Why Logical Pluralism

Synthese (2021) 198 (Suppl 20):S4947–S4968
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02132-w
S.I.: PLURALISTIC PERSPECTIVES ON LOGIC
Why logical pluralism?
Colin R. Caret1
Received: 1 July 2018 / Accepted: 8 February 2019 / Published online: 19 February 2019
© Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract
This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate
more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as
strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to
answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back
on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem
as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The present paper aims to improve this
situation by looking at a promising case study and drawing general lessons about the
kind of evidence that would support logical pluralism. I argue that the best motivation
for logical pluralism will ultimately be rooted in certain kinds of performative data.
Keywords Logic · Entailment · Consistency · Proof · Pluralism · Contextualism ·

Relativism
1 Introduction
In this paper, I will scrutinize the debate over logical pluralism with the hope of nudging
that debate in more fruitful directions. The impetus for this paper is the observation that
many arguments on both sides of the fence—those for and against logical pluralism—
are extremely blunt, offering little in the way of nuanced assessment. Critics argue
that logical pluralism is ill-defined, self-undermining, or even ‘trivially true’ (Priest
2001; Goddu 2002; Read 2006; Griffiths 2013; Keefe 2014; Eklund 2017; Stei 2017).
Those sympathetic to the pluralist cause have largely been occupied with ‘downstream’
issues, i.e. how to frame logical pluralism so as to avoid its alleged defects (Beall and
Restall 2006; Bueno and Shalkowski 2009; Hjortland 2013; Shapiro 2014b; Dicher
2016; Caret 2017; Kouri Kissel 2018). One factor that exacerbates this situation is an
all-around lack of clarity about what is at stake in the debate. The present paper aims
B Colin R. Caret
colin.caret@gmail.com
1 Yonsei University, 50 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul, South Korea
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S4948 Synthese (2021) 198 (Suppl 20):S4947–S4968
to raise the level of this debate by addressing the ‘upstream’ question of motivating
data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism?
The plan is as follows. Section 2 outlines the territory of the dispute. There are a
plethora of theories going by the name of ‘logical pluralism’ and some variations on the
pluralist theme may not be worth our time. I attempt to organize and classify different
versions of logical pluralism. Section 3 reflects on hurdles to a substantive debate. I
identify problems that arise with respect to data that has been (or could be) offered
to motivate logical pluralism. Can we do better? Section 4 engages in a detailed case
study of Shapiro’s recent work on logical pluralism, which I think provides the best
model yet for motivating the view. I criticize the way Shapiro frames the evidential
import of his own data, but there are lessons to be learned from this critique. The take
away lesson is that the best motivation for logical pluralism will ultimately be rooted
in certain kinds of performative data. This gets to the heart of disagreement between
monists and pluralists. I then speculate about future directions of the debate.
2 Logics and pluralisms
What is logical pluralism? In a slogan, it is the view that more than one logic is correct
or legitimate (Cook 2010; Russell 2016).1 This slogan, however, does not fully clarify
what the view is about and there are many ways to flesh out what it means in detail
(Carnap 1937; Beall and Restall 2000, 2006; Restall 2002; Varzi 2002; Russell 2008;
Field 2009; Bueno and Shalkowski 2009; Hjortland 2013; Shapiro 2014a, b; Pedersen
2014; Dicher 2016; Caret 2017; Kouri Kissel 2018). In this section of the paper, I
argue for a particular characterization of logical pluralism that unifies a broad range
of theories while also clarifying what makes them philosophically interesting. This is
useful for two reasons. First, since the label ‘logical pluralism’ is used by a number
of distinct theories, I need to specify which of those views play a central role in my
discussion. By classifying theories in this way, I also hope to show that there is greater
thematic unity amongst logical pluralists than there may at first appear to be. Second, I
offer an improvement on the most prevalent use of the term ‘logical pluralism’, which
is at once too demanding on the ‘logic’ side and too permissive on the ‘pluralism’
side. Shapiro (2014b, pp. 1) exemplifies this pattern when he describes his view as
concerned with ‘rigorous deduction, within various mathematical theories’ but then
goes on to say that he is a pluralist in part because terms like ‘logical consequence’ are
cluster terms, i.e. ‘A number of different, closely related notions go by those names.’
The focus on mathematics raises the worry that there may be features of mathematical
proofs that are not relevant to logic in general. Meanwhile, it does not seem that a kind
of pluralism resulting from mere terminological imprecision is worth our time. One
hopes the view is about something more contentious than the fact that certain terms
have a plurality of uses.
Cook (2010) and Shapiro (2014b) lean heavily on talk of ‘legitimacy’ to defend what
they call logic-as-modeling pluralism: the view that many logics are equally legitimate
1 Logical monism is the view that exactly one logic is correct or legitimate.
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as a result of underdetermination in our choice of explications.2 This harkens back

