force
Force Chief
Chief
of
of Staff
Staff Thomas
Thomas D. D. White
White toto tell
tell his
his top
top commanders
commanders in in
October
October 19571957 that the US
that the US Air
Air Force
Force hadhad never
never respected
respected
flak
flak but
but that
that itit could
could no no longer
longer ignore
ignore itit.. He
He insisted
insisted that
that
the
the airmen
airmen findfind out
out more
more about
about antiaircraft
antiaircraft defenses,
defenses, and
and
find it out quickly."
find it out quickly.'^
8811
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
Antiaircraft Missiles
Antiaircraft Missiles
At
At the same time
the same time US military forces
US military forces were
were enduring
enduring the the
post-World War
post-World War II II reduction
reduction and and then
then the trauma and
the trauma and frus-
frus-
trating limited war
trating limited war inin Korea,
Korea, aa majormajor technological
technological devel- devel-
opment
opment was was evolving.
evolving. This device, which
This device, which would
would greatly
greatly
improve
improve air air defense
defense and and radically change air
radically change air warfare,
warfare, waswas
of
of course
course thethe surface-to-air
surface-to-air missilemissile (SAM).
(SAM). A A number
number of of
countries
countries attempted
attempted to to follow
follow up up on the German
on the German efforts
efforts inin
the field,
the field, but
but for
for 20 years these
20 years first-generation missiles
these first-generation missiles
were
were notable
notable more more forfor their
their promise
promise than than forfor their
their per-
per-
formance. The
formance. The large and unwieldy
large and unwieldy missiles
missiles demonstrated
demonstrated
limited mobility.
limited mobility. Initially,
Initially, they used liquid
they used liquid fuelfuel with
with its
its
problems
problems of of handling,
handling, reliability, reaction time,
reliability, reaction time, and
and storage
storage..
The early missiles
The early missiles were
were guided
guided by by command
command systems systems in in
which
which one radar unit
one radar unit acquired
acquired and and tracked
tracked the the target,
target, aa
second
second tracked
tracked the the missile,
missile, and computer made
and aa computer made missile
missile
corrections
corrections to ensure interception
to ensure Although this
interception.. Although this awkward
awkward
system
system could down aircraft
could down aircraft flying
flying atat relatively
relatively high high alti-
alti-
tudes, steady
tudes, steady courses,
courses, and and moderate
moderate speeds,speeds, it had little
it had little
ability
ability toto kill fast-moving, low-flying,
kill fast-moving, maneuvering targets
low-flying, maneuvering targets..
(It must
(It must be remembered, however,
be remembered, however, that that air defenders saw
air defenders saw
formations of
formations high-flying aircraft
of high-flying aircraft as as the
the threat
threat.).) The
The com-
com-
mand guidance system
mand guidance system was also vulnerable
was also vulnerable to to electronic
electronic
countermeasures..
countermeasures
A
A number
number of of projects
projects emerged
emerged from from American
American design-design-
ers.'^ The
ers." The US Army sponsored
US Army sponsored the the widest variety of
widest variety of mis-
mis-
siles.. These
siles These missiles
missiles can can probably
probably best best be be divided
divided
generically
generically into three families
into three families basedbased on on the missile's mo-
the missile's mo-
bility: large,
bility: large, immobile
immobile SAMs; SAMs; mobile
mobile missiles;
missiles; and and man-
man-
portable
portable systems
systems.. TheThe earliest
earliest of of these
these Army projects was
Army projects was
the Nike
the Nike family, begun in
family, begun in 1945
1945 by by Bell Laboratories. The
Bell Laboratories. The
first of these,
first of these, the
the Nike Ajax (fig.
Nike Ajax (fig. 44),
44), stood
stood 34 feet high
34 feet high
and weighed
and weighed 2,455 pounds with
2,455 pounds with its
its booster
booster (21 (21 feet
feet and
and
1,150 pounds without
1,150 pounds without it).it). It carried aa 300-pound
It carried 300-pound warheadwarhead
at Mach 2.25
at Mach 2.25 toto aa maximum
maximum slant slant range
range of of 25
25 miles
miles andand
an altitude
an altitude of 60,000 feet.
of 60,000 feet. Ajax became the
Ajax became the first
first operational
operational
82
82
POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artillery Museum)
Figure 44. Nike Ajax.
US SAM
US SAM in in December
December 1953 1953 andand served
served with
with USUS forces
forces
overseas
overseas and
and with
with at at least
least five
five friendly
friendly foreign
foreign countries.
countries.
Western
Western Electric,
Electric, the
the prime
prime contractor
contractor (Douglas
(Douglas built
built the
the
airframe),
airframe), delivered
delivered about
about 15,000
15,000 ofof the
the missiles
missiles.. About
About
5,500
5,500 ofof them
them werewere fired,
fired, apparently
apparently none
none in in anger.
anger. The
The
Ajax
Ajax program
program costcost just
just over
over $1 $1 billion
billion before the United
before the United
States
States phased
phased it it out
out inin favor
favor ofof its
its successor,
successor, the the Nike
Nike
Hercules
Hercules..
In
In 1953
1953 the
the US
US Army's
Army's Ordnance
Ordnance Corps,
Corps, Bell
Bell Labora-
Labora-
tories,
tories, Western
Western Electric,
Electric, andand Douglas
Douglas began
began work
work on on the
the
Nike Hercules
Nike Hercules (fig.
(fig. 45).
45). The
The same
same basic
basic technology
technology was was used
used
on the
on the Hercules
Hercules as as was
was used
used onon the
the Ajax,
Ajax, although
although thethe for-
for-
mer was
mer was somewhat larger (measuring
somewhat larger (measuring 41 .5 feet
41.5 feet and
and weighing
weighing
about
about 10,400
10,400 pounds
pounds withwith its
its booster)
booster) and
and used
used solid
solid pro-
pro-
pellants.
pellants. Hercules
Hercules performed
performed better
better than the Ajax,
than the Ajax, carrying
carrying
aa 119-pound
119-pound warhead
warhead to to aa maximum
maximum slant slant range
range of
of 80
80 miles
miles
at
at Mach
Mach 3.65
3.65 and
and an an altitude
altitude over
over 150,000
150,000 feet
feet.. Hercules
Hercules
8833
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Figure 45. Nike Hercules.
4
884
POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
became operational
became operational in in July
July 1958,
1958, when
when it it began
began to to replace
replace
the
the 5858 Ajax
Ajax battalions
battalions.. One One demonstration
demonstration of the missile's
of the missile's
capability
capability came
came in in September
September 1960 1960 when
when one one Hercules
Hercules inin-
tercepted another
tercepted another flyingflying atat 100,000
100,000 feet feet and
and 30 30 miles
miles from
from
its
its launch
launch.. TheThe United
United StatesStates built
built over
over 9,000
9,000 Hercules
Hercules
missiles
missiles at at aa program
program cost cost of
of about
about $1.9$1 .9 billion.
billion .
A
A second
second family
family of missiles was
of missiles was somewhat
somewhat smallersmaller andand
much
much moremore mobile.
mobile. In In March
March 19531953 Raytheon
Raytheon began began de- de-
velopment
velopment of of the
the Hawk
Hawk (fig.
(fig. 46).
46). ItIt went
went into
into production
production
in
in 1957
1957 and
and into
into operation
operation in in July
July 1959.
1959. Shipped
Shipped to to Israel
Israel
in
in 1964,
1964, the
the Hawk
Hawk downed
downed its its first
first hostile
hostile aircraft,
aircraft, aa MiG-
MiG-
21,
21, inin May
May 1969. 11
1969.'^ HawkHawk measured
measured 16 .5 feet
16.5 feet inin length
length andand
weighed
weighed about
about 1,300
1,300 pounds
pounds at launch, and
at launch, and therefore
therefore itit was
was
easy
easy toto transport
transport.. Guided
Guided by by aa continuous-wave
continuous-wave semiactive
semiactive
radar
radar homer
homer (rather
(rather thanthan the
the more
more easily
easily jammed
jammed pulsepulse
radar),
radar), it carried aa 163-pound
it carried 163-pound warheadwarhead at at Mach
Mach 2.22 .2 to
to aa
slant
slant range
range ofof 22
22 miles
miles andand anan altitude
altitude ofof 40,000
40,000 feet
feet.. The
The
Hawk
Hawk program
program cost cost about
about $1 $1 billion
billion ($969
($969 million)
million) for
for just
just
«'..Êi*:;,"/,St.3s(S??
^'5iSi&.-viL"'
!i!4
(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artiilery Museum)
Figure 46. Hawk.
85
85
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
over 13,000 missiles.

over 13,000 missiles. The
The most
most notable aspect of
notable aspect of the
the Hawk,
Hawk,
however,
however, is its adaptability
is its adaptability.. ItIt has been modified,
has been modified, improved,
improved,
and
and fielded
fielded in in aa number
number of of advanced
advanced variants,
variants, some
some ofof
which
which remain
remain first-line
first-line equipment
equipment today.
today.
The
The third
third family
family of of antiaircraft
antiaircraft missiles,
missiles, man
man portable,
portable,
began
began with
with aa contract
contract toto Philco-Ford
Philco-Ford in in 1958
1958.. The
The Redeye
Redeye
system
system (fig.
(fig. 47),
47), which
which looks
looks like
like the
the World
World War War 11
II bazooka,
bazooka,
is housed in
is housed in aa device
device serving
serving asas both
both container
container and
and launcher.
launcher.
The
The missile system measures
missile system measures about
about 33.5 feet in
.5 feet in length,
length, 22%3/4
inches in diameter, and weighs about 28 pounds. The op-
inches in diameter, and weighs about 28 pounds. The op-
erator
erator acquires
acquires the target visually
the target and fires
visually and fires when
when an an aural
aural
signal
signal indicates
indicates thatthat the
the infrared
infrared homing
homing system
system has
has locked
locked
onto
onto the
the target.
target. When
When fired,
fired, the
the missile
missile isis boosted
boosted 20 feet
20 feet
or
or so
so from
from thethe launcher
launcher before
before thethe rocket
rocket ignites,
ignites, thus
thus pro-
pro-
tecting the operator from rocket blast. Redeye travels at
tecting the operator from rocket blast. Redeye travels at
Mach
Mach 2.52.5 with
with aa maximum
maximum range range of of 11.6
.6 miles
miles and
and 9,000-
9,000-
feet
feet altitude
altitude.. The
The missile
missile went
went into
into production
production in in 1964
1964 and
and
became
became operational
operational that that same
same year.
year.
: ■ A
t5? Jf'-fM-'''.
1. «
Figure 47. Redeye.
86
86
POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
The Navy
The Navy alsoalso developed
developed antiaircraft
antiaircraft missiles
missiles.. InIn Decem-
Decem-
ber
ber 1944
1944 the the chief of naval
chief of naval operations
operations directed
directed thatthat work
work
on
on the
the Bumblebee
Bumblebee projectproject begin
begin at at the
the Applied Physics Lab-
Applied Physics Lab-
oratory
oratory at at Johns
Johns Hopkins
Hopkins University
University.. This This work
work resulted
resulted
in
in the
the development
development of of the
the Terrier
Terrier and and Talos
Talos missiles.
missiles. The The
Convair
Convair Terrier
Terrier measured
measured 27 27 feet
feet andand weighed
weighed 3,000 3,000
pounds
pounds withwith its its booster
booster (14 (14.8.8 feet
feet andand 1,100
1,100 pounds
pounds withwith-
out)
out).. The
The NavyNavy first
first fired
fired thethe missile
missile on on September
September 1951 1951
and
and putput itit into
into production
production the next year.
the next year. ItIt became
became the the first
first
US
US Navy
Navy SAM SAM whenwhen itit achieved
achieved operational
operational status
status on on the
the
USS
USS Boston
Boston in in 1956
1956.. The
The Terrier
Terrier carried
carried aa 200-pound
200-pound warwar-
head
head at Mach 22.5
at Mach .5 to
to aa slant
slant range
range of of 1010 miles
miles and
and anan altitude
altitude
of 40,000 feet.
of 40,000 The United
feet. The United States
States built
built about
about 3,000
3,000 ofthese,
of these,
and
and they
they served
served withwith thethe United
United States
States andand twotwo foreign
foreign
navies.
navies.
The
The Bendix
Bendix TalosTalos also
also emerged
emerged from from the the 1944
1944 Bumblebee
Bumblebee
project.
project. It It was
was larger
larger than
than thethe Terrier
Terrier (31(31.3.3 feet
feet and
and 7,000
7,000
pounds
pounds with with booster,
booster, 21 21 feet
feet and
and 3,000
3,000 pounds
pounds without),
without),
which
which accounted
accounted for for its
its better
better performance
performance.. Talos Talos couldcould
carry
carry aa 300-pound
300-pound warheadwarhead at at Mach
Mach 2.5 2.5 over
over 6060 miles
miles slant
slant
range
range andand reach
reach an an altitude
87,000 feet.feet. First
First fired
fired in in
1950,
1950, it it became
became operational
operational on on the
the USSUSS Galveston
Galveston in in 1959
1959
(fig.
(fig. 48).
48). Bendix
Bendix built
built almost
almost 1,500 1,500 of of these
these missiles
missiles
(McDonnell
(McDonnell built built the
the airframe)
airframe) at at aa program
program cost cost of of $648
$648
million.
million.
The
The third
third naval
naval missile
missile was was the
the Convair
Convair Tartar
Tartar (fig.
(fig. 49)
49)..
It
It began,
began, and and was first fired,
was first fired, inin 1956.
1956. Tartar
Tartar went
went into into
production in 1958 and became operational three years
production in 1958 and became operational three years
later. The
later. The missile
missile measured
measured 15 feet in
15 feet in length
length andand weighed
weighed
1,200
1,200 pounds.
pounds. It It could
could reach
reach aa slant
slant range
range ofof over
over 10 10 miles,
miles,
an
an altitude
40,000 feet,
feet, and
and aa speed
speed of of Mach
Mach 22.5..5 . Convair
Convair
built
built over
over 3,600
3,600 of of these
these missiles
missiles at at aa cost
cost ofof $495
$495 million.
million.
It
It served
served withwith thethe United
United States
States andand four
four foreign
foreign navies.
navies.
The
The Army's
Army's airmenairmen also also engaged
engaged in in SAM
SAM work,
work, even even
before
before they
they achieved
achieved independence
independence.. In In April
April 1946
1946 the the AAF
AAF
had
had three
three SAMS
SAMs under under development
development out out ofof aa total
total of of 2828
87
87
Figure 48. Talos missile in launcher aboard the USS Galveston.
Figure 49. Tartar surface-to-air missile on Mark II mount aboard

the USS McCormick.
88
POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
missile
missile projects
projects.. Boeing
Boeing designed
designed the the ground-to-air
ground-to-air pilotless
pilotless
aircraft
aircraft (GAPA)
(GAPA) to defend against
to defend against aircraft,
aircraft, and and thethe missile
missile
could reach aa range
could reach range of 35 miles
of 35 miles and and an an altitude
60,000
feet.
feet. The
The airmen
airmen test-fired
test-fired about
about 100 100 of of these
these missiles
missiles.. TwoTwo
other
other AAF
AAF projects
projects werewere thethe University
University of of Michigan's
Michigan's Wiz- Wiz-
ard
ard and
and General
General Electric's
Electric's Thumper,
Thumper, both both designed
designed to to reach
reach
ranges
ranges of of 550
550 miles
miles and and altitudes
altitudes of of 500,000
500,000 feet. feet. InIn 1947
1947
the US Air
the US Air Force
Force relegated
relegated the the two
two antiballistic
antiballistic missile
missile proj-
proj-
ects
ects to
to "prolonged
"prolonged study" study" status.
status. By By March
March 1948 1948 the the Air
Air
Force
Force canceled
canceled the the Thumper.
Thumper. Wizard Wizard continued
continued as as aa study,
study,
but
but Boeing
Boeing replaced
replaced the the GAPA
GAPA project project with with Bomarc
Bomarc
(Boeing,
(Boeing, University
University of of Michigan
Michigan Aeronautical
Aeronautical Research Research
Center)
Center) in in 1949.'9
1949.'^
Bomarc
Bomarc was was essentially
essentially an an unmanned
unmanned aircraft aircraft.. InIn fact,
fact,
the airmen
the airmen initially
initially designated
designated the the missile
missile XF-99 XF-99 as it would
as it would
any
any experimental
experimental fighter.fighter. TheThe large
large (46 .8-foot length,
(46.8-foot length, 18- 18-
foot span)
foot span) andand heavy
heavy (15,500
(15,500 pound)
pound) missile missile was was radio-
radio-
controlled
controlled with with anan active
active radar-homing
radar-homing device. device . The The US US AirAir
Force
Force first
first fired the IM-99A
fired the IM-99A (fig.(fig. 50),
50), as as itit was
was redesignated,
redesignated,
in
in 1952
1952.. InIn 1958
1958 it it completed
completed an an interception
interception controlled
controlled
1,500
1,500 miles
miles away (fig.. 51)
away (fig 51).. Two
Two years
years later,
later, it it became
became op- op-
erational.
erational. Bomarc
Bomarc could could reach
reach Mach
Mach 22.8, .8, andand itit had
had aa 250-
250-
mile
mile slant
slant range.
range. The The US US AirAir Force
Force first first fired
fired the
the "B" "B"
model,
model, redesignated
redesignated MIM-10B,
MIM-lOB, in in May
May 1959 1959.. Although
Although 11.7 .7
feet shorter than the "A" model, it weighed 532 pounds
feet shorter than the "A" model, it weighed 532 pounds
more
more and and hadhad greater
greater performance
performance;; specifically,
specifically, it it could
could
reach
reach slant
slant ranges
ranges of of 440
440 miles
miles.. In
In its
its most
most memorable
memorable flight flight
it
it intercepted
intercepted aa Regulus
Regulus II II target
target drone
drone at at 100,000
100,000 feet,
feet, 446
446
miles
miles from
from itsits launch
launch pointpoint.. That
That July IM-99B became
July IM-99B became op- op-
erational.. In
erational In all,
all, Boeing
Boeing built
built 700
700 Bomarcs
Bomarcs at at aa cost
cost ofof $1
$1.6.6
billion .
billion.
Other
Other countries
countries also also engaged
engaged in in designing,
designing, building,
building, and and
testing
testing SAMS
SAMs.. The The British
British gotgot their
their first
first SAM,
SAM, Bloodhound,
Bloodhound,
into
into service
service in in 1958,
1958, the the Thunderbird
Thunderbird in in 1960,
1960, and and the the
Seaslug in 1962 . These first-generation missiles had com-
Seaslug in 1962. These first-generation missiles had com-
mand
mand guidance
guidance systems
systems and and were
were largelarge in in size
size (about
(about 20 20
8899
ARCHIE,
FLAK, AAA, SAM
(Photo Credit: Smithsonian Institution Photo No. 154042)
Figure 50. Boeing IIVI-99 Bomarc guided missile during erection

prior to launching, 4 June 1953.
feet in length)
feet in .* The
length).* French worked
The French worked on on the
the PARCA
PARCA and and the
the
MATRA R422-B;
MATRA R422-B; whereas
whereas the Swiss (Oerlikon)
the Swiss (Oerlikon) built
built the
the
RSD
RSD 58,58, again
again all
all first-generation missiles.. Meanwhile,
first-generation missiles Meanwhile, thethe
Soviets
Soviets were also making
were also making progress
progress with SAMs; but
with SAMs; but this
this must
must
be put
be put into
into the context of
the context of its
its testing in combat
testing in combat in Southeast
in Southeast
Asia.
Asia.
*British
"British SAMs
SAMs are
are addressed in chapter
addressed in chapter 44 in
in aa discussion
discussion of
of the Falkland War.
the Falkland War.
90
90
Figure 51. Launch of an Air Force Bomarc interceptor missile at

Cape Canaveral, Florida.
NOTES
NOTES
11.. Robert
Robert F. F. Futrell,
Futrell, United
United States
States Air
Air Force
Force Operations in the
Operations in the Korean
Korean
Conflict: 1 July 1952-27 July 1953, USAF Historical Study 127 (Max-
Conflict: 1 July 1952-27 July 1953, USAF Historical Study 127 (Max-
well
well AFB, AFB, Ala.:
Ala.: USAF
USAF Historical
Division, Air
Air University,
University, 1956),
1956), 87;
87;
US Army Air Defense School, "Air Defense: An Historical Analysis"
US Army Air Defense School, "Air Defense: An Historical Analysis"
(U),
(U), June June 1965,
1965, vol
vol.. 3:30-33
3:30-33 [AUL-M39991-4]
[AUL-M39991-4].. (SECRET-Infor-
(SECRET—Infor-
mation
mation extracted
extracted is
is unclassified .)
unclassified.)
2.
2. US
US Army
Army AirAir Defense
Defense School,
School, "Air
"Air Defense,"
Defense," 33:33-34;
:33-34; Max
Max Ro-
Ro-
senburg,
senburg, "The "The Air
Air Force
Force and
and the
the National
National Guided
Guided Missile
Missile Program:
Program:
1944-1954,"
1944-1954;' study, study, 1964,
1964, 36,
36, 4242 [AFHRC-K239.046-15]
[AFHRC-K239.046-15];; Joseph Joseph
Russo, "ADA
Russo, "ADA in in Retrospect,"
Retrospect," Air
Air Defense
Defense Trends,
Trends, July-September
July-September
1975, 12.
1975, 12.
33.. Futrell,
Futrell, Historical
Historical Study
Study 127,
127, 41,
41, 43;
43; Far
Far East
East Air
Air Forces
Forces Intel-
Intel-
ligence
ligence Roundup
Roundup (12-18 January 1952), vol . 2:11-12; Far East Air
(12-18 January 1952), vol. 2:11-12; Far East Air
Forces
Forces Intelligence
Intelligence Roundup
Roundup (29(29 December
December 1951-4
1951-4 January
January 1952),
1952),
vol.
vol. 33:8 :8 [AFHRC-K720.607A];
[AFHRC-K720.607A]; Andrew Andrew T. T. Soltys,
Soltys, "Enemy
"Enemy Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft
Defenses
Defenses in in North
North Korea,"
Korea," Air
Air University
University Quarterly
Quarterly Review,
Review, Spring
Spring
1954,77-80
1954, 77-80..
9911
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
4.
4. Futrell,
Futrell, Historical Study 127,
Historical Study 127, 165165..
55.. Ibid.,
Ibid., 80.
80.
6.
6. Commander
Commander in in chief,
chief, USUS Pacific
Pacific Fleet,
Fleet, Korean
Korean War.War: (25(25 June
June
1950-27
1950-27 July July 1953)
1953) USUS Pacific
Pacific Fleet
Fleet Operations,
Operations, chap chap.. 33 [NHC];
[NHC]; "Car-"Car-
rier Operations Evaluation Report No. 6, Interim, 1 February 1953-
rier Operations Evaluation Report No. 6, Interim, 1 February 1953-
27 July 1953,"
27 July 1953," 44, 68, reproduced
44,68, reproduced in in William
William E. E. Hodge
Hodge et et al.,
al, "Theater
"Theater
Air Warfare Study" (Thesis, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,
Air Warfare Study" (Thesis, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,
1977),
1977), 39 39 [AUL-MS43117-H688t]
[AUL-MS43117-H688t];; "Far "Far EastEast Air
Air Forces
Forces Report
Report on on
the Korean War," study, bk. 1 :63, 82, 97 [AFSHRC-K720 .04D]; US
the Korean War," study, bk. 1:63, 82, 97 [AFSHRC-K720.04D]; US
Navy
Navy Office Office ofof Information,
Information, "Korean
"Korean CombatCombat Statistics
Statistics forfor Three-
Three-
Year Period" [NHC].
Year Period" [NHC].
77.. A.
A. H.
H. Peterson
Peterson et al., "Aircraft
et al., "Aircraft Vulnerability
Vulnerability in in World
World War War II,"
II,"
Rand
Rand report report RM-402,
RM-402, rev. rev. July
July 1950
1950 (Santa
(Santa Monica,
Monica, Calif.
Calif.:: Rand
Rand
Corp.)
Corp.) fig. fig. 13
13 [AUL-M30352-9]
[AUL-M30352-9]..
88.. Pacific
Pacific Fleet
Fleet Evaluation
Evaluation Group,
Group, research
research memorandum,
memorandum, "The "The
Relative Risk to Anti-Aircraft Fire for Jet and Propeller Driven
Relative Risk to Anti-Aircraft Fire for Jet and Propeller Driven
Ground
Ground Attack Attack Aircraft
Aircraft in in Korea,"
Korea," MarchMarch 1952 1952 [NHC]
[NHC];; Robert
Robert F. F.
Futrell, United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict. 25
Futrell, United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict: 25
June-1
June-1 November
November 1950,1950, USAF
USAF Historical
Historical StudyStudy 71 71 (Maxwell
(Maxwell AFB, AFB,
Ala. : USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952), 57 [AFHRC-
Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952), 57 [AFHRC-
101-71].
101-71].
9.
9. "FEAF
"FEAF Report
Report on on Korean
Korean War,"
War," 128;128; Fifth
Fifth Air
Air Force
Force Intelligence
Intelligence
Summary,
Summary, 15 September 1952,
15 September 1952, 2626 [AFHRC-K730.607].
[AFHRC-K730.607].
10. Futrell, Historical Study
10. Futrell, Historical Study 127,
127, 152;
152; Fifth
Fifth Air
Air Force,
Force, Operations
Operations
Analysis Office, operations analysis memorandum, "A Survey
Analysis Office, operations analysis memorandum, "A Survey of of
Fighter
Fighter BomberBomber Tactics
Tactics and
and Flak
Flak Losses,"
Losses," January
January 1952,
1952, 77 [AFHRC-
[AFHRC-
K730.3101-1] ; Pat Meid and James Yingling, US Marine Corps Op-
K730.3101-1]; Pat Meid and James Yingling, US Marine Corps Op-
erations
erations in in Korea
Korea 1950-1953,
1950-1953, vol.vol. 5,5, Operations
Operations in in West Korea (Wash-
West Korea (Wash-
ington, D.C. : Historical Division, US Marine Corps, 1972), 64, 69.
ington, D.C.: Historical Division, US Marine Corps, 1972), 64, 69.
11
11.. Futrell,
Futrell, Historical
Historical Study
Study 127,127, 152;
152; MeidMeid and
and Yingling,
Yingling, West West
Korea, 5:70.
Korea, 5:70.
12.
12. Futrell,
Futrell, Historical
Historical Study 127, 152-53.
Study 127, 152-53.
13. Meid and
13. Meid and Yingling,
Yingling, West Korea, 55:70,
West Korea, 492n..
:70, 492n
14.
14. Ibid.,
Ibid., 70-72
70-72..
15
15.. Futrell,
Futrell, Historical
Historical Study
Study 127, 127, 219-22;
219-22; History,
History, FarFar East
East AirAir
Forces, July-December 1952, vol. 1 :58 [AFHRC-K720 .01] ; "FEAF
Forces, July-December 1952, vol. 1:58 [AFHRC-K720.01]; "FEAF
Report
Report on Korean War,"
on Korean War," 39.
39.
16 . Futrell, Historical Study 71,
16. Futrell, Historical Study 116; "FEAF
71, 116; "FEAF Report
Report on on Korean
Korean
War,"
War," 39-41, 128-33;; Memorandum
39-41, 128-33 Memorandum by by Thomas
Thomas S. S. Power
Power to to Gen
Gen
James B. Knapp, subject: Commanders' Conference, Patrick Air Force
James B. Knapp, subject: Commanders' Conference, Patrick Air Force
Base,
Base, 30 30 September-1 October, 44 October
September-1 October, October 1957, "Strategic Air
1957, 22;; "Strategic Air
Command Participation in the Missile Program from March 1957
Command Participation in the Missile Program from March 1957
92
92
POSTWAR
POSTWAR YEARS,
YEARS, 1945-65
1945-65
through
through December
December 1957,"
1957," USAF
USAF Historical
Historical Study
Study 70, vol. 22 [AFHRC-
70, vol. [AFHRC-
K416.01-70] (SECRET—Information extraction
K416.01-70].. (SECRET-Information extraction is
is unclassified
unclassified.).)
17. The remaining material is drawn from the sections on
17. The remaining material is drawn from the sections on the
the spe-
spe-
cific
cific missiles
missiles in
in Ted
Ted G.
G. Nicholas,
Nicholas, U .S. Missile
U.S. Data Book,
Missile Data Book, 1982
1982 (Foun-
(Foun-
tain Valley, Calif.: Data Search Associates, 1981); and Jane's All
tain Valley, Calif.: Data Search Associates, 1981); and Jane's All the
the
World's
World's Aircraft
Aircraft 1956-57;
1956-57; 1957-58 1958-59;; 1959-60
1957-58;; 1958-59 1959-60;; 1960-61
1960-61;; 1961-
1961-
62; 1962-63 ; 1963-64; 1964-65 ; 1965-66 ; 1966-67; 1967-68 (New
62; 1962-63; 1963-64; 1964-65; 1965-66; 1966-67; 1967-68 (New
York: Jane's Publishing
York: Jane's Publishing Co.
Co. Ltd.).
Ltd.).
18. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars:
18. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War
War and
and Peace
Peace in in the
the
Middle East
Middle East (New
(New York:
York: Random
Random House,
House, 1982),
1982), 225
225..
19. US
19. US Army
Army Air
Air Defense School,
Defense School, "Air
"Air Defense," vol
Defense," vol.. 33:48-50;
:48-50;
Rosenburg,
Rosenburg, "National
"National Guided Missile Program,"
Guided Missile Program," 71,71, 75,
75, 76,
76, 79,
79, 83,
83,
117-18,
117-18, 150.
150.
9933
CHAPTER
CHAPTER 33
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
The
The Vietnam
Vietnam conflict
conflict was
was another
another war
war that
that pitted
pitted West-
West-
ern
ern armies
armies and
and high-technology
high-technology armsarms against
against numerous
numerous te- te-
nacious
nacious foes
foes in
in primitive
primitive terrain.
terrain. The
The technology
technology brought
brought
with
with itit many
many advantages,
advantages, the
the most
most significant
significant of
of which
which were
were
firepower
firepower andand mobility
mobility.. Air
Air power
power was was the
the most
most important
important
and
and visible
visible manifestation
manifestation of of this
this technology
technology.. The
The guerrillas
guerrillas
relied
relied onon dispersion,
dispersion, camouflage,
camouflage, mobility,
mobility, and
and night
night op-
op-
erations
erations toto neutralize
neutralize the
the impact
impact of of air
air power
power as as well
well as
as
airfield
airfield attack
attack and ground-based weapons
and ground-based weapons to to directly
directly defend
defend
themselves
themselves..
French
French Operations
Operations
Compared
Compared to to the
the later
later American
American involvement
involvement in in Indo-
Indo-
china,
china, the the French
French conducted
conducted smaller
smaller military
military operations
operations
with
with less-modern
less-modern equipment
equipment.. The The French
French had had but
but 107
107
World
World War War II II vintage
vintage combat
combat aircraft
aircraft (fighters,
(fighters, fighter-
fighter-
bombers,
bombers, and and bombers)
bombers) during
during thethe decisive
decisive 1954
1954 battle
battle of
of
Dien
Dien BienBien Phu.
Phu. Here,
Here, thethe French
French attempted
attempted to to duplicate
duplicate
their
their 1953
1953 success
success atat Na
Na San
San where
where theythey used
used some
some ofof their
their
best
best troops
troops asas bait
bait to
to lure
lure the
the guerrillas
guerrillas into
into the
the open
open toto be
be
cut
cut down
down by by air
air and
and artillery
artillery fire
fire..
The
The Vietminh,
Vietminh, however,
however, learned
learned the the lessons
lessons from
from their
their
previous
previous defeats
defeats and
and increased
increased their
their antiaircraft
antiaircraft protection.
protection.
The
The Communist
Communist antiaircraft
artillery (AAA)
(AAA) forced
forced French
French
aircraft,
aircraft, which
which hadhad initially
initially flown
flown at at 600
600 toto 1,800
1,800 feet,
feet, to
to
fly at 2,700 to 3,000 feet decreasing French effectiveness .
fly at 2,700 to 3,000 feet decreasing French effectiveness.
The
The guns
guns also
also took
took aa toll
toll on
on French
French aircraft.
aircraft. During
During attacks
attacks
on
on the
the Vietminh supply lines
Vietminh supply lines for
for two
two weeks
weeks after
after 24
24 No-
No-
95
95
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
vember
vember 1953,1953, 45 45 of
of 51
51 French
French aircraft
aircraft were
were hithit by
by Com-
Com-
munist
munist AAAAAA and and two
two were
were downed.
downed. Not Not surprisingly,
surprisingly, flakflak
and
and air
air power
power played
played aa vital
vital role
role inin the
the actual
actual siege
siege.. The
The
Communists
Communists opened opened the battle by
the battle by attacking
attacking French
French airfields
airfields
throughout
throughout Indochina
Indochina with with artillery
artillery andand infiltrators
infiltrators andand
damaged
damaged aa number
number of of aircraft
aircraft.. A
A Vietminh
Vietminh artillery
artillery bom-
bom-
bardment
bardment on on 10 10 March
March initiated
initiated the
the direct
direct attack
attack onon Dien
Dien
Bien
Bien Phu
Phu andand within
within four
four days
days closed
closed the
the garrison's
garrison's air-
air-
strips.
strips. Meanwhile
Meanwhile the the Communists
Communists assaulted
assaulted thethe French
French
positions
positions as as they
they fended
fended offoff French
French airair attacks.
attacks.
The
The air
air portion
portion of of the
the battle
battle saw
saw French
French aircraft
aircraft duel
duel
Communist
Communist flak. flak. Communist
Communist antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns,
guns, 16 16 Viet-
Viet-
minh
minh andand 6464 Chinese,
Chinese, forced
forced French
French aircraft
aircraft higher
higher andand
higher
higher and
and disrupted
disrupted the the accuracy
accuracy of of both
both weapons
weapons and and
supply
supply delivery.
delivery. Thus, the Vietminh
Thus, the Vietminh countered
countered French
French ae-ae-
rial
rial firepower
firepower and and forced
forced over
over 50 50 percent
percent of of French
French air-air-
dropped
dropped supplies
supplies to to miss
miss their
their mark
mark and and fall
fall toto the
the
Communists.
Communists. Radar-directed
Radar-directed gunsguns hithit aircraft
aircraft flying
flying as
as high
high
as
as 10,000
10,000 feet
feet.. During
During the
the battle, the Vietminh
battle, the Vietminh downed
downed 48 48
French aircraft
French aircraft andand damaged
damaged another
another 167.167. More
More important,
important,
they cut off the fortress from the outside and neutralized
they cut off the fortress from the outside and neutralized
one
one of
of its
its most potent weapons
most potent weapons.. Thus
Thus AAA
AAA played
played aa critical
critical
role
role in
in the
the decisive
decisive battle
battle of the first
of the first Indochina
Indochina War.'War.'
American
American Operations
Operations through
through 1968
1968
American
involvement in in Indochina
Indochina began
began inin the
the 1950s,
1950s,
with
with the
the dispatch
dispatch ofof advisers
advisers and
and equipment.
equipment. Again
Again thethe
insurgents,
insurgents, this
this time
time called
called Vietcong
Vietcong (VC),
(VC), lacked
lacked air
air power.
power.
The
The South
South Vietnamese
Vietnamese usedused American
American helicopters,
helicopters, which
which
gave
gave them
them aa tactical
tactical advantage
advantage over
over the
the guerrillas
guerrillas (fig.
(fig. 52)
52)..
However,
However, thethe Communists
Communists employed
employed discipline
discipline and
and .50-
.50-
caliber
caliber machine
machine guns
guns to
to counter
counter the
the choppers,
choppers, asas they
they dem-
dem-
onstrated
onstrated during
during the
the December
December 1962
1962 battle
battle at
at Ap
Ap Bac
Bac.. De-
De-
spite
spite superior
superior numbers
numbers and and helicopters,
helicopters, the the South
South
Vietnamese
Vietnamese suffered
suffered heavy
heavy losses,
losses, including five helicopters
including five helicopters
96
96
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
Figure 52. American adviser instructing South Vietnamese troops

on the way to mount and dismount from a CH-21 Shaw-
nee helicopter in 1962.
destroyed
destroyed and and 1414 others
others hithit.. The
The VC VC continued
continued to to exact
exact aa
steady
steady toll
toll on
on the
the aircraft
aircraft attacking
attacking them. them. On On 2424 November
November
1963
1963 inin An
An Xuyen
Xuyen province,
province, for for example,
example, Communist
Communist
ground
ground fire
fire hit 25 aircraft
hit 25 aircraft and
and downed
downed five five.^.
The
The American
American presence
presence and and air air activity
activity steadily
steadily inin-
creased,
creased, andand with
with this
this increase
increase came came losses.
losses. The The United
United
States
States suffered
suffered itsits first
first combat
combat aircraft
aircraft loss loss onon 22 February
February
1962,
1962, when
when aa C-123 (fig. 53)
C-123 (fig. 53) flying
flying aa low-level
low-level training
training
mission
mission failed
failed to
to return.
return. The
The United
United States
States lost
lost 1111 aircraft
aircraft
to
to hostile
hostile causes
causes inin 1962
1962 and
and 23 23 aircraft
aircraft the the next
next year.
year. The
The
first
first US
US Navy
Navy loss
loss occurred
occurred in in Laos
Laos in June 1964,
in June 1964, oneone ofof
60
60 American
American aircraft
aircraft lost
lost inin combat
combat in in Indochina
Indochina in in 1964
1964..
The
The air
air war
war expanded
expanded in in May
May 1964 1964 as as thethe United
United States
States
began
began aa continuing
continuing program
program of of Air
Air Force
Force and and Navy
Navy recon-
recon-
naissance
naissance flights
flights over
over Laos.
Laos. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the Gulf
Gulf ofof Ton-
Ton-
kin
kin incident
incident in in August
August 1964 marked the
1964 marked the start
start of of the
the
American
American air air war
war inin Vietnam,
Vietnam, as as itit led
led to the first
to the first air
air strike
strike
against
against North
North Vietnam
Vietnam (fig.(fig. 54).
54). TwoTwo of of the
the 8080 attacking
attacking
9977
Figure 53. Saigon. An Air Force C-123K Provider, assigned to the

315th Air Commando Wing at Phan Rang Air Base, lifts
off from an Army special forces camp airstrip following
the delivery of vitally needed supplies.
Figure 54. North Vietnamese scramble for their guns.
98
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
Navy
Navy planes involved in
planes involved in the
the reprisal
reprisal attack
attack went
went down.
down.
Considering
Considering the the meagerness
meagemess of of the
the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese de- de-
fenses
fenses inin terms
terms of of quantity
quantity and and quality
quality at at this
this point,
point, these
these
losses
losses should
should havehave been
been aa warning
warning signal
signal to to the
the decision-
decision-
makers
makers of of what
what waswas toto come.
come. TheThe airair war
war escalated
escalated further
further
with
with armed
armed reconnaissance
reconnaissance and and fixed-target
fixed-target strikes
strikes in
in Laos
Laos
in
in December
December 1964 1964.. In In February
February 1965 1965 American
American reprisal
reprisal
strikes
strikes onon North
North Vietnam
Vietnam resumed
resumed on on aa "tit-for-tat"
"tit-for-tat" basis
basis..
The
The full-scale
full-scale bombing
bombing offensive
offensive against
against North
North Vietnam,
Vietnam,
code-named
code-named RollingRolling Thunder,
Thunder, beganbegan in in March 1965 . 3 On
March 1965.^ On
the
the first
first mission,
mission, 22 March
March 1965,
1965, North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese gunners
gunners
downed
downed fourfour ofof the
the 130
130 attacking
attacking US US and
and South
South Vietnamese
Vietnamese
aircraft.
aircraft. Although
Although the the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese lacked lacked thethe most
most
modern
modern equipment,
equipment, they they hadhad no no surface-to-air
missiles
(SAMs)
(SAMs) and and few
few jets;
jets; they
they did
did have
have numerous
numerous conventional
conventional
antiaircraft
artillery weapons
weapons.. So, So, while
while they
they could
could not
not stop
stop
the air
the air attacks,
attacks, they
they did
did make
make them costly..
them costly
From
From thethe start
start America
America used used air
air power
power against
against the
the North
North
as
as aa political tool:: first
political tool first during
during the the reprisal
reprisal raids
raids and
and then
then
during the
during the Rolling
Rolling Thunder
Thunder campaign.
campaign. The The objectives
objectives of of
the
the latter
latter were
were to to stiffen
stiffen the
the morale
morale of the South
of the South Vietnam-
Vietnam-
ese,
ese, interdict
interdict Communist
Communist supplies,
supplies, inflict
inflict punishment
punishment and and
cost
cost onon the
the North
North Vietnamese,
Vietnamese, and and demonstrate
demonstrate American
American
will.4
will.^
But many,
But many, thenthen andand now,
now, adamantly
adamantly proclaimproclaim the the op-
op-
eration
eration waswas restricted,
restricted, some some saysay decisively,
decisively, by the civilian
by the civilian
decisionmakers
decisionmakers.. Sortie Sortie levels
levels were
were controlled,
controlled, areasareas of of
North
North Vietnam
Vietnam were were putput off-limits
off-limits to to air
air attack,
attack, bombing
bombing
halts
halts were
were frequent,
frequent, andand targets were carefully
targets were carefully selected
selected from
from
Washington;
Washington; for for example,
example, MiG MiG fields
fields were
were off-limits
off-limits until
until
1967,
1967, as were missile
as were missile sites
sites until
until they
they downed
downed an an American
American
aircraft. In
aircraft. In addition,
addition, the the campaign
campaign was was graduated,
graduated, robbing
robbing
the
the airmen
airmen of of the
the elements
elements of of shock
shock andand surprise,
surprise, permitting
permitting
the
the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese to to build
build andand adjust
adjust their
their defenses.'
defenses.^
The
The airmen
airmen werewere also
also hindered
hindered by by other factors, the
other factors, the most
most
significant
significant was was their
their unpreparedness
unpreparedness to to fight
fight aa sustained,
sustained,
conventional
conventional air air campaign.
campaign.^6 American
American aircraftaircraft were
were un-
un-
99
99
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
suited
suited for
for these operations.. Ironically,
these operations Ironically, "strategic"
"strategic" bombers
bombers
were
were used
used against "tactical" targets
against "tactical" targets inin the
the South,
South, while
while "tac-
"tac-
tical"
tical" fighters
fighters werewere usedused against
against "strategic"
"strategic" targets
targets inin the
the
North. The
North. The lack
lack of of all-weather
all-weather aircraft
aircraft presented
presented aa consid-
consid-
erable
erable burden
burden in in the
the air
air war
war against North Vietnam,
against North Vietnam, es- es-
pecially
pecially in
in the
the winter
winter monsoon
monsoon season
season (December
(December through
through
mid-May)
mid-May).. TheThe onlyonly American
American all-weather
all-weather aircraft
aircraft were
were the
the
Marine/Navy
Marine/Navy A-6 A-6 (fig.
(fig. 55)
55) and Air Force
and Air Force F-111, the former
F-111, the former
entering action
entering action in in 1965,
1965, the
the latter
latter in
in 1968
1968.. America
America fought
fought
aa conventional
conventional air air war
war with
with tactics and aircraft
tactics and aircraft designed
designed
for
for nuclear
nuclear warfare
warfare.. The The best
best example
example of of this
this mismatch
mismatch was was
the F-105
the F-105 (fig
(fig.. 56).
56). A fighter with
A fighter with an an internal
internal bomb
bomb bay,bay, aa
contradiction
contradiction in in terms,
terms, itit was the US
was the US Air
Air Force's
Force's workhorse,
workhorse,
flying many
flying many of of the
the missions
missions over
over the
the North
North andand receiving
receiving
the
the most
most damage.'
damage.^
Figure 55. Gulf of Tonkin. A heavy armed A-6A Intruder attack air-
craft heads for a target over North Vietnam while op-
erating off the nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier
USS Enterprise.
100
100
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
Figure 56. With lieavy bombs hanging beneath their aircraft, F-105
Thunderchief pilots head toward a target in North
Vietnam.
The
The United
United States, for all
States, for all of
of its
its technological
technological prowess,
prowess,
was
was ill-equipped
ill-equipped in other areas
in other areas as
as well.
well. At
At thethe beginning
beginning of of
the
the air
air war,
war, thethe United
United States
States was
was still
still using
using unguided
unguided
(dumb)
(dumb) munitions,
munitions, just just asas airmen
airmen hadhad used
used in in World
World War
War
1!
I! Thus,
Thus, aircrews
aircrews hadhad toto overfly
overfly their
their targets,
targets, which
which proved
proved
dangerous
dangerous and and often
often fatal.'
fatal.^ Second,
Second, thethe United
United States
States had
had
neither
neither sufficient
sufficient nornor adequate
adequate electronic
countermeasures
(ECM).
(ECM). Although
Although Strategic
Strategic Air
Air Command
Command (SAC) (SAC) B-52s
B-52s were
were
reasonably
reasonably equipped,
equipped. Tactical
Tactical Air
Air Command
Command (TAC) (TAC) fighters
fighters
were not.
were not. The
The irony
irony therefore
therefore is that, until
is that, until late
late in the war,
in the war,
the better-equipped B-52s
the better-equipped B-52s operated
operated unopposed
unopposed over over South
South
Vietnam while
Vietnam while throughout
throughout the the war,
war, fighters
fighters flewflew against
against the
the
growing
growing and and much
much tougher
tougher defenses
defenses in in North
North Vietnam
Vietnam..
Another
Another factor,
factor, perhaps
perhaps thethe most
most important,
important, was was that
that the
the
Americans
Americans underestimated
underestimated the the power
power of of the
the defense
defense andand
the
the abilities
abilities ofof the
the North
North Vietnamese.
Vietnamese. The The airmen
airmen focused
focused
on
on the
the weapons
weapons on on which
which airmen
airmen always
always focus,
focus, where
where the
the
glamour
glamour and and glory
glory is,is, fighters
fighters and
and air-to-air
air-to-air combat.
combat. It It is
is
true
true that
that the
the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese built built up
up their
their air force. But
air force. But
this
this air
air force proved as
force proved as elusive as the
elusive as the Vietcong,
Vietcong, usingusing guer-
guer-
rilla
rilla tactics
tactics ofof hit
hit and
and run, and fighting
run, and fighting only
only when
when circum-
circum-
101
101
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
Stances were
stances were favorable
favorable.. With With the the major
major exception
exception of of
operation
operation Bolo Bolo in in January
January 1967, 1967, when
when US US fighter
fighter pilots
pilots
ambushed
ambushed the the MiGs
MiGs and and destroyed
destroyed sevenseven without
without aa loss,
loss,^9
American
American airmen airmen did did notnot engage
engage in in major
major air air battles
battles and
and
thus
thus were
were unable
unable to to rack
rack upup scores
scores asas they
they had had inin World
World
War
War II II and
and Korea
Korea.'° . 10 Air-to-air
Air-to-air combat
combat was was neither
neither frequent
frequent
nor
nor important
important in the Vietnam
in the Vietnam air air war.
war.
The
The principal
principal Communist
Communist weapon weapon against
against US US aircraft
aircraft
was
was AAA.
AAA. American
American airmen airmen not not only
only underestimated
underestimated North North
Vietnamese
Vietnamese defenses, defenses, they they especially underestimated the
especially underestimated the
impact
impact of of flak.
flak. Both
Both were were serious
serious mistakes
mistakes..
The
The North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese fielded fielded aa formidable
formidable groundground-
based
based air air defense
defense system system.. In In early
early 1965
1965 the the North
North Viet-
Viet-
namese
namese manned
manned about about 1,200 1,200 antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns, guns, which
which they
they
increased
increased to to almost
almost 2,000 2,000 gunsguns within
within sixsix months.
months. These
These
guns
guns accounted
accounted for for about
about 80 80 percent
percent of 169 American
of 169 American fixed-
fixed-
wing aircraft
wing aircraft lost lost in in 1965."
1965." Between
Between 1965 1965 and and 1973
1973 flak
flak
engaged
engaged one-fourth
one-fourth of of all
all flights
flights over
over North
North Vietnam
Vietnam and and
accounted for
accounted for 6666 percent
percent of of USUS aircraft
aircraft losses
losses over
over thethe
North.
North.'212
The farther
The farther northnorth the the airmen operated, the
airmen operated, more intense
the more intense
were
were thethe defenses. Although only
defenses. Although only 20 20 percent
percent of of US
US sorties
sorties
over
over Indochina
Indochina in in 1965
1965 werewere against
against North
North Vietnam,
Vietnam, 62 62
percent of its combat losses were there. The following year,
percent of its combat losses were there. The following year,
1966,
1966, proved
proved only only aa little
little better,
better, with
with about
about 30 30 percent
percent of of
the
the total
total Indochina
Indochina sorties sorties and and just
just under
under 60 60 percent
percent of of
losses occurring
losses occurring over over the the North
North.. The area north
The area north of 20 de-
of 20 de-
grees latitude,
grees latitude, especially
especially aroundaround the the Hanoi-Haiphong
Hanoi-Haiphong area, area,
proved
proved most most dangerous
dangerous.. In In the
the period
period September
September 1966 1966
through
through JulyJuly 1967,
1967, the the United
United States
States flew
flew lessless than
than 30 per-
30 per-
cent
cent ofof its
its North
North Vietnam
Vietnam attack sorties north
attack sorties north of of 20
20 degrees,
degrees,
yet
yet lost
lost 6363.5 percent of
.5 percent of its
its aircraft
aircraft there
there.'^. 13
The
The American
American airmen airmen initially
initially used
used nuclear
nuclear warfare
warfare tac-tac-
tics
tics that
that they
they had had practiced
practiced in in the
the late
late 1950s
1950s andand early
early
1960s:
1960s: high-speed,
high-speed, low-altitude
low-altitude approaches
approaches and and aa rapid
rapid
climb
climb (pop-up)
(pop-up) to to bombing
bombing altitudealtitude just
just before
before reaching
reaching the the
target.
target. One
One adjustment
adjustment to to using
using conventional
conventional ordnanceordnance was was
102
102
VIETNAM
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to
to make
make multiple
multiple passes
passes over
over the target. But
the target. But intense
intense ground
ground
fire
fire and
and the
the resulting
resulting losses
losses forced
forced aa change.
change. Therefore
Therefore the the
airmen
airmen raised
raised approach
approach altitudes
altitudes to to 15,000
15,000 to to 20,000
20,000 feet,
feet,
from
from which
which thethe aircraft
aircraft dive-bombed
dive-bombed their their targets,
targets, and
and lim-
lim-
ited
ited attacks
attacks toto aa single
single pass.
pass. '4"*
The
The air war changed
air war changed dramatically
dramatically on on 2424 July
July 1965
1965 when
when
aa Soviet
Soviet SA-2
SA-2 missile
missile downed
downed an an Air
Air Force
Force F-4
F-4 (fig.
(fig. 57)
57)
and
and damaged
damaged threethree others
others.. Proving
Proving this this shootdown
shootdown was was no no
fluke,
fluke, two
two days
days later
later an
an SA-2
SA-2 destroyed
destroyed an an American
American drone.
drone.
US
US reconnaissance
reconnaissance (fig. (fig. 58)
58) spotted
spotted construction
construction of of the
the first
first
SAM
SAM site
site in
in early
early April
April and
and watched
watched itit and and three
three other
other sites
sites
progress
progress throughout
throughout the spring (figs
the spring (figs.. 59
59 and
and 60).
60). But
But the
the
decisionmakers
decisionmakers would would notnot permit
permit the the airmen
airmen to to attack
attack the
the
missile
missile sites,
sites, one
one of of the
the many
many political
political restrictions
restrictions on
on the
the
air
air war.
war. Secretary
Secretary of of Defense
Defense Robert
Robert McNamara
McNamara arguedargued
that
that ifif the
the airmen
airmen attacked
attacked the
the SAM SAM sites,
sites, they
they must
must also
also
attack
attack thethe MiG fields, which
MiG fields, which wouldwould be be aa major
major escalation
escalation
of the air
of the air war.
war. TheThe leaders
leaders also
also feared
feared thatthat such
such attacks
attacks
might
might cause
cause Soviet
Soviet casualties.
casualties. Besides,
Besides, oneone of
of McNamara's
McNamara's
chief
chief assistants,
assistants, JohnJohn T. T. McNaughton,
McNaughton, believed believed that
that the
the
SAMs
SAMs onlyonly represented
represented aa bluffbluff andand would
would not not be
be used."
used.'^
The
The Soviet
Soviet antiaircraft
antiaircraft missile
missile evolved
evolved from from German
German
Figure 57. Phantom attacks. A US Air Force F-4 Phantom dives

