Logique & Analyse 241 (2018), 25-42

Logical Pluralism and Logical Form

Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette

Abstract
Disputes about logic are commonplace and undeniable. It is sometimes argued that
these disputes are not genuine disagreements, but are rather merely verbal ones.
Are advocates of different logics simply talking past each other? In this paper we
argue that pluralists (and anyone who sees competing logics as genuine rivals),
should reject the claim that real disagreement requires competing logics to assign
the same meaning to logical connectives, or the same logical form to arguments.
Along the way we argue that ascriptions of logical form, as well as connective
meaning, are always theory-relative.
Keywords: logical form, logical pluralism, meaning variance

1. Introduction

The classical logician and the intuitionist dispute excluded middle, while
the relevant logician and the classical one dispute ex falso quodlibet (i.e.,
explosion). But are these disputes genuine disagreements, or to put the
same point differently, are these logics genuinely rivals to one another?
Quine is notoriously taken to think otherwise, writing that “[this] is the
deviant logician’s predica­ment: when he tries to deny the doctrine he only
changes the subject” (Quine 1986, 81).1 If correct this appears to be a
significant challenge for those forms of logical pluralism which require that
there be at least two logics that are rivals and correct.2 But if changing one’s
logic changes the subject, it seems that the first of these conditions can
never be met. Rivals, it is natural to assume, must be rivals with respect to
something, that is, they must genuinely disagree.
In this paper we argue that the pluralist should not concern themselves
with this objection. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the reason the pluralist

1
The famous slogan, “change of logic, change of subject” appears as the section heading
on page 80 of Quine (1986).
2
 See Restall (2014) and Hjortland (2013) for examples of pluralists who both take
seriously and attempt to meet this challenge.

doi: 10.2143/LEA.241.0.3275103. © 2018 by Peeters Publishers. All rights reserved.

26 Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette

should not be concerned is because the charge of merely verbal disagree-

ment is correct. Change of logic is not just change of subject but change of
paradigm. Seeing why this is so sheds light on the nature of logical form,
and the nature of logical disagreement. And clarity about the latter disarms
the implicit dismissal in the claim that that the logical dissenter changes the
subject.3
To approach this task we will first sketch both logical pluralism and
the view that change of logic is change of subject. After discussing those
foundational issues, we will explain the role of logical form in the logical
pluralist’s stan­dard response to this challenge. But we will show that this
use of logical form brings to the fore an adequacy condition of logical
analysis that we dub Church’s Principle—logical form captures everything
relevant to consequence. This investigation into adequacy conditions for
logics leads ultimately to the view that competing logics correspond to
incommensurable paradigms. Finally, we ar­gue that this should not be taken
to repudiate the possibility of meaningful disagreement.

2. Logical pluralism and meaning variance

The problem of meaning variance comes in different forms,4 but the

common theme is that change of logic requires a change in meaning of
somekind. Quine’s focus was on a change in the meaning of the logical
connectives, but this is inessential. Meaning variance is a problem for plu-
ralism to the extent that it threatens to dissolve the disagreement between
logicians who are at odds over logical consequence. The worry is that logi-
cians disagreeing about logics are engaged in a merely verbal dispute, i.e.,
they are just misunderstanding the lan­guage each other is using.5 In the case
of a dispute between an intuitionist and quantum logician, they are confus-
ing each others meanings of negation and disjunction for their own. If they
see that they are really talking about different concepts—if they disambiguate
their words—they will no longer disagree. They will just see that each
means something different.
This renders logical pluralism benign. The logical pluralist claims that
there are two “correct” logical systems. If the disagreement is merely verbal
then what the pluralist should do is find some logic which could encompass
both systems. This is not logical pluralism in a meaningful sense. Of course,

 It is worth noticing that Quine, while ultimately dismissing so-called deviant logics,
3

does not himself think that the mere fact that they involve a change of subject settles
the important logical questions: “whoever denies the law of excluded middle changes the
subject. This is not to say that he is wrong in so doing” (Quine 1986, 83).
4
 See Haack (1978) and Hjortland (2013) for discussion
5
This explication of ‘verbal dispute’ comes from Jenkins (2014).
 Logical Pluralism and Logical Form  27

