A Characterization of Logical Constants Js Possible Gila SHER ABSTRACT: The paper sues dat a philosophically informative and mathematically precise chuncrztion is pos ble by () desing» parila propa for such acharacerization,() Showing tha cern eaiicame ‘his proponal ae sncorrec, ad (a) Sewing the general ese of what a carktetzaton Of logic cot sau at achieving Keys lial constant Joie consequence Can there be a mathematically precise and philosophically informative characterization, of logical constants? Gémez"Torrente’s answer to this question is negative: Logins and plosophers of logic have often ti offer picaaphicaly sicher carstezasions of the oton ofa logial expression than dhe ones) sugested bythe vague pragma pines jst mentioned ‘These atterpts analy charncesize the noon of# logical expeesuon in tems of aleged semantic, ep temic or mathemaseal peers Of the logis expessons I eonjece that there anempts wil notre ‘ed, sine must be nearly nips to model sel the vague se prgmaic notion os logic expres Sonn those terms, (Gomex-Torete (2003) ne ofthe pilosophiclconelsions that seem 1 met sexe strong suppor frm the above exams of Postel theaner of gal costars] «is Oat mont (petape a) of he ane sop co pions of the problem of log constant my have created wsohable versions ofthe prem. THe Search fora charceanton ofthe intended set flea expresonh may bes hopdlesa projet fie = ‘pred = hat he characte be gen in este of mates concept. or uespcted seman ed {pte proper. (Gomer Toren (200), 3132) 1 agree with Gémez-Torrente’s claim that ou choice of logical constants involves, and should involve, pragmatic considerations, but I think this does not rule out the posi- bility, or desirability, of a mathematically precise and philosophically informative cha- acterization of these constants. In this paper I will describe one proposal for a precise characterization of logiea! constants, explain why Gémez-Torrente’s criticism of this proposal is incorrect, and discuss the more general issue of what a characterization of logical constants aims at achieving. 1. A Charasterzation of Lagical Constants ‘The characterization I will defend is one T proposed in Sher (1991, Ch. 3), incorporat- ing elements from Mostowski (1957), Tarski (1966) and Lindstem (1966): DEFINITION LT C is a... lagical term [censtant) iff C is a truth-functional connective ar C satisfies [the following) conditions ... on logical constants [Sher (1991), 56}: A. A logical constant C is syntactically an mplace predicate or functor (func- tional exptession) of level 1 or 2, n being a positive integer. B. A logical constant C is defined by a single extensional function and is identified with its extension.190 Gi Sie C. A logical constant Cis defined over models. In each model A over which it is defined, Cis assigned a construct of elements of A corresponding to its syntactic category. Specifically I require that C be defined by a func- tion fe such that given a model A (with universe ) in its domain: b a mo If Cis a first-level m place predicate, then f(A) is a subset of 4. If Cis a first-level mplace functor, then f(A) is a function from A> into A. If Cis a second-level mplace predicate, then (A) is a subset of Bs * 1 * Bg, where for 1$iSn, A if (C)is an individual Be [Pra if i(C)is an mplace predicate ((O) beitg the ith argument of ©. If Cis a second-level n-place functor, then f(A) is a function from By X ... ¥ Bs into Byes, where for 1SSnt1, Bis as defined in (c). ‘A logical constant C is defined over all models (for the logic) ‘A logical constant C is defined by a function fe which is invariant under isomorphic structures. That is, the following conditions hold: If Cis a first-level m-place predicate, A and A’ are models with uni- verses A and A’ respectively, €A%, €A®, and the structures > and > ate isomorphic, then € f(A) iff Dyna € f(A"). If Cis a second-level mplace predicate, A and A’ are models with universes A and A’ respectively, €Bi * ou. * Boy BY * 1. * Bly, (where for 1$iSn, Band By are as in (Coo), and the structures >s > are isomorphic, then € f(A) iff € f(a?) Analogously for functors. [bid, 54-5) 2, Gimez.Torrente's Criticism According to Gémez-Torrente, the above definition provides a necessary but not a sufficient condition for logical constancy. His criticism proceeds in three ste} 1. Tarski’s (1966) definition of logical constants (a restricted version of my condition (E)) fails: [Mibe gestion whether Tank's defnion provides & sft condition for lg constancy, even forthe ‘casi quafexsonal languages for which iis ntended erm to have a lear negasveanrwer. A counte ‘example Would be