toward a target in North Vietnam.
103
103
Figure 58. Reconnaissance version of the higli-flying Mach 2-plus

fighter-bomber, the RF-4C, is equipped for sophisticated
day and night reconnaissance worl(.
Figure 59. Surface-to-air missile site in North Vietnam that has

been abandoned and returned to cultivation.
World
World WarWar II
II programs.
programs. The
The first
first Soviet
Soviet SAM,
SAM, the
the SA-1,
SA-1,
was
was aa German Wasserfall with
German Wasserfall with ground
ground (command)
(command) guid-
guid-
ance.
ance. It
It became
became operational
operational in
in early
early 1954
1954.. The
The West
West first
first
saw
saw its
its successor,
successor, the
the SA-2,
SA-2, in
in 1957.
1957. The
The Soviets
Soviets designed
designed
this
this missile
missile to
to defend
defend against
against high-flying,
high-flying, essentially
essentially non-
non-
maneuvering,
maneuvering, strategic
strategic bombers.
bombers. TheThe SA-2
SA-2 measured
measured 3355
104
104
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
Figure 60. North Vietnamese SA-2 position.
feet
feet in
in length
length and
and weighed
weighed 4,875
4,875 pounds
pounds withwith its
its booster.
booster.
It
It could
could carry
carry aa 288-pound
288-pound warhead
warhead at at Mach
Mach 33.5 .5 out
out to
to aa
slant
slant range
range ofof 24-25
24-25 miles
miles and
and was
was effective
effective between
between 3,000
3,000
and
and 60,000
60,000 feetfeet (fig.
(fig. 61).
61). The
The SA-2
SA-2 first
first achieved
achieved promi-
promi-
nence by
nence by knocking
knocking downdown an an American
American U-2 U-2 over
over the
the Soviet
Soviet
Union in
Union in the
the spring
spring ofof 1960
1960 and
and downing
downing another
another U-2
U-2 over
over
Cuba in October 1962 (fig . 62).' 6
Cuba in October 1962 (fig. 62).'^
Despite
Despite knowledge
knowledge of of the
the missile
missile since
since 1957,
1957, and
and its
its po-
po-
tential
tential (similar
(similar to to the Nike Ajax),
the Nike Ajax), the
the United
United States
States made
made
only
only mixed
mixed progress
progress with
with countermeasures.
countermeasures. Tight Tight budgets
budgets
in
in the
the late
late 1950s
1950s hampered
hampered these
these efforts.
efforts. Airmen
Airmen assigned
assigned
high
high priority
priority to countermeasures against
to countermeasures against the
the SA-2
SA-2 in in bud-
bud-
gets
gets for
for fiscal
fiscal years
years 1964
1964 and 1965, but
and 1965, but had
had nothing
nothing effec-
effec-
tive
tive in
in hand
hand when
when thethe need
need arose
arose.. As
As aa result,
result, in
in 1964,
1964, some
some
105
105
(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artiliery Museum)
Figure 61. Soviet SA-2.
.'■* )ii}M
Figure 62. SA-2 launch against US aircraft.
106
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
airmen
airmen believed
believed that that aircraft
aircraft couldcould not not operate
operate in in SAM-
SAM-
protected
protected areasareas.. Although
Although itit is easy and
is easy and partially
partially correct
correct to to
blame
blame the the tight
tight funding,
funding, it it is
is also
also true
true that
that the
the airmen
airmen
underestimated
underestimated the the requirement
requirement for for countermeasures.
countermeasures. Al- Al-
though
though the the US US Air
Air Force
Force equipped
equipped strategic
strategic bombers
bombers with with
warning
warning and and jamming
jamming devicesdevices in in the
the late
late 1950s,
1950s, it it did
did not
not
similarly
similarly equip
equip tactical
tactical fighters
fighters and and bombers.
bombers. Whatever
Whatever the the
reason-money,
reason—money, obsession obsession with with nuclear
nuclear weapons
weapons delivery,
delivery,
electrical
electrical power
power requirements,
requirements, trust trust in in fighter
fighter maneuver-
maneuver-
ability
ability and
and speed-the
speed—the tactical tactical air air forces
forces werewere unprepared
unprepared
for
for combat."
combat.'^
The
The potential
potential SAM SAM threat
threat grewgrew as as the
the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese
incorporated
incorporated more more missiles
missiles into into their
their inventory.
inventory. North North
Vietnamese
Vietnamese SAM SAM battalions
battalions increased
increased from from one one inin 1965
1965 toto
25
25 the
the next
next year,
year, toto 30
30 inin 1967,
1967, and and to 35-40 in
to 35-40 1968.. This
in 1968 This
growth
growth in in units
units permitted
permitted the the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese to to increase
increase
their
their missile
missile firings from 30
firings from 30 perper month
month in in the
the first
first 1111
months
months of of operation
operation to to 270270 per
per month
month between
between July July 19661966
and
and October
October 1967. 1967. TheThe latter
latter month,
month, with with between
between 590 590 and
and
740
740 SAMs
SAMs fired, fired, waswas the
the peakpeak monthmonth of of firing
firing until
until thethe
Linebacker
Linebacker II II operations
operations of of 1972
1972.. From
From October
October 1967 1967 to to
the
the bombing
bombing halt halt onon 11 April
April 1968,1968, SAM SAM firings
firings averaged
averaged
220
220 per month. During
per month. During this this period,
period, the the American
American airmen airmen
observed
observed 5,366-6,037
5,366-6,037 SAMs, SAMs, which downed 115-128
which downed 115-128
aircraft . 's
aircraft.'^
Despite
Despite the the increase
increase in in SAM
SAM firings,
firings, their
their direct
direct effec-
effec-
tiveness
tiveness declined.
declined. In In 1965
1965 itit took
took almost
almost 18 18 SAMs
SAMs to to down
down
each
each American
American aircraft,
aircraft, aa figure
figure thatthat rose
rose to to 35
35 in
in 1966,
1966, to to
57
57 inin 1967,
1967, and and toto 107
107 in in 1968.
1968. A A number
number of of factors
factors con- con-
tributed
tributed to to this
this decline.'
decHne.'^9
The
The airmen
airmen quicklyquickly learned
learned that that thethe SA-2
SA-2 could
could be be out-
out-
maneuvered
maneuvered.. The The Soviets
Soviets designed
designed the the SA-2
SA-2 to to destroy
destroy high-
high-
flying,
flying, nonmaneuvering,
nonmaneuvering, strategic strategic bombers;
bombers; but but until
until 19721972
it
it engaged
engaged primarily
primarily low-flying,
low-flying, very very maneuverable,
maneuverable, tactical tactical
fighters
fighters.. On On clear
clear days,
days, alertalert airmen
airmen could could spotspot SA-2 SA-2
launches
launches as the missile
as the missile was was large,
large, described
described by by most
most flyers
flyers
as aa flying
as telephone pole,
flying telephone pole, and and leftleft aa visible smoke trail.
visible smoke trail.
107
107
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
The
The pilots
pilots would
would rapidly
rapidly divedive toward
toward thethe missile,
missile, and
and when
when
it
it changed
changed direction
direction to to follow
follow thethe aircraft,
aircraft, the
the pilot
pilot would
would
pull up
pull up asas abruptly
abruptly and and as as sharply
sharply as as possible
possible.. TheThe SA-2SA-2
just
just could
could not not follow
follow such maneuvers.. But
such maneuvers But such
such action
action re- re-
quired sufficient warning,
quired sufficient warning, proper
proper timing,
timing, and,
and, of of course,
course,
nerve
nerve and and skill
skill.. To
To give
give pilots
pilots adequate
adequate timetime to to maneuver,
maneuver,
procedures prohibited the
procedures prohibited the pilots
pilots from
from flying
flying tootoo close
close to to
clouds
clouds between
between them them and and thethe ground.
ground. Later,
Later, thethe airmen
airmen
received
received electronic
electronic devices
devices thatthat gave
gave aa visual
visual andand aural
aural
warning when
warning when aa SAM SAM radar radar waswas tracking (painting) an
tracking (painting) an
aircraft.
aircraft. 2°2°
The American airmen
The American airmen also also directly
directly took
took onon thethe missiles
missiles..
On
On 27 27 July,
July, 4646 USUS AirAir Force
Force fighter-bombers
fighter-bombers attacked
attacked two two
missile
missile sites, met disaster,
sites, met disaster, andand according
according to to aa CIA
CIA report,
report,
hit
hit the
the wrong targets. North
wrong targets. North Vietnamese
Vietnamese gunners
gunners downed
downed
three aircraft while
three aircraft while aa midair
midair collision
collision accounted
accounted for for twotwo
others.
others. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the anti-SAM attacks continued
anti-SAM attacks continued.. In In
the
the first
first nine
nine months
months of of 1966,
1966, thethe airmen
airmen launched
launched 75 75
strikes
strikes against
against 60 60 sites
sites and
and claimed
claimed to to have destroyed 25
have destroyed 25
and damaged
and damaged 25 25.. Such
Such attacks
attacks proved
proved unprofitable
unprofitable because
because
of
of the mobility of
the mobility of the
the SAMs-they
SAMs—they could could be be relocated
relocated
within
within hours
hours.2' .
One
One effort
effort to to counter
counter North Vietnamese SAMs
North Vietnamese SAMs was was
standoff
standoff ECM: ECM: aircraft
aircraft crammed
crammed with electronics gear
with electronics gear that
that
orbited aa distance
orbited distance from from the defenses and
the defenses and interfered
interfered with with
Communist radar
Communist radar andand SAM signals. The
SAM signals. The Marines
Marines employed
employed
EF-lOBs in
EF-1011s this role
in this role between
between April April 1965
1965 and 1969. The
and 1969. The
Douglas Skyknight
Douglas Skyknight was was ancient,
ancient, having first flown
having first flown in in 1948
1948
and seen action
and seen action in in the
the Korean
Korean War War as night fighter.
as aa night fighter. It It
was joined in
was joined in the
the ECM
ECM rolerole inin late
late 1965
1965 by another Douglas
by another Douglas
product,
product, the the Skywarrior,
Skywarrior, which which first
first flew
flew in
in 1952.
1952. TheThe Navy
Navy
employed
employed the the Skywarrior
Skywarrior as as an
an electronics
electronics warfare
warfare aircraft
aircraft
designated as
designated the EKA-3B.
as the EKA-3B. The The AirAir Force
Force adopted
adopted the the Navy
Navy
aircraft
aircraft and and also
also used
used it it in the ECM
in the ECM rolerole as
as the
the EB-66C,
EB-66C,
which
which carried
carried aa crewcrew of seven, including
of seven, including fourfour ECMECM oper-oper-
ators
ators in crew compartment
in aa crew compartment fitted in the
fitted in the bomb
bomb bay. bay. Joined
Joined
by
by other
other ECM ECM versions
versions of of the
the B-66,
B-66, itit served
served throughout
throughout
10
1088
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
the
the war. However, the
war. However, the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese moved moved theirtheir
SAMs,
SAMs, forcing
forcing the
the EB-66
EB-66 in in turn
turn to
to move
move awayaway from
from North
North
Vietnam
Vietnam to to orbits
orbits over
over both
both Laos
Laos and
and the
the Gulf
Gulf of of Tonkin.
Tonkin.
In
In January
January 19681968 aa Vietnamese
Vietnamese MiG MiG downed
downed an an EB-66C
EB-66C
(fig.
(fig. 63).22
63).22 In
In late
late 1966
1966 thethe Marines
Marines introduced
introduced the the EA-6A
EA-6A
in
in the
the jamming
jamming role role..
A
A third
third American
American measuremeasure against
against thethe SAMs
SAMs was was code-
code-
named
named Wild Wild Weasel
Weasel.. TheThe Air
Air Force
Force installed
installed radar
radar homing
homing
and
and warning
warning (RHAW),
(RHAW), electronics
electronics equipment
equipment that that could
could
detect
detect SAMSAM radar
radar and
and indicate
indicate itsits location,
location, into
into F-100Fs,
F-lOOFs,
the
the two-seat
two-seat trainer
trainer version
version of of its
its fighter-bomber.
fighter-bomber. Wild Wild
Weasel
Weasel II went
went into
into action
action in in November
November 1965, 1965, flying
flying with
with
and guiding conventionally
and guiding conventionally armed armed F-105s
F-105s against
against SAM SAM po-
po-
sitions.
sitions. These
These operations,
operations, known known as as Iron
Iron Hand
Hand (SAM(SAM
suppression),
suppression), preceded
preceded the the main
main force
force by by about
about fivefive min-
min-
utes,
utes, attacked
attacked andand harassed
harassed the the SAMs
SAMs and and thus
thus permitted
permitted
operations
operations at at 4,000-6,000
4,000-6,000 feet feet above
above the the light
light flak
flak into
into
which
which thethe SAMs
SAMs had had forced
forced thethe American
American aircraft
aircraft.^^.
Figure 63. US airmen employed standoff jammers. US Air Force

EB-66, of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, in flight.
10
1099
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
In
In April
April and
and May
May of of 1966
1966 the
the American
American airmen
airmen first
first used
used
the
the Navy's
Navy's AGM-45A
AGM-45A Shrike Shrike missiles
missiles (fig.
(fig. 64).
64). Now
Now the the
anti-SAM
anti-SAM crewscrews had
had aa standoff
standoff weapon
weapon that homed in
that homed in on
on
the
the SAM's
SAM's radarradar signal
signal.. However,
However, the the Shrike
Shrike had had limited
limited
range
range and
and maneuverability
maneuverability and and could
could bebe confused.
confused. TheseThese
liabilities
liabilities reduced
reduced the the antiradiation
antiradiation missile's
missile's (ARM)
(ARM) effec-
effec-
tiveness
tiveness as as did
did Communist
Communist countermeasures.
countermeasures. The The North
North
Vietnamese
Vietnamese crews crews soon
soon learned
learned that
that by
by limiting
limiting emissions
emissions
and
and coordinating
coordinating several
several radars,
radars, they
they could
could still
still operate
operate thethe
SAMS
SAMs andand yetyet limit
limit their
their vulnerability
vulnerability toto the
the Wild
Wild Weasels
Weasels..
Just
Just as
as the
the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese used used decoys
decoys toto neutralize
neutralize andand
ambush
ambush American
American air air strikes,
strikes, SAM
SAM operators
operators sometimes
sometimes
turned
turned onon their
their radar
radar toto provoke
provoke an an ARM
ARM launch
launch andand then
then
turned
turned itit off
off before
before missile
missile impact
impact.. The
The Shrike's
Shrike's kill
kill rate
rate
declined
declined from
from 28 28 percent
percent of of those
those launched
launched by by Air
Air Force
Force
and
and Navy
Navy crews
crews in 1966 to
in 1966 18 percent
to 18 percent inin the
the first
first quarter
quarter
of 1967.
of 1967. In
In the
the fall
fall of
of 1967
1967 SA-2
SA-2 crews
crews began
began using
using optical
optical
aiming,
aiming, which
which rendered
rendered American
American ECM ECM efforts
efforts useless
useless;;
however,
however, optical
optical aiming
aiming required
required visual
visual conditions,
conditions, which
which
also
also reduced
reduced SAM SAM effectiveness
effectiveness.. In In March
March 19681968 the
the Amer-
Amer-
icans
icans introduced
introduced the the longer-range
longer-range and and more
more capable
capable AGM-AGM-
78
78 Standard
Standard ARM. ARM. Although
Although itit waswas constrained
constrained by by reli-
reli-
1 , v~
Figure 64. A-4 Skyhawk aircraft fires Shrike missile.
110
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
ability
ability and
and size
size problems,
problems, nevertheless,
nevertheless, the
the AGM-78
AGM-78 gave gave
American
American airmenairmen another
another weapon
weapon against
against thethe SAM
SAM.^^. 24
In
In the
the summer
summer of of 1966
1966 Wild
Wild Weasel
Weasel IIIIII appeared
appeared in in the
the
form
form of of the
the two-seat
two-seat F-105
F-105 trainer,
trainer, redesignated
redesignated F-105G
F-105G
(fig.
(fig. 65)
65).. Iron
Iron Hand
Hand operations
operations were
were now
now easier
easier as
as com
com-
patible
patible aircraft
aircraft were
were flying
flying together.
together. In
In late
late 1966
1966 USUS airmen
airmen
began
began using
using cluster
cluster bomb
bomb units
units (CBU-antipersonnel
(CBU—antipersonnel mu- mu-
nitions)
nitions) against
against North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese positions.
positions. But But inin the
the
period
period following
following the
the 1968
1968 bombing
bombing halt,
halt, 1969
1969 until
until summer
summer
1972,
1972, free-fall
free-fall munitions
munitions were
were removed
removed from from Iron
Iron Hand
Hand
aircraft,
aircraft, degrading
degrading their
their effectiveness
effectiveness.. By
By then,
then, however,
however, the the
airmen
airmen had had another
another weapon
weapon with
with which
which to to combat
combat the the
SAMs.
SAMs.25 2s
The Navy
The Navy in in mid-1966
mid-1966 and
and the
the US
US Air Force in
Air Force October
in October
tested ECM pods carried beneath the fighters . A formation
tested ECM pods carried beneath the fighters. A formation
of
of fighters
fighters using
using the
the pods,
pods, the
the Navy's
Navy's ALQ-51
ALQ-51 and and the
the AirAir
Force's
Force's QRC-160-redesignated
QRC-160—redesignated ALQ-71-seriously
ALQ-71—seriously inhib- inhib-
ited
ited radar-directed
radar-directed deferfses.
defenses. The
The pods
pods permitted
permitted opera-
opera-
Figure 65. Wild Weasel. US Air Force F-105G on the wing of a tanker
during the Strategic Air Command's Linebacker refueling
operations. The aircraft Is armed with two Shrike mis-
siles.
Ill
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
tions
tions between 10,000-17,000 feet,
between 10,000-17,000 feet, above
above the the reach
reach ofof light
light
and
and medium
medium flak.
flak. Put
Put into service in
into service in January
January 1967,
1967, thethe
pods
pods further
further neutralized
neutralized Communist
Communist defenses.
defenses. But But unfor-
unfor-
tunately
tunately for
for the
the airmen,
airmen, the
the formation
formation required
required for
for the
the best
best
ECM
ECM results
results made
made the
the aircraft
aircraft vulnerable
vulnerable to to MiG
MiG attack.
attack.
The
The various
various jamming
jamming devices
devices forced
forced the
the SAMSAM operators
operators to to
adopt
adopt aa new
new procedure,
procedure, track-on
track-on jamming.
jamming. They They fired
fired the
the
SA-2s
SA-2s at
at the
the jamming
jamming signal,
signal, but
but as
as itit gave
gave azimuth
azimuth and and
not
not range
range information,
information, it it proved
proved much
much lessless accurate
accurate than
than
the
the normal
normal method.
method. ^^
American
American Operations
Operations through
through Linebacker
Linebacker II
The 1968 Tet
The 1968 Tet offensive
offensive changed
changed the the war
war for
for the
the United
United
States
States.. As
As aa result,
result. President
President Lyndon
Lyndon B. B. Johnson
Johnson cappedcapped
American troop levels, stopped American bombing of
American troop levels, stopped American bombing of the
the
North
North above
above 20 20 degrees
degrees north latitude, and
north latitude, and then,
then, just
just before
before
the November election,
the November election, stopped
stopped all all bombing
bombing of of the
the North.
North.
Americans elected Richard
Americans elected Richard M. M. Nixon
Nixon president,
president, whowho began
began
to
to withdraw
withdraw US US troops
troops andand turn
turn the
the burden
burden ofof the
the war
war over
over
to
to the
the South
South Vietnamese.
Vietnamese. As As aa result,
result, American
American aircraft
aircraft
losses,
losses, especially fixed-wing machines,
especially fixed-wing machines, declined.
declined.^' 2'
The air war raged in other areas besides North Vietnam
The air war raged in other areas besides North Vietnam;;
however,
however, losses
losses inin the
the North
North werewere proportionally
proportionally the the great-
great-
est. American combat
est. American combat losses
losses onon aa per
per sortie
sortie basis
basis were
were next
next
highest
highest over
over Laos,
Laos, thenthen South
South Vietnam,
Vietnam, and and lowest
lowest overover
Cambodia
Cambodia.. But But because
because American
American airmenairmen flew
flew most
most oftheir
of their
sorties over
sorties over the
the South,
South, this
this isis where
where mostmost ofof the
the aircraft
aircraft
fell.. Between
fell Between 19611961 andand 1968,
1968, 859859 aircraft
aircraft were
were lost
lost toto hos-
hos-
tile action over
tile action over the North compared
the North compared with with about
about 1,709
1,709 over
over
the
the South.
South. One
One sharp
sharp difference
difference waswas thethe proportion
proportion of of heli-
heli-
copters destroyed in
copters destroyed in the
the two
two areas
areas.. Only
Only 1111 went
went downdown in in
North
North Vietnam,
Vietnam, but but about
about 1,073
1,073 helicopters
helicopters (or(or about
about 63 63
percent
percent of of all
all aircraft lost in
aircraft lost in the
the South)
South) were
were lost
lost in in South
South
Vietnam.
Vietnam. 2^
The
The helicopter
helicopter proved
proved to be vulnerable
to be vulnerable eveneven in in the
the less-
less-
112
112
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
lethal
lethal antiaircraft
antiaircraft environment
environment of of South
South Vietnam
Vietnam wherewhere
most
most American
American rotary-wing
rotary-wing aircraft
aircraft operated
operated (fig.
(fig. 66)
66).. The
The
vulnerability
vulnerability of of the
the chopper
chopper is is highlighted
highlighted by by the
the deaths
deaths
associated
associated with
with itit.. During
During thethe course
course ofof most
most of of the
the war
war
(1961-71)
(1961-71) in in all of Southeast
all of Southeast Asia,
Asia, about
about 6262 percent
percent ofof the
the
deaths
deaths from
from combat
combat aircraft
aircraft losses
losses and
and 66
66 percent
percent of of non-
non-
combat
combat aircraft
aircraft losses
losses were
were attributed
attributed to
to helicopters.
helicopters. These
These
numbers may overemphasize the point because helicopters
numbers may overemphasize the point because helicopters
were
were employed
employed in in large
large numbers,
numbers, as as troop
troop carriers,
carriers, near
near the
the
ground,
ground, and
and where
where ground
ground fire
fire was
was intense,
intense, all
all of
of which
which led
led
to
to high
high personnel
personnel losses
losses (figs.
(figs. 67
67 and
and 68). Helicopter vul-
68). Helicopter vul-
nerability
nerability was
was dramatically
dramatically demonstrated
demonstrated in in the
the 1971
1971 South
South
Vietnamese invasion of Laos (Lam Son 719). Although of-
Vietnamese invasion of Laos (Lam Son 719). Although of-
ficial figures put
ficial figures put losses
losses atat 107-122
107-122 and and the
the number
number of of heli-
heli-
copters
copters damaged
damaged at at 600, some put
600, some put these
these figures
figures much
much
Figure 66. A CH-53 helicopter moves in to take a closer look at a

captured Soviet twin-barrel antiaircraft gun.
113
t Bib- n a-t
Figure 67. One characteristic of the Vietnam War was the extensive
Allied use of the helicopter. Here VNAF Choctaws "fan
out" as they enter the landing zone.
Figure 68. Popular and regional forces scramble out of an H-34

through the paddies of the delta.
higher, as high as one-third lost of those engaged. The same

doubts cloud the official Army figures which acknowledge
2,166 helicopters lost in combat and 2,075 lost to noncom-
bat causes during the entire war. There are allegations that
the Army disguised the magnitude of their chopper losses
114
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
by
by repairing
repairing many
many damaged
damaged machines
machines thatthat did
did not
not deserve
deserve
such
such efforts
efforts.. One
One source states that
source states that thethe Communists
Communists
downed
downed 5,600
5,600 Army
Army helicopters,
helicopters, butbut the
the Army
Army successfully
successfully
retrieved two-thirds ofthese.
retrieved two-thirds of these. One
One critic
critic puts
puts total
total helicopter
helicopter
losses at 10,000.29
losses at 10,000.9
In
In March
March 1972 the North
1972 the North Vietnamese
Vietnamese attempted
attempted to to knock
knock
the
the South
South Vietnamese
Vietnamese out out of
of the
the war
war with
with aa massive
massive con-con-
ventional
ventional invasion.
invasion. The
The Communists
Communists used used weapons
weapons here-here-
tofore
tofore not seen in
not seen in the
the war
war inin the
the South:
South: tanks,
tanks, 130-mm
130-mm
artillery,
artillery, and
and the
the SA-7
SA-7 (fig. 69). The
(fig. 69). The latter
latter is
is aa shoulder-
shoulder-
launched,
launched, man-portable, heat-seeking missile
man-portable, heat-seeking missile with
with aa range
range
of
of just
just under
under twotwo miles
miles and
and able
able to
to reach
reach almost
almost 10,000
10,000
Figure 69. Soviet SA-7 Grail surface-to-air missile.
115
115
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
feet.
feet. The
The SA-7
SA-7 gavegave thethe guerrillas potent weapon
guerrillas aa potent weapon against
against
air power
air power and and putput thethe slow-moving,
slow-moving, low-flying
low-flying aircraft,
aircraft, es- es-
pecially
pecially helicopters
helicopters and and propeller
propeller aircraft,
aircraft, at at considerable
considerable
risk.
risk. It
It knocked
knocked down down aa number
number of helicopters and
of helicopters and observer
observer
aircraft and
aircraft and in in June AC-130.. Between
June aa AC-130 Between 29 29 April
April andand 1I
September,
September, the the Communists
Communists fired fired 351351 SA-7s
SA-7s at at American
American
aircraft
aircraft in in 221
221 incidents
incidents and and downed
downed 17 17 fixed-wing
fixed-wing and and
nine
nine rotary-wing
rotary-wing aircraft Aircraft flying
aircraft.. Aircraft flying lowlow and and slowslow
proved
proved especially
especially vulnerable
vulnerable to to the
the SA-7s
SA-7s.. It took 11.8
It took .8 mis-
mis-
siles
siles to
to down
down each each helicopter
helicopter compared
compared to to 10 required for
10 required for
each slow-moving fixed-wing aircraft kill (all propeller air-
each slow-moving fixed-wing aircraft kill (all propeller air-
craft
craft except
except for for one
one A-37),
A-37), andand 135135 missiles
missiles to to destroy
destroy one one
F-4.
F-4. The
The American
American airmen airmen usedused flares
flares toto decoy
decoy the the SA-7,
SA-7,
but
but most
most effective
effective of of all,
all, they
they increased
increased both both their
their speed
speed
and
and altitude.
altitude. Thus,
Thus, although
although the the number
aircraft downed
downed
was
was notnot great,
great, the
the SA-7's
SA-7's major
major impact
impact was was to to force
force Amer-
Amer-
ican
ican aircraft
aircraft to to fly
fly higher
higher where
where theythey were
were less
less effective
effective and and
to
to put
put some aircraft, such
some aircraft, such as as the
the A-1,
A-1, outout ofof business.
business.^"
The
The Communists
Communists employed employed their their SA-2s
SA-2s differently
differently during
during
the 1972
the 1972 campaign
campaign.. They preceded their
They preceded their invasion
invasion by by de-de-
ploying
ploying SA-2sSA-2s to to cover
cover thethe demilitarized
demilitarized zone, zone, andand on on 17 17
February
February 1972, fired 81
1972, fired 81 missiles
missiles which downed three
which downed three F-4s.
F-4s.
In
In March
March SA-2sSA-2s downed
downed two two AC-130s
AC-130s over over Laos
Laos and and thethe
next
next month
month an an EB-66
EB-66.. The The SA-2s
SA-2s also also took
took on on the
the B-52s
B-52s
which
which now now ventured
ventured furtherfurther north
north.. The
The Communists
Communists fired fired
23
23 SAMS
SAMs on on both
both 21 21 and
and 23 23 April
April in in defense
defense of of Vinh
Vinh and and
destroyed
destroyed aa B-52, B-52, the the first
first Boeing
Boeing bomberbomber lost lost toto Com-
Com-
munist
munist fire.fire. During
During Linebacker
Linebacker (later (later called
called Linebacker
Linebacker I), I),
the
the code
code name
name for for the
the renewed
renewed air air attacks
attacks of of the
the North
North in in
1972,
1972, the
the Communists
Communists fired fired 2,750
2,750 SA-2s
SA-2s at US aircraft
at US aircraft and
and
downed
downed 46 46 planes."
planes.^'
Just
Just as
as North
North Vietnam
Vietnam changed
changed the the rules
rules ofof the
the game,
game, so so
did the
did the United
United StatesStates.. Nixon's
Nixon's policypolicy of of detente
detente gavegave himhim
flexibility
flexibility thatthat hishis predecessor-who
predecessor—who feared feared direct
direct inter
inter-
vention
vention by by thethe Soviets,
Soviets, or or more
more likely,
likely, thethe Chinese-
Chinese—
lacked.
lacked. 1232 The
xhe president
president authorized
authorized the the mining
mining of of North
North
Vietnamese
Vietnamese ports, ports, longlong requested
requested by by the
the military,
military, and and used
used
116
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
air
air power
power as had not
as itit had not been
been usedused before.
before. The The airmen
airmen usedused
air
air power
power moremore effectively
effectively because
because they they hadhad fewer
fewer political
pohtical
restrictions, although
restrictions, although some some targets
targets and areas continued
and areas continued to to
be
be denied
denied to to them."
them."
Thus,
Thus, US US air
air power
power played
played aa major role in
major role stopping the
in stopping the
invasion
invasion by by inflicting
inflicting terrible
terrible losses
losses onon the
the North
North Vietnam-
Vietnam-
ese forces
ese forces.. As
As never
never before,
before, American
American airmenairmen had had targets
targets
they
they could see, hit,
could see, hit, and
and destroy.
destroy. The The airmen
airmen also also hadhad better
better
weapons.
weapons.
Although
Although the the airmen
airmen introduced
introduced no no new
new aircraft
aircraft since
since the
the
1968 bombing
1968 bombing of of North
North Vietnam,
Vietnam, they they did
did useuse other
other equip-
equip-
ment
ment that improved bombing
that improved bombing effectiveness
effectiveness.. These These devices
devices
put
put more bombs on
more bombs on target,
target, thus
thus reducing
reducing the the exposure
exposure of of
friendly aircraft to
friendly aircraft to hostile
hostile fire
fire.. The
The airmen
airmen began
began long-range
long-range
aid
aid to to navigation
navigation (LORAN)(LORAN) bombingbombing in in 1970,
1970, whichwhich mademade
itit possible
possible to to operate
operate in in the
the worst weather conditions
worst weather conditions and and
still
still getget bombs
bombs within within hundreds
hundreds of of meters
meters of of the
the aiming
aiming
point.^^ Although
point. 14 Although this this was
was notnot precision
precision bombing,
bombing, it it did
did
permit bombing
permit bombing during during bad bad weather
weather..
The most spectacular
The most spectacular new new equipment introduced were
equipment introduced were
guided munitions
guided munitions (smart (smart bombs),
bombs), whichwhich couldcould get get bombs
bombs
within
within meters
meters of of the target . A
the target. A number
number of of bridges
bridges that had
that had
withstood numerous, costly
withstood numerous, costly American
American strikesstrikes quickly
quickly fellfell
to
to these
these new weapons.. For
new weapons For example,
example, on on 1313 MayMay 1972 1972 four
four
flights
flights of of F-4s attacked the
F-4s attacked the formidable
formidable Thanh Thanh Hoa Hoa Bridge
Bridge
with
with guided
guided bombs,
bombs, dropping
dropping its its western
western span span and and causing
causing
other
other critical
critical damage.
damage. There There were
were no no US losses in
US losses in the
the attack,
attack,
whereas
whereas the previous 871
the previous 871 sorties
sorties hadhad cost
cost 11 11 aircraft
aircraft andand
had
had not not neutralized
neutralized the bridge.. The
the bridge The airmen considered the
airmen considered the
guided
guided bombs bombs to to bebe 100
100 times
times as as effective
effective as as unguided
unguided
weapons against
weapons against bridges
bridges and 100-200 times
and 100-200 times as as effective
effective
against
against hard hard targets
targets such such asas bunkers
bunkers.^^ ."
The
The Americans
Americans employed employed new new ECMECM and and anti-SAM
anti-SAM tac- tac-
tics
tics toto combat
combat the the formidable
formidable Communist
Communist defenses defenses.. Against
Against
North Vietnamese electronics, they employed more chaff,
North Vietnamese electronics, they employed more chaff,
aa World
World War War 11 II device
device that
that still
still worked.
worked. Chaff Chaff had had been
been
seldom
seldom used used because
because the the Navy
Navy fearedfeared itsits impact
impact on on their
their
117
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
shipborne
shipbome radar radar andand the US Air
the US Air Force
Force lacked
lacked aa suitable
suitable
dispenser.
dispenser. In In June
June 1972
1972 American
American airmen
airmen introduced
introduced the the
ALE-38
ALE-38 chaff chaff dispenser
dispenser (fig.(fig. 70),
70), and
and in in August
August chaff
chaff
bombs.
bombs. BothBoth devices
devices greatly
greatly enhanced
enhanced US US ECM ECM capabilities
capabilities
and
and reduced
reduced the the vulnerability
vulnerability of of chaff
chaff dispensing
dispensing aircraft
aircraft..
The
The US US Marines
Marines introduced
introduced aa new new jamming
jamming aircraft,
aircraft, the
the
EA-6B
EA-6B (fig.
(fig. 71),
71), into
into action
action in July 1972
in July 1972.^6. 36
The
The Americans
Americans also also .changed
changed their
their anti-SAM
anti-SAM tacticstactics (Wild
(Wild
Weasel) from Iron Hand, four F-105s using antiradiation
Weasel) from Iron Hand, four F-105s using antiradiation
missiles.
missiles. In In August
August the the US
US Air
Air Force
Force formed
formed hunter-killer
hunter-killer
teams
teams consisting
consisting of of two
two F-105 hunters armed
F-105 hunters armed with with ARMS
ARMs
and
and two
two F-4
F-4 killers
killers armed
armed with
with CBUs.
CBUs.^^ 3'
If the
If the airmen
airmen operated
operated successfully
successfully over
over NorthNorth Vietnam,
Vietnam,
they nevertheless
they nevertheless paid paid aa price
price.. During
During the the April
April through
through
October
October 19721972 bombing,
bombing, the the US Air Force
US Air Force flewflew 9,315
9,315 sorties
sorties
and
and dropped
dropped 155,500
155,500 tonstons ofof bombs
bombs on on the
the North
North andand lost
lost
63
63 planes.
planes. In In all,
all, the
the United
United States
States lost
lost 111
111 fixed-wing
fixed-wing air-
air-
craft
craft in
in combat,
combat, apparently
apparently in in equal
equal proportion
proportion to AAAs,
to AAAs,
MiGs,
MiGs, andand SAMS
SAMs.. In In addition
addition to to aircraft
aircraft losses,
losses, thethe airmen
airmen
Figure 70. AQM-34V in flight with an AN/ALE-38 chaff pod on

each wing.
118
11 8
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
• '' M
Figure 71. Marine EA-6B Prowler aircraft.
paid
paid another
another price:
price: only
only 2,346
2,346 ofof the
the total
total sorties
sorties were
were di-
di-
rectly attacking enemy
rectly attacking enemy installations
installations;; the
the others
others were
were inin sup-
sup-
port.
port. In
In fact,
fact, the
the ratio
ratio of of support
support aircraft
aircraft was
was even
even higher
higher
than these
than these numbers
numbers indicate
indicate (3 .4 :1), as
(3.4:1), as they
they do
do not
not include
include
tanker and
tanker and reconnaissance
reconnaissance aircraft .
aircraft.^^
As the bombing
As the bombing tooktook itsits toll
toll in
in the
the North
North and
and the
the invasion
invasion
of
of the
the South
South stalled
stalled and then was
and then was pushed
pushed back, negotiations
back, negotiations
prompted Kissinger's
prompted Kissinger's "peace-at-hand"
"peace-at-hand" commentcomment on on 26
26 Oc-
Oc-
tober.
tober. But,
But, as
as close
close asas the
the peacemakers
peacemakers got got to
to an
an agreement,
agreement,
they
they did
did not
not get
get aa treaty
treaty..
Linebacker II
Linebacker II
On
On 14
14 December
December President
President Nixon
Nixon gave
gave the
the North
North Viet-
Viet-
namese
namese 72 72 hours
hours to
to get
get back
back to
to serious
serious negotiations
negotiations "or
"or
else." The
else." The "or
"or else"
else" was
was aa three-day
three-day bombing
bombing offensive
offensive
against North
against North Vietnam,
Vietnam, which
which Nixon
Nixon ordered
ordered that
that day
day and
and
then
then changed
changed on
on 19
19 December
December toto an
an indefinite
indefinite period.
period. The
The
object of
object of Linebacker
Linebacker 11,
II, the
the code
code name
name for
for the
the December
December
119
119
FLAK, AAA,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, AAA, SAM
SAM
bombing, was
bombing, was to to get negotiations going
get negotiations going again.
again.^^39
US airmen
US returned to
airmen returned to the
the home
home of of the
the SAMS,
SAMs, AAA, AAA, andand
MiGs on
MiGs on the
the night
night of 18 December
of 18 December.^^ For
.4° For three
three consecutive
consecutive
days
days the
the script was about
script was about the same. F-111
the same. F-111 attacks
attacks on on air-
air-
fields and
fields and various
various other targets began
other targets began at at 77:00
:00 P.M and lasted
P.M.. and lasted
about nine
about nine and
and one-half hours.'*' About
one-half hours .4l About 20 20 to
to 6565 minutes
minutes
later,
later, the
the first of three
first of three waves
waves ofof B-52s unloaded their
B-52s unloaded their bombs
bombs
(fig.
(fig. 72).
72). The second wave
The second wave followed about four
followed about four hours
hours later
later
and was, in
and was, in turn,
turn, followed
followed by the third
by the third wave
wave about
about five
five
hours later.. Each
hours later Each wave
wave consisted
consisted of of between
between 21 21 toto 51
51 B-52s
B-52s
supported
supported by by 31 to 41
31 to 41 other aircraft, and
other aircraft, and each
each wavewave flew
flew
exactly
exactly the same pattern:
the same pattern: the
the same heading from
same heading from thethe west
west
and,
and, after
after aa sharp turn after
sharp turn after bombing,
bombing, the the same exit heading
same exit heading
to the
to the west.
west. There
There were also daylight
were also daylight attacks
attacks byby Air
Air Force,
Force,
Marine,
Marine, and and Navy
Navy aircraft.
aircraft.
The bombing
The bombing rocked Hanoi, but
rocked Hanoi, but the
the aircraft
aircraft losses
losses rocked
rocked
the airmen
the airmen as well. During
as well. During thethe first
first three
three days
days of of the
the op-
op-
erations, 12
erations, 12 aircraft went down,
aircraft went down, notnot aa large
large number
number and and
seemingly
seemingly bearable; however, the
bearable; however, the B-52
B-52 losses,
losses, three
three on
on thethe
Figure 72. B-52 dropping bombs.
120
120
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
first night and

first night and six
six on
on the
the third,
third, were
were shocking.
shocking. The The B-52s
B-52s
were,
were, after
after all,
all, America's
America's primary
primary strategic
strategic nuclear
nuclear bomber,
bomber,
the
the foundation
foundation of of the
the air-breathing
air-breathing leg leg of
of the
the Triad
Triad.. Up
Up toto
this
this point,
point, the
the US
US Air
Air Force
Force hadhad lost
lost only
only one
one B-52
B-52 to
to enemy
enemy
fire,
fire, although
although 17 17 had
had been
been lost
lost toto other
other causes.
causes. Although
Akhough
the
the overall
overall B-52
B-52 loss
loss rate
rate ofof 33 percent
percent of of effective
effective sorties
sorties
on
on thethe three
three missions
missions appears
appears acceptable,
acceptable, the the loss
loss rate
rate onon
the
the third
third mission
mission was was 6.8
6.8 percent,
percent, and and the
the nine
nine B-52s
B-52s rep-
rep-
resented almost
resented almost 55 percent
percent of of the
the 170
170 toto 210
210 B-52s
B-52s the
the USUS
Air
Air Force
Force had deployed in
had deployed in Southeast
Southeast Asia Asia and
and over
over 22 per-
per-
cent of the 402 in service in 1972 . 42 This is reminiscent of
cent of the 402 in service in 1972.^^ 7^15 jg reminiscent of
the
the summer
summer and and fall
fall of
of 1943
1943 over
over Germany.
Germany.
The
The B-52
B-52 losses
losses highlighted
highlighted aa number
number of of problems
problems.. First,
First,
the
the B-52
B-52 fleet
fleet was
was ofof mixed
mixed quality,
quality, consisting
consisting of of 107
107 ofof
the
the older
older but
but modified
modified "D" "D" models
models and and 9999 of
of the
the later
later "G"
"G"
models
models.. OnlyOnly half
half of
of the
the "G"
"G" models
models had had upgraded
upgraded ECM ECM
equipment,
equipment, which which proved
proved to to be
be one
one ofof the
the critical
critical factors
factors
in
in determining
determining which which aircraft
aircraft werewere hit
hit by
by the
the SAMs,
SAMs, the the
big
big killers
killers ofthe
of the B-52s
B-52s (fig.
(fig. 73) . 43 Even
73).43 gygn though
though the the defenders
defenders
fired
fired more
more SAMs
SAMs at at the
the B-52Ds,
B-52Ds, the the B-52Gs
B-52Gs were were hit
hit and
and
. ' i; /
Figure 73. B-52 aircraft that made an emergency landing at Da