to Carnapian tolerance pluralism (1937), according to which logic is a stipulative
endeavor with at most pragmatic constraints on how it is deployed. Critics like Eklund
(2017) charge that these views are ‘trivially true’ because they either amount to the
claim that many logics are worthy of investigation or the claim that many logics have
useful applications. Pluralism is a vast nation and Eklund is right to highlight the fact
that not every theory flying a pluralist flag is guaranteed to be genuinely controversial or
philosophically interesting. In the broadest possible sense, a pluralistic view merely
claims that there are many things of a given kind, but we would not call ourselves
‘mammal pluralists’ just because we believe that dogs are mammals and cats are
mammals. That would be a pointless proliferation of jargon. If ‘legitimacy’ is too
easy to come by, the worry is that these forms of logical pluralism are like mammal
pluralism: straightforwardly true, but boring.3
With this in mind, I want to highlight what I call ‘pluralism proper’, a kind of view
in which something philosophically interesting is clearly at stake. In the ‘proper’ sense
of the term, ‘pluralism about X’ is the view that there are irreducibly many distinct
ways to be X. The significance of this definition comes from two of its components.
First, it involves a correctness or sufficiency condition. The expression ‘way to be X’
in this definition should be read as a success term, i.e. one that implies ‘suffices for
being X’. A way of being has no subjective or epistemic construal. For example, the
fact that a particular agent values pleasure is orthogonal to the question of whether
being pleasurable is a way for something to be morally valuable. Second, pluralism
proper also involves an irreducibility condition. A properly pluralistic view about
phenomenon X says that X is a fundamentally disunited, fragmentary phenomenon.
This pattern is exemplified by a number of extant theories from across philosophy.
Ontological pluralists like Hirsch (2002) and McDaniel (2009) reject that there is a
single, overarching category of existence in favor of the view that there are irreducibly
many ways to be (full stop).4 Value pluralists like Ross (1930) and Thomson (1997) are
proper pluralists about moral value: Ross about the ways in which an act can be right,
Thomson about the ways in which something can be good. Religious pluralists in the
tradition of Hick (2004) claim that many religious world-views are equally adequate
because there are irreducibly many ways to experience the ‘religious ultimate’. Truth
pluralists like Wright (1992) and Lynch (2009) are proper pluralists about the property
of truth: they claim that traditional realist and anti-realist criteria of truth both had part
of the picture right.5 How would pluralism proper be transposed into the realm of
logic? That raises the thorny question: what is logic?
2 The keen reader may notice that this sounds different from the kind of logical pluralism described in the
first paragraph. Shapiro adheres to a plurality of pluralist theses about logic. See also fn. 8.
3 Appeals to ‘legitimacy’ are not only potentially too liberal, but also occur in puzzling places: “If there is
only one legitimate relation that underlies at least the main uses of phrases like “valid”…then folk-relativism
and pluralism concerning logic are both false” (Shapiro 2014b, p. 21). What is a legitimate relation? Isn’t
it enough if the phrase expresses one relation simpliciter?
4 The preferred formulation of ontological pluralism is in explicitly ideological terms, viz. that the most
perspicuous description of fundamental ontology is one expressed in a language with multiple quantifiers
ranging over disjoint ‘categories of being’.
5 Lynch (2009), Pedersen (2014), and Cotnoir and Edwards (2015) also try to forge connections between
pluralistic views about different phenomena, such as being, truth, and logic.
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Logic is usually glossed as the principles of correct reasoning, but the term ‘logic’
is at least three ways ambiguous in contemporary use: it can refer to a topic, an
interdisciplinary line of research (i.e. what logicians do), or a ‘mathematical toolbox’
that is widely used in that line of research (e.g. calculi for probability and proofs).
Clearly, there are many systems of symbolic logic and many logicians with different
agendas, but these pluralistic claims are uncontroversial and uninteresting. On the other
hand, pluralism proper about ‘logic’ in the first sense of the term promises much richer
possibilities, if we can clarify the nature of logic as a topic. While there is no single
phenomenon studied by all logicians, the traditional concerns of logic divide along
descriptive and normative dimensions. On the normative side, logic is about policies
of responsible belief-maintenance applicable to real cognitive agents, while on the
descriptive side, logic is occupied with alethic relations like consistency, coherence,
validity, and support defined in terms of the aim of belief, viz. truth. Here we face a
choice about how to orient our characterization of logical pluralism because we do
not want to just conflate descriptive and normative subjects.
Most self-avowed logical pluralists prioritize the descriptive side of logic, so I will
follow suit and henceforth use the word ‘logic’ to refer to the topic of alethic relations
like consistency and validity. If there is one topic at the heart of logic, so conceived, it
is the phenomenon is alethic support, where the premises of an argument are said to
support its conclusion just in case the truth of the premises makes a difference to the
truth of the conclusion. Symbolic logics and informal argumentation theory approach
this phenomenon in their own ways, as do formal epistemology and research methods
broadly speaking. Many logicians are exclusively interested in specific manifestations
of alethic support like the standards of mathematical proof, but in the spirit of greater
generality I will use the unqualified term ‘logical pluralism’ to refer to any properly
pluralistic view about alethic support. By contrast with current practice, this charac-
terization is more permissive on the ‘logic’ side, encompassing views about induction
just as much as those about deduction, yet more demanding on the ‘pluralism’ side,
eschewing merely terminological sources of plurality.
With this definition in mind, several versions of logical pluralism come into view
that have not been previously acknowledged. I will briefly catalog these views and
show where existing versions of logical pluralism fit into the landscape. The following
theories certainly do not share all the same theses and, for that reason, may appear
somewhat dissimilar, but I will show how each of them exemplifies the pattern of
logical pluralism described above. I am not trying to defend these views at the moment,
I am merely illustrating how the territory of logical pluralism looks different from the
perspective of the above definition.
One possible version of logical pluralism arises from the rift between inductive and
deductive standards of support. After all, even in the strongest inductive argument,
the truth of the premises only raises the probability that the conclusion is true (the
premises confirm the conclusion), whereas in valid deductive arguments, the truth of
the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion (the premises entail the conclusion).
Is there a fundamentally unified phenomenon that subsumes these different standards
or is the distinction between inductive and deductive support irreducibly primitive? A
monistic answer to this question is implicit in systems of inductive logic that treat con-
firmation as a generalization of entailment (Keynes 1921; Carnap 1950). This suggests
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that entailment is just the limiting case of confirmation that holds when the premises
of an argument confer ‘full’ probabilistic support on its conclusion. Such a reduc-
tion might, however, be contested on the grounds that confirmatory strength seems to
depend in part on factors external to an argument, whereas entailment depends only on
internal, structural factors, i.e. the semantic properties of sub-sentential expressions
occurring in the argument.6 While these claims are too imprecise to assess them in
their present form, the point is simply that the following statement captures a possible
version of logical pluralism based around the divide between inductive and deductive
standards of support.
Degree-Based Logical Pluralism (DLP): the view that there are irreducibly many
ways in which the premises of a given argument can support its conclusion,
e.g. (probabilistically) confirming vs. (necessarily) entailing.
Beall and Restall (2006, p. 28) approvingly mention a view like DLP in passing, though
they only treat it as an analogy for what they officially call ‘logical pluralism’. They
say that it is common to distinguish between inductive and deductive standards of
support (or ‘following from’), but they do not remark on whether this is an irreducible
distinction or merely a common way of speaking. In this respect, DLP is a more
interesting view because it has explicitly bolder commitments.
Other possible versions of logical pluralism would identify fragmentation of some
kind for specific manifestations of alethic support. An example from the history of
philosophy: medieval philosophers distinguished between entailments that hold in
virtue of ‘categorematic’ material, i.e. the singular terms and predicates occurring in
an argument, as opposed to entailments that hold purely in virtue of argument form
(Read 2012). A contemporary approximation of this distinction is the contrast between
the lexical entailments of descriptive linguistics and the formal entailments of symbolic
logic.7 The latter is often simply called ‘logical consequence’ in textbooks, but I want
to label it differently for the sake of maintaining my policy of using the word ‘logic’ in
a broader and more inclusive way. Lexical entailments are meant to hold in virtue of
semantic relations like synonymy (inter-changeable lexical meaning) and hyponymy
(where one lexical meaning is a species of another), as in the following example: ‘A taxi
ran out of fuel’ lexically entails ‘A vehicle ran out of fuel’. This looks like a counterpart
to the medieval notion of entailment grounded in the material of the argument. On the
other hand, entailments in symbolic logic are still to this day explicitly said to hold in
virtue of argument form, as in the following typical example: ‘ϕ and ψ’ formally entails
ϕ. Is there a fundamentally unified phenomenon that subsumes both types of relations
or is the distinction between lexical and formal entailment irreducibly primitive? A
monistic answer to this question might be motivated by the view that entailments are
all grounded in semantic facts. In that case, we might think that formal entailment is
just the limiting case of lexical entailment that deals with functional lexical categories
like the connectives. This reduction might, however, be contested on the grounds
that the standard definition of connectives that give rise to the properties of ‘formal-
logical’ entailment requires significant abstraction from the behavior of their natural
6 Though see Iacona (2018) for some complications with this standard picture.
7 I only say ‘approximation’ because the kind of distinctions drawn by medieval philosophers and those
drawn by contemporary philosophers do not exactly line up. It is only a family resemblance.
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language counterparts (Glanzberg 2015). In that case, formal entailment may be seen
as a kind of mathematical structure far removed from the concrete, communicative
underpinnings of lexical entailment. This is obviously quite sketchy, but the point is
simply that it is possible to defend a version of logical pluralism based on different
types of entailments.
Entailment-Based Logical Pluralism (ELP): the view that there are irreducibly
many ways in which the premises of a given argument can entail its conclusion, e.g.
lexical entailment vs. formal entailment.
Russell (2008) defends a view in the vicinity of ELP by drawing on the observation that
entailment can be said to hold between the sentences of an argument, their propositional
contents, or their Kaplanian characters. Whether the premises of an argument entail
its conclusion depends in part on ‘the depth of the interpretation’ (Russell 2008, p.
609). Since there are many levels at which we can analyze the truth-bearers involved
in an argument, there are many entailment relations between such relata: sentential,
propositional, etc. What makes this view properly pluralistic is the claim that none of
these relations is reducible to the other.
One final version of logical pluralism worth mentioning is the view that some
kind of fragmentation occurs at the level of formal entailment (‘logical consequence’)
specifically. This kind of view has received a great deal of attention in recent years and
is what most people associate with logical pluralism. Advocates of this view do not
generally spend a lot of time motivating the features they take to be distinctive of formal
entailment. Rather, they make the following standard assumptions: that argument form
is individuated syntactically and that certain models or rules for the ‘formal’ parts of
syntax determine which forms are valid. In a slogan, formal entailment is a relation of
necessary-truth-preservation in virtue of argument form. Such relations, however, do
seem to proliferate. The classical definition of formal entailment accepts the principles
of excluded middle and double-negation elimination, which encode something like the
determinacy of metaphysical possibilities, while the intuitionistic definition of formal
entailment rejects these principles, which encodes something like the indeterminacy of
constructive space. Is there a fundamentally unified phenomenon of formal entailment
that subsumes both of these relations or is the distinction irreducibly primitive? A
monistic answer to this question is inevitable if we think formal entailment is absolute
in the sense that univocal notions of ‘preservation’ and ‘form’ apply equally to all
arguments. In that case, we might come to see classical entailment as the limiting
case of intuitionistic entailment, i.e. one that is ‘locally accurate’ when constructive
constraints are irrelevant. Such reductions have, however, been contested by pluralists.
Varzi (2002)—inspired by some throw-away remarks of Tarski (1986)—contends that
a given argument can have a plurality of distinct forms. On this view, we have to first
isolate the vocabulary that matter to us, which then defines a notion of form relative
to our interests. Another route to pluralism about formal entailment turns on the idea
that there can be more than one way in which an argument form necessarily preserves