produced i 50 to speak “by chance” some ConSants noe yp ested 3 log de noted nosonsinvanant ander permutation ia a uriverss of discourse, Peruave counterexamples ofthis {nd rerl if we consider priate aot tested as logeal and which are predicated flu ofa india in all ewverses, These predicues denote loged notion nal universes, ame the empty set (oem, they de ‘ote the empry rer inal posible universes “Unicom he pahedron and male widow ate god cana, by epaahedroa’ I abbrevte regular polyhedron of even ees [Gamez-Torrete (2002), 185) "Henceforth I will assume that this isthe English meaning of ‘heptshedron’[A Charscxetion of Loge! Constants I Possible mt 2, Sher (1991) — ie, my characterization — purports to overcome the problem with ‘arski’s definition by introducing Condition (B): (Gita She (191) as proposed a Aefinton oll constancy ashe asco sidered an objeto et [proponl seaal-anagoo 0 he ane aed onthe existence of tees encom, Me labo Ia ‘Sede to deny relevance this objeeon, Sher sys ha under ex propos loge tem tii wit he (Gsssancdon tar gs to every convene the enotton ofthe ten inte nies: log terme ate iene wht (cl) extensions, otha in the tcetheoy the deons flog: cal terms ae ig.) Th (cua) extensions deeming oe ad te sue frcon over model and this funn rs legate log operso.(-)~ we ny sa hat the only wy 0 undead dhe mca ing of cm aed at» legal consae 1 Sad ry and foray, ce, 1 Mes wth the rate Rein ta sean defies Sher (1991)] 6465). {Gémes-Toeente 02, 1819} 3. Condition (B) fails to overcome the problem with Tarski’s definition: “This counerojecson it highly problemas. Suppose me had »peimiiveone-place logical peedcte “in Inathemadel languages, whove meng was gen sly bythe pala that abbrevates te expression Se oot densi with tel. Under Sher propos se term, and ence the sentences "Yun epabedzon() and “x~male widow(a most be 1 lgialy te Gn the itive seme) 28 Wa~ O(a “Ve ats)) would appear to be.» Sine sentences like "Ve~anicon(s, "Ve~hepabedro(a ‘Wi~mae widow (2 ~ are mt logical eth ia any radon senee of loge! tr, seems cleat tome that She's hve ie not seep ex ey of meting the ob (us objection posed by tems ie ise, 1] 3. Rebuttal It is a well-known and obvious fact that truth is relative to the use of words. If ‘uri- com’ were used as ‘elephant’ is commonly used in English, che sentence “Vx~unicorn(x)’ would be false, It is also quite obvious that the sentences “Vx~unicorn(x)’, ‘Vx~heptahedron(a)’ and ‘Vx~male widow (3) are not logically true when their English terms are sed as they are ordinarily used in Engh the truth of “Vx~unicorn(x)’ is based on a zoological fact, that of ‘Wx~heptahedron(s)’ on a geo- metrical fact, and that of ‘Vx~male widow (2)’ on a linguistic fact. Are they logically true when cheir English terms are used in a non-standard way? That depends on how the terms are used. If ‘unicorn’ is used in the way ‘non self identical is commonly used in English, then (under this use) ‘V2~unicorn(x)’ is logically true. All his is compatible ‘with my proposal. It follows from this proposal that the terms ‘unicorn’ ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’, as thy are commonly used in English, are extra-togical rather than logi- cal, and as such they are “strongly variable”, ic., every formally possible extension compatible with their syntactic category is assigned to them in some model (Sher 1991: 47-8). In particular, these constants are assigned non-empty extensions in some models; in these models the sentences ‘Vx~unicorn(x)’, “Vx~heptahedron(x)’ and “Wx~male widow (3)’ are false; hence, these sentences do not come out logically truc. Does the proposal adivcatea non-standard use of English terms? No. The proposal of- fers a set of conditions for using a term as a logical constant in a given language, but it does not attempt to reform ordinary English or to legislate how a term like ‘unicorn’192 Ga soma should be used in semi-arificial languages (or how a symbol whose meaning is defined using a term like ‘unicorn’ is to be used in an artificial language). Gémez-Torrente too, does not purport to legislate the use of terms in natural or artificial languages. He does not say that it is impossible, or forbidden, 60 use terms in non-standard way, eg. to use ‘unicorn’ as ‘non self identical”, What he says is that an adequate characterization of logical constants for a natural language like English, or for a semi-artificia language in which the natural-language expressions have their usual meaning, (or for a fully-artficial language in which certain symbols are defined using expressions like ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedfon’ and ‘male widow’, used as in ordinary English,) must be done in accordance with the observation that in such languages sen tences like ‘Wx~unicorn(x)’, ‘Wx~heptahedron(x)’ and “Vx~male widow (x)’ are not logically true, And he is tight. But he claims that the theory developed in Sher (1991) rendess such sentences logically reue. And this claim is wrong, To see whete the crear lie, let us examine how Gémez-Torrente arrives at this claim. His argument (ts for- mulated in the passage cited above) appears to be: 1. The constants ‘unicorn’, heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ ase Ingical accord. ing to Sher’s (1991) characterization of logical constants 2, As logical constants, ‘unicorn’, heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ are defined by functions, fiom finn aNd fashaiin, Which assign t0 every model A the empty set as its value, 3. As a result, the sentences “Vx~unicomn( “Vx~male widow(x)’ are true in all models. ", ‘Wx~heptahedron(s)’. and 4. It follows that these sentences are logically true according to Sher’s theory. This argument, however, relies on an erroneous premise, namely (1). Why does Gémez-Torsente believe that (1) is true? Hlis argument for (1) appears to be the fol- lowing: 4. ‘®” is 0 logical constant according to the definition of logical constants in Sher (1991). b. Under Sher’s proposal "@’, ‘unicorn’, heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ ate all the same term. ©. Therefore, under Sher's proposal, ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’, and ‘male widow’ are logical constants. But this argument, to0, is based on an efroneous premise, namely, (b). Why does Gémez-Torrente believe that () holds according to Sher (1991)? He does not say. My conjecture is that he reasons as follows: @ According to Sher (1991) logical constants are identified with their extension, (@ The extension of ‘®” is the empty set, the extension of ‘unicorn’ is the empty set, the extension of ‘heptahedron’ is the empty set, and the extension of ‘male widow’ is the empty setA Characterization of Logical Constants Ir Possible 93 (i) Therefore, according to Sher (1991), “®’, ‘unicorn’, heptahedron’ and ‘male ‘widow’ are the same term. But (ii) does not follow from () and (i). What does fallow from @) and (iis: Gi’) If ‘unicorn’, heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ are logical constants according to Sher’s definition, and if their extensions in all models are the same as in the actual world, then they are the same logical constant as “0”. But (i’) is a different conclusion from (i. ‘The correctness of Gémez-Torrente’s criticism thus depends on whether ‘unicorn’, ‘neptahedron’ and ‘male widow’, as they are used in the sentences above, afe logical constants according to my propostl. I will show that they are not. 1. Unicorn’. Let ‘Vx~unicorn(s)’ be a sentence of a language Lin which ‘unicorn’ has its usual English meaning. According to (LT), ‘unicorn’ is a logical constant of L Aff citer itis a teuth functional connective of Lor it satisfies the conditions (A)-(E) on logical constants in L. Clearly ‘unicorn’, as itis used in ordinary English, is not a truth- functional connective (or any other kind of connective). The question is whether it satisfies the conditions (A)-(E) in L. Let us examine these conditions one by one. Condition A. Condition (A) says that a logical constant is syntactically an n-place predicate of functor of level 1 of 2. ‘Unicorn’ is a 1-place predicate of level 1; as such it satisfies condition (A). Condition B. Condition (B) says that a logical constant is defined by a single exten- sional function and is identified ‘with its extension. The nature of this extensional function is specified in Condition (C).. Condition C. Condition (C) says that a t-place logical predicate of level 1, Gis de- fined by a function fe over models, such that for every model A with a universe A in its domain, (cassigns to A a subset of A, The domain of fc is specified in Condition ©. ‘Condition D. Condition (D) says that the domain of (cis the class of ail models for the given language; in particular, any set whatsoever, whether of existent of fictional objects, is the universe of some model’. ‘Taken together, conditions (B)-(D) say that: @) a 1-place logical predicate C of level 1 is defined by a single extensional function fe, such that (cis defined over all models fos the language, anid for every model A with a universe 4, f(A) is a subset of A; (i) the meaning of Cis fully and precisely captured by fe Can ‘unicorn’ be construed in L as a logical constant in accordance with (B)-(D)? Stsietly speaking, no. ‘Unicorn’ (as itis used in English) is a zoological predicate, and as such it is inapplicable to non-zooogical, or at least to rion-biological, objects — ‘numbers, thoughts, planets, etc. It follows that the meaning of ‘unicorn’ would not be 2 In conversation Gémez-Torrente sid that be took my definition to require that universes contain only cxintent objects. Although this GlaBcation may suffice f0 remove the mininderstanding, isk a explanation of why the exscim does not hod is required to forestall futher misunderstanding. 