Nang, AB, South Vietnam, after being damaged by a
SAIVI missile.
1211
12
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
downed
downed more more often, often, five five destroyed
destroyed on on thethe first
first three
three
missions
missions..
A
A second problem was
second problem was thatthat the
the B-52s were controlled,
B-52s were controlled, or or
better
better put, overcontroUed, from
put, overcontrolled, from SAC headquarters in
SAC headquarters in
Omaha.
Omaha. SAC SAC formedformed the the basic
basic battle
battle plan
plan and tactics lit-
and tactics lit-
erally
erally thousands
thousands of miles from
of miles from thethe actual
actual combat.
combat. Initially,
Initially,
SAC
SAC hadhad aa policy
policy of of nono maneuvers
maneuvers on on thethe bomb
bomb run, run, al-al-
though
though such such maneuvers
maneuvers often often permitted
permitted aircraft
aircraft to to elude
elude
the
the SAMS
SAMs."*"* .44 SAC
SAC also also mandated
mandated aa "press-on"
"press-on" procedure
procedure
which
which dictated
dictated that that bombers
bombers continuecontinue their their missions
missions de- de-
spite
spite the
the loss
loss of engines, computers,
of engines, computers, and and most
most critically,
critically,
ECM
ECM equipment
equipment.^5 .45 Not surprisingly, with
Not surprisingly, with oneone headquarters
headquarters
controlling
controlling the the bombers
bombers and and another
another the the support
support aircraft,
aircraft,
there was
there was aa lacklack of of coordination
coordination between between the the bombers
bombers and and
their
their escorts,
escorts, including
including two two instances
instances in in which
which B-52s
B-52s fired
fired
on
on USUS aircraft.
aircraft."*^ Other coordination
46 Other coordination problems
problems included
included US US
radios
radios jammed
jammed by by EB-66
EB-66 ECM ECM and and friendly
friendly radar
radar severely
severely
degraded
degraded by by B-52
B-52 ECM. ECM.^^
Losses indicated that
Losses indicated that thethe ECM,
ECM, the the key
key to to fending
fending off off the
the
SAMS,
SAMs, was inadequate. First,
was inadequate. First, B-52
B-52 ECM
ECM protection
protection mark-mark-
edly
edly declined
declined in the 100-degree
in the 100-degree turn turn immediately
immediately after after
bomb
bomb release
release because
because the the bank
bank reduced
reduced the the effectiveness
effectiveness of of
the bomber's
the bomber's spot spot jammers
jammers.^^ Second, winds
.48 Second, winds thatthat differed
differed
from
from forecasts
forecasts in in direction
direction and and speed upset the
speed upset the ECM
ECM pro- pro-
tection of
tection of the
the chaff
chaff corridors
corridors.. For For example,
example, on on 20
20 December
December
only
only four
four of of 2727 B-52B-52 cells
cells received
received chaff
chaff protection
protection at at the
the
bomb-release
bomb-release line, line, andand all all of
of the
the B-52s
B-52s downed
downed were were 55 to to
10 miles
10 miles from
from chaffchaff cover.49
cover."^^ Third,
Third, thethe North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese
gunners
gunners surprised
surprised the the American
American airmen airmen by by using
using aa radar
radar
designed and
designed and deployed
deployed for for gun
gun control
control (designated
(designated T8209)T8209)
to
to guide the SA-2s
guide the SA-2s.. The The American
American airmenairmen lacked
lacked equipment
equipment
to both warn
to both warn of of andand jamjam this this "new"
"new" I-band
I-band radar.
radar.^^
The
The North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese took took advantage
advantage of of the
the stereotyped
stereotyped
tactics
tactics byby salvoing
salvoing barrages
barrages of of SAMS
SAMs at at the
the point
point where
where thethe
B-52s
B-52s executed
executed their posttarget turns.
their posttarget turns. TheThe SAMSAM operators
operators
limited
limited radar
radar guidance
guidance to to the
the last
last five
five to to 1010 seconds
seconds of of
intercept, which
intercept, which made made the the tasks
tasks of of the
the ECM
ECM operators
operators and and
122
122
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
Wild
Wild Weasels
Weasels very very difficult."
difficult.5' The The American
American losses losses indi-
indi-
cated that
cated that the
the airmen
airmen had had to to modify
modify their their operations.
operations.
Thus
Thus the the Air Force formed
Air Force formed aa tactics tactics panel
panel andand changed
changed
tactics.
tactics." Although
12 Although most most US US aircraft
aircraft continued
continued to to fly
fly their
their
missions about
missions about the the samesame way,
way, this this was
was notnot true
true forfor the
the B-
B-
52s.
52s. OnOn thethe four
four missions
missions between
between 21 21 andand 24 24 December,
December,
only
only 3030 B-52Ds
B-52Ds were were employed
employed in in aa single
single wave.
wave. In In addi-
addi-
tion,
tion, the
the planners
planners varied
varied the the timing,
timing, headings,
headings, and and altitudes
altitudes..
The
The airmen
airmen increased
increased the the amount
amount of of chaff,
chaff, attempting
attempting to to
lay
lay aa chaff
chaff blanket
blanket instead
instead of of aa chaff
chaff corridor.
corridor. Thus,Thus, instead
instead
of
of 1515 percent
percent of of thethe bombers
bombers receiving
receiving chaff chaff protection
protection at at
the
the bomb
bomb release
release point,
point, now now 85 85 percent
percent did did.. In In all,
all, US
US
airmen
airmen dropped
dropped 125 125 tons
tons of of chaff
chaff during
during Linebacker
Linebacker II II..
Night
Night hunter-killer
hunter-killer teams teams werewere firstfirst used
used on on 2323 December
December
to nullify
to nullify thethe SAM
SAM threat;threat; however,
however, bad bad weather
weather permitted
permitted
only
only marginal
marginal results
results.. The The AirAir Force
Force alsoalso quickly
quickly installed
installed
jammers
jammers and and modified
modified ARMs ARMs for for use
use against
against the the I-band
I-band
radar
radar that
that had
had surprised
surprised them them." . 13 But
But thethe American
initially
initially lacked
lacked thethe AGM-45
AGM-45 A-6 A-6 suitable
suitable for for this
this job
job andand
did
did not
not get
get these
these missiles
missiles untiluntil 27 27 December.
December. The The AGM-
AGM-
78
78 (fig.
(fig. 74)
74) which
which also also could
could be be used
used against
against this
this band
band of of
radar,
radar, waswas inin short
short supply
supply eveneven before
before the the commencement
commencement
of
of Linebacker
Linebacker 11 . 54
11.^'*
The
The airmen
airmen hit hit Hanoi
Hanoi with with these
these newnew tactics
tactics on on 21 21 De-
De-
cember
cember and and lost
lost two
two B-52sB-52s andand one one A-6A.
A-6 A. During
During the the next
next
three
three nights
nights bombs
bombs fell fell on
on targets
targets in in Haiphong
Haiphong and and north
north
of Hanoi. The
of Hanoi. The new
new tactics
tactics and
and new new targets
targets paidpaid off off as the
as the
airmen
airmen lost lost only
only threethree aircraft
aircraft on on these
these three
three missions
missions..
There
There was was no no bombing
bombing on on 2525 December,
December, perhaps perhaps aa gallant,
gallant,
certainly
certainly aa diplomatic
diplomatic gesture gesture that
that allowed
allowed North
North Vietnam-
Vietnam-
ese
ese defenders
defenders to to rearm
rearm..
The
The attack
attack on on 26 26 December
December was was one one of of aa kind
kind.. TheThe
United
United States
States sent
sent 120 120 B-52s,
B-52s, the the mostmost on on any
any ofof the
the Line-
Line-
backer
backer missions,
missions, againstagainst targets
targets in in Hanoi
Hanoi and and Haiphong.
Haiphong.
Although
Although supported
supported by by 99
99 aircraft,
aircraft, two two B-52s
B-52s wentwent down.
down.
Both
Both followed
followed SAC'sSAC's "press-on"
"press-on" procedures,
procedures, attacked
attacked in in
broken
broken cells-formations
cells—formations of of two
two rather
rather thanthan the the normal
normal
12
1233
ARCHIE,
FLAK, AAA, SAM
Figure 74. Aerial photography of standard arm missiie (AGIVI-78)

igniting, Haiphong, North Vietnam, 19 August 1972.
three bombers—and thus

three bombers-and thus lacked adequate ECM
lacked adequate ECM power.
power.
The remaining
The remaining three
three missions (27-29 December)
missions (27-29 December) em- em-
ployed
ployed 6060 B-52s
B-52s each
each night,
night, but otherwise fit
but otherwise fit the
the same
same pat-
pat-
tern.
tern. Five
Five aircraft (two B-52s)
aircraft (two B-52s) went
went down
down on on 2727 December.
December.
There
There were
were nono losses on the
losses on the last
last two
two days.
days.
In all,
In all, the B-52s dropped
the B-52s dropped about
about 15,000
15,000 tonstons ofof bombs,
bombs,
while tactical aircraft added another 5,000 tons of bombs."
while tactical aircraft added another 5,000 tons of bombs.^^
Because
Because there
there were only 12
were only 12 hours
hours of
of visual conditions dur-
visual conditions dur-
ing
ing the
the 12-day
12-day operation, the airmen
operation, the airmen aimed
aimed thethe bulk of their
bulk of their
ordnance
ordnance by by nonvisual
nonvisual techniques
techniques such such as as radar
radar and
and
LORAN. 56
LORAN.56
Despite North
Despite North Vietnamese
Vietnamese claims
claims of 81 aircraft
of 81 aircraft destroyed
destroyed
1244
12
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
(38
(38 B-52s),
B-52s), Linebacker
Linebacker 11 II cost
cost 27 27 aircraft
aircraft of of which
which 15 15 were
were
B-52s.
B-52s."57 Compared
Compared to to the
the 33 percent
percent expected
expected losses
losses,^^ ,58 the
the
overall
overall loss
loss rate
rate of of below
below 22 percent
percent and and aa B-52
B-52 lossloss raterate
slightly
slightly above
above 22 percent
percent were were acceptable
acceptable.. Thus, Thus, airmen
airmen fa- fa-
vorably
vorably compared
compared the the loss
loss rates
rates in in Vietnam
Vietnam and and especially
especially
those
those ofof Linebacker
Linebacker 11 II with
with thosethose in in World
World War War 11 II andand
Korea.
Korea. Such
Such aa comparison,
comparison, however, however, disregards
disregards the the fact
fact that
that
Vietnam-era
Vietnam-era aircraftaircraft werewere much
much more more expensive
expensive than than theirtheir
predecessors,
predecessors, at at the
the same
same time
time inventories
inventories and and aircraft
aircraft pro- pro-
duction
duction werewere much smaller.. 59^^
much smaller
The
The American
American airmen airmen throttled
throttled two two parts
parts of of the
the North
North
Vietnamese
Vietnamese air air defenses
defenses.. The The smallsmall Communist
Communist air air force
force
launched
launched 32 32 aircraft,
aircraft, attempted
attempted interceptions
interceptions with with 20, 20, but but
scored
scored nono hits
hits onon thethe B-52s,
B-52s, and and downed
downed only only two
two F-4sF-4s for for
the
the loss
loss of
of sixsix MiGs.6°
MiGs.^° American
American tactics tactics (ECM,
(ECM, night,
night, and and
high-altitude
high-altitude operations),
operations), bad bad weather,
weather, and and fighter
fighter escorts
escorts
nullified
nullified the the MiGs
MiGs.. All All but
but the
the latter
latter diddid the
the same
same to to North
North
Vietnamese
Vietnamese AAA, AAA, which damaged only
which damaged only oneone B-52B-52 and and
downed
downed threethree tactical
tactical aircraft
aircraft.^' But
.61 But if the American
if the American airmen airmen
adequately
adequately handledhandled the the fighter
fighter and and flak
flak threats,
threats, the the samesame
cannot
cannot be be said
said ofof the
the SAMs.
SAMs.
During
During Linebacker
Linebacker II, 11, the
the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese fired fired 1,2851,285
SAMs
SAMs which
which downed
downed all all 15
15 B-52s
B-52s lost,lost, as well as
as well as three
three other
other
aircraft
aircraft.". The
12 The American
American airmen, airmen, however,
however, did did not
not target
target
the
the SAM
SAM sitessites until
until the the sixth
sixth mission
mission on on 23
23 December
December and and
did
did not
not attack
attack them them againagain until
until 27 27 December
December when when B-52s B-52s
and
and F-111
F-lllss attacked
attacked the the most
most effective
effective single
single SAM SAM site, site,
credited with
credited with downing
downing five five toto nine
nine B-52s
B-52s." .63 US
US AirAir Force
Force
hunter-killer
hunter-killer units units also
also attacked
attacked this this site,
site, designated
designated by by thethe
Americans
Americans as as VN
VN 549,549, with
with atat least
least nine
nine AGM-45s
AGM-45s and and two two
AGM-78s.
AGM-78s. But But VNVN 549 549 survived,
survived, and and therefore,
therefore, on on 27 27 De-De-
cember
cember briefers
briefers instructed
instructed the American bomber
the American bomber crews crews to to
fly
fly well
well clear
clear of of it.it. Rumors,
Rumors, never never confirmed,
confirmed, circulated
circulated
that
that itit was
was manned
manned by by Chinese
Chinese gunners.gunners. The The B-52
B-52 and and F- F-
111
111 attacks
attacks on on SAM
SAM sites sites continued
continued on on the
the last
last two
two days days
of
of the
the operation,
operation, along along withwith F-4F-4 attacks
attacks on on SAMSAM storage
storage
facilities
facilities.. Despite
Despite these these efforts,
efforts, intelligence
intelligence estimated
estimated that that
125
125
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
only
only two
two sites were 50
sites were 50 percent damaged, eight
percent damaged, eight were
were un- un-
damaged, and
damaged, results against
and results against three were unknown
three were unknown.^^ . 64 It
It
should be
should be noted
noted that only 33 percent
that only percent ofof the bombs fell
the bombs fell on on
SAM
SAM targets as compared
targets as compared with with 55.3 percent that
.3 percent that fell
fell on
on air-air-
fields.^^ The
fields.65 The saving
saving grace
grace waswas that
that by
by 29 29 December
December the the
North Vietnamese
North Vietnamese had had runrun out of SAMs,
out of SAMs, leaving
leaving the
the North
North
essentially defenseless
essentially . 66
defenseless.^^
Clearly Linebacker II
Clearly Linebacker II was
was an outstanding feat
an outstanding feat of
of arms.
arms.
After
After years
years of restrictions and
of restrictions frustrations, American
and frustrations, American airair-
men
men were
were able, in typical
able, in typical blunt
blunt American fashion, to
American fashion, to di- di-
rectly take on
rectly take on and defeat aa formidable
and defeat formidable air defense system.
air defense system.
For
For the
the United States, and
United States, and especially
especially the airmen, this
the airmen, this waswas
proud, satisfactory
aa proud, satisfactory wayway to to end
end the
the war,
war, or or at least end
at least end
American involvement.. But tactical aspects,
the tactical
But the aspects, the
the victory,
victory,
should not
should not obscure
obscure the fact that
the fact that strategic
strategic bombing
bombing did did not not
achieve decisive ends
achieve decisive ends in
in Vietnam:
Vietnam: the the final
final treaty
treaty was
was sub-sub-
stantially the same
stantially the same asas the
the agreements
agreements mademade in in October.
October.^^
Conclusions
Conclusions
The American airmen
The American airmen were were unprepared
unprepared for the war
for the war
fought
fought inin the
the skies over Southeast
skies over Southeast Asia: unprepared in
Asia: unprepared in terms
terms
of
of the political restrictions
the political restrictions levied
levied onon them,
them, thethe scant
scant targets
targets
they
they had
had toto attack,
attack, and
and thethe nature
nature of of aa long
long conventional
conventional
war
war they had to
they had to fight.
fight. As
As the
the realities
realities of battle forced
of battle forced them
them
to
to change
change bothboth their
their tactics
tactics and equipment, the
and equipment, the airmen
airmen hadhad
to
to relearn
releam thethe lessons
lessons ofof the
the past,
past, and
and inin the process suffered
the process suffered
substantial losses.. They
substantial losses They again
again found
found that enemy antiaircraft
that enemy antiaircraft
defenses,
defenses, SAMs
SAMs (but most of
(but most of all
all AAA)
AAA) rather than aircraft,
rather than aircraft,
presented
presented the major obstacle
the major obstacle to to air operations. They
air operations. They again
again
learned
learned how dangerous it
how dangerous it was
was toto fly
fly close
close toto the ground in
the ground in
the
the face
face ofof intense ground fire.
intense ground fire. They
They again realized that
again realized that
attacking
attacking enemy antiaircraft positions
enemy antiaircraft positions (SAM(SAM andand AAA)
AAA) was was
dangerous
dangerous and and of dubious value.
of dubious value. Most
Most of of all,
all, they
they saw
saw that
that
the tactics
the tactics used
used inin World
World War War II II and
and Korea
Korea were
were relevant
relevant
for modem air
for modern air warfare
warfare..
126
126
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
SAMs
SAMs greatly
greatly enhanced
enhanced the the power
power of of the
the defense
defense and and
represented
represented new new difficulties
difficulties to to the
the airmen.
airmen. TheirTheir impact
impact
must
must be be measured
measured not not only
only by by the
the number
aircraft theythey
destroyed,
destroyed, but but in two other
in two other ways.ways. First,
First, SAMs
SAMs forced
forced air-air-
craft
craft into the teeth
into the teeth of of the
the guns,
guns, which
which were
were very
very effective.
effective.
Second, to
Second, to counter
counter the the missiles,
missiles, the the airmen
airmen had had toto expand
expand
the
the total
total number
number of of support
support sorties,
sorties, aa requirement
requirement which which
increased
increased as as the
the warwar progressed.
progressed. Another
Another disturbing
disturbing weapon
weapon
introduced
introduced was was thethe man-portable
man-portable SAM. SAM. Although
Although not not pos-
pos-
sessing
sessing great
great lethality,
lethality, itit was
was easily
easily concealed,
concealed, highly
highly mo- mo-
bile,
bile, and
and itit gave
gave oneone man
man thethe power
power toto down
down aa multimillion
multimillion
dollar
dollar aircraft.
aircraft.
Countermeasures helped
Countermeasures helped keepkeep American
American aircraft losses
aircraft losses
to
to aa manageable
manageable rate. One Air
rate. One Air Force
Force officer
officer estimated
estimated that that
ECM
ECM reduced
reduced losses
losses by by 25
25 percent,
percent, while
while aa Navy
Navy officer
officer
put
put the
the figure
figure atat 80 80 percent
percent.^^ Nevertheless,
.68 Nevertheless, air air operations
operations
were
were expensive
expensive both both in in losses
losses and and effort.
effort. Communist
Communist gungun-
ners
ners proved
proved aa worthy
worthy and and resourceful
resourceful foe, foe, although
although limited
limited
by
by second-rate
second-rate Soviet Soviet equipment.
equipment. Yet, Yet, despite
despite the the able
able
Communist
Communist air air defense
defense tactics
tactics and and their
their adaptation
adaptation to to the
the
changing
changing tactical
tactical situation,
situation, thethe American
American airmen
airmen gradually
gradually
increased
increased their edge. The
their edge. The big
big improvement
improvement for for the
the offensive
offensive
side
side came
came with
with the
the use
use of
of ECM
ECM and and antiradiation
antiradiation and and stand-
stand-
off
off weapons
weapons.. TheseThese increased
increased accuracy
accuracy and and decreased
decreased
losses
losses.. InIn the
the full-scale
full-scale operations
operations of of Linebacker
Linebacker Il, II, the
the
American
American airmenairmen showed
showed thatthat massive
massive application
application of mod-
of mod-
ern
ern aircraft
aircraft with
with modern
modern equipment
equipment could could succeed
succeed against
against
defenses
defenses limited
limited in in numbers
numbers and quality. 69
and quality. ^^
NOTES
NOTES
l1.. Bernard
Bernard Fall,
Fall, Hell
Hell in
in aa Very
Very Small
Small Place:
Place: The
The Siege
Siege ofDien
ofDien Bien
Bien
Phu (Philadelphia,
Phu (Philadelphia, Pa.:
Pa.: J.
J. P.
P. Lippincott,
Lippincott, 1966),
1966), 31-34,
31-34, 49,
49, 133,
133, 144,
144,
454-55
454-55;; William
William Leary,
Leary, "CAT
"CAT at at Dien
Dien Bien
Bien Phu,"
Phu," Aerospace
Aerospace Histo-
Histo-
rian,
rian, September
September 1984,
1984, 178-80,
178-80, 183183;; Robert
Robert F.F. Futrell,
Futrell, The
The United
United
127
127
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
States Air
States Air Force
Force in in Southeast Asia:: The
Southeast Asia The Advisory
Advisory Years
Years to to 1965
1965 (Wash-
(Wash-
ington,
ington, D.C.: D.C.: Office
Office of of Air Force History,
Air Force History, 1981),
1981), 19-20,
19-20, 116; 116; V V. J.J.
Croizat, trans ., A Translation from
Croizat, trans., A Translation from the
the French
French: : Lessons
Lessons of
of the
the War
War in
in
Indochina,
Indochina, vol. vol. 2,2, Rand Report RM-5271-PR
Rand Report RM-5271-PR (Santa (Santa Monica,
Monica, CalifCalif.:. :
Rand Corp., May 1967), 292,
Rand Corp., May 1967), 292, 302.
302.
2.
2. Futrell,
Futrell, The The United
United States
States Air
Air Force
Force inin Southeast
Southeast Asia, Asia, 158-59,
158-59,
163, 196.
163, 196.
33.. Benjamin
Benjamin F. F. Schemmer,
Schemmer, "Vietnam
"Vietnam Casualty
Casualty RatesRates Dropped
Dropped 37% 37%
after
after Cambodia
Cambodia Raid," Raid," Armed
Arnêd Forces
Forces Journal,
Journal, 18 18 January
January 1971, 1971, 30;30;
Michael McCrea, "U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Fixed-
Michael McCrea, "U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Fixed-
Wing
Wing Aircraft
Aircraft Losses
Losses and and Damage
Damage in in Southeast
Southeast Asia Asia (1962-1973),"
(1962-1973),"
Center for Naval Analyses study, August 1976, 2-1, 2-13, 2-19,
Center for Naval Analyses study, August 1976, 2-1, 2-13, 2-19, 2-20
2-20
[AUL-M31914-22]
[AUL-M31914-22];; Futrell, Futrell, The
The United
United States
States AirAir Force
Force in in Southeast
Southeast
Asia, 116.
Asia, 116.
4.
4. TheThe Pentagon
Pentagon Papers,Papers, ed.ed. The
The Senator
Senator Gravel
Gravel (Boston,
(Boston, Mass.Mass.::
Beacon Press, 1975), 3:269; Lon O. Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile
Beacon Press, 1975), 3:269; Lon O. Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile
Age (Washington,
y4ê (Washington, D .C.: Smithsonian
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution
Institution Press,
Press, 1985),
1985), 11 11..
5 . The
5. The Pentagon
Pentagon Papers,
Papers, 3:294-95
3:294-95;; Nordeen,
Nordeen, Air Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Mis-
Mis-
sile Age,
sile Age, 15,15, 18;18; U.
U. S.S. Grant
Grant Sharp, Strategy for
Sharp, Strategy for Defeat
Defeat:: Vietnam
Vietnam in in
Retrospect
Retrospect (San (San Rafael,
Rafael, Calif:
Calif.: Presidio
Presidio Press,
Press, 1978),
1978), xiii-xiv,
xiii-xiv, 271271;; Lou
Lou
Drendel, ....
Drendel, . . And
And Kill
Kill MiGs:
MiGs: AirAir to
to Air
Air Combat
Combat in in the
the Vietnam
Vietnam War War
(Carrollton,
(CarroUton, Tex.: Squadron Signal
Tex.: Squadron Signal Publishers,
Publishers, 1984),1984), 88;; David
David Hal-Hal-
bertstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House,
bertstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House,
1972),
1972), 367-68;
367-68; Richard
Richard Kohn,
Kohn, chief
chief of of Air
Air Force history, interview
Force history, interview
with
with author,
author, JuneJune 1986.
1986.
66.. For
For especially
especially sharp
sharp criticism
criticism of the airmen,
of the airmen, see see Hanson
Hanson Baldwin,
Baldwin,
"Introduction,"
"Introduction," in in Jack
Jack Broughton,
Broughton, Thud Thud Ridge (Philadelphia, Pa.:
Ridge (Philadelphia, Pa.: J.J.
P.
P. Lippincott,
Lippincott, 1969), 12-13;; and
1969), 12-13 and Dana
Dana Drenkowski,
Drenkowski, "Operation
"Operation Line- Line-
backer II," Soldier ofFortune,
backer II," Soldier of Fortune, September
September 1977.
1977.
7.
7. This
This aircraft
aircraft was was poorly
poorly designed,
designed, having
having essentially
essentially no no backup
backup
for its
for its vital
vital hydraulic
hydraulic controls.
controls. OfOf 617
617 USUS Air
Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft lost
lost over
over
North Vietnam, 280 were F-105s . McCrea, "Fixed-Wing Aircraft
North Vietnam, 280 were F-105s. McCrea, "Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Losses,"
Losses," 6-47. 6-47. In In addition
addition to to aa total
total of of 334
334 F-105
F-105 combat losses in
combat losses in
Southeast Asia, there were 63 operational losses . John Granville,
Southeast Asia, there were 63 operational losses. John Granville,
"Summary
"Summary of of USAF
USAF Aircraft
Aircraft Losses
Losses in in SEA,"
SEA," Tactical
Tactical Air Air Command
Command
study,
study, 1974, 1974, 22, 22, 36,
36, 57
57 [AFHRC-K417.042-16]
[AFHRC-K417.042-16]..
88.. Broughton,
Broughton, Thud Thud Ridge,
Ridge, 22,
22, 96;
96; William
WiUiam W. W. Momyer,
Momyer, Air Air Power
Power
in Three Wars
in Three Wars (Washington,
(Washington, D.C. D.C.:: Department
Department ofthe of the AirAir Force,
Force, 1978),
1978),
126.
126.
9.
9. This
This was
was halfhalf ofof North
North Vietnam's
Vietnam's MiG-21
MiG-21 inventory
inventory.. R. R. Frank
Frank
Futrell et al., eds., Aces and Aerial Victories : The United States Air
Futrell et al., eds.. Aces and Aerial Victories: The United States Air
Force
Force in in Southeast
Southeast Asia,Asia, 1965-1973
1965-1973 (Washington,
(Washington, D.C.: D.C.: Government
Government
Printing Office, 1976), 35-42 .
Printing Office, 1976), 35-42.
12
1288
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
10.. The
10 The Navy
Navy MiG MiG kill
kill ratio
ratio in in Vietnam
Vietnam was was 33.86:1
.86:1 (54(54 MiGs
MiGs de- de-
stroyed) and the Air Force's was 2.15:1 (129 MiGs destroyed) . "South-
stroyed) and the Air Force's was 2.15:1 (129 MiGs destroyed). "South-
east
east Asia
Asia Air-to-Air
Air-to-Air Combat,"
Combat," Armed Armed Forces
Forces Journal
Journal International,
International,
May 1974, 38 . In World War II, USAAF fighters had a 3.55:1
May 1974, 38. In World War II, USAAF fighters had a 3.55:1 edge
edge
in
in air-to-air
air-to-air combat
combat against
against Germany
Germany and and 4.25 :1 against
4.25:1 against Japan.
Japan. TheThe
Navy
Navy and and Marine
Marine Corps'Corps' ratio
ratio against
against Japan
Japan waswas 12 .97 :1 . United
12.97:1. United
States
States Army
Army AirAir Forces,
Forces, Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces Statistical
Statistical Digest
Digest:: World
World WarWar
II (Washington, D.C. : Office of Statistical Control, 1945), 255-61,
//(Washington, D.C.: Office of Statistical Control, 1945), 255-61,
263-68
263-68;; AdmAdm LouisLouis E. E. Denfeld,
Denfeld, chief chief of
of naval
naval operations,
operations, US US Navy,
Navy,
address on the occasion of the 37th anniversary of naval aviation, 99
address on the occasion of the 37th anniversary of naval aviation,
May
May 19491949 [NHC].
[NHC]. In In the
the Korean
Korean War, War, USUS Air
Air Force
Force fighter
fighter pilots
pilots ran
ran
up a 6 .82:1 score of victories to losses in air-to-air combat . Larry
up a 6.82:1 score of victories to losses in air-to-air combat. Larry
Davis,
Davis, MiG MiG Alley
Alley:: Air
Air toto Air
Air Combat
Combat Over Over Korea
Korea (Carrollton,
(CarroUton, Tex. Tex.::
Squadron
Squadron Signal
Signal Publishers,
Publishers, 1978),1978), 70; 70; USAF
USAF Creditsfor
Credits for the the Destruc-
Destruc-
tion of
tion of Enemy
Enemy Aircraft Korean War,
Aircraft Korean War, USAF
USAF Historical
Historical Study Study no.no. 8181
(Maxwell
(Maxwell AFB, AFB, Ala.:Ala.: Albert
Albert F. F. Simpson
Simpson Historical Research Center,
Historical Research Center,
Air University, 1975) .
Air University, 1975).
11.. A
11 A further
further 15 15 percent
percent fell
fell to SAMs, 77 percent
to SAMs, percent to to MiGs,
MiGs, 22 percent
percent
to friendly causes, and 10 percent to unknown causes . McCrea,
to friendly causes, and 10 percent to unknown causes. McCrea,
"Fixed-Wing
"Fixed-Wing Aircraft Aircraft Losses,"
Losses," 6-29,6-29, 6-46, 6-55; Granville,
6-46, 6-55; Granville, "Summary
"Summary
of USAF Aircraft Losses," 11 .
of USAF Aircraft Losses," 11.
12.
12. Nordeen,
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 13;
13; Paul
Paul Burbage
Burbage et et
al ., "The Battle
al., "The Battle for
for the
the Skies
Skies Over
Over North
North Vietnam,"
Vietnam," in
in Air
Air War-
War-
Vietnam (Indianapolis, Ind
Vietnam (Indianapolis, Ind.:.: Bobbs-Merrill
Bobbs-Merrill Co Co.,., Inc., 1978), 224;
Inc., 1978), 224;
Schemmer,
Schemmer, "Vietnam"Vietnam Casualty
Casualty Rates,"Rates," table
table 351
351;; Institute
Institute for De-
for De-
fense Analyses, Jason study, "The Bombing of North Vietnam," De-
fense Analyses, Jason study, "The Bombing of North Vietnam," De-
cember
cember 1967, 1967, 2:49
2:49 [Box
[Box 247,
247, Lyndon
Lyndon B. B. Johnson
Johnson Library,
Library, Austin,
Austin,
Tex .].
Tex.].
13.
13. Report
Report of of the
the Central
Central Intelligence
Intelligence Agency,
Agency, "The"The Effectiveness
Effectiveness
of the Rolling Thunder Program in North Vietnam : 1 January-30
of the Rolling Thunder Program in North Vietnam: 1 January-30
September
September 1966," 1966," November
November 1966, 1966, A-2,
A-2, A-16;
A-16; CIA,
CIA, "Report
"Report on on Roll-
Roll-
ing
ing Thunder,"
Thunder," 1966, 1966, 66 [Both
[Both Box Box 221,221, Lyndon
Lyndon B. Johnson Library,
B. Johnson Library,
Austin,
Austin, Tex.];
Tex.]; Institute
Institute for for Defense
Defense Analyses,
Analyses, JasonJason study,study, "The
"The
Bombing
Bombing of of North
North Vietnam,"
Vietnam," 3:49-503:49-50;; Raphael
Raphael Littauer
Littauer and and Norman
Norman
Uphoff, eds.,
Uphoff, eds., TheThe Air
Air War
War inin Indochina,
Indochina, rev. rev. ed.
ed. (Boston,
(Boston, Mass.:Mass.: Bea-
Bea-
con Press, 1971),
con Press, 1971), 283 283..
14 . McCrea, "Fixed-Wing Aircraft
14. McCrea, "Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses,"
Losses," 2-3;
2-3; Futrell,
Futrell, AcesAces andand
Aerial Victories,
Aerial Victories, 44..
15. Cable to
15. Cable to White
White HouseHouse Situation
Situation Room,Room, 12/16437
12/16437 May, May, 11;; In-
In-
telligence
telligence Memorandum,
Memorandum, "Status "Status ReportReport on SAMs in
on SAMs in North
North Viet-
Viet-
nam," 29 June 1965, 1-2; and Memorandum, "CIA Appreciation of
nam," 29 June 1965, 1-2; and Memorandum, "CIA Appreciation of
SA-2 Activity in
SA-2 Activity in North
North Vietnam
Vietnam During During Late
Late July,"
July," 11 August
August 1965, 1965,
1, in CIA Research Reports: Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 1946-1976,
1, in CIA Research Reports: Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 1946-1976,
12
1299
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
ed. Paul
ed. Paul Kesaris
Kesaris (Frederick,
(Frederick, Md.Md.:: University
University Publications,
Publications, 1983); 1983); Fu-
Fu-
trell, Aces and Aerial Victories, 5; Notes of Lyndon B.
trell, Aces and Aerial Victories, 5; Notes of Lyndon B. Johnson,
Johnson, White
White
House
House meeting,
meeting, 16 May 1965,
16 May 1965, 33 [Lyndon
[Lyndon BB.. Johnson
Johnson Library,
Library, Austin,
Austin,
Tex.]; Thomas D. Boettcher,
Tex.]; Thomas D. Boettcher, Vietnam
Vietnam: : The
The Valor
Valor and
and the
the Sorrow
Sorrow (Bos-
(Bos-
ton,
ton, Mass.
Mass.:: Little,
Little, Brown
Brown and and Co.,
Co., 1985),
1985), 232.232.
16. Apparently the Soviets fired 14 SA-2s at
16. Apparently the Soviets fired 14 SA-2s at Francis
Francis G. G. Powers
Powers in in
1960:
1960: 12 12 missed,
missed, oneone destroyed
destroyed aa MiG-19,
MiG-19, and and oneone gotgot the
the U-2,
U-2, R. A.
R. A.
Mason, ed., War in
Mason, ed., War in the
the Third
Third Dimension:
Dimension: Essays
Essays in
in Contemporary
Contemporary Air
Air
Power
Pow^r (London:
(London: Brassey's,
Brassey's, 1986),
1986), 105 John W.
105.. John W. R. R. Taylor,
Taylor, ed.,ed., Jane's
Jane's
All
All the
the World's
World's Aircraft,
Aircraft, 1967-68
1967-68 (New(New York:
York: McGraw-Hill
McGraw-Hill Book Book Co.,
Co.,
1967), 521-22 ; C. M. Plattner, "SAMs Spur Changes, in Combat Tac-
1967), 521-22; C. M. Plattner, "SAMs Spur Changes, in Combat Tac-
tics,
tics, New
New Equipment,"
Equipment," Aviation
Aviation Week,
Week, 24 lA January
January 1966, 1966, 26, 26, 30;
30; US
US
Army, "Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook," study, 1977, 18-
Army, "Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook," study, 1977, 18-
19
19 [AUL-M39991-9]
[AUL-M39991-9];; Nordeen,Nordeen, Air Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age, Age, 15;
15;
Laurence R. Jensen, "Use of Intelligence Information to Determine
Laurence R. Jensen, "Use of Intelligence Information to Determine
Countermeasures
Countermeasures Requirements
Requirements for for the
the SA-2"
SA-2" (Thesis,
(Thesis, Air Air Command
Command
and Staff School, Maxwell AFB,
and Staff School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,
Ala., 1966), 9-10
1966), 9-10 [AUL-MU35582-
[AUL-MU35582-
77 J54u].
J54u].
17.
17. Jensen,
Jensen, "Use
"Use of of Intelligence,"
InteUigence," 28-42;
28-42; Richard
Richard Rash, Rash, "Electronic
"Electronic
Combat : Making the Other Guy Die for His Country!" (Thesis, Air
Combat: Making the Other Guy Die for His Country!" (Thesis, Air
War
War College,
College, Maxwell
Maxwell AFB, AFB, Ala.,
Ala., March
March 1983),1983), 7, 7, 92
92 [AUL-M43117-
[AUL-M43117-
R224E] ; Momyer, Air Power, 138 .
R224E]; Momyer, Air Power, 138.
18. McCrea, "Fixed-Wing
18. McCrea, Aircraft Losses,"
"Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses," 2-10; Granville, "Sum-
2-10; Granville, "Sum-
mary of USAF Aircraft Losses," 10-11 ; US Pacific Fleet, "An Analysis
mary of USAF Aircraft Losses," 10-11; US Pacific Fleet, "An Analysis
of
of SASA-22 Missile
Missile Activity
Activity in in North
North Vietnam
Vietnam from from July July 1965
1965 through
through
March 1968," staff study 8-68, October 1968, 2 [NHC] .
March 1968," staff study 8-68, October 1968, 2 [NHC].
19. Momyer,
19. Momyer, Air Air Power,
Power, 136.
136.
20.
20. Nordeen,
Nordeen, Air
Air Warfare
Warfare in
in the
the Missile
Missile Age, Age, 16; 16; Peter
Peter B. B. Mersky
Mersky
and
and Norman
Norman Polmar,
Polmar, The The Naval
Naval Air
Air War
War in in Vietnam
Vietnam .((Annapolis,
Annapolis, Md.: Md.:
Nautical
Nautical and and Aviation,
Aviation, 1981),
1981), 6161;; Bryce
Bryce Walker,
Walker, Fighting
Fighting Jets Jets (Alex-
(Alex-
andria,
andria, Va.Va.:: Time-Life
Time-Life Books,
Books, 1983),
1983), 112;
112; M.M. J. J. Armitage
Armitage and and R.
R. A.
A.
Mason, Air
Mason, Air Power
Power in in the
the Nuclear
Nuclear Age,
Age, 2d 2d ed.
ed. (Urbana,
(Urbana, Ill. 111.:: University
University
of Illinois, 1985), 108.
of Illinois, 1985), 108.
21
21.. Nordeen,
Nordeen, AirAir Warfare
Warfare inin the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 18;18; CIA,
CIA, "Effectiveness
"Effectiveness
of Air Campaign," B-22; Maj Paul Burbage et al., "Air Superiority
of Air Campaign," B-22; Maj Paul Burbage et al., "Air Superiority
Tactics
Tactics OverOver North
North Vietnam,"
Vietnam," (U) (U) (Thesis,
(Thesis, Air Air Command
Command and and Staff
Staff
College, Maxwell
College, Maxwell AFB,
AFB, Ala.,
Ala., 1975), 13 [AUL-M43034-2] . (SECRET-
1975), 13 [AUL-M43034-2]. (SECRET—
Information extracted is
Information extracted is unclassified
unclassified.).)
22
22.. Futrell,
Futrell, Aces
Aces andand Aerial
Aerial Victories,
Victories, 4-5;4-5; Nordeen,
Warfare inin
the Missile Age, 13 ; Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers,
the Missile Age, 13; Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers,
United
United States
States Navy
Navy Aircraft
Aircraft Since
Since 1911
1911 (New
(New York:York: FunkFunk andand Wagnalls
Wagnalls
Co., 1968), 177-78; Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers,
Co., 1968), 177-78; Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers,
United
United States
States Military
Military Aircraft
Aircraft Since
Since 1908,
1908, rev.rev. ed.
ed. (London:
(London: Putnam, Putnam,
130
130
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
1971),
1971), 267-69
267-69;; Julian
Julian S. S. Lake
Lake andand Richard
Richard V. V. Hartman,
Hartman, "Air"Air Elec-
Elec-
tronic Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1976, 46;
tronic Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1976, 46;
"US
"US Marine
Marine Corps
Corps Forces
Forces inin Vietnam:
Vietnam: MarchMarch 1965-Sept
1965-Sept 1967,
1967, His-
His-
torical Summary," vol. 2 :36 .
torical Summary," vol. 2:36.
23.
23. Nordeen,
Nordeen,^/>Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 16 Burbage, The
16;; Burbage, The Battle
Battle
for
for the
the Skies,
Skies, 240
240..
24.
24. McCrea,
McCrea, "Fixed-Wing
"Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Aircraft Losses,"
Losses," 2-24,
2-24, 2-29
2-29;; USAF
USAF Pa- Pa-
cific
cific Command
Command Scientific
Scientific Advisory
Advisory Group,Group, "Shrike
"Shrike Missile
Missile Effec-
Effec-
tiveness
tiveness under
under Rolling
Rolling Thunder
Thunder Operations"
Operations" (Working
(Working paperpaper 1-67,
1-67,
headquarters
headquarters of of the
the commander
commander in in chief
chief Pacific,
Pacific, Scientific
Scientific Advisory
Advisory
Group,
Group, January
January 1967),
1967), 11 [AUL-M42294-2]
[AUL-M42294-2];; USAF USAF Pacific
Pacific Command
Command
Scientific
Scientific Advisory
Advisory Group,
Group, "Shrike
"Shrike Effectiveness
Effectiveness under under Rolling
Rolling Thun-
Thun-
der
der Operation,
Operation, First
First Quarter,
Quarter, 1967,"
1967," (U)(U) (Working
(Working paper 7-67, assis-
paper 7-67, assis-
tant
tant forfor operations
operations analysis,
analysis, Headquarters
Headquarters Pacific Pacific Air
Air Forces,
Forces, April
April
1967),
1967), 11 [AUL-M38434-13
[AUL-M38434-13 #67-9] #67-9].. (SECRET-Information
(SECRET—Information extracted extracted
is
is unclassified.) Nordeen, Air
unclassified.) Nordeen, Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 18-19;
18-19; Mil-
Mil-
itary
itary Assistance
Assistance Command,
Command, Vietnam,Vietnam, uncoordinated
uncoordinated draft, draft, "Line-
"Line-
backer
backer Study,"
Study," staff
staff study,
study, January
January 1973,1973, 77 [AFHRC-K712.041-19]
[AFHRC-K712.041-19];;
Burbage, The
Burbage, The Battle
Battle for
for the
the Skies,
Skies, 247.
I'M.
25.
25. Report
Report of of Tactical
Tactical AirAir Command,
Command, Directorate
Directorate of Fighter Op-
of Fighter Op-
erations, "SEA Tactics Review Brochure," April 1973, 2:77-79 [AUL-
erations, "SEA Tactics Review Brochure," April 1973, 2:77-79 [AUL-
M41737-283] Nordeen, Air
M41737-283];; Nordeen, Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,Age, 19,
19, 22;
22; Swan-
Swan-
borough and Bowers, United States Military Aircraft, 471 ; Momyer,
borough and Bowers, United States Military Aircraft, 471; Momyer,
Air
Air Power,
Power, 130.
130.
26. McCrea, "Fixed-Wing
26. McCrea, "Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses," 2-24;
Aircraft Losses," Nordeen, Air
2-24; Nordeen, Air
Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 23-24; Burbage, The
IZ-IA; Burbage, The Battle
Battle for the Skies,
for the Skies,
240; Momyer, Air
240; Momyer, Air Power,
Power, 127127;; Lake
Lake and and Hartman,
Hartman, "Air "Air Electronic
Electronic
Warfare,"
Warfare," 47. 47.
27.
27. Littauer
Littauer and Uphoff, The
and Uphoff, The Air
Air War
War in in Indochina,
Indochina, 283.283.
28 . Schemmer, "Vietnam Casualty Rates," table 351 .
28. Schemmer, "Vietnam Casualty Rates," table 351.
29.
29. Ibid.;
Ibid.; Carl
Carl Berger
Berger et et al., eds., The
al., eds., The United
United States
States Air
Air Force
Force in in
Southeast
Southeast Asia:Asia: 1961-1973
1961-1973 (Washington,
(Washington, D .C. : Office of Air Force
D.C.: Office of Air Force
History,
History, 1977),
1977), 116;
116; Armitage
Armitage and Mason, Air
and Mason, Air Power
Power in the Nuclear
in the Nuclear
Age,
Age, 92;92; James
James Coath
Coath and and Michael
Michael Kilian, Heavy Losses:
Kilian, Heavy Losses: The
The Dan-
Dan-
gerous
gerous Decline
Decline ofAmerica's
of America'sDefense
Defense(New York: Penguin
(Ney/York: PenguinBooks,
Books, 1985),
1985),
136-37;; Warren
136-37 Warren R. Young, The
R. Young, The Helicopters
Helicopters (Alexandria,
(Alexandria, Va. Va.:: Time-
Time-
Life
Life Books,
Books, 1982),
1982), 140;
140; Peter
Peter Mersky,
Mersky, US US Marine
Marine Corps
Corps Aviation
Aviation:: 1912
1912
to
to the
the Present
Present (Baltimore,
(Baltimore, Md. Md.:: Nautical
Nautical & & Aviation,
Aviation, 1987),
1987), 244.
244. InIn
Vietnam, one helicopter was hit for every 450 sorties, one downed
Vietnam, one helicopter was hit for every 450 sorties, one downed
for
for every
every 7,000
7,000 sorties,
sorties, and
and oneone lost
lost for
for every
every 20,000
20,000 sorties
sorties.. Peter
Peter
Borgart,
Borgart, "The
"The Vulnerability
Vulnerability ofthe
of the Manned
Manned Airborne
Airborne Weapon
Weapon System,
System,
Part
Part 33:: Influence
Influence onon Tactics
Tactics and Strategy," International
and Strategy," International Defense
Defense Re-Re-
view,
view, December
December 1977,1977, 1065
1065..
13
1311
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
30.
30. Claude
Claude G. G. Morita,
Morita, "Implication
"Implication of Modern Air
of Modern Air Power
Power in in aa
Limited
Limited War" War" (Report
(Report of of interview
interview with Gen John
with Gen John W. W. Vogt,
Vogt, JrJr.,., com-
com-
mander, Seventh Air Force, Office of Pacific Air Forces History, 29
mander, Seventh Air Force, Office of Pacific Air Forces History, 29
November
November 1973),23-24
1973), 23-24 [AUL-M38245-228]
[AUL-M38245-228];; John John A. A. Doglione,
Doglione, "Air- "Air-
power and the 1972 Spring Invasion," Air War-Vietnam, 142, 197
power and the 1972 Spring Invasion," Air War—Vietnam, 142, 197;;
Nordeen,
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 64;64; G.
G. H H.. Turley,
Turley, "Time
"Time of of
Change in Modern Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1974,
Change in Modern Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1974,
18;
18; Center
Center for for Naval
Naval Analyses,
Analyses, "Documentation
"Documentation and and Analysis
Analysis of of U.S.
U.S.
Marine Corps Activity in Southeast Asia: 1 April-31 July 1972,"
Marine Corps Activity in Southeast Asia: 1 April-31 July 1972,"
11:110-11
:110-11 [Marine
[Marine CorpsCorps Historical
Historical Center]
Center];; Lake
Lake and and Hartman,
Hartman, "Air "Air
Electronic
Electronic Warfare,"
Warfare," 47. 47.
31
31.. Doglione,
Doglione, "Airpower
"Airpower and and the
the 1972
1972 Spring
Spring Invasion,"
Invasion," 132; 132; Ber-Ber-
ger, The USAF in SEA,
ger, The USAF in SEA, 168;
168; Nordeen,
Nordeen, Air
Air Warfare
Warfare in
in the
the Missile Age,
Missile Age,
64;; House,
64 House, Hearings
Hearings beforebefore thethe Subcommittee
Subcommittee of of the
the Committee
Committee on on
Appropriations,
Appropriations, 93d 93d Cong.,
Cong., 1st 1st sess.,
sess., 99 January
January 1973,1973, 10; 10; Center
Center for for
Naval
Naval Analyses,
Analyses, "Summary
"Summary of of Air
Air Operations
Operations in in Southeast
Southeast Asia:Asia: Jan-Jan-
uary
uary 1972-31
1972-31 January
January 1973,"
1973," OEG/OP508N,
OEG/OP508N, January January 1974, 4-17, 4-
1974, 4-17, 4-
19 .
19.
32. Seymour
32. Seymour Hersh,Hersh, TheThe Price
Price ofPower:
ofPower: Kissinger
Kissinger in in the
the Nixon
Nixon WhiteWhite
House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 506; Richard Nixon, RN.-
House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 506; Richard Nixon, RN:
The
The Memoirs
Memoirs ofRichard
of Richard Nixon
Nixon (New(New York:
York: Grosset
Grosset & & Dunlap,
Dunlap, 1976), 1976),
606-7
606-7. .
33
33.. Guenter
Guenter Lewy, Lewy, America
America in in Vietnam
Vietnam (New(New York: Oxford Uni-
York; Oxford Uni-
versity,
versity, 1978),
1978), 410;
410; Hersh,
Hersh, The The Price
Price ofof Power,
Power, 526.526.
34
34.. TAC,
TAG, "SEA"SEA Tactics
Tactics Review
Review Brochure,"
Brochure," II, II, 68.
68.
35
35.. Guided
Guided weapons
weapons were were expensive,
expensive, limited
limited by by the
the weather,
weather, and and
few in number. Directorate of Operations Analysis, Headquarters Pa-
few in number. Directorate of Operations Analysis, Headquarters Pa-
cific
cific Air
Air Forces,
Forces, Project Contemporary Historical
Project Contemporary Historical Examination
Examination of of
Current Operations Report, "Linebacker : Overview of the First 120
Current Operations Report, "Linebacker: Overview of the First 120
Days,"
Days," 27 27 September
September 1973, 1973, 21,
21, 27
27 [AUL-M38245-221
[AUL-M38245-221]; ]; Nordeen,
Nordeen, Air Air
Warfare in the Missile Age, 59, 63. One problem encountered with the
Warfare in the Missile Age, 59, 63. One problem encountered with the
ECM
ECM pods pods waswas that
that they
they created
created interference
interference withwith thethe electro-optical
electro-optical
guided
guided bombbomb (EOGB) guidance system.
(EOGB) guidance system. A A wire
wire screen
screen quickly
quickly solved
solved
that problem. Patrick J. Breitling, "Guided Bomb Operations in SEA:
that problem. Patrick J. Breitling, "Guided Bomb Operations in SEA:
The
The Weather
Weather Dimensions,
Dimensions, 11 February-31
February-31 December
December 1972," 1972," Contem-
Contem-
porary Historical Examination of Current Operations Report, 11 Oc-
porary Historical Examination of Current Operations Report, Oc-
tober
tober 1973,
1973, 3, 3, 24
24 [AUL-M38245-223]
[AUL-M38245-223];; Jeffrey Jeffrey P.R Rhodes,
Rhodes, "Improving
"Improving
the Odds on Ground Attack," Air Force Magazine, November 1986,
the Odds on Ground Attack," Air Force Magazine, November 1986,
48;; Delbert
48 Corum, "The
Delbert Corum, "The Tale
Tale ofof Two
Two Bridges,"
Bridges," in in Air
Air War-Vietnam,
War—Vietnam,
85-86
85-86;; Morita,
Morita, Vogt Vogt interview,
interview, 6. 6.
36.
36. Momyer,
Momyer, Air Air Power,
Power, 129;129; Military
Military Assistance
Assistance Command,
Command, Viet- Viet-
nam,
nam, "Linebacker
"Linebacker Study"; Study"; Nordeen,
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,Age,
24; Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing Fiscal Year 1974
24; Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing Fiscal Year 1974
1322
13
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
Authorization,
Authorization, 92d 92d Cong.,
Cong., 2d 2d sess.,
sess., 13-20
13-20 March
March 1973,1973, pt.
pt. 66:4275.
:4275.
37.
37. TAC,
TAC, "SEA "SEA Tactics
Tactics Review
Review Brochure,"
78. During
During the the period
period
of 10 May through 10 September 1972, the United States lost 63 fixed-
of 10 May through 10 September 1972, the United States lost 63 fixed-
wing
wing aircraft
aircraft in in combat
combat over over the
the North:
North: 21 21 to
to AAA,
AAA, 22 22 to
to MiGs,
MiGs, and and
20 to SAMs.
20 to SAMs.
38
38.. Military
Military Assistance
Assistance Command,
Command, Vietnam, Vietnam, "Uncoordinated
"Uncoordinated
Draft," 7, chap. 8; Burbage, The Battle for the Skies, 267;
Draft," 7, chap. 8; Burbage, The Battle for the Skies, 267; Directorate
Directorate
of
of Operations
Operations Analysis,Analysis, "Linebacker,"
"Linebacker," 70-72; 70-72; DOD,
DOD, OAD, OAD, "US "US Air-Air-
craft
craft Losses
Losses in in SE
SE Asia,"
Asia," October
October 1973,
1973, table
table 351,
351, 55;; R.
R. Mark
Mark Clod-
Clod-
felter,
felter, "By "By Other
Other Means:Means: An An Analysis
Analysis of of the
the Linebacker
Linebacker Bombing
Bombing
Campaigns
Campaigns as as Instruments
Instruments of of National
National Policy"
Policy" (Master's
(Master's thesis,
thesis, Uni-
Uni-
versity
versity of of Nebraska,
Nebraska, 1983), 1983), 77;
77; Center
Center forfor Naval
Naval Analyses,
Analyses, "Summary
"Summary
of
of Air
Air OpsOps in in SEA:
SEA: Jan Jan 72-Jan
72-Jan 73,"73," 4-1,
4-1, 4-8,
4-8, 4-19,
4-19, and
and 4-23
4-23..
39.
39. Marvin
Marvin and and Bernard
Bernard Kalb,
Kalb, Kissinger
Kissinger (Boston,
(Boston, Mass.Mass.:: Little,
Little,
Brown
Brown and and Co.,
Co., 1974),
1974), 412412;; Clodfelter,
Clodfelter, "By "By Other
Other Means,"
Means," 105, 105, 111111;;
W.
W. Hays
Hays Parks,
Parks, "Linebacker
"Linebacker and and the
the Law
Law of of War,"
War," AirAir University
University Re- Re-
view
view 34 34 (January-February
(January-February 1983) 1983):: 16
16;; Nixon,
Nixon, Memoirs,
Memoirs, 734. 734.
40. Broughton, Thud Ridge, 36 .
40. Broughton, Thud Ridge, 36.
41
41.. Briefing
Briefing Books Books IV IV (U),
(U), Headquarters
Headquarters US US AirAir Force,
Force, details
details on on
the
the Linebacker
Linebacker II II missions,
missions, 22 vols.,
vols., December
December 1972 1972 [AFSHRC-
[AFSHRC-
K143 .042-12]. (SECRET-Information
K143.042-12]. (SECRET—Information extracted extracted is is unclassified
unclassified.) .)
42.
42. Norman
Norman Polmar, Polmar, ed., ed.. Strategic
Strategic AirAir Command.
Command: People,People, Aircraft
Aircraft
and
and Missiles
Missiles (Annapolis,
(Annapolis, Md.: Md.: Nautical
Nautical & «fe Aviation,
Aviation, 1979),
1979), 126;
126; Gran-
Gran-
ville,
ville, "Summary
"Summary of of USAF
USAF Aircraft
Aircraft Losses,"
Losses," 18; 18; James
James McCarthy
McCarthy and and
George Allison, Linebacker IL A View from the Rock (Maxwell AFB,
George Allison, Linebacker IT. A View from the Rock (Maxwell AFB,
Ala.:
Ala.: Airpower
Airpower ResearchResearch Institute,
Institute, 1979),
1979), 12; 12; Karl
Karl Eschmann,
Eschmann, "The "The
Role of Tactical Air Support: Linebacker II" (Thesis, Air Command
Role of Tactical Air Support: Linebacker 11" (Thesis, Air Command
and
and Staff
Staff College,
College, Maxwell
Maxwell AFB, AFB, Ala.,
Ala., 1985),
1985), 70-72
70-72 [AUL-M43122
[AUL-M43122
E741
E741r]. r].
43.
43. Eschmann,
Eschmann, "The "The Role
Role of of Tactical
Tactical Air Air Support,"
Support," 49, 49, 70-72;
70-72;
McCarthy
McCarthy and and Allison,
Allison, Linebacker
Linebacker II,II, 86.
86. OnOn these
these first
first three
three missions,
missions,
11.6
.6 percent
percent of of the
the "Ds"
"Ds" and and 4.9
4.9 percent
percent of of the
the "Gs"
"Gs" went down per
went down per
sortie
sortie.. In In the
the entire
entire 11-day
11-day campaign,
campaign, the the "Ds"
"Ds" suffered
suffered 11.8 .8 percent
percent
and
and the the "Gs"
"Gs" 2.7 2.7 percent
percent losses
losses.. About
About 10 10 percent
percent of of the
the missiles
missiles fired
fired
against
against the the "Gs"
"Gs" impacted,
impacted, whereas
whereas only only 33 percent
percent of of those
those fired
fired
against the "Ds" did likewise. Headquarters US Air Force, Briefing
against the "Ds" did likewise. Headquarters US Air Force, Briefing
Books,
Books, DecemberDecember 1972 1972;; Briefing,
Briefing, Headquarters
Headquarters Pacific Pacific AirAir Forces,
Forces,
"Operations
"Operations Analysis Analysis:: Linebacker
Linebacker II II Air
Air Operations"
Operations" (U), (U), 31
31 January
January
1973 [AFHRC-K168.06-232]
1973 [AFHRC-K168.06-232].. (SECRET-Information
(SECRET—Information extracted extracted is is
unclassified
unclassified.).) The The gunners
gunners on on B-52Gs
B-52Gs were
were stationed
stationed in in the
the tail,
tail, where
where
they
they usedused either
either electronic
electronic or or visual
visual sighting.
sighting. McCarthy
Allison,
Linebacker II,
Linebacker II, 70;
70; Eschmann,
Role ofof Tactical
Tactical Air
Air Support,"
Support," 49. 49.
44.
44. This
This policy
policy quickly
quickly changed
changed beginning
beginning with the second
with the second wave
wave on on
133
133
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
the
the second
second day. McCarthy and
day. McCarthy and Allison,
Allison, Linebacker
Linebacker II, 46-47..
II, 46-47
45. Robert Clement, "A Fourth of July in December: A
45. Robert Clement, "A Fourth of July in December: A B-52
B-52 Nav-
Nav-
igator's
igator's Perspective
Perspective ofLinebacker
of Linebacker II" 11" (Thesis,
(Thesis, Air Command and
Air Command and Staff
Staff
College, Maxwell
College, Maxwell AFB, AFB, AlaAla.,., 1984),
1984), 18, 18, 49 49 [AUL-M43122
[AUL-M43122 C626f] C626fl;;
McCarthy
Allison, Linebacker
Linebacker II, II, 30,
30, 32 32..
46. Headquarters USAF,
46. Headquarters USAF, "Linebacker
"Linebacker USAF USAF Bombing
Bombing Survey,"Survey,"
1973,
1973, 35 35 [AFHRC-K717
[AFHRC-K717.64-8]; .64-8] ; TAC, "SEA
TAC, "SEA Tactics
Tactics Review
Review Brochure,"
Brochure,"
II,
II, 77;
77; Eschmann,
Role of of Tactical
Support," 60. 60.
47.. Eschmann,
47 Eschmann, "The "The Role
Role of of Tactical
Support," 60, 60, 63;
63; Clod-
Clod-
felter, "By Other Means," 121 .
felter, "By Other Means," 121.
48
48.. TAC, "SEA Tactics
TAC, "SEA Tactics Review
Review Brochure,"
76.
49 . Strategic Air Command Briefing, subject : Chaff
49. Strategic Air Command Briefing, subject: Chaff Effectiveness
Effectiveness
in Support
in Support of of Linebacker
Linebacker II Operations, March
II Operations, March 1973 1973 [AFHRC-
[AFHRC-
K168 .06-223] .
K168.06-223].
50.
50. Ibid
Ibid..
51 . TAC, "SEA
51. TAC, "SEA Tactics
Tactics Review
Review Brochure,"
Brochure," II, II, 76
76..
52
52.. "The
"The Battle
Battle forfor the
the Skies Over North
Skies Over North Vietnam
Vietnam:: 1964-1972,"
1964-1972," 94 94
[AFHRC-K239.043-14].
[AFHRC-K239.043-14].
53
53.. SAC,
SAC, "Chaff
"Chaff Effectiveness,"
Effectiveness," MarchMarch 1973 1973;; TAC,
TAC, "SEA "SEA Tactics
Tactics
Review
Review Brochure,"
76.
54
54.. SAC,
SAC, "Chaff
"Chaff Effectiveness,"
Effectiveness," March March 1973; 1973; forfor aa general
general discus-
discus-
sion
sion ofthe
of the changes,
changes, alsoalso see
see Clement,
Clement, "A "A Fourth
Fourth ofJuly
of July in in December,"
December,"
49 ; Eschmann, "The Role of Tactical Air Support," 75-76; McCarthy
49; Eschmann, "The Role of Tactical Air Support," 75-76; McCarthy
and Allison,
and AlUson, Linebacker
97, 121
121;; History,
History, 388th 388th Tactical
Tactical Fighter
Fighter
Wing, October-December 1972, 27, 32-33.
Wing, October-December 1972, 27, 32-33.
55.
55. B-52s
B-52s flewflew 708,
708, F-Ills
F-llls 148,
148, A-7s
A-7s 226, 226, andand F-4s
F-4s 283 283 effective
effective
sorties. Headquarters US Air Force, Briefing Books, II.
sorties. Headquarters US Air Force, Briefing Books, II.
56. During
56. During periods
periods of of limited
limited visibility,
visibility, the the TAC
TAC fighters
fighters scored
scored
some remarkable successes, most notably hitting two especially dif-
some remarkable successes, most notably hitting two especially dif-
ficult
ficult targets,
targets, thethe Hanoi
Hanoi thermal
thermal plant
plant andand Radio
Radio HanoiHanoi.. The The latter,
latter,
protected
protected by by aa 25-foot-high
25-foot-high and and 10-foot-thick
10-foot-thick blast blast wall,
wall, had had survived
survived
the
the bombing
bombing of of 3636 B-52s.
B-52s. F-4s
F-4s got
got four
four laser-guided
laser-guided bombs bombs inside
inside the
the
walls
walls and and destroyed
destroyed the the target Clodfelter, "By
target.. Clodfelter, "By Other
Other Means,"
Means," 120;120;
assistant chief of staff, Intelligence (ACSI), "Linebacker 11: 18-29 Dec.
assistant chief of staff. Intelligence (ACSI), "Linebacker II: 18-29 Dec.
72"
72" (U),(U), supporting
supporting document
document III-K1III-Kl [AFHRC-TS-HOA-74-197]
[AFHRC-TS-HOA-74-197]..
(TOP SECRET-Information extracted is unclassified.)
(TOP SECRET—Information extracted is unclassified.)
57.
57. History,
History, Air Air Force
Force Intelligence
Intelligence Service,
Service, 11 July July 1972-30
1972-30 JuneJune
1973 : Linebacker
1973: Linebacker II
II Summary
Summary III,
III, K2
K2; ; Center
Center for
for Naval
Naval Analyses
Analyses
study,
study, "U.S "U.S.. Navy,
Navy, Marine Corps, and
Marine Corps, and AirAir Force Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Force Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Losses
Losses and and Damage
Damage in in Southeast
Southeast Asia Asia (1962-1973),
(1962-1973), Part Part I:I: List
List of
of
Aircraft Lost," report no. CRC 305 (Alexandria, Va. : Defense Doc-
Aircraft Lost," report no. CRC 305 (Alexandria, Va.: Defense Doc-
umentation
umentation Center, Center, 1977),
1977), 191-93, 223, 488-92
191-93, 223, 488-92 [AUL-M31914-22
[AUL-M31914-22
#305 (a) v. I] . Eschmann, "The Role of Tactical Air Support,"
#305 (a) v. I]. Eschmann, "The Role of Tactical Air Support," 103-103-
134
134
VIETNAM
VIETNAM
4,
4, lists
lists 30
30 aircraft
aircraft destroyed,
destroyed, including
including three
three lost
lost in
in accidents.
accidents. Futrell,
Futrell,
Aces
Aces and and Aerial
Aerial Victories,
Victories, 17,17, states
states that
that 27 27 US
US AirAir Force
Force aircraft
aircraft were
were
lost.
lost. The
The North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese claimed claimed 81 81 United
United States
States aircraft
aircraft (34 (34 B-
B-
52s).
52s). Gareth
Gareth Porter,
Porter, A A Peace
Peace Denied:
Denied: The The United
United States,
States, Vietnam,
Vietnam, and and
the
the Paris
Paris Agreements
Agreements (Bloomington,
(Bloomington, Ind Ind.:.: Indiana
Indiana University,
University, 1975),1975),
161-62;
161-62; Richard
Richard Holloran,
Holloran, "Bombing
"Bombing Halt Hah Brings
Brings Relief
Relief to to B-52
B-52
Crews
Crews in in Guam,"
Guam," New Nevi> York Times, 22 January
York Times, January 1973,1973, 33.. Drenkowski,
Drenkowski,
"Operations
"Operations Linebacker
Linebacker Il," II," pt.pt. 2,
2, 55,
55, says
says that
that 22
22 toto 27
27 B-52s
B-52s werewere
destroyed .
destroyed.
58.
58. Clodfelter,
Other Means,"
Means," 108; 108; Clement,
Clement, "A "A Fourth
Fourth of of July
July
in December," 47.
in December," 47.
59.
59. Headquarters
Headquarters US US AirAir Force,
Force, Briefing
Briefing Books,
Books, II andand II.II.
60. Eschmann, "The Role of Tactical Air Support," 108; Berger
60. Eschmann, "The Role of Tactical Air Support," 108; Berger et et
al.,
al.. The
The USAF
USAFin in SEA, 60; Drendel,
SEA, 60; Drendel, And And KillMiGs,
Kill MiGs, 47,7347,73;; SAC,
SAC, "Chaff
"Chaff
Effectiveness,"
Effectiveness," March March 19731973;; McCarthy
Allison, Linebacker
65,
116; Futrell, Aces and Aerial Victories, 125.
116; Futrell, Aces and Aerial Victories, 125.
61 . Eschmann,
61. Eschmann, "The "The RoleRole of of Tactical
Support," 46. 46.
62. Center for Naval Analyses, "Summary of Air Ops SEA:
62. Center for Naval Analyses, "Summary of Air Ops SEA: Jan Jan 72-
72-
Jan 73,"
Jan 73," 4-17
4-17.. The
The North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese did did not
not have
have the
the most
most modern
modern
equipment; in the 1973 Middle East War the Egyptians and Syrians
equipment; in the 1973 Middle East War the Egyptians and Syrians
inflicted
inflicted heavyheavy losses
losses on on Israeli
Israeli aircraft
aircraft withwith Soviet SA-3 and
Soviet SA-3 and SA-6
SA-6
missiles and ZSU-23-4 guns, equipment not employed in the Vietnam
missiles and ZSU-23-4 guns, equipment not employed in the Vietnam
War.
War. See See chapter
chapter 44.. The
The North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese may may have
have improved
improved and and
manned
manned their their defenses
defenses without
without the the help
help or or knowledge
knowledge of of the
the Soviets
Soviets..
Porter,
?OTter, AA Peace Denied, 161
Peace Denied, 161;; Jon
Jon M.M. Van
Van Dyke,
Dyke, North
North Vietnam's
Vietnam's Strat-
Strat-
egy
egy for
for Survival
Survival (Palo Alto, Calif.:
(Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific
Pacific Books,
Books, 1972),
1972), 61,
61, 217.
217.
63
63.. On
On thethe third
third day
day of of the
the campaign,
campaign, aa SAC SAC commander
commander ordered ordered
aa search
search for for North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese SAM SAM storage
storage facilities.
facilities. Within
Within 18 18
hours, the intelligence people began to find them, whereupon SAC
hours, the intelligence people began to find them, whereupon SAC
requested
requested JCS JCS permission
permission to to bomb
bomb them.
them. Permission
Permission for for all
all but
but one
one
was forthcoming, although it took another 24 to 36 hours . As a result,
was forthcoming, although it took another 24 to 36 hours. As a result,
these
these targets
targets were
were notnot hit
hit until
until 26 26 December.
December. McCarthyMcCarthy and and Allison,
Allison,
Linebacker
Linebacker II, II, 97-98
97-98..
64.
64. Ibid.,
Ibid., 155;
155; Eschmann,
Eschmann, "The "The RoleRole of of Tactical
Support," 94; 94;
George
George Allison,
Allison, "The"The Bombers
Bombers Go Go toto the
the Bullseye,"
BuUseye," Aerospace
Aerospace His- His-
torian,
torian, December
December 1982, 1982, 233233;; History,
History, 388th
388th Tactical
Tactical Fighter
Fighter Wing,
Wing,
October-December 1972
October-December 1972..
65 . While several helicopters and
65. While several helicopters and transports
transports were were destroyed
destroyed on on the
the
ground,
ground, intelligence
intelligence claimed
claimed that that only
only two two to to three
three MiG-21
MiG-21ss were were
damaged. The bulk of the bombs fell on railroad yards (44 percent)
damaged. The bulk of the bombs fell on railroad yards (44 percent)
and
and storage
storage facilities
facilities (30(30 percent)
percent).. ACSI,
ACSI, "Linebacker
"Linebacker II"; 11"; Head-
Head-
quarters USAF, "Linebacker USAF Bombing Survey," 3, 14, 16-17,
quarters USAF, "Linebacker USAF Bombing Survey," 3, 14, 16-17,
40-43
40-43..
13
1355
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
66.
66. Clodfelter,
Other Means,"
Means," 127 127.. The
The airmen
airmen had also run
had also run
out
out of
of worthwhile
worthwhile targets
targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong
in the Hanoi-Haiphong area area.. McCarthy
McCarthy and and
Allison, Linebacker 11, 163 .
Allison, Linebacker II, 163.
67.
67. It
It would
would be be ahistorical
ahistorical to to maintain,
maintain, however,
however, that
that the
the same
same terms
terms
could have been reached in October.
could have been reached in October.
68.
68. Momyer,
Momyer, Air Power, 126;
Air Power, 126; Senate,
Senate, Fiscal
Fiscal 1974
1974 Authorization
Authorization Hear-
Hear-
ing,
ing, pt. :4253 .
pt. 66:4253.
69.
69. American
gunners tracked
tracked very
very few
few targets
targets during
during
the
the course
course of of the
the Vietnam
Vietnam War. War. There
There were
were at
at least
least two
two incidents
incidents of of
North Vietnamese aircraft attacking American ground or sea forces.
North Vietnamese aircraft attacking American ground or sea forces.
Although some
Although some US US Army
Army AAA AAA units
units served
served inin the
the war,
war, none
none fired
fired
their weapons against hostile aircraft. The Navy credits its gunners,
their weapons against hostile aircraft. The Navy credits its gunners,
however,
however, withwith downing
downing threethree North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese MiGs MiGs.. TheThe first
first fell
fell
to a Talos missile fired from the Long Beach in November 1968, the
to a Talcs missile fired from the Long Beach in November 1968, the
second
second to to aa Terrier
Terrier fired
fired byby the
the Sterett
Sterett on 19 April
on 19 1972, and
April 1972, the third
and the third
to
to a
a Talos
Talcs fired
fired by
by the
the Chicago
Chicago on
on 9
9 May
May 1972.
1972. History,
History, Seventh
Seventh Fleet,
Fleet,
1972,
1972, enclosures
enclosures 1,1, 20, 20, 2525 (NHC]
[NHC];; McCrea,
McCrea, "Fixed-Wing
"Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Aircraft
Losses,"
Losses," 2-30
2-30..
136
136
CHAPTER
CHAPTER 44
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
Recent
Recent experience
experience offers
offers several
several instances
instances where
where ground-
ground-
based
based air
air defense
defense systems
systems made
made the
the difference
difference.. This
This chapter
chapter
discusses
discusses the Arab-Israeli War,
the Arab-Israeli American air
War, American air strikes
strikes in
in the
the
Middle
Middle East,
East, Indian-Pakistani
Indian-Pakistani Wars,
Wars, thethe Falkland
Falkland War,
War, and
and
other recent and
other recent and ongoing
ongoing conflicts
conflicts..
Arab-Israeli Wars
Arab-Israeli Wars
Of
Of the
the numerous
numerous non-American
non-American conflicts
conflicts since 1945,
since 1945,
none
none have
have stirred
stirred more
more military
military interest
interest than
than those
those between
between
Arabs
Arabs and
and Jews
Jews.. Their
Their number,
number. Western
Western sympathies,
sympathies, Israeli
Israeli
successes
successes against
against great
great odds,
odds, and
and the
the employment
employment of of mod-
mod-
ern equipment on
ern equipment on aa large
large scale
scale are
are all
all factors
factors which
which generate
generate
this
this interest
interest.. Israeli
Israeli predominance
predominance in in the
the air
air attracts
attracts par-
par-
ticular
ticular attention
attention.. For
For Israeli,
Israeli, air
air power
power plays
plays and
and continues
continues
to
to play
play aa vital
vital role
role in
in their
their successful
successful military
military record.
record.
1948, 1956, and