truth (Beall and Restall 2006; Bueno and Shalkowski 2009). On this view, a formal
entailment relation is always qualified by a particular, restrictive modal operator or
set of ‘cases’. There are also pluralists who argue that formal entailment cannot be
resolved independently of the discourse to which it is applied (Shapiro 2014a, b; Kouri
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Kissel and Shapiro 2017).8 On this view, formal entailment is univocally defined over
all arguments, but the scope of this quantifier ‘all’ is restricted to the current domain of
inquiry. Although they diverge over the details, these views all arrive at the following
version of logical pluralism in one way or another.
Formal-Entailment-Based Logical Pluralism (FLP): the view that there are irre-
ducibly many ways in which the premises of a given argument can formally entail
its conclusion, e.g. classically vs. intuitionistically.
If this sounds like a ‘trivial’ and uninteresting thesis, bear in mind that it is explicitly
intended as a properly pluralistic claim. In particular, FLP is not just the view that
some formal entailments hold according to one symbolic logic and fail according
to another. That claim is completely uncontroversial. FLP says that more than one
symbolic logic actually gives a correct definition of ‘the’ formal entailment relation.
We have now canvassed several possible pluralistic views about alethic support.
It is worth noting that this exercise also points the way toward a related family of
views, which indicate potential avenues of future research. Notions of entailment and
consistency are often intimately inter-related or even inter-definable, as are notions of
confirmation and coherence. If the phenomenon of alethic support is fragmented at
some level, this may be accompanied by a plurality of different standards of consistency
or coherence. This is yet another direction in which the present approach promises to
enrich the landscape of logical pluralism.
In sum, I have argued that we should conceive of logical pluralism as the view that
there are an irreducible plurality of support relations (of some kind). For the logical
pluralist, alethic support is a fragmented phenomenon and ‘apparent rivalry [between
logical theories] is merely apparent’ (Haack 1978, p. 223). This definition is not only
consonant with most extant versions of logical pluralism, but also provides a general
perspective from which we can appreciate how a variety of pluralistic views relate
to one another. It is, however, equally important to see what was excluded from this
discussion: Carnap (1937) and Field (2009) are influential pluralists, but they have very
different priorities from other logical pluralists. They both prioritize the normative side
of logic and, furthermore, they both hold that logical norms of belief are individualistic
and voluntary, which allows for a plurality of different ‘logics’ to arise (see Steinberger
2017 on Carnap’s voluntarism). While these views are important, their concerns are
so far removed from the phenomenon of alethic support that they deserve a separate
discussion of their own.
3 Motivational hurdles
The question at the heart of this paper is as follows: what does good motivating data
for logical pluralism look like? Given our taxonomy above, the answer seems to be
that any evidence of an irreducible plurality of support relations counts in favor of
logical pluralism. This is technically correct, but utterly uninformative. One wants to
8 This ‘discourse relative’ pluralism is yet another kind of pluralism endorsed by Shapiro, but it is much
more interesting than some of the things he regards as ‘pluralistic theses’ such as the aforementioned ‘cluster
term’ thesis about the term ‘logical consequence’. See also fn. 2.
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know what that looks like. I will make some general, programmatic remarks before
turning to an instructive case study in the next section.
Can we ‘observe’ that the truth of certain claims makes a difference to the truth
of some other claim? Do we just ‘see’ that the premises of an argument support its
conclusion? Not in the same way that we observe nearby physical events. After all,
events are discrete, concrete individuals whereas alethic support is not only relational
but also abstract and repeatable. Furthermore, the support relation is defined in terms
of the property of truth, which is independently problematic to ‘detect’ or analyze.
Sometimes we can judge whether a claim is true under certain conditions. Often as
not we disagree. This is just a quick way of gesturing at why it is difficult to pin down
the nature of evidence for logical theories, but in this respect perhaps it is no more
difficult than understanding the nature of evidence for epistemological or metaphysical
theories. Which is to say, this is no reason to despair. There are some arguments with
respect to which we get a distinctive, forceful impression of alethic support. Anyone
will agree that the premise “Kyoto is beautiful” supports the conclusion “Something
is beautiful”. How do these clear-cut examples function? Perhaps our philosophical
intuitions are the data we rely on for logical theories generally and logical pluralism
specifically. Logical pluralists often do lean on such a methodology, but there are
various reasons to buck this trend.
Whether or not we should be skeptics about intuitions in general, I submit that log-
ical pluralists should aspire to better data. The literature is plagued by unproductive,
clashing judgments. For one thing, evidence about the properties of support relations
must appeal to an understanding of the nature and constitution of arguments. The case
for logical pluralism specifically relies on evidence that standards of support funda-
mentally vary in some way. The less clarity we have about the identity conditions
of arguments or the less forceful an impression of varying standards, the weaker the
motivation for pluralism. Furthermore, if there is a straightforward monistic interpre-
tation of the data available, then the case for pluralism is that much shakier. Appeals to
intuition are particularly subject to these worries because intuitions are not shared by
everyone and they can often be explained away as a byproduct of confounding factors.
This kind of situation puts the pluralist on the back foot.
To see how these problems could deleteriously infect the debate over logical plu-
ralism, consider the debate over ‘logical vocabulary’. It is tempting to view this as a
source of pluralistic succor. The logical vocabulary are meant to be the expressions
that contribute to the form of an argument as opposed to its matter. Conjunction and
the existential quantifier are usually considered to be paradigm examples of expres-
sions that contribute to form, while proper names and common nouns are part of the
matter. If we find this contrast interesting, we might start to wonder exactly what sets
the former expressions apart from the latter. What makes them special? The most
popular answer to this question is the invariantist view that categorizes the logical
vocabulary as expressions whose extensions are invariant under some important class
of transformations (Sher 1991; Bonnay 2008). For this to work, all expressions need
to be assigned extensions. To illustrate the idea, we might, e.g. treat the extension of a
quantifier as a set of subsets of the domain. The standard quantifiers can be interpreted
in this vein as follows: the extension of the universal ‘for all’ always includes just
one unique subset of the domain, viz. the whole domain, while the extension of the
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existential ‘for some’ includes every subset of the domain apart from the empty set.
While this looks somewhat different from the usual textbook definition of a quantifier,
it is sensible enough if we think of these subsets as the parts of the domain relevant to
whether the given quantifier applies to an open formula: is it satisfied by the objects in
any of the relevant subsets? As usual, the extension of a common noun like ‘kangaroo’
is effectively just an arbitrary set of objects. But this makes all the difference in the
world: the extension of such a common noun changes if we reorganize the objects in
the domain, but the extensions of the quantifiers do not because the relevant subsets
are the same ones even after their elements are reorganized.9
Impressed by the novelty and precision of the invariantist project, we might be
seduced into thinking that it also motivates logical pluralism along the lines of
ELP, viz. the view that there are irreducibly distinct types of entailments. After all,
invariantism seems to reveal a substantial difference in kind between ‘formal’ and
‘non-formal’ vocabulary. If entailments are grounded in the properties of sub-sentential
expressions, then such a distinction between kinds of vocabulary yields a correspond-
ing difference between ‘formal’ and ‘non-formal’ entailments. This is a hypothetical
argument of my own invention, but it offers a useful cautionary tale. The invariantist
project did not discover a distinction amongst vocabulary, it assumed that we need
such a distinction (Sagi (2014, p. 261), Novaes (2012, p. 405)). The reliance on such
assumptions is evident in the way invariantists disagree with one another about the
kind of ‘transformations’ that matter and how this influences the demarcation of logical
vocabulary. MacFarlane (2000, pp. 207–214) shows, in fact, that a specific invariantist
criterion only precisely demarcates vocabulary relative to background assumptions
about ‘intrinsic’ semantic structure that are often hidden from view. In other words,
intuitions about formality are built into the project from the start and while invari-
antism may systematize those intuitions, it does not justify them. The hypothetical
argument for pluralism that we are entertaining is subject to a kind of naturalistic
fallacy: no one can disagree that key expressions in certain entailments are invariant
in a specific technical sense, but we can still disagree about whether that makes them
distinctively formal (cf. Lycan 1989). If we want to motivate a distinction between
types of entailments, we will not get anywhere by relying on a theory that assumes
such a distinction from the start.10
Although the example above is purely hypothetical, when we examine the cited
motives of avowed logical pluralists, we find that they often have similar shortcomings.
Beall and Restall (2006, pp. 30–31) attempt to motivate their brand of FLP with the
claim that ‘There appear to be at least two senses of ‘validity’ or ‘follows from’.’
What apparent variation are they referring to? They illustrate this claim by appeal
to ECQ, the form of argument that proceeds from a contradictory premise A ∧ ¬A
to any conclusion C. Beall and Restall insist that we get a forceful impression of
varying standards of entailment from such arguments. They elaborate that in one way,
ECQ seems valid because there is no consistent case where the premises are true
without the conclusion being true, but in another way, ECQ seems invalid because the
9 This is a crude sketch of permutation invariance, which is really one specific version of invariantism.
There are other versions based on other types of transformations. Permutation invariance was originally
advanced by Tarski (1986) and will suffice to illustrate the points I want to make.
10 Thanks to two anonymous referees for raising concerns that helped me clarify this section.
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premises are irrelevant to the conclusion. There are several reasons why this is clearly
not good motivation. As I said before, intuitions are fragile, not everyone shares the
same intuitions about whether support is present or absent in any given argument. The
purported intuitions put forth by Beall and Restall are problematic because they are
especially brute. Beall and Restall assert that they feel a pull in both directions, but
this kind of personal report does little to clarify the evidence for anyone who does
not immediately share the same intuitions. There is an obvious reason why they chose
ECQ as their example. Anyone who teaches symbolic logic can attest that students
often baulk when they are first told that ECQ is valid, but this response is usually the
byproduct of a confounding factor, viz. that the student is confusing entailment with
warrant to believe. This opens the data up to a monist interpretation on which the
‘irrelevance’ intuition is orthogonal to whether the entailment holds.
Beall and Restall have a ready response to this move. When they elaborated on
the varying standards of entailment, they were not alluding to this kind of epistemic
notion of relevance. On their view, formal entailment (‘logical consequence’) is offi-
cially defined as truth-preservation in all cases. Furthermore, they claim that cases
partition into irreducibly disjoint types characterized by different structural proper-
ties. One category of ‘cases’ are what they call ‘situations’, which are highly flexible in
the sense that there are both negation-incomplete and negation-inconsistent situations.
They define relevant entailment as truth-preservation in all situations. So, when they
say that the contradictory premises of an ECQ argument are irrelevant to its (arbi-
trary) conclusion, they are simply saying that we can describe a negation-inconsistent
situation where the premises hold but the conclusion does not hold. The problem is
that this clarification undermines the alleged motivation because it is subject to a kind
of naturalistic fallacy: no one can disagree that the premises of an ECQ argument
are irrelevant to its conclusion in this technical sense, but we can still disagree about
whether this makes the argument invalid. Ultimately, the importance of the alleged
data turns on whether negation-inconsistent situations have any role in determining
entailment. We may be able to answer that question philosophically, but doing so takes
us far afield from compelling, theory-neutral data.
In sum, the ideal motivating data for logical pluralism will not be a result of opacity
about argument individuation, but it will give a robust, forceful impression of varying
standards of support that cannot easily be ‘explained away’. The more this is achieved
independently of contentious philosophical agenda, the stronger the evidence for logi-
cal pluralism. Unfortunately, the cited motives of some pluralists fall short of this ideal,
which sets their view on weak foundations and gives the impression that nothing hangs
on the debate. There is, however, an exception to this rule. In the next section, I will
engage in a case study of Shapiro’s recent work on logical pluralism, which points the
way toward better means of dialectical engagement.
4 A case study
4.1 Why Shapiro?
Shapiro (2014a, b) draws attention to noteworthy mathematical data as the primary