con­temporary logical pluralists usually focus their attention not on disa-

greements about the logical connectives, but on consequence relations
within formal sys­tems.
A formal system consists of a formal language L, and a consequence
relation  between the sentences of L. The consequence relation on L is
generated in some way, either by a semantics/model theory, or a proof
theory. Throughout  is a placeholder for these notions of consequence.
Pluralism in certain forms is indisputable; clearly there are many pairs
L, , so pluralism is true. But that would be, to paraphrase Roy Cook, a
rather cheap form of logical pluralism (Cook 2010).
For a meaningful pluralism a formal system has to be correct in some
sense. We will focus on what (Priest 2014) calls the ‘canonical application’
of logic to argument evaluation in a natural language. In this application
when a system is correct, it gets validity in natural language right. That
requires there to be a relationship between the formal system and natural
language arguments. For that reason we will work with logical systems,
each of which consists of a formal system L, , and some relationship T
between (some fragment of ) a natural language and L. We don’t want to
be sidetracked too much by discussion of the specifics of logical systems
here, but we will give two warnings.
First, we are not initially placing any constraints on T. There are various
debates about when that relationship constitutes one of adequacy, appropriate­
ness, or correctness, but we will, for the moment, leave those aside.6 Similarly,
we are not taking a stand on what criteria  must meet to count as a form of
logical consequence. Logical pluralists maintain that there are at least two
logics which are adequate, or appropriate, or correct. More generally, the
pluralist holds that there are two logics where both T and  meet whatever
criteria they take to be relevant.
The second warning relates to the sense of ‘logics’ in ‘two logics’. We
need a sense of distinctness of logical systems that doesn’t multiply logics
indefi­nitely. It is technically quite difficult to give a mathematically precise
definition for when two pairs L,  and L,  are distinct, or rather
when two such pairs are non-identical, but not distinct.7 Think of two
formulations of classical propositional logic using different sets of atomic
sentences. Those are non­identical, but they are not distinct logics. We will
have to use an intuitive un­derstanding of this notion of distinctness. With
those warnings we can return to our primary discussion.

6
 Even those who reject the idea of applying logic to natural language can just take T as
the empty relation. But this discussion cannot get started unless one takes logic to have some
application.
7
 See part 2 of Béziau (2007).
28 Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette

Not all varieties of logical pluralism depend on genuine rivalry between

logics.8 Local Pluralism, as characterized by Haack (1978) arises when
two sep­arate domains of discourse have different logics. In contrast Global
Pluralism requires more than one general purpose logic, where a general
purpose logic is one which captures consequence for any domain of dis-
course.9 Local pluralism does not require rivalry between logics with respect
to one and the same set of arguments, whereas global pluralism does.
A third, middle way, type of pluralism that we will call National Pluralism
arises when two logics are equally correct or adequate for a particular
domain of discourse, without either logic having to be a general purpose
logic. National pluralism also requires logics to be genuine rivals to each
other with respect to some set of arguments.
If all logical disagreement is merely verbal any form of national or global
pluralism collapses into a form of local pluralism, which is to say, into
monism, albeit of a heavily disjunctive sort. After all, if the rival logics
identified by the pluralist in fact involve alternative meanings, then once
those meanings are disambiguated the logics can, at least in principle, be
combined into a single patchwork logic. It seems, therefore, that the
defender of national or global plu­ralism must rebut the charge of meaning
variance.

3. An attempt at genuine disagreement

One way in which logical pluralists have attempted to resist the claim
that logical disputes are merely verbal is by arguing against the charge that
change of logic requires a change in meaning. One strategy is to advocate
minimalism as to the meaning of the logical connectives.10 On this approach,
agreement as to the so-called meaning-constituitive properties for two con-
nectives c1 and c2, is sufficient to block the claim that the subject has been
changed. Two logics that agree on all the meaning-constituitive properties
of a pair of connectives, are thus in a position to be genuine rivals. If both
logics are also correct, pluralism has been established.
The difficulty for minimalism, as Putnam (1979) and Field (2008) have
dis­cussed, is in distinguishing the meaning-constitutive properties of a

 See Cook (2010) for a comprehensive survey.

8
9
We can see the patchwork system which results from combining context specific logics
as found in local pluralism as an all purpose logic as well. But the relationship between a
patchwork all purpose logic and traditional general purpose logics is analogous to that
between a multi-headed screwdriver and a hammer for affixing wood to wood. One is use-
ful for many types of screws be­cause it can be manipulated to conform to the particularities
of various screws, whereas a hammer deals with all affixing in a similar manner: hitting.
10
The name minimalism comes from Restall (2002).
 Logical Pluralism and Logical Form  29