2 This point is emphasized i Sher (199), p. 56: “Condition (B) ensures chat logical tems ae rigid. Each Togieal term has 4 pefived meaning in the metalanguage This meaning is unchangeable and is com: pletely ehausted by is semantic definiion (the function defining i). [Undedine added,198 Gia Sun accurately captured by a function defined over models with universes consisting of (non-empty) sets of such objects. Hence construing ‘unicorn’ as a logical constant ‘would violate condition (D).. Suppose, however, that we relax (B)(D) by allowing certain conventional exten- sions of partial functions capturing the meaning of logical constants, Suppose we adopt the following principles: (@ Ifa function that precisely captures the meaning of a logical constant C is par- tial (Le, defined over a proper subclass of all models), then a conventional extension of this function that does not seriausly change the meaning of C is said to eqpture®its meaning, (©) One of the total functions that capture the meaning of C is (conventionally) designated as presiely capturing*its meaning, ‘And we require that a logical constant be defined by a total funetion that preaiehy cap- ‘ures*its meaning. Suppose, farther, that the meaning of ‘unicorn’ is precisely captured by the partial function faim, where @ the domain of fxn is the class of all models whose universes contain real or fictional animals, and (for any model A in the domain of fin if A is the universe Of A, fin(A) = the set of unicoms in A. ‘Then the sora/ function /iom defined below is said to capture* the meaning of ‘uni- comm’. For any model A, “feion( A) if Ais in the domain of fom Prosiont A) ‘The empty set otherwise Let us further (conventionally) designate /*aiwn a8 precisely capturing* the meaning of ‘unicorn’ in L, Then ‘unicorn’, as defined by /*aiom satisfies (B)-(D). Does it satisfy i) Before turning to this question let me observe that if ‘unicorn’, thus defined, is considered a logical constant, Gémez-Torrente’s criticism does not apply. The reason is that under this definition ‘unicorn’ has a non-empty extension in some models (namely, models whose universes contain mythological animals of the kind unicorn), and as a result “Vx~unicorn(x)’ will not come out logically true. Putting this issue aside, let us proceed to condition (E). Does ‘unicorn’, under the above definition, sat- isfy condition (E)? Condition E. Condition (B) says that a 1-place logical predicate of level 1, Cis de- fined by a function fe which is invasiant under isomorphisms of structures. That is, the following holds: If A and A’ are models with universes A and A? respectively, BEA, b’€A’, and the structures <4,> and > ate isomorphic, then bE f(A) iff b’€ aD.A Gharacretiation of Logical Consats I Possible 195 Icis clear that /*nian does 10t satisfy this condition, Let A be a model whose universe, ‘A, isa set of exactly one mythological animal— a unicorn, . Let A’ be 2 model whose universe, 4; is a set if exactly one number, # Then the structures <4,> and > are isomorphic, but bE fiom (A) while #’€ Pinn(A?). Similar considera. tions will apply to other construals of ‘unicorn’ as a logical constant of L: if the re- quirement that any set of objects (including sets of fictional animals) constitute the universe of some model for L is satisfied and the conditions (B)-(D) are satisfied, (E) will not be satisfied. 2. ‘Heptahedeon’, Like ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ , as it is used in L (@ language whose English terms preserve their usual meaning), is neither a truth-functional con- nective nos, strictly speaking, a constant satisfying conditions (A)-(E); ‘Heptahedron’ is a geometrical predicate, and as such it is inapplicable 10 non-geometsical objects, eg, thoughts; hence itis not defined over all models. Can we extend ‘heptahedron’ to all models along the lines described above, ie, by a partly conventional function, PProuininn that captures* it meaning? 