1948,1956, and 1967
1967
Although
Although Arab
Arab and
and Jew
Jew have
have been
been fighting
fighting each
each other
other for
for
aa long
long time,
time, the
the airmen's
airmen's interest
interest focuses
focuses on on their
their conflicts
conflicts
since
since 1967,
1967, in
in which
which air
air power
power has
has played
played aa significant
significant role.
role.
Both
Both sides
sides employed
employed aircraft
aircraft in
in the
the 1948
1948 and and 1956
1956 wars,
wars,
but these
but these forces
forces consisted
consisted of of small
small numbers
numbers of of obsolete,
obsolete, oror
obsolescent,
obsolescent, aircraft
aircraft.. In 1956 the
In 1956 Israelis lost
the Israelis 10 to
lost 10 to 15
15 air-
air-
craft
craft out
out of
of aa total
total inventory
inventory of of 136-155,
136-155, most most toto ground
ground
fire,
fire, and
and claimed
claimed eight
eight aerial
aerial victories
victories.'.' In the 1967
In the 1967 and
and
1973
1973 conflicts,
conflicts, however,
however, the the combatants
combatants used used modern
modern
137
137
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
equipment
equipment and and airair power
power became became critical,
critical, if if not
not
predominant.
predominant.
It
It can
can bebe argued
argued thatthat air
air power
power won won itsits most
most striking
striking
victory
victory of of all time in
all time in the June 1967
the June 1967 war.war. Preemptive
Preemptive strikes
strikes
by
by the
the Israeli
Israeli Air
Air Force
Force (IAF)
(lAF) on on the
the first
first day
day destroyed
destroyed thethe
bulk
bulk of of the
the numerically
numerically superior
superior Arab Arab airair forces
forces on on the
the
ground,
ground, permitting
permitting Israeli
Israeli armor
armor and and close-support
close-support aircraft
aircraft
to decisively
to decisively crushcrush the
the numerically
numerically superiorsuperior ArabArab ground
ground
forces
forces.. OnOn that
that first
first day,
day, thethe IAF
lAF destroyed
destroyed 85 85 percent
percent of of
the Egyptian
the Egyptian Air Force and
Air Force and aa total
total ofof 410
410 Arab
Arab aircraft
aircraft in
in
exchange
exchange for for 1919 aircraft
aircraft lost
lost (all
(all but two or
but two or three
three toto ground
ground
fire).
fire). This
This short, sharp war
short, sharp war cost
cost thethe Israelis
Israelis aa total
total of
of 40
40 to
to
50
50 aircraft
aircraft (all
(all but
but three
three to to 1212 toto ground
ground fire).
fire). In
In contrast,
contrast,
the Arab air
the Arab forces lost
air forces lost about
about 450 450 aircraft,
aircraft, mostly
mostly on on the
the
ground,
ground, including
including 60-79
60-79 to to Israeli
Israeli aircraft
aircraft and
and about
about 5050 to
to
Israeli
Israeli ground-based
ground-based air air defenses.2
defenses.^
Although
Although the the Egyptians
Egyptians had had 18 18 toto 25
25 batteries
batteries of of SA-2s,
SA-2s,
those
those batteries
batteries hadhad nono direct effect on
direct effect on the
the battle
battle.. Their
Their SAM
SAM
operators
operators fired
fired perhaps
perhaps 12 12 missiles
missiles but but registered
registered no no kills,
kills,
although
although possibly
possibly one one hit.
hit. The
The unclassified
unclassified sources
sources do do not
not
mention
mention aa breakdown
breakdown of of Israeli
Israeli credits
credits for their surface-
for their surface-
based
based airair defense
defense systems,
systems, but but apparently
apparently an an Israeli
Israeli Hawk
Hawk
downed
downed an an IAF
lAF A-4A-4 on on 55 JuneJune.. TheThe damaged
damaged fighter-
fighter-
bomber
bomber apparently
apparently penetrated
penetrated aa restricted
restricted area
area around
around an an
Israeli
Israeli nuclear
nuclear facility.'
facility.^
1967-73
1967-73
The
The Israelis gained aa phenomenal
Israelis gained phenomenal military
military victory
victory and
and
new
new territories
territories in
in the
the 1967
1967 War,
War, but
but they
they did
did not
not win
win peace.
peace.
Soviet
Soviet resupply
resupply ofof her
her Arab
Arab clients
clients led
led to
to aa drawn-out
drawn-out land
land
and
and air
air war
war of attrition along
of attrition along the
the Suez
Suez Canal,
Canal, the
the new
new bor-
bor-
der
der between
between Egypt
Egypt and
and Israel.
Israel. Between
Between July
July 1967
1967 and
and Jan-
Jan-
uary
uary 1970,
1970, the
the IAF
lAF lost
lost 15 aircraft (13
15 aircraft (13 to
to ground
ground fire)
fire) while
while
it claimed
it claimed 7474 Egyptian
Egyptian andand Syrian
Syrian aircraft
aircraft.. In
In September
September-
October
October 1969, the IAF
1969, the lAF took
took out
out the
the Egyptian
Egyptian SAMS.
SAMs. In In
138
138
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
January
January 1970 1970 thethe Israelis received US
Israelis received US ECMECM pods pods and,
and,
within
within three
three months,
months, neutralized
neutralized the the Egyptian
Egyptian air air defense
defense
system
system by by destroying
destroying three-fourths
three-fourths of of its
its early
early warning
warning
radar.
radar.
The
The Soviets
Soviets countered
countered in in early
early 1970
1970 by by sending
sending moremore
missiles, including
missiles, including the the SA-3,
SA-3, to to Egypt.
Egypt. Although
Although the the SA-3's
SA-3's
range
range was
was about
about one-third
one-third to to one-half
one-half that
that of
of the
the SA-2
SA-2 (slant
(slant
range
range ofof 13-17
13-17 miles compared to
miles compared to SA-2's slant range
SA-2's slant range of of 25-
25-
30
30 miles),
miles), the the former
former could
could operate
operate against
against lower-flying
lower-flying
aircraft
aircraft.. The
The missiles
missiles became
became operational
operational in in April
April 1970,
1970,
and
and byby the
the endend of
of June
June the
the Egyptians
Egyptians had had aa total
total of
of 55
55 SAM
SAM
batteries.
batteries. Soviet
Soviet technicians,
technicians, operators,
operators, and and pilots
pilots bolstered
bolstered
the
the Egyptian
Egyptian air air defenses,
defenses, which,
which, in in essence,
essence, they
they took
took over.
over.
The
The air
air war
war heated
heated up up in late June
in late June when
when SAMsSAMs downeddowned
three
three IAFlAF aircraft
aircraft inin one week. Meanwhile,
one week. Meanwhile, the the lAFIAF at-at-
tacked
tacked thethe Egyptian
Egyptian SAMsSAMs and and destroyed
destroyed five
five batteries.
batteries. On On
88 July
July 1970
1970 the the two
two opponents
opponents agreedagreed to to aa cease-fire
cease-fire;; andand
although
although the the battle
battle subsided,
subsided, tensions
tensions remained
remained and and the
the lull
lull
permitted
permitted the the Egyptians
Egyptians to to rebuild
rebuild their
their defenses
defenses alongalong the
the
canal.
canal. InIn the
the warwar ofof attrition
attrition (July
(July 1967
1967 toto May
May 1973),
1973), thethe
Israelis
Israelis lost
lost 27 27 aircraft
aircraft (25
(25 toto ground
ground fire)
fire) and
and thethe Arabs
Arabs
lost
lost 162
162 aircraft
aircraft (13 (13 to
to Hawks
Hawks and and 24 24 to
to 37-mm
37-mm and and 40-
40-
mm
mm guns).
guns).'*
1973
1973
The
The joint
joint Egyptian-Syrian
Egyptian-Syrian attackattack onon Israel
Israel on
on 66 October
October
1973
1973 took
took both
both the
the world
world andand the
the Israelis
Israelis by
by surprise
surprise.. Be-
Be-
cause
cause ofof the
the overwhelming
overwhelming superiority
superiority ofof the
the IAF,
lAF, nono one
one
expected
expected the
the Arab
Arab armies
armies toto win;
win; therefore,
therefore, nono one
one expected
expected
them
them toto attack.
attack. Conventional
Conventional wisdomwisdom heldheld that
that air
air supe-
supe-
riority
riority was
was vital
vital to
to victory.
victory. After
After all,
all, aviation
aviation had
had ruled
ruled the
the
battlefield since
battlefield since 1939,
1939, or,
or, put
put another
another way,
way, victory
victory was
was pos-
pos-
sible only
sible only under
under friendly
friendly oror at
at least
least neutral
neutral skies
skies.. This
This view
view
conveniently overlooked the
conveniently overlooked the various
various guerrilla
guerrilla wars
wars and
and
most
most especially
especially the
the Vietnam
Vietnam War.War. During
During thethe first
first days of
days of
139
139
ARCHIE,
FLAK, AAA, SAM
the
the conflict,
conflict, thethe two
two Arab
Arab states used their
states used their air air forces
forces spar-
spar-
ingly.
ingly. They
They relied
rehed primarily
primarily on on ground-based
defense
systems
systems and and were
were modest
modest in in their
their air
air plans,
plans, attempting
attempting only only
to
to gain
gain local
local and
and limited
limited air air superiority.
superiority. On On day day one,
one, the
the
Egyptians
Egyptians flew flew 200-240
200-240 sorties while their
sorties while their armies
armies advanced
advanced
under
under aa protective
protective umbrella
umbrella of surface-based air
of surface-based air defense
defense
weapons.
weapons.
This
This umbrella
umbrella was was massive, mixed, and
massive, mixed, and mobile
mobile.. The
The
Egyptians
Egyptians emphasized
emphasized their their surface-based
surface-based air air defense
defense force
force
(formed
(formed as as aa separate
separate service
service in in 1968),
1968), whichwhich has has three
three
times
times as as many
many personnel
personnel as as did
did their
their airair force
force and
and which
which
comprised
comprised one-fourth
one-fourth of of their
their total
total armed
armed forces forces.. The
The Syr-
Syr-
ian
ian air
air defense
defense waswas smaller
smaller in in size, but much
size, but much denser because
denser because
its
its battlefield
battlefield was was smaller.
smaller. The Syrians manned
The Syrians manned perhapsperhaps 47 47
SAM
SAM batteries
batteries (32-35
(32-35 SA-6s SA-6s and and thethe rest
rest SA-2s
SA-2s andand SA-SA-
3s), while
3s), while thethe Egyptians
Egyptians operated
operated 150 150 batteries,
batteries, of of which
which
46 were SA-6s.5
46 were SA-6s.^
The Arabs
The Arabs fielded
fielded not only aa large
not only large number
number but but also
also aa
great
great assortment
assortment of Soviet equipment.
of Soviet equipment. The The vast vast number
number of of
guns
guns waswas imposing,
imposing, although
although the most modern
the most modern was was the
the
small
small number
number of of four-barrel
four-barrel 23-mm23-mm ZSU-23-4
ZSU-23-4.. The The missile
missile
arsenal
arsenal included
included the the SA-2
SA-2 andand SA-7
SA-7 employed
employed in in Vietnam,
Vietnam,
the
the SA-3 employed in
SA-3 employed in the
the war
war of attrition, and
of attrition, and aa new
new mis-
mis-
sile,
sile, the
the SA-6
SA-6 (fig.
(fig. 75).
75). The
The Arab
Arab air air defense
defense systemsystem was was
more
more thanthan just
just large
large and
and varied,
varied, for,for, unlike
unlike the the immobile
immobile
North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese defensesdefenses (except
(except for for light
light AAAAAA andand SA-SA-
7s),
7s), the
the Arab
Arab airair defenses
defenses could
could move,
move, as as the
the ZSU-23-4
ZSU-23-4 and and
SA-6 were
SA-6 were vehicle
vehicle mounted,
mounted, and and thethe SA-7
SA-7 and and SA-9
SA-9 were
were
man
man portable
portable.. WhatWhat mustmust be be emphasized
emphasized is is that
that the
the impact
impact
of the Arab
of the Arab air air defenses
defenses came came fromfrom the the combination
combination of of
numbers,
numbers, mixture,mixture, mobility,
mobility, and and modernity,
modernity, as as the
the IAF
lAF
soon
soon found
found out.'
out.^
The
The SA-6,
SA-6, the the most
most modern
modern of of these
these weapons,
weapons, had had been
been
observed
observed in in 1967
1967 but but had
had notnot been
been seenseen in in action.
action. ItIt was
was
aa relatively
relatively small,
small, smokeless
smokeless missile
missile weighing
weighing about about 1,200
1,200
pounds,
pounds, permitting
permitting three three to to bebe mounted
mounted on on aa converted
converted
(PT-76)
(PT-76) tank tank chassis.
chassis. The The missile
missile was faster (2.5-2
was faster (2.5-2.8 .8 Mach)
Mach)
14
1400
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
Ih^^r
(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artiliery Museum)
Figure 75. Soviet SA-6.
and
and muchmuch moremore sophisticated
sophisticated thanthan thethe other
other Soviet
Soviet SAMs,
SAMs,
as
as itit used
used radar
radar to to guide
guide its initial flight
its initial and rapidly
flight and changed
rapidly changed
frequencies,
frequencies, and and then homed in
then homed in on its prey
on its prey using
using heat-seek-
heat-seek-
ing
ing sensors.
sensors. (The(The SA-6 used aa filter,
SA-6 used filter, as did the
as did the SA-7,
SA-7, toto
counter
counter the the use
use ofof flares
flares intended
intended to to decoy
decoy itsits infrared
infrared sen-
sen-
sor.)
sor.) Although
Although its its 17-25
17-25 mile
mile slant
slant range
range is comparable to
is comparable to
the
the SA-2's
SA-2's andand SA-3's,
SA-3's, thethe SA-6
SA-6 could
could kill aircraft flying
kill aircraft flying at
at
low
low altitudes
altitudes.. Therefore,
Therefore, the the combination
combination of of newness,
newness, mo-mo-
bility, high
bility, high speed,
speed, sophisticated
sophisticated guidance,
guidance, and and low-altitude
low-altitude
capability gave
capability gave thethe SA-6
SA-6 aa powerful
powerful potential
potential.. While
While itit did
did
not produce the
not produce the 97-percent
97-percent killkill rate
rate promised
promised by by the
the So-
So-
viets, downed many
viets, itit downed aircraft and
many aircraft and forced
forced IAF
lAF aircraft
aircraft into
into
Arab
Arab AAA,AAA, especially
especially thethe ZSU-23.'
ZSU-23.''
The
The ZSU-23-4
ZSU-23-4 (fig. (fig. 76)
76) was
was aa very
very effective
effective AAA
AAA piece.
piece.
Mounted
Mounted on on aa modified
modified PT-76
PT-76 tanktank chassis,
chassis, its
its four
four 23-
23-
mm
mm barrels
barrels could
could fire
fire at
at aa maximum
maximum rate rate of
of 4,000
4,000 rounds
rounds
per minute,
per minute, although
although gunners
gunners never
never just
just held
held thethe trigger
trigger
141
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Figure 76. Soviet ZSU-23-4.
down
down butbut instead
instead werewere trained
trained to to fire
fire in
in short
short bursts
bursts ofof 75
75
or
or so
so rounds.
rounds. A A radar
radar with
with aa 12-mile
12-mile range
range directed
directed thethe
guns,
guns, which
which could could reach
reach an an effective
effective range
range of of about
about 4,000
4,000
feet.
feet. There
There were were also
also optical
optical sights.
sights. Similar
Similar toto the SA-6, the
the SA-6, the
weapon's
weapon's chief chief assets
assets were
were its
its low-altitude
low-altitude capability,
capability, mo-mo-
bility, and
bility, and the the fact
fact that
that the
the West
West hadhad not
not previously
previously ob- ob-
served
served it it in
in action.
action.^8
Following
Following the the initial
initial Arab
Arab assault,
assault, as as expected,
expected, the the Israelis
Israelis
quickly
quickly launched
launched tank tank andand aircraft
aircraft counterattacks
counterattacks to to blunt
blunt
the
the advance
advance of of the
the invading
invading ArabArab armies,
armies, to to succor
succor thethe
outnumbered
outnumbered and and outgunned
outgunned forwardforward defenders,
defenders, and and toto
shield
shield Israel's
Israel's mobilization.
mobilization. However,
However, Israel's
Israel's tankers,
tankers, air-
air-
men,
men, equipment,
equipment, and and tactics
tactics failed
failed against
against ArabArab missiles
missiles
and
and guns
guns.. On On thethe Suez
Suez front, the IAF
front, the lAF lost
lost four
four aircraft
aircraft in
in
their
their first
first strike;
strike; andand on on the
the Golan
Golan Heights
Heights front,
front, they
they lost
lost
four
four out
out ofof four
four aircraft
aircraft onon the
the first
first wave
wave andand twotwo ofof four
four
aircraft
aircraft onon thethe second
second wave.wave. Some
Some claim
claim that
that Arab
Arab gunners
gunners
downed
downed as as many
many as as 30
30 toto 40
40 Israeli
IsraeH aircraft
aircraft on
on the
the first
first day
day
of
of the
the war.
war.
During
During the the first
first three
three days,
days, the
the IAF
lAF lost
lost dozens
dozens of of aircraft
aircraft
142
142
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
at
at the
the Suez
Suez front,
front, perhaps
perhaps as as many
many as 50. These
as 50. These heavy
heavy losses
losses
(twice
(twice the the raterate ofof the
the 1967
1967 war)
war) shocked
shocked the the Israelis,
Israelis, whowho
for
for the
the moment
moment stopped stopped flying
flying within
within 10-1510-15 miles
miles of of the
the
Suez
Suez Canal.
Canal. But But the
the grave
grave military
military situation
situation required
required the the
IAF
lAF to to continue
continue its its efforts,
efforts, especially
especially on on thethe critical
critical Syrian
Syrian
front.
front. During
During the the first
first week,
week, thethe IAF
lAF lost
lost aa total
total of of 78-90
78-90
aircraft,
aircraft, aa sizable
sizable percentage
percentage of of their
their force
force andand ofof what
what were
were
to
to be
be their
their overall
overall losses.
losses.^9
The
The SA-7SA-7 had had little
little direct
direct impact
impact on on thethe battle
battle andand prob-
prob-
ably
ably served
served most most as as aa nuisance
nuisance to the Israelis
to the Israelis and
and aa morale
morale
booster
booster to to the Arabs . Despite
the Arabs. Despite an an infrared
infrared (IR) (IR) filter,
filter, the
the
shoulder-fired
shoulder-fired SAM SAM downeddowned only only twotwo fixed-wing
fixed-wing aircraft,
aircraft,
although
although it it damaged
others. Aircraft
Aircraft could
could outrun
outrun and and
outmaneuver
outmaneuver the the missile,
missile, asas USUS airmen
airmen had had proved
proved the the year
year
before.
before. In In addition,
addition, the the SA-7
SA-7 lacked
lacked killing
killing power;
power; it it hit
hit
aircraft
aircraft in in thethe tail,
tail, where
where itsits small
small warhead
warhead did did not
not inflict
inflict
serious
serious damage.
damage. A A vehicle-mounted
vehicle-mounted arrangement,
arrangement, the the SA-
SA-
88 fitted
fitted with
with eighteight SA-7s,
SA-7s, waswas no no more
more effective.'°
effective.'°
On the
On the other
other hand,
hand, the the SA-6
SA-6 proved
proved especially
especially effective
effective
both
both directly
directly by by destroying
destroying aa sizable
sizable proportion
proportion of of IAF
lAF air-
air-
craft
craft and and indirectly
indirectly by by forcing
forcing Israeli
Israeli aircraft
aircraft into
into Arab
Arab
AAA
AAA fire fire.. The
The SAM's
SAM's rapid rapid speed
speed andand itsits new
new and
and changing
changing
frequencies
frequencies were were difficult
difficult to to counter
counter.. The The overconfidence
overconfidence
of
of the
the Israelis,
Israelis, theirtheir neglect
neglect ofof ECM
ECM (at (at one
one point,
point, thethe IAF
lAF
stripped
stripped ECM ECM from from their
their aircraft
aircraft forfor greater
greater economy,
economy,
speed,
speed, and and maneuverability),
maneuverability), and and US US restrictions
restrictions on on ECM
ECM
sales
sales leftleft the
the lAF IAF in in aa serious
serious bindbind.. Israeli
Israeli improvisation
improvisation
was
was speedy
speedy and and effective,
effective, yet yet costly.'
costly.''1
The
The IAF lAF used used aa variety
variety of of means
means to deal with
to deal with thethe SAM
SAM
threat.
threat. To To spoof
spoof heat-seeking
heat-seeking missiles,
missiles, the the IAF
lAF employed
employed
aircraft
aircraft maneuvering,
maneuvering, such such as as violent
violent maneuvers,
maneuvers, turning turning
toward
toward the the missile,
missile, to to present
present thethe IRIR seeker
seeker aa "cold
"cold side,"
side,"
and
and maneuvering
maneuvering aircraft aircraft toto cross
cross inin the
the skysky creating
creating aa "hot"hot
spot."
spot." In In addition,
addition, IsraeliIsraeli airmen
airmen dropped
dropped flares
flares andand even
even
jettisoned
jettisoned fuel fuel andand thenthen ignited
ignited itit inin order
order to to decoy
decoy the the
heat-seeking
heat-seeking missiles. missiles. Spotters
Spotters in in helicopters
helicopters warned
warned pilots
pilots
of
of missile
missile launches
launches.. The The IAF
lAF alsoalso used
used chaff,
chaff, first
first carried
carried
14
1433
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
in
in speed
Speed brakes,
brakes, laterlater in in aa more
more conventional
conventional manner, manner, im- im-
proved
proved American
American ECM ECM pods, pods, and and standoff
standoff jammers
jammers oper- oper-
ating
ating from
from the the ground,
ground, helicopters,
helicopters, and and transports
transports..
In
In addition,
addition, the the Israelis
Israelis directly
directly assaulted
assaulted the SA-6s. The
the SA-6s. The
SA-6's low
SA-6's low initial
initial trajectory
trajectory encouraged
encouraged the the IAFlAF to to dive-
dive-
bomb the
bomb SAMs from
the SAMs from veryvery steep
steep angles:
angles: desperate
desperate measures
measures
improvised for
improvised for aa desperate
desperate situation.
situation. The The IAF lAF also fired
also fired
Shrike
Shrike antiradiation
antiradiation missiles missiles.. 12'^
The Israelis
The Israelis turned
turned aroundaround the air war,
the air war, and and to to aa degree
degree
the ground
the ground action,
action, by by taking
taking out out the
the Arab
Arab SAMs.
SAMs. Concen-
Concen-
trating first on
trating first the Syrians,
on the Syrians, the the IAF
lAF destroyed
destroyed half half ofof their
their
SAMs in
SAMs in four
four days.
days. One One source
source claims
claims that that the the Israelis
Israelis
knocked
knocked out out aa Syrian
Syrian control center which
control center which seriously
seriously ham- ham-
pered
pered the the Syrian
Syrian missile
missile defenses
defenses.. The The Syrians
Syrians were were de- de-
feated
feated andand only
only political
political restraints
restraints prevented
prevented aa much much greater
greater
Israeli
IsraeU victory.'
victory.'^
The
The solution
solution to to the
the IAF's
lAF's problem
problem on on the
the Egyptian
Egyptian front front
came
came from from an an unexpected
unexpected source, source, the the Israeli
Israeli Army.Army. The The
Egyptians
Egyptians made made one one major
major thrust
thrust fromfrom their
their formidable
formidable
position
position along along thethe canal
canal and and suffered
suffered aa decisive
decisive defeatdefeat on on
14
14 October
October in in the
the largest
largest tank
tank battle
battle since
since World
World War War II. II.
The
The Israelis
Israelis quickly
quickly followed
followed up up their
their tactical
tactical victory.
victory. In In
the
the early
early morning
morning of of 1616 October,
October, Israeli
Israeli forces
forces crossed
crossed the the
canal
canal and and in in short
short orderorder created
created havochavoc in in the
the Egyptian
Egyptian
Army.
Army. By By midday,
midday, the the Israelis
Israelis had had destroyed
destroyed four four SAM
SAM
sites;
sites; and
and by by the
the next
next morning,
morning, the the IAF
lAF was was operating
operating in in
full
full support
support of of the
the ground
ground forces.
forces. In In reverse
reverse of of the
the accepted
accepted
practice,
practice, the the Army
Army made made it it possible
possible for for thethe Air
Air Force
Force to to
operate
operate.. The The Israelis
Israelis now now hadhad thethe initiative
initiative and and could
could easily
easily
have
have inflicted
inflicted an an overwhelming
overwhelming defeat defeat on on thethe Egyptians
Egyptians..
But,
But, the
the major
major powers
powers intervened,
intervened, which which led led toto aa cease-fire
cease-fire
on
on 22 October.. The
22 October Israelis won
The Israelis won thethe war
war and
and in in the
the process
process
destroyed
destroyed approximately
approximately 40 40 ofof the 55-60 SAM
the 55-60 SAM batteries
batteries
that the
that the Egyptians
Egyptians had had in action.. This
in action This destruction
destruction was was in-in-
flicted
flicted by by the
the IAF,
lAF, as as well
well asas byby Israeli
Israeli ground
ground forces.forces. "*
14
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the ground-based
defenses took took aa sub-
sub-
stantial
stantial toll.
toll. The
The combatants
combatants lost lost about
about the the same
same number
number
14
1444
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
of
of aircraft
aircraft to to SAMs
SAMs and and flak,flak, the
the Arabs
Arabs 40 40 toto 7575 (one
(one or or
two
two dozen
dozen to to Hawks)
Hawks) and and the the Israelis
Israelis perhaps
perhaps 82 82 toto 100.'
100.'^5
The
The ground
ground defenses
defenses also also claimed
claimed aa number
number of of friendly
friendly
aircraft
aircraft.. Israeli
Israeli gunners
gunners apparently
apparently downeddowned two two ofof their
their own
own
aircraft,
aircraft, which
which were were probably
probably Mirages Mirages mistaken
mistaken for for the
the
same
same type
type aircraft
aircraft the the Egyptians
Egyptians received
received fromfrom thethe Libyans
Libyans..
The
The Arabs
Arabs destroyed
destroyed 45 45 to to 6060 of
of their
their own.
own. On On 88 October,
October,
for
for example,
example, Syrian Syrian SAMs
SAMs destroyed
destroyed 20 20 Iraqi
Iraqi MiGs,
MiGs, while while
Egyptian
Egyptian SA-6s SA-6s may may have have downed
downed 40 40 Egyptian
Egyptian aircraft.
aircraft.
Thus,
Thus, the the Arab
Arab SAMs SAMs destroyed
destroyed more more ArabArab aircraft
aircraft (45- (45-
58) than Israeli
58) than Israeli aircraft
aircraft (39-44)
(39-44).. ThisThis accounted
accounted for for about
about
10-12
10-12 percent
percent of of total
total Arab
Arab losses.
losses.'^16
Helicopters
Helicopters again again proved
proved vulnerable.
vulnerable. IsraeliIsraeli air air andand
ground
ground defenses
defenses devastated
devastated an an Egyptian
Egyptian commando
commando strike strike
carried
carried out out by by approximately
approximately 50 50 Mi-8
Mi-8 helicopters
helicopters on on the
the
first
first day
day of of the
the war,
war, downing
downing 20-35 20-35 of of them
them.. TheThe Israelis
Israelis
claimed
claimed the the destruction
destruction of of 3355 Egyptian
Egyptian choppers
choppers in in the
the first
first
days
days of of the
the war.
war. An An Egyptian
Egyptian attack attack on on thethe critical
critical Israeli
Israeli
canal
canal bridge
bridge on on 1818 October
October ended ended with
with all all five
five helicopters
helicopters
downed.
downed. On On the the Arab
Arab side,side, SA-7s
SA-7s claimed
claimed six six IAF
lAF rotary-
rotary-
wing
wing aircraft
aircraft.'^ ."
The
The IAFlAF clearly
clearly wonwon the the airair war,
war, destroying
destroying about about 450 450
Arab
Arab aircraft,
aircraft, whilewhile losing
losing aboutabout 107 107 aircraft
aircraft in in combat,
combat,
115
115 overall.
overall. Compared
Compared to to the
the 1967
1967 war,
war, the
the Arabs
Arabs lostlost about
about
the
the same
same number
number of of aircraft,
aircraft, although
although many many more more in in the
the
air, while the
air, while the Israelis
Israelis lost
lost twice
twice as as many.
many. On On aa sortie
sortie basis,
basis,
however, IAF
however, lAF losses
losses actually
actually declined
declined from from 44 percent
percent in in
1967,
1967, to to just
just over
over 11 percent
percent in in 1973.
1973. Arab losses in
Arab losses in 1973
1973
were
were just
just under
under 55 percent
percent.'^ ."
Although
Although the the IAF
lAF beat
beat the the Arab
Arab air air forces
forces in in the
the air,
air, it
it
failed
failed to to use
use airair power
power as as it it had
had in in the 1967 war.
the 1967 war. Close
Close air air
support
support (CAS)(CAS) proved
proved limited
limited and and disappointing,
disappointing, especially
especially
in
in the
the first
first three critical days
three critical days of of the
the war.
war. OneOne study
study stated
stated
that
that aircraft
aircraft did did not
not unequivocally
unequivocally damage damage or or destroy
destroy one one
tank.
tank. Even
Even if if this decline in
this decline in CAS
CAS effectiveness
effectiveness is is overdrawn,
overdrawn,
air
air power
power clearly
clearly influenced
influenced the the war
war less
less inin 1973
1973 thanthan it it
had in
had 1967.. A
in 1967 A dense,
dense, mobile,
mobile, mixed,mixed, surface-based
surface-based air air de-
de-
14
1455
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
fense system
fense system thwarted
thwarted possibly
possibly the best-trained and
the best-trained and highest-
highest-
motivated
motivated airair force
force inin the
the world
world andand inflicted
inflicted severe
severe losses
losses
on
on it.
it. Just
Just as American airmen
as American airmen underestimated
underestimated North North
Vietnamese
Vietnamese air air defenses,
defenses, soso had
had the
the Israeli
Israeli airmen
airmen under-
under-
estimated
estimated Arab
Arab airair defenses.
defenses. Both
Both paid
paid the
the price.
price. The
The 1973
1973
war
war seemed
seemed to to indicate that the
indicate that the balance
balance between
between the the offense
offense
and
and defense (specifically aircraft
defense (specifically aircraft versus
versus ground
ground defenses)
defenses)
had swung
had swung inin favor
favor ofof the latter.. Aircraft
the latter Aircraft appeared
appeared to to have
have
lost
lost much
much ofof their
their battlefield
battlefield dominance
dominance.'^ . 19
1982
1982
The
The IAF
lAF action
action in Lebanon in
in Lebanon in the
the summer
summer of of 1982
1982 altered
altered
the
the apparent
apparent shift
shift of
of superiority
superiority toward
toward ground
ground defenses.
defenses.
Lebanon
Lebanon existed
existed in in aa state
state ofof chaos
chaos from
from the
the occupation
occupation
by
by militias
militias of
of right
right and
and left,
left, Palestine
Palestine guerrillas
guerrillas and
and Syrians,
Syrians,
and from
and from fighting
fighting among
among these
these groups
groups and
and between
between themthem
and
and the
the Israelis.
Israehs. The Syrians rebuilt
The Syrians rebuilt their
their military
military forces
forces
from
from the
the defeat
defeat of of the
the 1973
1973 warwar and,
and, inin so doing, almost
so doing, almost
tripled
tripled their ground-based air
their ground-based air defenses,
defenses, increasing
increasing them
them
from
from 3030 to
to 80 batteries and
80 batteries and manning
manning them with their
them with their best
best
personnel.. In
personnel late April
In late 1981 the
April 1981 Syrians moved
the Syrians moved 19 19 batteries
batteries
of
of missiles,
missiles, including
including SA-6s,
SA-6s, into
into Lebanon's
Lebanon's Bekaa
Bekaa Valley.
Valley.
Here
Here the
the Syrians
Syrians established
established aa dense and, what
dense and, what appeared
appeared
from
from the
the record
record of of the
the 1973
1973 war,
war, formidable
formidable air air defense
defense
system.
system. ^°
In early
In early June
June 19821982 the
the Israelis
Israelis invaded
invaded Lebanon,
Lebanon, pri-pri-
marily
marily fighting
fighting thethe Palestine
Palestine guerrillas
guerrillas but
but also
also engaging
engaging thethe
Syrians
Syrians.. The Israelis battered
The Israelis battered thethe latter,
latter, despite
despite their large
their large
arsenal
arsenal ofof apparently
apparently modern Soviet equipment
modern Soviet equipment and and the
the
"lessons"
"lessons" ofof the 1973 war.
the 1973 war. In In this
this brief
brief but
but intense
intense action
action
the
the Israelis
Israelis won
won aa lopsided
lopsided victory,
victory, destroying
destroying 80 80 toto 90
90
Syrian
Syrian aircraft*
aircraft* and
and 19 19 to
to 36
36 batteries
batteries of of missiles,
missiles, for
for the
the
destruction
destruction of of three
three toto six Israeli aircraft.
six Israeli aircraft.^^
♦Israelis ground
"Israelis ground fire
fire downed
downed at
at least
least one
one Syrian
Syrian jet
jet (a
(a Vulcan
Vulcan gun
gun got
got an
an Su-7)
Su-7) and
and
two
two helicopters .2'
helicopters.^'
146
146
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
On 99 June
On June thethe IAF
lAF took
took onon the
the Syrian
Syrian air air defenses
defenses in in the
the
Bekaa
Bekaa Valley
Valley with
with aa complex
complex yet yet carefully
carefully planned,
planned, coor-coor-
dinated,
dinated, and
and executed
executed attack
attack.. The
The Israelis
Israelis used used air-
air- and
and
ground-launched
ground-launched drones drones as as decoys
decoys to to activate
activate Syrian
Syrian radar.
radar.
This
This allowed
allowed thethe Israeli
Israeh EC-135s
EC-135s to to obtain
obtain the the location
location and and
frequency
frequency of of the
the Syrian
Syrian radars
radars andand inin turn
turn to to rapidly relay
rapidly relay
this
this information
information to to strike
strike elements
elements.. The The Israelis
Israelis thereby
thereby
coupled
coupled real-time
real-time intelligence
intelligence with
with rapid
rapid response
response to to give
give
their
their pilots
pilots precise
precise locations
locations of of the
the SAMs
SAMs and and accurate
accurate tun-tun-
ing
ing information
information for for their
their jamming
jamming equipment.
equipment. In In the
the elec-
elec-
tronics
tronics war,
war, the
the IAF
lAF usedused ECM
ECM pods,
pods, chaff
chaff rockets,
rockets, possibly
possibly
chaff
chaff from
from drones,
drones, and and standoffjammers
standoff jammers in in CH-53,
CH-53, Boeing
Boeing
707,
707, and
and Arava
Arava transports
transports.. The The Israeli
Israeli airmen
airmen employed
employed
diversionary
diversionary tactics, precise timing,
tactics, precise timing, sharply
sharply executed
executed lowlow-
level
level tactics,
tactics, and
and weapons
weapons such such asas ARMs,
ARMs, standoffweapons,
standoff weapons,
iron
iron bombs,
bombs, and and cluster
cluster munitions
munitions.. In In addition,
addition, the the Israelis
Israelis
used aa new
used new surface-to-surface
surface-to-surface ARM, ARM, the the WolfWolf missile
missile..
Ground
Ground forces
forces fired artillery, launched
fired artillery, launched ground ground assaults
assaults
along
along the
the front,
front, andand just
just before
before thethe air
air attack
attack tooktook outout aa
control
control center
center with
with aa commando
commando raid. raid. The
The Syrians
Syrians did did not
not
help
help their
their own
own cause,
cause, as as they
they failed
failed to dig in,
to dig in, poorly
poorly sited
sited
their radar, and
their radar, and ignited
ignited smoke
smoke screens
screens thatthat guided
guided rather
rather
than
than confused
confused the the IAF.
lAF. OnOn the
the first
first day,
day, thethe IAFlAF destroyed
destroyed
17
17 missile
missile batteries
batteries and and severely
severely damaged
damaged two two others
others.. The
The
Syrians pushed more
Syrians pushed more SAM SAM units
units into
into the
the Bekaa
Bekaa Valley,
Valley, butbut
to
to no
no avail.
avail. On
On thethe second
second dayday ofof the
the action,
action, the the IAF
lAF de- de-
stroyed 11
stroyed more missile
11 more missile batteries
batteries.. On On 2424 July
July thethe Israelis
Israelis
knocked
knocked outout three
three batteries
batteries of of SA-8s.
SA-8s. A A few
few daysdays later,
later, they
they
destroyed
destroyed some
some SA-9sSA-9s (fig.
(fig. 77).
77). Reportedly,
Reportedly, the the IAF
lAF de- de-
stroyed four SA-9 batteries in September.
stroyed four SA-9 batteries in September.^^
American
American Air
Air Strikes
Strikes in
in the
the
Middle
Middle East, 1983-86
East, 1983-86
American
American strikes
strikes in
in the
the Middle
Middle East
East aa little
little over
over aa year
year
later
later were
were much
much less
less successful.
successful. The
The United
United States
States inter-
inter-
vened
vened in
in Lebanon
Lebanon in
in 1983
1983 and
and that
that December
December the the US
US Navy
Navy
147
147
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Figure 77. The Soviet SA-9 is a mobile version of the SA-7