connec­tive from the non-meaning-constitutive ones. Paoli (2007, 556) sug-

gests one can draw the line in a principled manner between what he calls
the operational meaning of a connective and its global meaning. The opera-
tional meaning of a connective c is determined by its inference (elimination
and introduction) rules, which must be formulated so that they do not refer-
ence any other connective.11 The global meaning of a connective will
include derived inference rules which display relationships between c and
other connectives. Whatever the merits of this approach, it relies upon a
proof-theoretic conception of meaning for the logical connectives. Intra-
theoretic pluralism, as described by Hjortland (2013), avoids the problem
of distinguishing between operational and global meaning altogether. It also
provides accounts of meaning in both model-theoretic and proof-theoretic
terms.12
Hjortland’s discussion of intra-theoretic pluralism focuses on two many
valued logics: SK3 (Kleene’s 3-valued logic) and LP (Priest’s logic of para­
dox). SK3’s values are 0, i, and 1 where the only designated value—the
value that intuitively speaking makes sentences true—is 1. LP also has the
same three values: 0, i, 1, but it has two designated values: i, 1.13 What is
interesting about these logics to pluralists, as displayed in Hjortland’s paper
and elsewhere14, is that they give the same semantics to the connectives
while giving rise to distinct consequence relations. What is perhaps more
surprising is that a special three place sequent calculus can be given for
both of these logics which is exactly the same: that is, all of the proof rules
for the calculus are the same. In that calculus sequents take the general
form: Γ|Δ|Φ meaning at least one γ ∈ Γ takes the value 0, or at least one
δ ∈ Δ takes the value i or at least one ϕ ∈ Φ takes the value 1. How we get
LP and SK3 out of the same proof rules is by classifying certain sequents
as displaying SK3 consequence and others as displaying LP consequence.
Sequents of the form Γ|Γ|Δ mean that Γ  Δ in SK3, and Γ|Δ|Δ means that
Γ  Δ in LP (where Γ  Δ means that either something in Γ is undesignated
or something in Δ is designated). One can even represent classical logic
using a similar sequent selection criterion: If Γ|Γ, Δ|Δ is derivable, then Δ
follows classically from Γ. We will continue to focus on SK3 and LP.
Hjortland’s suggestion is that in these systems there is one language. The
meaning of the connectives—understood in terms of the model and proof

11
This is an idea that goes back at least to Dummett (1991).
12
 An important difference between Hjortland and Paoli’s approach is that Paoli counts
the rules governing logical constants other than the one of interest — c, say — towards the
global meaning of c, whereas in Hjortland’s example the systems agree on the rules govern-
ing all the constants. See also Paoli (2003).
13
 In LP the value i is usually interpreted as meaning that a sentence with that value is
true and false.
14
This treatment of these two logics was originally developed in Baaz et al. (1993).
30 Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette

theory—remains stable. Some approaches which hold the operational mean-

ings stable are criticised because other aspects of the sequents are different;
the argument is that these other rules play a role in the meanings of the
connectives. For example, Restall (2014) gives an entirely proof-theoretical
approach to classical, intuitionist, and dual-intuitionist logics with similar
pluralist goals. However, Restall’s proof theoretical treatments vary in
terms of the number of sentences allowed on either side of standard two-
sided sequents, which might be claimed to impact the meaning of connec-
tives. In the system for intra-theoretic plural­ism the various logics arise
only from different organizations of the formulas in a sequent; it doesn’t
put any constraints on how many sentences are allowed in one cell through-
out the proofs. Nevertheless, the extensions of the consequence relations
differ, so there is arguably a pluralism of logics without a merely verbal
disagreement. And there can be no charge that differences in structural rules
are playing a meaning constitutive role. We are focusing on Hjortland’s
intra­theoretic pluralism because it provides the strongest version of this
strategy for responding to the charge of merely verbal disagreement. If there
is something wrong with intra-theoretic pluralism, there is good reason to
reject this form of response in general.
What intra-theoretic pluralism gives us is two formal systems—that is
pairs of L and —embedded in a single metatheory with two concepts of
consequence. But as we noted above, the existence of multiple formal sys-
tems is not in dispute between the pluralist and monist. The significance of
this mathemat­ical unification for pluralism requires an account of the ade-
quacy of both sys­tems. For that we must turn to the relationships between
SK3, LP, and some reference class of intuitively valid and invalid natural
language arguments. Let’s call this class C.
Suppose, as a toy example, that C contains the following argument.
Finn is either in the tree house or the shed
Finn isn’t in the shed
∴ Finn is in the tree house

Let’s call this argument Finn. What toy examples don’t display, but argu-
ments in an actual C should display, is the context, etc., that is necessary
for under­standing the argument.15 But toy examples are useful for illustrat-
ing the prob­lem. What we need to do is specify what is relevant in relating

15
 As a brief philosophical aside, this is what made mathematics such an easy target
for the de­velopment of formal logic in the late nineteenth century. Little context is needed
to make sense of a mathematical argument. And it is what has made applying formal logic
to social philosophy so difficult: e.g., the implicit understanding underlying our many and
varied moral judgments.
 Logical Pluralism and Logical Form  31