motivation for his brand of FLP, i.e. the view that formal entailment is resolved dif-
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ferently relative to different areas of discourse. He only identifies examples of such

fragmentation within mathematics, but if entailments vary between parts of mathemat-
ics, it follows more generally that there is no unified phenomenon of entailment. In
this section, I analyze Shapiro’s case for logical pluralism with an eye toward extract-
ing methodological lessons. I focus on this particular view because it strikes me that
the data to which Shapiro appeals is exemplary, but that he often undersells or even
misrepresents its evidential import. In the core chapter of his recent book, Shapiro
(2014b) suggests that an eclectic Hilbertian stance toward mathematics is essential
to appreciating the mathematical data. That would make the motivations for the view
rather theory-laden. Of course, it is entirely possible that this is correct, i.e. that the
proffered data will only be of interest those who already share Shapiro’s views in
the philosophy of mathematics. This does not, however, seem to me to be the case.
My quarrel is not with Hilbertianism per se, but with the claim that one must be a
Hilbertian in order to appreciate the evidential pull of the mathematical data. I will
argue that the data is, in fact, compelling to anyone who is enough of a naturalist to
respect the autonomy of scientific disciplines. That is what makes it so interesting.
Apart from clarifying the virtues of a particular set of data, this discussion also
serves to highlight what makes a certain argument strategy effective. I submit that
Shapiro’s data is admirable because it is so compelling regardless of one’s stance on
controversial philosophical issues. It also gives more than just a ‘good first impression’
of pluralism. The options for staunchly holding onto logical monism in the face of
this data are rather unpalatable, requiring the monist to make questionable judgments
about the variable successes of different scientific practices. There are general lessons
to be learned about where pluralists should look for motivating data in the future
and how they should convey the evidential import of this data. Before reaching those
conclusions, however, let me describe the structure of Shapiro’s book.
The book has seven chapters, but they group together in four parts. Chapters 1–2
set the stage by defining key concepts like ‘consequence’, ‘logical vocabulary’, ‘rel-
ativism, and ‘pluralism’. Various pluralistic views of logic are described and lightly
criticized for not going far enough. Chapter 3 presents the core argument for pluralism,
which we will discuss extensively in the rest of this paper. The argument turns on data
from constructive mathematics. An earlier rehearsal of this argument was also pub-
lished in (2014a). Chapters 4–5 reflect on how logical pluralism impacts the meaning
of terms like ‘valid’ and the meaning of connectives like ‘not’. The last part of the
book in Chapters 6–7 deals with the meta-theoretic logical resources that pluralists
need to state their pluralistic view of logics.
4.2 Just the facts
Turning to mathematics itself: it is well-known that shortly after Frege and Russell
championed classical logic as the backbone of secure mathematical theories, a rival
system of intuitionistic logic was championed by Brouwer and Heyting for the same
purpose. This spawned a research program of mathematics conducted within explicitly
constructive constraints, i.e. according to the strictures of intuitionistic logic. What is
somewhat less widely-known is that developments in constructive mathematics have
123
continued into the present day and have far outstripped the wildest predictions of the
founding figures of this movement. Some constructive theories are incommensurate
with classical logic, yet they are internally consistent and exhibit the hallmarks of any
rich and fruitful branch of mathematics.
An illustrative example is Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis (SIA), a fascinating con-
structive branch of analysis. SIA allows us to compute derivatives and integrals of
functions, but also arguably does a better job than any alternative theory of capturing
the ‘smoothness’ of the continuum. This is in part because it treats the identities of
certain quantities as indeterminate, the result of which is that the continuum is irre-
ducible to a set of points. To see how this might be a strength of the theory, it might help
to briefly recount the formative years of mathematical analysis and the invention of
the calculus. When they invented the calculus, Leibniz and Newton posited ‘infinitely
small’ or ‘infinitesimal’ quantities with a curious dual nature. The infinitesimals are
often described as being arbitrarily close to zero, but what is that supposed to mean? In
this guise, the derivative of a function can be thought of as its slope over any infinites-
imal interval, i.e. the rate of change no matter how small the interval of change may
be. But now a problem looms: infinitesimals have to be distinct from zero and from
each other while, at the same time, if two quantities are only ‘infinitesimally far apart’
they are actually identical. In other words, if ε is an infinitesimal, then it is important
for some purposes that ε = 0 and it is important for others purposes that ε = 0.11 To
avoid an outright contradiction, classical analysis came to view talk of infinitesimals
as a metaphor.
One way to take the notion literally, however, is to define infinitesimals somewhat
indirectly and restrict certain operations on them. Call a nilsquare infinitesimal any
quantiity ε such that ε2 = 0. Notice how this is a natural regimentation of the informal
notion of a quantity that is so close to zero as to be indiscernible from it. The concept of
a nilsquare is well-defined in any branch of analysis, but its behavior varies. According
to classical analysis, of course, there is just one nilsquare, viz. zero itself, but that need
not be the case in a constructive setting. SIA is defined in a background of intuitionistic
logic, taking the usual axioms of an algebraic ordered field and supplementing them
with the axiom of micro-affineness that says: for any function f and number x, there is
unique number d such that for all nilsquares ε, it is the case that f (x + ε) = f x + dε.
This implies that the set of nilsquares ‘can be translated and rotated but it cannot be
bent’ and, thus, is not identifiable with any particular point (Hellman 2006, p. 626).
Furthermore, it implies that all functions are linear over the set of infinitesimals, which
massively simplifies the computation of derivatives as envisioned in the early calculus.
Much more can be said about the mathematical achievements of this theory and its
applications in geometry, but for present purposes we want to focus on its logical
properties. According to SIA, not all nilsquares are identical with zero.
SIA ¬∀x(x 2 = 0 → x = 0)
11 For more on the early calculus, see Colyvan (2008) and Bell (2017).
123
Moreover, according to SIA, every nilsquare is indistinct from zero.
SIA ∀x(x 2 = 0 → ¬(x = 0))
In fact, according to SIA, identity is generally indeterminate.
SIA ¬∀x(x = 0 ∨ ¬(x = 0))
This is a corollary of the SIA principle of micro-cancellation: if εa = εb for all nil-