missile.
responded
responded to to Syrian
Syrian firing on American
firing on reconnaissance air-
American reconnaissance air-
craft
craft with
with 12
12 A-7Es
A-7Es and and 16 16 A-6Es.
A-6Es. TheThe naval
naval aviators
aviators used
used
tactics
tactics proven
proven in in Vietnam:
Vietnam: they they penetrated
penetrated at at 20,000
20,000 feet
feet
then
then descended
descended to to 3,000 feet for
3,000 feet for their
their attacks.
attacks. ToTo counter
counter
Syrian
Syrian heat-seeking
heat-seeking missiles,
missiles, they
they dropped
dropped numerous
numerous decoy
decoy
flares-but
flares—but to to little
little effect.
effect. The
The American
American flyers
flyers encountered
encountered
intense
intense defenses,
defenses, more
more thanthan expected,
expected, and
and Soviet
Soviet SA-7
SA-7 and
and
SA-9
SA-9 missiles
missiles had
had been
been modified
modified toto counter
counter the
the decoy
decoy flares.
flares.
The
The Syrians
Syrians launched
launched 40-50 40-50 SAMS,
SAMs, which
which downed
downed one one
A-7
A-7 andand oneone A-6
A-6 and
and damaged
damaged another A-7.. While
another A-7 While the
the Navy
Navy
blamed the
blamed the losses
losses on changes in
on changes in Soviet
Soviet missile
missile sensors,
sensors, the
the
Israelis
Israelis criticized American planning,
criticized American planning, tactics,
tactics, and
and experi-
experi-
ence.
ence. Later
Later Syrian
Syrian fire
fire against
against US
US aircraft
aircraft was
was met
met byby ship
ship
fire . 24
fire.24
This less
This less than
than satisfactory
satisfactory experience
experience jarred
jarred the
the Ameri-
Ameri-
148
148
RECENT EXPERIENCE
RECENT EXPERIENCE
cans
cans and
and probably
probably influenced
influenced the the next
next USUS air
air operation,
operation,
the
the April
April 1986
1986 raid
raid onon Libya.
Libya. OneOne factor
factor driving
driving American
American
planning
planning waswas to to avoid
avoid thethe SA-7s, which meant
SA-7s, which meant operating
operating at at
night
night.. There
There were,
were, of of course,
course, other
other reasons
reasons forfor night
night op-op-
erations,
erations, such
such as as achieving
achieving maximum
maximum surprise,
surprise, avoiding
avoiding aa
major
major engagement
engagement with with Libyan
Libyan air air defenses,
defenses, avoiding
avoiding cas-cas-
ualties
ualties to to both
both Soviet
Soviet advisers
advisers and and Libyan
Libyan civilians,
civilians, and and
revealing
revealing as as little American ECM
little American ECM as as possible
possible.. But
But night
night
operations
operations also also meant
meant that only two
that only two American
American aircraft
aircraft
could
could be be effectively
effectively usedused:: the
the Air
Air Force's
Force's FB-111
FB-IU and and thethe
Navy's
Navy's A-6.A-6. While
While the the A-6s
A-6s were aboard carriers
were aboard carriers cruising
cruising
in
in the
the Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, the the FB-111 bombers were
FB-111 bombers were stationed
stationed
in
in Britain,
Britain, 5,600
5,600 miles
miles away
away (a(a 14-hour
14-hour flight)
flight).. The
The FB-111
FB-111 ss
would
would require
require aerial
aerial refueling
refueling because
because of the distance
of the distance and and
government
government overflight
overflight restrictions
restrictions.^^ .
US airmen flew a large strike force of
US airmen flew a large strike force of 3232 bombers
bombers (18 (18
FB-111
FB-111ss andand 14 14 A-6s)
A-6s) supported
supported by by almost
almost 70 70 aircraft
aircraft.. The
The
large
large supporting
supporting force force was required because
was required because Libyan
Libyan air air de-
de-
fenses
fenses were both large
were both large andand sophisticated
sophisticated for for aa third
third world
world
country.
country. Besides
Besides MiGs,MiGs, the the defenses
defenses consisted
consisted of of 100
100 bat-
bat-
teries
teries ofof SA-2s,
SA-2s, SA-3s,
SA-3s, and and SA-6s
SA-6s (about
(about 30 30 to
to 6060 batteries
batteries
were
were operational),
operational), as as well
well asas SA-5,
SA-5, SA-8,
SA-8, SA-9,
SA-9, andand French
French
Crotale
Crotale missiles,
missiles, and and perhaps
perhaps 450 450 AAAAAA gunsguns.^^.
The American aircraft successfully penetrated Libyan
The American aircraft successfully penetrated Libyan de- de-
fenses,
fenses, suppressing
suppressing and and evading
evading fire
fire from
from Libyan
Libyan SAMsSAMs and and
AAA
AAA and and encountering
encountering no no aerial
aerial opposition.
opposition. The The airmen
airmen
used
used low-level
low-level and and high-speed
high-speed tactics,
tactics, thethe FB-111
FB-111ss at at 400
400
feet
feet and
and 500500 knots,
knots, thethe A-6s
A-6s asas low
low as as 200
200 feet
feet and
and 450450
knots,
knots, and they dropped
and they dropped both both laser-guided
laser-guided and and iron
iron bombs.
bombs.
One
One FB-111
FB-111 went went down,
down, the the cause
cause notnot publicly
publicly known.
known. Al- Al-
though
though the the Libyans
Libyans received
received 30 30 toto 45
45 minutes
minutes notice
notice from
from
Maltese
Maltese air air controllers
controllers that that unidentified
unidentified aircraft
aircraft were
were head-
head-
ing for North
ing for North Africa, apparently Libyan
Africa, apparently Libyan radar
radar diddid not
not ac-ac-
tivate
tivate until
until about
about four
four minutes
minutes before
before the the 22:00
:00 A.M.
A.M. attack.
attack.
Standoffjamming
Standoff jamming by by EF-111
EF-11 Iss and
and EA-6Bs,
EA-6Bs, on on board
board ECM,
ECM,
and
and about
about 50 50 antiradiation
antiradiation missiles
missiles almost
almost completely
completely nul- nul-
lified Libyan
lified Libyan radar.
radar. TheThe mission
mission was was both
both aa technical
technical and and
14
1499
ARCHIE,
FLAK, AAA, SAM
political
political success
success:: the
the airmen
airmen got
got their
their bombs
bombs on on target,
target,
losses were light,
losses were and since
light, and since the
the air
air attack,
attack, there
there has
has been
been aa
lack
lack of
of terrorist
terrorist activity
activity openly
openly and directly associated
and directly associated with
with
the Libyans
the Libyans.. Thus,
Thus, thethe 12-minute
12-minute raid
raid demonstrated
demonstrated thatthat
the
the American
American military
military could
could hit
hit difficult
difficult targets
targets despite
despite dis-
dis-
tance
tance and
and other
other natural
natural obstacles
obstacles as
as well
well as
as penetrate
penetrate fairly
fairly
numerous
numerous andand sophisticated
sophisticated defenses
defenses with
with light
light losses."
losses."
Indian-Pakistani
Indian-Pakistani Wars
Wars
In
In September
September 1965 1965 war war erupted
erupted on on the
the Asian
Asian subconti-
subconti-
nent
nent between
between India
India andand Pakistan
Pakistan and burned itself
and burned out in
itself out in
23
23 days.
days. Both
Both sides
sides fielded
fielded smallsmall airair forces
forces equipped
equipped withwith
aa few
few modern aircraft (Indian
modern aircraft (Indian MiG-21
MiG-21ss and and Pakistani
Pakistani F- F-
104s),
104s), but
but most
most aircraft
aircraft were
were at at least
least aa decade
decade beyond
beyond their
their
prime
prime (Indian
(Indian Hunters
Hunters and and Vampires
Vampires and and Pakistani
Pakistani F-86s)
F-86s)..
Just
Just as as the
the ground
ground war war ended
ended in in aa stalemate,
stalemate, so so did
did the
the
air
air war.
war. But
But even
even at at this
this writing
writing (1988)
(1988) it it is
is difficult
difficult to
to sort
sort
out from
out from the
the conflicting
conflicting claims
claims exactly
exactly whatwhat happened
happened.. The The
Pakistanis
Pakistanis claimclaim to to have destroyed 110
have destroyed 110 Indian
Indian aircraft-
aircraft—
35 in
35 in air-to-air
air-to-air combat,
combat, 32 32 byby antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns,guns, and
and thethe
rest
rest inin attacks
attacks onon airfields
airfields.. TheyThey admit
admit to to losing
losing 19
19 aircraft,
aircraft,
eight
eight in in air
air combat,
combat, two two to to their
their ownown AAA,
AAA, and and nine
nine toto
other
other causes
causes.. The The Pakistanis
Pakistanis admit admit that that Indian
Indian gunsguns
downed
downed aa few few aircraft,
aircraft, but but claim
claim none
none ofof the
the F-86s
F-86s engaged
engaged
in
in almost
almost 500 500 CAS
CAS sorties
sorties were
were lost,
lost, although
although 58 58 were
were dam-
dam-
aged.
aged. TheThe Indians
Indians claim
claim 73 73 Pakistani
Pakistani aircraft
aircraft destroyed
destroyed and and
admitted
admitted losing
losing 35 35.. The
The Indians
Indians firedfired aa few
few SA-2
SA-2 missiles
missiles
and
and claimed
claimed oneone C-130
C-130.. TheThe Pakistanis
Pakistanis dispute
dispute this
this claim,
claim,
stating
stating that
that they
they did did notnot lose
lose aa C-130
C-130 to to the
the SAMS,
SAMs, and and
counter
counter thatthat the
the SA-2
SA-2 gotgot an an Indian
Indian An-12
An-12 transport
transport.. The
The
Pakistanis
Pakistanis do do admit
admit that that an an SA-2
SA-2 damaged
damaged an an RB-57F
RB-57F at at
52,000
52,000 feet .
feet.28
In December 1971
In December 1971 thethe two
two countries
countries fought
fought another
another brief
brief
(two-week) war.
(two-week) war. By By this
this time
time bothboth sides
sides had
had upgraded
upgraded their
their
air forces
air forces inin quality
quality and and quantity
quantity but but still
still fielded
fielded forces
forces that
that
150
150
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
were
were relatively
relatively small
small and
and of of mixed
mixed vintage.
vintage. This
This war
war re-
re-
sulted
sulted inin Pakistan's
Pakistan's losing
losing what
what isis now
now Bangladesh
Bangladesh..
Again
Again the the combatants'
combatants' claimsclaims markedly
markedly conflict,
conflict, and
and
these
these differences
differences remain
remain along
along with
with the
the political
political problems.
problems.
Indians
Indians claimed
claimed toto have
have destroyed
destroyed 94 94 Pakistani
Pakistani aircraft
aircraft for
for
the loss
the loss of
of 54
54 and
and stated
stated that
that one
one aircraft
aircraft fell
fell to
to an
an SA-2
SA-2
missile . The
missile. The Pakistanis
Pakistanis claimed
claimed the
the destruction
destruction of of 104
104 In-
In-
dian aircraft
dian aircraft at
at the
the cost
cost of of 26
26 planes. They admit
planes. They losing
admit losing
three
three toto four
four aircraft
aircraft to
to flak as well
flak as well as
as two
two aircraft
aircraft to
to friendly
friendly
fire
fire.. The
The Pakistanis
Pakistanis assert
assert that
that 49
49 ofof their
their 104
104 kills
kills were
were
registered
registered by by AAA.
AAA. Another
Another source
source states
states that
that half
half ofof the
the
lost
lost Pakistani
Pakistani aircraft
aircraft fell
fell to
to ground
ground defenses
defenses.^^.
The
The Falklands,
Falklands, 1982
1982
More
More recently,
recently, another
another brief
brief campaign
campaign in in aa remote
remote part
part
of
of the
the world
world captured
captured the
the public's
public's attention
attention.. The
The Falklands
Falklands
campaign
campaign surprised
surprised the
the civilian and military
civilian and military alike
alike because
because
Argentina and Britain went to war, because Britain suc-
Argentina and Britain went to war, because Britain suc-
cessfully
cessfully liberated
liberated the
the islands
islands over
over such
such aa great
great distance,
distance,
and
and because
because Argentina
Argentina inflicted
inflicted startling
startling losses
losses onon the
the Brit-
Brit-
ish forces.. The
ish forces The conflict pitted aa small,
conflict pitted small, well-trained,
well-trained, andand well-
well-
equipped
equipped modern
modern force
force ofof aa European
European nation
nation operating
operating
7,000
7,000 miles
miles from
from home
home against
against aa larger,
larger, less
less well-trained
well-trained
force
force with
with aa mixture
mixture ofof old
old and
and modern
modern equipment
equipment of of aa
developing
developing nation.
nation. It
It provides
provides us us with
with another
another looklook at
at air
air
defenses
defenses in in operation.
operation.
From
From the the standpoint
standpoint ofof the
the air
air war,
war, the
the Argentines
Argentines fielded
fielded
an
an air
air force
force of of mixed
mixed capabilities
capabilities equipped
equipped withwith old
old Can-
Can-
berras
berras (fig.
(fig. 78)
78) and
and A-4s,
A-4s, counterinsurgency
counterinsurgency Pucaras,
Pucaras, andand
the
the more
more modern
modern Mirages
Mirages and and Super
Super Etendards
Etendards.. For For
ground-based
ground-based defenses,
defenses, thethe Argentines
Argentines had, had, in
in addition
addition toto
automatic
automatic weapons,
weapons, British
British (Sea
(Sea Dart,
Dart, Seacat,
Seacat, andand Blow-
Blow-
pipe) and
pipe) and Franco-German
Franco-German (Roland)
(Roland) surface-to-air
missiles..
Although
Although the the British
British used
used the
the old
old Vulcan
Vulcan bomber
bomber (fig.
(fig.
79),
79), their
their primary
primary combat
combat aircraft
aircraft was
was the
the vertical-takeoff-
vertical-takeoff-
1511
15
Figure 78. One of the ironies of the Faiidand War was that the British
faced their own equipment. One such example was
Argentine use of the Canberra, shown here with RAF
markings.
Figure 79. Although designed as a nuclear bomber, the Avro Vulcan

saw its only combat in attacks on the Argentine airfield
and radar site at Port Stanley.
152
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
and-landing
and-landing Harrier
Harrier (fig.
(fig. 80).
80). The
The Royal
Royal Navy
Navy ships
ships oper-
oper-
ated aa mixture
ated mixture ofof gun
gun defenses and SAMs
defenses and SAMs (Seacat,
(Seacat, Seawolf,
Seawolf,
Sea
Sea Dart,
Dart, and
and Seaslug)
Seaslug).. British
British troops
troops ashore
ashore used
used three
three
SAM systems:: Blowpipe,
SAM systems Blowpipe, Stinger,
Stinger, and
and Rapier.
Rapier.ô3o
The
The Argentine
Argentine airair defense
defense proved
proved minimal
minimal against
against the
the
British
British Harriers
Harriers and
and helicopters.
helicopters. However,
However, itit should
should bebe
quickly
quickly noted
noted that,
that, in
in contrast
contrast toto the
the Argentine
Argentine Air Air Force,
Force,
which
which flew
flew and
and fought
fought without
without ECM,
ECM, the the British
British employed
employed
both
both airborne
airborne ECM
ECM (jammers aboard Vulcan
(jammers aboard Vulcan bombers
bombers and and
chaff
chaff dispensers
dispensers on Sea Harriers)
on Sea Harriers) and
and shipborne
shipborne ECM ECM (jam-
(jam-
mers
mers and
and Corvus
Corvus chaff
chaff rockets)
rockets).. The
The British
British used
used antira-
antira-
diation
diation missiles
missiles (Shrikes)
(Shrikes) against
against the
the main
main Falkland-based
Falkland-based
Argentine
Argentine radar
radar without success, but
without success, but the
the missile
missile did
did destroy
destroy
one
one other
other radar
radar set .31 The
set.^' The Argentine
Argentine airair arms
arms lacked
lacked similar
similar
weapons.
weapons. Argentine
Argentine firefire destroyed
destroyed 22 22 British
British aircraft,
aircraft, 1313 of
of
which
which were
were helicopters
helicopters destroyed aboard ships
destroyed aboard ships sunk
sunk oror
Figure 80. The star of the air war in the Falkland Islands was the
Hawker Siddeley Harrier. In the unique circumstances of
that war, the vertical takeoff and landing aircraft proved
more than a match for conventional jet aircraft.
1533
15
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
damaged
damaged by by airair attack.
attack. Argentine
Argentine groundground fire fire destroyed
destroyed all all
but
but oneone ofof the
the remaining
remaining nine, nine, aa Scout
Scout helicopter
helicopter downeddowned
by
by aa Pucara.
Pucara. The The British
British flewflew 2,000
2,000 sorties,
sorties, butbut state
state that
that
they
they lost
lost only
only five Harriers in
five Harriers in combat:
combat: one one to to aa Roland
Roland
missile,
missile, oneone to to small
small arms,
arms, andand three
three toto 35-mm
35-mm antiaircraft
antiaircraft
fire. Small arms
fire. Small arms or or Blowpipe
Blowpipe missiles
missiles accounted
accounted for for three
three
Gazelle
Gazelle helicopters.
helicopters. One One source
source claims
claims that that the
the Argentines
Argentines
engaged
engaged two two of of their
their own
own helicopters-not
helicopters—not unlikely, unlikely, as as both
both
sides
sides flew
flew the
the same
same kinds
kinds of of machines
machines.^^ .
The effectiveness of the Argentine Air
The effectiveness of the Argentine Air Force
Force provided
provided
one of
one of the
the big
big surprises
surprises of of the
the war,
war, especially
especially considering
considering
its
its limitations
limitations.. The The Argentine
Argentine airmenairmen flew flew mostly
mostly outdated
outdated
aircraft during
aircraft daytime, in
during daytime, clear weather,
in clear without ECM,
weather, without ECM,
and at
and at the
the limits
limits of of their
their range.
range. In In addition,
addition, with with the the ex-
ex-
ception
ception of of five
five French-made
French-made Exocet Exocet missiles,
missiles, theythey dropped
dropped
gravity
gravity bombs
bombs on on targets
targets (mainly
(mainly ships)
ships) thatthat they
they hadhad notnot
been
been trained
trained to to engage.
engage. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, they they sank
sank six six ships
ships
and
and damaged
damaged perhaps
perhaps eight
eight others
others.. British losses could
British losses could have
have
been
been far far worse,
worse, butbut one-fifth,
one-fifth, perhaps
perhaps three-quarters,
three-quarters, of of the
the
Argentine
Argentine bombs bombs failedfailed to to explode
explode due due to to faulty
faulty fuzefuze set-
set-
tings,
tings, defective
defective fuzesfuzes or or bombs,
bombs, and and mostmost of of all,
all, to
to ex-
ex-
tremely
tremely low-level
low-level and and short
short bomb
bomb releases
releases.. TheThe Argentine
Argentine
pilots demonstrated their
pilots demonstrated courage and
their courage and dedication
dedication by by their
their
repeated
repeated attacks
attacks despite
despite the the formidable
formidable odds odds and and highhigh
losses
losses.. ForFor example,
example, between
between 21 21 and
and 25 25 May
May they they lost
lost 1919
aircraft
aircraft on on 117
117 sorties
sorties." ."
The
The British
British also
also operated
operated under under aa number
number of of severe
severe hand-
hand-
icaps
icaps in in the
the campaign
campaign.. The The British
British supply
supply line line stretched
stretched
7,000
7,000 milesmiles between
between the the Falklands
Falklands and and Britain,
Britain, relieved
relieved
only
only by by the
the sparse,
sparse, American-operated
American-operated base base on on Ascension
Ascension
Island
Island.. TheThe British
British hadhad only
only two
two small
small carriers
carriers available
available to to
support
support the the campaign
campaign.. (The (The British
British planned
planned to to reduce
reduce eveneven
this small
this small force
force.. Thus,
Thus, had had thethe Argentines
Argentines delayed delayed their their
action,
action, British
British difficulties
difficulties wouldwould have have beenbeen far far greater.)
greater.)
Their
Their small
small decks
decks forced
forced the the British
British to to rely for air
rely for air superi-
superi-
ority
ority on on aa handful
handful of of Harriers,
Harriers, an aircraft neither
an aircraft neither designed
designed
nor
nor equipped
equipped for for such
such aa role.
role. British
British ship ship designs
designs also also
15
1544
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
proved
proved flawed
flawed in in that
that damage
damage control
control systems
systems were were inad-
inad-
equate
equate and and somesome of of the
the ships
ships lacked
lacked armored
armored cables.cables. Ini-
Ini-
tially
tially only
only twotwo shipsships in the invasion
in the invasion fleet
fleet carried
carried modern
modern
missiles
missiles (Seawolf)
(Seawolf) for for defense
defense against
against low-level
low-level attacks.
attacks.
Combat
Combat revealed
revealed the the biggest
biggest British
British problem
problem to to be
be the
the
lack
lack of of early
early warning
warning aircraft
aircraft.. Although
Although the the British
British bril-
bril-
liantly
liantly andand rapidly
rapidly improvised
improvised to to make
make goodgood other
other serious
serious
deficiencies
deficiencies (such (such as as adapting
adapting the the land-based
land-based HarrierHarrier GR- GR-
33 to
to operate
operate off off aircraft
aircraft carriers,
carriers, expanding
expanding air-to-air
air-to-air re-re-
fueling
fueling capabilities,
capabilities, mating mating the the Sidewinder
Sidewinder to to the
the Harrier,
Harrier,
and
and installing
installing ECM ECM aboardaboard the the Vulcan),
Vulcan), this this one
one glaring
glaring
gap
gap remained.
remained. And And the the inadequacy
inadequacy of of early
early warning
warning proved
proved
costly
costly to to the
the British
British.. In In short,
short, the
the British
British entered
entered the the conflict
conflict
ill
ill prepared
prepared.^'' .
The
The British
British claimed
claimed the the destruction
destruction of of 72 aircraft in
72 aircraft the
in the
air, not an unreasonable number when compared with the
air, not an unreasonable number when compared with the
Argentine
Argentine admission
admission of of 3636 pilots
pilots killed
killed inin the
the campaign
campaign on on
505 sorties. The
505 sorties. The Harriers
Harriers downed downed 20 20 aircraft,
aircraft, small
small armsarms
as
as many
many as as six, naval 44.5-inch
six, naval .5-inch gunsguns one,
one, andand 45 45 fell
fell to
to
various surface-to-air
various surface-to-air missiles missiles.^^ .
As usual,
As usual, these
these numbers
numbers are are probably overstated.. Three
probably overstated Three
recent
recent books
books based based on on Argentine
Argentine documents
documents and and interviews
interviews
put
put total
total Argentine
Argentine air air losses
losses between
between 50 50 and
and 55 55.. Although
Although
these authors boost the Harriers' credits up to 21 to
these authors boost the Harriers' credits up to 21 to 2626 of
of
the
the air-to-air kills, they
air-to-air kills, they downgrade
downgrade the the surface-based
surface-based weap- weap-
ons
ons to to 2020 kills
kills withwith an an additional
additional two two toto three
three attributed
attributed
to
to Argentine
Argentine ground ground fire. 16
fire.^^
Although
Although the the British credit the
British credit the Blowpipe
Blowpipe with with destroying
destroying
nine
nine Argentine
Argentine aircraft,
aircraft, these
these authors
authors saysay the
the true number
true number
is
is from
from twotwo to to four.
four. The
The troops
troops whowho carried
carried the the 47-pound
47-pound
Blowpipe
Blowpipe throughthrough the the difficult Falklands terrain
difficult Falklands terrain criticized
criticized
its
its weight
weight (fig.
(fig. 81).*
81).* The
The Blowpipe,
Blowpipe, like like the
the SA-7
SA-7 andand Amer-
Amer-
ican Redeye and
ican Redeye and Stinger
Stinger (fig.(fig. 82), is operated
82), is operated by by one
one man;
man;
but
but unlike
unlike the the heat-seeking
heat-seeking Soviet Soviet andand American
American devices,devices.
*Understandable
*Understandable criticism
criticism under
under the
the circumstances,
circumstances, but
but it
it did
did give
give the
the troops
troops some
some
protection against Argentine aircraft.
protection against Argentine aircraft.
15
1555
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
Figure 81. Blowpipe launcher ashore on the Falkland Islands.
Blowpipe
Blowpipe is is optically guided. Its
optically guided. Its record
record proved
proved it could do
it could do
the
the job,
job, both ashore and
both ashore afloat.. One
and afloat One detachment
detachment aboard aboard aa
Royal Fleet
Royal Fleet auxiliary
auxiliary fired
fired six
six missiles
missiles and claimed three
and claimed three
aircraft destroyed.. The
aircraft destroyed The Argentines
Argentines also
also used
used thethe Blowpipe
Blowpipe
and
and claimed
claimed one one Harrier
Harrier and
and twotwo helicopters
helicopters with it. In
with it. In
addition the
addition the British used the
British used lighter weight
the hghter weight Stinger but fired
Stinger but fired
only
only four
four missiles
missiles for
for one
one kill.
kill. (However,
(However, therethere is is some
some
controversy
controversy about
about that
that particular
particular credit .)17
credit.)^'
The
The British
British initially
initially credited
credited thethe Rapier
Rapier (fig. (fig. 83),
83), the
the
other
other ground-based
ground-based SAM SAM employed
employed by by the
the British,
British, with
with 1313
156
156
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
Figure 82. Stinger.
kills,
kills, and
and later
later raised
raised its
its kill
kill ratio
ratio to
to 20
20.. Just
Just as
as the
the Roland
Roland
kills
kills are
are hotly
hotly disputed
disputed by by thethe British,
British, so so are
are the
the Rapier
Rapier
kills
kills byby those
those who
who havehave seen
seen Argentine
Argentine documents
documents and and
talked
talked to to Argentine
Argentine pilots.
pilots. (Perhaps
(Perhaps thisthis argument
argument has has more
more
to
to dodo with
with future
future sales
sales of
of these
these weapons
weapons than than history.)
history.) The
The
authors
authors usingusing Argentine
Argentine sources
sources put put the
the Rapier
Rapier credits
credits at
at
one to
one to three.
three. While
While thethe British
British stated
stated that
that the
the campaign
campaign
validates the
validates the weapon,
weapon, the the question
question of of the
the actual
actual kills
kills cast
cast
some
some doubtdoubt on on these
these assertions
assertions.. Although
Although the the Army
Army unitunit
(T
(T Battery)
Battery) fired
fired only
only with
with optical
optical tracking,
tracking, 40 40 percent
percent ofof
its kills were
its kills were inin the
the tail-chase
tail-chase mode.
mode. The The missile's
missile's unique
unique
hittile
hittile (direct
(direct hitting
hitting missile)
missile) system
system (contact,
(contact, notnot proximity
proximity
fuzed)
fuzed) worked
worked well,
well, as British gunners
as British gunners often
often had
had to
to fire
fire over
over
their
their ownown men men andand ships
ships (figs
(figs.. 84
84 and
and 85).
85). Firing
Firing over
over
15
1577
■ M
Figure 83. A Rapier surface-to-air antiaircraft missile system

launcher.
Figure 84. Rapier system under a camouflage net.
158
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
Figure 85. 7.62-mm GPMG deployed ashore on the Falklands.
friendly
friendly forces
forces also
also highlighted
highlighted another
another feature
feature of of the
the de-de-
vice,
vice, manual
manual control
control (it(it is
is not
not aa fire-and-forget
fire-and-forget weapon),
weapon),
which
which proved
proved useful
useful because
because the the operator
operator could
could pull
pull thethe
missile off aa target
missile off if it
target if it flew
flew behind
behind friendly
friendly forces."
forces. ^^
The British
The British naval
naval air defense concept
air defense concept consisted
consisted of of Har-
Har-
riers
riers as
as air
air cover,
cover, destroyers
destroyers armedarmed with
with Sea
Sea Dart
Dart missiles
missiles
as long-range
as long-range defenses,
defenses, andand aa close-in
close-in air
air defense
defense ofof ships
ships
armed with
armed with guns
guns and other missiles
and other missiles (figs.
(figs. 86,
86, 87,
87, and
and 88) 88)..
The British
The British claim
claim that
that Royal
Royal Navy
Navy SAMs
SAMs downed
downed aa totaltotal
of
of 21
21 aircraft
aircraft.. The
The large
large Seaslug
Seaslug missile
missile (fig.
(fig. 89),
89), which
which
entered
entered service
service inin 1962,
1962, received
received nono credits.
credits. The
The two-stage
two-stage
Sea
Sea Dart
Dart destroyed
destroyed fivefive toto eight
eight aircraft,
aircraft, but
but more
more impor-
impor-
15
1599
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Figure 86. Some British ships were also armed with surface-to-air
missiles. Seacat being loaded during a training exercise.
tant, forced
tant, forced Argentine
Argentine aircraft
aircraft into
into low-level
low-level tactics.
tactics. How-
How-
ever,
ever, itit could
could handle
handle only one target
only one target at at aa time,
time, asas was
was
dramatically
dramatically demonstrated
demonstrated when when four four A-4s
A-4s attacked
attacked the
the
HMS Coventry. The
HMS Coventry. The destroyer's
destroyer's Sea Sea Darts
Darts destroyed
destroyed thethe
first
first two
two Argentine
Argentine aircraft,
aircraft, but
but the
the third
third scored
scored aa direct
direct
hit
hit which
which sank
sank the
the ship
ship (fig.
(fig. 90).
90). According
According to to the
the manu-
manu-
facturer,
facturer, obsolescent
obsolescent radar
radar andand computers
computers hamperedhampered the the
missile.
missile. InIn addition,
addition, rougher
rougher seas
seas than
than whatwhat the
the missile
missile was
was
designed
designed to to operate
operate over degraded the
over degraded the system's
system's perfor-
perfor-
mance against
mance against low-flying
low-flying aircraft.
aircraft. 39
^^
The
The small,
small, short-range
short-range Seacat
Seacat began
began development
development in in 1958
1958
and
and isis in
in service
service with
with aa number
number of of countries.
countries. Although
Although
British
British sources
sources credit
credit itit with
with eight
eight kills,
kills, other
other sources
sources put
put
this
this figure
figure at
at one
one.. The
The other
other short-range
short-range missile
missile system
system was
was
the
the more
more advanced
advanced Seawolf.
Seawolf. Although
Although clearly
clearly aa better
better sys-
sys-
160
160
RECENT
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EXPERIENCE
Figure 87. The British used a variety of antiaircraft weapons during

the Falklands campaign. These included rifle-caliber
weapons such as this 7.62-mm GPMG mounted on HMS
Hermes.
tem
tern than
than the
the Seacat,
Seacat, which
which it
it was designed to
was designed to replace,
replace, there
there
were
were just
just too
too few
few available,
available, onon only
only two
two ships.
ships. (Argentine
(Argentine
duds hit
duds both.).) Nevertheless,
hit both Nevertheless, thisthis SAM
SAM received credit for
received credit for
downing
downing three
three toto five
five aircraft
aircraft and
and at
at least
least one
one air-to-surface
air-to-surface
missile.
missile*"
Regardless
Regardless ofof the
the dispute
dispute over claims, the
over claims, the Royal
Royal Navy's
Navy's
defenses
defenses proved
proved inadequate:
inadequate: the the Argentine
Argentine Air Air Force
Force came
came
close to driving
close to driving off
off the
the British
British fleet.
fleet. Clearly,
Clearly, thethe Argentines
Argentines
came off
came better in
off better in the
the air-sea
air-sea battle
battle inin terms
terms of of resources
resources
expended.
expended. Each
Each British
British ship
ship cost tens if
cost tens if not
not hundreds
hundreds of of
millions
millions of
of dollars
dollars;; the
the HMS Sheffield, for
HMS Sheffield, for example,
example, cost
cost
161
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Figure 88. The Bofors aircraft gun also served in the Falldands.
40-mm L/60 Bofors on board either HIVIS Fearless or HIVIS
Intrepid during the Falkland War.
$225
$225 million
million.. Argentine
Argentine Exocets
Exocets and and aircraft
aircraft cost
cost far
far less,
less,
on
on the
the order
order ofof $200,000
$200,000 for
for the
the missiles,
missiles, and
and perhaps
perhaps $5$5
million
million for
for aa modern
modern jet
jet fighter But the British did win
.41 But the British did win
fighter."^'
the war and did achieve their national objective
the war and did achieve their national objective..
Ongoing
Ongoing and
and Recent
Recent Aspects
Aspects
Since
Since the
the dramatic
dramatic actions
actions in 1986, there
in 1986, there have
have been
been no
no
major
major airair operations
operations.. Three
Three other
other aspects
aspects should
should bebe men-
men-
tioned,
tioned, however,
however, before
before closing
closing out
out this
this study: the Iran-Iraq
study: the Iran-Iraq
War,
War, the
the invasion
invasion ofof Grenada,
Grenada, and
and guerrilla
guerrilla use
use of
of shoulder-
shoulder-
fired
fired SAMS.
SAMs.
Another
Another recent
recent and
and ongoing
ongoing war
war (as
(as of
of 1988)
1988) is the con-
is the con-
flict
flict between
between twotwo third
third world
world countries,
countries, Iran
Iran and
and Iraq.
Iraq. Both
Both
have
have considerable
considerable quantities
quantities ofof relatively
relatively modern
modern aircraft
aircraft
and
and air
air defense
defense equipment:
equipment: thethe Iranians
Iranians with
with American
American air-
air-
craft
craft and
and British
British and
and American
American missiles
missiles (Hawk,
(Hawk, Rapier,
Rapier, and
and
1622
16
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
Figure 89. Seaslug.
Tigercat);; and
Tigercat) and thethe Iraqis with Soviet
Iraqis with equipment, including
Soviet equipment, including
70
70 SAM batteries (SA-2,
SAM batteries (SA-2, SA-3, and aa few
SA-3, and few SA-6s)
SA-6s).. Report-
Report-
edly,
edly, both sides lost
both sides lost about
about 150 aircraft by
150 aircraft by the
the end
end ofof 1981,
1981,
most
most ofof the combat losses
the combat losses to ground weapons
to ground weapons butbut appar-
appar-
ently
ently not through the
not through the efficiency of the
efficiency of the enemy's
enemy's airair or
or ground
ground
defenses. Neither side
defenses. Neither side has proved able
has proved able to
to make
make good
good use
use
of modern technology
of modern technology because
because of of problems
problems withwith parts,
parts,
maintenance,
maintenance, and and training
training.. In addition, the
In addition, the main
main objective
objective
of
of both
both air
air forces seems to
forces seems to be
be to avoid attrition
to avoid attrition and
and defeat
defeat
and to
and to deter
deter attacks
attacks.. The lessons of
The lessons of this conflict therefore
this conflict therefore
may
may be be that modern equipment
that modern equipment does not automatically
does not automatically
make modern
make modern forces, and that
forces, and that air
air forces without access
forces without access toto
secure
secure support
support and resupply may
and resupply adopt aa defensive
may adopt defensive strategy
strategy
to preserve their
to preserve their limited
limited forces .
forces.^^
163
163
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Figure 90. Sea Dart launch during peacetime.
The
The 1984
1984 Grenada
Grenada invasion
invasion willwill probably
probably best
best bebe re-
re-
membered
membered for for its
its nonmilitary
nonmilitary aspectsaspects;; nevertheless,
nevertheless, air air
power
power played
played aa significant
significant rolerole in
in the
the short, one-sided op-
short, one-sided op-
eration.. The
eration The United
United States faced neither
States faced neither hostile aircraft nor
hostile aircraft nor
any antiaircraft
any antiaircraft weapon
weapon greater
greater than
than 2323 mm-only
mm—only small small
arms and
arms and 24
24 ZSU-23
ZSU-23 guns,
guns, andand these
these lacked
lacked radar
radar guidance
guidance..
Despite
Despite this
this imbalance,
imbalance, the the defenders
defenders downed
downed fourfour heli-
heli-
copters
copters (a(a fifth
fifth was
was destroyed
destroyed afterafter colliding
colliding with
with aa damaged
damaged
copter) and severely damaged at least four others. The
copter) and severely damaged at least four others. The loss
loss
of
of so many machines
so many machines against
against suchsuch minor
minor resistance
resistance here
here
and
and inin the
the 1975 Mayaguez incident,
1975 Mayaguez incident, during
during which
which eight
eight ofof
nine helicopters that
nine helicopters that hit
hit the
the beach
beach were
were disabled,
disabled, surfaces
surfaces
the
the question
question of of helicopter
helicopter survival
survival in in combat
combat operations.
operations."*^
Finally,
Finally, in
in recent
recent years
years guerrilla
guerrilla groups have claimed
groups have claimed suc-
suc-
cess
cess against
against aircraft
aircraft (fig.
(fig. 91).
91). Although
Although itit is
is difficult to sep-
difficult to sep-
arate
arate guerrilla
guerrilla claims
claims from
from their
their propaganda,
propaganda, aa number
number of of
aircraft
aircraft have
have gone
gone down
down in in antiguerrilla
antiguerrilla operations
operations in in An-
An-
gola,
gola, Chad,
Chad, Nicaragua,
Nicaragua, and and thethe Sudan.
Sudan. Whether
Whether theythey were
were
164
164
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
Figure 91. Afghanistan rebels witli downed Soviet helicopter in