1 will consider thsee eases: @ ‘Heptahedron’ in English is well-defined over one-sided surfaces in accordance ‘with Hilbert & Cohn-Vossen’s use (1952: 302-3), so that ‘heptahedron’ has a non-empty extension in some models. In that case we can construct _Pnpiatuéen in a way that captures* the meaning of ‘heptahedron’, eg., by pos- culating that its value for all models over which ‘heptahedron’ is not defined is the empty set. But then the reconstructed ‘heptahedron’ does not satisfy ®). (The season is similar ta that described in (i) below) {i ‘Heptahedron’ in English is restricted to two-sided surfaces in Euclidean space and we construct /*ehine 4S assigning the empty set to all models. Jn that case, (the seconstructed) ‘heptahedron’ will not satisfy (B)-(D): (B)-(D) re- quite that the definition of *heptahedron? capture* its intended meaning in Lie, its English meaning. But if we define ‘heptahedron’ by /tpuataine, this requirement is violated. Why? Because in that case she meaning of “hepta- hhedron’ in L is the same as the meaning of ‘@” in L or that of ‘non-self- identical in English. But ‘heptahedron’ is a geometrical concept, and as such its meaning in L (by assumption, its meaning. in English) is ver diferent from the meaning of the aon-geometrical concept ‘®” in L or that of ‘non self ‘denticaY in English. (ii) ‘Heptahedron’ in Bnglish is as in Gi), but we overcome the problem with (i) by constructing /*ipunine 48 a function that “regards” one (conventionally des- ignated) object with no geometric properties, 6%, as a heptahedon jin sll models to which it belongs. In thar case, however, (E) is violated, Why? Suppose A is a model with a universe A such that /Ypunem/(A) is the empty set. (There is such a model) Take a model A’ with a universe 4’ such that @) Wis a member of A’, and (b) the cardinality of 4’ is the same as the cat- dinality of A. Let # be a member of 4. Then the structures <4,> and > are isomorphic, bot bE fguanin( A) while 6°€ Pigutind( A). 3. ‘Male widow’. For similar reasons ‘male widow” is not a logical constant of L.196 casio Tt goes without saying that if we decide to use ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’, and ‘male ‘widow’ in a non-standard way (celative to theit usual English use), then, depending on how we use them, they vill or will not satisfy (LTT). For example, if we decide to use them as “the empty predicate”, ic. as a predicate whose meaning is fuly captured by a function that assigns to all models the empty set, they will. But in that ease Gémez- Torrente’s criticism will no longer hold, since under this use “Wx~unicom(x)’, “Yx~heptahedron(s)’ and ‘Wx~male widow (x)’ sill be logically true. ‘This brings us to our next topic: the task (point, goal} of characterizations of logi- cal constants. 4, Three Characterization Tasks ‘We may distinguish three types of precise and informative characterization of logical constants, according to the tasks they set out to accomplish: () a characterization of logical operators, (ji) a characterization of logical constants in logical languages, (ii) a characterization of logical constants in English (or some other natural language). A Characterization of Logical Operators. Logical operators, unlike logical constants, are not linguistic entities. Sometimes, however, the characterization of logical opera- tors is given in terms of logical constants. A classical example is the characterization of the logical connectives as truth-functional. Although this characterization is forrmu- lated as a characterization of linguistic entities (logical connectives), its main point is not linguistic: Every Boolean truth-function is a logical operator, and the logical op- erators of sentential logic are exhausted by the Boolean truth functions. ‘The challenge of developing an equally comprehensive, precise and informative characterization of logical operators for predicate logic was taken up by Mostowski (1957), Tarski (1966), Lindstrdm (1966) and others, sometimes directly — as in Tarski (1966)* and Sher (1991, Ch. 4) — and sometimes through a definition of logical constants ~ as in Sher (1991, Ch. 3) Direct characterizations of logical operators ~ e.g., Tarski’s characterization — are, to begin with, immune to csiticisms of the kind made by Gémez-Tocrente; characteri- zations of logical constants whose main aim (or one of whose main aims) is to charac terize logical operators — e.g., my characterization — are, to begin with, partially im- ‘mune. (The argument of the last section was intended to show that my characteriza tion eschews this criticism altogether) The importance of characterizations of logical constants partly lies in their embedded characterization of