squares ε, then a = b. Using micro-cancellation, there is a reductio proof from the
supposition that every nilsquare is or is not identical with 0 to the absurd conclusion
that 1 = 0. This avoids the traditional, imminent contradiction about infinitesimals
by rejecting both their identity with and distinctness from zero. It is also where the
intuitionistic rubber hits the road and we begin to see what makes this theory incom-
mensurate with classical logic. All constructive theories restrict the use of Excluded
Middle (EM), but SIA goes far beyond such restrictions. It actually has contra-
classical theorems. That is, if we apply fully classical standards of entailment to
such a theory, this would result in an absurd set of commitments, i.e. SIA+EM is
negation-inconsistent and, thus, trivial in the sense that it has every sentence as a
theorem.12
In addition to all of the above, SIA also enjoys an intuitionistically-acceptable con-
sistency proof. For example, Bell (2008) shows how to construct a model of SIA from
the category of smooth manifolds. Since this proof draws on the resources of category
theory, it is only a relative consistency proof, but that puts it on par with any consistency
proof in classical mathematics. What we have with SIA is an example of a rich and
fruitful theory that captures historically significant ideas, yet is incommensurate with
classical logical standards and, at the same time, provably consistent by intuitionistic
logical standards. This is surely theory-neutral data, but what exactly does it indicate
about the unity (or otherwise) of entailment?
4.3 Philosophy of mathematics
I think it is fair to say that SIA will appear as quite the anomaly to anyone who
is not already acquainted with this niche area of contemporary mathematics. Any
philosopher with an interest in logic and mathematics will probably feel an urge to
understand what is going on here. For the sake of simplicity, let us imagine that the
only available mathematical data divides cleanly into two kinds. On the one hand, we
have theories that are like SIA in being constructive and incommensurate with classical
logic, and on the other hand we have classical mathematical theories that are unlike SIA
12 Because it has ECQ. This ‘contra-classicaity’ is what interests Shapiro. It is not a feature unique to SIA,
though the case of SIA is particularly interesting (at least historically) because it did not emerge from the
Brouwerian program. Bell and Hellman note that this is, in some sense, why it is especially challenging to
give any classical re-interpretation of SIA. More on this below.
123
in these ways.13 This is an inaccurate picture, as Shapiro (2014b, pp. 82–86) himself
recognizes, but this simplifying assumption makes it easier to think about the potential
significance of such data. In outline, three options are then available.
A classical monist holds that there is a fundamentally unified phenomenon of for-
mal entailment, i.e. the one defined by classical logic. To hold this view in light of
the above data, they need to explain away the importance of theories like SIA. An
intuitionistic monist holds that there is a fundamentally unified phenomenon of for-
mal entailment, i.e. the one defined by intuitionistic logic. They might view classical
mathematics as merely a degenerate part of mathematics, which as a whole should
be understood along constructive lines.14 A pluralist, meanwhile, holds that formal
entailment is fragmentary. On this view, classical and intuitionistic entailment are irre-
ducibly distinct yet perfectly on par—neither is a mere ‘simulacrum’ of entailment
and neither relation is reducible to the other.
Shapiro (2014b, p. 95) says at one point that ‘the matter of relativism and plu-
ralism concerning logic is merely terminological.’ At this stage of the discussion,
he takes himself to have shown that classical monism is a non-starter, which leaves
only intuitionistic monism and pluralism on the table.15 Shapiro is saying that dis-
agreement over this kind of division is merely terminological, i.e. only pragmatic or
aesthetic considerations about our preferred ideology are relevant. This odd remark
seems to disavow the significance of the very debate that is supposed to be the subject
of the book. I will argue that this is not only a poor choice of rhetoric, it genuinely
misrepresents the evidential import of the data.
Just before making this remark, Shapiro says that we will also see disagreements
about monism and pluralism as merely terminological in nature if we share his eclectic
Hilbertian stance toward mathematics. This is the view that ‘consistency implies exis-
tence…it is the only formal criterion for legitimacy’ (2014b, p. 83). Shapiro suggests
that this view in philosophy of mathematics is essential to the case for logical plural-
ism. According to the Hilbertian, a mathematical theory only fails qua mathematics
if it does not have some minimal logical property.16
(Hilbert) All consistent mathematical theories are legitimate.
13 We have to be careful here. Not all constructive theories stand in the same kind of antagonistic relationship
to the laws of classical logic as SIA. For example, constructive theories developed in the tradition of Bishop
(1967) are always consistent with classical logic in the sense that they restrict classical laws without ever
contradicting them. Hence, we are really talking about a handful of theories, not the entirety of constructive
mathematics as a discipline.
14 They will perhaps also need to explain away some classical theories in the process. For example, a
Brouwerian intuitionist might say that classical logic is adequate in finite domains, but not in infinite
domains. They can then easily accept some classical theories, but run into difficulties with classical theories
intended for infinite domains. Are these theories just wrong? Should they be re-interpreted? An intuitionistic
monist might have to say something about this.
15 Shapiro thinks that, realistically, a monist who is compelled in this direction by the mathematical data
would probably go even weaker than intuitionistic logic, but let’s just continue to operate with the simplifying
assumption that there are just three dialectical options.
16 Shapiro briefly floats the idea of paraconsistent mathematics. As a result, he officially widens the target
property from consistency to non-triviality (i.e. not entailing absolutely everything). The difference between
Footnote 16 continued
these two formulations of Hilbertianism make little difference to what I have to say, so I leave aside such
nuances for the time being.
123
By contrast with, e.g., heavy-weight platonism about mathematics, this sets a relatively
low bar for mathematical theories. It is a more liberal and permissive outlook insofar
as it holds a wider range of mathematical theories to be on equal footing. This has
metaphysical ramifications, according to Shapiro, because a mathematical structure
can be said to exist so long as it is the subject of a legitimate mathematical theory. For
the Hilbertian, then, logical standards determine both the scope of legitimate theories
and the corresponding ontology of mathematical structures. I don’t want to delve into
whether or not Hilbertianism is true, but I do want to discuss how it is supposed to bear
on the topic of logical pluralism. Notice that a direct inference from Hilbertianism to
pluralism is simply an instance of affirming the consequent.
(1) All consistent mathematical theories are legitimate.
(2) SIA is a legitimate mathematical theory.
∴ SIA is a consistent mathematical theory.
Of course, this conclusion seems to refute classical monism, which might pave the
way to logical pluralism. But surely this fallacious argument is not meant to be the
route by which Hilbertianism contributes to the case for logical pluralism. So what is
its role in the debate, exactly?
Shapiro does not quite put it this way, but he comes close to saying that the crux
of the debate lies in the philosophy of mathematics. He suggests that our views in
the philosophy of mathematics will be amongst the considerations that guide our
preferences toward how to speak about logic. On this construal, the case for logical
pluralism runs as follows: we should be Hilbertians and once we accept that view,
then we should have a preference for speaking about logic in pluralistic terms. This
portrays logical pluralism as a heavily theory-laden doctrine, while at once diminishes
its importance insofar as it ultimately rests on a flexible choice of terminology. Must
we adjudicate the nature of mathematical truth and ontology before we can even
judge how the mathematical data (concerning theories like SIA) bears on the unity
of entailment? This does not seem right. In the remainder of the paper, I argue for a
better understanding of how the mathematical data supports pluralistic conclusions.
The only casualty is the Hilbertian philosophy of mathematics.
4.4 Hedging against Hilbert
Even if one rejects Hilbertianism in lieu of a competing view in the philosophy of