1979. Uses of American and British shoulder-fired mis-
siles beginning in 1986 changed the tide of the war.
victims
victims of of SAMs,
SAMs, small
small arms,
arms, operational
operational problems,
problems, or or
propaganda
propaganda pens,pens, remains
remains to to be seen.. In
be seen In anyany case,
case, the
the ac-
ac-
quisition
quisition ofof shoulder-launched
shoulder-launched SAMs SAMs gives
gives the the guerrillas,
guerrillas,
or
or the
the terrorists,
terrorists, aa potent
potent antiaircraft
antiaircraft weapon.
weapon.'*'* 44
Particularly effective
Particularly effective isis the American built
the American built Stinger.
Stinger. Air-
Air-
men,
men, Americans
Americans in in Vietnam
Vietnam andand Soviets
Soviets in in Afghanistan,
Afghanistan,
quickly
quickly found
found countermeasures
countermeasures to to the
the first
first generation
generation SA-SA-
77 and
and Redeye
Redeye missile
missile.. Both
Both missiles
missiles are
are limited
limited by by lack
lack ofof
electronic
electronic identification
identification capability
capability and
and three
three performance
performance
factors
factors:: They
They areare strictly
strictly tail
tail and
and chase
chase (revenge)
(revenge) weapons,
weapons,
they
they are
are decoyed
decoyed by by flares,
flares, and
and they
they are
are restricted
restricted inin ma-
ma-
neuverability.
neuverability. The The second-generation
second-generation Stinger
Stinger is is aa different
different
story.
story. It
It is
is aa foot
foot longer
longer than
than the
the four-foot
four-foot Redeye
Redeye and and
weighs
weighs an an additional
additional 16 16 pounds.
pounds. More important, the
More important, the
Stinger has improved
Stinger has improved performance
performance in in all
all four
four areas.
areas. In
In ad-
ad-
dition
dition toto having
having anan electronic
electronic IFF
IFF capability,
capability, the the Stinger
Stinger
16
1655
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
has forward firing

has aa forward firing capability,
capability, moremore resistance
resistance to to decoy
decoy
flares,
flares, is
is faster,
faster, and
and outranges
outranges the the two-mile
two-mile RedeyeRedeye by by aa
mile
mile.. General
General Dynamics
Dynamics began began development
development of the Stinger
of the Stinger
in
in 1971,
1971, and
and itit became
became operational
operational in in 1981
1981.. The
The missile's
missile's
biggest success
biggest success has been in
has been in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan. In In fact
fact its
its impact
impact
in
in that
that conflict
conflict prompted
prompted one one reporter
reporter to to write
write that:
that: "What
"What
the longbow
the longbow was was to to English
English yeomen
yeomen .. .. .. the the Stinger
Stinger anti-
anti-
aircraft missile
aircraft missile is is to
to today's
today's American-backed
American-backed guerrilla guerrilla
fighters."^^
fighters .' 141
The
The war
war in in Afghanistan
Afghanistan clearly
clearly shows
shows how how missile
missile tech-
tech-
nology
nology hashas given
given the
the guerrillas
guerrillas aa valuable
valuable weapon.
weapon. The The So-
So-
viets, while
viets, bogged down
while bogged down on on thethe ground
ground and and largely
largely
confined
confined to to the
the cities and fortified
cities and fortified positions,
positions, made made effective
effective
and growing
and growing use use of both fixed-wing
of both fixed-wing and and rotary-wing
rotary-wing aircraft
aircraft
against
against sparse rebel antiaircraft
sparse rebel antiaircraft defenses
defenses including
including SA-7 SA-7
missiles.
missiles. Therefore,
Therefore, in March 1986,
in March 1986, the the American
American and and Brit-
Brit-
ish
ish agreed
agreed to to ship
ship Stingers and Blowpipe
Stingers and Blowpipe SAMS SAMs to to the
the Af-
Af-
ghanistan
ghanistan guerrillas.
guerrillas.
The
The American
American Stingers were initially
Stingers were criticized for
initially criticized for their
their
weight
weight andand complexity,
complexity, but but after month in
after aa month in which
which 11 11 were
were
fired
fired without
without aa miss,
miss, they
they quickly
quickly showed
showed their their effective-
effective-
ness.
ness. InIn October
October the the guerrillas
guerrillas reportedly
reportedly downeddowned two two hel-
hel-
icopters
icopters and and one
one fighter
fighter and
and in November 11
in November helicopters
11 helicopters
and
and oneone MiG-23
MiG-23.. These losses forced
These losses forced the the Soviets
Soviets to to fly
fly
higher
higher and
and to to operate
operate at at farther distances from
farther distances from their
their targets,
targets,
and restrict,
and restrict, ifif not
not abandon,
abandon, theirtheir gunship
gunship strikes,
strikes, markedly
markedly
reducing
reducing their
their military
military effectiveness.
effectiveness. In In February
February 1987 1987 AirAir
Force Chief
Force Chief of of Staff
Staff Larry
Larry D D.. Welch
Welch testified
testified that
that "some-
"some-
where
where between
between 150 150 and 300 Stingers
and 300 Stingers have have absolutely
absolutely drivendriven
the Russian Air
the Russian Air Force
Force outout ofof the
the skies
skies in in Afghanistan."
Afghanistan.'"*^ 46
The
The rebels
rebels claimed
claimed to to have
have downed
downed as as many
many as as 1515 toto 20
20
Soviet helicopters
Soviet helicopters aa month
month and and by by the
the summer
summer of of 1987
1987 maymay
have
have downed
downed one one aircraft
aircraft aa day.
day. During
During the fall 1987
the fall 1987 of-
of-
fensive,
fensive, thethe government
government reportedly
reportedly lost lost 17 17 helicopters,
helicopters, an an
An-22
An-22 transport,
transport, and and four
four MiG-21
MiG-21ss to to the
the Stingers
Stingers..
The
The Stinger's
Stinger's impact
impact goesgoes beyond
beyond the the aircraft
aircraft losses
losses.. A A
Western
Western journal
journal reports
reports that
that 2020 Afghanistan
Afghanistan pilots pilots refused
refused
166
166
RECENT EXPERIENCE
RECENT EXPERIENCE
to fly
to against rebel
fly against positions defended
rebel positions defended by by the
the American-
American-
built
built missiles.
missiles. The
The Communists
Communists acknowledge
acknowledge the the weapon's
weapon's
effectiveness
effectiveness and
and how
how itit changed
changed the
the conflict.
conflict. The
The leader
leader
of
of the
the Afghanistan
Afghanistan Communist party confirmed
Communist party confirmed thisthis defen-
defen-
sive
sive blow
blow when
when he
he spoke
spoke of
of the
the siege
siege of
of Khost,
Khost, aa city
city about
about
100
100 miles
miles south
south of
of Kabul.
Kabul. HeHe admitted that US
admitted that US and
and British
British
SAMs
SAMs hadhad halted
halted Communist
Communist daytime
daytime air
air supply
supply of of the
the city.
city.
Thus,
Thus, the
the Communists
Communists have have been
been forced
forced to
to concede
concede thethe
countryside
countryside toto the
the rebels,
rebels, concentrate
concentrate their
their forces
forces inin Kabul
Kabul
and
and other
other major
major cities,
cities, and
and make
make numerous
numerous moves
moves toward
toward
withdrawal
withdrawal from
from thethe conflict.
conflict. In
In this
this confrontation
confrontation the the
American-built
American-built missile
missile isis playing
playing aa major
major role.
role."*^
Summary
Summary
Any
Any warwar isis difficult
difficult toto evaluate,
evaluate, but but small wars are
small wars are es-
es-
pecially
pecially tricky.
tricky. Because
Because the the amount
amount of of equipment
equipment used used isis
usually
usually small,
small, andand forfor the
the most
most partpart less
less than
than the
the most
most
modern,
modern, it it is
is difficult
difficult to
to extrapolate
extrapolate the the findings
findings into
into more
more
general
general andand future
future uses
uses.. When
When thesethese wars
wars areare fought
fought by by
other
other countries,
countries, the the problems
problems of of interpretation
interpretation increase
increase..
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, itit is the only
is the only laboratory
laboratory the the soldier
soldier has,
has, and
and
he
he must
must make
make the the most
most of of it.
it.
The
The 1973
1973 Arab-Israeli
Arab-Israeli War War presented
presented many many surprises,
surprises,
from
from its
its origin
origin to to the
the way
way itit was
was fought
fought.. The
The Arabs
Arabs diddid not
not
follow
follow the
the conventional
conventional wisdomwisdom but but instead
instead attacked
attacked aa
country
country having
having aa superior
superior military
military without
without having
having first
first
gained air
gained superiority. Initially,
air superiority. Initially, the Arabs used
the Arabs used their
their air
air
forces
forces sparingly
sparingly and advanced under
and advanced under aa dense
dense and
and lethal
lethal
umbrella
umbrella of of SAMs
SAMs and and guns.
guns. This
This air
air defense proved ef-
defense proved ef-
fective
fective and
and inflicted
inflicted heavy
heavy losses
losses on on the
the Israeli
Israeli Air
Air Force.
Force.
Arab
Arab missiles
missiles andand guns sorely tested
guns sorely tested the
the IAF;
lAF; but
but the Israelis
the Israelis
changed their tactics, adopted new equipment, persisted,
changed their tactics, adopted new equipment, persisted,
and
and won
won.. However,
However, Arab Arab air
air defenses
defenses did not permit
did not permit the the
Israelis
Israelis to
to fight the air
fight the air and
and ground
ground war war as as they
they had
had done
done
in
in 1967
1967 and
and as as they
they would
would havehave liked.
liked. AsAs aa result
result ofof this
this
167
167
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
SAM
war, some commentators

war, some commentators spoke spoke ofof the
the demise
demise of of the
the tank
tank
and
and aircraft, victims of
aircraft, victims of the modern missile.
the modern missile. The
The defense
defense
seemed
seemed to be supreme.
to be supreme.
But
But the
the wars
wars of 1982 seemingly
of 1982 offered different
seemingly offered different lessons
lessons..
The IAF
The lAF wonwon aa small
small but striking victory
but striking victory against
against Syrian
Syrian
aircraft
aircraft andand SAMs.
SAMs. This This came about through
came about through the the use
use ofof
coordinated efforts
coordinated efforts ofof all
all arms
arms andand especially
especially through
through the the
use of high-technology
use of high-technology equipment
equipment such such asas ARMS,
ARMs, remotely
remotely
piloted vehicles (RPVs),
piloted vehicles (RPVs), and electronics aircraft.
and electronics aircraft.
The
The implications
implications of of the
the war
war in the Falklands
in the Falklands appear
appear lessless
clear.
clear. ItIt might
might be be thought
thought of of as the converse
as the converse of of Vietnam;
Vietnam;
that is,
that relatively sophisticated
is, aa relatively sophisticated but small British
but small British force
force
pitted
pitted against
against aa larger
larger but less-modern Argentine
but less-modern Argentine one.one. The
The
Argentines
Argentines used mostly old
used mostly aircraft and
old aircraft old bombs,
and old bombs, without
without
ECM protection
ECM protection at the limits
at the limits of their range.
of their range. Not
Not surpris-
surpris-
ingly, the British,
ingly, the with small
British, with small numbers
numbers of of aircraft
aircraft and SAMs,
and SAMs,
imposed heavy
imposed heavy losses
losses onon these
these aircraft
aircraft and aircrews. But
and aircrews. But
the Argentines
the Argentines did penetrate the
did penetrate the defenses
defenses andand diddid inflict
inflict
much damage to
much damage to the
the more costly British
more costly British fleet.
fleet. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless,
the
the British
British wonwon thethe war.
war.
If these wars showed anything,
If these wars showed anything, they showed the
they showed the potential
potential
of high
of technology. At
high technology. At the
the same
same time, they indicated
time, they indicated thatthat
numbers
numbers and weapons handling
and weapons handling are are extremely
extremely important
important to to
the
the final outcome.. High-technology
final outcome High-technology weapons weapons demand
demand high-
high-
quality personnel..
quality personnel
NOTES
NOTES
11.. Moshe Dayan, Diary