Finn to some­thing in the shared formal language of LP and SK3; more

generally, we must specify the relations TSK3 and TLP.
In these two logics there is disagreement regarding some argument
forms, for example disjunctive syllogism:

P ∨ Q P DS
Q

In SK3 P ∨ Q, P  Q, while in LP it doesn’t. The reason is that P ∨ Q

is designated when at least one of its disjuncts in designated in both logics,
and the truth value of P is i if and only if the truth value of P is i, but
what designated means in each logic is different, so when P’s value is i and
Q’s value is 0, relative to LP both the premises are designated while Q is
not. But in SK3, when P’s truth value is i, it isn’t designated, so there is
no counterexample to disjunctive syllogism.
The LPer and the SK3er agree that Finn should be represented by [DS].
They may even agree that in natural language a particular use of Finn is
rationally convincing. The paraconsistentist, in virtue of their view that
actual true contradictions are rare, can allow that the conclusion of Finn is
very likely true, given the truth of the premises. Where the LPer will disagree
with the SK3er is on whether all arguments represented by [DS] are valid.
Similarly their disagreement as to whether P ∧ P is a logical falsehood
or not seems most naturally characterized as a disagreement as to whether
sentences of that pattern can ever be true.
What is the significance for intra-theoretic pluralism of the logics assign-
ing the same formulas to a natural language argument? Why should this
rebut the charge that this is a merely verbal disagreement? The thought is
that because the connectives all have the same rules for evaluation (model-
theoretically and proof-theoretically) in each of the systems, they have the
same meaning in both systems. But something slightly more is needed to
make the jump from sameness of mathematical model to sameness of
meaning; just because we might use mathematical fluid dynamics to model
traffic flow doesn’t mean we think cars are liquid. One may respond that
we are caricaturing what conclusions can be drawn from the sameness of
mathematical models. Of course one wouldn’t think cars are liquid, but they
are analogues of something in the model. Our response is that if the only
desired conclusion was that the connectives of the logical systems were
analogues, then we already knew that. Why do we have to go to such extremes
of finding a common metalanguage for expressing the proof-theory and
model-theory of them? There is something missing.
What is supposed to permit the jump is the idea that the logics assign the
same logical forms to actual arguments. The logical systems of SK3 and
LP both relate Finn to the same formulas. The logical connectives in those
32 Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette

formulas are governed by the same rules and given the same semantics. No
amount of disambiguation would settle their dispute over the validity of
that argument: the meaning of ‘or’ and ‘not’ are not disputed. Genuine
disagreement between correct (adequate, etc.) logics requires a common
core of agreement, and a shared account of the logical form of natural lan-
guage arguments is intended to provide that core.
If successful, what Hjortland’s intra-theoretic pluralism accomplishes is
three­fold. First, it offers a robust account of logical form that is taken to be
shared between two rival logics. Second, this shared account of logical
form is used to block the charge of merely verbal disagreement. And finally,
it provides a way to locate the source or foundation of the disagreement
between two logics. In the example above the disagreement concerns the
structure of the consequence relation. Hjortland allows that this disagreement
over consequence is a form of meaning-variance, but maintains that it does
not collapse into a merely verbal dispute.
Notice, however, that the argument against meaning variance requires
that the account of logical form be independent of the conceptions of logical
conse­quence. If the logical forms depended on the notion of logical conse-
quence, one could not claim that the forms assigned by the two systems to,
say, Finn were the same.
What we argue in the sequel is that the apparent robustness of the shared
account of logical form in intra-theoretic pluralism is a technical mirage;
the shared account is mathematically robust, but not philosophically robust.
How­ever, we ultimately agree with Hjortland that the charge of merely verbal
dis­agreement is misplaced. To make this argument we must digress at some
length on the topic of logical form before returning to the possibilities of
pluralism and disagreement. In the next section we will discuss the relation-
ship between mathematical models and the concept of logical consequence
for natural lan­guage. The upshot of this discussion is to argue that there is
no independent notion of logical form of the sort intra-theoretic pluralism
needs.