mathematics, it seems that SIA gives just as strong an impression of logical pluralism.
This suggests a loose relationship between the two subjects. In the context of the
present debate, however, there is an obvious reason to be interested in auxiliary theses,
e.g. views drawn from the philosophy of mathematics. Not to put too fine a point on it,
but formal theories are cheap. An axiomatic mathematical theory will generally include
an explicit definition of entailment. Say that the internal standards of entailment of an
axiomatic, formal theory are those defined by its explicit background logic. Bearing
in mind pluralism proper, we want to avoid conflating internal standards of entailment
(i.e. ‘according-to-the-theory’) with entailment itself. The mathematical data shows
that different parts of mathematics conform to their own distinct internal standards
of entailment, but does it show anything more? Hilbertianism enters the discussion
123
as a way to grant each of these theories equal authority on matters of logic, but it is
unclear that this works. I will explore some ideas about how a classical monist can
explain away the data from constructive mathematics while still being a Hilbertian.
This means that even if Hilbertianism is true, the diversity of mathematical theories
does not require us to be logical pluralists.
A classical monist holds that there is a fundamentally unified phenomenon of for-
mal entailment, i.e. the one defined by classical logic. How can this be squared with
theories like SIA? Shapiro(2014b, pp. 75–81) observes that a classical monist can give
a modal translation of such a theory, but the result is ‘strained and unmotivated’. This
is apparently why he treats classical monism as a non-starter, but this line of thought
assumes that we have to put classical and constructive theories on the same logical
footing. It does not seem that Hilbertianism requires this. One blunt option for the clas-
sical monist cum Hilbertian is to not bother holding all theories to the same standards:
insist that only (classically) consistent theories are legitimate. Doesn’t this violate
the liberal and eclectic spirit of the view? Not exactly. The main point of divergence
between this Hilbertian and the one envisioned by Shapiro lies in their ‘disciplinary
regard’ for constructive mathematics. Both respect and value such theories, but the
classical monist resists the thought that SIA is valuable because it describes a math-
ematical structure, or because it is consistent, or because it is just as legitimate as
any piece of classical mathematics. This classical monist does not try to re-interpret
the theory in a way they can understand, but they agree that it is still an interesting
and worthwhile theory. Just consider an analogy: the early calculus was valuable to
classical mathematicians even if it was known to be inconsistent. A classical monist
cum Hilbertian can respect theories like SIA even while viewing them as logically
false and, in that sense, illegitimate.
There is a more refined option in this vicinity as well: loosen up the interpretation
of the Hilbertian slogan, (Hilbert), and treat internal standards of consistency as the
criterion for legitimacy. The classical monist may accept that SIA is just as legitimate
and understandable as any piece of classical mathematics by drawing on a distinction
between ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’ deductive procedures, roughly as follows.17 We often
engage in contentful, belief-guiding deductive inference that is constrained by what
can or cannot be true. This is ‘on-line’ deduction that aims to conform to standards
of formal entailment and consistency. But we can also engage in merely formalistic
‘symbol manipulation’ that is a mere simulacrum of inference, strictly speaking, but
which allows for counterpossible pretense detached from the aim of truth. This type
of ‘off-line’ deduction proceeds by rule-like conformity to the internal standards of
a formal theory. We can then say that a theory like SIA is legitimate because we
get a robust understanding of its subject matter by mastering its internal standards of
entailment—despite the fact that it describes something impossible. A classical monist
cum Hilbertian can say that mathematics does not always require ‘on-line’ deduction
and theories like SIA just illustrate this fact.
Shapiro (2014b, p. 69) overlooks such possibilities when he remarks on how some
mathematicians adopt a ‘hypothetical spirit, exploring the consequences’ of theories
like SIA, when ‘Strictly speaking…one cannot even do that…if one is serious about
17 I borrow this terminology from Field (2015), with slight change of meaning.
123
classical logic being the One True Logic. For this [classical] monist, every sentence
is a consequence of this [contra-classical] theory.’ This is a mistake. If the Hilbertian
can accept mere internal consistency as a criterion for legitimacy, then they can say
that ‘genuine’ truth-preservation is irrelevant. What happens when we explore the
consequences of a theory like SIA is that we suspend ‘on-line’ deduction and proceed
by ‘off-line’ rule-like conformity to the internal logic of the theory. Not every sentence
is a consequence when we do this. It is, thus, possible to be an eclectic Hilbertian who
grants that theories like SIA are just as legitimate as any piece of classical mathematics,
but since this is only due to the fact that they are consistent by internal standards, it
does not yet lead to logical pluralism.18
For these reasons, the mathematical data does not directly support logical pluralism
even with the aid of auxiliary hypotheses from the philosophy of mathematics. In the
next section, I consider indirect evidential connections between the mathematical data
and pluralistic conclusions about logic. I give my most charitable reconstruction of
Shapiro’s view and compare it to an alternative that requires fewer heavy-weight
assumptions. I then conclude with general lessons we can take away about the ideal
approach to motivating logical pluralism.
4.5 Naturalizing pluralism
Deeply constructive mathematics does not force us to be logical pluralists, but it might
give us some defeasible reason to be so. I submit that we should construe this data as
calling out for an inference to the best explanation (IBE). Logical pluralism may be
one possible explanation. Framing the issue in this way makes it easier to productively
engage in such a debate and brings the dialectic in line with ‘anti-exceptionalism’ about
logic.19 But what can possibly be explained by logic? The salient fact is that equally
mature parts of mathematics operate according to their own distinct internal standards
of entailment. How and why does this arise? What explains this diversity of practices?
An honest naturalist simply takes mathematics as it stands and respects the autonomy of
the discipline, rather than imposing outside ideas about how it ‘should’ be practiced.
Who are we to police the bounds of mathematics because of some hangup about
bivalence or truth-tables? To my mind, this is why logical pluralism is immediately
attractive upon consideration of theories like SIA.
One thing we have not mentioned so far, however, is the fact that practitioners of
non-classical mathematics are in the minority. This might give pause even to an honest
naturalist. After all, we don’t have to take seriously every quack theory at the fringe
of every discipline. I don’t think SIA falls into this category, but my reason for this is
simply: ‘it walks like mathematics and it talks like mathematics, so it is mathematics’.
The practice of constructive mathematics is so robust that it seems bizarre to deny that
it is in the same business as classical mathematics. Of course, this impression would
carry little wight against someone who sincerely challenged the alleged data itself.
My goal in this paper is to more clearly understand why the mathematical data is so
compelling, but to call it ‘data’ assumes that SIA represents something interesting
18 For a related argument, see also Priest (this issue).
19 This terminology is from Hjortland (2017). See also Priest (2006) and Williamson (2013).
123
about the practice of mathematics. If someone vigorously questions that assumption,