logical operators. ‘+ Alchough Tarski (1966 called the objects he charactesized “logical notions”, they were sot linguistic (or conceptual) entice: “T use the term ‘notion’ .. to mean, roughly speaking, objects of al possible types in some hierarchy of Ses like that in Pricpia Matbematc. Thos notions included individoals classes of individuals, rations of individuals, classes of clases of individuals, and so on.” (147) Such objects an be easly reconstrued as operators (here, functions fom models to structures of ob jects within tex), 5 In Ch 4 of Sher (1991) 1 give a characterization of logical constants “from below” chat includes adie, ‘characterization of logical operators; in Ch, 3 of Sher (1991) I give a characterization of logical con- stants “from above” that includes an indirect characterization of logical operators. The characteriea- tion I discuss inthis paper is char of Ch. 3,AcChantenaon of Lageal Costas f Posie ww (@ A Characterization of Logical Constants in Logical Languages. This is the direct aim of my characterization. The idea is that one way 10 describe the scope and nature of logic is to describe (or give a set of instructions for) the construction of a logical system, and ont important step in such a construction is the construction of logical constants, My characterization of logical constants is of this kind. It says that if you start with a background language in which the distinction berween logical and non-logical con- stants is not demarcated and you set out to construct a logical systemn with logical eon stants taken fom this language, you proceed as follows: Either () you pick out a tesm that can be introduced as a logical constant in accordance with (LT) without any sub- stantial change to its original meaning, and introduce it as a logical constant in the sys- ‘tem you are constructing, or (i) you pick out a term that cannot serve as a logical con- stant in accordance with (LT) as it stands, and change its otiginal meaning so that it can, It is in these ways that you can introduce English terms like ‘not’, ‘every’, ‘nine’, ‘the number of planets’, ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’, and ‘male widow’ (or symbols repte- senting them) as logical constants in a logical system. "Nov and ‘every’ require no gub- stantive change; ‘nine’ can be used a5 a logical constant if itis construed as @ 2nd-level predicate (predicate of predicates of individuals); ‘the number of planets’ can be used as a logical constant if it is construed as synonymous to (the 2nd-level) ‘nine’; and ‘unicom’, heptahedron’ and ‘male widow" can be used as logical constants if they are construed as synonymous with the empty predicate. To the extent that this characteri- zation of logical constants concerns their use in formal stems and is not commited to preserving their meaning in a given background language, it is also immune to the type Of cfiticism exemplified by Gémex-Torsente. (i) A Characterization of Logieal Constants in Natural Languages. This is largely an em- pirical enterprise, the enterprise of determining what terms speakers actually use as logical constants, cither commorly or in certain contexts or circumstances. It is probably true that most people normally use ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male ‘widow’ as non-logical constants, but this is an issue that neither Tarski nor I have much to say about. BIBLIOGRAPHY Gémez-Tostente, M, (2002), “The Problem of Logical Constants”, The Bullen of Symbolic Lagi vol. 8, 1- 37 —~ 2003), “Logical Consequence and Logical Expressions”. Thon this volume. Hiller, D. & S. Cohn-Vossen (1952), Geometry and be Imaynaton New York: Chelsea, nds, P. (1966), “First Order Predicate Logi with Generalized Quancifirs”. Theria Sweden), vol. 32, 18695, Mostowds, A. (1957), “On a Generalization of Quantfien”. Fendameta Mathematica, vol 44, 12-36. Sher, G. (1991), The Bound of Lgic A Geteraiced Viewpoint. Cambridge (Mase): MIT Press. ‘Fars, A, (1966), “Whae Are Logieal Notions®” Hit and Phibeoply of Lg, vo. 7 (1986) 143-58198 Gi Se Gita sien is a Professor at the University of California in San Diego. Her main areas of research are in the philosophy of logle, metaphysics and epistemology. She is the author of The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint (MIT, 1991), "On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth* (Synthese, 1998/8), and "Is There a Place for Philosophy in Quine’s Theory?” (Journal of Philosophy, 1998). ‘Address: University of California, San Diego, Department of Philosophy, 9500 Gilman Orve, La Jolla, ‘CA'92095-0119. E-mal: gsher@uced edu