4. Logical form

Ascriptions of logical form are intended to provide intra-theoretic plural-

ism with a core of agreement with respect to which two logics can claim
genuine rivalry. What the defender of intra-theoretic pluralism needs is
an account of logical form which is suitably independent from the account
of consequence. This makes salient a key issue: what is the relationship
between logical forms and consequence?
As we have said above, we are focusing on the application of logic to
natural language consequence. As such, the conception of logical consequence
 Logical Pluralism and Logical Form  33

at issue in this paper is a relation between (possible) natural language utter-

ances. The mathematical investigation of logic is an attempt to clarify and
unify the de­scription of that relationship by representing it with mathemat-
ical models. In order to represent consequence relations, we must determine
what is relevant to whether the relationship obtains. In short, we need a
specification of what matters to (logical) consequence.
It is a tradition going back to Aristotle that not everything in natural
language matters to consequence. We see this tradition alive and well in the
work of Frege. In his Begriffsschrift he notes that:
In my formalized language…only that part of judgments which affects the
possible inferences is taken into consideration. Whatever is needed for a
valid inference is fully expressed; what is not needed is for the most part not
indicated either; no scope is left for conjecture. (1952/1980, 3)

On this view what matters to consequence is all and only what is repre-
sented in Frege’s formal language. Church also captures the idea that we
must isolate those parts of the argument that are relevant to consequence
succinctly in his Introduction to Mathematical Logic:
The argument, it may be held, is valid from its form alone, indepen­dently
of matter … The reasoning may be right though the facts be wrong, and
it is just in maintaining this distinction that we separate the form from the
matter. (Church 1956, 2)

We arrive at the correct form, in Church’s sense, of the premises and

conclusion of an argument just in case we have represented all (and only)
what is relevant to the assessment of validity—such forms are usually
assumed to be sentences, or collections of sentences, in a formal language.
What Frege and Church refer to by ‘valid inference’ or ’valid argument’ is
now more usually denoted by ‘consequence’, but the point is that the logi-
cal form of utterances is to capture those parts of the utterances relevant
to (logical) consequence. When we formalize an utterance (or a series of
utterances intended to be an argument) we are left with all that is needed
to assess validity, though not soundness, conversational implicatures, etc.
Let us call this idea Church’s principle:
Church’s Principle (CP) Logical form includes all that matters to consequence.16

What does it mean for something to ‘matter’ to consequence? We take

this to be fairly straightforward: something matters to consequence when it
makes a difference to whether some utterances u and u  imply one another.

16
Frege has historical priority, but we name it after Church for two reasons. First, as a
practical matter, two Frege’s Principles seemed to us to be sufficient. Second, as we will
see subsequently, Church is particularly insightful as to the philosophical significance of CP
for logic.
34 Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette

On first glance it might seem that Church’s Principle is a thesis regarding

the nature of the consequence relation—namely, that the point of CP is to
con­strain the domain of what is relevant to consequence. But attention to
logical practice suggests something quite different: CP functions not as a
thesis about the consequence relation but as an adequacy condition for
theories of logical form.
For example, Edward Keenan, in articulating a version of the view that
natural language sentences possess logical forms in virtue of their grammars,
is very clear that there is an interdependence between the ascription of
logical forms and the conception of logical consequence in natural language:
[G]iven a set of expressions of a language … a logical theory defines a
set of LFs (logical structures) whose descriptive adequacy is determined by
the correct predictions they make concerning the logical properties of the
expressions of the language. For example, it is a logical property of (a) below
that it entails (logically implies) (c), whereas (b) does not have this property.
a. Both John and Mary can swim.
b. Either John or Mary can swim.
c. Mary can swim.
(Keenan 1979, 164)

In other words, the logician describing the logical forms of a language

starts with a conviction as to the nature of the consequence relation, and on
that basis produces an account of logical form which explicates the conse-
quence relation she wishes to defend.
Consider an example from a somewhat different tradition than Keenan’s:
Russell’s famous treatment of definite descriptions in “On Denoting”
(1905). It is in light of prior convictions about the consequence relation that
he proposes that we take (2) to capture the logical form of (1).
1. The present king of France is bald.
2. x∀y(Kx ∧ (Ky → y = x) ∧ Bx)

Success for Russell’s analysis of the logical form of definite descriptions

lies in getting the consequences right. It is central to Russell’s argument for
taking (2) to be the logical form of (1) that doing so explains why the denial
of (1) does not have the existence of the present king of France as a con-
sequence.17 We can also maintain the law of excluded middle; giving (1) a
distinct truth value despite the failure of the description to denote.

17
 Getting the intuitive consequences ‘right’ is also central to Russell’s critique of
Meinong’s treat­ment of sentences like (1), though of course metaphysical issues are at play
there as well.
 Logical Pluralism and Logical Form  35

This observation about the relationship between accounts of logical form

and theories of consequence is not novel. Church notes explicitly that our
ac­counts of logical form are not theory-independent:
To adopt a particular formalized language thus involves adopt­ing a particular
theory or system of logical analysis. (This must be regarded as the essential
feature of a formalized language, not the more conspicuous but theoretically
less important feature that it is found convenient to replace the spelled words of
most (written) natural languages by single letters and various special symbols.)
(Church 1956, 3)18