I’m not entirely sure what to say in response. This might be a sticking point in the
debate, but for the purpose of this paper I will just continue to assume that SIA does
represent something interesting about the practice of mathematics.
We saw that a classical monist has to go to some pretty extreme lengths to explain
away the impression of logical pluralism that we get from theories like SIA. They do
not have to reject the legitimacy of such theories, nor reject any particular stance in the
philosophy of mathematics such as Hilbertianism. They do, however, need to divorce
some parts of mathematics from truth, allow that the internal logical standards of a
legitimate theory need not be truth-preserving, and tell a convoluted story about how
we use mathematical theories when they fail to respect genuine standards of consis-
tency. On this view, classical theories have a shot at being true, whereas constructive
ones can be at most interesting or useful. This is unpalatable because it divides up the
discipline and classifies different mature parts of mathematics as operating in surpris-
ingly different ways. It is baroque and spuriously motivated. A pluralist can push back
with an alternative explanation of the data.
On a charitable reconstruction, this is exactly Shapiro’s argument. He even sug-
gests this toward the end of the book, saying ‘The arguments in favor of the eclectic
approach, such as they are, are not primarily deductive—perhaps not deductive at all.
It is more like an inference to the best explanation’ (Shapiro 2014b, p. 168).20 Of
course, explanatory arguments are sometimes confused with instances of affirming
the consequent, which is how it looked to us previously. Unfortunately, this inten-
tion is not mentioned in the original article-length treatment of the argument and the
structure of the intended IBE is only alluded to briefly in the book. Let me try to
clarify this. Shapiro’s argument is best interpreted as follows. The explanandum is
that equally mature parts of mathematics operate according to their own distinct inter-
nal standards of entailment. It could be that such differences are a manifestation of
logical pluralism, i.e. that formal entailment is fragmentary and there are irreducibly
distinct classical and intuitionistic varieties of entailment. On a Hilbertian picture of
mathematics ‘relativism or pluralism concerning logic would result in a relativism or
pluralism concerning mathematics itself’ (Shapiro 2014b, p. 67). The explananda are
logical pluralism together with Hilbertianism, which predict the kind of division in
mathematics we set out to explain. So stated, however, this is just a possible explana-
tion. A fully articulated IBE argument also needs to show why the chosen explanation
is best amongst all of the alternatives. We saw that a classical monist is going to strug-
gle here. Shapiro’s explanation is superior in every way to one that classifies different,
equally mature theories as being successful in varying degrees. Is it better than an
intuitionistic monist explanation? Shapiro dismisses this as a terminological choice,
but then why bother arguing the point at all?
I will now sketch a different pluralist explanation and suggest why it might be
stronger than any alternative, even Shapiro’s own self-described understanding of
the evidential import of the data. The explanandum, just as above, is the fact that
equally mature parts of mathematics operate according to their own distinct internal
standards of entailment. It could be that such differences are a manifestation of logical
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
123
pluralism, i.e. that formal entailment is fragmentary and there are irreducibly distinct
classical and intuitionistic varieties of entailment. We now draw attention to the fact
that there are explanatory relations between descriptive and normative sides of logic,
even if they are different topics. For example, agents have (defeasible) reason to believe
any of the logical consequences of their beliefs. I assume that mathematical practice
reflects a competent grasp of the commitments of mathematical theories. Call this
the performance-competence assumption (PCA). On this view, if logical pluralism is
true, we should witness differences in the attitudes of mathematicians working with
logically distinct types of theories. For example, mathematicians working in theories
like SIA should not behave as if they are committed to contradictory ε = 0 and ε = 0
for infinitesimal quantities ε. In fact, mathematicians working with SIA do not ‘shrug
off’ implicit contradictions in their theory, but instead behave as if the axioms of the
theory provide no reason to accept either of the above identities. The explananda are
logical pluralism together with PCA, which predict the kind of division in mathematics
we set out to explain. On this understanding, the proof practices of mathematicians
from different areas of mathematics evince the fact that there are irreducibly distinct
standards of proof, i.e. distinct types of entailments.
Here is why this is, plausibly, the best possible explanation. For starters, the PCA
explanation fits mathematical practice better than any explanation available to the clas-
sical monist because it does not relegate theories like SIA to ‘symbol manipulation’.
This, however, is also the case for any explanation afforded by a logical pluralist or
intuitionistic monist. What primarily weighs in favor of the PCA explanation over
Shapiro’s proposed explanation is its modesty. In the end, pluralists reach the same
conclusions, but I claim that the mathematical data does most of the work on its own
and certainly does not need to be bolstered by anything so heavy-weight as the Hilber-
tian view of mathematical truth and ontology. What primarily weights in favor of the
PCA explanation over intuitionistic monism is its uniformity and simplicity. It draws
only on resources that any naturalist should already happily grant: mathematicians
prove things and these proofs unpack the consequences of their theories. Why do we
witness differences in the attitudes of mathematicians working with classical theo-
ries as opposed to constructive theories? The thorough-going intuitionist has to give
a disjointed explanation and say that the proofs of classical mathematicians reflect
supplementary, non-logical assumptions about the domain of inquiry. According to
the PCA explanation, on the other hand, cognitive engagement in mathematics is the
same kind of thing everywhere that it occurs. Classical proofs simply track a distinct
entailment relation from the one that is tracked by constructive proofs. This is only
a sketch, but the point should be clear: the PCA explanation is best on the grounds
that it is simpler, more uniform, and more modest than any alternative. This strategy
supports logical pluralism on the basis of minimal assumptions and shows that there
is more at stake than a mere choice of terminology.
I think this sheds light on the significance of Shapiro’s data and why it is an
admirable example for all logical pluralists. The data just is the divide between clas-
sical analysis and theories like SIA. The importance of the data, however, lies in
the abductive question it prompts: why do such incommensurate theories exist within
mathematics? With this kind of argument strategy, logical pluralism is supported by the
role it plays in explaining the mathematical divide. And this can all be accomplished
123
without appeal to contentious views in the philosophy of mathematics. Indeed, the