Moshe Dayan, Diary ofthe
of the Sinai
Sinai Campaign
Campaign (New York:: Schocken
(New York Schocken
Books, Inc.,
Books, Inc., 1965),
1965), 177-78,
177-78, 221
221; ; Chaim
Chaim Herzog,
Herzog, The
The Arab-Israeli
Arab-Israeli
Wars:
Wars: WarWar and
and Peace
Peace in
in the
the Middle East (New
Middle East (New York
York:: Random
Random House,
House,
1982),
1982), 145 Trevor N.
145;; Trevor N. Dupuy,
Dupuy, Elusive
Elusive Victory:
Victory: The
The Arab-Israeli
Arab-Israeli Wars,
Wars,
1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 212; Stephen Peltz,
1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 212; Stephen Peltz,
"Israeli
"Israeli AirAir Power,"
Power," Flying
Flying Review
Review International, December 1967,
International, December 1967,
1019.
1019.
2. Edward
2. Edward N. N. Luttwak
Luttwak and
and Daniel Horowitz, The
Daniel Horowitz, The Israeli
Israeli Army
Arn^y (New
(New
York:
York: Harper
Harper andand Row,
Row, 1975),
1975), 229,
229, 230
230;; Nadav Safran, From
Nadav Safran, From War
War to
to
168
168
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
War.
War: The The Arab-Israeli
Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967 (Indianapolis,
Confrontation, 1948-1967 (Indianapolis, Ind Ind.:. :
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969), 324, 325; Murray Rubenstein and
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969), 324, 325; Murray Rubenstein and
Richard
Richard Goldman,Goldman, Shield of David (Englewood
Shield ofDavid (Englewood Cliffs,
Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-
N.J.: Prentice-
Hall,
Hall, Inc., Inc., 1978),
1978), 100;
100; Robert
Robert Jackson,
Jackson, The The Israeli
Israeli AirAir Force
Force Story
Story
(London:
(London: Stacey, Stacey, 1970),
1970), 218218;; Warren
Warren Wetmore,
Wetmore, "Israeli
"Israeli Air Air Punch
Punch
Major
Major Factor Factor in in War,"
War," Aviation Week, 33 July
Aviation Week, July 1967,
1967, 22;22; Edgar
Edgar O'Bal-
O'Bal-
lance,
lance. The The Third
Third Arab-Israeli
Arab-Israeli War War (Hamden,
(Hamden, Conn.:
Conn.: Archon
Archon Books,
Books,
1972),
1972), 67, 67, 75,
75, 8282..
3.
3. Jackson,
Jackson, Israeli
Israeli Air Force, 153,
Air Force, 153, 248;
248; Wetmore,
Wetmore, "Israeli
"Israeli AirAir Punch
Punch
Major Factor in War," 22; James Hansen, "The Development of
Major Factor in War," 22; James Hansen, "The Development of So-
So-
viet
viet Tactical
Tactical Air Air Defense,"
Defense," International
International Defense Review, May
Defense Review, May 1981,
1981,
532;
532; "Off "Off the the Record,"
Record," Journal
Journal of of Defense
Defense and Diplomacy, January
and Diplomacy, January
1988,
1988, 63 63..
44.. Jackson,
Jackson, Israeli
Israeli Air Force, 233
Air Force, 233;; Luttwak
Luttwak and and Horowitz,
Horowitz, The The Israeli
Israeli
Army, 302,
Army, 302, 321-23;
321-23; Chaim
Chaim Herzog,
Herzog, TheThe War
War of of Atonement,
Atonement, OctoberOctober
1973 (Boston,
1973 (Boston, Mass.Mass.:: Little,
Little, Brown
Brown andand Co.,
Co., 1975),
1975), 8,8, 9,
9, 232,
232, 235-37,
235-37,
253;
253; the the Insight
Insight Team
Team of of the
the Sunday Times (London),
Sunday Times (London), The The YomYom Kippur
Kippur
War (Garden
War (Garden City, City, N.Y.
N.Y.:: Doubleday
Doubleday and Co., 1974),
and Co., 1974), 33,33, 36;
36; Lon
Lon O.O.
Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age (Washington, D .C.: Smith-
Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age (Washington, D.C.: Smith-
sonian
sonian Institution
Institution Press,Press, 1985),
1985), 134.
134.
55.. Hansen,
Hansen, "The "The Development
Develojjment of of Soviet
Soviet Tactical
Tactical AirAir Defense,"
Defense," 533 533..
Nordeen,
Warfare in in the
the Missile Age, 149-50;
Missile Age, 149-50; Herzog,
Herzog, War War of of
Atonement, 256;
Atonement, 256; Ronald
Ronald Bergquist,
Bergquist, The The Role
Role ofAirpower
ofAirpower in in the
the Iran-
Iran-
Iraq
Iraq War War (Maxwell
(Maxwell AFB, AFB, Ala.
Ala.:: Airpower
Airpower Research
Research Institute,
Institute, Septem-
Septem-
ber 1988).
ber 1988).
66.. Herzog,
Herzog, The The War of Atonement,256;
War ofAtonement, 256;Hansen,
Hansen,"The "TheDevelopment
Development
of
of Soviet
Soviet Tactical
Tactical Air Air Defense,"
Defense," 533 533;; C.
C. N.N. Barclay,
Barclay, "Lessons
"Lessons from from
the October War," Army, March 1974, 28; Charles Corddry, "The
the October War," Army, March 1974, 28; Charles Corddry, "The
Yom
Yom Kippur Kippur War, War, 1973-Lessons
1973—Lessons New New andand Old,"
Old," National
National Defense,
Defense,
May-June
May-June 1974, 1974, 508;
508; Robert
Robert R. R. Ropelewski,
Ropelewski, "Setbacks
"Setbacks Spur Spur System
System
to
to Counter
Counter Israel,"
Israel," Aviation
Aviation Week,Week, 77 July
July 1975,
1975,15;15; Amnon
Amnon Sella, Sella, "The
"The
Struggle
Struggle for for Air
Air Supremacy
Supremacy:: OctoberOctober 1973-December
1973-December 1975," 1975," RUSI
RUSI
Journalfor
Journal for Defense Studies, December
Defense Studies, December 1976,
1976, 33 33;; Insight Team, Yom
Insight Team, Yom
Kippur, 189.
Kippur, 189.
7.
7. Nordeen,
Warfare in in the
the Missile Age, 149;
Missile Age, 149; Luttwak
Luttwak and and Ho-
Ho-
rowitz,
rowitz, The The Israeli Army, 348
Israeli Army, 348;; Herbert
Herbert J.J. Coleman,
Coleman, "Israeli
"Israeh AirAir Force
Force
Decisive
Decisive in in War,"
War," Aviation Week, 33 December
Aviation Week, December 1973, 1973, 19;19; "U.S.
"U.S. Finds
Finds
SA-6
SA-6 to to bebe Simple,
Simple, Effective,"
Effective," Aviation Week, 33 December
Aviation Week, December 1973, 1973, 22;
22;
Robert
Robert R R.. Ropelewski,
Ropelewski, "Egypt "Egypt Assesses
Assesses Lessons
Lessons of of October
October War,"War,"
Aviation
Aviation Week, Week, 17 17 December
December 1973, 1973, 16;
16; "SA-6-Arab
"SA-6-Arab Ace Ace inin the
the 20-Day
20-Day
War,"
War," International
International Defense Review, December
Defense Review, December 1973, 1973, 779-80;
779-80; Robert
Robert
Hotz,
Hotz, "The "The ShockShock of of Technical
Technical Surprise,"
Surprise," Aviation Week, 24
Aviation Week, 24 March
March
1975,
1975, 9. 9.
169
169
ARCHIE,
FLAK, AAA, SAM
Nordeen, Air
88.. Nordeen, Air Warfare
Warfare inin the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 149;
149; Ropelewski,
Ropelewski, "Egypt "Egypt
Assesses,"
Assesses," 16 16;; "Soviet
"Soviet Anti-Aircraft
Anti-Aircraft Gun Gun Takes Toll," Aviation
Takes Toll," Aviation Week, Week,
22 October 1973, 19.
22 October 1973, 19.
9.
9. Insight Team, Yom
Insight Team, Kippur, 161,
YomKippur, 161, 184-85 Herzog, The
184-85;; Herzog, The Arab-Israeli
Arab-Israeli
Wars, 281, 346; Herzog, The War of Atonement, 87, 256 ; J.
Wars, 281, 346; Herzog, The War of Atonement, 87, 256; J. Viksne,
Viksne,
"The
"The Yom Yom Kippur
Kippur War War in Retrospect," Army
in Retrospect," Army Journal,
Journal, April
April 1976,
1976, pt pt..
1 :41 ; "Israeli Aircraft, Arab SAMs in Key Battle," Aviation Week, 22
1:41; "Israeli Aircraft, Arab SAMs in Key Battle," Aviation Week, 22
October
October 1973, 1973, 14; Historical Evaluation
14; Historical Evaluation and and Research
Research Organization,
Organization,
"The Middle East War of October 1973 in Historical Perspective,"
"The Middle East War of October 1973 in Historical Perspective,"
study, February
study, February 1976, 1976, 145
145 [AUL-M42138-5]
[AUL-M42138-5];; Dupuy, Dupuy, Elusive
Elusive Victory,
Victory,
551 ; Bryce Walker, Fighting Jets (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books,
551; Bryce Walker, Fighting Jets (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books,
1983),
1983), 149; 149; Peter
Peter Borgart, "The Vulnerability
Borgart, "The Vulnerability ofthe of the Manned
Manned Airborne
Airborne
Weapon
Weapon System, System, Part Part 33:: Influence
Influence on on Tactics
Tactics and Strategy," Inter-
and Strategy," Inter-
national Defense Review, December 1977, 1066 .
national Defense Review, December 1977, 1066.
10. Nordeen, Air
10. Nordeen, Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 165 165;; Luttwak
Luttwak and and Ho- Ho-
rowitz, The Israeli Army, 349; Coleman, "Israeli Air Force Decisive
rowitz, The Israeli Army, 349; Coleman, "Israeli Air Force Decisive
in
in War,"
War," 19; 19; "SA-7
"SA-7 Avoids
Avoids Homing
Homing on Flares," Aviation
on Flares," Aviation Week,
Week, 55 No- No-
vember 1973, 17;;
vember 1973,17 Robert R. Rodwell, "The Mid-East War
Robert R. Rodwell, "The Mid-East War: : AA Damned
Damned
Close-Run Thing,"
Close-Run Thing," Air Air Force
Force Magazine, February 1974,
Magazine, February 1974, 39; 39; Hotz,
Hotz,
"The
"The Shock Shock of Technical Surprise,"
of Technical Surprise," 99..
11 Nordeen, Air
11.. Nordeen, Air Warfare
Warfare inin the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 349,
349, 3351;
51 ; Jeffrey
Jeffrey Green-
Green-
hunt,
hunt, "Air "Air War:
War: Middle East," Aerospace
Middle East," Aerospace Historian,
Historian, March March 1976,1976, 22. 22.
12. Rodwell, The Mid-East War, 39 ; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 552;
12. Rodwell, The Mid-East War, 39; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 552;
Nordeen, Air
Nordeen, Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age, 156; Luttwak
Age, 156; Luttwak and and Horowitz,
Horowitz,
The Israeli Army, 349; Insight Team, Yom Kippur, 187-88, 370; Cole-
The Israeli Army, 349; Insight Team, Yom Kippur, 187-88, 370; Cole-
man,
man, "Israeli
"Israeli AirAir Force
Force Decisive
War," 19 19;; Bill
Bill Gunston
Gunston et al..., War
et al War
Planes. 1945-1976 (London: Salamander, 1976), 58; Walker, Fighting
Planes: 1945-1976 (London: Salamander, 1976), 58; Walker, Fighting
Jets,
Jets, 149 149;; Borgart,
Borgart, "Vulnerability,
"Vulnerability, Part Part 3,"3," 1064
1064..
13 .
13. Insight
Insight Team, Yom Kippur,
Team, Yom Kippur, 204;
204; Walker, Fighting
Walker, Fighting Jets,
Jets, 150;
150; Cole-
Cole-
man,
man, "Israeli
"Israeli Air Air Force
Force Decisive
War," 18 18..
14
14.. One
One author
author states
states that
that the
the IAF
lAF destroyed
destroyed 28 28 SAM
SAM sites
sites and
and the the
Israeli Army 12 others . Herzog, War ofAtonement, 242, 259; Insight
Israeli Army 12 others. Herzog, War of Atonement, 242, 259; Insight
Team, Yom
Team, Yom Kippur,
Kippur, 338; Herzog, Arab-Israeli
338; Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, Wars, 285,
285, 341341;; Rub-Rub-
enstein and Goldman, Shield of David, 127, 129.
enstein and Goldman, Shield of David, \11, 129.
15. Herzog, Arab-Israeli
15. Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars,
Wars, 346-47 Herzog, War
346-47;; Herzog, War ofAtonement,
of Atonement,
257
257;; Luttwak
Luttwak and Horowitz, The
and Horowitz, The Israeli
Israeli Army,
Army, 347; Nordeen, Air
347; Nordeen, Air War-War-
fare
fare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 163-66;
163-66; M. M. J.J. Armitage
Armitage and and R. R. A. Mason, Air
A. Mason, Air
Power
Power in in the
the Nuclear
Nuclear Age, Age, 2d
2d ed.ed. (Urbana,
(Urbana, 111.:Ill. : University
University of of Illinois,
Illinois,
1985),
1985), 134; 134; Roy
Roy M. M. Braybrook,
Braybrook, "Is "Is ItIt Goodbye
Goodbye to to Ground
Ground Attack?"
Attack?"
Air
Air International,
International, May May 1976,
1976, 234-44;
234-44; Charles
Charles Wakebridge,
Wakebridge, "The "The Tech-Tech-
nological Gap in the Middle East," National Defense, May-June 1975,
nological Gap in the Middle East," National Defense, May-June 1975,
461 ; "SA-6-Arab Ace,"
461;"SA-6-Arab Ace," 779
779..
16. "Bekaa Valley Combat," Flight
16. "Bekaa Valley Combat," Flight International,
International, 16 16 October
October 1982, 1982,
170
170
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
1110
1110;; Herzog,
Herzog, The War of
The War ofAtonement,
Atonement, 260; 260; Insight
Insight Team,
Team, Yom Yom Kippur
Kippur,
315 ; Thomas Walczyk, "October War," Strategy and Tactics, March-
315; Thomas Walczyk, "October War," Strategy and Tactics, March-
April
April 1977,
1977, 10 10;; Martin
Martin van van Creveld,
Creveld, The The Washington Papers, Militar
Washington Papers, Military
Lessons of the Yom Kippur War. Historical Perspectives, no. 24 (Beverl,
Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives, no. 24 (Beverly
Hills/London:
Hills/London: Sage Sage Publications,
Publications, 1975),1975), 31 31;; Peter Borgart, "Vulner
Peter Borgart, "Vulner-
ability,
ability, Part
Part 3,"3," 1064,
1064, 1066
1066;; Rubenstein
Rubenstein and and Goldman,
Goldman, Shield Shield ofDavia
ofDavid,
128 Herzog, Arab-Israeli
128;; Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, Wars, 347347;; Ropelewski,
Ropelewski, "Egypt "Egypt Assesses,'
Assesses,"
16
16..
17
17.. Rubenstein
Goldman, ShieldShield ofDavid,
of David, 113 113;; Dupuy,
Dupuy, Elusiv,
Elusive
Victory,
Victory, 592;592; Nordeen,
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 151151;; Herzol
Herzog
Arab-Israeli Wars, 266 ; Herzog,
Arab-Israeli Wars, 266; Herzog, War
War of Atonement, 258
of Atonement, 258;; Lawrenc(
Lawrence
Whetten
Whetten and and Michael
Michael Johnson,
Johnson, "Military
"Military Lessons
Lessons of of the
the Yom
Yom Kippu
Kippur
War,"
War," WorldWorld Today,
Today, MarchMarch 1974,
1974, 109.109.
18 . Herzog, The War of Atonement, 260-61
18. Herzog, The War of Atonement, 260-61;; Corddry,
Corddry, "The "The YonYom
Kippur War,"
Kippur War," 508 508;; Historical Evaluation and
Historical Evaluation and Research
Research Organization
Organization,
"The Middle East War," appendix ; Walczyk, "October War," 10;
"The Middle East War," appendix; Walczyk, "October War,"' 10 ; Wil
Wil-
liam
liam Staudenmaier,
Staudenmaier, "Learning "Learning from from the
the Middle
Middle East East War,"
War," AirAir Defense
Defense
Trends, April-June 1975, 18 ; "Israeli Aircraft, Arab SAMs in
Trends, April-June 1975, 18; "Israeli Aircraft, Arab SAMs in Ke,
Key
Battle,"
Battle," 14 14;; Rubenstein
Goldman, Shield Shield of David, 128
of David, 128;; Borgart
Borgart,
"Vulnerability,
"Vulnerability, Part Part 3," 1066.. A
3," 1066 number of
A number of factors
factors contribute
contribute to to the
the
discrepancy in losses . Besides the differences in the training, leader,
discrepancy in losses. Besides the differences in the training, leader-
ship,
ship, motivation,
motivation, and and doctrine
doctrine of of the
the opposing
opposing forces,forces, two
two other
other fac
fac-
tors stand out: Soviet equipment versus Western equipment, and thf
tors stand out: Soviet equipment versus Western equipment, and the
Arab
Arab lack lack ofof ECM
ECM equipment
equipment and Israel's use
and Israel's use of of it.
it. Dupuy,
Dupuy, Elusivc
Elusive
Victory, 549; Coleman, "Israeli Air Force Decisive in War," 18 ; Nor.
Victory, 549; Coleman, "Israeli Air Force Decisive in War," 18; Nor-
deen,
deen, Air Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,Age, 162-63
162-63..
19. Van Creveld, "Military Lessons," 31,
19. Van Creveld, "Military Lessons," 31, 3232;; Luttwak
Luttwak and and Horowitz
Horowitz,
The
The Israeli
Israeli Army,
Army, 350, 350, 351351;; Hansen,
Hansen, "The "The Development
Development of of Soviet
Soviet
Tactical Air Defense," 533;
Tactical Air Defense," 533; Historical
Historical Evaluation
Evaluation and Research Or
and Research Or-.
ganization,
ganization, "The "The Middle
Middle EastEast War,"
War," 148,148, 177;
177; Drew
Drew Middleton,
Middleton, "Mis "Mis-.
siles
siles Blunt
Blunt Thrust
Thrust of of Traditional
Traditional Tank-Plane
Tank-Plane Team," Team," New New York
York Times
Times,
17
17 October
October 1973, 1973, 19 19;; John
John Finney,
Finney, "New Missiles Are
"New Missiles Enabling In-
Are Enabling In-
fantry
fantry to to Counter
Counter Planes
Planes and and Tanks,"
Tanks," New New YorkYork Times,
Times, 22 November
November
1973, 19.
1973, 19.
20.
20. "Bekaa
"Bekaa Valley
Valley Combat,"
Combat," 1110; 1110; William
William Haddad,
Haddad, "Divided
"Divided Leb-Leb-
anon," Current History,
anon," Current January 1982,
History, January 1982, 35 35..
21
21.. "Anti-Aircraft
"Anti-Aircraft Defence Defence Force:
Force: TheThe PLOPLO in in Lebanon,"
Lebanon," Born Born it in
Battle, no.
Battle, no. 27,
27, 7, 32
7, 32..
22.
22. R. R. D D.. M.
M. Furlong,
Furlong, "Israel
"Israel Lashes
Lashes Out,"
Out," Interavia,
Interavia, August
August 1982,
1982,
1002,
1002, 1003 1003;; Clarence
Clarence Robinson,
Robinson, Jr., Jr., "Surveillance
"Surveillance Integration
Integration Pivotal
Pivotal
in
in Israeli
Israeli Successes,"
Successes," Aviation
Aviation Week,
Week, 55 July
July 1982,
1982, 17 17;; Edgar
Edgar Ulsamer,
Ulsamer,
"In
"In Focus:
Focus: TAC TAC Air Air Feels
Feels the
the Squeeze,"
Squeeze," Air Air Force
Force Magazine,
Magazine, October
October
1982, 23; Anthony Cordesman, "The Sixth Arab-Israeli Conflict,"
1982, 23; Anthony Cordesman, "The Sixth Arab-Israeli Conflict,"
171
171
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
Armed
Armed ForcesForces Journal
Journal International,
International, August
August 1982,.
1982, 30.30. The
The IAFlAF maymay
have
have destroyed
destroyed as as many
many as as 108
108 Syrian
Syrian aircraft.
aircraft. "Syrian
"Syrian Resupply,"
Resupply,"
Aerospace Daily, 15 November 1982, 74 .
Aerospace Daily, 15 November 1982, 74.
23. Furlong,
23. Furlong, "Israel
"Israel Lashes
Lashes Out,"
Out," 1002,
1002, 1003
1003;; Robinson,
Robinson, "Surveil-
"Surveil-
lance Integration Pivotal in Israeli Successes," 17 ; Ulsamer, "In Focus
lance Integration Pivotal in Israeli Successes," 17; Ulsamer, "In Focus::
TAC
TAC Air Air Feels
Feels the
the Squeeze,"
Squeeze," 23 23;; Cordesman,
Cordesman, "The "The Sixth
Sixth Arab-Israeli
Arab-Israeli
Conflict," 30; "Bekaa Valley Combat," 1110; Drew Middleton, "So-
Conflict," 30; "Bekaa Valley Combat," 1110; Drew Middleton, "So-
viet
viet Arms
Arms Come
Come in in Second
Second in Lebanon," New
in Lebanon," New York York Times,
Times, 19 19 Sep-
Sep-
tember 1982, 2E; "Israeli Defense Forces in the Lebanon War," Born
tember 1982, 2E; "Israeli Defense Forces in the Lebanon War," Born
in
in Battle,
Battle, nono.. 30,
30, 22,
22, 45-47;
45-47; "The"The Syrians
Syrians in in Lebanon,"
Lebanon," no. no. 27,
27, 12,
12,
28, 31-33 ; "SA-9 Firings Seen Part of Attempt to Probe Israeli Ca-
28, 31-33; "SA-9 Firings Seen Part of Attempt to Probe Israeli Ca-
pabilities," Aerospace
pabilities," Aerospace Daily,
Daily, 88 November
November 1982, 1982, 45. 45.
24
24.. Eugene
Eugene Kozicharow,
Kozicharow, "Navy "Navy Blames
Blames Aircraft
Aircraft Loss Loss onon Soviet
Soviet Sen-
Sen-
sor Change," Aviation Week, 12 December 1983, 25-26 ; Richard Hal-
sor Change," Aviation Week, 12 December 1983, 25-26; Richard Hal-
loran,
loran, "Navy,
"Navy, Stung
Stung by by Criticism,
Criticism, Defends
Defends Cost Cost of of Bombing
Bombing Raid Raid inin
Lebanon," New York Times, 7 December 1983, 1, 19 ; Thomas Fried-
Lebanon," New York Times, 1 December 1983, 1,19; Thomas Fried-
man,
man, "US "US Ships
Ships Attack
Attack Syrian
Syrian Positions
Positions in in Beirut Region," New
Beirut Region," New York
York
Times, 14 December 1983, 1 .
Times, 14 December 1983, 1.
25
25.. "US
"US Demonstrates
Demonstrates AdvancedAdvanced Weapons
Weapons Technology
Technology in in Libya,"
Libya,"
Aviation Week, 21 April 1986, 19 ; Fred Hiatt, "Jet Believed Lost,
Aviation Week, 21 April 1986, 19; Fred Hiatt, "Jet Believed Lost, 55
Sites
Sites Damaged
Damaged in in Raid
Raid on Libya," Washington
on Libya," Washington Post, Post, 1616 April
April 1986,
1986,
A25
A25;; Anthony
Anthony Cordesman,
Cordesman, "After "After the Raid," Armed
the Raid," Armed Forces,
Forces, August
August
1986,
1986, 359.359.
26
26.. Cordesman,
Cordesman, "After "After thethe Raid,"
Raid," 358,
358, 360.
360.
27. Ibid., 355-60;
27. Ibid., 355-60; "US "US Airpower
Airpower Hits Back," Defence
Hits Back," Defence Update/73,
Update/73,
1986, 27-32
1986, 27-32;; Hiatt,
Hiatt, "Jet
"Jet Believed
BeUeved Lost,"
Lost," A25
A25;; "US
"US Demonstrates
Demonstrates Ad- Ad-
vanced Weapons Technology in Libya," 20, 21 ; David M. North, "Air
vanced Weapons Technology in Libya," 20, 21; David M. North, "Air
Force, Navy
Force, Navy Brief
Brief Congress
Congress on on Lessons
Lessons fromfrom Libya Strikes," Aviation
Libya Strikes," Aviation
Week, 2 June 1986, 63; Judith Miller, "Malta Says Libya Got Tip
Week, 2 June 1986, 63; Judith Miller, "Malta Says Libya Got Tip onon
Raid," New
Raid," New York
York Times,
Times, 66 August
August 1983,1983, 1,1, 8.
8.
28
28.. John Fricker, Battlefor
John Fricker, Battle for Pakistan
Pakistan:: TheThe Air
Air War
War of of 1965
1965 (London:
(London:
Allan,
Allan, 1979),
1979), 122,
122, 124,
124, 183,
183, 184.
184. Slightly
Slightly different
different claims
claims can
can be
be found
found
in Nordeen, Air
in Nordeen, Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 113 113..
29.. John
29 John Fricker,
Fricker, "Post-Mortem
"Post-Mortem of an Air
of an War," Air
Air War," Air Enthusiast,
Enthusiast,
May 1972,
May 1972, 230,
230, 232; Nordeen, Air
232; Nordeen, Air Warfare
Warfare in in the
the Missile
Missile Age,
Age, 103-4;
103-4;
Borgart, "Vulnerability, Part 3," 1066 ; Pushpindar Chopra, "Journal
Borgart, "Vulnerability, Part 3," 1066; Pushpindar Chopra, "Journal
of
of anan Air
Air War,"
War," AirAir Enthusiast,
Enthusiast, April
April 1972,
1972, 177-83,
177-83, 206. 206.
30 . Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The Falklands Campaign:
30. Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The Falklands Campaign:
The
The Lessons
Lessons (London
(London:: Her Her Majesty's
Majesty's Stationery
Stationery Office,
Office, 1982),
1982), annex
annex
B
B [AUL-MU37324-18];
[AUL-MU37324-18]; Dov Dov Zakheim,
Zakheim, "The "The South
South Atlantic
Atlantic:: Evalu-
Evalu-
ating
ating thethe Lessons"
Lessons" (Paper
(Paper delivered
delivered at at Southern
Southern Methodist
Methodist University
University
(SMU)
(SMU) Conference
Conference on on The
The Three
Three Wars
Wars of of 1982
1982:: Lessons
Lessons to to be
be Learned,
Learned,
Dallas, Tex ., 15 April 1983), 29.
Dallas, Tex., 15 April 1983), 29.
172
172
RECENT EXPERIENCE
RECENT EXPERIENCE
31
31.. Jeffrey
Jeffrey Ethell
Ethell andand Alfred Price, Air
Alfred Price, Air WarWar South
South Atlantic
Atlantic (New(New
York:
York: Macmillan
Macmillan Publishing
Publishing Co., Co., Inc
Inc.,., 1983),
1983), 146.146.
32
32.. Ibid.,
Ibid., 180-81
180-81;; David
David Brown,
Brown, "Countermeasures
"Countermeasures Aided Aided British
British
Fleet," Aviation Week, 19 July 1982, 18 ; "British Government on Per-
Fleet"Aviation Week, 19 July 1982, 18; "British Government on Per-
formance
formance of of Roland,
Roland, Rapier
Rapier in in Falklands,"
Falklands," Aerospace
Aerospace Daily,
Daily, 27 27 Oc-
Oc-
tober 1982, 309 ; "British SAMs Credited with Most Kills in Falklands
tober 1982, 309; "British SAMs Credited with Most Kills in Falklands
Conflict,"
Conflict," Aerospace
Aerospace Daily,
Daily, 99 August
August 1982, 1982, 211211;; Sunday
Sunday Times
Times (Lon-
(Lon-
don) Insight Team, War in the Falklands (Cambridge, Mass. : Harper
don) Insight Team, War in the Falklands (Cambridge, Mass.: Harper
and
and RowRow Publishers,
Publishers, 1982),
1982), 201201;; Great
Great Britain,
Britain, Ministry
Ministry of of Defence,
Defence,
The
The Falklands
Falklands Campaign,
Campaign, 19, 19, annex
annex C C;; Derek
Derek WoodWood and and Mark
Mark Hewish,
Hewish,
"The
"The Falklands
Falklands Conflict,
Conflict, PartPart 11;; The
The AirAir War,"
War," International
International Defense
Defense
Review
Review 88 (1982)
(1982):: 978,
978, 980;
980; Brian
Brian Moore,
Moore, "The "The Falklands
Falklands War:
War: TheThe
Air Defense Role," Air Defense Artillery, Winter 1983, 19; "Blowpipe
Air Defense Role," Air Defense Artillery, Winter 1983, 19; "Blowpipe
Draws
Draws Commendation
Commendation for for Falklands
Falklands Performance,"
Performance," Aerospace
Aerospace Daily,
Daily,
12 August 1982, 239; David Griffiths, "Layered Air Defense Keyed
12 August 1982, 239; David Griffiths, "Layered Air Defense Keyed
British
British Falklands
Falklands Victory,"
Victory," Defense
Defense Week,Week, 30 30 August
August 1982,
1982, 13 13.. The
The
French claimed that nine Roland missiles downed four Harriers and
French claimed that nine Roland missiles downed four Harriers and
damaged
damaged another,
another, aa claim
claim fiercely
fiercely disputed
disputed by the British
by the British.. Interest-
Interest-
ingly,
ingly, the
the British
British had
had attempted
attempted to sell their
to sell their Rapier
Rapier missile
missile to to the
the
Argentines. "Euromissile on Performance of Roland in Falklands,
Argentines. "Euromissile on Performance of Roland in Falklands,
Middle
Middle East,"
East," Aerospace
Aerospace Daily,
Daily, 23 23 September
September 1982, 1982, 126;
126; "Exocet,
"Exocet,
Roland Combat Performance Rated High," Aviation Week, 1 Novem-
Roland Combat Performance Rated High," Aviation Week, 1 Novem-
ber
ber 1982, 26; Anthony
1982, 26; Anthony Cordesman,
Cordesman, "The "The Falklands
Falklands:: The The Air
Air War and
War and
Missile Conflict," Armed Forces Journal International, September
Missile Conflict," Armed Forces Journal International, September
1982,
1982, 40.40.
Roberts, "The
33. Brad Roberts,
33. Brad Military Implications
"The Military Implications ofthe of the Falklands/
Falklands/ Mal- Mal-
vinas
vinas Island
Island Conflict,"
Conflict," report
report no.no. 82-140F,
82-140F, Congressional
Congressional Research
Research
Service, Library of Congress, August 1982, 15 [AUL-M42953-1-U#82-
Service, Library of Congress, August 1982, 15 [AUL-M42953-1-U#82-
140fJ;
140fl; Cordesman,
Cordesman, "The "The Falklands,"
Falklands," 33, 33, 35 35;; Steward
Steward Menaul,
Menaul, "The "The
Falklands Campaign:: A
Falklands Campaign A War
War of Yesterday?"
of Yesterday?" Strategic
Strategic Review,
Review, Fall
Fall
1982,
1982, 87,87, 88; Wood and
88; Wood and Hewish,
Hewish, "Falklands
"Falklands Conflict,
Conflict, Part
Part 1,"1," 978;
978;
Ezio
Ezio Bonsignore,
Bonsignore, "Hard
"Hard Lessons
Lessons from from the the South
South Atlantic,"
Atlantic," Military
Military
Technology,
Technology, JuneJune 1982,
1982, 3232;; John
John Guilmartin,
Guilmartin, Jr., Jr., "The
"The South
South Atlantic
Atlantic
War: Lessons and
War: Lessons and Analytical Guideposts, A
Analytical Guideposts, A Military
Military Historian's
Historian's Per- Per-
spective," 17; SMU Conference, April 1983 ; Ethell and Price, Air War,
spective," 17; SMU Conference, April 1983; Ethell and Price, Air War,
120-21,
120-21,183, 183, 217-18
217-18;; Jesus
Jesus Romero
Romero Briasco
Briasco and and Salvador
Salvador Mafe
Mafe Huer-
Huer-
tas, Falklands: Witness ofBattles (Valencia, Spain : Domenech, 1985),
tas, Falklands: Witness of Battles (Valencia, Spain: Domenech, 1985),
172.
172.
34.. Guilmartin,
34 Guilmartin, "The "The South
South Atlantic
Atlantic War," War," 12; 12; Ethell and Price,
Ethell and Price,
Air
Air War,
War, 179.
179.
35.
35. II have
have relied
relied primarily
primarily on on the
the official
official British
British reports
reports for for the
the
statistics, Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Falklands Campaign,
statistics. Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Falklands Campaign,
annex
annex B. B. Also
Also see
see the
the figures,
figures, which
which vary
vary at at times
times from
from these
these numbers,
numbers.
17 3
173
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
in
in Wood
Wood and and Hewish,
Hewish, "Falklands
"Falklands Conflict,
Conflict, PartPart 1,"1," 980;
980; Moore,
Moore, "The"The
Falklands War,"
Falklands War," 21 Cordesman, "The
21;; Cordesman, "The Falklands,"
Falklands," 32 32;; Guilmartin,
Guilmartin,
"The
"The South
South Atlantic
Atlantic War,"
War," 17 17..
36.
36. Ethell
Ethell and Price, Air
and Price, Air War,
War, 207;
207; Briasco
Briasco and Huertas, Falklands,
and Huertas, Falklands,
165-68, 173 ; Rodney A. Burden et al., Falklands: The Air War
165-68, 173; Rodney A. Burden et al., Falklands: The Air War (Lon-
(Lon-
don:: Arms
don Arms andand Armour,
Armour, 1986),1986), 33-147.
33-147.
37. Derek Wood and Mark Hewish, "The
37. Derek Wood and Mark Hewish, "The Falklands
Falklands Conflict,
Conflict, Part
Part
2:
2: Missile Operations," International
Missile Operations," International DefenseDefense Review,Review, September
September
1982,
1982, 1151,
1151, 1154; ;
1154 Moore, "The Falklands
Moore, "The Falklands War,"
War," 20; Christopher Foss,
20; Christopher Foss,
"European
"European Tactical
Tactical Missile Systems," Armor,
Missile Systems," Armor, July-August
July-August 1975, 1975, 2424;;
Ethell
Ethell andand Price,
Price, Air Air War,
War, 196-208
196-208;; Briasco
Briasco and Huertas, Falklands,
and Huertas, Falklands,
165-69;
165-69; Terry
Terry Gander,
Gander, "Maintaining
"Maintaining the the Effectiveness
Effectiveness of of Blowpipe
Blowpipe
SAM," Jane's
SAM," Jane's Defence
Defence Review
Review 4, 4, no.
no. 22 (1983)
(1983):: 159.
159.
38 . Some accounts claim that Rapier's radar interfered
38. Some accounts claim that Rapier's radar interfered withwith the
the
Royal
Royal Navy's
Navy's radar.
radar. After
After all,
all, the
the British
British army
army did did notnot expect
expect toto fight
fight
alongside destroyers on the plains of central Europe! Others state that
alongside destroyers on the plains of central Europe! Others state that
the
the British
British sent
sent the
the army unit to
army unit to the
the Falklands
Falklands without
without radar,
radar, inin con-
con-
trast
trast toto the
the RAF
RAF regiment
regiment thatthat arrived
arrived later
later with
with Rapier
Rapier and
and radar.
radar.
Whatever
Whatever the the case,
case, the the initial
initial unit
unit that
that went
went ashore
ashore in in the
the campaign,
campaign,
and
and the
the only
only one
one that
that saw
saw action,
action, fired
fired optically
optically guided
guided missiles
missiles.. "UK
"UK
Planned to Use Shrike Missiles Against Argentine Radars," Aerospace
Planned to Use Shrike Missiles Against Argentine Radars," Aerospace
Daily,
Daily, 30 30 August
August 1982, 1982, 334;
334; "Air
"Air Defense
Defense Missiles
Missiles Limited
Limited Tactics
Tactics of of
Argentine Aircraft," Aviation Week, 19 July 1982, 21 ; Great Britain,
Argentine Aircraft," Aviation Week, 19 July 1982, 21; Great Britain,
Ministry
Ministry of Defence, The
of Defence, The Falklands
Falklands Campaign,
Campaign, 22; Wood and
11; Wood and Hewish,
Hewish,
"The Falklands Conflict, Part 2," 1153 ; Moore, "The Falklands War,"
"The Falklands Conflict, Part 2," 1153; Moore, "The Falklands War,"
19;
19; Ethell
and Price, Air War,
War, 196-208;
196-208; Briasco
Briasco and Huertas, Falk-
and Huertas, Falk-
lands, 165-69 ; Jacques du Boucher, "Missiles in the Falklands," Af-
lands, 165-69; Jacques du Boucher, "Missiles in the Falklands," Af-
rican
rican Defence,
Defence, October
October 1983,1983, 60.60.
39.
39. John
John Laffin,
Laffin, Fight
Fight for
for the
the Falklands
Falklands (New (New York:York: StSt.. Martin's
Martin's
Press, 1982), 92, 93; Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The Falklands
Press, 1982), 92,93; Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The Falklands
Campaign,
Campaign, 9, 9, annex
annex B; B; Wood
Wood and and Hewish,
Hewish, "The "The Falklands
Falklands Conflict,
Conflict,
Part
Part 2,"
2," 1151,
1151, 1154;
1154; Ethell
and Price, Air War,
War, 196-208
196-208;; Briasco
Briasco andand
Huertas, Falklands,
Huertas, Falklands, 165-69.
165-69.
40.
40. Cordesman,
Falklands," 38; 38; Great
Great Britain,
Britain, Ministry
Ministry of of
Defence, The
Defence, The Falklands
Falklands Campaign,
Campaign, annex annex B; B; Insight Team, War
Insight Team, War inin the
the
Falklands, 216; Ethell and Price, Air War, 196-208 ; Briasco and
Falklands, 216; Ethell and Price, Air War, 196-208; Briasco and Huer-
Huer-
tas, Falklands,
tas, 165-69; Roger
Falklands, 165-69; Roger Villar,
ViUar, "The"The Sea Sea Wolf
Wolf Story-GW
Story—GW S25 S25
to VM40," Jane's Defence
to VM40," Jane's Defence Review
Review 2,
2, no.
no. 1
1 (1981)
(1981): : 75.
75.
41
41.. Cordesman,
Falklands," 34 34;; Alistair
Alistair Horne,
Home, "A "A British
British
Historian's
Historian's Meditations:
Meditations: LessonsLessons of of the Falklands," National
the Falklands," National Review,
Review,
23 July 1982, 888.
23 July 1982, 888.
42.
42. Anthony
Anthony Cordesman,
Cordesman, "Lessons"Lessons of of the
the Iran-Iraq
Iran-Iraq War: War: Part
Part II,
II,
Tactics, Technology, and Training," Armed Forces Journal Interna-
Tactics, Technology, and Training," Armed Forces Journal Interna-
17
1744
RECENT
RECENT EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE
tional,
tional, June
June 1982,
1982, 70,
70, 78,
78, 79;
79; "The
"The Iranian
Iranian Air
Air Force
Force at War," Bor)
at War," Bom
in
in Battle, no.. 24,
Battle, no 24, 13;
13; "The
"The Iraq-Iran War," Defence
Iraq-Iran War," Defence Update,
Update, no.
no. 4,
44
(1984)
(1984)::43-44; Nordeen, Air
43-44; Nordeen, Air Warfare
Warfare in
in the
the Missile Age, 185-88
Missile Age, 185-88;; Rol,
Role
ofAir
of Air Power
Power inin the
the Iran-Iraq
Iran-Iraq War.
War.
43.
43. Stephen Harding, Air
Stephen Harding, Air War
War Grenada
Grenada (Missoula,
(Missoula, Mont.:
Mont.: Pictoria
Pictorial
Histories,
Histories, 1984),
1984), 9, 9, 33,
33, 36,
36, 51
51;; stated
stated in
in Thomas
Thomas D. D. Des
Des Brisay,
Brisay, "The
"The
Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident,"
Incident," in Air War-Vietnam
in^/> War—Vietnam (Indianapolis,
(Indianapolis, Ind.:
Ind.: Bobbs
Bobbs-
Merrill
Merrill Co.,
Co., Inc
Inc.,., 1978),
1978), 326.
326.
44.
44. Jean
Jean de de Galard,
Galard, "French
"French Jaguar
Jaguar Shot
Shot Down
Down in Chad," Jane'
in Chad," Jane's
Defence
Defence Weekly
Weekly 1,1, no.no. 44 (4
(4 February
February 1984):
1984): 142;
142; Charles
Charles Mohr,
Mohr, "Con
"Con-
tras
tras Say
Say They
They Fear
Fear aa Long War," New
Long War," New York
York Times,
Times, 16 16 June
June 1986,
1986, 88;
Pico
Pico Iyer,
Iyer, "Sudan
"Sudan:: Stranded
Stranded Amid Amid the Time, 11 Septembe
Gunfire," Time,
the Gunfire," September:
1986, 34; William Claiborne, "S. African Military Says Intervention
1986, 34; William Claiborne, "S. African Military Says Intervention
in
in Angola
Angola Staved
Staved Off Off Rebel Defeat," Washington
Rebel Defeat," Washington Post,
Post, 1313 Novembe:
November
1987, A28.
1987, A28.
45.
45. John
John H.H. Cushman,
Cushman, Jr., Jr., "The
"The Stinger
Stinger Missile:
Missile: Helping
Helping to to Chang(
Change
the
the Course
Course of War," New
of aa War," New YorkYork Times,
Times, 17 17 January
January 1988,1988, E2E2;; Ra`
Ray
Barnes, ed., The U.S. War Machine (New York: Crown Publishers
Barnes, ed.. The U.S. War Machine (New York: Crown Publishers,
1978),
1978), 234-35
234-35;; Maurice
Maurice Robertson,
Robertson, "Stinger
"Stinger:: Proven
Proven Plane
Plane Killer,'
Killer,"
International Combat Arms, July 1985 ; General Dynamics, The
International Combat Arms, July 1985; General Dynamics, The
World's
World's Missile
Missile Systems
Systems (Pomona,
(Pomona, Calif.
Calif.:: General
General Dynamics,
Dynamics, 1982).1982).
46. "Soviets Press Countermeasures to Stinger Missile," Aerospacc
46. "Soviets Press Countermeasures to Stinger Missile," Aerospace
Daily,
Daily, 66 August
August 1987,1987, 205205;; "Disjointed
"Disjointed Rebels
Rebels Join
Join Forces
Forces as as The3
They
Oust Their Enemy," Insight, 25 January 1988, 21 ; Anthony Cordes.
Oust Their Enemy," Insight, 25 January 1988, 21; Anthony Cordes-
man,
man, "The"The Afghan
Afghan Chronology
Chronology:: Another
Another Brutal
Brutal Year
Year of of Conflict,"
Conflict,"
Armed Forces,
Armed Forces, April
April 1987,1987, 156-60.
156-60.
47. Cordesman,
47. Cordesman, "Afghan "Afghan Chronology,"
Chronology," 158-60;
158-60; Cushman,
Cushman, E2 E2;; Rone
Rone
Tempest,
Tempest, "Afghan
"Afghan RebelRebel Rockets
Rockets JarJar Government Assembly," Wash-
Government Assembly," Wash-
ington
ington Post,
Post, 30
30 November
November 1987, 1987, A24
A24;; John
John Kifner,
Kifner, "Moscow
"Moscow Is Is Seen
Seen
at
at Turning
Turning Point
Point in in Its
Its Intervention
Intervention in Afghanistan," New
in Afghanistan," New YorkYork Times.
Times,
29
29 November
November 1987,1987, 11;; Peter
Peter Youngsband,
Youngsband, "Grappling
"Grappling for for the
the Advan-
Advan-
tage
tage When
When TalkTalk Replaces Gunfire," Insight,
Replaces Gunfire," Insight, 77 December
December 1987, 1987, 43;
43;
Robert Schultheis, "The Mujahedin Press Hard," Time, 18 May 1987,
Robert Schultheis, "The Mujahedin Press Hard," Time, 18 May 1987,
51;; Steven
51 Steven R. R. Weisman,
Weisman, "U "U.S..S. in
in Crossfire
Crossfire ofof Border War," New
Border War," New York
York
Times,
Times, 17 17 May
May 1987,
1987, E3 E3..
17
1755
CHAPTER
CHAPTER 55
SUMMARY,
SUMMARY, TRENDS,
TRENDS, AND
AND CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Ground-based
Ground-based air air defenses
defenses have
have been
been aa problem
problem for
for air-
air-
men
men from
from the
the onset
onset of
of manned
manned flight.
flight. Although
Although seldom
seldom able
able
to
to stop
stop air
air power,
power, air
air defenses
defenses have
have made
made airair operations
operations
both
both costly
costly and
and dangerous.
dangerous. For For just
just as
as aircraft
aircraft have
have become
become
more
more capable
capable so
so have
have air air defenses.
defenses. This
This extended
extended offensive
offensive
versus
versus defensive
defensive battle
battle shows
shows no
no sign
sign of
of lessening,
lessening, in
in fact,
fact,
every
every sign
sign points
points to
to itit becoming
becoming more
more complex
complex andand costly
costly
as it continues.
as it continues.
Summary
Summary
Airmen
Airmen have have hadhad to to contend
contend withwith ground-based
ground-based air air de-
de-
fense
fense since
since itit downed
downed its its first
first aircraft
aircraft in
in 1912
1912.. In
In every
every war
war
except
except World
World War War I,I, more
more American
American aircraft
aircraft have
have been
been lost
lost
to
to antiaircraft
artillery than
than to fighters; nevertheless,
to fighters; nevertheless, air-to-
air-to-
air
air combat
combat has has dominated
dominated the the public's
public's mind.
mind. TheThe military
military
has
has suffered
suffered aa similarly
similarly mistaken
mistaken and and romantic
romantic attitude
attitude
regarding
regarding the the relative
relative merits
merits of of hostile
hostile flak
flak and fighters .
and fighters.
Probably
Probably this this attitude
attitude denigrating
denigrating AAA AAA and and the
the defense
defense
(the
(the idea that the
idea that the bomber
bomber would
would always
always get
get through)
through) peaked
peaked
in
in the
the 1930s
1930s andand 1940s
1940s.. During
During thethe early
early years
years ofof World
World
War
War 11,II, the
the offense
offense diddid have
have thethe advantage
advantage and and flak
flak was
was
ineffective
ineffective.. But aviation advanced
But aviation advanced modestly
modestly between
between 19351935
and 1945
and 1945.. (For
(For example,
example, the the B-17,
B-17, which
which first
first flew
flew in
in 1935,
1935,
was
was still
still frontline
frontline equipment
equipment in in 1945,
1945, asas were
were such
such fighters
fighters
as
as the
the Me-109
Me-109 and and Spitfire,
Spitfire, which
which first
first flew
flew in
in 1935
1935 and
and
1936
1936.).) These
These aircraft,
aircraft, andand others
others like
like them,
them, areare more
more rep-rep-
resentative
resentative of of air
air combat
combat in in World
World WarWar II II than
than the
the better
better
177
177
ARCHIE,
ARCHIE, FLAK,
FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
performing,
performing, and and perhaps
perhaps betterbetter remembered,
remembered, B-29s B-29s and and
Me-262s .
Me-262s.
In
In contrast,
contrast, the the defense
defense made made great
great strides
strides during
during the the
war.
war. Flak
Flak grew
grew from
from an an ineffective
ineffective nuisance
nuisance weapon
weapon into into aa
potent force
potent force byby 1944
1944.. Although
Although AAA AAA could
could not not stop
stop deter-
deter-
mined airmen,
mined airmen, it it could
could inflict
inflict heavy
heavy losses
losses on on the flyers,
the flyers,
disrupt
disrupt accuracy,
accuracy, andand in in general
general make
make airair operations
operations much much
more expensive. The notable antiaircraft successes, such as
more expensive. The notable antiaircraft successes, such as
British guns
British guns in in the
the V-1
V-1 campaign,
campaign, GermanGerman flak flak defense
defense of of
the
the oiloil targets,
targets, andand American
American defensedefense of of thethe Remagen
Remagen
Bridge,
Bridge, clearly
clearly support
support this this point
point.. Compared
Compared to to aircraft,
aircraft,
flak proved
flak proved inexpensive
inexpensive and and very
very cost-effective
cost-effective..
The two major technical advances responsible
The two major technical advances responsible for for this
this
improvement
improvement and success were
and success were radar
radar and
and proximity
proximity fuzes fuzes..
Radar stripped
Radar stripped the the cloak
cloak of of surprise
surprise and and invisibility
invisibility from from
aircraft.
aircraft. It It provided
provided detection
detection and and warning
warning of of attacking
attacking airair-
craft,
craft, allowed
allowed control
control of defensive fighters,
of defensive fighters, and permitted
and permitted
more
more accurate
accurate all-weather,
all-weather, day/night
day/night firing
firing of of thethe guns.
guns.
Other
Other devices
devices increased
increased the the lethality
lethality of of flak,
flak, none
none moremore so so
than
than proximity
proximity fuzes.
fuzes.
As
As aa result, airmen learned
result, airmen learned thatthat AAA
AAA constituted
constituted aa dan- dan-
gerous
gerous andand powerful
powerful force.
force. World
World War War II II also
also proved
proved that that
low-level
low-level operations
operations in in the
the face
face ofof flak were costly
flak were costly because
because
guns
guns were
were increasingly
increasingly effective
effective at at lower
lower altitudes
altitudes.. Strafing
Strafing
fighters
fighters were
were particularly
particularly vulnerable.
vulnerable. Another
Another air air defense
defense
difficulty involved
difficulty correctly identifying
involved correctly identifying friend
friend and and foefoe:: ide-
ide-
ally, not engaging
ally, not engaging the the former
former and always engaging
and always engaging the the latter.
latter.
Experience
Experience showedshowed numerous
numerous instances,
instances, however,
however, of of friends
friends
downed
downed by by "friendly"
"friendly" fire fire and
and gunners
gunners letting
letting foes
foes slip
slip by.
by.
To
To counter
counter ground
ground fire,fire, the
the airmen
airmen adopted
adopted tactics
tactics thatthat
would
would be be used
used again
again andand again
again inin subsequent
subsequent air air wars.
wars. Be-Be-
sides
sides avoiding
avoiding flakflak areas,
areas, thethe flyers
flyers used
used surprise,
surprise, the the sun,
sun,
the
the terrain,
terrain, andand one-pass
one-pass attacks.
attacks. TheyThey also
also employed
employed ECM, ECM,
specifically
specifically chaff
chaff and
and jammers.
jammers. Finally,
Finally, the
the airmen
airmen attacked
attacked
their
their tormentors
tormentors;; but but direct
direct action
action seldom
seldom proved
proved effective,
effective,
although
although usually
usually expensive.
expensive. The The trade-off
trade-off of of cheap
cheap guns guns
178
178
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
versus
versus valuable
valuable aircraft
aircraft mademade direct
direct attack
attack aa high-risk
high-risk and and
low-return
low-return proposition
proposition..
So,
So, during
during the the course
course of of World
World War War II, II, the
the balance
balance bebe-
tween
tween airair offense
offense and and air air defense
defense tilted
tilted toward
toward the the defense
defense..
But
But events
events in in the
the last
last stages
stages ofof the war obscured
the war obscured thesethese facts.
facts.
The
The introduction
introduction of of jets
jets radically
radically improved
improved aircraft
aircraft per-
per-
formance, just
formance, just asas the
the atomic
atomic bombbomb enormously
enormously expanded
expanded
firepower. Therefore,
firepower. Therefore, both both the
the public
public andand military
military saw
saw the the
offensive
offensive as as again
again supreme.
supreme.
But
But the
the combatants
combatants used used only
only the the jet,
jet, not
not thethe atomic
atomic
bomb,
bomb, in in America's
America's next next war,
war, Korea,
Korea, which
which was was different
different
from
from World
and the the wars
wars that that thethe prophets
prophets and and
theorists
theorists hadhad forecast
forecast.. "Peasant
"Peasant hordes"hordes" stalemated
stalemated the the
strongest
strongest nation
nation in in the
the world
world on on thethe periphery
periphery of of Asia
Asia.. With
With
the
the exception
exception of of the
the MiG-15,
MiG-15, the the Communists
Communists used used onlyonly
limited
limited numbers
numbers of obsolete equipment
of obsolete equipment to to thwart
thwart andand im- im-
pose
pose considerable
considerable losses losses on on the
the Allied
Allied airmen.
airmen. Air Air power
power
was
was notnot decisive
decisive in in the
the war.
war. At At thethe same
same time,
time, the
the warwar
reemphasized
reemphasized many many of of the
the basic
basic AAAAAA lessons
lessons from
from World
World
War
War II-the
II—the lethality
lethality of of flak,
flak, thethe danger
danger of of low-altitude
low-altitude
operations,
operations, and and thethe usefulness
usefulness of of antiflak
antiflak countermeasures
countermeasures..
In
In many
many respects,
respects, the the Vietnam
Vietnam War War repeated
repeated the the same
same
pattern.
pattem. Again,
Again, American
American airmen airmen were were unprepared
unprepared for for the
the
reality
reality of combat and
of combat and especially
especially their
their chief
chief opponent,
opponent, AAA. AAA.
Again,
Again, the the lessons
lessons of of World
and Korea
Korea hadhad to to bebe
relearned
releamed.. Again,
Again, the the air air power
power of of the
the strongest
strongest nation
nation in in
the
the world
world proved
proved indecisive
indecisive against
against AsianAsian peasants
peasants armed
armed
with
with simple
simple weapons
weapons..
The
The one
one new
new air air defense
defense weaponweapon introduced
introduced into into combat
combat
in
in Vietnam
Vietnam was was the
the surface-to-air
surface-to-air missile
missile (SAM).
(SAM). Although
Although
these
these missiles
missiles claimed
claimed relatively
relatively few few aircraft,
aircraft, they
they made
made air air
operations
operations more more difficult
difficult and and expensive
expensive.. American
American tactics
tactics
and
and equipment
equipment overcameovercame the the SAMS,
SAMs, but the missiles
but the missiles forced
forced
the
the airmen
airmen to to increase
increase the the number
number of of support
support aircraft
aircraft andand
operate
operate at at low
low altitudes
altitudes where where AAA AAA proved
proved deadly.
deadly.
American
American airmen airmen learned
learned to to cope
cope withwith thethe ground-based
ground-based
defenses
defenses.. They
They used used electronic
countermeasures (ECM), (ECM), anan-
179
179
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,
AAA, SAM
SAM
missiles (ARMS),
tiradiation missiles
tiradiation (ARMs), and and standoff
standoff weapons weapons that that
showed the
showed the impact
impact of of technology
technology on on modern
modern combat combat.. Line-
Line-
backer
backer II clearly demonstrated
II clearly demonstrated that modest numbers
that modest numbers (com-(com-
pared
pared to to World
World War War II II or current Soviet
or current Soviet inventories)
inventories) of of
second-rate air
second-rate air defense equipment could
defense equipment could not not stop
stop large-scale
large-scale
air
air efforts
efforts by major power
by aa major power but but could
could inflict
inflict both
both aa burden
burden
and loss
and loss onon the attacker..
the attacker
Shortly after
Shortly after the Americans closed
the Americans closed outout their
their involvement
involvement
in the Vietnam
in the Vietnam War, War, airair operations
operations in in the Middle East
the Middle East
seemed
seemed to indicate the
to indicate the predominance
predominance of of the defense.. For
the defense For
unlike the
unlike the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
1967 Arab-Israeli War in in which
which the Israeli Air
the Israeli Air
Force
Force was was overwhelmingly
overwhelmingly supreme supreme and triumphant, the
and triumphant, the
1973
1973 war indicated the
war indicated renewed power
the renewed power of of the
the defense
defense..
The Arabs violated
The Arabs violated the basic rules
the basic rules of of war
war by by attacking
attacking aa
country
country with superior military
with superior forces while
military forces while lacking
lacking airair su-
su-
periority. They advanced
periority. They advanced under dense umbrella
under aa dense umbrella of of SAMs
SAMs
and guns, and
and guns, and they downed many
they downed Israeli Air
many Israeli Force aircraft.
Air Force aircraft.
Although
Although the Israelis won
the Israelis won thethe war, they suffered
war, they suffered heavyheavy air-
air-
craft losses
craft losses andand their air force
their air force was
was unable
unable to to influence
influence op-op-
erations as
erations as itit had
had in 1967.. Ground-based
in 1967 Ground-based air air defenses
defenses
seemed
seemed to to have
have regained
regained the the edge
edge..
Operations
Operations in 1982 between
in 1982 between the the Arabs
Arabs and and Israelis
Israelis cast
cast
doubt
doubt on on these
these findings
findings.. In short and
In aa short and sharp
sharp action,
action, the
the
Israeli Air
Israeli Air Force
Force won won anan air battle against
air battle against Syrian
Syrian MiGs MiGs andand
SAMs, aa battle
SAMs, battle about
about as lopsided as
as lopsided as their
their 1967 victory..
1967 victory
few months
A few
A months earlier,
earlier, on
on the other side
the other side ofof the
the world,
world, the
the
lessons
lessons of of another
another conflict
conflict were less clear.
were less clear. In In the
the Falklands,
Falklands,
aa small force from
small force from aa Western power defeated
Western power defeated aa largerlarger force
force
from third world
from aa third world country.
country. However,
However, the the Argentine
Argentine Air Air
Force
Force battered
battered the the Royal
Royal Navy despite the
Navy despite the restrictions
restrictions of of
range,
range, old aircraft, old
old aircraft, old bombs,
bombs, and and lack
lack of of ECM.
ECM. Although
Although
the British
the British air defense imposed
air defense imposed heavyheavy losses
losses on on the attack-
the attack-
ers, the
ers, the Argentines
Argentines did get through
did get through to to severely punish the
severely punish the
defenders
defenders..
18
1800
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
Trends
Trends (Speculations)
(Speculations)
What does all
What does this mean?
all this mean? What What are are the
the lessons
lessons of of the
the past
past
and
and what
what do do they
they telltell us
us about
about the the future?
future? Just Just asas inin weather
weather
forecasting,
forecasting, itit is is probably
probably aa safe safe bet
bet toto expect
expect more more of of the
the
same
same (and
(and alsoalso to to expect
expect some some unpleasant
unpleasant surprises).
surprises). It It
seems
seems that
that wewe can can expect
expect to to see
see more
more capable
capable air air defense
defense
systems
systems fielded
fielded in in the
the future.
future. The capabilities of
The capabilities of missiles
missiles
on
on the
the drawing
drawing boardsboards indicate
indicate that that they
they will
will become
become harderharder
to
to jam,
jam, more
more difficult
difficult to to evade,
evade, and and more
more effective
effective against
against
many
many moremore attackers.
attackers. The The key key to to advancements
advancements in in air
air de-
de-
fense appears
fense appears to to bebe inin the area of
the area of electronics.
electronics. The devices
The devices
will
will become
become more more complex
complex as as they
they become
become more more capable.
capable.
Sensors
Sensors will
will improve,
improve, and and thethe almost total reliance
almost total reliance on on radar
radar
will end. Different
will end. Different types types of sensors will
of sensors will bebe tied
tied together
together and and
will
will give
give more
more data more quickly
data more quickly to the air
to the air defenders.
defenders. All All
of
of this
this will
will be
be much
much more expensive in
more expensive terms of
in terms of dollars
dollars andand
trained
trained manpower.
manpower.
A
A second
second expectation
expectation is is that
that effective
effective air air defense
defense weapons
weapons
will
will spread
spread in in numbers
numbers and and geography.
geography. We We can can expect
expect mostmost
countries
countries to to equip
equip theirtheir forces with missiles,
forces with missiles, and and sometimes
sometimes
we will
we will see
see our
our own own weapons
weapons used used against
against us us.. In
In addition,
addition,
man-portable
man-portable SAMS SAMs will will give
give antiaircraft
antiaircraft protection
protection to to
guerrilla
guerrilla groups
groups and will give
and will give terrorists
terrorists aa potent
potent weapon.
weapon.
Although
Although costs costs of of all
all weapons
weapons will will dramatically
dramatically increase increase
throughout
throughout the the coming
coming years,
years, air defense will
air defense will retain
retain its its cost
cost
advantage
advantage over over similarly
similarly modern aircraft. AAA
modern aircraft. AAA always
always has has
been
been cheaper
cheaper than than aircraft,
aircraft, and and there
there is is no
no indication
indication that that
this
this relative
relative costcost imbalance
imbalance will will change.
change.
Future
Future military
military conflicts
conflicts may may be be decided
decided not not so so much
much on on
the combat performance of weapons (that is their proba-
the combat performance of weapons (that is their proba-
bility
bility ofof kill,
kill, time
time of of flight,
flight, lethal
lethal radius,
radius, launch
launch envelope,
envelope,
ECM,
ECM, and and electronic
electronic counter-countermeasures-ECCM)
counter-countermeasures—ECCM)
but
but onon other
other factors.
factors. These
These will will include
include nontechnical
nontechnical fac- fac-
tors-numbers
tors—numbers of of weapons
weapons in in the
the field
field andand in in the
the supply
supply
depots
depots as as well
well as as maintainability
maintainability and and reliability-and
reliability—and hu- hu-
man
man factors-training,
factors—training, adaptability,
adaptability, and and motivation
motivation..
1811
18
ARCHIE, FLAK,
ARCHIE, AAA, SAM
FLAK, AAA, SAM
What are
What are thethe big payoff areas
big payoff areas in
in the
the future?
future? Improved
Improved
ECM
ECM will
will bebe useful
useful but increasingly difficult
but increasingly difficult because
because of of the
the
introduction
introduction of of multisensors
multisensors on on aa large scale and
large scale and ECCM.
ECCM.
Most
Most ofof all, the airmen
all, the airmen needneed capable and versatile
capable and versatile standoff
standoff
weapons
weapons:: the the attacker
attacker must
must get away from
get away from the
the defenders.
defenders.
These
These weapons
weapons offer offer the advantages of
the advantages of increased
increased accuracy
accuracy
(thereby
(thereby requiring
requiring fewer
fewer sorties) and increased
sorties) and increased reach
reach (per-
(per-
mitting less risk
mitting less risk to
to the
the airmen)
airmen).. The air defenders
The air defenders also also need
need
more
more ECM
ECM and ECCM.. The
and ECCM The big
big area of opportunity
area of opportunity is is in
in
the field
the field of
of multiple
multiple sensors.
sensors. Both
Both the friendly air
the friendly air defenders
defenders
and
and their airmen partners
their airmen partners would
would greatly benefit from
greatly benefit from the the
introduction
introduction of of effective identification equipment.
effective identification equipment. Until Until
the
the problem
problem of of rapidly
rapidly and and accurately
accurately sorting out friends
sorting out friends
from
from foes
foes is is solved,
solved, the effectiveness of
the effectiveness of both
both thethe offense
offense
and
and defense
defense will will be
be greatly reduced . In
greatly reduced. In short, the area
short, the area that
that
needs
needs toto bebe exploited
exploited is is electronics Advances in
electronics.. Advances in civilian
civilian
technology indicate
technology indicate that
that much
much can
can bebe expected
expected fromfrom elec-
elec-
tronics: less
tronics: less expensive, smaller, and
expensive, smaller, and more
more capable
capable equip-
equip-
ment. Therefore,
ment. Therefore, the the future
future seems
seems toto belong
belong toto those
those whowho
can
can best use, not
best use, not just
just field, modern, high-cost,
field, modern, high-cost, high
high tech-
tech-
nology
nology in combat.. This
in combat This will
will decide
decide the outcome of
the outcome of wars
wars andand
the
the balance between the
balance between the offense and defense
offense and defense..
Conclusions
Conclusions
US Air
US Air Force
Force assumptions
assumptions aboutabout future
future conflicts
conflicts have
have
proved
proved toto be
be in
in error. Since 1945
error. Since 1945 the
the Air
Air Force
Force has
has geared
geared
itself for air-to-air
itself for air-to-air combat
combat andand aa nuclear exchange with
nuclear exchange with aa
major power.. Although
major power Although this
this is certainly America's
is certainly America's mostmost se-
se-
rious challenge, it
rious challenge, it has
has turned
turned outout to
to be
be the least likely
the least likely one
one..
For
For the
the reality of war
reality of war has
has proved
proved to to be far different.
be far different. Since
Since
World
World WarWar IIII the US Air
the US Air Force
Force hashas fought
fought in two wars
in two wars
against minor powers,
against minor powers, used
used conventional weapons, and
conventional weapons, and
found its chief
found its chief opposition
opposition toto be ground-based air
be ground-based air defense
defense
weapons . Not only did the nature of war prove different
weapons. Not only did the nature of war prove different
from
from the
the one anticipated, but
one anticipated, but the
the technology
technology tooktook aa turn
turn
182
182
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
away
away from
from thethe offense
offense to to favor
favor thethe defense
defense.. The The bigbig con-
con-
tributor
tributor toto this
this shift
shift in
in the
the balance
balance between
between the the offense
offense andand
defense
defense was was thethe emergence
emergence of of effective
effective surface-to-air
surface-to-air
missiles.
missiles.
The airmen
The airmen never
never appreciated
appreciated the the impact
impact of of ground-
ground-
based
based air
air defense
defense systems
systems untiluntil itit was
was tootoo late
late.. The
The USUS Air
Air
Force
Force used
used ECM,
ECM, direct
direct action,
action, and and tactics
tactics to to nullify
nullify the
the
defensive
defensive threat but, in
threat but, in so
so doing
doing andand in in relearning
relearning old old les-
les-
sons,
sons, suffered
suffered heavy
heavy losses.
losses. WhatWhat should
should be be emphasized
emphasized to to
all American military
all American military personnel,
personnel, especially
especially all all airmen,
airmen, is is
that
that since
since World
World War War II andand especially
especially since
since early
early 1944,
1944, USUS
airmen
airmen have
have lost
lost more
more aircraft
aircraft inin combat
combat to to ground-based
ground-based
air
air defense
defense systems
systems thanthan to to hostile
hostile aircraft
aircraft.. There
There is is no
no
indication
indication thatthat the
the future
future willwill be
be any different .
any different.
Prospects
Prospects seemseem toto favor
favor thethe air defender.. Proliferation
air defender Proliferation of of
potent
potent ground-based
defense systems throughout the
systems throughout the
world
world will
will continue
continue and and intensify.
intensify. In In addition,
addition, these these weap-
weap-
ons
ons will
will become
become more more effective
effective as the electronics
as the electronics revolution
revolution
makes
makes themthem smarter
smarter.. Aircraft
Aircraft weapons
weapons will will also
also improve
improve
but,
but, relative
relative to to aircraft,
aircraft, airair defense
defense systems
systems will will become
become
cheaper.. In
cheaper In brief,
brief, then,
then, thethe airman
airman will will face
face aa greater
greater quan-
quan-
titative
titative and
and qualitative
qualitative threat
threat inin the
the future
future..
American
American airmenairmen should
should realize
realize that
that increased
increased capabil-
capabil-
ities
ities of
of ground-based
defenses challenge
challenge them them in in two
two
important
important waysways.. The
The first
first and
and most
most obvious
obvious way way isis to
to make
make
their
their job
job more
more difficult
difficult and and dangerous,
dangerous, whetherwhether itit be be in
in aa
major
major conflict
conflict with
with aa major
major foe foe or
or in in aa minor
minor conflict
conflict with
with
aa minor
minor foe.
foe. The
The other
other aspect
aspect is is the
the impact
impact of of this
this air
air of-
of-
fense/defense
fense/defense balance
balance on on friendly
friendly powers,
powers, who who will
will un-
un-
doubtedly
doubtedly requestrequest US US assistance
assistance for for their
their air air force
force
problems .
problems.
This
This study
study indicates
indicates the the potential
potential pitfalls
pitfalls of of air
air defense
defense
systems
systems and and possible
possible solutions
solutions to to counter
counter these these systems
systems
from
from past
past and
and recent
recent experience.
experience. For For clearly,
clearly, ground-based
ground-based
air
air defense
defense weapons
weapons are are aa vital
vital issue
issue to to American
of
of today
today and
and tomorrow.
tomorrow. If If our
our airmen
airmen are are to to be
be successful,
successful,
they must
they must meet
meet andand master
master the the challenge
challenge of of these
these systems
systems..
183
183
INDEX
INDEX
Page
Page numbers
numbers in
in bold
bold indicate
indicate illustrations
illustrations..
A-1: 116
A-1:116 Spitfire:
Spitfire: 23, 49,177
23,49,177
A-4: 110, 138, 151, 160
A-4:110,138,151,160 Typhoon: 46, 49
l^phoon: 46,49
A-6 :100,123,148-49
A-6:100,123,148-49 Vampire:
Vampire: 150 150
A-7 :134,148
A-7:134,148 Vulcan:
Vulcan: 151, 152, 153,155
151,152,153,155
A-20: 55,56
A-20:55,56 Israel
Israel
A-37:116
A-37:116 Arava
Arava transport: 147
transport: 147
AAA.
AAA. SeeSee antiaircraft
artillery Soviet
Soviet Union
Union
AC-130:116
AC-130:116 An-12:150
An-12:150
Accuracy
Accuracy degraded
degraded An-22:166
An-22:166
German
German AirAir Force
Force Mi-8 : 145
Mi-8:145
Battle of Britain
Battle of Britain:: 55 MiG: 125
MiG: 125
Great
Great Britain,
Britain, 1941:
1941:43 43 MiG-15:179
MiG-15:179
United
United States
States Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces MiG-19
MiG-19:130 :130
1944-45: 43
1944^5:43 MiG-21: 85,
MiG-21:85,128,135,150,166
Korean
Korean WarWar:: 74
74 MiG-23:166
MiG-23:166
Leuna:
Leuna: 3131 Su-7: 146n
Su-7:146n
Acoustical devices: 22
Acoustical devices: United
United States
States
Afghan
Afghan War:
War: 165,165-67
165,165-67 A-1:116
A-1:116
Aircraft
Aircraft losses,
losses, Soviet
Soviet:: 166
166 A-4 :110,138,151,160
A-4:110,138,151,160
AGM-45. See Shrike
AGM-45. See Shrike A-6:100,123,
A-6:100,123,148-49 148-49
AGM-78.
AGM-78. SeeSee Standard
Standard A-7:134,148
A-7:134,148
Air
Air Corps
Corps Tactical
Tactical School
School:: 58,
58, 60
60 A-20
A-20:: 55,
55,5656
Aircraft
Aircraft A-37:116
A-37:116
Argentina
Argentina AC-130:116
AC-130:116
Pucara
Pucard:: 151, 154
151,154 B-17 :34,44,48,54,177
B-17:34,44,48,54,177
France
France B-24:29,34,47,54
B-24:29,34,47,54
Mirage:
Mu-age: 145, 151
145,151 B-25
B-25:: 50
50
Super Etendard :151
Super Etendard: 151 B-26:77,77
B-26:77,77
Germany
Germany B-29
B-29::54,56,178
54,56,178
FW 190 : 23
FW190: 23 B-52 : 101,116,120,121,120-
B-52:101,116,120,121,120-
Ju 88: 22
Ju88:22 25,133-35
25,133-35
Me
Me 109:177
109:177 B-66 :108
B-66:108
Me
Me 163:37
163: 37 Boeing 707:147
Boemg707:147
Me
Me 262: 178
262:178 C-47:
C-47: 23,
23,4747
Great Britain
Great Britain C-119: 78, 79
C-119:78,79
Canberra
Canberra:: 151,152
151,152 C-123:97,98
C-123: 97,98
Gazelle: 154
Gazelle: 154 C-130
C-130:150:150
Harrier
Harrier:: 153,153-55,159,173
153,153-55,159,173 CH-21
CH-21:97 :97
Hunter:
Hunter: 150
150 CH-53:113,147
CH-53:113,147
Scout:
Scout: 154
154 Choctaw:
Choctaw: 114 114
185
185
EA-6A:109
EA-6A: 109 Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft artillery
artillery
EA-6B:
EA-6B: 118,119,
118,119,149 149 Cost effectiveness:: 58
Cost effectiveness 58
EB-66: 109,108-9, 116,122
EB-66:109,108-9,116,122 Countermeasures,
Countermeasxires, World World War
War II:
II:
EC-135:147
EC-135:147 43-46
43-46
EF-10B:108
EF-lOB: 108 Direct attack
Direct attack
EF-111 : 149
EF-111:149 Vietnam: 109,111,118
Vietnam: 109, 111, 118
EKA-3B: 108
EKA-3B: 108 World
World WarWar II:II: 44-46
44-46
F-4:103,103,116-17,125,134
F-4:103,103,116-17,125,134 Impact during World War
Impact during World War II:
II: 58
58
F4U: 75,78
F4U: 75,78 Antiaircraft gun, improvisioned,
Antiaircraft gun, improvisioned.
F9F: 75
F9F:75 World War I:
World War 1:33
F-51:75, 75, 76n
F-51:75,75,76n Antiradiation missiles:
Antiradiation missiles: 118, 127,
118,127,
F-80: 76, 76
F-80:76,76 147,168,179
147,168,179
F-86 : 78,150
F-86:78,150 Shrike:: 110,110-11,111,123,
Shrike 110,110-11, 111, 123,
F-10OF:
F-IOOF: 109109 125,144,153
125,144,153
F-104:150
F-104:150 Standard:
Standard: 110-11,123,124,125
110-11,123,124,125
F-105 :100,101,109,111,118,
F-105:100,101,109, 111, 118, Wolf: 147
Wolf. 147
128
128 Antwerp, Belgium: 19-21,
Antwerp, Belgium: 50
19-21,50
F-111: 100,120,125,134
F-111:100,120,125,134 Ap
Ap Bac:
Bac: 9696
FB-111: 149
FB-111:149 Applied
Applied Physics
Physics Laboratory:
Laboratory: 87
87
H-34:114
H-34:114 AQM-34V:118
AQM-34V: 118
P-38 :29
P-38:29 Arab-Israeli
Arab-Israeli WarWar.. See
See Middle
Middle East
East
P-47 : 23, 44-45, 50, 76n
F-47:23,44-45,50,76n War
War
P-51 :23,49-50,76n
P-51:23,49-50,76n Arava transports: 147
Arava transports: 147
RB-57F:
RB-57F: 150 150 Argentina
Argentina
RF-4C: 104
RF-4C: 104 Aircraft
Aircraft
T-6: 80, 81
T-6:80,81 Pucara:151,154
Pucard: 151,154
U-2:105,130
U-2:105,130 Falkland
Falkland War:
War: 151-62,168,173,
151-62,168,173,
Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses 180
180
Allied
Allied to
to German
German antiaircraft
antiaircraft ARM.
ARM. SeeSee antiradiation
antiradiation missiles
missiles
artillery:
artillery: 42,
42, 45n
45n Arnheim,
Arnheun, Holland:
Holland: 57 57
United
United States
States Ascension
Ascension Island
Island:: 154
154
Korean
Korean WarWar:: 74-76,75n
74-76,75n Asch,
Asch, Belgium:
Belgiimi: 22-23
22-23
Vietnam War 97,112,118,
Vietnam War: : 97,112,118, Avranches:
Avranches: 22 22
125,135
125,135
World
World WarWar II II vs. Japan:: 54n
vs. Japan 54n B-17::34,44,48,54,177
B-17 34,44,48,54,177
Aircraft technology
Aircraft technology B-24:29,34,47,54
B-24: 29,34,47,54
Interwar
Interwar:: 33 B-25:50
B-25: 50
Air-to-air
Air-to-air combat
combat ratio:
ratio: kills/losses
kills/losses B-26:77,77
B-26: 77,77
Korean War: 129
Korean War: 129 B-29:54,56,178
B-29: 54,56,178
Vietnam War:
Vietnam War: 129129 B-52: 101, 116,120,121,120-25,
B-52:101,116,120,121,120-25,
World
World WarWar II:II: 129
129 133-35
133-35
ALE-38 :118
ALE-38:118 Linebacker
Linebacker IIII
ALQ-51:111
ALQ-51: 111 B-52D and B-52G
B-52D and B-52G:: 121,133
121,133
ALQ-71:
ALQ-71: 111 111 Electronic
Electronic countermeasures
coimtermeasures::
An-12 : 150
An-12:150 121-22
121-22
An-22:166
An-22:166 Losses
Losses:: 120-21
120-21
AN/ALE-38
AN/ALE-38:118 :118 B-66 :108
B-66:108
18
1866
Baldwin,
Baldwin, Stanley
Stanley (quote)
(quote):: 55 1942-43
1942-43:10:10
Barrel liners, removable: 2
Barrel liners, removable: 2 Battle
Battie of
of Britain:
Britain: 55
Battle
Battle of Britain: 55
of Britain: Falkland
Falkland War:
War: 153-57,159-61,
153-57,159-61,
Battle
Battle of
of the
the Bulge:
Bulge: 22
22 173
173
Beeson, Duane W.: 69
Beeson, Duane W.: 69 Malta:
Malta: 8-9
8-9
Bekaa
Bekaa Valley,
Valley, Lebanon:
Lebanon: 146-47
146-47 Tobruk: 7-8
Tobruk: 7-8
Bell
Bell Laboratories:
Laboratories: 82-83
82-83 V-1
V-1 campaign
campaign:: 17-19
17-19
Bendix Talos: 87
BendixTalos:87 Indian-Pakistani
Indian-Pakistani Wars:Wars: 150-51
150-51
Bloodhound
Bloodhound:: 89 89 Japan: 54
Japan: 54
Blowpipe : 151,153-56,156,166
Blowpipe: 151,153-56,156,166 Middle East
Middle East War
War
Falkland
FaUdand War War claims
claims:: 154-56
154-56 1956:137
1956:137
Boeing:
Boeing: 89 89 1967:138
1967:138
Boeing
Boeing 707:
707:147147 1967-70:138
1967-70:138
Bomarc:
Bomarc: 89, 89, 90, 91
90,91 1967-73:138-39
1967-73:138-39
Breech
Breech mechanisms,
mechanisms, automatic:
automatic: 22 1973 :145
1973:145
British Bomber Command: 50
British Bomber Command: 50 1982:146
1982:146
British
British women
women gunners:
guimers: 6,6,77 Soviet
Soviet Union
Union
Bumblebee project: 87
Biunblebee project: 87 World
World WarWar 11:H: 67
67
United
United States
States Army
Army
C-47:23,47
C-47:23,47 3
3 December
December 1944:22
1944:22
C-119:78,79
C-119:78,79 Avranches
Avranches:: 22 22
C-123:97,98
C-123:97,98 Battle
Battle of
of the
the Bulge:
Bulge: 2222
C-130 :150
C-130:150 Normandy:
Normandy: 21 21
Canberra: 151,152
Canberra: 151,152 Remagen:
Remagen: 23 23
Cape Canaveral, Florida:
Cape Canaveral, Florida: 91
91 World
World WarWar I: 1-2
1:1-2
Cape
Cape Gloucester,
Gloucester, Bismarck
Bismarck World
World War
War II:II: 23
23
Archipelago assault: 50
Archipelago assault: 50 United
United States
States Navy
Navy
Carpet : 43
Carpet: 43 5-inch:
5-iach: 52
52
CBU.
CBU. SeeSee cluster
cluster bomb
bomb unit
imit 20-mm:
20-mm: 51 51
CH-21
CH-21:97:97 40-mm:
40-mm: 52 52
CH-53:113,147
CH-53:113,147 Talos
Talos::136
136
Chaff
Chaff:: 43, 44,117-18,122-23,143,
43,44,117-18,122-23,143, Terrier:
Terrier: 136
136
147,178
147,178 World War 1:1-2
World War I:1-2
Cherbourg, France:
Cherbourg, France: 4646 World
World War
War II:II: 5-6, 8-10,17-19,
5-6,8-10,17-19,
Choctaw: 114
Choctaw: 114 21-23, 29-32, 51-52, 54, 67
21-23,29-32,51-52,54,67
Churchill,
Churchill, Winston
Winston (quote)
(quote):: 44 Cluster
Cluster bomb
bomb unit:
unit: 111,
111, 118
118
Claims
Claims Cologne: 29
Cologne: 29
Argentina
Argentina:: 153-54,173
153-54,173 Convair:
Convair: 87
87
Falkland War: 152-57,159-61,
Falkland War: 152-57,159-61, Crotale:149
Crotale: 149
173
173
Germany
Germany D-day:
D-day: 49
49
1940-41:27
194(M1: 27 Defense-offense resource
Defense-offense resource ratio,
ratio.
Leuna:
Leuna: 31 31 World War I: 1
World War 1:1
Ploesti:
Ploesti: 29-31
29-31 Dien
Dien Bien
Bien Phu
Phu
Vienna : 32
Vienna: 32 Aircraft losses,
Aircraft losses, French:
French: 96
96
Great
Great Britain
Britain Guns,
Guns, number
number ofof Communist:
Communist: 9696
1940-41:5-6
1940-41: 5-6
187
187
Impact
Impact of
of Vietminh
Vietminh antiaircraft
jintiaircraft Falkland
Falkland War:
War: 151-62,168,
151-62,168,173,173,
artillery: 95-96
artillery: 95-96 174,180
174,180
Director,
Director, gun
gun Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses
Great
Great Britain:
Britain: 77 Argentina:
Argentina: 154-55
154-55
Doolittle, James: 50
Doolittle, James: 50 Great Britain: 153-54
Great Britain: 153-54
Douglas:
Douglas: 8383 Argentine
Argentine Air Force, impact
Air Force, impact ofof::
Douhet, Giulio : 4,58
Douhet, Giulio: 4,58 154
154
Claims
Claims
EA-6A:109
EA-6A: 109 Argentina
Argentina:: 153-54,156,173
153-54,156,173
EA-6B:118,119,
EA-6B: 118,119,149149 Great Britain: 155-57,
Great Britain: 159-61
155-57,159-61
EB-66:109,108-9,116,122
EB-66:109,108-9,116,122 Dud
Dud bombs:
bombs: 154 154
EC-135:147
EC-135:147 Electronic
Electronic countermeasures:
countermeasures:
ECM.
ECM. SeeSee electronic
electronic 153-55,168,180
153-55,168,180
countermeasures
countermeasures Great
Great Britain
Britain
EF-10B:108
EF-lOB: 108 Claims : 154-57,159-61
Claims: 154-57,159-61
EF-111:149
EF-111:149 Improvisations:
Improvisations: 155 155
EKA-3B:108
EKA-3B: 108 FB-111:
FB-111:149 149
Electronic coimtermeasures:: 33,33, Finucane,
Finucane, Brendan
Brendan:: 69 69
43, 54, 58, 147, 149, 168, 171,
43, 54,58,147,149,168,171, Foehn:
Foehn: 37 37
178-83
178-83 Fractricide:
Fractricide: 46-47, 49-51, 59
46-47,49-51,59
Carpet
Carpet:: 43
43 Battle of Britain: 55
Battle of Britain:
Chaff: 43,44,117-18,122-23,
Chaff: 43,44,117-18,122-23, Cape
Cape Gloucester,
Gloucester, Bismarck
Bismarck
143,178
143,178 Archipelago, December 1943:
Archipelago, December 1943:
Effectiveness,
Effectiveness, World
World War
War II:
II: 50
50
44
44 D-day,
D-day, June
June 1944:
1944:4949
Falkland
Falkland War:
War: 153-55,168,180
153-55,168,180 German
German Air Air Force,
Force, 11 January
January
Libyan raid: 149
Libyan raid: 149 1945: 22, 59
1945: 22, 59
Middle
Middle East War:: 143,
East War 147,171
143,147,171 Korean
Korean War:War: 78 78
Pods: 111,
Pods: 111, 139,147
139,147 Middle East War: 138,145
Middle East War: 138,145
Vietnam War:
Vietnam War: 101,107-8, 112,
101,107-8,112, Pacific
Pacific theater,
theater, December
December
117-18,121-23
117-18,121-23 1943-June
1943-June 1944 1944:: 50
50
World
World War
War IIII:: 43-44
43-44 Sicily incidents, July 1943:
Sicily incidents, July 47, 49,
1943:47,49,
Enzian:
Enzian: 37-38, 39
37-38,39 59
59
Exocet::154,162
Exocet 154,162 United
United States
States Marine
Marine Corps:
Corps: 51
51
France
France
F-4 :103,103,116-17,125, 134
F-4:103,103,116-17,125,134 Aircraft
Aircraft
F4U: 75,78
F4U:75,78 Mirage:
Mirage: 145,151
145,151
F9F: 75
F9F: 75 Super Etendard : 151
Super Etendard: 151
F-51
F-51:: 75, 75, 76n
75,75,76n Dien
Dien Bien
Bien Phu:
Phu: 95-96
95-96
F-80
F-80:: 76, 76
76,76 Surface-to-air
Surface-to-air missiles
missiles
F-86 : 78,150
F-86:78,150 Crotale: 149
Crotale: 149
F-10OF:109
F-IOOF: 109 MATRA
MATRAR422-B:90 R422-B : 90
F-104: 150
F-104:150 PARCA 90
PARCA: : 90
F-105: 100, 101, 109, 111,
F-105:100,101,109, 111, 111,
111, 118,
118, Roland:
Roland: 151, 154, 157, 173
151,154,157,173
128
128 World War
World War I:1 1:1
Poorly
Poorly designed
designed:: 128
128 Fuzes
Fuzes
F-111: 100, 120, 125, 134
F-111:100,120,125,134
188
188
Increased
Increased effectiveness,
effectiveness, 8.8
8.8 cm
cm flak-18/36/37
flak-18/36/37:: 24n,
24n, 25
25
Germany:
Germany: 33 33 20-mm:
20-mm: 33, 34, 35
33,34,35
Proximity
Proximity:: 17, 58,178
17,58,178 40-mm
40-mm Bofors
Bofors:: 35
35
Falkland
Falkland War: 157
War: 157 50-mm:
50-mm: 36 36
Germany.
Germany: 34,40-41
34,40-41 88-mm: 3, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30
88-mm:3,24,25,26,27,30
Korean
Korean War:
War: 7979 105-mm:
105-mm: 25-26,30
25-26,30
Ratio,
Ratio, increased
increased effectiveness,
effectiveness, 128-mm: 26, 28, 30, 36
128-mm: 26,28,30,36
V-1 campaign: 17
V-1 campaign: 17 Railroad-mounted:
Railroad-mounted: 26, 34, 36
26,34,36
United
United States
States Navy:
Navy: 5252 Romanian
Romanian 75-mm75-mm:: 3030
Fuze
Fuze setters
setters Soviet
Soviet 76.5-mm:
76.5-mm: 30 30
Automatic,
Automatic, Great
Great Britain:
Britaia: 99 Guns,
Guns, mix
mix ofof
Continuous
Continuous:: 33 Ploesti:: 30
Ploesti 30
FW 190:23
FW190:23 Guns, number of
Guns, number of
1939:
1939: 2424
Gabreski,
Gabreski, Francis
Francis S.:S.: 69
69 Hamburg : 32
Hamburg: 32
GAPA:
GAPA: 89 89 Leuna: 31
Leima: 31
Gazelle:
Gazelle: 154
154 Munich
Munich:: 32 32
General
General Electric
Electric:: 89
89 Ploesti: 29-30,36
Ploesti: 29-30,36
Germany
Germany Politz:
Politz: 31
31
Air
Air attack,
attack, l1 January
January 1945:
1945: 22,
22, Vienna:
Vienna: 32 32
57, 59
57, 59 Radar: 31, 43
Radar: 31,43
Aircraft
Aircraft Gun-laying:
Gun-laying: 33 33
FW
FW 190
190:: 23
23 Rockets:
Rockets: 34,34, 37,58
37,58
Ju 88: 22
Ju88:22 Spanish
Spanish Civil
Civil War:
War: 2424
Me
Me 109:177
109:177 Surface-to-air
missiles
Me
Me 163: 37
163:37 Enzian
Enzian:: 37-38,39
37-38,39
Me
Me 262:
262:178178 Foehn:
Foehn: 37 37
Air defense effectiveness,
Air defense effectiveness, Rheintochter:
Rheintochter: 38-39,40
38-39,40
kills/sorties
kills/sorties:: 53
53 Roland:151,154,157,173
Roland: 151,154,157,173
Antiaircraft
artillery Schmetterling
Schmetterling:: 39,39, 41
41
Assigned
Assigned to to Luftwaffe,1934
Luftwaffe, 1934:: Taifun:
Taifun: 37,38
37,38
24
24 Wasserfall: 39-41,
WasserfaU: 42, 104
39-41,42,104
Banned:
Banned: 23 23 Units
Units
Personnel:
Fersoimel: 41 41 JG
JG 11:
11: 22
22
Problems,
Problems, 1944-45:41
1944-45:41 V-1. See V-1
V-1. See V-1
Strait
Strait of
of Messina,
Messina, August
August 1943:
1943: V-2:19,39,41
V-2:19,39,41
27-29
27-29 World
World War War I:1:11
Claims
Claims World
World WarWar II II losses
losses:: 23
23
1940. 41:27
1940-41: 27 Goering,
Goering, Hermann
Hermann:: 37 37
Guns: 42
Guns: 42 Great
Great Britain
Britain
Leuna:
Leuna: 3131 Air attack
Air attack
Ploesti : 29-31
Ploesti: 29-31 Cologne:
Cologne: 29 29
Vienna
Vieima:: 32
32 Leuna:
Leima: 31 31
Fuzes:
Fuzes: 3333 Ploesti:
Ploesti: 29
29
Proximity
Proximity:: 34, 40-41
34,40-41 Aircraft
Aircraft
Guns
Guns Canberra:
Canberra: 151,152
151,152
7.7-cm: 22
7.7-cm: Gazelle
Gazelle:: 154
154
189
189
Harrier : 153,153-55,159,173
Harrier: 153,153-55,159,173 Blowpipe:: 151,153
Blowpipe 151,153 -- 56,156,
56,156,
Hunter
Hunter:: 150
150 166
166
Scout:
Scout: 154
154 Rapier
Rapier:: 153,156-57,158,162,
153,156-57,158,162,
Spitfire : 23,
Spitfire: 49,177
23,49,177 173-74
173-74
Typhoon
Typhoon:: 46,46,4949 Seacat:: 151,153,160,160-61
Seacat 151,153,160,160-61
Vampire: 150
Vampire: 150 Sea Dart: 151,153,159-60,164
Sea Dart: 151,153,159-60,164
Vulcan : 151,152,153,155
Vulcan: 151,152,153,155 Seaslug:
Seaslug: 89, 153, 159, 163
89,153,159,163
Antiaircraft artillery personnel:
personnel: Seawolf:153,155,160-61
Seawolf: 153,155,160-61
6-7
6-7 Thunderbird
Thunderbird:: 89 89
Home
Home Guard:
Guard: 66 Tigercat:
Tigercat: 163163
Numbers: 6-7
Niunbers: 6-7 Units
Units
Territorial
Territorial forces:
forces: 66 41st
41st Squadron:
Squadron: 22 22
Women:
Women: 6,7 6,7 130th
130th Squadron
Squadron:: 22 22
Battle
Battle of
of Britain:
Britain: 55 350th Squadron : 22
350th Squadron: 22
Casualties
Casualties caused
caused by by Germany:
Germany: 610th
610th Squadron
Squadron:: 22 22
19
19 British
British Bomber
Bomber Command:
Command: 50 50
Claims
Claims T Battery: 157
T Battery: 157
1940-41 :5-6
1940-41:5-6 V-1.
V-1. See
See V-1
V-1
1942-43 :10
1942-43:10 World War 1:1:11
World War
Battle of
Battle of Britain:
Britain: 55 Grenada invasion:
Grenada invasion: 164
164
Falkland
Falkland War War:: 153-57,159-61,
153-57,159-61, Helicopter
Helicopter losses
losses:: 164
164
173
173 ZSU-23 :164
ZSU-23:164
Malta:
Malta: 8-9
8-9 Grooved
Grooved projectiles
projectiles:: 33
33
Tobruk:
Tobruk: 7-8 7-8 Gulf
Gulf of
of Tonkin
Tonkin incident:
incident: 9797
V-1 campaign: 17-19
V-1 campaign: 17-19 Guns
Guns
Falkland
Falkland Islands
Islands war:
war: 153-61,173
153-61,173 Germany
Germany
Guns
Guns 7.7-cm:
7.7-cm: 22
3-inch:: 44
3-inch 8.8
8.8 cm
cm flak-18/36/37:
flak-18/36/37:24n, 24n, 25
25
3.7-inch:
3.7-inch: 4-5,15,19,
4-5,15,19,24n24n 20-mm:
20-mm: 33, 34, 35
33,34,35
7 .62-mm
7.62-mm GPMG:159,161
GPMG: 159,161 40-mm
40-mm Bofors
Bofors:: 35
35
20-mm
20-mm::10,17
10,17 50-mm: 36
50-mm: 36
20-mm
20-mm Bredas
Bredas:: 88 88-mm:
88-mm: 3, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30
3,24,25,26,27,30
40-mm Bofors:
40-mm Bofors: 8, 9, 10,
8,9,10,17,162 105-mm: 25-26, 30
105-mm: 25-26,30
Two-pound:
Two-poimd: 52 52 128-mm:
128-mm: 26, 28, 30, 36
26,28,30,36
Guns,
Guns, mix
mix ofof Railroad-mounted:
Railroad-mounted: 26, 34, 36
26,34,36
1943:10
1943:10 Romanian 75-mm: 30
Romanian 75-mm: 30
Battle of Britain:
Battle of Britain: 55 Soviet
Soviet 76.5-mm
76.5-mm:: 30 30
Guns,
Gims, number
number of of Great
Great Britain
Britain
1938-40 : 5
1938-40: 5 3-inch:
3-inch: 44
1943 :10
1943:10 3.7-inch:
3.7-inch: 4-5,15,19,
4-5,15,19,24n 24n
World
World War
War 1:1 I: 1 7.62-mm
7.62-mm GPMGGPMG::159,161
159,161
Gun technology: 99
Gun technology: 20-mm:10,17
20-mm: 10,17
Radar: 4,
Radar: 6,13
4,6,13 20-mm
20-nmi Bredas
Bredas:: 88
Rockets: 7n,
Rockets: 7n, 8,13,17
8,13,17 40-mm
40-mm Bofors:
Bofors: 8, 9,10,17,162
8,9,10,17,162
Surface-to-air missiles Two-pound: 52
Two-pound: 52
Bloodhound
Bloodhound:: 89 89 Soviet
Soviet Union
Union
76.5-mm: 30
76.5-mm: 30
190
190
85-mm
85-mm Model
Model 1939 :74
1939:74 Indian-Pakistani
Indian-Pakistani War,
War, 1965:150
1965:150
85-mm Model 1944
85-mm Model :74
1944:74 Aircraft losses
Aircraft losses:: 150
150
ZSU-23
ZSU-23:164 :164 Claims
Claims:: 150
150
ZSU-23-4: 135,140-42,142
ZSU-23-4:135,140-42,142 Indian-Pakistani
Indian-Pakistani War,
War, 1971: 150-51
1971:150-51
United
United States
States Aircraft losses : 151
Aircraft losses: 151
.50-caliber:
.50-caHber: 23, 51, 72
23,51,72 Claims : 151
Claims: 151
1.1-inch: 51
1.1-inch: 51 Iran-Iraq
Iran-Iraq War:
War: 162-63
162-63
3-inch
3-incli:: 2, 4, 4
2,4,4 Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses:: 163
163
5-inch/38-caliber:
5-inch/38-caliber: 52 52 Surface-air-missile
Surface-air-missile units:
units: 163
163
20-mm: 51
20-mm: 51 Iron Hand : 109,111,118
Iron Hand: 109, 111, 118
37-mm:
37-mm: 23,52
23,52 Israel
Israel (See
(See also
also Middle
Middle East
East wars)
wars)
40-mm:
40-mm: 23,51-52,
23,51-52,72 72 Aircraft
Aircraft
75-mm Sky Sweeper: 72,72n,
75-mm Sky Sweeper: 72,72n, Arava
Arava transport:
transport: 147
147
73
73 Italy
Italy
90-mm: 4,17,19,
90-nim: 21, 23, 24n
4,17,19,21,23,24n Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft artillery,
artillery. World
World
Vulcan: 146n
Vulcan: 146n War I:1
War 1:1
Gun
Gun technology
technology
Great Britain
Great Britain 1943:
1943: 99 Japan
Japan
Interwar
Interwar:: 2-3
2-3 Air
Air defense
defense effectiveness,
effectiveness,
kills/sorties:
kills/sorties: 53
53
H-34 :114
H-34:114 Antiaircraft artillery: 53-57
Antiaircraft artillery: 53-57
Haiphong,
Haiphong, North
North Vietnam:
Vietnam: 124
124 Claims,
Claims, World
World WarWarn:II: 54
54
Hamburg:
Hamburg: 43 43 Guns
Gims
Defenses
Defenses of:
of: 32
32 75-mm
75-mm type
type 4: 53
4:53
Hanson,
Hanson, Robert:
Robert: 6969 75-mm
75-mm type
type 88: 53
88:53
Harrier:
Harrier: 153,153-55,159,173
153,153-55,159,173 88-mm:
88-mm: 5353
Hawk: 72,
Hawk: 85, 85-86,138-39,145,
72,85,85-86,138-39,145, 120-mm:
120-mm: 53 53
162
162 150-mm:: 53
150-mm 53
Helicopter
Helicopter losses
losses Guns,
Guns, mix
mix of:
of: 53
53
Grenada:164
Grenada: 164 Guns, numbers of.
Guns, numbers of: 53
53
incident : 164
Mayaguez incident:
Mayaguez 164 Johns
Johns Hopkins
Hopkins University:
University: 8787
Middle East War, 1977 : 145
Middle East War, 1977:145 Johnson, Lyndon .:
Johnson, Lyndon B
B.: 112
112
Vietnam
Vietnam War:
War: 113-15,131
113-15,131 Ju 88: 22
Ju88:22
Hill,
Hill, Roderic:11,14,16
Roderic: 11,14,16
Hitler,
Hitler, Adolph:
Adolph: 11,11, 24, 37
24,37 Kissinger,
Kissinger, Henry:
Henry: 119119
HMS Coventry
HMS Coventry:: 160
160 Korean
Korean War:
War: 72-81,129,179
72-81,129,179
HMS Fearless:: 162
liMS Fearless 162 Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses
HMS Hennes :161
UMS Hermes: 161 Jet
Jet compared
compared with with propeller:
propeller:
HMS
YfMS Intrepid:
Intrepid: 162
162 75-76
75-76
HMS
UUS Sheffield:
Sheffield: 161
161 United
United States
States:: 74-75, 75n
74-75,75n
Hunter: 150
Hunter: 150 Air tactics: 77-79
Air tactics: 77-79
Antiaircraft
artillery
Identification, friend
Identification, friend or foe: 49,165
or foe: 49,165 Countermeasures:
Coimtermeasures: 78-80 78-80
Identification problem. See
Identification problem. See Lessons: 81
Lessons: 81
fratricide
fratricide United
United States
States Air
Air Force
Force
IFF. See
IFF. See identification,
identification, friend
friend or
or Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses:: 75n
75n
foe
foe Air
Ak tactics:
tactics: 77-80
77-80
191
191
United
United States
States Marine
Marine Corps
Corps Canal
Canal crossing
crossing:: 144
144
Aircraft losses
Aircraft losses:: 54n,
54n, 75, 75n, 78
75,75n, 78 Claims
Claims:: 145
145
Air
Air tactics:
tactics: 78
78 Electronic
countermeasures::
United States Navy
United States Navy 143,171
143,171
Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses:: 54n,
54n, 75, 75n
75,75n Fratricide:
Fratricide: 138,145
138,145
Air tactics: 77-78
Air tactics: 77-78 Guns
Guns
Lam
Lam Son
Son 719: 113
719:113 ZSU-23-4 :135,140-42,142
ZSU-23-4:135,140-42,142
Lebanon strike, 1983
Lebanon strike, 1983 Helicopter losses : 145
Helicopter losses: 145
Aircraft losses : 148
Aircraft losses: 148 Loss discrepancy: 171
Loss discrepancy: 171
tactics: 148
Air tactics:
Air 148 Surface-to-air
missiles
Leuna: 31
Leuna: 31 Direct attack o£
Direct attack of: 144
144
Libya
Libya strike
strike SA-6:135,140-41,143-45
SA-6:135,140-41,143-45
Air
Air tactics:
tactics: 149
149 Units:
Units: 140
140
Antiradiation missiles
Antiradiation missiles:: 149
149 Middle East War,
Middle East War, 1982: 146-47,
1982:146-47,
Electronic countermeasures:: 149
149 168,180
168,180
Surface-to-air missiles,
Surface-to-air missiles, number
number Aircraft
Aircraft losses:
losses: 146
146
of: 149
of: 149 Air tactics: 147
Air tactics: 147
Li6ge,
Li5ge, Belgium:
Belgium: 2020 Claims
Claims:: 146
146
Linebacker
Linebacker I:1:116-19
116-19 Electronic
countermeasures::
Linebacker
Linebacker 11: 107, 119-27,133,135
H: 107,119-27,133,135 147
147
LORAN:
LORAN: 117,124
117,124 Guns
Guns
Low-level
Low-level operations:
operations: 22-23, 29, 57
22-23,29,57 Vulcan:
Vulcan: 146n
146n
Surface-to-air missiles:: 146
146
Malta:
Malta: 8-9
8-9 MiG:
MiG: 125
125
Market-Garden: 4445
Market-Garden: 44-45 MiG-15: 179
MiG-15:179
MATRA R422-B: 90
MATRAR422-B:90 MiG-19:130
MiG-19:130
Mayaguez
Mayaguez incident:
incident: 164164 MiG-21:
MiG-21: 85,85,128,135,150,166
McDonnell 87
McDonnell: : 87 MiG-23:166
MiG-23:166
McNamara,
McNamara, Robert:
Robert: 103103 Mirage:
Mirage: 145,151
145,151
McNaughton,
McNaughton, John John T.:103
T.: 103 Mitchell,
Mitchell, William
William "Billy":
"Billy": 44
Me
Me 109:177
109:177 Munich, defenses of:
Mimich, defenses of: 32
32
Me 163:37
Me 163:37
Me 262:178
Me 262:178 Nancy,
Nancy, France
France:: 5050
Meyer,
Meyer, John:
John: 2323 Na San, Vietnam: 95
Na San, Vietnam: 95
Mi-8 : 145
Mi-8:145 NEGAT:
NEGAT: 78 78
Middle
Middle East
East War,
War, 1956:137
1956:137 New
New Year's
Year's Day, 1945 German
Day, 1945 German air
air
Middle East War, 1967:138,180
Middle East War, 1967:138,180 attack: 22
attack: 22
Middle
Middle East War, 1967-70:138
East War, 1967-70:138 Night
Night kills
kills
Middle
Middle East
East War
War 1967-73:
1967-73:139139 Battle
Battle of
of Britain:
Britain: 55
Middle East War, 1973:135,
Middle East War, 1973:135, Nike Ajax : 82-83, 83,105
Nike Ajax: 82-83,83,105
139-46,167,180
139-46,167,180 Nike
Nike Hercules:
Hercules: 83, 84, 85
83,84, 85
Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses Nixon,
Nixon, Richard
Richard M.:M.: 112,119
112,119
Israel, initial:
Israel, initial: 142-43, 145
142-43,145 Normandy: 21
Normandy: 21
Air defenses
Air defenses North
North Korea
Korea (See
(See also
also Korean
Korean
Impact of:
Impact of: 145
145 War)
War)
Air tactics
Air tactics Guns,
Guns, number
mmiber of.of: 74
74
Israel: 143-44
Israel: 143-44 Rockets:
Rockets: 74 74
192
192
North
North Vietnam
Vietnam (See also Vietnam
(See also Vietnam Regulus
Regulus 11:II: 89
89
War)
War) Remagen:
Remagen: 23, 57,178
23,57,178
Air
Air defenses
defenses RF-4C:104
RF-4C: 104
Underestimated: 101-2
Underestimated: 101-2 Rheintochter
Rheintochter:: 38-39,
38-39,4040
Antiaircraft
artillery guns:
guns: 98
98 Ridgway,
Ridgway, Matthew
Matthew B.: B,: 47
47
Rockets
Rockets
Oil
Oil Campaign
Campaign 1944 : 57
1944:57 Germany: 34,
Germany: 37, 58
34,37,58
Operation Bolo: 102
Operation Bolo: 102 Great Britain: 7n,
Great Britain: 7n, 8,13,17
8,13,17
North Korea: 74
North Korea: 74
P-38 : 29
P-38:29 Roland
Roland::151,154,157,173
151,154,157,173
P-47:23,44-45,50,76n
P-47:23,44-45,50,76n Falkland War
Falkland War claims
claims:: 173
173
P-51 : 23,49-50, 76n
P-51:23,49-50,76n Rolling Thunder: 99-112
Rolhng Thunder: 99-112
PARCA:
PARCA: 90 90 RSD 58
RSD 58:: 90
90
Patton, George: 50
Patton, George: 50 Rules of engagement
Rules of engagement
Pearl Harbor: 50n
Pearl Harbor: 50n 9th
9th Tactical
Tactical Air Command, 1944:
Air Command, 1944:
Peenemunde:18
Peenemunde: 18 50
50
Philco-Ford: 86
Philco-Ford: 86 Great Britain,
Great Britain, V-1
V-1 campaign:
campaign:
Pile,
PUe, Frederick
Frederick A.:
A.: 14
14 13-17
13-17
Pile mattress:: 14,14,15
Pile mattress 14,14,15
Pile
Pile portable
portable platforms.
platforms. See See Pile
Pile Sabot devices: 34,
Sabot devices: 34n
34,34n
mattress
mattress SAC.
SAC. See See Strategic
Strategic Air
An: Command
Command
Ploesti:
Ploesti: 29-31, 30, 32, 36, 57
29-31,30,32,36,57 SAM.
SAM. See See surface-to-air
missiles
Claims : 29
Claims: 29 Schmetterling: 39, 41
Schmetterling: 39,41
Politz:
Politz: 31
31 Scout:
Scout: 154154
Powers,
Powers, Francis
Francis G.:
G.: 130
130 Seacat: :151,153,160,160-61
Seacat 151,153,160,160-61
Preddy, George E., Jr.: 69
Freddy, George E., Jr.: 69 Falkland
Falkland War War claims:
claims: 160
160
Predictors,
Predictors, electric
electric:: 99 Sea
Sea Dart:
Dart: 151,153,159-60,164
151,153,159-60,164
Propellants,
Propellants, flashless:
flashless: 99 Falkland
Falkland War War claims
claims:: 159
159
Proximity fuzes. See
Proximity fuzes. See fuzes,
fuzes, Seaslug: 89,153, 159,163
Seaslug: 89,153,159,163
proximity
proximity Seawolf:153,155,160-61
Seawolf: 153,155,160-61
Pucara
Pucard:: 151,154
151,154 Falkland
Falkland War War claims
claims:: 160-61
160-61
Shrike : 110,110-11,111, 123,
Shrike: 110,110-11, 111, 125,
123,125,
Quesada,
Quesada, Elwood
Elwood "Pete"
"Pete" (quote)
(quote):: 44 144,153
144,153
Sicily
Sicily:: 47, 49, 59
47,49,59
Radar:
Radar: 58,178
58,178 Smart
Smart bombs:
bombs: 117 117
Falkland War: 153,160,174
Falkland War: 153,160,174 Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Germany:
Germany: 31, 33, 43
31,33,43 Aircraft
Aircraft
Great
Great Britain:
Britain: 4, 6,13
4,6,13 An-12:150
An-12:150
Libya:
Libya: 149
149 An-22:166
An-22:166
Middle East
Middle East War,
War, 1983 : 147
1983:147 Mi-8
Mi-8:145: 145
United
United States
States:: 17
17 MiG:125
MiG: 125
Radar homing
Radar homing and
and warning:
warning: 109
109 MiG-15:
MiG-15:179 179
Rapier: 153,156-57,158,162,173-74
Rapier: 153,156-57,158,162,173-74 MiG-19: 130
MiG-19:130
Falkland
Fedkland War
War claims
claims:: 156-57
156-57 MiG-21: 85,
MiG-21: 128, 135, 150,166
85,128,135,150,166
Raytheon
Raytheon:: 85
85 MiG-23:166
MiG-23:166
RB-57F:150
RB-57F: 150 Su-7 :146n
Su-7:146n
Redeye:
Redeye: 86,155,165-66
86,155,165-66 Claims
Claims
193
193
World
World War
Warn: II: 67
67 Enzian:
Enzian: 37-38,39
37-38,39
Guns
Guns Foehn:
Foehn: 37 37
76.5-mm:
76.5-mm: 30 30 Rheintochter:
Rheintochter: 38-39, 40
38-39,40
85-mm
85-mm Model
Model 1939:74
1939: 74 Roland:
Roland: 151,154,157,173
151,154,157,173
85-mm Model 1944:74
85-mm Model 1944:74 Schmetterling:
Schmetterling: 39, 41
39,41
ZSU-23
ZSU-23:164:164 Taifun:
Taifun: 37,38
37,38
ZSU-23-4 :135,140-42,142
ZSU-23-4:135,140-42,142 Wasserfall:
Wasserfall: 39-41, 42,104
39-41,42,104
Surface-to-air missiles Great Britain
Great Britain
SA-1:104
SA-1:104 Bloodhound:
Bloodhound: 89 89
SA-2:103-5,104,105,106,
SA-2:103-5,104,105,106, Blowpipe : 151,153-56,156,
Blowpipe: 151,153-56,156,
107-8,110,112,116,122,130,
107-8,110,112,116,122,130, 166
166
138-41,149-51,163
138-41,149-51,163 Rapier:
Rapier: 153,156-57,158,162,
153,156-57,158,162,
SA-3: 135,139-41,149,163
SA-3:135,139-41,149,163 173-74
173-74
SA-5 :149
SA-5:149 Seacat:151,153,160,160-61
Seacat: 151,153,160,160-61
SA-6:135,141,140-46,149,
SA-6:135,141,140-46,149, Sea
Sea Dart:
Dart: 151,153,159-60,16
151,153,159-60,164
163
163 Seaslug: 89, 153, 159, 163
Seaslug: 89,153,159,163
SA-7:115,115-16,140-41,143,
SA-7:115,115-16,140-41,143, Seawolf.
Seawolf: 153, 155, 160-61
153,155,160-61
145,148-49,155,165-66
145,148-49,155,165-66 Thunderbird
Thunderbird:: 89 89
SA-8 :147, 149
SA-8:147,149 Tigercat : 163
Tigercat: 163
SA-9 :140,147-49,148
SA-9:140,147-49,148 Soviet
Soviet Union
Union
Spaatz, Carl: 50
Spaatz, Carl: 50 SA-1: 104
SA-1:104
Spanish Civil War:
Spanish Civil War: 24 24 SA-2:103-5,104,105,106,
SA-2:103-5,104,105,106,
Spitfire: 23, 49,177
Spitfire: 23,49,177 107-8,110,112,116,122,
107-8,110,112,116,122,
Squeeze bore: 34,
Squeeze bore: 34n
34,34n 130,138-41,149-51,163
BO, 138-41,149-51,163
Standard:: 110-11,123,124,125
Standard 110-11,123,124,125 SA-3 :135,139-41,149,163
SA-3:135,139-41,149,163
Stinger:
Stinger: 153,157
153,157 SA-5:149
SA-5:149
Afghan War:
Afghan War: 165-66
165-66 SA-6: 135,141,140-46,149,
SA-6:135,141,140-46,149,
Falkland War: 155-57
Falkland War: 155-57 163
163
Strait of Messina
Strait of Messina:: 27-29
27-29 SA-7:115,115-16,140-41,14-'
SA-7:115,115-16,140-41,143,
Strategic Air Command: 101,122
Strategic Air Command: 101,122 145, 148-49,155,165-66
145,148-49,155,165-66
Su-7 :146n
Su-7:146n SA-8:147,149
SA-8:147,149
Super
Super Etendard
Etendard:: 151151 SA-9:140,147-49,148
SA-9:140,147-49,148
SUPPRESS : 79
SUPPRESS: 79 Switzerland
Switzerland
Surface-to-air missiles RSD
RSD 58 : 90
58:90
Countermeasures
Countermeasxires United States
United States
Air
Air tactics:
tactics: 107-12, 122-23,
107-12,122-23, Bomarc:
Bomarc: 89, 90, 91
89,90,91
125-26,143-44,147
125-26,143-44,147 Bumblebee
Bumblebee project:
project: 87
87
Antiradiation
missiles:: 110,
110, GAPA 89
GAPA: : 89
110-11,111, 118,123,124,
110-11, 111, 118,123,124, Hawk
Hawk:: 72, 85, 85-86,138-39,
72,85,85-86,138-39,
125,
125,127,144,147,153,168, 145,162
145,162
179
179 Nike
Nike Ajax:
Ajax: 82-83, 83,105
82-83,83,105
France
France Nike
Nike Hercules:
Hercules: 83, 84, 85
83,84,85
Crotale:
Crotale: 149
149 Redeye:
Redeye: 86,155,165-66
86,155,165-66
MATRA
MATRA R422-B:R422-B: 9090 Stinger
Stinger:: 153, 155-56,157,
153,155-56,157,
PARCA: 90
PARCA: 90 165-66
165-66
Roland:
Roland: 151,154,157,
151,154,157,173 173 Talos:
Talos: 87, 88, 136
87,88,136
Germany
Germany Tartar : 87, 88
Tartar: 87,88
194
194
Terrier:
Terrier: 87,136
87,136 452d
452d Bomb
Bomb Wing:
Wing: 7777
Thumper:
Thumper: 89 89 Fifth
Fifth Air
Air Force:
Force: 76-78, 80
76-78,80
Wizard:
Wizard: 8989 Strategic Air Command: 101,
Strategic Air Command: 101,
Switzerland
Switzerland 122
122
Surface.-to-£iir missiles Tactical
Tactical Air
Air Command:
Command: 101 101
RSD 58: 90
RSD58:90 United States Army
United States Army
Air
Air Corps
Corps Tactical School: 58,
Tactical School: 60
58,60
T-6: 80, 81
T-6:80,81 Antiaircraft artillery
Tactical
Tactical Air
Air Command:
Command: 101 101 Post-World
Post-World War War II:H: 72
72
Taifun:
Taifun: 37,38
37,38 World
World War
War I:1-2
1:1-2
Talos: 87, 88,136
Talos:87,88,136 Claims
Claims
Tartar
Tartar:: 87,
87,88 88 33 December
December 1944:22
1944: 22
Terrier:
Terrier: 87,136
87,136 Avranches: 22
Avranches: 22
Tet
Tet offensive:
offensive: 112 112 Battle
Battle ofof the
the Bulge
Bulge:: 22
22
Thanh
Thanh HoaHoa Bridge
Bridge:: 117
117 Normandy:
Normemdy: 21 21
Thumper:
Thumper: 89 89 Remagen:
Remagen: 23 23
Thunderbird:
Thunderbird: 89 89 World
World WarWar I:1-2
1:1-2
Tigercat :163
Tigercat: 163 World
World WarWar II:
II: 23
23
Tobruk: 7-8
Tobruk: 7-8 Guns
Gims
Guns
Gxms .50-caliber:
.50-caiiber: 23,72
23,72
Claims
Claims:: 8 8 3-inch:
3-mch: 2, 4, 4
2,4,4
Mix
Mix of:of: 88 37-mm:: 23
37-mm 23
Number
Niunber of. of: 88 40-mm: 23,72
40-mm: 23,72
Tokyo:
Tokyo: 54 54 75-mm Sky
75-mm Sky Sweeper:
Sweeper: 72,72n,
72,72n,
Tonkin incident. See
Tonldn incident. See Gulf
Gulf of
of 73
73
Tonkin incident
Tonkin incident 90-mm:
90-mm: 4,17,19, 21, 23, 24n
4,17,19,21,23,24n
Trenchard,
Trenchard, Hugh:Hugh: 44 Vulcan: 146n
Vulcan: 146n
Tuck,
Tuck, Robert:
Robert: 69 69 Guns,
Guns, mix
mix of,
of, Remagen:
Remagen: 23 23
Turnhout: 45
Turnhout: 45 Guns,
Guns, number
niunber of,
of, Remagew
Remagen:. 2323
Typhoon:
Typhoon: 46, 46, 49
49 Ordnance Corps: 83
Ordnance Corps: 83
Surface-to-air
missiles
U-2:105,130
U-2:105,130 Hawk:
Hawk: 72,85,85-86,138-39,
72,85,85-86,138-39,
United States Air
Force 145,162
145,162
Aircraft. See specific
Aircraft. See specific Nike
Nike Ajax:
Ajax: 82-83, 83,105
82-83,83,105
designation.
designation. SeeSee also
also aircraft,
aircraft. Nike
Nike Hercules
Hercules:: 83, 84, 85
83,84,85
United
United States
States;; Korean
Korean War;
War; Redeye: 86,155,165-66
Redeye: 86,155,165-66
Vietnam War
Vietnam Wax Stinger:
Stinger: 153,155-56,157,
153,155-56,157,
Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses 165-66
165-66
Korean
Korean WarWar:: 75n
75n Thumper
Thumper:: 89 89
Surface-to-air missiles Wizard:
Wizard: 89 89
Bomarc:
Bomarc: 89, 90, 91
89,90,91 Units
Units
GAPA:
GAPA: 89 89 62d Coast Artillery:
62d Coast Artillery: 44
Units
Units 82d
82d Airborne
Airborne Division
Division:: 47
47
18th
18th Fighter
Fighter Bomber
Bomber Wing:
Wing: 75
75 Eighth Army: 80
Eighth Army: 80
315th
315th Air
Air Commando
Commando Wing:Wing: 98
98 First
First Army
Army:: 21-23
21-23
355th Tactical Fighter Wing :
355th Tactical Fighter Wing: Third
Third Army:
Army: 2323
109
109 Ninth Army: 23
Ninth Army: 23
195
195
IX
IX Corps:
Corps: 80 80 20-mm:
20-mm: 51 51
World War 1: 1-2
World War 1:1-2 37-mm: 52
37-mm: 52
United
United States
States Army
Army AirAir Forces
Forces 40-mm:
40-mm: 51-52
51-52
Air attack
Air attack Surface-to-air missiles
Leuna:
Leuna: 31 31 Bumblebee
Bumblebee project:
project: 87
87
:
Ploesti 29-31,30,32,36, 57
Ploesti:29-31,30,32,36,57 Talos:
Talos: 87, 88, 136
87,88,136
Vienna
Vienna:: 32 32 Tartar:
Tartar: 87, 88
87,88
Aircraft.
Aircraft. SeeSee specific
specific Terrier
Terrier:: 87,136
87,136
designation. See
designation. See also
also aircraft,
aircraft, Vietnamese
Vietnamese aircraft
aircraft shot
shot down:
down:
United
United States
States 136
136
Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses University
University of
of Michigan:
Michigan: 8989
To
To German
German AAA: AAA: 42 42 USS Boston : 87
VSS Boston: 87
To
To Japan:
Japan: 54n 54n USS
USS Chicago:
Chicago: 136
136
Air tactics:: 58
Air tactics 58 USS
VSS Enterphse:100
Enterprise: 100
Change
Change of against Japan:
of against Japan: 54
54 USS
USS Galveston:
Galveston: 87,88
87,88
Leuna:
Leuna: 31 31 USS Helena : 52
USSê/enfl:52
Ploesti: 29-31, 30, 32, 36, 57
Ploesti:29-31,30,32,36,57 Long Beach
USS Long
VSS Beach:: 136
126
Units
Units USS McCormick : 88
USS McComwcA:: 88
Eighth
Eighth AirAir Force:
Force: 43,
43, 45
45 USS
USS Sterett:136
Sterett: 136
8th Fighter Command: 50
8th Fighter Command: 50
Ninth
Ninth Air
Air Force
Force:: 45-46
45-46 V-1 : 10, 11, 66,178
V-1:10,11,66,178
9th
9th Tactical
Tactical Air Air Command:
Command: 45, 45, Bomber-launched
Bomber-laurched:: 18 18
50
50 Difficult
Difficult target
target:: 12
12
Fifteenth
Fifteenth Air Air Force:
Force: 32,
32, 45
45 Long-range
Long-range version:
version: 18 18
Twentieth
Twentieth Air Air Force:
Force: 54,57
54,57 Performance
Performance:: 10 10
56th
56th Fighter
Fighter Group:
Group: 4545 V-1
V-1 campaign:
campaign: 10-21
10-21
352d
352d Fighter
Fighter Group:
Group: 22-23
22-23 Antwerp
Antwerp
366th
366th Fighter
Fighter Group:
Group: 22
22 Casualties
Casualties:: 21
21
Mediterranean
Mediterranean Air Air Force:
Force: 4343 Defenses of. 20,
Defenses of: 50
20,50
United
United States
States Strategic
Strategic Air
Air Guns,
Gims, mix
mix of
of:. 19
19
Forces
Forces in in Europe:
Europe: 4545 Guns,
Guns, number
number of. of: 19
19
United States Marine
United States Marine Corps
Corps V-1s launched against : 19
V-ls laimched against: 19
Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses V-1s
V-ls reaching:
reaching: 20 20
Japan:: 54n
Japan 54n Casualties inflicted by
Casualties inflicted by V-1s
V-ls
Korean
Korean War: War: 75n75n Continent:
Continent: 21 21
Korean
Korean War:War: 74-75,
74-75,7878 Great
Great Britain
Britain:: 19
19
United States Navy
United States Navy Claims
Claims
Aircraft.
Aircraft. SeeSee specific
specific Balloons
Balloons:: 18
18
designation
designation.. See See also
also aircraft,
aircraft, Continental defenses:
Continental defenses: 1919
United States
United States Defenses :
Defenses: 17-19
17-19
Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses Fighters:
Fighters: 18
18
Japan:
Japan: 54n54n Guns: 17-18
Guns: 17-18
Korea: 75,
Korea: 75n
75,75n Continental
Continental campaign
campaign:: 19-21
19-21
Guns
Gims Great
Great Britain
Britiiin
.50-caliber
.50-caliber:: 51 51 Balloons:
Balloons: 1818
1.1-inch
1.1-inch:: 5151 Casualties : 19
Casualties: 19
5-inch/38-caliber
5-inch/38-caliber:: 52 52 Claims
Claims
196
196
Defenses
Defenses:: 17-19
17-19 Major
Major obstacle:
obstacle: 102,126
102,126
Fighters : 18
Fighters: 18 Underestimated : 101-2
Underestimated: 101-2
Guns
Guns:: 17-18
17-18 Antiradiation
missiles
Defense plan:
Defense plan: 11 11 Shrike : 110, 110-11,111,123,
Shrike: 110,110-11, 111, 123,
Defensive
Defensive deployment
deployment 125
125
Final:
Final: 1616 Effectiveness:
Effectiveness: 110 110
Initial:
Initial: 12
12 Standard : 110-11,123,124,125
Standard: 110-11,123,124,125
Defensive
Defensive problems:
problems: 13 13 Claims
Claims
Fighter units, number of.
Fighter units, mmiber of: 13
13 Surface-to-air
missiles, 1965-
1965-
Guns
Gims 68 :107
68:107
Mix
Mix of.
of: 13,17
13,17 Dien
Dien Bien
Bien Phu:
Phu: 95-96
95-96
Move: 16
Move: 16 Dumb munitions: 101
Dumb munitions: 101
Number
Number of: of: 13,17
13,17 Electronic countermeasures : 101,
Electronic coimtermeasures: 101,
Plan
Plan toto move
move:: 15 15 107-8,112,121-23
107-8,112,121-23
Pile mattress : 14,14,15
Pile mattress: 14,14,15 B-52: 121-22
B-52:121-22
Rules
Rules of engagement:: 13,17
of engagement 13,17 Impact
Impact on on losses
losses:: 127
127
V-Is fired against: 11,18
V-ls fired against: 11,18 Pods : Ill
Pods: 111
V-1s
V-ls reaching:
reaching: 19 19 Impact
Impact on operations:: 112
on operations 112
Li6ge,
Li^ge, V-ls
V-ls launched
launched against:
against: 20
20 Problems:
Problems: 132 132
V-2: 19, 39, 41
V-2:19,39,41 F-105
F-105 losses:
losses: 128 128
Vampire:
Vampire: 150 150 French
French involvement:
involvement: 95-96 95-96
VC.
VC. See
See Vietcong
Vietcong Helicopter
HeUcopter losses losses
Versailles
Versailles peace treaty: 23
peace treaty: 23 United
United States
States:: 113-15,131
113-15,131
Vienna,
Vieima, defenses
defenses of of:: 32
32 Iron
Iron Hand:
Hand: 109,111,
109, 111, 118
118
Vietcong:
Vietcong: 96-97,101
96-97,101 Lam
Lam SonSon 719 :113
719:113
Vietminh
Vietminh Linebacker
Linebacker I:1:116-19116-19
Antiaircraft artillery impact
impact onon Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses:: 116,118
116,118
French
French aircraft,
aircraft, Ratio of support aircraft
Ratio of support aircraft:: 119
119
Dien
Dien Bien
Bien Phu:
Phu: 95-96
95-96 Totals:
Totals: 118118
Vietnam
Vietnam War:
War: 95-136
95-136 Linebacker II:
Linebacker H: 107,119-27,135
107,119-27,135
1972 invasion: 115-16
1972 invasion: 115-16 Aircraft losses : 119-27,135
Aircraft losses: 119-27,135
Aircraft
Aircraft losses
losses Air
Air tactics,
tactics. United
United States
States:: 120-
120-
1962-64:97
1962^64: 97 21, 125, 127
21,125,127
1961-68, United
1961-68, United States
States:: 112
112 B-52D
B-52D and and B-52G:
B-52G: 121, 133
121,133
Geographic
Geographic area area:: 112
112 Electronic
Electronic countermeasures:
coimtermeasures:
Linebacker : 116, 118
Linebacker 11:116,118 122-23
122-23
Linebacker II:
Linebacker II: 125,135
125,135 Lack
Lack ofof coordination
coordination:: 122 122
Air
Air tactics
tactics MiGs
MiGs nullified:
nuUified: 125 125
Anti-SAM
Anti-SAM:: 107-12,117-18,
107-12,117-18, "Press
"Press on" tactics : 122-23,133-
on" tactics: 122-23,133-
122-23,125-26
122-23,125-26 34
34
Changed: 126
Changed: 126 SAC
SAC over-control:
over-control: 122 122
United
United States
States:: 102-3
102-3 Success: 127,134
Success: 127,134
Air-to-air combat: 102,
Air-to-air combat: 129
102,129 Tonnage
Tonnage dropped:
dropped: 124 124
Air
Air war
war LORAN:
LORAN: 117,124117,124
United
United States
States unprepared:
imprepared: 126 126 Military restrictions on
MiUtary restrictions on air
air war:
war:
Antiaircraft
artillery 99-101
99-101
Direct
Direct attack:
attack: 126
126 Na
Na San,
San, Vietnam:
Vietnam: 95 95
197
197
North
North Vietnam
Vietnam von
von Braun,
Braim, Wernher:
Wernher: 3737
Air defenses: 101-2,127
Air defenses: 101-2,127 von
von Richthofen,
Richthofen, Manfred
Manfred:: 68
68
Guns:
Guns: 98,102
98,102 Vulcan (British bomber) : 151, 152,
Vulcan (British bomber): 151,152,
Surface-to-air
missiles, 1965-
1965- 153,155
153,155
68:104,105,106,107-8,110,
68:104,105,106,107-8,110, Vulcan (United
Vulcan (United States
States gun)
gun):: 146n
146n
112,115,115-16,122,125,
112,115,115-16,122,125,
127
127 Wasserfall
Wasserfall:: 39-41, 42,104
39-41,42,104
Operation Bolo: 102
Operation Bolo: 102 Watson-Watt,
Watson-Watt, Robert A. :15
Robert A.: 15
Political restrictions on
Political restrictions on air
air war:
war: Welch,
Welch, Larry
Larry D.
D. (quote):
(quote): 166
166
99,103
99,103 Wesel:
Wesel: 46
46
Rolling
Rolling Thunder
Thunder:: 99-112
99-112 Western Electric:: 83
Western Electric 83
Objectives: 99
Objectives: 99 White,
White, Thomas
Thomas D.:D.: 81
81
SA-2:104,105,106,107-8,110,
SA-2:104,105,106,107-8,110, Wild Weasel: 109,111,111,118,123
Wild Weasel: 109, 111, 111, 118,123
112, 116,122, 125
112,116,122,125 Window:
Window: 43.43. See
See also
also chaff
chaff
SA-7:115,115-16
SA-7:115,115-16 Wizard:
Wizard: 8989
Smart
Smart bombs
bombs:: 117
117 Wolf:
Wolf: 147
147
Surface-to-air
missiles Women
Women gunners,
gunners, Great
Great Britain
Britain:: 6,
6,77
Firings
Firings:: 107,116,124
107,116,124 World
World War
War I: 1-2,2,3
1:1-2,2,3
Impact
Impact onon operations:
operations: 127 127 World
World War
War II:
II: 5-6, 8-10,17-19,
5-6,8-10,17-19,
United
United States
States Navy
Navy shoots
shoots 21-23, 29-32, 43-46, 51-52, 54,
21-23,29-32,43-46,51-52,54,
down
down Vietnamese aircraft :
Vietnamese aircraft: 54n,
54n, 58, 67,177-79
58,67,177-79
136
136 Lessons: 57
Lessons: 57
Tet
Tet offensive
offensive:: 112
112
Weather: 100
Weather: 100 Zemke,
Zemke, Hubert:
Hubert: 68
68
Wild
Wild Weasel
Weasel:: 109, 111 ) 111,
109, 111, 111, 118,
118, ZSU-23:164
ZSU-23:164
123
123 ZSU-23-4 :135,140-42,142
ZSU-23-4:135,140-42,142
198
198
•ii U.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING
S. GOVERNMENT OFFICE:: 2002-737-561
PRINTING OFFICE 2002-737-561