The upshot of this quote from Church is that formal languages, under-
stood as representing logical forms, and systems of analysis cannot be
separated. This holism has the consequence that there is no such thing as a
logical form independent from a logical system.19 We will return to this
point in the last section of the paper.
Returning to our main argument, we can put the general situation roughly
as follows. What one needs for pluralism without meaning variance is that
the common logical forms assigned to utterances by rival logics must be
compatible with the logics’ different consequence relations. It follows that
there must be something that makes a difference to whether u is a logical
consequence of u  which isn’t in the logical form. In contrast, CP requires
that all the things that can make a difference to consequence are included
in the logical form.
In short, the pluralist who wishes to deny meaning variance must reject
CP as inconsistent with their claims about logical form. However it’s not
sufficient to reject CP — the pluralist must provide us with an alternate
adequacy con­dition for ascriptions of logical form to natural language utter-
ances and argu­ments.

5. Rejecting Church’s Principle

5.1. Form without consequence

The advocate of intra-theoretic pluralism owes us an alternative account
of adequacy for ascriptions of logical form. Imagine that you are presented
with the common parts of the system of SK3 and LP, but without any

18
The idea that the ‘formality’ of formal logic consists essentially in the adoption of a
particular system of logical analysis is in itself notable, and suggests that Church, despite
his earlier invocation of the form/matter distinction, might ultimately be conceiving of the
formal as pertaining to rules. See Dutilh Novaes (2011) for a discussion of this idea of
formality and its various subtypes.
19
 Related observations concerning the holism of logical analysis have been made by
others. Cf. Cargile (2010).
36 Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette

definition of con­sequence. That is, you are given the three-sided sequent
calculus, and the three valued model theory, along with a mapping between
an appropriate fragment of natural language and the system. This system,
you are told, captures the logical forms of these these natural language
sentences. On what basis could you assess this claim?
One might think that logical forms can be read in some way off the
grammatical properties of natural language sentences. This approach comes
in both a naive form, in which logical form can be read off the surface
grammar, and a more sophisticated version in which syntactic theory will
eventually deliver the logical forms of utterances.
The problem with either approach is that there is nothing about the
syntax or grammar of natural language which can distinguish the logical
operators from the non-logical ones. The concept of logical form at play
in intra-theoretic pluralism depends upon this distinction. More precisely,
it depends upon the assumption that only some of the syntactic properties
of natural language are logical properties. To give a simple example,
standard first-order languages do not allow us to distinguish between ‘Finn
loves the tree-house’ and ‘The tree-house is loved by Finn’, despite their
grammatical differences. What makes this acceptable is the (no doubt cor-
rect!) assumption that the differences between the sentences are not logical
ones.
What motivates the division between the logical and non-logical parts of
a language are precisely convictions about what matters to consequence—
that is, we are implicitly relying on Church’s Principle when we make this
division. So even if the defender of intra-theoretic pluralism is in possession
of a complete syntactic theory for the natural language, they do not have
independent criteria for ascriptions of logical form unless they also have a
theory of which syntactic properties are also logical properties which itself
does not rely on CP.
But how could we recognize the logical properties of an utterance
indepen­dently of a notion of logical consequence? This is, we admit, argu-
ment by rhetor­ical question. But it is genuinely unclear to us what response
could be given here, and given the dominance of CP as the criterion of
adequacy for theories of logical form, the burden is clearly on the defender
of intra-theoretic pluralism to provide an alternate.
Another strategy for someone who wants to avoid merely verbal
disagree­ment would be to find a way of describing consequence which
doesn’t invoke logical forms or connective meaning at all. A ready option
is available to us: necessary truth preservation. On the necessary truth
preservationist account there is no privileged set of logical connectives.
Thus, it might seem that CP’s role as an adequacy criterion can be rejected
by advocates of this approach. We will consider this strategy in the next
section.
 Logical Pluralism and Logical Form  37