appeal to Hilbertianism is at best a distraction and at worst it goes too far out on a
limb for the sake of explaining the mathematical data.
4.6 Lessons
This points the way toward a model for how the debate between monists and pluralists
can unfold more productively. It is commonplace to say that mathematical proofs are
paradigmatic examples of logical mastery, but they are not the only such examples.
The best conceivable motive for any brand of logical pluralism will be drawn from
arenas where a performance-competence link offers a promising explanation of data
like that found in the mathematical theories above.
Here is an analogy for the general strategy I have in mind. Linguists study lexical
entailments by eliciting behavior from agents whose performance they take to manifest
the pertinent semantic facts. Perhaps we can, more broadly, study the properties of
support relations by eliciting behavior from agents whose performance we take to
manifest the pertinent logical facts. Apart from mathematics, where would that be?
For starters, we probably want to regard scientific practice of most kinds as manifesting
competent grasp of support relations. The emphasis may be on confirmation in many
parts of science, but that is also important data for the larger enterprise of logical
theory. We can, however, reasonably expect that entailment plays a role in all sciences
as well as many contexts of debate in the vernacular. If linguistic behavior can be
isolated by good experimental design, why not logical behavior? At the end of the
day, we don’t have to just look for ‘specialized’ data, we just have to be careful about
the pedigree of our data. This will have to be judged on a case by case basis. Even
with something like SIA, we only consider it to be significant because it has the ‘feel’
of a manifestation of logical relations.
Given any such data, an interesting abductive debate may develop between monists
and relativists. Which camp has the best explanation of what is going on with such-
and-such examples of discursive performance? A debate conducted along these lines
promise to be more interesting in part because there is no immediate inference from
the practical, performative data to the best explanation of that data. We can see Shapiro
as contributing to such debate already, though I have argued that his approach can be
refined and improved. On this methodological proposal, monists and pluralists will
not generally disagree over the ‘raw data’ itself—e.g. the interesting features of SIA
can be accepted by all parties—but over the need to posit a fragmentation of support
relations to explain that data. The tendency is for monists to conservatively resist such
explanations, while pluralists try to bolster their appeal.
To wrap up, I want to speculate about more controversial directions of future inves-
tigation. My conjecture is that we should look for and may expect to find evidence
of pragmatic encroachment in certain patterns of debate. In most circumstances, it
is correct to reject negation-inconsistent assertions that are brought to our attention,
but in some circumstances it may not be correct. Why not? One factor that seems to
play a role is the degree of investment we have in understanding someone: the higher
this investment, the less we should reject their contradictory assertions. Such a dif-
123
ference in pragmatic circumstances may, in fact, constitute a difference in standards

of entailment. It depends on how well we can isolate such examples and how well
logical pluralism can explain such data, but if such evidence stands it could motivate
a contextualist version of logical pluralism (Caret 2017). Further discussion of that
issue will have to wait for another occasion.
5 Conclusion
Logical pluralism has garnered a great deal of attention in recent years, but there is a
chorus of dissenters who suggest that it is a defective position. I have tried to make
this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would
count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? When confronted with the task
of motivating their view, many logical pluralists fall back on unproductive appeals
to philosophical intuition. I used a case study to argue for a different approach. The
strategy I recommend going forward is an abductive one: look for anomolous discursive
patterns in areas where we have an antecedently good grasp on argument individuation
and where a performance-competence link offers a promising explanation of this data.
Arguing for (or against) logical pluralism on such abductive grounds makes the stakes
clearer and the debate more robust.21
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Why Logical Pluralism

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Synthese (2021) 198 (Suppl 20):S4947–S4968

S.I.: PLURALISTIC PERSPECTIVES ON LOGIC

Why logical pluralism?

Keywords Logic · Entailment · Consistency · Proof · Pluralism · Contextualism ·

1 Yonsei University, 50 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul, South Korea

2 Logics and pluralisms

as a result of underdetermination in our choice of explications.2 This harkens back

4.1 Why Shapiro?

Shapiro (2014a, b) draws attention to noteworthy mathematical data as the primary

ferently relative to different areas of discourse. He only identifies examples of such

4.2 Just the facts

Moreover, according to SIA, every nilsquare is indistinct from zero.

SIA ∀x(x 2 = 0 → ¬(x = 0))

In fact, according to SIA, identity is generally indeterminate.

SIA ¬∀x(x = 0 ∨ ¬(x = 0))

This is a corollary of the SIA principle of micro-cancellation: if εa = εb for all nil-

4.3 Philosophy of mathematics

4.4 Hedging against Hilbert

Even if one rejects Hilbertianism in lieu of a competing view in the philosophy of

4.5 Naturalizing pluralism

about the practice of mathematics. If someone vigorously questions that assumption,

20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

without appeal to contentious views in the philosophy of mathematics. Indeed, the

ference in pragmatic circumstances may, in fact, constitute a difference in standards

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