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Kennein P.

1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

ARCHIE, FLAK, AAA,

INDEX . ... . . . .... . . . . .. . . ... . . .... . . . ... . . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . ... . . . . . .. . . .

44 British women receiving

99 Preparing Pile mattress

Figure 18.. The

(Photo Credit:. Imperial

ijrinmtm c n.tMt p r v;;;

Figure 28. The

Figure 29. Another

Figure 31.. Wasserfall

Figure 36. Douglas A-20s attack Japanese positions at Karos,

Figure 37.. Although

(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artiilery IVIuseum)

Figure 38. 75-mm Sky Sweeper.

>*/f *,* .1." '4S

Figure 42. US Air Force C-119s were one of the logistical

(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artillery Museum)

Figure 44. Nike Ajax.

(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artillery Museum)

Figure 45. Nike Hercules.

(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artiilery Museum)

Figure 46. Hawk.

over 13,000 missiles.

(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artillery Museum)

Figure 47. Redeye.

Figure 48. Talos missile in launcher aboard the USS Galveston.

Figure 49. Tartar surface-to-air missile on Mark II mount aboard

(Photo Credit: Smithsonian Institution Photo No. 154042)

Figure 50. Boeing IIVI-99 Bomarc guided missile during erection

Figure 51. Launch of an Air Force Bomarc interceptor missile at

Figure 52. American adviser instructing South Vietnamese troops

Figure 53. Saigon. An Air Force C-123K Provider, assigned to the

Figure 54. North Vietnamese scramble for their guns.

Figure 57. Phantom attacks. A US Air Force F-4 Phantom dives

Figure 58. Reconnaissance version of the higli-flying Mach 2-plus

Figure 59. Surface-to-air missile site in North Vietnam that has

Figure 60. North Vietnamese SA-2 position.

(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artiliery Museum)

Figure 61. Soviet SA-2.

Figure 62. SA-2 launch against US aircraft.

Figure 63. US airmen employed standoff jammers. US Air Force

Figure 64. A-4 Skyhawk aircraft fires Shrike missile.

Figure 66. A CH-53 helicopter moves in to take a closer look at a

Figure 68. Popular and regional forces scramble out of an H-34

higher, as high as one-third lost of those engaged. The same

Figure 69. Soviet SA-7 Grail surface-to-air missile.

Figure 70. AQM-34V in flight with an AN/ALE-38 chaff pod on

Figure 71. Marine EA-6B Prowler aircraft.

Figure 72. B-52 dropping bombs.

first night and

Figure 73. B-52 aircraft that made an emergency landing at Da

Figure 74. Aerial photography of standard arm missiie (AGIVI-78)

three bombers—and thus

1948, 1956, and

(Photo Credit: US Army Air Defense Artiliery Museum)

>/f ,* .1." '4S