5.2. Consequence without form

Intra-theoretic pluralism, and minimalism more generally, takes a Tarskian
approach to logical methodology, i.e., one on which a language is divided
up into the logical and non-logical, and the syntax of L is given indepen-
dently of the semantics. The formulas serve as proxies for natural language
utterances which contain only the things relevant to determining the utter-
ances’ consequences within that system of analysis.
Such a move privileges the so-called logical constants as central to
conse­quence relations, and thus makes agreement on the meanings of the
constants central to real disagreement between logics. An alternative to this
is provided by the traditional and re-emerging20 approach to logic which
understands logical consequence in terms of necessary truth preservation.
Our claim is that this approach will not avoid invoking CP, and to see why
we will engage the work of Gil Sagi.
In her (2014), Sagi suggests that we can do away with the notion of
argument form as determined by distinctions between logical and non-
logical vocabulary. She shows this by specifying the structure of a language
via its semantic interpretation. The specifications are given by what she
calls semantic constraints, which are formulated by sentences in the meta-
language.21 She sees this as very natural since it already underlies how
interpretations are specified in first-order logic. Generally, we say: when
P is a unary predicate, I (P) ⊆ D, where D is the domain of the model. But
P can be specified as being a predicate in exactly the reverse manner:
If I(P) ⊆ D, then P is a unary predicate. Relations etc. follow analogous
specifications. Consequence is then determined between premises and
conclusions via truth preservation over all the models which all satisfy the
same, perhaps numerous, semantic constraints.22
Does this really avoid CP? No; Sagi’s contention is that logical conse-
quence does indeed rely on the form of an argument. Those forms are,
however, developed in a slightly different manner from the traditional
approach. She claims that it is the semantic constraints that determine the
logical forms of arguments. They are, after all, representations of what mat-
ters to consequence. Those parts of the models serve as representations of
utterances; and what is invariable in all models under the same semantic
constraints determines what matters to consequence under those semantic
constraints. In essence she has shifted the representation of logical form
from the object language of a logical system to the semantic metalanguage

20
We can see this in the work of Etchemendy (1990) among others.
21
 In her case a formal language would simply be a free algebra of some sort.
22
 A limited example would be: Bachelor(John) entails Unmarried(John) iff in all
­models M where I(Bachelor) ⊆ D, I(Unmarried) ⊆ D, I(John) ∈ D and I(Bachelor) ⊆
I(Unmarried) are satisfied, if Bachelor(John) is true, then so is Unmarried(John).
38 Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette

of a logical system. The formulas in her system do not carry any burden of
representing logical structure since they only have structure because of the
semantic constraints the models impose.23
If the model theory is now the representation of logical form, we can ask
our basic question about adequacy conditions, which caused problems for
the Tarskian approach. What makes a model theory adequate? This will
again be whether it gets the logical relations in natural language right.
And as we saw above, the only plausible adequacy condition on an account
of logical relations is whether we have captured all that matters to conse-
quence. But that is just Church’s Principle in a slightly different guise:
model theory includes everything relevant to consequence.
On the Tarskian approach it was more plausible that logical forms qua
formal languages could play the role of an independent mediator between
logical systems because the formal languages were thought to be autono-
mous of the rest of the system. Here the representations of logical form
and the thing used to determine the consequence relation are one and the
same.
For similar reasons the necessary truth preservationist approach implic-
itly relies on a relative of CP as an adequacy condition. Preservationist
accounts give a theory of truth and truth preservation for a given class of
utterances C.24 This usually proceeds by offering a mathematical framework
where the truth conditions of utterances and the consequence relation are
represented in a formal system. But regardless of the framework used, the
system’s adequacy is a function of its explanatory power with respect to
class C.25 In particular, a preservationist theory is adequate to the extent that
it captures everything relevant to necessary truth preservation, i.e., consequence.
But again, this is just CP in a slightly different form.
Recall that what intra-theoretic pluralism needs is some common ground
between two logics that is determined independently of the consequence
relation. On a Tarskian approach logical form is the natural candidate, but
it turns out that our adequacy conditions for logical form are not independ-
ent of a particular consequence relation. On a preservationist approach,
which es­hews the fundamentality of logical constants for consequence,
it is the theory of truth (often given in terms of model theory of some kind)
which plays this role. Preservationist accounts in general define the conse-
quence relation as something which preserves some property. In truth theo-
retic cases, that property is truth. However, what counts as truth can also
be determined by what it is that a truth preservationist account preserves.

 She does go on to show how one can develop a theory of argument schema which is
23

a more traditional representation of argument form.

24
 Cf. Payette and Schotch (2007).
25
 Cf. Payette and Wyatt (forthcoming).
 Logical Pluralism and Logical Form  39

Think of the example of SK3 and LP above. They are both truth preserva-
tionist accounts of consequence, but what counts as truth in the underlying
semantics is different. Thus, the adequacy conditions for those truth theories
also depend upon a particular account of consequence.

6. Pluralism in the light of Church’s Principle

Suppose we want to evaluate the claim that f captures the logical form
of u. The upshot of the discussion so far is that, regardless of the nature of f,
we need two other pieces of information. First, we need some pre-theoretic
idea of the logical relations between the utterances, and second we need a
theory of the relationships between the f s. The claim that f captures u will
be satisfactory to the extent that the theory matches with the pre-theoretic
intuitions.
What emerges from our discussion is that evaluation and justification of
systems of logical analysis must be understood holistically: the adequacy
of each part of a logical system L, ,T  with respect to a reference class
C depends upon the interrelations of the parts. At the end of section 4 we
observed that Church shares this view of logic.
Whatever the meanings of the operators in LP, they are the same no mat-
ter what mathematical treatment of the logic we use. What makes one logic
different from another logic is that the extensions of the consequence rela-
tions are different (up to isomorphism in some sense). A symbol has a
particular meaning in a system because it represents something which matters
to consequence in that system. Minimalism and intra-theoretic pluralism
justify claims about sameness of meaning on the basis of overlap between
the mathematical treatments of logical operators combined with agreement
on the assignment of formulas to utterances. But systems are holistic and
logical form only makes sense within the context of a system of analysis.
Hence, sub-components of mathematical models cannot reasonably be
taken to have significance in isolation. And ipso facto, the logical forms for
SK3 and LP are different even if they can be given an overlapping math-
ematical treatment.
If intra-theoretic pluralism were the best hope for avoiding the charge of
meaning variance, the outlook for real logical disagreement, and thus for
logical pluralism, might seem bleak. Our arguments support the view that
logical form is a system relative notion, and furthermore, that logical sys-
tems can only be evaluated and compared holistically. Attempts to explicate
these disagree­ments in terms of shared notions of logical form—and in
particular in terms of agreement about the meanings of logical operators
and the logical forms of natural language utterances—are futile in light of
system relativity and holism.
40 Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette

But it seems clear that there are genuine disagreements in logic. Mini-
malism and intra-theoretic pluralism attempt to defend this truism against
the charge that all disagreements are merely verbal in nature. But their
approach makes methodological assumptions that are problematic.
CP is implicit in our logical methodology. Once we make it explicit we
see why connective meaning seems so important. According to CP, logical
forms must contain all the vehicles of consequence. The mathematical
methodology of contemporary logic is to represent logical forms with
­formulas, and the con­sequence relevant parts of formulas are the logical
operators. Formulas are parts of formal languages, and intuitively terms
are the same in languages when they have the same meanings. So in order
to meaningfully disagree about con­sequence, two logics would have to
give the same meanings to the logical op­erators, but disagree on their
consequences.
This focus on the logical operators distracts us from seeing the scope and
nature of real disagreement between logics. Suppose, for a moment, that
the classicist and the intuitionist accept the claim that they are talking past
each other (changing the subject!) and allow that there are two kinds of
negation, disjunction, etc. This will not, contra the claim of merely verbal
disagreement, actually dissolve the dispute. The intuitionist will continue
to maintain that classical negation does not matter to consequence, and the
classicist will say the same about intuitionist negation.
This point about the nature of logical disagreement was actually clearly
seen by Quine, if not more generally. He writes “the intuitionist should not
be viewed as controverting us as to the true laws of certain fixed logical
operations, namely negation and alternation. He should be viewed rather as
opposing our negation and alternation as unscientific ideas, and propounding
certain other ideas, somewhat analogous, of his own” (Quine 1986, 87). Of
course Quine was no pluralist—he took it for granted that not both intuition-
ist and classical logic could be properly scientific ideas, and advocated the
cause of the latter strenuously. But there is nothing about this conception of
logical disagreement as involving two or more largely incomparable systems
of logical analysis that precludes the possibility of multiple correct systems.
The minimalist and the intra-theoretic pluralist attempt to meet the charge
of merely-verbal disagreement on its own grounds; accepting the claim that
logical disagreement must, if it is to exist at all, take the form of disagree-
ment with respect to some common pool of logical operators. But framed
this way, as we have seen, the problem is insoluble. On our view we should
instead reject the terms of the debate.
The way to resolve this problem is to view competing logical systems
as competing research programs in science. We will not give a recipe for
how to compare research programs in logic. We will simply say that inso-
far as comparisons between research programs in science are generally
 Logical Pluralism and Logical Form  41

possible, the compar­isons between research programs in logic are also

possible. The adequacy of logical systems and the adequacy of compari-
sons between logical systems will have their own idiosyncrasies as with
other sciences. But the fundamental ob­servation is that this situation is
consistent with there being multiple adequate theories and with them being
comparable.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the referees for this journal and the audience at
the 2015 meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy at McMaster University
for help­ful comments and discussion. We would also like to thank Patrick
Allo for his helpful comments. Gillman Payette would like to acknowledge
the support of this research from the Killam foundation through a Killam
postdoctoral fellow­ship, and from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada through a Banting postdoctoral fellowship.

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Nicole Wyatt
University of Calgary
nicole.wyatt@ucalgary.ca
www.nicolewyatt.net

Gillman Payette
University of British Columbia
gpayette@dal.ca